4
50
763
-
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a9d5b0ba4c3a697082adf96f9236a26a
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Text
SLOVAKIA
31
DECLARATION
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF
SWVAK DESCENT MAY 24-25, 1954,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WE - the participants of the National Conference of
Americans of Slovak descent, sponsored by the Slovak
League of America at Washington, D. C., May 24-25, 1954
- do solemnly and unanimously declare:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of our
American Democracy - the principles upon which our
United States of America was founded and which made it
the greatest democratic country in the world.
2. Our primary interest is the welfare and security of
the United States of America.
3. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and
conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political
system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement.
We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and
out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to
persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at
our command until the plague of Communism is completely
wiped off the face of the earth .
4. We cannot sU1bscribe to the policy that doing business with the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best
interests of the welfare and security of the United States
and the free world.
5. The ''Council of Free Czechoslovakia" does not express the political will of the Slovak nation or the will of the
Slovaks in exile. The Slovak members ("Czech" Slovaks)
of the Council are individuals who either did not get a mandate from the Slovak nation, or betrayed it by collaborating
with communists and the Sovi6}t Union.
We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official
and private American institutions desiring any information
�32
SLOVAKIA
on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the
Slovak League of America, an Amelticfu illSltitution which
since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation.
Another organization worthy of consultation in the
matter of the problems of the Slovak nation is the Slovak
National Council Abroad whose leadership and membership
~epreserits the majority o.f the Slovak exiles.
6. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our
Government, its agencies and Congressional Comrriitt~ to
ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements,
specifically all communists and fellow~travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy.
All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly
give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism,
should be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of
our Government.
7. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity
in all countries of the world, as far as is humanly possible.
The UNO at the present time is not really an organization
of United Nations, but an organization of Governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and the national interests of the nations they
claim to represent.
8. We subscribe wholeheartedly to the principle that
a.11 nations have the right to determine by their own free
choice the state or form of political organization under
which they wish to live. The principle of self-determination
- the fundamental principle of American policy in Europe
since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson must apply without reservations even to the Slovak nation
from .which we are descended.
9. We endorse the principle that the Government of
the United States shall refuse to recognize any government
imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power
and urge that this principle be made operative even in the
case of the Slovak nation, which is in fact dominated today
�SLOVAKIA
33
by the . Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in violation of
the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and the fundamental principle of American policy of self-determination.
10. The independent Slovak Republic, established by the
duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation on March
14, 1939, should not have been destroyed by the victorious
allied Nations without consulting the will of the Slovak nation. We, therefore, respectfully request the President of the
U. S. and the Congress to instruct our delegate to the United
Nations Organization to request an investigation by the
UNO of the destruction of the Slovak Republic.
11. We furthermo.re , respectfully petition the President of the U. S. and the Congress to voice a strong protest
against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and political
leaders by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague.
12. As Christians and adherents of the democratic
way of life, we resolutely oppose the domination and exploitation of any nation by any other nation or political state.
The Slovak nation did not want to be dominated by the Magyars prior to 1918 and, today, does not want to be ruled by
the Czech nation. We firmly believe that the national existence and the welfare of the Slovruk nation can best be safeguarded by the Slovaks themselves in their own Slovak
Republic.
13. We seek no special favors or grants for the nation
we are descended from. We only plead for the recognition
of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because it cannot voice itself freely today. These rights are
predicated on the elementary democratic and Christian principle that all peoples, wherever they may be found and however few their numbers, are morally entitled to speak in the
council- of nations, there to defend the rights of their nation to survival and self-fulfillment.
14. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings ("Czech"
Slovaks), now organized in various Czech and "Czechoslovak" organizations, do not represent the political will of the
�34
SLOVAKIA
Slovak nation and, therefore, have no authority to speak for
the Slovaks anywhere. One such organization, the "Council
of Free Czechoslovakia," purports to be an organization of
''anti-communist, democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slova:kia,
but is, in fact, an organization controlled by Czechs who
were members of the communist-dominated "National
Front" government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald, which collaborated closely with the Soviet Union and
outlawed all anti-socialistic and anti-communistic parties in
Czecho-Slovakia. The leading members of this Council should
be recognized for what they really were in their homeland:
promoters of socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the
Czech socialists a nd communists.
(Signatures:)
P. A. Hrobak, Jacob J. Kocis, Julia Krajcovic, Milan V.
Blazek, Frantisek Hrusovsky, t Theodore G. Kojis, O.S.B.,
Abbot, P. Jamriska, Msgr. F. J. Dubosh, Joseph G. Prusa,
John J. Sirotnak, Julius A. Janci, Stephanie 0. Husek, Peter
P. Hletko M.D., George P. Baluh, Stephen J. Tkach, M. J.
Wargovich, Helen Kocan, Gabriela I. Vavrek, Frank J.
Gurcak, Rev. Cyril M. Orendac, Karol Piacek, Frank Bobus,
Marge Bleskan, Jozef A. Mikus, Mary Koenig, Victoria Lunter, Veronica Ginovsky, Maria Kolesar, Anna M. Sotak, John
Lafko, Edward Alexovic, John P. Stankovic, M. F. Gajdos,
Marge Bleskan, Anna Mae Hutira, Bridget Alexovic, George
S. Luba O.S.B., Rev. Michael M. Tondra, Rev. Casimir
Cvercko, Rev. John E. Senglar D.S.L., Susan Matuscak,
Martin Kopunek, John A. Kanuck, Anna E. Kanuck, Rev.
Augustine J. Zan, Rev. Max. Chladny-Hanos S.T.D., Frank
Tartal, Mary Luchansky, Matej Varga, Steve S. Koenig,
John J. Rozboril, Mary Janci, Joseph Bransky, Stefan Klucar,
Bernadina Hanuscin, Helen Kudlac, Maria Walovich, Rev.
Joseph Chochula, Rev. Alfons Vercek, Rev. Charles J. Florek,
Paul C. Kazimer, Jan Beliansky, Stefan Hodos, M. J. Bosak,
�SLOVAKIA
35
Jozef Pauco, Vojtech Balaz, Frank Deviatka, Method M.
Balco, Juraj Getlik, Anton Moravcik, Otto Klement, Mike
Soyka Sr., Joseph Stanek, Dr. Rudolph Medlen, Mary
Student, Stephen Student, Gabriel Lantos, Andrew Welchek,
Simon Siranec, Blase Dvorsky, Michal Rak, Veronica Janci,
Anna M. Kocur, Irene F. Kocur, Anna V. Kocur, Mary
Welchek, Irene Halac, Terezia Ondriska, Anna Vizza, Susanna
K.lucar, Veronica Patala, Julia P. Benya.
•
•
•
ADDRESS OF PHILIP A. HROBAK,
PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, DELIVERED
AT THE INFORMAL DINNER OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF AMERICANS OF SLOVAK DESCENT, WASHINGTON HOTEL,
MAY 24, 1954
As citizens of the United States of America we firmly
hold to the belief that all nations without exception have the
inherent, God-given right to freedom and independence, the
right to establish their own political state and to freely
elect a govern.men t of their own choice.
On March 14, 1939, after over ten centuries of alien
domination, the Slovak nation exercised its inherent right
when its duly elected representatives in the Bratislava Assembly of autonomous Slovakia proclaimed the independence
of the land the Slovaks had occupied for 1500 years and
established the Republic of Slovakia. Of course, certain people in America present this historical fact in a false light
and attempt to debase and vilify everything connected with
it. But the utterly simple historical truth is that the Slovak
Assembly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an
independent republic.
Independent Slovakia, the dream of Slova;k generations,
did become a reality and was thoroughly enjoyed by the
Slovak people, even though it was short-lived (1939-1945).
And it is significant even today that the Slovak Republic
was recognized by twenty-seven countries, includmg Great
Britain, France, Japan, and even the Soviet Union. Natu-
�
SLOVAKIA
31
DECLARATION
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF
SWVAK DESCENT MAY 24-25, 1954,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WE - the participants of the National Conference of
Americans of Slovak descent, sponsored by the Slovak
League of America at Washington, D. C., May 24-25, 1954
- do solemnly and unanimously declare:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of our
American Democracy - the principles upon which our
United States of America was founded and which made it
the greatest democratic country in the world.
2. Our primary interest is the welfare and security of
the United States of America.
3. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and
conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political
system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement.
We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and
out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to
persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at
our command until the plague of Communism is completely
wiped off the face of the earth .
4. We cannot sU1bscribe to the policy that doing business with the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best
interests of the welfare and security of the United States
and the free world.
5. The ''Council of Free Czechoslovakia" does not express the political will of the Slovak nation or the will of the
Slovaks in exile. The Slovak members ("Czech" Slovaks)
of the Council are individuals who either did not get a mandate from the Slovak nation, or betrayed it by collaborating
with communists and the Sovi6}t Union.
We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official
and private American institutions desiring any information
�32
SLOVAKIA
on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the
Slovak League of America, an Amelticfu illSltitution which
since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation.
Another organization worthy of consultation in the
matter of the problems of the Slovak nation is the Slovak
National Council Abroad whose leadership and membership
~epreserits the majority o.f the Slovak exiles.
6. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our
Government, its agencies and Congressional Comrriitt~ to
ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements,
specifically all communists and fellow~travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy.
All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly
give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism,
should be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of
our Government.
7. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity
in all countries of the world, as far as is humanly possible.
The UNO at the present time is not really an organization
of United Nations, but an organization of Governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and the national interests of the nations they
claim to represent.
8. We subscribe wholeheartedly to the principle that
a.11 nations have the right to determine by their own free
choice the state or form of political organization under
which they wish to live. The principle of self-determination
- the fundamental principle of American policy in Europe
since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson must apply without reservations even to the Slovak nation
from .which we are descended.
9. We endorse the principle that the Government of
the United States shall refuse to recognize any government
imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power
and urge that this principle be made operative even in the
case of the Slovak nation, which is in fact dominated today
�SLOVAKIA
33
by the . Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in violation of
the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and the fundamental principle of American policy of self-determination.
10. The independent Slovak Republic, established by the
duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation on March
14, 1939, should not have been destroyed by the victorious
allied Nations without consulting the will of the Slovak nation. We, therefore, respectfully request the President of the
U. S. and the Congress to instruct our delegate to the United
Nations Organization to request an investigation by the
UNO of the destruction of the Slovak Republic.
11. We furthermo.re , respectfully petition the President of the U. S. and the Congress to voice a strong protest
against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and political
leaders by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague.
12. As Christians and adherents of the democratic
way of life, we resolutely oppose the domination and exploitation of any nation by any other nation or political state.
The Slovak nation did not want to be dominated by the Magyars prior to 1918 and, today, does not want to be ruled by
the Czech nation. We firmly believe that the national existence and the welfare of the Slovruk nation can best be safeguarded by the Slovaks themselves in their own Slovak
Republic.
13. We seek no special favors or grants for the nation
we are descended from. We only plead for the recognition
of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because it cannot voice itself freely today. These rights are
predicated on the elementary democratic and Christian principle that all peoples, wherever they may be found and however few their numbers, are morally entitled to speak in the
council- of nations, there to defend the rights of their nation to survival and self-fulfillment.
14. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings ("Czech"
Slovaks), now organized in various Czech and "Czechoslovak" organizations, do not represent the political will of the
�34
SLOVAKIA
Slovak nation and, therefore, have no authority to speak for
the Slovaks anywhere. One such organization, the "Council
of Free Czechoslovakia," purports to be an organization of
''anti-communist, democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slova:kia,
but is, in fact, an organization controlled by Czechs who
were members of the communist-dominated "National
Front" government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald, which collaborated closely with the Soviet Union and
outlawed all anti-socialistic and anti-communistic parties in
Czecho-Slovakia. The leading members of this Council should
be recognized for what they really were in their homeland:
promoters of socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the
Czech socialists a nd communists.
(Signatures:)
P. A. Hrobak, Jacob J. Kocis, Julia Krajcovic, Milan V.
Blazek, Frantisek Hrusovsky, t Theodore G. Kojis, O.S.B.,
Abbot, P. Jamriska, Msgr. F. J. Dubosh, Joseph G. Prusa,
John J. Sirotnak, Julius A. Janci, Stephanie 0. Husek, Peter
P. Hletko M.D., George P. Baluh, Stephen J. Tkach, M. J.
Wargovich, Helen Kocan, Gabriela I. Vavrek, Frank J.
Gurcak, Rev. Cyril M. Orendac, Karol Piacek, Frank Bobus,
Marge Bleskan, Jozef A. Mikus, Mary Koenig, Victoria Lunter, Veronica Ginovsky, Maria Kolesar, Anna M. Sotak, John
Lafko, Edward Alexovic, John P. Stankovic, M. F. Gajdos,
Marge Bleskan, Anna Mae Hutira, Bridget Alexovic, George
S. Luba O.S.B., Rev. Michael M. Tondra, Rev. Casimir
Cvercko, Rev. John E. Senglar D.S.L., Susan Matuscak,
Martin Kopunek, John A. Kanuck, Anna E. Kanuck, Rev.
Augustine J. Zan, Rev. Max. Chladny-Hanos S.T.D., Frank
Tartal, Mary Luchansky, Matej Varga, Steve S. Koenig,
John J. Rozboril, Mary Janci, Joseph Bransky, Stefan Klucar,
Bernadina Hanuscin, Helen Kudlac, Maria Walovich, Rev.
Joseph Chochula, Rev. Alfons Vercek, Rev. Charles J. Florek,
Paul C. Kazimer, Jan Beliansky, Stefan Hodos, M. J. Bosak,
�SLOVAKIA
35
Jozef Pauco, Vojtech Balaz, Frank Deviatka, Method M.
Balco, Juraj Getlik, Anton Moravcik, Otto Klement, Mike
Soyka Sr., Joseph Stanek, Dr. Rudolph Medlen, Mary
Student, Stephen Student, Gabriel Lantos, Andrew Welchek,
Simon Siranec, Blase Dvorsky, Michal Rak, Veronica Janci,
Anna M. Kocur, Irene F. Kocur, Anna V. Kocur, Mary
Welchek, Irene Halac, Terezia Ondriska, Anna Vizza, Susanna
K.lucar, Veronica Patala, Julia P. Benya.
•
•
•
ADDRESS OF PHILIP A. HROBAK,
PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, DELIVERED
AT THE INFORMAL DINNER OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF AMERICANS OF SLOVAK DESCENT, WASHINGTON HOTEL,
MAY 24, 1954
As citizens of the United States of America we firmly
hold to the belief that all nations without exception have the
inherent, God-given right to freedom and independence, the
right to establish their own political state and to freely
elect a govern.men t of their own choice.
On March 14, 1939, after over ten centuries of alien
domination, the Slovak nation exercised its inherent right
when its duly elected representatives in the Bratislava Assembly of autonomous Slovakia proclaimed the independence
of the land the Slovaks had occupied for 1500 years and
established the Republic of Slovakia. Of course, certain people in America present this historical fact in a false light
and attempt to debase and vilify everything connected with
it. But the utterly simple historical truth is that the Slovak
Assembly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an
independent republic.
Independent Slovakia, the dream of Slova;k generations,
did become a reality and was thoroughly enjoyed by the
Slovak people, even though it was short-lived (1939-1945).
And it is significant even today that the Slovak Republic
was recognized by twenty-seven countries, includmg Great
Britain, France, Japan, and even the Soviet Union. Natu-
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
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Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
31
DECLARATION
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICANS OF
SWVAK DESCENT MAY 24-25, 1954,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
WE - the participants of the National Conference of
Americans of Slovak descent, sponsored by the Slovak
League of America at Washington, D. C., May 24-25, 1954
- do solemnly and unanimously declare:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of our
American Democracy - the principles upon which our
United States of America was founded and which made it
the greatest democratic country in the world.
2. Our primary interest is the welfare and security of
the United States of America.
3. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarian political system. We recognize the Godless philosophy of materialistic Communism as the dread evil and
conspiracy against free humanity that it is, as a political
system which threatens mankind with utter enslavement.
We have fought consistently and resolutely against it in and
out of season and, today, are more determined than ever to
persevere in our fight against it with all possible means at
our command until the plague of Communism is completely
wiped off the face of the earth .
4. We cannot sU1bscribe to the policy that doing business with the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best
interests of the welfare and security of the United States
and the free world.
5. The ''Council of Free Czechoslovakia" does not express the political will of the Slovak nation or the will of the
Slovaks in exile. The Slovak members ("Czech" Slovaks)
of the Council are individuals who either did not get a mandate from the Slovak nation, or betrayed it by collaborating
with communists and the Sovi6}t Union.
We strongly recommend that all official, semi-official
and private American institutions desiring any information
32
SLOVAKIA
on problems affecting the Slovak nation, consult with the
Slovak League of America, an Amelticfu illSltitution which
since 1907 has been advancing the cause of freedom and national rights of the Slovak nation.
Another organization worthy of consultation in the
matter of the problems of the Slovak nation is the Slovak
National Council Abroad whose leadership and membership
~epreserits the majority o.f the Slovak exiles.
6. We heartily commend all efforts on the part of our
Government, its agencies and Congressional Comrriitt~ to
ferret out, unmask and prosecute all subversive elements,
specifically all communists and fellow~travelers, which propagate class hatreds, economic strife, chaos and anarchy.
All persons and organizations, who wittingly or unwittingly
give aid and comfort to the conspiracy of Communism,
should be thoroughly investigated by the proper organs of
our Government.
7. We approve the idea of a United Nations Organization which shall promote and preserve peace and prosperity
in all countries of the world, as far as is humanly possible.
The UNO at the present time is not really an organization
of United Nations, but an organization of Governments, several of which definitely are not representative of the political will and the national interests of the nations they
claim to represent.
8. We subscribe wholeheartedly to the principle that
a.11 nations have the right to determine by their own free
choice the state or form of political organization under
which they wish to live. The principle of self-determination
- the fundamental principle of American policy in Europe
since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson must apply without reservations even to the Slovak nation
from .which we are descended.
9. We endorse the principle that the Government of
the United States shall refuse to recognize any government
imposed upon any nation by the force of an alien power
and urge that this principle be made operative even in the
case of the Slovak nation, which is in fact dominated today
SLOVAKIA
33
by the . Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in violation of
the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and the fundamental principle of American policy of self-determination.
10. The independent Slovak Republic, established by the
duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation on March
14, 1939, should not have been destroyed by the victorious
allied Nations without consulting the will of the Slovak nation. We, therefore, respectfully request the President of the
U. S. and the Congress to instruct our delegate to the United
Nations Organization to request an investigation by the
UNO of the destruction of the Slovak Republic.
11. We furthermo.re , respectfully petition the President of the U. S. and the Congress to voice a strong protest
against the violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and political
leaders by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague.
12. As Christians and adherents of the democratic
way of life, we resolutely oppose the domination and exploitation of any nation by any other nation or political state.
The Slovak nation did not want to be dominated by the Magyars prior to 1918 and, today, does not want to be ruled by
the Czech nation. We firmly believe that the national existence and the welfare of the Slovruk nation can best be safeguarded by the Slovaks themselves in their own Slovak
Republic.
13. We seek no special favors or grants for the nation
we are descended from. We only plead for the recognition
of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because it cannot voice itself freely today. These rights are
predicated on the elementary democratic and Christian principle that all peoples, wherever they may be found and however few their numbers, are morally entitled to speak in the
council- of nations, there to defend the rights of their nation to survival and self-fulfillment.
14. The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings ("Czech"
Slovaks), now organized in various Czech and "Czechoslovak" organizations, do not represent the political will of the
34
SLOVAKIA
Slovak nation and, therefore, have no authority to speak for
the Slovaks anywhere. One such organization, the "Council
of Free Czechoslovakia," purports to be an organization of
''anti-communist, democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slova:kia,
but is, in fact, an organization controlled by Czechs who
were members of the communist-dominated "National
Front" government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald, which collaborated closely with the Soviet Union and
outlawed all anti-socialistic and anti-communistic parties in
Czecho-Slovakia. The leading members of this Council should
be recognized for what they really were in their homeland:
promoters of socialism and the pro-Soviet policy of the
Czech socialists a nd communists.
(Signatures:)
P. A. Hrobak, Jacob J. Kocis, Julia Krajcovic, Milan V.
Blazek, Frantisek Hrusovsky, t Theodore G. Kojis, O.S.B.,
Abbot, P. Jamriska, Msgr. F. J. Dubosh, Joseph G. Prusa,
John J. Sirotnak, Julius A. Janci, Stephanie 0. Husek, Peter
P. Hletko M.D., George P. Baluh, Stephen J. Tkach, M. J.
Wargovich, Helen Kocan, Gabriela I. Vavrek, Frank J.
Gurcak, Rev. Cyril M. Orendac, Karol Piacek, Frank Bobus,
Marge Bleskan, Jozef A. Mikus, Mary Koenig, Victoria Lunter, Veronica Ginovsky, Maria Kolesar, Anna M. Sotak, John
Lafko, Edward Alexovic, John P. Stankovic, M. F. Gajdos,
Marge Bleskan, Anna Mae Hutira, Bridget Alexovic, George
S. Luba O.S.B., Rev. Michael M. Tondra, Rev. Casimir
Cvercko, Rev. John E. Senglar D.S.L., Susan Matuscak,
Martin Kopunek, John A. Kanuck, Anna E. Kanuck, Rev.
Augustine J. Zan, Rev. Max. Chladny-Hanos S.T.D., Frank
Tartal, Mary Luchansky, Matej Varga, Steve S. Koenig,
John J. Rozboril, Mary Janci, Joseph Bransky, Stefan Klucar,
Bernadina Hanuscin, Helen Kudlac, Maria Walovich, Rev.
Joseph Chochula, Rev. Alfons Vercek, Rev. Charles J. Florek,
Paul C. Kazimer, Jan Beliansky, Stefan Hodos, M. J. Bosak,
SLOVAKIA
35
Jozef Pauco, Vojtech Balaz, Frank Deviatka, Method M.
Balco, Juraj Getlik, Anton Moravcik, Otto Klement, Mike
Soyka Sr., Joseph Stanek, Dr. Rudolph Medlen, Mary
Student, Stephen Student, Gabriel Lantos, Andrew Welchek,
Simon Siranec, Blase Dvorsky, Michal Rak, Veronica Janci,
Anna M. Kocur, Irene F. Kocur, Anna V. Kocur, Mary
Welchek, Irene Halac, Terezia Ondriska, Anna Vizza, Susanna
K.lucar, Veronica Patala, Julia P. Benya.
•
•
•
ADDRESS OF PHILIP A. HROBAK,
PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, DELIVERED
AT THE INFORMAL DINNER OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF AMERICANS OF SLOVAK DESCENT, WASHINGTON HOTEL,
MAY 24, 1954
As citizens of the United States of America we firmly
hold to the belief that all nations without exception have the
inherent, God-given right to freedom and independence, the
right to establish their own political state and to freely
elect a govern.men t of their own choice.
On March 14, 1939, after over ten centuries of alien
domination, the Slovak nation exercised its inherent right
when its duly elected representatives in the Bratislava Assembly of autonomous Slovakia proclaimed the independence
of the land the Slovaks had occupied for 1500 years and
established the Republic of Slovakia. Of course, certain people in America present this historical fact in a false light
and attempt to debase and vilify everything connected with
it. But the utterly simple historical truth is that the Slovak
Assembly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an
independent republic.
Independent Slovakia, the dream of Slova;k generations,
did become a reality and was thoroughly enjoyed by the
Slovak people, even though it was short-lived (1939-1945).
And it is significant even today that the Slovak Republic
was recognized by twenty-seven countries, includmg Great
Britain, France, Japan, and even the Soviet Union. Natu-
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Title
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Declaration of the National Conference of Americans of Slovak Descent - May 24-25,1954, Washington, D.C.
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954
pp. 31-35
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3e2582aad377e8e73aa9fb6c56175b31.pdf
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PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more.
I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and
satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and
re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I
had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing
the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police
guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without
fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my
only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y
the peace and security of a great democratic country.
• • •
TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Dr. Arved Grebert
When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary
a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate
from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia.
The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in
the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its
mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as
weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always
tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the
Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical
aspirations and plans.
"The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin"
From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most
natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against
the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent
its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the
west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the
second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely
even with a relatively small number of people and arms.
�SLOVAKIA
25
The thi:ok forests provide excellent nests of resistance
again.st an aggressor. SlovaJkia is an ideal natwral fort~;
it is a "Gi!braltar of the Darmlbe Basin."
From the most ancient times, the southern and southwestern regions of this natural fortress formed one of the
most important strategic places orf Europe. These regions,
especiaJlly the landis on both ·banks of the Danube, represented from time immemorial a part of the territory, which
the Czech military theoreti~ian, Colonel E. Morruvec, charactenized as the "g,reatest strategic crossroads orf Central Europe ." On the ban:ks of the Danwbe, between the mouth
of the Lpel Rirver and Vienna, there existed the territory
from the ages where, on the one side, there met the imperialistic pressure of the German wo:rld, coming from the
W~t, with the pressure of the Mongols, which came from
the Russian steppes (thrrough the Uz Pass), and, on the
other side, the pressure coming from the No!rlh through the
Moravian Gate against the pressure of the Italian ipeninsula
(The Romans) am.d the Balikans (Byzantium; the Turks).
During fiive centuries, it was on the central Danube
that the Romans defended ancient civiilization against the
world orf "barbarians" ; it was there that the wild Huns to•r e
into the heart olf Euroipe; it was there that the Flrruniks
clashed with the .AJvars and, in the ninth centucy the German world with the Slovanic world; it was ,t here tl)at the
nomaru.c Magyars and the Tatars attacked the Christian
civilization of western Europe; and it was th,rowgh th~re
that just recently one of the currents of Asiatic lbolshe:vism
poured into IDurorpe.
"Nowhere else was the land of Eurnpe so satwated with
blood," wrote Colonel Moraivec, "as it wais in the lowlands
which extend on iboth sides of the Danu'be. There most of the
nations were. exchaniged, ,t here it was that the pressure was
the greatest am.d !borders changed most frequently." This
territory is reaUy "the crosS1road of pressure of the imperialistic forces of IDurope." (See: E. Moravec : La V aleur
straregique de la Tchecoslovaquie pour fEurope Oooidentale;
Prague, 1938; p. 10).
From the aibove it follows that the Slovaks occupy a tet-
�26
SLOVAKIA
ritory whose strategic importiamce is far greater than its silZe
and the numlber of its in:haibirtaints. We shall see that even
more clearly id: we at least 1b riefly dndicate what the occupation of this territory means for its ne~ghbors.
Why the Neighbors are Interested
Whil.e the Slovruks are firmly propped against rvalleys
and slopes of this natura!l mountam fortress , the Magyars,
Poles rund Ozechs occupy the lowlands, which do not afford
them ainy kind of natural protection agaiinst ipossilble attacks
from their neighibors. It is, therefore, only natural, that Magyar, Czech and Po.lish imperialists saw and still see in Slovrukia an important defensive bastion, which could serve
them well in the event of an enemy attack.
For the Ozechs. the domination of Slovakia means
rubove all else protection against the everlasting German
pressll!I'e which is .s queezing them liike pincers from three
sides. 'Dhe Magyars see in Slovrukia from the militrury standpoint a real defensirve wall against the constant pressure of
the Slovanic world. For the Poles the domination of SlOIVakia would represent a real cover-uip for their baciks against
possilble attaclks, which have come so often in their history
from the East and the West, from Germany and Russia. For
the Polish imperialists Slovaikia would aiso mean access to
the Drunulbe, whi:ch in turn wol.l!ld mean increasing the influence of Poland in the Danulbe basin. Poland, held in the pincers of two colossi, the German and the Russli,an, only by
coming into the DanUJbe region could become a real " European Great Power," whfoh is the open am'bition of the
Polish adherents of this policy.
From the economic standpoint, Slovakia means much
for the surrounding nations. Not only as a market far their
industry, but also as a source of ram materials. For the Magyars the forest wealth of Slovrulcia, the natural conditions
for the development of industry (mineral wealth, wood, water power, coal) are a valuruble adjund to the agricultural
regions of the Magyar lowlands. Slovrukia served as a market for Ozech industrial products, which annuailly "if we
figure consei,vati'Vely" - to use the words of Dr. Kazwas "amounted to rupproximately 1100-1200 million Czecho-Slo1
�27
SLOVAKIA
va,k Crowns ( 37 -40 million dollars) ." Slorv,aJkia meant more
for the Owchs than Hungary (1005 million crowns), Poland
(625 million crowns), Ru1mania (596 million crowns), Ita:ly
( 491 million crowns), etc. Ozecho-1Slovakia expovted more
only to Germany, Austria, Y,u gosla,via and IDngla,nd (from
the official statistics of 1930).
From the stamdipoint of ,production of the Ozech lands,
Slovakia was also a more important maI1ket than the foreign
marlcets, ibecaUJSe it meant a market protected by a customs
(tax) lb order, that is, a mrurlket which brings higher prices
(see: Kanvas, ":Sjednocooi vyrdbnich podmin~ v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku," Pra;gue, 1933, pp. 80, 1'18). For Czech
imperialists holding onto Slorvaik,i a meant a lso an access to
the free Danulbe, in other words, not only an open door to
the Danube Basin, ibut also· to the Balikans. In a free Europe
the Danulbe is a free river, which means concretely that it
opened the door for Ozeoh industria,l ;products directly not
only into all the Danulbian states, but also to the coastal
states of the Bla:ck Sea and the Mediterranean. For Poland,
the domina,tioo of Slov-aJkfa from the economic standpoint
would mean the same thing.
F:rom the aibove facts -w hich represent only a few of the
m~ interests of the neighlbors of Sfovaikia, it is obvious
that the imperialistic linterests of the Ozechs, Poles and Magyars clash in Slovakia.
1
The Consequences of Dominating Slovakia
The domination of Slova:kia .b y one of her neighbors, however, also presents a threat to the remainmg nations of this
region. The domination oif SlOIVa.lkia by the Czechs is aga;inst
the interests of Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Croatians,
Ruthenians and Slovenes. Having the Ozeohs on the Danube
meams a Czecho-Russian aHiance to the Poles, Orech canons
only 35 kilometers f,r om Budaipest, a reviva!l orf Ozech imperurlism ,m the eyes of the Germans and a tool of other imperialisms, the daillger of cultural and economical Ozechlzation of Ruthenia, and indirectly the reviival of Sel'\bian imperfalism. in the eyes of the Croatians and Slovenes. The
dominaition of SlovaJk,ia by the Magyars is aigainst the interests of the Ruma.mans, Czechs, Seoos, Ruthenians, Poles and
�28
SLOVAKIA
Germans-. 'It wouJd mean suppressing the Czechs into an interila.tioo.allry political provincialism, a strengthening of- Magyar pressure against the Rurrrania:ns, Croatians, Slovenes
and Serl>s, bloclcinig the Polii.Sih penetration to the South. A
Slova:kia doniinated hy Poland wouJd be rugainst the interests
of the. Oze,chs, Magyars, Rutheniains and Germans. Harving
the Poles on the DanuJbe would mean insignirficwnce and .political sUJppression of the Czechs and Magyars in the Danube
Basin. Domination oif SlovakJa either 1b y ibhe Germans or the
Russians wowld be directly against the vital interests of all
other nations of this region. It would really mean the first
step towrurd the domination of the whole of Central Europe
by one of the great powers, the result of which would ,be the
brealking up of the balance of power not only in this area,
but also on the entire Euro1pean continent, together with
fear-reaching consequences em~mating therefrom .
And similarply even from the narrower viewpoint of the
Central-European :firamework, judging what the domination
of Slovakia by ariy of its neighibo;ios wo,uld mean, at first
glance it is quite Olbvious that it would mean. :the dest.Tuction of the 'b alance of power in this area, which wou~d bear
with itself the seeds of discontent, pressures and arguments,
that it prepares the conditions for the insterference and influence oif power interests outside the area, which in the final
restrlts are always harmful to all the nations of this region.
SlOIV'rukia wouJd always be a too great and quite an indigestible ,prey whether in the stomach of the Czech, Maigyar, or
Po~~ imiperialism. ·F orcefully dominating ,SlovaJkia would
b'ting them · more dangers than advantages, especially in
times· of crises. SlavaJkia in reality would be for them not
a: defen:sd'Ve position, but a "Trodan horse" in the service of
their . enemies. 'I'he events of March 1939 illustrated this
clea'.il'ly to the Ozechs.
The Real Interest of All
iFfowevef, an independent Slovakia · is not against the
just interests of any orf its neighlbors or any other state.
Coruversely, an independent Slovakia is the reaJ interest of
al!I · her neighbors. Imperialistic phantoms, no matter how
~nticirig; rciiily·-indicate· the road to ca:tastrophy, especially
�SLOVAKIA
29:
when · they are not supported by sufrficient power means.
And this is doubly true for Ozeoh, Magya,r and Polish im-·
peril:!lism, especially when we glance at the goopolitical sit...
uation i~ wh'ich these nations liive.
An i,n.depei:i,dent iSlov.a.kia ~eed not mean a hiindrance to
c_zooh or Poli~!J, econoap.ic products on ~.µeir way to the free.
apd internationa!l Danµibe. Ali these are questi<?ns whlyh
cocld be solved to werybody's . satisfaction with good will ..
And independen~ Sl01Vakia has just as much interest to .de-.
fend .Central Euroipe against a,l,l outside imperialisti<: pres-.
sll!I'e,· :W4ether it carnes from Germany or Russia, as to the
rest of .the nations Oif. this ar~a. Conversely, as an independent state it is a far greater guarantee that it would not be
use<l ~nd .a bused in the interest of foreign imipeTialistic plans
than wh~ it is forced ~ainst its wiU into t_h e fI:~mework of
op,e c;,f its neighibofiing. states. T,he ens1aved . ~nd ~uppressed
always justify their right to "treason" and ~ to valid.a~·
it at t.J?.e first QppOrt.une moment. A Slovalkia dOII'lll.nat.ed py
t.µe ;Magyars, Czechs, or Poles will aa.ways increase ,t he numper p.f .their enemies. A free aJ?.,d ,i_n depe,ndent ~lova.}{ia, l:i,ow~
ever, _wouJd be a real friend.
The Mission of the Slovak State ·
prer~ud.-
An independ~f Slovakia is thus one .of the
sites of the balance oif power in Central Euroipe, which means
peace and tranquility _;_ 'we'1ifare and prosperity in 'this so
~eaivily tried area of Eur01pe. · fiom this ~ewpodnt the_.Slovadc
State .sh8ilf have a signirficant and important mission m·the
Centra;J ...Europea.n area: on its territory can be eliimiriated tme
counter interests of Centro-IDu:ro,pean iinperiaJlisms, which
it would be· pos~ible to replace W:ith cooipera,,tion anq. -m1,1tuw.
understanding. The Slo~k State would par.a il~ ~e~l
dang~o11s and poi&on<>us "srnali" imipema,,lasms jn this so im~
portant -area, which M,ter the .destruction of Soviet' impem~
a_1ism .:WQJtld again attain thek relati,ve impor~e }n.· this
r egion. 'Vherefore, the .e,xiste.Q.<!~ -of an independent \Sl<wa.k
State is not only in the interest of Central Europe, but also
the whole of Europe. Under such circumstances Slovalkia
couM be among the Poles, Czechs and Ma:gyars what Swit.zerland is ,bebween France, Germany and Italy. The relation
�30
SLOVAKIA
of forces is much more against the beneifilt of SW!ita:erland
than it would be in the oase orf SlOIV'akia.
The Slovruk State, therefore, has a signifiicant mission
of consolidat'iing the Central~European Area to promote
peace. An independent Slovak,iia womd neuitralirze P◊lish imperialism tenddng toward the south, Czech iimperialism tendill!g East and MaJgya,r imperia1ism tending North. In thls
manner independent SlovaJkia wouJd be contributing in a
great measuTe to the pacification, consolidation and star
biHzation of the peace prereqwisites of this important region.
At the same time its existence as such would be one of the
fundam.ental piUars orf balance of power in this part of
Europe.
Sta,hllity, consolidation and ba:lance in relation among
the small and larger nations between Germany and Russia
are the conditions for the common defense of th~s especially
imlportant area of Euro1p e by all these nations agamst any
attempt to do1rninate them. Freedom and independence of
this regfon is one of the fundamental oondi tions of European
ba!lance of power and, hence, indirectly even balance of
world power. And tlris area will oniliy then be aJble to defend
itself when alJ the nations of thris area will be interested in
defond!ing the 1:pol!i.tical system instalJed in this area. That
will be olrty ,w hen atll shiaH be free and equal.
The SlOIV'aks inhaJbit a territory that is so important
strategically and geoipollitically that the .nations of this area
cannot be indilfiferent aJbout defending it. The events of 1939
and 1944 proved thls clearly. The Slovaks wiH defend this
area olrly if they are free and independent.
Judging the question on the basis of the aJbove viewpomts, the exd.stence of the SlavaJk State is in the interest
not Olltly of Cent:raJl Europe, but the whole of Europe as
well. During the first World War, Professor A. Denis of the
Unwe11Sity of Paris underatood this cwrectly, pointing out
already 8Jt that time the European significance of the Slova:k
question.
•
•
•
�
SLOVAKIA
Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more.
I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and
satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and
re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I
had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing
the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police
guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without
fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my
only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y
the peace and security of a great democratic country.
• • •
TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Dr. Arved Grebert
When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary
a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate
from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia.
The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in
the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its
mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as
weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always
tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the
Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical
aspirations and plans.
"The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin"
From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most
natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against
the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent
its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the
west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the
second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely
even with a relatively small number of people and arms.
�SLOVAKIA
25
The thi:ok forests provide excellent nests of resistance
again.st an aggressor. SlovaJkia is an ideal natwral fort~;
it is a "Gi!braltar of the Darmlbe Basin."
From the most ancient times, the southern and southwestern regions of this natural fortress formed one of the
most important strategic places orf Europe. These regions,
especiaJlly the landis on both ·banks of the Danube, represented from time immemorial a part of the territory, which
the Czech military theoreti~ian, Colonel E. Morruvec, charactenized as the "g,reatest strategic crossroads orf Central Europe ." On the ban:ks of the Danwbe, between the mouth
of the Lpel Rirver and Vienna, there existed the territory
from the ages where, on the one side, there met the imperialistic pressure of the German wo:rld, coming from the
W~t, with the pressure of the Mongols, which came from
the Russian steppes (thrrough the Uz Pass), and, on the
other side, the pressure coming from the No!rlh through the
Moravian Gate against the pressure of the Italian ipeninsula
(The Romans) am.d the Balikans (Byzantium; the Turks).
During fiive centuries, it was on the central Danube
that the Romans defended ancient civiilization against the
world orf "barbarians" ; it was there that the wild Huns to•r e
into the heart olf Euroipe; it was there that the Flrruniks
clashed with the .AJvars and, in the ninth centucy the German world with the Slovanic world; it was ,t here tl)at the
nomaru.c Magyars and the Tatars attacked the Christian
civilization of western Europe; and it was th,rowgh th~re
that just recently one of the currents of Asiatic lbolshe:vism
poured into IDurorpe.
"Nowhere else was the land of Eurnpe so satwated with
blood," wrote Colonel Moraivec, "as it wais in the lowlands
which extend on iboth sides of the Danu'be. There most of the
nations were. exchaniged, ,t here it was that the pressure was
the greatest am.d !borders changed most frequently." This
territory is reaUy "the crosS1road of pressure of the imperialistic forces of IDurope." (See: E. Moravec : La V aleur
straregique de la Tchecoslovaquie pour fEurope Oooidentale;
Prague, 1938; p. 10).
From the aibove it follows that the Slovaks occupy a tet-
�26
SLOVAKIA
ritory whose strategic importiamce is far greater than its silZe
and the numlber of its in:haibirtaints. We shall see that even
more clearly id: we at least 1b riefly dndicate what the occupation of this territory means for its ne~ghbors.
Why the Neighbors are Interested
Whil.e the Slovruks are firmly propped against rvalleys
and slopes of this natura!l mountam fortress , the Magyars,
Poles rund Ozechs occupy the lowlands, which do not afford
them ainy kind of natural protection agaiinst ipossilble attacks
from their neighibors. It is, therefore, only natural, that Magyar, Czech and Po.lish imperialists saw and still see in Slovrukia an important defensive bastion, which could serve
them well in the event of an enemy attack.
For the Ozechs. the domination of Slovakia means
rubove all else protection against the everlasting German
pressll!I'e which is .s queezing them liike pincers from three
sides. 'Dhe Magyars see in Slovrukia from the militrury standpoint a real defensirve wall against the constant pressure of
the Slovanic world. For the Poles the domination of SlOIVakia would represent a real cover-uip for their baciks against
possilble attaclks, which have come so often in their history
from the East and the West, from Germany and Russia. For
the Polish imperialists Slovaikia would aiso mean access to
the Drunulbe, whi:ch in turn wol.l!ld mean increasing the influence of Poland in the Danulbe basin. Poland, held in the pincers of two colossi, the German and the Russli,an, only by
coming into the DanUJbe region could become a real " European Great Power," whfoh is the open am'bition of the
Polish adherents of this policy.
From the economic standpoint, Slovakia means much
for the surrounding nations. Not only as a market far their
industry, but also as a source of ram materials. For the Magyars the forest wealth of Slovrulcia, the natural conditions
for the development of industry (mineral wealth, wood, water power, coal) are a valuruble adjund to the agricultural
regions of the Magyar lowlands. Slovrukia served as a market for Ozech industrial products, which annuailly "if we
figure consei,vati'Vely" - to use the words of Dr. Kazwas "amounted to rupproximately 1100-1200 million Czecho-Slo1
�27
SLOVAKIA
va,k Crowns ( 37 -40 million dollars) ." Slorv,aJkia meant more
for the Owchs than Hungary (1005 million crowns), Poland
(625 million crowns), Ru1mania (596 million crowns), Ita:ly
( 491 million crowns), etc. Ozecho-1Slovakia expovted more
only to Germany, Austria, Y,u gosla,via and IDngla,nd (from
the official statistics of 1930).
From the stamdipoint of ,production of the Ozech lands,
Slovakia was also a more important maI1ket than the foreign
marlcets, ibecaUJSe it meant a market protected by a customs
(tax) lb order, that is, a mrurlket which brings higher prices
(see: Kanvas, ":Sjednocooi vyrdbnich podmin~ v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku," Pra;gue, 1933, pp. 80, 1'18). For Czech
imperialists holding onto Slorvaik,i a meant a lso an access to
the free Danulbe, in other words, not only an open door to
the Danube Basin, ibut also· to the Balikans. In a free Europe
the Danulbe is a free river, which means concretely that it
opened the door for Ozeoh industria,l ;products directly not
only into all the Danulbian states, but also to the coastal
states of the Bla:ck Sea and the Mediterranean. For Poland,
the domina,tioo of Slov-aJkfa from the economic standpoint
would mean the same thing.
F:rom the aibove facts -w hich represent only a few of the
m~ interests of the neighlbors of Sfovaikia, it is obvious
that the imperialistic linterests of the Ozechs, Poles and Magyars clash in Slovakia.
1
The Consequences of Dominating Slovakia
The domination of Slova:kia .b y one of her neighbors, however, also presents a threat to the remainmg nations of this
region. The domination oif SlOIVa.lkia by the Czechs is aga;inst
the interests of Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Croatians,
Ruthenians and Slovenes. Having the Ozeohs on the Danube
meams a Czecho-Russian aHiance to the Poles, Orech canons
only 35 kilometers f,r om Budaipest, a reviva!l orf Ozech imperurlism ,m the eyes of the Germans and a tool of other imperialisms, the daillger of cultural and economical Ozechlzation of Ruthenia, and indirectly the reviival of Sel'\bian imperfalism. in the eyes of the Croatians and Slovenes. The
dominaition of SlovaJk,ia by the Magyars is aigainst the interests of the Ruma.mans, Czechs, Seoos, Ruthenians, Poles and
�28
SLOVAKIA
Germans-. 'It wouJd mean suppressing the Czechs into an interila.tioo.allry political provincialism, a strengthening of- Magyar pressure against the Rurrrania:ns, Croatians, Slovenes
and Serl>s, bloclcinig the Polii.Sih penetration to the South. A
Slova:kia doniinated hy Poland wouJd be rugainst the interests
of the. Oze,chs, Magyars, Rutheniains and Germans. Harving
the Poles on the DanuJbe would mean insignirficwnce and .political sUJppression of the Czechs and Magyars in the Danube
Basin. Domination oif SlovakJa either 1b y ibhe Germans or the
Russians wowld be directly against the vital interests of all
other nations of this region. It would really mean the first
step towrurd the domination of the whole of Central Europe
by one of the great powers, the result of which would ,be the
brealking up of the balance of power not only in this area,
but also on the entire Euro1pean continent, together with
fear-reaching consequences em~mating therefrom .
And similarply even from the narrower viewpoint of the
Central-European :firamework, judging what the domination
of Slovakia by ariy of its neighibo;ios wo,uld mean, at first
glance it is quite Olbvious that it would mean. :the dest.Tuction of the 'b alance of power in this area, which wou~d bear
with itself the seeds of discontent, pressures and arguments,
that it prepares the conditions for the insterference and influence oif power interests outside the area, which in the final
restrlts are always harmful to all the nations of this region.
SlOIV'rukia wouJd always be a too great and quite an indigestible ,prey whether in the stomach of the Czech, Maigyar, or
Po~~ imiperialism. ·F orcefully dominating ,SlovaJkia would
b'ting them · more dangers than advantages, especially in
times· of crises. SlavaJkia in reality would be for them not
a: defen:sd'Ve position, but a "Trodan horse" in the service of
their . enemies. 'I'he events of March 1939 illustrated this
clea'.il'ly to the Ozechs.
The Real Interest of All
iFfowevef, an independent Slovakia · is not against the
just interests of any orf its neighlbors or any other state.
Coruversely, an independent Slovakia is the reaJ interest of
al!I · her neighbors. Imperialistic phantoms, no matter how
~nticirig; rciiily·-indicate· the road to ca:tastrophy, especially
�SLOVAKIA
29:
when · they are not supported by sufrficient power means.
And this is doubly true for Ozeoh, Magya,r and Polish im-·
peril:!lism, especially when we glance at the goopolitical sit...
uation i~ wh'ich these nations liive.
An i,n.depei:i,dent iSlov.a.kia ~eed not mean a hiindrance to
c_zooh or Poli~!J, econoap.ic products on ~.µeir way to the free.
apd internationa!l Danµibe. Ali these are questi<?ns whlyh
cocld be solved to werybody's . satisfaction with good will ..
And independen~ Sl01Vakia has just as much interest to .de-.
fend .Central Euroipe against a,l,l outside imperialisti<: pres-.
sll!I'e,· :W4ether it carnes from Germany or Russia, as to the
rest of .the nations Oif. this ar~a. Conversely, as an independent state it is a far greater guarantee that it would not be
use<l ~nd .a bused in the interest of foreign imipeTialistic plans
than wh~ it is forced ~ainst its wiU into t_h e fI:~mework of
op,e c;,f its neighibofiing. states. T,he ens1aved . ~nd ~uppressed
always justify their right to "treason" and ~ to valid.a~·
it at t.J?.e first QppOrt.une moment. A Slovalkia dOII'lll.nat.ed py
t.µe ;Magyars, Czechs, or Poles will aa.ways increase ,t he numper p.f .their enemies. A free aJ?.,d ,i_n depe,ndent ~lova.}{ia, l:i,ow~
ever, _wouJd be a real friend.
The Mission of the Slovak State ·
prer~ud.-
An independ~f Slovakia is thus one .of the
sites of the balance oif power in Central Euroipe, which means
peace and tranquility _;_ 'we'1ifare and prosperity in 'this so
~eaivily tried area of Eur01pe. · fiom this ~ewpodnt the_.Slovadc
State .sh8ilf have a signirficant and important mission m·the
Centra;J ...Europea.n area: on its territory can be eliimiriated tme
counter interests of Centro-IDu:ro,pean iinperiaJlisms, which
it would be· pos~ible to replace W:ith cooipera,,tion anq. -m1,1tuw.
understanding. The Slo~k State would par.a il~ ~e~l
dang~o11s and poi&on<>us "srnali" imipema,,lasms jn this so im~
portant -area, which M,ter the .destruction of Soviet' impem~
a_1ism .:WQJtld again attain thek relati,ve impor~e }n.· this
r egion. 'Vherefore, the .e,xiste.Q.<!~ -of an independent \Sl<wa.k
State is not only in the interest of Central Europe, but also
the whole of Europe. Under such circumstances Slovalkia
couM be among the Poles, Czechs and Ma:gyars what Swit.zerland is ,bebween France, Germany and Italy. The relation
�30
SLOVAKIA
of forces is much more against the beneifilt of SW!ita:erland
than it would be in the oase orf SlOIV'akia.
The Slovruk State, therefore, has a signifiicant mission
of consolidat'iing the Central~European Area to promote
peace. An independent Slovak,iia womd neuitralirze P◊lish imperialism tenddng toward the south, Czech iimperialism tendill!g East and MaJgya,r imperia1ism tending North. In thls
manner independent SlovaJkia wouJd be contributing in a
great measuTe to the pacification, consolidation and star
biHzation of the peace prereqwisites of this important region.
At the same time its existence as such would be one of the
fundam.ental piUars orf balance of power in this part of
Europe.
Sta,hllity, consolidation and ba:lance in relation among
the small and larger nations between Germany and Russia
are the conditions for the common defense of th~s especially
imlportant area of Euro1p e by all these nations agamst any
attempt to do1rninate them. Freedom and independence of
this regfon is one of the fundamental oondi tions of European
ba!lance of power and, hence, indirectly even balance of
world power. And tlris area will oniliy then be aJble to defend
itself when alJ the nations of thris area will be interested in
defond!ing the 1:pol!i.tical system instalJed in this area. That
will be olrty ,w hen atll shiaH be free and equal.
The SlOIV'aks inhaJbit a territory that is so important
strategically and geoipollitically that the .nations of this area
cannot be indilfiferent aJbout defending it. The events of 1939
and 1944 proved thls clearly. The Slovaks wiH defend this
area olrly if they are free and independent.
Judging the question on the basis of the aJbove viewpomts, the exd.stence of the SlavaJk State is in the interest
not Olltly of Cent:raJl Europe, but the whole of Europe as
well. During the first World War, Professor A. Denis of the
Unwe11Sity of Paris underatood this cwrectly, pointing out
already 8Jt that time the European significance of the Slova:k
question.
•
•
•
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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SLOVAKIA
Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more.
I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and
satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and
re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I
had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing
the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police
guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without
fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my
only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y
the peace and security of a great democratic country.
• • •
TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Dr. Arved Grebert
When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary
a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate
from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia.
The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in
the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its
mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as
weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always
tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the
Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical
aspirations and plans.
"The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin"
From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most
natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against
the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent
its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the
west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the
second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely
even with a relatively small number of people and arms.
SLOVAKIA
25
The thi:ok forests provide excellent nests of resistance
again.st an aggressor. SlovaJkia is an ideal natwral fort~;
it is a "Gi!braltar of the Darmlbe Basin."
From the most ancient times, the southern and southwestern regions of this natural fortress formed one of the
most important strategic places orf Europe. These regions,
especiaJlly the landis on both ·banks of the Danube, represented from time immemorial a part of the territory, which
the Czech military theoreti~ian, Colonel E. Morruvec, charactenized as the "g,reatest strategic crossroads orf Central Europe ." On the ban:ks of the Danwbe, between the mouth
of the Lpel Rirver and Vienna, there existed the territory
from the ages where, on the one side, there met the imperialistic pressure of the German wo:rld, coming from the
W~t, with the pressure of the Mongols, which came from
the Russian steppes (thrrough the Uz Pass), and, on the
other side, the pressure coming from the No!rlh through the
Moravian Gate against the pressure of the Italian ipeninsula
(The Romans) am.d the Balikans (Byzantium; the Turks).
During fiive centuries, it was on the central Danube
that the Romans defended ancient civiilization against the
world orf "barbarians" ; it was there that the wild Huns to•r e
into the heart olf Euroipe; it was there that the Flrruniks
clashed with the .AJvars and, in the ninth centucy the German world with the Slovanic world; it was ,t here tl)at the
nomaru.c Magyars and the Tatars attacked the Christian
civilization of western Europe; and it was th,rowgh th~re
that just recently one of the currents of Asiatic lbolshe:vism
poured into IDurorpe.
"Nowhere else was the land of Eurnpe so satwated with
blood," wrote Colonel Moraivec, "as it wais in the lowlands
which extend on iboth sides of the Danu'be. There most of the
nations were. exchaniged, ,t here it was that the pressure was
the greatest am.d !borders changed most frequently." This
territory is reaUy "the crosS1road of pressure of the imperialistic forces of IDurope." (See: E. Moravec : La V aleur
straregique de la Tchecoslovaquie pour fEurope Oooidentale;
Prague, 1938; p. 10).
From the aibove it follows that the Slovaks occupy a tet-
26
SLOVAKIA
ritory whose strategic importiamce is far greater than its silZe
and the numlber of its in:haibirtaints. We shall see that even
more clearly id: we at least 1b riefly dndicate what the occupation of this territory means for its ne~ghbors.
Why the Neighbors are Interested
Whil.e the Slovruks are firmly propped against rvalleys
and slopes of this natura!l mountam fortress , the Magyars,
Poles rund Ozechs occupy the lowlands, which do not afford
them ainy kind of natural protection agaiinst ipossilble attacks
from their neighibors. It is, therefore, only natural, that Magyar, Czech and Po.lish imperialists saw and still see in Slovrukia an important defensive bastion, which could serve
them well in the event of an enemy attack.
For the Ozechs. the domination of Slovakia means
rubove all else protection against the everlasting German
pressll!I'e which is .s queezing them liike pincers from three
sides. 'Dhe Magyars see in Slovrukia from the militrury standpoint a real defensirve wall against the constant pressure of
the Slovanic world. For the Poles the domination of SlOIVakia would represent a real cover-uip for their baciks against
possilble attaclks, which have come so often in their history
from the East and the West, from Germany and Russia. For
the Polish imperialists Slovaikia would aiso mean access to
the Drunulbe, whi:ch in turn wol.l!ld mean increasing the influence of Poland in the Danulbe basin. Poland, held in the pincers of two colossi, the German and the Russli,an, only by
coming into the DanUJbe region could become a real " European Great Power," whfoh is the open am'bition of the
Polish adherents of this policy.
From the economic standpoint, Slovakia means much
for the surrounding nations. Not only as a market far their
industry, but also as a source of ram materials. For the Magyars the forest wealth of Slovrulcia, the natural conditions
for the development of industry (mineral wealth, wood, water power, coal) are a valuruble adjund to the agricultural
regions of the Magyar lowlands. Slovrukia served as a market for Ozech industrial products, which annuailly "if we
figure consei,vati'Vely" - to use the words of Dr. Kazwas "amounted to rupproximately 1100-1200 million Czecho-Slo1
27
SLOVAKIA
va,k Crowns ( 37 -40 million dollars) ." Slorv,aJkia meant more
for the Owchs than Hungary (1005 million crowns), Poland
(625 million crowns), Ru1mania (596 million crowns), Ita:ly
( 491 million crowns), etc. Ozecho-1Slovakia expovted more
only to Germany, Austria, Y,u gosla,via and IDngla,nd (from
the official statistics of 1930).
From the stamdipoint of ,production of the Ozech lands,
Slovakia was also a more important maI1ket than the foreign
marlcets, ibecaUJSe it meant a market protected by a customs
(tax) lb order, that is, a mrurlket which brings higher prices
(see: Kanvas, ":Sjednocooi vyrdbnich podmin~ v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku," Pra;gue, 1933, pp. 80, 1'18). For Czech
imperialists holding onto Slorvaik,i a meant a lso an access to
the free Danulbe, in other words, not only an open door to
the Danube Basin, ibut also· to the Balikans. In a free Europe
the Danulbe is a free river, which means concretely that it
opened the door for Ozeoh industria,l ;products directly not
only into all the Danulbian states, but also to the coastal
states of the Bla:ck Sea and the Mediterranean. For Poland,
the domina,tioo of Slov-aJkfa from the economic standpoint
would mean the same thing.
F:rom the aibove facts -w hich represent only a few of the
m~ interests of the neighlbors of Sfovaikia, it is obvious
that the imperialistic linterests of the Ozechs, Poles and Magyars clash in Slovakia.
1
The Consequences of Dominating Slovakia
The domination of Slova:kia .b y one of her neighbors, however, also presents a threat to the remainmg nations of this
region. The domination oif SlOIVa.lkia by the Czechs is aga;inst
the interests of Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Croatians,
Ruthenians and Slovenes. Having the Ozeohs on the Danube
meams a Czecho-Russian aHiance to the Poles, Orech canons
only 35 kilometers f,r om Budaipest, a reviva!l orf Ozech imperurlism ,m the eyes of the Germans and a tool of other imperialisms, the daillger of cultural and economical Ozechlzation of Ruthenia, and indirectly the reviival of Sel'\bian imperfalism. in the eyes of the Croatians and Slovenes. The
dominaition of SlovaJk,ia by the Magyars is aigainst the interests of the Ruma.mans, Czechs, Seoos, Ruthenians, Poles and
28
SLOVAKIA
Germans-. 'It wouJd mean suppressing the Czechs into an interila.tioo.allry political provincialism, a strengthening of- Magyar pressure against the Rurrrania:ns, Croatians, Slovenes
and Serl>s, bloclcinig the Polii.Sih penetration to the South. A
Slova:kia doniinated hy Poland wouJd be rugainst the interests
of the. Oze,chs, Magyars, Rutheniains and Germans. Harving
the Poles on the DanuJbe would mean insignirficwnce and .political sUJppression of the Czechs and Magyars in the Danube
Basin. Domination oif SlovakJa either 1b y ibhe Germans or the
Russians wowld be directly against the vital interests of all
other nations of this region. It would really mean the first
step towrurd the domination of the whole of Central Europe
by one of the great powers, the result of which would ,be the
brealking up of the balance of power not only in this area,
but also on the entire Euro1pean continent, together with
fear-reaching consequences em~mating therefrom .
And similarply even from the narrower viewpoint of the
Central-European :firamework, judging what the domination
of Slovakia by ariy of its neighibo;ios wo,uld mean, at first
glance it is quite Olbvious that it would mean. :the dest.Tuction of the 'b alance of power in this area, which wou~d bear
with itself the seeds of discontent, pressures and arguments,
that it prepares the conditions for the insterference and influence oif power interests outside the area, which in the final
restrlts are always harmful to all the nations of this region.
SlOIV'rukia wouJd always be a too great and quite an indigestible ,prey whether in the stomach of the Czech, Maigyar, or
Po~~ imiperialism. ·F orcefully dominating ,SlovaJkia would
b'ting them · more dangers than advantages, especially in
times· of crises. SlavaJkia in reality would be for them not
a: defen:sd'Ve position, but a "Trodan horse" in the service of
their . enemies. 'I'he events of March 1939 illustrated this
clea'.il'ly to the Ozechs.
The Real Interest of All
iFfowevef, an independent Slovakia · is not against the
just interests of any orf its neighlbors or any other state.
Coruversely, an independent Slovakia is the reaJ interest of
al!I · her neighbors. Imperialistic phantoms, no matter how
~nticirig; rciiily·-indicate· the road to ca:tastrophy, especially
SLOVAKIA
29:
when · they are not supported by sufrficient power means.
And this is doubly true for Ozeoh, Magya,r and Polish im-·
peril:!lism, especially when we glance at the goopolitical sit...
uation i~ wh'ich these nations liive.
An i,n.depei:i,dent iSlov.a.kia ~eed not mean a hiindrance to
c_zooh or Poli~!J, econoap.ic products on ~.µeir way to the free.
apd internationa!l Danµibe. Ali these are questi<?ns whlyh
cocld be solved to werybody's . satisfaction with good will ..
And independen~ Sl01Vakia has just as much interest to .de-.
fend .Central Euroipe against a,l,l outside imperialisti<: pres-.
sll!I'e,· :W4ether it carnes from Germany or Russia, as to the
rest of .the nations Oif. this ar~a. Conversely, as an independent state it is a far greater guarantee that it would not be
use<l ~nd .a bused in the interest of foreign imipeTialistic plans
than wh~ it is forced ~ainst its wiU into t_h e fI:~mework of
op,e c;,f its neighibofiing. states. T,he ens1aved . ~nd ~uppressed
always justify their right to "treason" and ~ to valid.a~·
it at t.J?.e first QppOrt.une moment. A Slovalkia dOII'lll.nat.ed py
t.µe ;Magyars, Czechs, or Poles will aa.ways increase ,t he numper p.f .their enemies. A free aJ?.,d ,i_n depe,ndent ~lova.}{ia, l:i,ow~
ever, _wouJd be a real friend.
The Mission of the Slovak State ·
prer~ud.-
An independ~f Slovakia is thus one .of the
sites of the balance oif power in Central Euroipe, which means
peace and tranquility _;_ 'we'1ifare and prosperity in 'this so
~eaivily tried area of Eur01pe. · fiom this ~ewpodnt the_.Slovadc
State .sh8ilf have a signirficant and important mission m·the
Centra;J ...Europea.n area: on its territory can be eliimiriated tme
counter interests of Centro-IDu:ro,pean iinperiaJlisms, which
it would be· pos~ible to replace W:ith cooipera,,tion anq. -m1,1tuw.
understanding. The Slo~k State would par.a il~ ~e~l
dang~o11s and poi&on<>us "srnali" imipema,,lasms jn this so im~
portant -area, which M,ter the .destruction of Soviet' impem~
a_1ism .:WQJtld again attain thek relati,ve impor~e }n.· this
r egion. 'Vherefore, the .e,xiste.Q.<!~ -of an independent \Sl<wa.k
State is not only in the interest of Central Europe, but also
the whole of Europe. Under such circumstances Slovalkia
couM be among the Poles, Czechs and Ma:gyars what Swit.zerland is ,bebween France, Germany and Italy. The relation
30
SLOVAKIA
of forces is much more against the beneifilt of SW!ita:erland
than it would be in the oase orf SlOIV'akia.
The Slovruk State, therefore, has a signifiicant mission
of consolidat'iing the Central~European Area to promote
peace. An independent Slovak,iia womd neuitralirze P◊lish imperialism tenddng toward the south, Czech iimperialism tendill!g East and MaJgya,r imperia1ism tending North. In thls
manner independent SlovaJkia wouJd be contributing in a
great measuTe to the pacification, consolidation and star
biHzation of the peace prereqwisites of this important region.
At the same time its existence as such would be one of the
fundam.ental piUars orf balance of power in this part of
Europe.
Sta,hllity, consolidation and ba:lance in relation among
the small and larger nations between Germany and Russia
are the conditions for the common defense of th~s especially
imlportant area of Euro1p e by all these nations agamst any
attempt to do1rninate them. Freedom and independence of
this regfon is one of the fundamental oondi tions of European
ba!lance of power and, hence, indirectly even balance of
world power. And tlris area will oniliy then be aJble to defend
itself when alJ the nations of thris area will be interested in
defond!ing the 1:pol!i.tical system instalJed in this area. That
will be olrty ,w hen atll shiaH be free and equal.
The SlOIV'aks inhaJbit a territory that is so important
strategically and geoipollitically that the .nations of this area
cannot be indilfiferent aJbout defending it. The events of 1939
and 1944 proved thls clearly. The Slovaks wiH defend this
area olrly if they are free and independent.
Judging the question on the basis of the aJbove viewpomts, the exd.stence of the SlavaJk State is in the interest
not Olltly of Cent:raJl Europe, but the whole of Europe as
well. During the first World War, Professor A. Denis of the
Unwe11Sity of Paris underatood this cwrectly, pointing out
already 8Jt that time the European significance of the Slova:k
question.
•
•
•
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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The Slovak State and Central Europe
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Arvéd Grébert
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954
pp. 24-30
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/61b97e8a6667b4e204ee5aec380a2684.pdf
d51f4318c3ccf8071e25c987b7b5f243
PDF Text
Text
20
SLOVAKIA
I WAS AN OFFICER OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMV
Anonymous Preferred
Until the autumn of 1'948, I was an active officer of the
Ozecho.;Slovak Army, bearing the rank of Stalff-Captain. I
achieved this rank doing regular officer's duties after graduating as ·an artiHery 'lieutenant from the Military Academy
at BratisilaNa, the capital city of Slovrukia, my country.
In 1942-43, ·as a member of the Slovak Army, I was ~n
comlbat rugainst the U.1S.S.R. During that time I travelled
through Galicia, Ukvainia, White Ruthenia and the Caucasus and :came· in cootact with the divty, miserable, starved
and frightened population of those territories. I spoke with
many intellec.tuals there and they gave me an idea of what
real life is li!ke in communist Russia. I had heard similar
stories before, at home, but found it hard to believe them.
Now I had it first hand from people who. lived under the
men of the -Kremlin.
At t:Jhe end of 1944 and the 1b eginning of 19415, the Red
Army made its way in Slovakia and eventually "lit~ted"
all of Ozecho-,Slovakia. The Red occupation lasted until the
end of 1946, but even after that time the country, especially
Slo.va!kia - the eastern part of Czecho-Slovakia - remained
an eldarado for · military units, groups and indi,viduals whether desertees or reguJar sOildier of the Red Arimy who robbed, pillaged, plundered, murdered and raped almost
at will.
Thds occupation had a very great influence on the reorgani1z ation of the OzechO-iSlorvak Army after the wrur. First,
because the first 1post-war Ozeoho.;81ovak government was
established in Moscow, which was its official residence for a
time, and, secondly, beca.u se the first Czecho-Slova;k _A rmy
corps, organized in Russia during the war, was the fir~t to
come into the coll!Iltry with the Russdans.
The Ozecho-.Slov-a k Army was made up of two nationalities: the. Czechs and the ,Sfovruks, These two nations, even
thoug,h they lived in the same state and were governed by
the same government (Prague), did not get along very
�SLOVAKIA
21
well. Causes of this lay deeply in the mentalities coming out
of their religious beliefs, traditions and economic structure.
Furthermore, the Slova:ks felt that they were forced to lilve
with the Czechs in the same state, since no reaJl representative of the SlovaJk nation attended the P.aris Peace Conference in 1'919, or was consulted. As time went on, the lea;d.
ing Czech politiciruns e~loited the Slovaks more and more
and stul:fuornly refused to recognize their just claims and
their inherent dght to freedom, lilberty and the pursuit of
hruppiness. This resulted in the utter colia:pse of Ozecho-,Slovakia in 1939, when the Slovruk nation proclaimed the independence of SlovaJkia all1d the Czechs ca:me under the Germans.
The prolblems which preceded the collapse of the first
Ozech0-4SlovaJk Repulblic (1918-11938) were not solved after
1945, but rather intensified. They af1footed /both civilian and
army personnel. The deteriorated relations between the
Ozechs and Slo'Vaks g;rew worse, because Dr. Edward Benes
and his Moscow government pursued communist tendencies
and persecuted anti-socialistic and anti--communistic elements e$peciaHy in S}()JVa,k ia. Thousands of good citizens
were disfranchised, dispossessed, forcefully deported out of
Slovrukia, jailed and even executed lb ecaue they refused to accept the new order of Benes and Stalin and cooperate with
Communists. Officers of the Slovak Army and their families
suffered the most.
The armed forces were suibordinate to the Ministry of
National Defense and were dirvided ,i nto four inHitary regions
(Vojenske Olblasti): 1. Praigue, 2. Hradec Kralove, 3. Brno,
4. Bratislava. The Department of Defense Security was o-r ganized under the Ministry of National Defense; its task
was to -keep the military in line and it was much the same
as the NKVD in the Red Army. The department had 'brancihes or units at aH headquarters, in all army units and Judependent units. The heads oif these departments were also
sll!bstitute commanders; all were from the first Ozecho-,Slovak Army Corps which was trained and schooled in Russia. Their activities were aiimed especiaUy against Slwaik officers ·who were at least 90 per cent anti-communist. This socalled · "Fifth Department" (Intelligence) of the Ministry of
�22
SLOVAK·I A
Naitional Defense had to keep a record of just albout everything on everybody in the Army. Agents of the department
shadowed every officer amd reported what he did on or
off duty . .Ais soon as am,y officer !became a suspect of some
indiscretion or v-iolation - real or imagined - he was
jailed and held for court.
Another new department established within the armed
forces was the Department of T,raining and Education. Officers of this department were assigned to every military
unit, staritilng from a company, battery, or a wing. The functions of these officers were the same as those of the Polytrl.llks (political commissars) in the Red Army. Their job was
to preserve unity in the army, hold the soldiers to certain
princi<ples and incmkate and foster the idea of devotion and
loyalty to the state and the regime. These officers spread
the seed of Commun<ism and hate against their superiors
among their men. Once a week they held lectures, praJsin,g
Stalin, the Red Army, the heroes of Socialism and Soviet
establishment s and smearing and condemning Ca;piWism,
western democracy and Christianity.
The officers of this Department of Educaition and braining had little or no education at a;ll. Communists took advantage of this fact and devloped in them a certain 'kind of
ill-aimbition by granting them high ranks, because they had
learned to speaik and act as they were ordered. In 1948 I
was an instructor in a.school for officers in reserve. I taught
ballistics. When I had to interrupt my teaching, because I
was called to taike part in artill.ery maneuvers, a captain substituted for me. When he introduced' himself to the attendants of the sohool, he told them: "Let the staff-captaiin continue gilv:ing you lectures on the subject of baHistics. I can't
do it, because I finished at the Moscow School and their
ballistics are altogether different than those of the CzechoSlovaik A,r my; they use different mathematics; it's very complicated, so I won't coinfuse you with it." The students immediately felt that something was wrong, because my substitute did not want to teach ballistics. 'Dhey urged him to
explain ballistics as taught by the Moscow School, but he
evaded alil questions on the suibject and preferred to talk
about the history of the Red Army. When I returned to the
�SLOVAKIA
23
school, I chec,ked the record orf this individual and found
that he was illiterate when drafted into the service.
The officer-iins tructors had a very destTuct1ve inf1uence
upon the moral discipline, and behavior of the men. 'I'heir
poweT increased to such an extent that rriany commande rs
could not f,ulfiH programs and orders regarding men's training. In 1946 morale and discipline were so deteriorate d that
practically no one's orders were 01beyed; such a condition
existed in SlovaJkia especially. During a football game in
Bratislawa ilil 1946, a riot 'b roke out in the stands and General
Sirica, commande r of 'Military District No. 4 was beaten
brutally when he attempted to ca:Jm the rioters. These officers, it seems, were outside the jurisdiction of regU'lar commanders. COIIllmanders usually did not ask to haive them
puniished or transferred , because i[ they did so, they were
the 01I1es to 'be punished and t:Jransferred.
The reoiiganiza tion of the Czooho-Slo vak Airrmiy, Sovietstyle, was begun in 1945, ·b ut was not completed in 1948,
antj. I doubt that it will ever be completed. Chaos, fear and
inseouriity, brought in ,by Dr. Benes and his Londlon-Moscow
governmen t in 1946, hiwe taken hold of the milita_ry. No one
is certain of anything; every!body, it seems, is spying on
every!body else. Partisans, formerly ,p rivileged, who robb,e d,
plundered and raped the population, are now :be:ing replaced
as um-eliaJble. The Communis ts are in complete power and
control in Ozeicho-Slovaikia and oruy tried and loya,1-to-Moscow Reds are placed in responsible positions Court martials
and severe punishmen ts hwe failed to increase disciipline and
morale. Desertions by officers, who were favorites just a
while back, ooour daily.
1
During 1947 and 1948 I was imprisoned on several occasions and inivesitiigated on ohar,ges of conspiracy. When I
escruped successfull y in the autumn of 1948, I said good-1bye
to no one, not even my dear wife who was with chi'ld at that
time. After I deserted the army and escaped, I Jearned that
my wife W?,S 'jaHed man~ times and brutally beaten during
the investigatio n. Her herulth gradually broke down and in
1951 she died under the most tragic circumstan ces, leaving
two small children. She was only 26.
�SLOVAKIA
Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more.
I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and
satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and
re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I
had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing
the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police
guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without
fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my
only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y
the peace and security of a great democratic country.
• • •
TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Dr. Arved Grebert
When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary
a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate
from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia.
The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in
the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its
mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as
weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always
tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the
Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical
aspirations and plans.
"The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin"
From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most
natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against
the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent
its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the
west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the
second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely
even with a relatively small number of people and arms.
�
20
SLOVAKIA
I WAS AN OFFICER OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMV
Anonymous Preferred
Until the autumn of 1'948, I was an active officer of the
Ozecho.;Slovak Army, bearing the rank of Stalff-Captain. I
achieved this rank doing regular officer's duties after graduating as ·an artiHery 'lieutenant from the Military Academy
at BratisilaNa, the capital city of Slovrukia, my country.
In 1942-43, ·as a member of the Slovak Army, I was ~n
comlbat rugainst the U.1S.S.R. During that time I travelled
through Galicia, Ukvainia, White Ruthenia and the Caucasus and :came· in cootact with the divty, miserable, starved
and frightened population of those territories. I spoke with
many intellec.tuals there and they gave me an idea of what
real life is li!ke in communist Russia. I had heard similar
stories before, at home, but found it hard to believe them.
Now I had it first hand from people who. lived under the
men of the -Kremlin.
At t:Jhe end of 1944 and the 1b eginning of 19415, the Red
Army made its way in Slovakia and eventually "lit~ted"
all of Ozecho-,Slovakia. The Red occupation lasted until the
end of 1946, but even after that time the country, especially
Slo.va!kia - the eastern part of Czecho-Slovakia - remained
an eldarado for · military units, groups and indi,viduals whether desertees or reguJar sOildier of the Red Arimy who robbed, pillaged, plundered, murdered and raped almost
at will.
Thds occupation had a very great influence on the reorgani1z ation of the OzechO-iSlorvak Army after the wrur. First,
because the first 1post-war Ozeoho.;81ovak government was
established in Moscow, which was its official residence for a
time, and, secondly, beca.u se the first Czecho-Slova;k _A rmy
corps, organized in Russia during the war, was the fir~t to
come into the coll!Iltry with the Russdans.
The Ozecho-.Slov-a k Army was made up of two nationalities: the. Czechs and the ,Sfovruks, These two nations, even
thoug,h they lived in the same state and were governed by
the same government (Prague), did not get along very
�SLOVAKIA
21
well. Causes of this lay deeply in the mentalities coming out
of their religious beliefs, traditions and economic structure.
Furthermore, the Slova:ks felt that they were forced to lilve
with the Czechs in the same state, since no reaJl representative of the SlovaJk nation attended the P.aris Peace Conference in 1'919, or was consulted. As time went on, the lea;d.
ing Czech politiciruns e~loited the Slovaks more and more
and stul:fuornly refused to recognize their just claims and
their inherent dght to freedom, lilberty and the pursuit of
hruppiness. This resulted in the utter colia:pse of Ozecho-,Slovakia in 1939, when the Slovruk nation proclaimed the independence of SlovaJkia all1d the Czechs ca:me under the Germans.
The prolblems which preceded the collapse of the first
Ozech0-4SlovaJk Repulblic (1918-11938) were not solved after
1945, but rather intensified. They af1footed /both civilian and
army personnel. The deteriorated relations between the
Ozechs and Slo'Vaks g;rew worse, because Dr. Edward Benes
and his Moscow government pursued communist tendencies
and persecuted anti-socialistic and anti--communistic elements e$peciaHy in S}()JVa,k ia. Thousands of good citizens
were disfranchised, dispossessed, forcefully deported out of
Slovrukia, jailed and even executed lb ecaue they refused to accept the new order of Benes and Stalin and cooperate with
Communists. Officers of the Slovak Army and their families
suffered the most.
The armed forces were suibordinate to the Ministry of
National Defense and were dirvided ,i nto four inHitary regions
(Vojenske Olblasti): 1. Praigue, 2. Hradec Kralove, 3. Brno,
4. Bratislava. The Department of Defense Security was o-r ganized under the Ministry of National Defense; its task
was to -keep the military in line and it was much the same
as the NKVD in the Red Army. The department had 'brancihes or units at aH headquarters, in all army units and Judependent units. The heads oif these departments were also
sll!bstitute commanders; all were from the first Ozecho-,Slovak Army Corps which was trained and schooled in Russia. Their activities were aiimed especiaUy against Slwaik officers ·who were at least 90 per cent anti-communist. This socalled · "Fifth Department" (Intelligence) of the Ministry of
�22
SLOVAK·I A
Naitional Defense had to keep a record of just albout everything on everybody in the Army. Agents of the department
shadowed every officer amd reported what he did on or
off duty . .Ais soon as am,y officer !became a suspect of some
indiscretion or v-iolation - real or imagined - he was
jailed and held for court.
Another new department established within the armed
forces was the Department of T,raining and Education. Officers of this department were assigned to every military
unit, staritilng from a company, battery, or a wing. The functions of these officers were the same as those of the Polytrl.llks (political commissars) in the Red Army. Their job was
to preserve unity in the army, hold the soldiers to certain
princi<ples and incmkate and foster the idea of devotion and
loyalty to the state and the regime. These officers spread
the seed of Commun<ism and hate against their superiors
among their men. Once a week they held lectures, praJsin,g
Stalin, the Red Army, the heroes of Socialism and Soviet
establishment s and smearing and condemning Ca;piWism,
western democracy and Christianity.
The officers of this Department of Educaition and braining had little or no education at a;ll. Communists took advantage of this fact and devloped in them a certain 'kind of
ill-aimbition by granting them high ranks, because they had
learned to speaik and act as they were ordered. In 1948 I
was an instructor in a.school for officers in reserve. I taught
ballistics. When I had to interrupt my teaching, because I
was called to taike part in artill.ery maneuvers, a captain substituted for me. When he introduced' himself to the attendants of the sohool, he told them: "Let the staff-captaiin continue gilv:ing you lectures on the subject of baHistics. I can't
do it, because I finished at the Moscow School and their
ballistics are altogether different than those of the CzechoSlovaik A,r my; they use different mathematics; it's very complicated, so I won't coinfuse you with it." The students immediately felt that something was wrong, because my substitute did not want to teach ballistics. 'Dhey urged him to
explain ballistics as taught by the Moscow School, but he
evaded alil questions on the suibject and preferred to talk
about the history of the Red Army. When I returned to the
�SLOVAKIA
23
school, I chec,ked the record orf this individual and found
that he was illiterate when drafted into the service.
The officer-iins tructors had a very destTuct1ve inf1uence
upon the moral discipline, and behavior of the men. 'I'heir
poweT increased to such an extent that rriany commande rs
could not f,ulfiH programs and orders regarding men's training. In 1946 morale and discipline were so deteriorate d that
practically no one's orders were 01beyed; such a condition
existed in SlovaJkia especially. During a football game in
Bratislawa ilil 1946, a riot 'b roke out in the stands and General
Sirica, commande r of 'Military District No. 4 was beaten
brutally when he attempted to ca:Jm the rioters. These officers, it seems, were outside the jurisdiction of regU'lar commanders. COIIllmanders usually did not ask to haive them
puniished or transferred , because i[ they did so, they were
the 01I1es to 'be punished and t:Jransferred.
The reoiiganiza tion of the Czooho-Slo vak Airrmiy, Sovietstyle, was begun in 1945, ·b ut was not completed in 1948,
antj. I doubt that it will ever be completed. Chaos, fear and
inseouriity, brought in ,by Dr. Benes and his Londlon-Moscow
governmen t in 1946, hiwe taken hold of the milita_ry. No one
is certain of anything; every!body, it seems, is spying on
every!body else. Partisans, formerly ,p rivileged, who robb,e d,
plundered and raped the population, are now :be:ing replaced
as um-eliaJble. The Communis ts are in complete power and
control in Ozeicho-Slovaikia and oruy tried and loya,1-to-Moscow Reds are placed in responsible positions Court martials
and severe punishmen ts hwe failed to increase disciipline and
morale. Desertions by officers, who were favorites just a
while back, ooour daily.
1
During 1947 and 1948 I was imprisoned on several occasions and inivesitiigated on ohar,ges of conspiracy. When I
escruped successfull y in the autumn of 1948, I said good-1bye
to no one, not even my dear wife who was with chi'ld at that
time. After I deserted the army and escaped, I Jearned that
my wife W?,S 'jaHed man~ times and brutally beaten during
the investigatio n. Her herulth gradually broke down and in
1951 she died under the most tragic circumstan ces, leaving
two small children. She was only 26.
�SLOVAKIA
Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more.
I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and
satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and
re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I
had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing
the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police
guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without
fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my
only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y
the peace and security of a great democratic country.
• • •
TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Dr. Arved Grebert
When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary
a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate
from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia.
The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in
the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its
mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as
weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always
tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the
Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical
aspirations and plans.
"The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin"
From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most
natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against
the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent
its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the
west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the
second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely
even with a relatively small number of people and arms.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
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Text
Any textual data included in the document
20
SLOVAKIA
I WAS AN OFFICER OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMV
Anonymous Preferred
Until the autumn of 1'948, I was an active officer of the
Ozecho.;Slovak Army, bearing the rank of Stalff-Captain. I
achieved this rank doing regular officer's duties after graduating as ·an artiHery 'lieutenant from the Military Academy
at BratisilaNa, the capital city of Slovrukia, my country.
In 1942-43, ·as a member of the Slovak Army, I was ~n
comlbat rugainst the U.1S.S.R. During that time I travelled
through Galicia, Ukvainia, White Ruthenia and the Caucasus and :came· in cootact with the divty, miserable, starved
and frightened population of those territories. I spoke with
many intellec.tuals there and they gave me an idea of what
real life is li!ke in communist Russia. I had heard similar
stories before, at home, but found it hard to believe them.
Now I had it first hand from people who. lived under the
men of the -Kremlin.
At t:Jhe end of 1944 and the 1b eginning of 19415, the Red
Army made its way in Slovakia and eventually "lit~ted"
all of Ozecho-,Slovakia. The Red occupation lasted until the
end of 1946, but even after that time the country, especially
Slo.va!kia - the eastern part of Czecho-Slovakia - remained
an eldarado for · military units, groups and indi,viduals whether desertees or reguJar sOildier of the Red Arimy who robbed, pillaged, plundered, murdered and raped almost
at will.
Thds occupation had a very great influence on the reorgani1z ation of the OzechO-iSlorvak Army after the wrur. First,
because the first 1post-war Ozeoho.;81ovak government was
established in Moscow, which was its official residence for a
time, and, secondly, beca.u se the first Czecho-Slova;k _A rmy
corps, organized in Russia during the war, was the fir~t to
come into the coll!Iltry with the Russdans.
The Ozecho-.Slov-a k Army was made up of two nationalities: the. Czechs and the ,Sfovruks, These two nations, even
thoug,h they lived in the same state and were governed by
the same government (Prague), did not get along very
SLOVAKIA
21
well. Causes of this lay deeply in the mentalities coming out
of their religious beliefs, traditions and economic structure.
Furthermore, the Slova:ks felt that they were forced to lilve
with the Czechs in the same state, since no reaJl representative of the SlovaJk nation attended the P.aris Peace Conference in 1'919, or was consulted. As time went on, the lea;d.
ing Czech politiciruns e~loited the Slovaks more and more
and stul:fuornly refused to recognize their just claims and
their inherent dght to freedom, lilberty and the pursuit of
hruppiness. This resulted in the utter colia:pse of Ozecho-,Slovakia in 1939, when the Slovruk nation proclaimed the independence of SlovaJkia all1d the Czechs ca:me under the Germans.
The prolblems which preceded the collapse of the first
Ozech0-4SlovaJk Repulblic (1918-11938) were not solved after
1945, but rather intensified. They af1footed /both civilian and
army personnel. The deteriorated relations between the
Ozechs and Slo'Vaks g;rew worse, because Dr. Edward Benes
and his Moscow government pursued communist tendencies
and persecuted anti-socialistic and anti--communistic elements e$peciaHy in S}()JVa,k ia. Thousands of good citizens
were disfranchised, dispossessed, forcefully deported out of
Slovrukia, jailed and even executed lb ecaue they refused to accept the new order of Benes and Stalin and cooperate with
Communists. Officers of the Slovak Army and their families
suffered the most.
The armed forces were suibordinate to the Ministry of
National Defense and were dirvided ,i nto four inHitary regions
(Vojenske Olblasti): 1. Praigue, 2. Hradec Kralove, 3. Brno,
4. Bratislava. The Department of Defense Security was o-r ganized under the Ministry of National Defense; its task
was to -keep the military in line and it was much the same
as the NKVD in the Red Army. The department had 'brancihes or units at aH headquarters, in all army units and Judependent units. The heads oif these departments were also
sll!bstitute commanders; all were from the first Ozecho-,Slovak Army Corps which was trained and schooled in Russia. Their activities were aiimed especiaUy against Slwaik officers ·who were at least 90 per cent anti-communist. This socalled · "Fifth Department" (Intelligence) of the Ministry of
22
SLOVAK·I A
Naitional Defense had to keep a record of just albout everything on everybody in the Army. Agents of the department
shadowed every officer amd reported what he did on or
off duty . .Ais soon as am,y officer !became a suspect of some
indiscretion or v-iolation - real or imagined - he was
jailed and held for court.
Another new department established within the armed
forces was the Department of T,raining and Education. Officers of this department were assigned to every military
unit, staritilng from a company, battery, or a wing. The functions of these officers were the same as those of the Polytrl.llks (political commissars) in the Red Army. Their job was
to preserve unity in the army, hold the soldiers to certain
princi<ples and incmkate and foster the idea of devotion and
loyalty to the state and the regime. These officers spread
the seed of Commun<ism and hate against their superiors
among their men. Once a week they held lectures, praJsin,g
Stalin, the Red Army, the heroes of Socialism and Soviet
establishment s and smearing and condemning Ca;piWism,
western democracy and Christianity.
The officers of this Department of Educaition and braining had little or no education at a;ll. Communists took advantage of this fact and devloped in them a certain 'kind of
ill-aimbition by granting them high ranks, because they had
learned to speaik and act as they were ordered. In 1948 I
was an instructor in a.school for officers in reserve. I taught
ballistics. When I had to interrupt my teaching, because I
was called to taike part in artill.ery maneuvers, a captain substituted for me. When he introduced' himself to the attendants of the sohool, he told them: "Let the staff-captaiin continue gilv:ing you lectures on the subject of baHistics. I can't
do it, because I finished at the Moscow School and their
ballistics are altogether different than those of the CzechoSlovaik A,r my; they use different mathematics; it's very complicated, so I won't coinfuse you with it." The students immediately felt that something was wrong, because my substitute did not want to teach ballistics. 'Dhey urged him to
explain ballistics as taught by the Moscow School, but he
evaded alil questions on the suibject and preferred to talk
about the history of the Red Army. When I returned to the
SLOVAKIA
23
school, I chec,ked the record orf this individual and found
that he was illiterate when drafted into the service.
The officer-iins tructors had a very destTuct1ve inf1uence
upon the moral discipline, and behavior of the men. 'I'heir
poweT increased to such an extent that rriany commande rs
could not f,ulfiH programs and orders regarding men's training. In 1946 morale and discipline were so deteriorate d that
practically no one's orders were 01beyed; such a condition
existed in SlovaJkia especially. During a football game in
Bratislawa ilil 1946, a riot 'b roke out in the stands and General
Sirica, commande r of 'Military District No. 4 was beaten
brutally when he attempted to ca:Jm the rioters. These officers, it seems, were outside the jurisdiction of regU'lar commanders. COIIllmanders usually did not ask to haive them
puniished or transferred , because i[ they did so, they were
the 01I1es to 'be punished and t:Jransferred.
The reoiiganiza tion of the Czooho-Slo vak Airrmiy, Sovietstyle, was begun in 1945, ·b ut was not completed in 1948,
antj. I doubt that it will ever be completed. Chaos, fear and
inseouriity, brought in ,by Dr. Benes and his Londlon-Moscow
governmen t in 1946, hiwe taken hold of the milita_ry. No one
is certain of anything; every!body, it seems, is spying on
every!body else. Partisans, formerly ,p rivileged, who robb,e d,
plundered and raped the population, are now :be:ing replaced
as um-eliaJble. The Communis ts are in complete power and
control in Ozeicho-Slovaikia and oruy tried and loya,1-to-Moscow Reds are placed in responsible positions Court martials
and severe punishmen ts hwe failed to increase disciipline and
morale. Desertions by officers, who were favorites just a
while back, ooour daily.
1
During 1947 and 1948 I was imprisoned on several occasions and inivesitiigated on ohar,ges of conspiracy. When I
escruped successfull y in the autumn of 1948, I said good-1bye
to no one, not even my dear wife who was with chi'ld at that
time. After I deserted the army and escaped, I Jearned that
my wife W?,S 'jaHed man~ times and brutally beaten during
the investigatio n. Her herulth gradually broke down and in
1951 she died under the most tragic circumstan ces, leaving
two small children. She was only 26.
SLOVAKIA
Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more.
I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and
satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and
re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I
had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing
the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police
guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without
fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my
only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y
the peace and security of a great democratic country.
• • •
TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
Dr. Arved Grebert
When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary
a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate
from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia.
The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in
the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its
mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as
weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always
tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the
Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical
aspirations and plans.
"The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin"
From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most
natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against
the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent
its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the
west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the
second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely
even with a relatively small number of people and arms.
Dublin Core
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Title
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I Was an Officer in the Czecho-Slovak Army
Description
An account of the resource
Anonymous Preferred
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954
pp. 20-24
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
-
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5e925a8f673b0491d1991e3c2743db18
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
LIBERATI ON
INDEPEN DENCE
17
FEDERAT ION
By Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
In 1952 millions of Americans voted in the great hope
of seeing a moral and rational policy of liberation launched
to prevent a disastrous World War III and, at the same
time, to insure the eventual defeat of Russian Communist
imperialism . As of today, there isn't the slightest realization
of this outstanding promise. And it cannot be expected that
the people will forget.
No matter how one dresses it up verbally , the foreign
policy of the United States today is still containmen t. The
so-called policy of mass retaliation is essentially containment by threat. This retaliation version of containmen t is as
devoid of moral principle, political and psychologic al inspiration, and historical perspective as the orthodox version
maintained by Mr. Kennan and his well placed followers.
Dedicated to the liberation and the links of independence and federation in the same policy chain, we must intens ify our efforts to bring this winning policy into being. We
must s upport those who are for this American policy, and
oppose those who are against it. It is the only policy capable
of obstructing the genoc!dal consolidati on of the Communis t
Empire in which Moscow is currently engaged. Once this
consolidatio n is accomplish ed, the enemy will have established his basic and requisite position for world conquest.
This consolidatio n is the prime ground for the enemy's
reasonable expectation of success. Fortified by the advanta ges of a world-wide conspir acy and "the first shot ,"
this expectation does not require any superiority in arms. I>::
the calculus of world conquest, consolidati on, subversion
a nd spontaneou s aggression are sufficient to produce "regionalized Pearl Harbors" devastating major sources of retaliatory effort.
Liberation is a process of political warfar~ aimed at the
ultimate defeat of the enemy and the independen ce of captive nations as a necessary and logical basis for ·'European
and Asiatic reconstruct ion. History does · not - s tand still .
The dynamics of Western freedom and Ru ssian Communist
�1
SLOVAKIA
totalitarianism leave us no choice but to carry political warfare on the present empire terrain of the enemy. By the
standards of what constitutes "peace" today, this action is
J.>eaceable. It demands our full, active support of the real ,
existing undergrounds and resistance forces in Slovakia,
East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These known underground forces are
fighting in a political offensive to regain the very independence and self-government for their respective nations that
we must fight in to preserve for our own.
Theirs is not an ersatz struggle. Last week we witnessed
the spectacle of a Senate committee entertaining testimony
pitched to an "underground tour" from the Baltic to the
Mediterranean. There is a good deal of evidence to support
the lack of credibility in such testimony and brazenly fabricated claims that border on insult to the intelligence of the
American people. Observers are carefully watching to see
whether the Jenner committee intends to call upon witnesses that represent real underground networks and who
can expertly testify on the misleading and dishonest opera tions of the totalitarian and anti-Semitic Russian organization known as the NTS.
They are also waiting to see whether this bold spectacle before a Congressional committee is nothing more than
a blown, plllblicity cover-up - engineered by interested but
sorely embarrassed American supporters - of the recent
cases of heavy Communist infiltration in the group. A Russian "priest" and NTS leader in West Berlin, Matyslav Volonsevich, defected to the Soviets with all the addresses of
his parishioners and the funds of the church. "Georg Mueller," alias Georg Vladimir Khonmzhy-Kherso nsky," another
NTS leader, was recently given a prison sentence by a
United States court in Frankfurt for operating as a Soviet
spy. There is also the case of Alexander Trushnovich about
whom much doubt exists concerning his being "kidnapped"
by the Communists.
On the surface this spectacle has all the marks of a
publicity cover-up tuned to the gullibility of viewers in such
matters. There can be no doubt, however, that this totali-
�SLOVAKIA
19
tarian Russian group, which opportunistically operated with
Nazism as it now seeks to do with the West, is a prime target for Communist infiltration. The totalitarianism of NTS
s hares many things in common with the totalitarianism of
Moscow, notably totalitarian Great Russianism with all its
racist and freedom-denying qualities. The group is the best
possible breeding-ground for Soviet Russian spies and, as
seen in the Khersonsky case, an agency of espionage for
Moscow. It scarcely deserves our trust. Even the Nazis, in
the closing days of the war, saw fit to slay scores of its
members.
The enlightened nationalist cause of the Slovak, Polish,
Ukrainian and other resisters certainly restricts the range
of possible Russian Communist infiltration. It is based on
the invincible fight for national independence and freedom
from alien Russian domination. This is its consuming end,
not that of substituting one form of totalitarianism with
an empire complex for another with the same complex. It
seeks the national independence that we Americans enjoy
and are now challenged to defend.
This spirit of national independence is the full source of
power and strength of the patriotic, non-Russian resisted behind the Iron Curtain. It is our means of victory over Russian Communist imperialism. It is our formula of enduring
peace beyond the defeat of Communism For only with real
independence and equal soverignty can the now captive nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, begin to think of entering into free contracts of federalization. The experience
of Indo-China should convince us that peoples fight for
something rather than merely against Communism.
We who are of these convictions must work tirelessly
for their realization. This is our task in the great interest of
our own country. To aid in this task, it is necessary for us to
establish an American Conference on Foreign Affairs . consisting of American organizations such as yours. the Polish
American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee and
others, that would meet annua11y to discuss and assess our
common problems. I sincerely hope that the inspiration for
this will be generated here today.
�
SLOVAKIA
LIBERATI ON
INDEPEN DENCE
17
FEDERAT ION
By Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
In 1952 millions of Americans voted in the great hope
of seeing a moral and rational policy of liberation launched
to prevent a disastrous World War III and, at the same
time, to insure the eventual defeat of Russian Communist
imperialism . As of today, there isn't the slightest realization
of this outstanding promise. And it cannot be expected that
the people will forget.
No matter how one dresses it up verbally , the foreign
policy of the United States today is still containmen t. The
so-called policy of mass retaliation is essentially containment by threat. This retaliation version of containmen t is as
devoid of moral principle, political and psychologic al inspiration, and historical perspective as the orthodox version
maintained by Mr. Kennan and his well placed followers.
Dedicated to the liberation and the links of independence and federation in the same policy chain, we must intens ify our efforts to bring this winning policy into being. We
must s upport those who are for this American policy, and
oppose those who are against it. It is the only policy capable
of obstructing the genoc!dal consolidati on of the Communis t
Empire in which Moscow is currently engaged. Once this
consolidatio n is accomplish ed, the enemy will have established his basic and requisite position for world conquest.
This consolidatio n is the prime ground for the enemy's
reasonable expectation of success. Fortified by the advanta ges of a world-wide conspir acy and "the first shot ,"
this expectation does not require any superiority in arms. I>::
the calculus of world conquest, consolidati on, subversion
a nd spontaneou s aggression are sufficient to produce "regionalized Pearl Harbors" devastating major sources of retaliatory effort.
Liberation is a process of political warfar~ aimed at the
ultimate defeat of the enemy and the independen ce of captive nations as a necessary and logical basis for ·'European
and Asiatic reconstruct ion. History does · not - s tand still .
The dynamics of Western freedom and Ru ssian Communist
�1
SLOVAKIA
totalitarianism leave us no choice but to carry political warfare on the present empire terrain of the enemy. By the
standards of what constitutes "peace" today, this action is
J.>eaceable. It demands our full, active support of the real ,
existing undergrounds and resistance forces in Slovakia,
East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These known underground forces are
fighting in a political offensive to regain the very independence and self-government for their respective nations that
we must fight in to preserve for our own.
Theirs is not an ersatz struggle. Last week we witnessed
the spectacle of a Senate committee entertaining testimony
pitched to an "underground tour" from the Baltic to the
Mediterranean. There is a good deal of evidence to support
the lack of credibility in such testimony and brazenly fabricated claims that border on insult to the intelligence of the
American people. Observers are carefully watching to see
whether the Jenner committee intends to call upon witnesses that represent real underground networks and who
can expertly testify on the misleading and dishonest opera tions of the totalitarian and anti-Semitic Russian organization known as the NTS.
They are also waiting to see whether this bold spectacle before a Congressional committee is nothing more than
a blown, plllblicity cover-up - engineered by interested but
sorely embarrassed American supporters - of the recent
cases of heavy Communist infiltration in the group. A Russian "priest" and NTS leader in West Berlin, Matyslav Volonsevich, defected to the Soviets with all the addresses of
his parishioners and the funds of the church. "Georg Mueller," alias Georg Vladimir Khonmzhy-Kherso nsky," another
NTS leader, was recently given a prison sentence by a
United States court in Frankfurt for operating as a Soviet
spy. There is also the case of Alexander Trushnovich about
whom much doubt exists concerning his being "kidnapped"
by the Communists.
On the surface this spectacle has all the marks of a
publicity cover-up tuned to the gullibility of viewers in such
matters. There can be no doubt, however, that this totali-
�SLOVAKIA
19
tarian Russian group, which opportunistically operated with
Nazism as it now seeks to do with the West, is a prime target for Communist infiltration. The totalitarianism of NTS
s hares many things in common with the totalitarianism of
Moscow, notably totalitarian Great Russianism with all its
racist and freedom-denying qualities. The group is the best
possible breeding-ground for Soviet Russian spies and, as
seen in the Khersonsky case, an agency of espionage for
Moscow. It scarcely deserves our trust. Even the Nazis, in
the closing days of the war, saw fit to slay scores of its
members.
The enlightened nationalist cause of the Slovak, Polish,
Ukrainian and other resisters certainly restricts the range
of possible Russian Communist infiltration. It is based on
the invincible fight for national independence and freedom
from alien Russian domination. This is its consuming end,
not that of substituting one form of totalitarianism with
an empire complex for another with the same complex. It
seeks the national independence that we Americans enjoy
and are now challenged to defend.
This spirit of national independence is the full source of
power and strength of the patriotic, non-Russian resisted behind the Iron Curtain. It is our means of victory over Russian Communist imperialism. It is our formula of enduring
peace beyond the defeat of Communism For only with real
independence and equal soverignty can the now captive nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, begin to think of entering into free contracts of federalization. The experience
of Indo-China should convince us that peoples fight for
something rather than merely against Communism.
We who are of these convictions must work tirelessly
for their realization. This is our task in the great interest of
our own country. To aid in this task, it is necessary for us to
establish an American Conference on Foreign Affairs . consisting of American organizations such as yours. the Polish
American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee and
others, that would meet annua11y to discuss and assess our
common problems. I sincerely hope that the inspiration for
this will be generated here today.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
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Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
LIBERATI ON
INDEPEN DENCE
17
FEDERAT ION
By Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
In 1952 millions of Americans voted in the great hope
of seeing a moral and rational policy of liberation launched
to prevent a disastrous World War III and, at the same
time, to insure the eventual defeat of Russian Communist
imperialism . As of today, there isn't the slightest realization
of this outstanding promise. And it cannot be expected that
the people will forget.
No matter how one dresses it up verbally , the foreign
policy of the United States today is still containmen t. The
so-called policy of mass retaliation is essentially containment by threat. This retaliation version of containmen t is as
devoid of moral principle, political and psychologic al inspiration, and historical perspective as the orthodox version
maintained by Mr. Kennan and his well placed followers.
Dedicated to the liberation and the links of independence and federation in the same policy chain, we must intens ify our efforts to bring this winning policy into being. We
must s upport those who are for this American policy, and
oppose those who are against it. It is the only policy capable
of obstructing the genoc!dal consolidati on of the Communis t
Empire in which Moscow is currently engaged. Once this
consolidatio n is accomplish ed, the enemy will have established his basic and requisite position for world conquest.
This consolidatio n is the prime ground for the enemy's
reasonable expectation of success. Fortified by the advanta ges of a world-wide conspir acy and "the first shot ,"
this expectation does not require any superiority in arms. I>::
the calculus of world conquest, consolidati on, subversion
a nd spontaneou s aggression are sufficient to produce "regionalized Pearl Harbors" devastating major sources of retaliatory effort.
Liberation is a process of political warfar~ aimed at the
ultimate defeat of the enemy and the independen ce of captive nations as a necessary and logical basis for ·'European
and Asiatic reconstruct ion. History does · not - s tand still .
The dynamics of Western freedom and Ru ssian Communist
1
SLOVAKIA
totalitarianism leave us no choice but to carry political warfare on the present empire terrain of the enemy. By the
standards of what constitutes "peace" today, this action is
J.>eaceable. It demands our full, active support of the real ,
existing undergrounds and resistance forces in Slovakia,
East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These known underground forces are
fighting in a political offensive to regain the very independence and self-government for their respective nations that
we must fight in to preserve for our own.
Theirs is not an ersatz struggle. Last week we witnessed
the spectacle of a Senate committee entertaining testimony
pitched to an "underground tour" from the Baltic to the
Mediterranean. There is a good deal of evidence to support
the lack of credibility in such testimony and brazenly fabricated claims that border on insult to the intelligence of the
American people. Observers are carefully watching to see
whether the Jenner committee intends to call upon witnesses that represent real underground networks and who
can expertly testify on the misleading and dishonest opera tions of the totalitarian and anti-Semitic Russian organization known as the NTS.
They are also waiting to see whether this bold spectacle before a Congressional committee is nothing more than
a blown, plllblicity cover-up - engineered by interested but
sorely embarrassed American supporters - of the recent
cases of heavy Communist infiltration in the group. A Russian "priest" and NTS leader in West Berlin, Matyslav Volonsevich, defected to the Soviets with all the addresses of
his parishioners and the funds of the church. "Georg Mueller," alias Georg Vladimir Khonmzhy-Kherso nsky," another
NTS leader, was recently given a prison sentence by a
United States court in Frankfurt for operating as a Soviet
spy. There is also the case of Alexander Trushnovich about
whom much doubt exists concerning his being "kidnapped"
by the Communists.
On the surface this spectacle has all the marks of a
publicity cover-up tuned to the gullibility of viewers in such
matters. There can be no doubt, however, that this totali-
SLOVAKIA
19
tarian Russian group, which opportunistically operated with
Nazism as it now seeks to do with the West, is a prime target for Communist infiltration. The totalitarianism of NTS
s hares many things in common with the totalitarianism of
Moscow, notably totalitarian Great Russianism with all its
racist and freedom-denying qualities. The group is the best
possible breeding-ground for Soviet Russian spies and, as
seen in the Khersonsky case, an agency of espionage for
Moscow. It scarcely deserves our trust. Even the Nazis, in
the closing days of the war, saw fit to slay scores of its
members.
The enlightened nationalist cause of the Slovak, Polish,
Ukrainian and other resisters certainly restricts the range
of possible Russian Communist infiltration. It is based on
the invincible fight for national independence and freedom
from alien Russian domination. This is its consuming end,
not that of substituting one form of totalitarianism with
an empire complex for another with the same complex. It
seeks the national independence that we Americans enjoy
and are now challenged to defend.
This spirit of national independence is the full source of
power and strength of the patriotic, non-Russian resisted behind the Iron Curtain. It is our means of victory over Russian Communist imperialism. It is our formula of enduring
peace beyond the defeat of Communism For only with real
independence and equal soverignty can the now captive nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, begin to think of entering into free contracts of federalization. The experience
of Indo-China should convince us that peoples fight for
something rather than merely against Communism.
We who are of these convictions must work tirelessly
for their realization. This is our task in the great interest of
our own country. To aid in this task, it is necessary for us to
establish an American Conference on Foreign Affairs . consisting of American organizations such as yours. the Polish
American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee and
others, that would meet annua11y to discuss and assess our
common problems. I sincerely hope that the inspiration for
this will be generated here today.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Liberation - Independence - Federation
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954
pp. 17-19
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Dobriansky, Lev E.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
LCNAF
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c1b4c01c282a23f5617c662b2dcfb47b.pdf
5183f4c90973d838c6d2636b069c1b04
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
15
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
LIKAVA
'I'he ruins of this ancient castle are situated, on an isolated rook aibove the toiwn of Lilkarva, near Ruwmlberok, in
LiptO'V County. In the bax::kgroiund it is surrounded by mountains, the nearest of wlhich is caUed Cebrat,. while memoraJble ChOlc rises northeast and fogenda.ry Mnich soutih of the
castle. On Mt. Mnich (Monk) there was at one time a monastery of the Red MonJk-lremp18!rs. Legend has it that this
monastery was conneioted with the 'V'illage of Llkaiva lby underground passages.
It has not been definitely estaJblished when Likav a
Castle was !built; some historians say that it was 1built during the time of Mojmir or Svatop'h.1.ik, while others olaim that
the Red Monks, the Templars, who had occuJpied a whole
series of 1Slovruk castles, built it in the 13th century to preveillt the wHd Tatars from coming into Ora,iva.
The ruins of Liikaiva iare very interesting even today. Its
mam walls reach heaivenward, forming the image oif a ship.
The buildings of Li!kaNa were quite extensive and in some
places as high as five . .stories. Traces of :p aintings, histOI1ical
dates and various decorations on the walls are stilil faintly
vi,silble, as are evidences of several gates and underground
store rooms. Soutlh and west of the castle were two extensive gardens; below the castle a yard and a fishpond north
of it. The iview from the castle is ivery 1bea,wtifuL On the south
one can see the ,w hite ho1Uses of Liik,a va, ~ond which lies
Ruzomberok, the city of Father Andrew llli.nika, champion
of justice and Slo1vaJk freedom.
When danger threatened, the people of Gerner, UptOIV
and Turiec usually fled to the hills and mountains. The
Likava Castle was a sarfe pla-ce of refuge when 500,000 Tatars itore into Hungary in 1241 ; in the battle a/bove the Sajava River some 100,000 soldiers perished. The people
of those regions fled not only into the mountains and
castles, but also sought refuge in the many caives for which
�16
SLOVAKIA
Slovakia is noted. Plroof od: this exists in the carves of Liptov and those orf Mt. Mnich and Mt. Choe.
After the depa:riture of the Tata.Ts, Likava passed into
the hands of Genman calonirers who were called in by King
Bela IV of HUil!gary. In 1312, the lord of Lrkaiva Castle was
Radomir, the last Prior Of Cerveny Klastor (Red . Monastery) on Mt. Mnich. Three years later (1'31'5) Ki:ng Charles
RdbeTt •donated Lilkava to Miatusv Done, administrator of
Li-pto1V Oounty, for aid giiven him in 1:Jhe battle near Rozhanovce. Later, the casble 1belonged to George Buibek (Bebek ?) , King Zigmll!l1d, John Jiskra (1441), Peter Komorovsky (1449); the la;tter also awned the Oraiva Castle. Other
owners of Likava included Andrew Bathory, John Krusie,
the Hunady's, Zaipol'skys, Illeshazis and, finaMy the Tokolys.
While the latteT family held it, Litkava ,p robably sa;w its most
glorious days. Of course, the owners and the people connected with the castle never had any long, peaceful periods.;
the never-ending struggle for 1:Jhe crown of Hungary brought
misery and suffering to the p01pU1lation; the throne of Hungary was seldom gained without bloodshed. Many of the
battles for the throne took place ,b eneath the Lilkaiva Castle.
'Dhe Tokoly clan became a ,power in Hungary and rebelled a:gainst the thTOne. In 1670, when the imperial anny
besieged the Orava Castle, whi-ch was held by 1:Jhe elder Toko1y, his so.n Emevich, disguised as a woman, fled Likava
and organiized a rebellion against the HaJb$burgs. When
Francis Raikoczi ordered the old castle demol,ished in 1707,
the people undertook the task enthusiastically, but the
walls would not go down. No one became interested in re building the old Lika1Va 'bastion, so tJhe bleak walls remain
a silent and ominous witness to a troubled past.
•
•
•
DEFINITION OF A CZECHOSLOVAK: A Czechoslo vak is a Czech
or renegade Slovak who claims that the Slovak nation does not want
to be free and independent, but prefers to be under the domination
of the Czechs, who are, according to him, the only peuple in the
world who can safeguard the national existence of the Slovak people
and promote its national welfare better than the Slovaks themselves.
In short: A LIAR!
�
SLOVAKIA
15
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
LIKAVA
'I'he ruins of this ancient castle are situated, on an isolated rook aibove the toiwn of Lilkarva, near Ruwmlberok, in
LiptO'V County. In the bax::kgroiund it is surrounded by mountains, the nearest of wlhich is caUed Cebrat,. while memoraJble ChOlc rises northeast and fogenda.ry Mnich soutih of the
castle. On Mt. Mnich (Monk) there was at one time a monastery of the Red MonJk-lremp18!rs. Legend has it that this
monastery was conneioted with the 'V'illage of Llkaiva lby underground passages.
It has not been definitely estaJblished when Likav a
Castle was !built; some historians say that it was 1built during the time of Mojmir or Svatop'h.1.ik, while others olaim that
the Red Monks, the Templars, who had occuJpied a whole
series of 1Slovruk castles, built it in the 13th century to preveillt the wHd Tatars from coming into Ora,iva.
The ruins of Liikaiva iare very interesting even today. Its
mam walls reach heaivenward, forming the image oif a ship.
The buildings of Li!kaNa were quite extensive and in some
places as high as five . .stories. Traces of :p aintings, histOI1ical
dates and various decorations on the walls are stilil faintly
vi,silble, as are evidences of several gates and underground
store rooms. Soutlh and west of the castle were two extensive gardens; below the castle a yard and a fishpond north
of it. The iview from the castle is ivery 1bea,wtifuL On the south
one can see the ,w hite ho1Uses of Liik,a va, ~ond which lies
Ruzomberok, the city of Father Andrew llli.nika, champion
of justice and Slo1vaJk freedom.
When danger threatened, the people of Gerner, UptOIV
and Turiec usually fled to the hills and mountains. The
Likava Castle was a sarfe pla-ce of refuge when 500,000 Tatars itore into Hungary in 1241 ; in the battle a/bove the Sajava River some 100,000 soldiers perished. The people
of those regions fled not only into the mountains and
castles, but also sought refuge in the many caives for which
�16
SLOVAKIA
Slovakia is noted. Plroof od: this exists in the carves of Liptov and those orf Mt. Mnich and Mt. Choe.
After the depa:riture of the Tata.Ts, Likava passed into
the hands of Genman calonirers who were called in by King
Bela IV of HUil!gary. In 1312, the lord of Lrkaiva Castle was
Radomir, the last Prior Of Cerveny Klastor (Red . Monastery) on Mt. Mnich. Three years later (1'31'5) Ki:ng Charles
RdbeTt •donated Lilkava to Miatusv Done, administrator of
Li-pto1V Oounty, for aid giiven him in 1:Jhe battle near Rozhanovce. Later, the casble 1belonged to George Buibek (Bebek ?) , King Zigmll!l1d, John Jiskra (1441), Peter Komorovsky (1449); the la;tter also awned the Oraiva Castle. Other
owners of Likava included Andrew Bathory, John Krusie,
the Hunady's, Zaipol'skys, Illeshazis and, finaMy the Tokolys.
While the latteT family held it, Litkava ,p robably sa;w its most
glorious days. Of course, the owners and the people connected with the castle never had any long, peaceful periods.;
the never-ending struggle for 1:Jhe crown of Hungary brought
misery and suffering to the p01pU1lation; the throne of Hungary was seldom gained without bloodshed. Many of the
battles for the throne took place ,b eneath the Lilkaiva Castle.
'Dhe Tokoly clan became a ,power in Hungary and rebelled a:gainst the thTOne. In 1670, when the imperial anny
besieged the Orava Castle, whi-ch was held by 1:Jhe elder Toko1y, his so.n Emevich, disguised as a woman, fled Likava
and organiized a rebellion against the HaJb$burgs. When
Francis Raikoczi ordered the old castle demol,ished in 1707,
the people undertook the task enthusiastically, but the
walls would not go down. No one became interested in re building the old Lika1Va 'bastion, so tJhe bleak walls remain
a silent and ominous witness to a troubled past.
•
•
•
DEFINITION OF A CZECHOSLOVAK: A Czechoslo vak is a Czech
or renegade Slovak who claims that the Slovak nation does not want
to be free and independent, but prefers to be under the domination
of the Czechs, who are, according to him, the only peuple in the
world who can safeguard the national existence of the Slovak people
and promote its national welfare better than the Slovaks themselves.
In short: A LIAR!
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
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SLOVAKIA
15
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
LIKAVA
'I'he ruins of this ancient castle are situated, on an isolated rook aibove the toiwn of Lilkarva, near Ruwmlberok, in
LiptO'V County. In the bax::kgroiund it is surrounded by mountains, the nearest of wlhich is caUed Cebrat,. while memoraJble ChOlc rises northeast and fogenda.ry Mnich soutih of the
castle. On Mt. Mnich (Monk) there was at one time a monastery of the Red MonJk-lremp18!rs. Legend has it that this
monastery was conneioted with the 'V'illage of Llkaiva lby underground passages.
It has not been definitely estaJblished when Likav a
Castle was !built; some historians say that it was 1built during the time of Mojmir or Svatop'h.1.ik, while others olaim that
the Red Monks, the Templars, who had occuJpied a whole
series of 1Slovruk castles, built it in the 13th century to preveillt the wHd Tatars from coming into Ora,iva.
The ruins of Liikaiva iare very interesting even today. Its
mam walls reach heaivenward, forming the image oif a ship.
The buildings of Li!kaNa were quite extensive and in some
places as high as five . .stories. Traces of :p aintings, histOI1ical
dates and various decorations on the walls are stilil faintly
vi,silble, as are evidences of several gates and underground
store rooms. Soutlh and west of the castle were two extensive gardens; below the castle a yard and a fishpond north
of it. The iview from the castle is ivery 1bea,wtifuL On the south
one can see the ,w hite ho1Uses of Liik,a va, ~ond which lies
Ruzomberok, the city of Father Andrew llli.nika, champion
of justice and Slo1vaJk freedom.
When danger threatened, the people of Gerner, UptOIV
and Turiec usually fled to the hills and mountains. The
Likava Castle was a sarfe pla-ce of refuge when 500,000 Tatars itore into Hungary in 1241 ; in the battle a/bove the Sajava River some 100,000 soldiers perished. The people
of those regions fled not only into the mountains and
castles, but also sought refuge in the many caives for which
16
SLOVAKIA
Slovakia is noted. Plroof od: this exists in the carves of Liptov and those orf Mt. Mnich and Mt. Choe.
After the depa:riture of the Tata.Ts, Likava passed into
the hands of Genman calonirers who were called in by King
Bela IV of HUil!gary. In 1312, the lord of Lrkaiva Castle was
Radomir, the last Prior Of Cerveny Klastor (Red . Monastery) on Mt. Mnich. Three years later (1'31'5) Ki:ng Charles
RdbeTt •donated Lilkava to Miatusv Done, administrator of
Li-pto1V Oounty, for aid giiven him in 1:Jhe battle near Rozhanovce. Later, the casble 1belonged to George Buibek (Bebek ?) , King Zigmll!l1d, John Jiskra (1441), Peter Komorovsky (1449); the la;tter also awned the Oraiva Castle. Other
owners of Likava included Andrew Bathory, John Krusie,
the Hunady's, Zaipol'skys, Illeshazis and, finaMy the Tokolys.
While the latteT family held it, Litkava ,p robably sa;w its most
glorious days. Of course, the owners and the people connected with the castle never had any long, peaceful periods.;
the never-ending struggle for 1:Jhe crown of Hungary brought
misery and suffering to the p01pU1lation; the throne of Hungary was seldom gained without bloodshed. Many of the
battles for the throne took place ,b eneath the Lilkaiva Castle.
'Dhe Tokoly clan became a ,power in Hungary and rebelled a:gainst the thTOne. In 1670, when the imperial anny
besieged the Orava Castle, whi-ch was held by 1:Jhe elder Toko1y, his so.n Emevich, disguised as a woman, fled Likava
and organiized a rebellion against the HaJb$burgs. When
Francis Raikoczi ordered the old castle demol,ished in 1707,
the people undertook the task enthusiastically, but the
walls would not go down. No one became interested in re building the old Lika1Va 'bastion, so tJhe bleak walls remain
a silent and ominous witness to a troubled past.
•
•
•
DEFINITION OF A CZECHOSLOVAK: A Czechoslo vak is a Czech
or renegade Slovak who claims that the Slovak nation does not want
to be free and independent, but prefers to be under the domination
of the Czechs, who are, according to him, the only peuple in the
world who can safeguard the national existence of the Slovak people
and promote its national welfare better than the Slovaks themselves.
In short: A LIAR!
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Likava
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954
pp. 15-16
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d34ef8d9b1e14db214783cae3b9d29e9.pdf
9f5488907155635d54a32238029997c0
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
THE CASE OF
DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY
Joseph K~rschbaum, M,A., LL.D.
Early in February orf this year. Senator William E.
Jenner's Committee !began to investigate se:veraJ Cze<!h politicians and their SlOIVaJk hirelings (br. Ruibert Ripka, Dr.
Ferdinand Peroutka, Dr. Peter Zenlkl, Dr. J ose,ph Let.trich,
General Nicholas Feriencik) who collatbomted wiitJh Communism and were granted asy1wm ·a nd aid by the administration oif President Hiarry Truman: The iillvesti:gatiion was
initiated in the interests of American democracy and the
security of .the United States of America. Anglo...Saxon
law, however, protects the accused and the suspect until a
verd!ict is rendered and, therefore, no one on the Slov,ak side
has thus far taJken · a meritorious position, even though the
SlovaJk nation ,p aid and is stiU .paying heavily in blood and
suffering for the politics of the Czech and so-.called "Czechoslovak" CO'llaJboraitOTs with Communism now being investigated.
The investi,gaJtion is not as yet completed, and it can happen that for various reaso1I1s it may not b_e completed in
such a m·a nner as would ·be demanded by truth and justice.
In the first place, we are here concerned with a .poHtical
committee and the evidence of facts after some 10-12 yea·r s
is quite 'buvdensome. In the second plaJce, many political
circles, new,spa;pers. and or1ganimations in the demooratic
world are and wiU 1~ interested in defending the 0zech collalborators, because all fellow-travelers and cry,pto-Communists wiill thereby deifend their own policies and themselves.
The following remarks concerning the case of Hulbert
Ripka· and Coonpan~ are not a result of the investigation of
the Senate SU:b-<Committee, nor do they in any way consider
what the eventual result might ib.e. Dr. Hulbert Ripka himself,
conscious of his own "mistakes" and not altogether governed
by the mofal prindp.le that "the hest deifense is offense," d!id
not wait for .the resll!lt of the investigation, as every serious
person would do, but attacked his a0cusers, waning: I cOiffiplain, I oigject. Ordinarily we wou,l d not expect this from a
60-year-old politician. The remariks t'hat foHow refer to t:Jhis
1
�SLOVAKIA
5
complaint of Dr. Ripka and his altlies in whose na;me Dr.
Rrpka speaks.
The Psychological Errors of Ripka's Defense
The very fad that Dr. Riipka considered it necessary to
complain iaJbout hiis accusers 1publ icly must girve the impression to ervery legally and politica!My minded person that Dr.
Riipka is not certain albout his ow11 innocence and, therefore,
resorted to hysteri'ca1 spasms before the resul..ts of the investigation were made kno1W11. The manner of his public defense and ang,r y tone, as well as the badly selec,ted vooa1bulary of Dr. Rip:k,a in his series of articles .pU!blished in the
NiEW YORKSKY DENN1K f!rom March 12th of this year,
necessarily leads us to the conclusion that some/body stepped
on the corns of Dr. Ripka and his fsociates.. Dr. Ripka
made it quite dbvious that the co·r n huH:s, and he and his
associates are afraid of having it operated on.
1
This, however, undoulb,t edl,y wu.H not sur.pTise any decent person, who is acquainted with the actual situation in
the Gzecho-Sl{)!Vruk Repulblic after 194.5 and wu.th the politics
of the aocused Ozech aifd "Ozechoslovatk" collaJborators with
Oommunism, as much as the fa'Ct that heire we hruve a man
who so scandra:lously defends himself aigainst accusations
of politi'cal collalboration, lbut who voted with both hands
to hang ,p oliticians who eiven "might have" collalborated and
with far less catastrophic consequences than in the case of
Dr. Rtpka and his associates. The Sloivak ,p oliticians, who
saived their nation from suffering and possible caitastrophy
and cairried out the state rewolution with a song on their
lips, were not resiponsi/ble foir a single verdict of death for
politi:ca:l reasons while they g01Verned. How did they fare
during the reign of DT. Rip!ka and his a;SSociates? They were
hung and shot and tortured witho,wt mercy and without regard to rig,ht and justice for "all.eged" collaJbomtion. Nay,
the verofoits were already rendered by the Ozech exiles in
London without investigation and trial.
Yet, this same Dr. Ripka, who sent people to the g•allows, feels highly inswted and thiniks that he is unjustly
treated by the very faot th11it somebody had dared to ask
him what the conditions were in Ozec'ho-Slova;kia while he
�(j
SI. OV AKT A
and his associates were memibers of the "National Front"
Government there and why that country was surrende,r ed to
Moscow without a fight. Instead of exiplaining calmly and
objectively and, incidentally, uttering "mea oulipa" and pointing out extenuating circUlffis1Jances, 1because only these will
be considered, Dr. Hulbert Riplka insolently attacked his accusers and the victims of his politics in the effort to weaken
the accusation and diivert attention to events which had
little or nothing in common with the investigation of the
Senate COIIlllrn.ittee of the United States.
PsyohologicaHy - and in politics psychological moments are not without significance - Dr. R•i pka b.egan his
defense very amk!war<ily. Lt was "a very wrong approach"
to the delicate question of collaJboration in ipolitics. Let us,
however, leave the realm of psycholo,g y and see at least
cursorily how the case looks from the angle of political and
legal argiuments.
Political Falsehoods and Half-Truths
Dr. Ripka rests his defense on several politicai falsehoods and half--truths, assuming that "Ameri:cans, with the
exception of a few experts, cannot knoiw the comp1ex problems of Central EurO!pe," as he himself stated it.
The main lies resorted to 'by Ripka are the following:
1. that the whole (Ozechos;Jo1vruk) nation wa:s for an alliance
with the USSR during the war; 2. that the treaty of Dr.
Benes with Moscow (December 12, 1943) was concluded to
save Sl01ViaJkfa; 3. that the A.Hies had wanted a Soviet-Czech
treaty in 1943.
In the first instance, we are concerned with such an
apparent lie that we must seriously question the fact that
Dr. Ripka, a learned politician, can so daringly state such
an exposed untruth in the face of thousands of Czechs and
Sfovaks. The fad is that, for example, in Slovakia - in
whose name Ripka presumes to spealk - up to the time of
the OzechoJSoviet treaty, both the Communists and those
accused with Ripka today (Ur. Lettrich and Gen. Feriencik) were practically inactive in politics. It was only after
the treaty of Dr. Benes with Stalin that the so-ealled "Slovak underground" - the Communists and their collabora-
�SLOVAKIA
i
tors from the "Ozechoslova;k" camp - met for the first
time and on the basis of the treaty decided in Moscow to
undertake political action for the renewal of Ozecho-.Slo ,,akia.
It seems that Dr. Ri,pka depends entirely too much on
the "ignorance " of Americans when he a1btempts to deny
such evident facts. He pretends that he has forgotten that
the governmen t, in which he occupied such an eminent position, had jailed and sentenced to death thousands and thousands of ,people in Sloivakia and the Czech lands, that it dispossessed and disfranchis ed them only /because they were
against Moscow and CommuniS1In; that the governmen t of
which Ripka was a part deported over three million Germans in a ba.zfuaTic manner aJlso beicause they rather looked
to Germany than to Russia, and that it deported even the
Magyars for collaiborating with the Germans.
Now, then, where was this "whole nation" which Ripka
spoke of? In this case we can understand "nation" in the
political sense oi Anglo.Saxo n terminolog y and, consequent ly, must include the entire population of the Ozecho-Slo.vak
Repulblic, because otherwise in the Ozech~lov aJk Repulblic
there are and were at least two nations already even at the
time the London governmen t of Dr. Benes concluded the
Czecho-Sov iet Treaty.
2. The weakest argument of a political nature offered
for the co.llalboration of the Czech ,p oliticians with Moscow
is the statement that the Czecho-&wieit Treaty of 1943 was
concluded "to save Slovailria." '.Dhis is not only a lie, but a
political rubsurdity, especially in the veraion of Dr. Hulbert
Ri,p ka. At the time when the Czech exiles, headed 'by Dr.
Edward Benes, concluded their treaty with Moscow, there
were no SlovaJk Communis ts in Moscow who could have had
"sepa.ratist ic tendencies, " nay, there were :no significant SloV1ak Communis ts there at aJI. The leader of the Slovak Communist s, Dr. Vladimir Clementis, was Dr. Benes's
man in London and the rest of the Slovruk Communist s, outside of one or two exceptions, li'Ved comfortabl y in Slovakia.
Dr. Ripka knowingly uses the argument which could
be applied cum grano salis to the events of 1944 and later,
�SLOVAKIA
when Slovaik Communists manifested tendencies for independence, because they saw no reason why the Czechs should
rule over S10!Vl8Jk,ia (Dr. Nemec, the governmoot delegate),
when Slwruk blood was !being spilled the:re, while in the
Czech lands the people, taiking council from the London
government of Benes, were even afraid to speak out so that
they mi ght not anger the Germa:ris. At this time it is bloody
irony to ta1k a'bout "saNing Slovalkia," whkh without the
interference orf Dr. Ripka and his associates would have
come out of the war either as Finland did, or in the worst
case as Hungary did, which would haNe been !better for the
Slovak nation from every point oif 'View than the position
which ·r esulted from the Ozecho-Soviet Treaty. Slovakia was
plundered so thoroughly and Silo1Vak women and girls were
brutally ravaged by the Russian hordes as if no treaty had
existed at all. And thus it was that amti-Commun ists were
hung, shot and jailed in Slo,valkia. To this ibolshevik vengeance and inhumanity was added also the revenge of the
Ozechs, ait times, proved wo,r se than the excesses of the
bar'baria.n Reds. Then SlovaJkia was also plundered economically by Prague.
1
If Dr. Riipka and his asso.ciates maintain that they rendered the Czechs and the SlOIV'aJks a seirivice by delaying the
bolsheivization of Czecho-Slwaik ia with the:i.r treaty (which
we seriously doulbt), then it is apparent that Ripka '8Jlld Coonpany would like us to forget how many people perished and
are still perishing ~ause they believed the false and n.ruive
the sis aJbouit the independeince oif the Ozecho~Slovak Republic and therefore, came out openl;y- agiainst Communism. And
how muoh damage did the propaganda of Riipka and his associates do from the international standpoint when it
proved, or tried to pmve, that collaJboration witfu Moscow
was not only possible, but necessary? The tTuth is that the
policy of Dr. Benes, Dr. Ripka and Company could have
served only the interests of Moscow and the Czech Communists, lbecaJuse under the veil of Czech propaganda Moscow could play its false role, and the Czech Communists
could murrder, deport, violate, ipersecute any one they wanted
to with the copartidspaJtion and coresponsibili ty of the glo-
�SLOVAKIA
9
rified "democ,r,a,ts" in the western world of Dr. Benes, Masaryik, Dr. Ripka, Zenkl, etc.
3. Rilpka did not state the trwth when he wrote that the
western a:11:ies wanted the Czecho-Soviet 'Dreaty in 1943. We
know that they were not for it; Churchill aind EJden eS1peciaJl.y were against it; both protested.pulbliicly ag:ainst it and the
matter was debated in Parliament. Of course, when the
allies did coI11SenJt to it, it was only rufter Dr. Benes had
everything cwt and dried amd the allies were faced with .,_
fait accampli; and they did so to aJVoid an airig,ument with
Moscow at t:hat time. In his entire "complaint," Dr. Rtpka
moves aibout on thin ice; he anticipates, distorts the facts
and entangles his argumentation with pettifoggery. He
would like to hruve us forget, at the same time, that he himse1f had spoken and written aJbout aH. these matters, that
the Loo.don bToadc,a sts .and the press of the Ozeich exiles
commented on them, that we ha,ve the memoirs of Dr. Benes, Dr. Olementis, Masaryk and even the great masterpiece
of collraJboration by Ripka himself, his boolk IDAST AND
WEST, published in London in 1944.
U siI1Jg the Polish case as an argument in this connootion
is also antici'Pating and distorting the facts. Dr. Ripka intentionally forgets jrust wh~in Dr. Edward Benes began hi:s. Sovietophile politics; and ver,y conrvenienUy prefers not tq mention thait between Moscow and the Poiish London Government there was not only the "Katyn affa.ir," but also an 8JPparent anti-Communist atmosphere, while the goivernment
of Dr. Benes wa,s a cami:miflaged bols'hevilk emlbassy a:nd
propagation center in the western world, which Moscow
not only did not h0JVe to l,iquidaJte, 'but, converaely, used its
.services very effectivcly to promote its own interests. Moscow liquidate its own agents only after they harve finished
the wo~k asstgrned them. Since this was not the case with
Benes'•s . London Go:vernmenrt in 1943, no parallel can ibe
drawn between the Ozecli and Polish governments in London
without an attempt at deceit.
By using the arguments he did, Ripka not only did not
produce an adequate defense for the conclusion of the Czecho-Soviet Treaty,. but eiven did not give an aiecepbalble ex-
�10
SLOVAKIA
ipla.nation for it. On the contrary, by taking recourse to lies,
half-truths, anticipation and distortion of the facts , he
demonstrated quite clearly that the Cooch and Slovak collaborators with Communism do not know how to defend their
politics. Therefore, it remains for us to answer at least
briefly the question whether Dr. Ripka and Company did
collaJborate with bolshevism at the eX!pense of the Czech and
SlOIVak naJtions and at the expense of the interests o.f democracy in general.
The Collaboration of Ripka and Co.
If we do not taJke into account the legal pa:squinades
of the so-.cahled "peoples-democrat ic" courts, we find that
there is no established legal definition for the crime of col1.a!boration as we have, for exa:mple, in the case of treason.
In general, after the S'e cond World War, colla:boraltion meant
aiding the occU1pants in the management of the territories
they had oocU!pied -and su,pportirug their aggressions. A whole
series of governments - from Petiaiin's to the H'l.l!Ilgarian,
Rumanian and Slava:k - ,w as placed on trial and convicted
for such colla!boration, even though in some cases collaboration consisted of not resisting German agg·ressiorn and of alliances of these governments with Berlin, which undoubtedly spared the nations concerned from aJctwail oocuipation and
its consequences. The defense "of the collaborators with Germany - pointing out that they a'Verted ca:tastTophy f.rcnn
other nations - however, was not accepted.
Post~war governments, including the one of which Dr.
Riipka and his associates were members, a::r\bitrnrily and mercilessly sent hundreds and thousands of such "collaJbora:tors"
to the gallows, jails and concentration camps.
If it is true that the Czecho.-iSlovruk Repulblic was "occupied" by the Russian Army, as Dr. Ripka himself now
claims in his defense, and not "lifberated" - as he claimed
eaxlier - then tihere can be no argument that the politics
of Dr. Riipka and Co. exhausts the rea.il sUl~ance of the
crime of coll.aJboration as it was defined by the "Nation.al
Courts" of Ozecho--SlOIV'alkria and by the manifestations of
Dr. R:ilpka himself.
�SLOVAKIA
11
Dr. Ripka and his associates not only col,laJborated with
the occupying power, but a:lso he1ped it sig:n.irficantly to consolidate its aggressions, includJing Ozecho-<Slovaikia itself.
Naturally, Dr. Ripka points out that that was not his intention. It is possilble, however, to ,presuppose that it was the
intention of Petain, or any other government in Central Euro:pe during the war, to aid the Gernnans at the expense of
their own ·nations and countries? Did they a1l not defend
themselrve.s - and many of them altogether jlUSbly - that
they saved their naitions from great drumacge, from slaughter
and plunder? What was the answer given to such questions,
or to suoh a defense, by the government of which Benes,
Ripka, Zenfkl, Lettrich, etc., were members? The gallows,
concentration camps, deportation to Siberia, forced labor
camps, and jails!
So that there mi:ght not be any misunderstanding, decent ,people in macny cases regarded the continU'atiOlll cxf "peoples-democratic governments" as a travesty of justice and
judicial mocder and, therefore, we do not want to girve the
impression that our conclusion is to "repay the gaUows with
gallows." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim
of those remarks is something altogether different: to point
out what kind of individuals are seelking cover in the democratic society and are aippealing to its sense of justrl.re, when
they themselves never displayed any towat-d persons who
were guilty of lesser transgressions than they and whose politics resulted in far less fortunate consequences than theirs.
Comparing the collaJboration and politics of Dr. Ripka
and Co. with that of, for example, Marshall Petain, Dr. Tiso,
Antonescu, etc., we must also taJke into consideration one
essential difference: the latter did not request and did not
want colialboration with Germa'lllY; they did not initiate it
and did not see in the Naizi system a;nd collaiboration with
Germany what Dr. Rirpka and Oompany, long before 1945,
saw in bolsheviism and in collaboration with Moscow.
Marshal Petain and Dr. Tiso were put into the situation of "co'llalboration," when more than half of France was
occupied and Slovakia was gi;ven a choice of being ooowpied
by Germany or dirvided among its neighbors. Therefore,
even if they did accept unpleasant and ungrateful tasks in
�12
SLOVAKIA
the interest of their nations, they did not 'b ecome international propagandists Of German politics, as w,a,s- the case
with the Czech gove:mment-in..exile in its relation to Russia.
Dr. RiJpka and Co., therefore, were not only guilty of the
type of "collaboration'' for whfoh Pet-ain was coovicted and
Dr. Tiso was murdered, but of a ty;pe much wcmse, because
they wanted to collalbol'late with Russia and presented bolsheivism, fong before they returned to Prague, in glowing
ternns as a form of prog,r essive democrax!y, defending i,t
a-g ainst the Naizi bogey and convincing the world that the
Soviets love and want peruce and the necessity for cooperating with Russia.
Broadcasting over BBC, London, November 7, 1942, on
the world s1gmficance of the Soviet Revolution, Dr. Hubert
Ripka said that the revolution (which ,b rought bo~shevism
or Communism to Russia) "is a super-111ational ideal, an
eternal ideal, a h\.llill'an ideal, an ideal which has kindled the
minds of t'he nolblest of men from the time of Plato and
through t'he Chr:isti,a n era, through the great Fre1mh Revolution and until today."
In his hook EA/ST AND WEST (London, l944), Dr.
Rlipka wrote (p. 64). "The democvatization of Russia and the
whole of Soviet society, which is a permanent resuit of the
Soviet revolutionary process, eliJminated from Russian policy
the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against
the smaUer nations; it also resulted in the ,Soviet Union's becoming a genll'inely pea~e-loving power, sincerely interested
in -the maJnteniance of peace,. but at the same time powerful enough to resist aggression and furnish effective help
and support to t'he peace..Joving forees of the world."
Addressing .himself to the Central...Jilil~apean nations,
Dr. Ripka stated categorically: "We repeat: the So'Vli.ets are
not anxious to 'Bolshewze' Central and South~Eastern Europe" (East and West, p. 61). And: "Here and there, mi~
givings still exist on the score of Russian or, more ,preciseily,
Soviet imlperi,a;lism. We do not share those feavs" (.p. 51)
Dr. Fevclinamd Peroutka, a very close fri-end of Dr. Rirpka, even after he had the opportunity to see just what the
bolshevi!k ho:rdes ·were c84)alble of and to know just what oommunist politics aimed to achieve, wrote: "The East, there is
�SLOVAKIA
13
our liberator, our ally and our protector in the future ... If in
England there still can be found factors who evince a bigoted
hatred for the Soviet Union, then those persons cannot even
be considered as our friends" (DNESEK, June 11, 1946).
The remain!ing 0zech aind Slova!k associa.tes of Dr. Ripka spolke, acted and wrote along the same lines, here and
there trying to outdo each othm- in their apPeasement of
the Communists and in proclaiming their undying loyalty to
the Soviet Union.
In other words, in the case of Dr. Ripka a.nd Oo. we are
not concerned with coUaJborators who were forced to collaborate, 'but with politicians who. even gained otheiis for the
Soviet Union (Vd. the books of Dr. Ripka, Dr. Peroutka, Dr.
Benes and their manifestations during and aftm- the war;
Dr. Stephen Osusky',s booklet "Dr. Bene£ and the Slova!ks";
also quotaitions in the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER and S'LOV A.KIA, as well as HrOlbak's "CZECH0SL0ViA!KliSM Versus A!MERilC.AJN]SM").
Conclusion
As I had said at the beginning of these remavks, the investigaition of Dr. Hubm-t Ripka and Co. can be completed
without the American authorities undertaking any necessary steps a;gainst this grouip of collalbomtors with bolshevism who are hidiinig behind a democratic laibel an~ are using
and abusing the good nature and hospitality of certain
American circles. But eiven such an end of the inivestigation
will not change the fact in t'he least that Dr. Ripka; Peroutka, Zeillkl, Lettrich, Fm-ienci,k, etc., were tools of communist
policy in the 0zecho..Slo:vak Republi:c - Dr. Ripka even in
and t'hat their collalbora.tion
the international arena resulted in rirvers of blood, suffering and the enslavement
of millions of innocent hwman beings.
Dr. Rii.pk•a and his associ,a tes are attempting to defend
their coHalboration by saying that they intended to 'defend
democracy and that they could not foresee that Russia
would not honor its treaties. In ,p olitics, where everything is
judged b.y results and not according to intentions, this
feeble defense will not · rid them of the responsibility. It
�14
SLO VAKIA
could be, as already stated, the maximum of extenuating
circumstances, ,booaruse in poil[tics the definition still. applies :
gouverner, c'est prevoir (to govern is to foresee). Dr. Rirpka
and Co. either l,araked necessairy f.oresig'ht, or, if they knew
what they were doing, collaJborated fully and wiUingly in
the full sense of the word.
In either case, however, i:t is difficrut to understand
why sO!Ill'e American chicles are still supporting these ~ech
politicfans, who in the battle a:g·a inst Communism - failed
.shamefully and rutterly, maJking it ruppeaT that some one is
interested in whitewashing them forcefll!lly of c0Ua1boration
- the collaJb oriation which they committed to a very greater
measure than did the people they shot and hung for coUaboratirrg with the Na2Jis.
·
The Czech politicians coli1ruborated with the men of the
Kremlin 'because they hated the West after Munich (193:8).
Some wanted to avenge themselves on the West. They :knew
what they were doing; they turned to Moscow knowingly
and willingly. The Ozech •p oliticians a3so hated the SloV'a:ks,
because they had dared to lwe their own li,ves and proclaim their independence; th,a t they demonstmted their
ability to live without the Czechs and thus frustrated their
plan to Ozechize the S1ovaik nation, to destroy it as a nation.
Driven by this hatred, the desire for revenge and the ambition to rule, Dr. Ripka and Co. thrust themseJ,ves into the
embrace of Moscow and fled to the West only after they
sa:w that they played the wrong hoTse and Moscow wanted
to liquidate them.
We m'll!st, therefore, ask the question, whether in the
fight against Communism these persons are, from among
the Czech and Slov,a,k exiles, suitaJble intei,preters o;f democratic conceptions with regard to the ~ h and Slovak nations and whether they came to the United States and
Cainada through those elements of the past administrations,
which saw in Comtmunism "a progressive democracy" - as
did Ripka, PerourtJka, Zenkl Le1Jtrich and Co. The <:ry· "cavean:t consules, nequid detrimenti Res PUiblica capiat," it
seems, is, therefore, in order, but the investigation of the
Czech collalborators is aJso late by several years.
�
SLOVAKIA
THE CASE OF
DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY
Joseph K~rschbaum, M,A., LL.D.
Early in February orf this year. Senator William E.
Jenner's Committee !began to investigate se:veraJ Cze<!h politicians and their SlOIVaJk hirelings (br. Ruibert Ripka, Dr.
Ferdinand Peroutka, Dr. Peter Zenlkl, Dr. J ose,ph Let.trich,
General Nicholas Feriencik) who collatbomted wiitJh Communism and were granted asy1wm ·a nd aid by the administration oif President Hiarry Truman: The iillvesti:gatiion was
initiated in the interests of American democracy and the
security of .the United States of America. Anglo...Saxon
law, however, protects the accused and the suspect until a
verd!ict is rendered and, therefore, no one on the Slov,ak side
has thus far taJken · a meritorious position, even though the
SlovaJk nation ,p aid and is stiU .paying heavily in blood and
suffering for the politics of the Czech and so-.called "Czechoslovak" CO'llaJboraitOTs with Communism now being investigated.
The investi,gaJtion is not as yet completed, and it can happen that for various reaso1I1s it may not b_e completed in
such a m·a nner as would ·be demanded by truth and justice.
In the first place, we are here concerned with a .poHtical
committee and the evidence of facts after some 10-12 yea·r s
is quite 'buvdensome. In the second plaJce, many political
circles, new,spa;pers. and or1ganimations in the demooratic
world are and wiU 1~ interested in defending the 0zech collalborators, because all fellow-travelers and cry,pto-Communists wiill thereby deifend their own policies and themselves.
The following remarks concerning the case of Hulbert
Ripka· and Coonpan~ are not a result of the investigation of
the Senate SU:b-<Committee, nor do they in any way consider
what the eventual result might ib.e. Dr. Hulbert Ripka himself,
conscious of his own "mistakes" and not altogether governed
by the mofal prindp.le that "the hest deifense is offense," d!id
not wait for .the resll!lt of the investigation, as every serious
person would do, but attacked his a0cusers, waning: I cOiffiplain, I oigject. Ordinarily we wou,l d not expect this from a
60-year-old politician. The remariks t'hat foHow refer to t:Jhis
1
�SLOVAKIA
5
complaint of Dr. Ripka and his altlies in whose na;me Dr.
Rrpka speaks.
The Psychological Errors of Ripka's Defense
The very fad that Dr. Riipka considered it necessary to
complain iaJbout hiis accusers 1publ icly must girve the impression to ervery legally and politica!My minded person that Dr.
Riipka is not certain albout his ow11 innocence and, therefore,
resorted to hysteri'ca1 spasms before the resul..ts of the investigation were made kno1W11. The manner of his public defense and ang,r y tone, as well as the badly selec,ted vooa1bulary of Dr. Rip:k,a in his series of articles .pU!blished in the
NiEW YORKSKY DENN1K f!rom March 12th of this year,
necessarily leads us to the conclusion that some/body stepped
on the corns of Dr. Ripka and his fsociates.. Dr. Ripka
made it quite dbvious that the co·r n huH:s, and he and his
associates are afraid of having it operated on.
1
This, however, undoulb,t edl,y wu.H not sur.pTise any decent person, who is acquainted with the actual situation in
the Gzecho-Sl{)!Vruk Repulblic after 194.5 and wu.th the politics
of the aocused Ozech aifd "Ozechoslovatk" collaJborators with
Oommunism, as much as the fa'Ct that heire we hruve a man
who so scandra:lously defends himself aigainst accusations
of politi'cal collalboration, lbut who voted with both hands
to hang ,p oliticians who eiven "might have" collalborated and
with far less catastrophic consequences than in the case of
Dr. Rtpka and his associates. The Sloivak ,p oliticians, who
saived their nation from suffering and possible caitastrophy
and cairried out the state rewolution with a song on their
lips, were not resiponsi/ble foir a single verdict of death for
politi:ca:l reasons while they g01Verned. How did they fare
during the reign of DT. Rip!ka and his a;SSociates? They were
hung and shot and tortured witho,wt mercy and without regard to rig,ht and justice for "all.eged" collaJbomtion. Nay,
the verofoits were already rendered by the Ozech exiles in
London without investigation and trial.
Yet, this same Dr. Ripka, who sent people to the g•allows, feels highly inswted and thiniks that he is unjustly
treated by the very faot th11it somebody had dared to ask
him what the conditions were in Ozec'ho-Slova;kia while he
�(j
SI. OV AKT A
and his associates were memibers of the "National Front"
Government there and why that country was surrende,r ed to
Moscow without a fight. Instead of exiplaining calmly and
objectively and, incidentally, uttering "mea oulipa" and pointing out extenuating circUlffis1Jances, 1because only these will
be considered, Dr. Hulbert Riplka insolently attacked his accusers and the victims of his politics in the effort to weaken
the accusation and diivert attention to events which had
little or nothing in common with the investigation of the
Senate COIIlllrn.ittee of the United States.
PsyohologicaHy - and in politics psychological moments are not without significance - Dr. R•i pka b.egan his
defense very amk!war<ily. Lt was "a very wrong approach"
to the delicate question of collaJboration in ipolitics. Let us,
however, leave the realm of psycholo,g y and see at least
cursorily how the case looks from the angle of political and
legal argiuments.
Political Falsehoods and Half-Truths
Dr. Ripka rests his defense on several politicai falsehoods and half--truths, assuming that "Ameri:cans, with the
exception of a few experts, cannot knoiw the comp1ex problems of Central EurO!pe," as he himself stated it.
The main lies resorted to 'by Ripka are the following:
1. that the whole (Ozechos;Jo1vruk) nation wa:s for an alliance
with the USSR during the war; 2. that the treaty of Dr.
Benes with Moscow (December 12, 1943) was concluded to
save Sl01ViaJkfa; 3. that the A.Hies had wanted a Soviet-Czech
treaty in 1943.
In the first instance, we are concerned with such an
apparent lie that we must seriously question the fact that
Dr. Ripka, a learned politician, can so daringly state such
an exposed untruth in the face of thousands of Czechs and
Sfovaks. The fad is that, for example, in Slovakia - in
whose name Ripka presumes to spealk - up to the time of
the OzechoJSoviet treaty, both the Communists and those
accused with Ripka today (Ur. Lettrich and Gen. Feriencik) were practically inactive in politics. It was only after
the treaty of Dr. Benes with Stalin that the so-ealled "Slovak underground" - the Communists and their collabora-
�SLOVAKIA
i
tors from the "Ozechoslova;k" camp - met for the first
time and on the basis of the treaty decided in Moscow to
undertake political action for the renewal of Ozecho-.Slo ,,akia.
It seems that Dr. Ri,pka depends entirely too much on
the "ignorance " of Americans when he a1btempts to deny
such evident facts. He pretends that he has forgotten that
the governmen t, in which he occupied such an eminent position, had jailed and sentenced to death thousands and thousands of ,people in Sloivakia and the Czech lands, that it dispossessed and disfranchis ed them only /because they were
against Moscow and CommuniS1In; that the governmen t of
which Ripka was a part deported over three million Germans in a ba.zfuaTic manner aJlso beicause they rather looked
to Germany than to Russia, and that it deported even the
Magyars for collaiborating with the Germans.
Now, then, where was this "whole nation" which Ripka
spoke of? In this case we can understand "nation" in the
political sense oi Anglo.Saxo n terminolog y and, consequent ly, must include the entire population of the Ozecho-Slo.vak
Repulblic, because otherwise in the Ozech~lov aJk Repulblic
there are and were at least two nations already even at the
time the London governmen t of Dr. Benes concluded the
Czecho-Sov iet Treaty.
2. The weakest argument of a political nature offered
for the co.llalboration of the Czech ,p oliticians with Moscow
is the statement that the Czecho-&wieit Treaty of 1943 was
concluded "to save Slovailria." '.Dhis is not only a lie, but a
political rubsurdity, especially in the veraion of Dr. Hulbert
Ri,p ka. At the time when the Czech exiles, headed 'by Dr.
Edward Benes, concluded their treaty with Moscow, there
were no SlovaJk Communis ts in Moscow who could have had
"sepa.ratist ic tendencies, " nay, there were :no significant SloV1ak Communis ts there at aJI. The leader of the Slovak Communist s, Dr. Vladimir Clementis, was Dr. Benes's
man in London and the rest of the Slovruk Communist s, outside of one or two exceptions, li'Ved comfortabl y in Slovakia.
Dr. Ripka knowingly uses the argument which could
be applied cum grano salis to the events of 1944 and later,
�SLOVAKIA
when Slovaik Communists manifested tendencies for independence, because they saw no reason why the Czechs should
rule over S10!Vl8Jk,ia (Dr. Nemec, the governmoot delegate),
when Slwruk blood was !being spilled the:re, while in the
Czech lands the people, taiking council from the London
government of Benes, were even afraid to speak out so that
they mi ght not anger the Germa:ris. At this time it is bloody
irony to ta1k a'bout "saNing Slovalkia," whkh without the
interference orf Dr. Ripka and his associates would have
come out of the war either as Finland did, or in the worst
case as Hungary did, which would haNe been !better for the
Slovak nation from every point oif 'View than the position
which ·r esulted from the Ozecho-Soviet Treaty. Slovakia was
plundered so thoroughly and Silo1Vak women and girls were
brutally ravaged by the Russian hordes as if no treaty had
existed at all. And thus it was that amti-Commun ists were
hung, shot and jailed in Slo,valkia. To this ibolshevik vengeance and inhumanity was added also the revenge of the
Ozechs, ait times, proved wo,r se than the excesses of the
bar'baria.n Reds. Then SlovaJkia was also plundered economically by Prague.
1
If Dr. Riipka and his asso.ciates maintain that they rendered the Czechs and the SlOIV'aJks a seirivice by delaying the
bolsheivization of Czecho-Slwaik ia with the:i.r treaty (which
we seriously doulbt), then it is apparent that Ripka '8Jlld Coonpany would like us to forget how many people perished and
are still perishing ~ause they believed the false and n.ruive
the sis aJbouit the independeince oif the Ozecho~Slovak Republic and therefore, came out openl;y- agiainst Communism. And
how muoh damage did the propaganda of Riipka and his associates do from the international standpoint when it
proved, or tried to pmve, that collaJboration witfu Moscow
was not only possible, but necessary? The tTuth is that the
policy of Dr. Benes, Dr. Ripka and Company could have
served only the interests of Moscow and the Czech Communists, lbecaJuse under the veil of Czech propaganda Moscow could play its false role, and the Czech Communists
could murrder, deport, violate, ipersecute any one they wanted
to with the copartidspaJtion and coresponsibili ty of the glo-
�SLOVAKIA
9
rified "democ,r,a,ts" in the western world of Dr. Benes, Masaryik, Dr. Ripka, Zenkl, etc.
3. Rilpka did not state the trwth when he wrote that the
western a:11:ies wanted the Czecho-Soviet 'Dreaty in 1943. We
know that they were not for it; Churchill aind EJden eS1peciaJl.y were against it; both protested.pulbliicly ag:ainst it and the
matter was debated in Parliament. Of course, when the
allies did coI11SenJt to it, it was only rufter Dr. Benes had
everything cwt and dried amd the allies were faced with .,_
fait accampli; and they did so to aJVoid an airig,ument with
Moscow at t:hat time. In his entire "complaint," Dr. Rtpka
moves aibout on thin ice; he anticipates, distorts the facts
and entangles his argumentation with pettifoggery. He
would like to hruve us forget, at the same time, that he himse1f had spoken and written aJbout aH. these matters, that
the Loo.don bToadc,a sts .and the press of the Ozeich exiles
commented on them, that we ha,ve the memoirs of Dr. Benes, Dr. Olementis, Masaryk and even the great masterpiece
of collraJboration by Ripka himself, his boolk IDAST AND
WEST, published in London in 1944.
U siI1Jg the Polish case as an argument in this connootion
is also antici'Pating and distorting the facts. Dr. Ripka intentionally forgets jrust wh~in Dr. Edward Benes began hi:s. Sovietophile politics; and ver,y conrvenienUy prefers not tq mention thait between Moscow and the Poiish London Government there was not only the "Katyn affa.ir," but also an 8JPparent anti-Communist atmosphere, while the goivernment
of Dr. Benes wa,s a cami:miflaged bols'hevilk emlbassy a:nd
propagation center in the western world, which Moscow
not only did not h0JVe to l,iquidaJte, 'but, converaely, used its
.services very effectivcly to promote its own interests. Moscow liquidate its own agents only after they harve finished
the wo~k asstgrned them. Since this was not the case with
Benes'•s . London Go:vernmenrt in 1943, no parallel can ibe
drawn between the Ozecli and Polish governments in London
without an attempt at deceit.
By using the arguments he did, Ripka not only did not
produce an adequate defense for the conclusion of the Czecho-Soviet Treaty,. but eiven did not give an aiecepbalble ex-
�10
SLOVAKIA
ipla.nation for it. On the contrary, by taking recourse to lies,
half-truths, anticipation and distortion of the facts , he
demonstrated quite clearly that the Cooch and Slovak collaborators with Communism do not know how to defend their
politics. Therefore, it remains for us to answer at least
briefly the question whether Dr. Ripka and Company did
collaJborate with bolshevism at the eX!pense of the Czech and
SlOIVak naJtions and at the expense of the interests o.f democracy in general.
The Collaboration of Ripka and Co.
If we do not taJke into account the legal pa:squinades
of the so-.cahled "peoples-democrat ic" courts, we find that
there is no established legal definition for the crime of col1.a!boration as we have, for exa:mple, in the case of treason.
In general, after the S'e cond World War, colla:boraltion meant
aiding the occU1pants in the management of the territories
they had oocU!pied -and su,pportirug their aggressions. A whole
series of governments - from Petiaiin's to the H'l.l!Ilgarian,
Rumanian and Slava:k - ,w as placed on trial and convicted
for such colla!boration, even though in some cases collaboration consisted of not resisting German agg·ressiorn and of alliances of these governments with Berlin, which undoubtedly spared the nations concerned from aJctwail oocuipation and
its consequences. The defense "of the collaborators with Germany - pointing out that they a'Verted ca:tastTophy f.rcnn
other nations - however, was not accepted.
Post~war governments, including the one of which Dr.
Riipka and his associates were members, a::r\bitrnrily and mercilessly sent hundreds and thousands of such "collaJbora:tors"
to the gallows, jails and concentration camps.
If it is true that the Czecho.-iSlovruk Repulblic was "occupied" by the Russian Army, as Dr. Ripka himself now
claims in his defense, and not "lifberated" - as he claimed
eaxlier - then tihere can be no argument that the politics
of Dr. Riipka and Co. exhausts the rea.il sUl~ance of the
crime of coll.aJboration as it was defined by the "Nation.al
Courts" of Ozecho--SlOIV'alkria and by the manifestations of
Dr. R:ilpka himself.
�SLOVAKIA
11
Dr. Ripka and his associates not only col,laJborated with
the occupying power, but a:lso he1ped it sig:n.irficantly to consolidate its aggressions, includJing Ozecho-<Slovaikia itself.
Naturally, Dr. Ripka points out that that was not his intention. It is possilble, however, to ,presuppose that it was the
intention of Petain, or any other government in Central Euro:pe during the war, to aid the Gernnans at the expense of
their own ·nations and countries? Did they a1l not defend
themselrve.s - and many of them altogether jlUSbly - that
they saved their naitions from great drumacge, from slaughter
and plunder? What was the answer given to such questions,
or to suoh a defense, by the government of which Benes,
Ripka, Zenfkl, Lettrich, etc., were members? The gallows,
concentration camps, deportation to Siberia, forced labor
camps, and jails!
So that there mi:ght not be any misunderstanding, decent ,people in macny cases regarded the continU'atiOlll cxf "peoples-democratic governments" as a travesty of justice and
judicial mocder and, therefore, we do not want to girve the
impression that our conclusion is to "repay the gaUows with
gallows." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim
of those remarks is something altogether different: to point
out what kind of individuals are seelking cover in the democratic society and are aippealing to its sense of justrl.re, when
they themselves never displayed any towat-d persons who
were guilty of lesser transgressions than they and whose politics resulted in far less fortunate consequences than theirs.
Comparing the collaJboration and politics of Dr. Ripka
and Co. with that of, for example, Marshall Petain, Dr. Tiso,
Antonescu, etc., we must also taJke into consideration one
essential difference: the latter did not request and did not
want colialboration with Germa'lllY; they did not initiate it
and did not see in the Naizi system a;nd collaiboration with
Germany what Dr. Rirpka and Oompany, long before 1945,
saw in bolsheviism and in collaboration with Moscow.
Marshal Petain and Dr. Tiso were put into the situation of "co'llalboration," when more than half of France was
occupied and Slovakia was gi;ven a choice of being ooowpied
by Germany or dirvided among its neighbors. Therefore,
even if they did accept unpleasant and ungrateful tasks in
�12
SLOVAKIA
the interest of their nations, they did not 'b ecome international propagandists Of German politics, as w,a,s- the case
with the Czech gove:mment-in..exile in its relation to Russia.
Dr. RiJpka and Co., therefore, were not only guilty of the
type of "collaboration'' for whfoh Pet-ain was coovicted and
Dr. Tiso was murdered, but of a ty;pe much wcmse, because
they wanted to collalbol'late with Russia and presented bolsheivism, fong before they returned to Prague, in glowing
ternns as a form of prog,r essive democrax!y, defending i,t
a-g ainst the Naizi bogey and convincing the world that the
Soviets love and want peruce and the necessity for cooperating with Russia.
Broadcasting over BBC, London, November 7, 1942, on
the world s1gmficance of the Soviet Revolution, Dr. Hubert
Ripka said that the revolution (which ,b rought bo~shevism
or Communism to Russia) "is a super-111ational ideal, an
eternal ideal, a h\.llill'an ideal, an ideal which has kindled the
minds of t'he nolblest of men from the time of Plato and
through t'he Chr:isti,a n era, through the great Fre1mh Revolution and until today."
In his hook EA/ST AND WEST (London, l944), Dr.
Rlipka wrote (p. 64). "The democvatization of Russia and the
whole of Soviet society, which is a permanent resuit of the
Soviet revolutionary process, eliJminated from Russian policy
the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against
the smaUer nations; it also resulted in the ,Soviet Union's becoming a genll'inely pea~e-loving power, sincerely interested
in -the maJnteniance of peace,. but at the same time powerful enough to resist aggression and furnish effective help
and support to t'he peace..Joving forees of the world."
Addressing .himself to the Central...Jilil~apean nations,
Dr. Ripka stated categorically: "We repeat: the So'Vli.ets are
not anxious to 'Bolshewze' Central and South~Eastern Europe" (East and West, p. 61). And: "Here and there, mi~
givings still exist on the score of Russian or, more ,preciseily,
Soviet imlperi,a;lism. We do not share those feavs" (.p. 51)
Dr. Fevclinamd Peroutka, a very close fri-end of Dr. Rirpka, even after he had the opportunity to see just what the
bolshevi!k ho:rdes ·were c84)alble of and to know just what oommunist politics aimed to achieve, wrote: "The East, there is
�SLOVAKIA
13
our liberator, our ally and our protector in the future ... If in
England there still can be found factors who evince a bigoted
hatred for the Soviet Union, then those persons cannot even
be considered as our friends" (DNESEK, June 11, 1946).
The remain!ing 0zech aind Slova!k associa.tes of Dr. Ripka spolke, acted and wrote along the same lines, here and
there trying to outdo each othm- in their apPeasement of
the Communists and in proclaiming their undying loyalty to
the Soviet Union.
In other words, in the case of Dr. Ripka a.nd Oo. we are
not concerned with coUaJborators who were forced to collaborate, 'but with politicians who. even gained otheiis for the
Soviet Union (Vd. the books of Dr. Ripka, Dr. Peroutka, Dr.
Benes and their manifestations during and aftm- the war;
Dr. Stephen Osusky',s booklet "Dr. Bene£ and the Slova!ks";
also quotaitions in the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER and S'LOV A.KIA, as well as HrOlbak's "CZECH0SL0ViA!KliSM Versus A!MERilC.AJN]SM").
Conclusion
As I had said at the beginning of these remavks, the investigaition of Dr. Hubm-t Ripka and Co. can be completed
without the American authorities undertaking any necessary steps a;gainst this grouip of collalbomtors with bolshevism who are hidiinig behind a democratic laibel an~ are using
and abusing the good nature and hospitality of certain
American circles. But eiven such an end of the inivestigation
will not change the fact in t'he least that Dr. Ripka; Peroutka, Zeillkl, Lettrich, Fm-ienci,k, etc., were tools of communist
policy in the 0zecho..Slo:vak Republi:c - Dr. Ripka even in
and t'hat their collalbora.tion
the international arena resulted in rirvers of blood, suffering and the enslavement
of millions of innocent hwman beings.
Dr. Rii.pk•a and his associ,a tes are attempting to defend
their coHalboration by saying that they intended to 'defend
democracy and that they could not foresee that Russia
would not honor its treaties. In ,p olitics, where everything is
judged b.y results and not according to intentions, this
feeble defense will not · rid them of the responsibility. It
�14
SLO VAKIA
could be, as already stated, the maximum of extenuating
circumstances, ,booaruse in poil[tics the definition still. applies :
gouverner, c'est prevoir (to govern is to foresee). Dr. Rirpka
and Co. either l,araked necessairy f.oresig'ht, or, if they knew
what they were doing, collaJborated fully and wiUingly in
the full sense of the word.
In either case, however, i:t is difficrut to understand
why sO!Ill'e American chicles are still supporting these ~ech
politicfans, who in the battle a:g·a inst Communism - failed
.shamefully and rutterly, maJking it ruppeaT that some one is
interested in whitewashing them forcefll!lly of c0Ua1boration
- the collaJb oriation which they committed to a very greater
measure than did the people they shot and hung for coUaboratirrg with the Na2Jis.
·
The Czech politicians coli1ruborated with the men of the
Kremlin 'because they hated the West after Munich (193:8).
Some wanted to avenge themselves on the West. They :knew
what they were doing; they turned to Moscow knowingly
and willingly. The Ozech •p oliticians a3so hated the SloV'a:ks,
because they had dared to lwe their own li,ves and proclaim their independence; th,a t they demonstmted their
ability to live without the Czechs and thus frustrated their
plan to Ozechize the S1ovaik nation, to destroy it as a nation.
Driven by this hatred, the desire for revenge and the ambition to rule, Dr. Ripka and Co. thrust themseJ,ves into the
embrace of Moscow and fled to the West only after they
sa:w that they played the wrong hoTse and Moscow wanted
to liquidate them.
We m'll!st, therefore, ask the question, whether in the
fight against Communism these persons are, from among
the Czech and Slov,a,k exiles, suitaJble intei,preters o;f democratic conceptions with regard to the ~ h and Slovak nations and whether they came to the United States and
Cainada through those elements of the past administrations,
which saw in Comtmunism "a progressive democracy" - as
did Ripka, PerourtJka, Zenkl Le1Jtrich and Co. The <:ry· "cavean:t consules, nequid detrimenti Res PUiblica capiat," it
seems, is, therefore, in order, but the investigation of the
Czech collalborators is aJso late by several years.
�
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1954
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SLOVAKIA
THE CASE OF
DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY
Joseph K~rschbaum, M,A., LL.D.
Early in February orf this year. Senator William E.
Jenner's Committee !began to investigate se:veraJ Cze<!h politicians and their SlOIVaJk hirelings (br. Ruibert Ripka, Dr.
Ferdinand Peroutka, Dr. Peter Zenlkl, Dr. J ose,ph Let.trich,
General Nicholas Feriencik) who collatbomted wiitJh Communism and were granted asy1wm ·a nd aid by the administration oif President Hiarry Truman: The iillvesti:gatiion was
initiated in the interests of American democracy and the
security of .the United States of America. Anglo...Saxon
law, however, protects the accused and the suspect until a
verd!ict is rendered and, therefore, no one on the Slov,ak side
has thus far taJken · a meritorious position, even though the
SlovaJk nation ,p aid and is stiU .paying heavily in blood and
suffering for the politics of the Czech and so-.called "Czechoslovak" CO'llaJboraitOTs with Communism now being investigated.
The investi,gaJtion is not as yet completed, and it can happen that for various reaso1I1s it may not b_e completed in
such a m·a nner as would ·be demanded by truth and justice.
In the first place, we are here concerned with a .poHtical
committee and the evidence of facts after some 10-12 yea·r s
is quite 'buvdensome. In the second plaJce, many political
circles, new,spa;pers. and or1ganimations in the demooratic
world are and wiU 1~ interested in defending the 0zech collalborators, because all fellow-travelers and cry,pto-Communists wiill thereby deifend their own policies and themselves.
The following remarks concerning the case of Hulbert
Ripka· and Coonpan~ are not a result of the investigation of
the Senate SU:b-<Committee, nor do they in any way consider
what the eventual result might ib.e. Dr. Hulbert Ripka himself,
conscious of his own "mistakes" and not altogether governed
by the mofal prindp.le that "the hest deifense is offense," d!id
not wait for .the resll!lt of the investigation, as every serious
person would do, but attacked his a0cusers, waning: I cOiffiplain, I oigject. Ordinarily we wou,l d not expect this from a
60-year-old politician. The remariks t'hat foHow refer to t:Jhis
1
SLOVAKIA
5
complaint of Dr. Ripka and his altlies in whose na;me Dr.
Rrpka speaks.
The Psychological Errors of Ripka's Defense
The very fad that Dr. Riipka considered it necessary to
complain iaJbout hiis accusers 1publ icly must girve the impression to ervery legally and politica!My minded person that Dr.
Riipka is not certain albout his ow11 innocence and, therefore,
resorted to hysteri'ca1 spasms before the resul..ts of the investigation were made kno1W11. The manner of his public defense and ang,r y tone, as well as the badly selec,ted vooa1bulary of Dr. Rip:k,a in his series of articles .pU!blished in the
NiEW YORKSKY DENN1K f!rom March 12th of this year,
necessarily leads us to the conclusion that some/body stepped
on the corns of Dr. Ripka and his fsociates.. Dr. Ripka
made it quite dbvious that the co·r n huH:s, and he and his
associates are afraid of having it operated on.
1
This, however, undoulb,t edl,y wu.H not sur.pTise any decent person, who is acquainted with the actual situation in
the Gzecho-Sl{)!Vruk Repulblic after 194.5 and wu.th the politics
of the aocused Ozech aifd "Ozechoslovatk" collaJborators with
Oommunism, as much as the fa'Ct that heire we hruve a man
who so scandra:lously defends himself aigainst accusations
of politi'cal collalboration, lbut who voted with both hands
to hang ,p oliticians who eiven "might have" collalborated and
with far less catastrophic consequences than in the case of
Dr. Rtpka and his associates. The Sloivak ,p oliticians, who
saived their nation from suffering and possible caitastrophy
and cairried out the state rewolution with a song on their
lips, were not resiponsi/ble foir a single verdict of death for
politi:ca:l reasons while they g01Verned. How did they fare
during the reign of DT. Rip!ka and his a;SSociates? They were
hung and shot and tortured witho,wt mercy and without regard to rig,ht and justice for "all.eged" collaJbomtion. Nay,
the verofoits were already rendered by the Ozech exiles in
London without investigation and trial.
Yet, this same Dr. Ripka, who sent people to the g•allows, feels highly inswted and thiniks that he is unjustly
treated by the very faot th11it somebody had dared to ask
him what the conditions were in Ozec'ho-Slova;kia while he
(j
SI. OV AKT A
and his associates were memibers of the "National Front"
Government there and why that country was surrende,r ed to
Moscow without a fight. Instead of exiplaining calmly and
objectively and, incidentally, uttering "mea oulipa" and pointing out extenuating circUlffis1Jances, 1because only these will
be considered, Dr. Hulbert Riplka insolently attacked his accusers and the victims of his politics in the effort to weaken
the accusation and diivert attention to events which had
little or nothing in common with the investigation of the
Senate COIIlllrn.ittee of the United States.
PsyohologicaHy - and in politics psychological moments are not without significance - Dr. R•i pka b.egan his
defense very amk!war<ily. Lt was "a very wrong approach"
to the delicate question of collaJboration in ipolitics. Let us,
however, leave the realm of psycholo,g y and see at least
cursorily how the case looks from the angle of political and
legal argiuments.
Political Falsehoods and Half-Truths
Dr. Ripka rests his defense on several politicai falsehoods and half--truths, assuming that "Ameri:cans, with the
exception of a few experts, cannot knoiw the comp1ex problems of Central EurO!pe," as he himself stated it.
The main lies resorted to 'by Ripka are the following:
1. that the whole (Ozechos;Jo1vruk) nation wa:s for an alliance
with the USSR during the war; 2. that the treaty of Dr.
Benes with Moscow (December 12, 1943) was concluded to
save Sl01ViaJkfa; 3. that the A.Hies had wanted a Soviet-Czech
treaty in 1943.
In the first instance, we are concerned with such an
apparent lie that we must seriously question the fact that
Dr. Ripka, a learned politician, can so daringly state such
an exposed untruth in the face of thousands of Czechs and
Sfovaks. The fad is that, for example, in Slovakia - in
whose name Ripka presumes to spealk - up to the time of
the OzechoJSoviet treaty, both the Communists and those
accused with Ripka today (Ur. Lettrich and Gen. Feriencik) were practically inactive in politics. It was only after
the treaty of Dr. Benes with Stalin that the so-ealled "Slovak underground" - the Communists and their collabora-
SLOVAKIA
i
tors from the "Ozechoslova;k" camp - met for the first
time and on the basis of the treaty decided in Moscow to
undertake political action for the renewal of Ozecho-.Slo ,,akia.
It seems that Dr. Ri,pka depends entirely too much on
the "ignorance " of Americans when he a1btempts to deny
such evident facts. He pretends that he has forgotten that
the governmen t, in which he occupied such an eminent position, had jailed and sentenced to death thousands and thousands of ,people in Sloivakia and the Czech lands, that it dispossessed and disfranchis ed them only /because they were
against Moscow and CommuniS1In; that the governmen t of
which Ripka was a part deported over three million Germans in a ba.zfuaTic manner aJlso beicause they rather looked
to Germany than to Russia, and that it deported even the
Magyars for collaiborating with the Germans.
Now, then, where was this "whole nation" which Ripka
spoke of? In this case we can understand "nation" in the
political sense oi Anglo.Saxo n terminolog y and, consequent ly, must include the entire population of the Ozecho-Slo.vak
Repulblic, because otherwise in the Ozech~lov aJk Repulblic
there are and were at least two nations already even at the
time the London governmen t of Dr. Benes concluded the
Czecho-Sov iet Treaty.
2. The weakest argument of a political nature offered
for the co.llalboration of the Czech ,p oliticians with Moscow
is the statement that the Czecho-&wieit Treaty of 1943 was
concluded "to save Slovailria." '.Dhis is not only a lie, but a
political rubsurdity, especially in the veraion of Dr. Hulbert
Ri,p ka. At the time when the Czech exiles, headed 'by Dr.
Edward Benes, concluded their treaty with Moscow, there
were no SlovaJk Communis ts in Moscow who could have had
"sepa.ratist ic tendencies, " nay, there were :no significant SloV1ak Communis ts there at aJI. The leader of the Slovak Communist s, Dr. Vladimir Clementis, was Dr. Benes's
man in London and the rest of the Slovruk Communist s, outside of one or two exceptions, li'Ved comfortabl y in Slovakia.
Dr. Ripka knowingly uses the argument which could
be applied cum grano salis to the events of 1944 and later,
SLOVAKIA
when Slovaik Communists manifested tendencies for independence, because they saw no reason why the Czechs should
rule over S10!Vl8Jk,ia (Dr. Nemec, the governmoot delegate),
when Slwruk blood was !being spilled the:re, while in the
Czech lands the people, taiking council from the London
government of Benes, were even afraid to speak out so that
they mi ght not anger the Germa:ris. At this time it is bloody
irony to ta1k a'bout "saNing Slovalkia," whkh without the
interference orf Dr. Ripka and his associates would have
come out of the war either as Finland did, or in the worst
case as Hungary did, which would haNe been !better for the
Slovak nation from every point oif 'View than the position
which ·r esulted from the Ozecho-Soviet Treaty. Slovakia was
plundered so thoroughly and Silo1Vak women and girls were
brutally ravaged by the Russian hordes as if no treaty had
existed at all. And thus it was that amti-Commun ists were
hung, shot and jailed in Slo,valkia. To this ibolshevik vengeance and inhumanity was added also the revenge of the
Ozechs, ait times, proved wo,r se than the excesses of the
bar'baria.n Reds. Then SlovaJkia was also plundered economically by Prague.
1
If Dr. Riipka and his asso.ciates maintain that they rendered the Czechs and the SlOIV'aJks a seirivice by delaying the
bolsheivization of Czecho-Slwaik ia with the:i.r treaty (which
we seriously doulbt), then it is apparent that Ripka '8Jlld Coonpany would like us to forget how many people perished and
are still perishing ~ause they believed the false and n.ruive
the sis aJbouit the independeince oif the Ozecho~Slovak Republic and therefore, came out openl;y- agiainst Communism. And
how muoh damage did the propaganda of Riipka and his associates do from the international standpoint when it
proved, or tried to pmve, that collaJboration witfu Moscow
was not only possible, but necessary? The tTuth is that the
policy of Dr. Benes, Dr. Ripka and Company could have
served only the interests of Moscow and the Czech Communists, lbecaJuse under the veil of Czech propaganda Moscow could play its false role, and the Czech Communists
could murrder, deport, violate, ipersecute any one they wanted
to with the copartidspaJtion and coresponsibili ty of the glo-
SLOVAKIA
9
rified "democ,r,a,ts" in the western world of Dr. Benes, Masaryik, Dr. Ripka, Zenkl, etc.
3. Rilpka did not state the trwth when he wrote that the
western a:11:ies wanted the Czecho-Soviet 'Dreaty in 1943. We
know that they were not for it; Churchill aind EJden eS1peciaJl.y were against it; both protested.pulbliicly ag:ainst it and the
matter was debated in Parliament. Of course, when the
allies did coI11SenJt to it, it was only rufter Dr. Benes had
everything cwt and dried amd the allies were faced with .,_
fait accampli; and they did so to aJVoid an airig,ument with
Moscow at t:hat time. In his entire "complaint," Dr. Rtpka
moves aibout on thin ice; he anticipates, distorts the facts
and entangles his argumentation with pettifoggery. He
would like to hruve us forget, at the same time, that he himse1f had spoken and written aJbout aH. these matters, that
the Loo.don bToadc,a sts .and the press of the Ozeich exiles
commented on them, that we ha,ve the memoirs of Dr. Benes, Dr. Olementis, Masaryk and even the great masterpiece
of collraJboration by Ripka himself, his boolk IDAST AND
WEST, published in London in 1944.
U siI1Jg the Polish case as an argument in this connootion
is also antici'Pating and distorting the facts. Dr. Ripka intentionally forgets jrust wh~in Dr. Edward Benes began hi:s. Sovietophile politics; and ver,y conrvenienUy prefers not tq mention thait between Moscow and the Poiish London Government there was not only the "Katyn affa.ir," but also an 8JPparent anti-Communist atmosphere, while the goivernment
of Dr. Benes wa,s a cami:miflaged bols'hevilk emlbassy a:nd
propagation center in the western world, which Moscow
not only did not h0JVe to l,iquidaJte, 'but, converaely, used its
.services very effectivcly to promote its own interests. Moscow liquidate its own agents only after they harve finished
the wo~k asstgrned them. Since this was not the case with
Benes'•s . London Go:vernmenrt in 1943, no parallel can ibe
drawn between the Ozecli and Polish governments in London
without an attempt at deceit.
By using the arguments he did, Ripka not only did not
produce an adequate defense for the conclusion of the Czecho-Soviet Treaty,. but eiven did not give an aiecepbalble ex-
10
SLOVAKIA
ipla.nation for it. On the contrary, by taking recourse to lies,
half-truths, anticipation and distortion of the facts , he
demonstrated quite clearly that the Cooch and Slovak collaborators with Communism do not know how to defend their
politics. Therefore, it remains for us to answer at least
briefly the question whether Dr. Ripka and Company did
collaJborate with bolshevism at the eX!pense of the Czech and
SlOIVak naJtions and at the expense of the interests o.f democracy in general.
The Collaboration of Ripka and Co.
If we do not taJke into account the legal pa:squinades
of the so-.cahled "peoples-democrat ic" courts, we find that
there is no established legal definition for the crime of col1.a!boration as we have, for exa:mple, in the case of treason.
In general, after the S'e cond World War, colla:boraltion meant
aiding the occU1pants in the management of the territories
they had oocU!pied -and su,pportirug their aggressions. A whole
series of governments - from Petiaiin's to the H'l.l!Ilgarian,
Rumanian and Slava:k - ,w as placed on trial and convicted
for such colla!boration, even though in some cases collaboration consisted of not resisting German agg·ressiorn and of alliances of these governments with Berlin, which undoubtedly spared the nations concerned from aJctwail oocuipation and
its consequences. The defense "of the collaborators with Germany - pointing out that they a'Verted ca:tastTophy f.rcnn
other nations - however, was not accepted.
Post~war governments, including the one of which Dr.
Riipka and his associates were members, a::r\bitrnrily and mercilessly sent hundreds and thousands of such "collaJbora:tors"
to the gallows, jails and concentration camps.
If it is true that the Czecho.-iSlovruk Repulblic was "occupied" by the Russian Army, as Dr. Ripka himself now
claims in his defense, and not "lifberated" - as he claimed
eaxlier - then tihere can be no argument that the politics
of Dr. Riipka and Co. exhausts the rea.il sUl~ance of the
crime of coll.aJboration as it was defined by the "Nation.al
Courts" of Ozecho--SlOIV'alkria and by the manifestations of
Dr. R:ilpka himself.
SLOVAKIA
11
Dr. Ripka and his associates not only col,laJborated with
the occupying power, but a:lso he1ped it sig:n.irficantly to consolidate its aggressions, includJing Ozecho-<Slovaikia itself.
Naturally, Dr. Ripka points out that that was not his intention. It is possilble, however, to ,presuppose that it was the
intention of Petain, or any other government in Central Euro:pe during the war, to aid the Gernnans at the expense of
their own ·nations and countries? Did they a1l not defend
themselrve.s - and many of them altogether jlUSbly - that
they saved their naitions from great drumacge, from slaughter
and plunder? What was the answer given to such questions,
or to suoh a defense, by the government of which Benes,
Ripka, Zenfkl, Lettrich, etc., were members? The gallows,
concentration camps, deportation to Siberia, forced labor
camps, and jails!
So that there mi:ght not be any misunderstanding, decent ,people in macny cases regarded the continU'atiOlll cxf "peoples-democratic governments" as a travesty of justice and
judicial mocder and, therefore, we do not want to girve the
impression that our conclusion is to "repay the gaUows with
gallows." Nothing could be farther from the truth. The aim
of those remarks is something altogether different: to point
out what kind of individuals are seelking cover in the democratic society and are aippealing to its sense of justrl.re, when
they themselves never displayed any towat-d persons who
were guilty of lesser transgressions than they and whose politics resulted in far less fortunate consequences than theirs.
Comparing the collaJboration and politics of Dr. Ripka
and Co. with that of, for example, Marshall Petain, Dr. Tiso,
Antonescu, etc., we must also taJke into consideration one
essential difference: the latter did not request and did not
want colialboration with Germa'lllY; they did not initiate it
and did not see in the Naizi system a;nd collaiboration with
Germany what Dr. Rirpka and Oompany, long before 1945,
saw in bolsheviism and in collaboration with Moscow.
Marshal Petain and Dr. Tiso were put into the situation of "co'llalboration," when more than half of France was
occupied and Slovakia was gi;ven a choice of being ooowpied
by Germany or dirvided among its neighbors. Therefore,
even if they did accept unpleasant and ungrateful tasks in
12
SLOVAKIA
the interest of their nations, they did not 'b ecome international propagandists Of German politics, as w,a,s- the case
with the Czech gove:mment-in..exile in its relation to Russia.
Dr. RiJpka and Co., therefore, were not only guilty of the
type of "collaboration'' for whfoh Pet-ain was coovicted and
Dr. Tiso was murdered, but of a ty;pe much wcmse, because
they wanted to collalbol'late with Russia and presented bolsheivism, fong before they returned to Prague, in glowing
ternns as a form of prog,r essive democrax!y, defending i,t
a-g ainst the Naizi bogey and convincing the world that the
Soviets love and want peruce and the necessity for cooperating with Russia.
Broadcasting over BBC, London, November 7, 1942, on
the world s1gmficance of the Soviet Revolution, Dr. Hubert
Ripka said that the revolution (which ,b rought bo~shevism
or Communism to Russia) "is a super-111ational ideal, an
eternal ideal, a h\.llill'an ideal, an ideal which has kindled the
minds of t'he nolblest of men from the time of Plato and
through t'he Chr:isti,a n era, through the great Fre1mh Revolution and until today."
In his hook EA/ST AND WEST (London, l944), Dr.
Rlipka wrote (p. 64). "The democvatization of Russia and the
whole of Soviet society, which is a permanent resuit of the
Soviet revolutionary process, eliJminated from Russian policy
the imperialist aims which Tsarist Russia pursued against
the smaUer nations; it also resulted in the ,Soviet Union's becoming a genll'inely pea~e-loving power, sincerely interested
in -the maJnteniance of peace,. but at the same time powerful enough to resist aggression and furnish effective help
and support to t'he peace..Joving forees of the world."
Addressing .himself to the Central...Jilil~apean nations,
Dr. Ripka stated categorically: "We repeat: the So'Vli.ets are
not anxious to 'Bolshewze' Central and South~Eastern Europe" (East and West, p. 61). And: "Here and there, mi~
givings still exist on the score of Russian or, more ,preciseily,
Soviet imlperi,a;lism. We do not share those feavs" (.p. 51)
Dr. Fevclinamd Peroutka, a very close fri-end of Dr. Rirpka, even after he had the opportunity to see just what the
bolshevi!k ho:rdes ·were c84)alble of and to know just what oommunist politics aimed to achieve, wrote: "The East, there is
SLOVAKIA
13
our liberator, our ally and our protector in the future ... If in
England there still can be found factors who evince a bigoted
hatred for the Soviet Union, then those persons cannot even
be considered as our friends" (DNESEK, June 11, 1946).
The remain!ing 0zech aind Slova!k associa.tes of Dr. Ripka spolke, acted and wrote along the same lines, here and
there trying to outdo each othm- in their apPeasement of
the Communists and in proclaiming their undying loyalty to
the Soviet Union.
In other words, in the case of Dr. Ripka a.nd Oo. we are
not concerned with coUaJborators who were forced to collaborate, 'but with politicians who. even gained otheiis for the
Soviet Union (Vd. the books of Dr. Ripka, Dr. Peroutka, Dr.
Benes and their manifestations during and aftm- the war;
Dr. Stephen Osusky',s booklet "Dr. Bene£ and the Slova!ks";
also quotaitions in the SLOVAK NEWSLETTER and S'LOV A.KIA, as well as HrOlbak's "CZECH0SL0ViA!KliSM Versus A!MERilC.AJN]SM").
Conclusion
As I had said at the beginning of these remavks, the investigaition of Dr. Hubm-t Ripka and Co. can be completed
without the American authorities undertaking any necessary steps a;gainst this grouip of collalbomtors with bolshevism who are hidiinig behind a democratic laibel an~ are using
and abusing the good nature and hospitality of certain
American circles. But eiven such an end of the inivestigation
will not change the fact in t'he least that Dr. Ripka; Peroutka, Zeillkl, Lettrich, Fm-ienci,k, etc., were tools of communist
policy in the 0zecho..Slo:vak Republi:c - Dr. Ripka even in
and t'hat their collalbora.tion
the international arena resulted in rirvers of blood, suffering and the enslavement
of millions of innocent hwman beings.
Dr. Rii.pk•a and his associ,a tes are attempting to defend
their coHalboration by saying that they intended to 'defend
democracy and that they could not foresee that Russia
would not honor its treaties. In ,p olitics, where everything is
judged b.y results and not according to intentions, this
feeble defense will not · rid them of the responsibility. It
14
SLO VAKIA
could be, as already stated, the maximum of extenuating
circumstances, ,booaruse in poil[tics the definition still. applies :
gouverner, c'est prevoir (to govern is to foresee). Dr. Rirpka
and Co. either l,araked necessairy f.oresig'ht, or, if they knew
what they were doing, collaJborated fully and wiUingly in
the full sense of the word.
In either case, however, i:t is difficrut to understand
why sO!Ill'e American chicles are still supporting these ~ech
politicfans, who in the battle a:g·a inst Communism - failed
.shamefully and rutterly, maJking it ruppeaT that some one is
interested in whitewashing them forcefll!lly of c0Ua1boration
- the collaJb oriation which they committed to a very greater
measure than did the people they shot and hung for coUaboratirrg with the Na2Jis.
·
The Czech politicians coli1ruborated with the men of the
Kremlin 'because they hated the West after Munich (193:8).
Some wanted to avenge themselves on the West. They :knew
what they were doing; they turned to Moscow knowingly
and willingly. The Ozech •p oliticians a3so hated the SloV'a:ks,
because they had dared to lwe their own li,ves and proclaim their independence; th,a t they demonstmted their
ability to live without the Czechs and thus frustrated their
plan to Ozechize the S1ovaik nation, to destroy it as a nation.
Driven by this hatred, the desire for revenge and the ambition to rule, Dr. Ripka and Co. thrust themseJ,ves into the
embrace of Moscow and fled to the West only after they
sa:w that they played the wrong hoTse and Moscow wanted
to liquidate them.
We m'll!st, therefore, ask the question, whether in the
fight against Communism these persons are, from among
the Czech and Slov,a,k exiles, suitaJble intei,preters o;f democratic conceptions with regard to the ~ h and Slovak nations and whether they came to the United States and
Cainada through those elements of the past administrations,
which saw in Comtmunism "a progressive democracy" - as
did Ripka, PerourtJka, Zenkl Le1Jtrich and Co. The <:ry· "cavean:t consules, nequid detrimenti Res PUiblica capiat," it
seems, is, therefore, in order, but the investigation of the
Czech collalborators is aJso late by several years.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Case of Dr. Hubert Ripka and Company
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Kirschbaum, M.A., LL.D.
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954
pp. 4-14
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/49c22a933a41fb6c35fc24890b895dd2.pdf
1d665ed688c0f104a1b3b9d37fb8d66d
PDF Text
Text
VOL. IV
JUNE ,1954
NO. 2 (11i
IN TillS ISSUE:
Tf;IE CA§E OF DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY
.r-;
. ·,:p·,:,cASTLES OF SLOVAKIA:
I
f"
. .....
LIKAVA
f
LIBERATI .O N -
INDEPENDENCE -
I
FEDERATION
,- '
I Y'/AS AN OFFICER IN THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY
THE SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
DECL.:ARATION -
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SLOVAKS
ADDRE•SS OF, PH I LIP A. H ROBAK
MARCH 14 -
SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY
THE SLOVAKS AND KING SAMO'S EMPIRE
WHO SAID IT ? -
*
*
P.
64
*
Edited and compile.d by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Published by
· THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
ts to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U.S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa .
�SLOVAKIA,
Published quarter ly by the Slova k
VO L. IV
JU N E 1954
DR. HUBERT RIPKA, one of
the founders of tlhe so-called
" Coun c il of F r ee Czechoslovaki a," and former mem1ber of the
Communist-dmninated "Nation a 1
Fron.t" government of Benes and
Gottwald, tried hard to e."plain
a.way his coilla'boraJtion wHh the
Reds of his country and wi-th
Moscow in a s·e ries of articles pUJblished -in the NEW YORESKY
DENINiK, last March (March 1226, 19'54). His record, however,
stands. To our readers we recommend Ripka's book "EAISl'l' ANiD
WEST" (London, 1944) so that
they might see just :hO<W Mr.
Ripk,a and otJher Bene.s Czechs
fought Communism at home and
aJbroad . Since the book is no:t
easy to get, the s ,LOV!A.K NEWS·
LElT'DER, might serve the pul'lpose,
since it has -published lerugthy
quotations from it since Miairch,
1954. Copies gf .the NiIDWSLETTER are still available for those
who wish t hem. Send 25 cents to
SLOVAKIA to pay for the cost
of handling and postage.
DR. FEDOR HODZA, son of the
Ia te premier of Czecho,S!ova:kia,
s igned
the
letter
protesting
" forced I·a:bor" which was published- in the NEW YORK
TIIM ES, April 8, 1954. He signed
it as a member of ithe "'Steering
Committee, Council of Free Czechosfovakia." With the contents
of the · letter prnbaib ly we could
all agree, but was no.t the same
Hodza, as were other Czecll politicians now organized in the
"Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
a member of the ''National
Front As semibly in Pra.g ue whiC1h
Leag ue of Ame rica
N O. 2 (1 1)
,p ;assed Law No. 88, the Compulsory LaJbor Decree, October 1,
19'45? Furthermore, ·w e und erstand that Hodza declared in tlie
Prague Assembly on No·vembe.r
14, 1945, that ,hifs ,>arty (The Let.
'trLch "democrats") " unreservedly
accepts its slb.are of resipon·s ibility
for esta,blislhing complete co ntrol
by the State of aJl! productive
laibor." Would he no,w want us to
'b elieve .that he and his poli<ti,cal
f,riend.s were not aware of the
fact that s lave or forced la bor
oa,mps did exist in Czecho-Slova.
kia when they ruled that country together? Well !·
"CZECHOSLOVAKISM
AME,RICANIS M" a
v ersus
48-page
expose of the pro-Soviet " N•a tional Fronters" in the so-caBe.d
",Council of Free Czecllosiovakia"
- Slhould be read by ever:9" one
seeking the ansrwer to the question why "Czechosloviak demo craoy" converted so ea:shly to a
R ed ·"people's denioc-i,a,cy." Send
25 ce nts in sta1I11Ps or coin and
your co1py will •be se nt promptly.
MORE THAN FORTY Catholic
priests were arrested last M,arch
by the Communist authorities in
Slovakia in the wake of "illegal"
celeibrations comm emorating the
1'5th anniversary of the proclamation of Slovakia's independence,
according to rep'Or:ts · from Vienna. T<he .priests were arres.ted for
off.erirug "unlta.wful" Masses a,nd
paying tribute to Dr. Josepih Tiso, first .president of independent Slovakia, who •was hanged in
194,7 by Vhe Benes-Gottwald regime. ·'I1housands of Slovaks were
�2
SLOVAKli
questioned and detained by the ·
,security police for takin-g par.t in
"illegal" independence demonstra.
tions. The spirit of freedom and
independence lives on in Slovakia!
DR. HUBERT RIPKA, promoter of the pro,Soviet policy of the
Czech National ,SO!cialdsts (the
Czech Naz'is) and author of the
"we-must-colla:boraite-wti.th-1:!he U.
S. S. R. book EAJST AND WEST
(London, 1944), received a ho,t
reception
from ,the
Chtca:go
Czechs the evening of May 10th.
Police were called in to quell the
distunbance when Rilpka ma.de his
,a p;pearance to lecture. -Pic<kets
barred RLpka's entrance to a. lecture hall and one. of them even
l:Yanged Ri pka over the head wit,h
a po!>ter he was carirying. The
Czechs are finalcy- 1beginning .to
s-e parate tJhe chaff from the
wheat.
1
TISO DAY, April 18:th, was reverently ·c ommemorated by true
Slovaks everywhere, Americans
of Slovak descent includ•e d. Dr.
Joseph Tiso, .president of the Slovak Repub1ic (19.39-19145), was
murdered April 18, 1'947, by the
Communist-do:mina:ted "National
Front" gove.rnment of the iBenesGottw'a.ld coalition. Tiso grows in
s,tature with the passing years
and hi s memory lives on in the
hearts of •Slovaks every,w'here.
Con•g ress. Brom'inent American
•personalities are g,radwally learning the. awful trutih about the po1i tical me.ss that wa;s Czecho-Slova:kia ,a nd the peoJ.}le directly and
indirectly resJ.}ons~ble for the sellOLLt of the Czech and Slov01k nations ,to the USSR It is especially gratifying th-at responsible people in Go.v e;rnment a.re finially
le.arning to distinguish ,Slova/ks
from Czechs. 'l'he stirr.i ng and inspiring mess,a ges of President
Eisenhower, V. P. Richard Nixon,
S-ec retary of S·tate John Foster
Dulles, were well received and
,aJ.)pfauded lustily.
BOL•SHEVISM s.till devours its
own cb1ldren. Last April, five
leading Slovak Reas Husak,
HorvaJth, Oka.Li, Holdos and Novomes•ky - were given sentences
of ten years to life for "cons·piring aga inst tJhe integrity of the
State." The Czech Reds are sup11eme rulers in Czecho-Slovakia,
but even they do not know whose
,h eau wHl lbe on the block next.
JOH,N HVASTA, American citizen of Slovak descent, Hillside,
N. J ., told the story of his ar-r est
and escape from Red Cze.cho:SilOIV'akiia In the. SA'DtJIR'OA'Y EVE.
NIING POST (May 15•22, 1~&4) .
Hva,sta expects to have a book
pUJblislhed 'before .the end of the
year.
1
Sl •S TER
THE
NAT1IOiNAL
CONFER-
ENCE of Americans of Silovak
Descent, sponsored by the. Slovak
League of America, in WaSihington, D. C.. May 24-25, 19'54, was
attended ,b y some 1,3,5 delegates
from pra-ctically all parts of
.A:merica settled 'b y the Slova:ks
and some 50 honored guests,
wlhich included three senators and
32 representatives of the U. S.
MAKARIA
BARATH,
a Slovak nun -w ho fled tJhe Communists in Czecho•Slovwkia, told
the story of her underground
rwor.k .anu the success of her
flight in LI•F E mwg,azine, May 17,
19,54. The niun esca-ped from Slovakia in 195.2, spent the next .two
yeiars in Ba..varia and arrived in
'New York last February_ She
aame to · PihiJ.adelphia for a brief
visit June Nth.
�SLOVAKIA
THE SLOVAKS aire not taking
to Marxist sociaUsm quickly
enough, so the Czech Reds of
Prague held new elections to local "national" committees in Sfovakia M.ay l&tlh. Zaipotoeky, Red
Czech president, asked to have
the "1b est" citizens elected, and
the "!best" of the wornit that
could be .found were elected.
Poor SlovakJa!
MR. JOHN PAPI\NEK, former
Czecho-Slovak delegate to the
UN, writes the column "From
the United Nations" Wihich appears in the Ozech "progres,s ive"
papers and the NEW YORK'8KY
DillNN1K, the Czechosfovak daHy
pu,blislhed in. Slovak lan'g uage"(!).
Pa,panek now tells ho,w Communists might be stop,ped or weak•
ened, but he does not want to be
asked how he vote·d on various
issues, ru· why he voted with the
U SISR, when a delegate of Mr.
Benes to the U.N. Papanek might
make his stories a 1bit shorter and
more to the point ,b y saying:
Beihold, hmv I promoted Dr. Benes's
,pro-iSoviet
,p olicy
and
backed tlhe Red-s in the U.N. by
voting wi•th them - now, I, Pa•
panek, admit that is not the w,a y
to stop or wea,ken Communist'S.
Or is confession no longer good
for the soul?
HAVE YOU READ "This is
.Slovakia" by Dr. F,rancis Hrusovs ky, eminent Slovalk historian?
If not, do so at your earliest convenience. You ,oan order your
COPf, , trom SWVAKIA only
$1.0().
THE "MATICA SLOV,ENSKA"
(Slovak Institute) is no more.
The famous cultural institution
of learning was outlawed by decree of the Slovak National Coun-
3
cil on April 27th. T,he Matica
1b,ui:lding is now a lilbra;ry. The
diS1Solution of the institution wias
expected since ·t he Reds estrublished tlhe "Slovak Academy of
Sciences" la.st year whiclb. allegedly took over mos.t of the func.
tions of the Mtatica, the guardian
of Slovak national and cultural
traditions.
"MOST" (Brid,ge), quarterly for
<Slovak culture, estaJbliSihed in
1953, contains many noteworthy
contri,b utions of Slovak intellec·tuals. We recomemnd it to a:11
our readers who C'an read Slovak.
Issue No. 3 has just come off the
press. 'I1he quarterly is edited by
Rev. Niooolas Sprinc of the Slovak Benedictine High School,
Cleveland, Ohio. You can have
'IMOST" for five dollars per annum. Send subscriptions to:
MOST, 2006 Slchrage Avenue,
Whiting, Ind.
"DR.
JOZEF T,IISO
O SEBE"
(Dr. Joseph Tiso .Aibout Himself)
is the title of a book p,ulblished
by the Slovak Catholic Sokol
Press, Passaic, N. J. It was authored by Dr. Joseph Pauco, Middle.t01Wn. Pa., former editor of the
S100VAK, the largest Slovak
daily in Slovakia during tlhe war
years. T-h e speech of Dr. Tiso,
president of the Slovak Republic
(19,39-1945), made in !his own
defense at the conclusion of his
trial in 1-94'7, lasting eleven full
hours, forms the contents of the
book. EX:planatory notes are supplied by Dr. Pauco, who prepared
the speech for puiblic.ation. We
,heartily recommend it to the
readers of Slovakiia who have
a reading ·knowle<lgi'l of Slovak.
You can get a copy by sending
$1.50 to : Dr. Joseph Pauco, 114
N. U nion Street, Middletown, Pa.
�
VOL. IV
JUNE ,1954
NO. 2 (11i
IN TillS ISSUE:
Tf;IE CA§E OF DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY
.r-;
. ·,:p·,:,cASTLES OF SLOVAKIA:
I
f"
. .....
LIKAVA
f
LIBERATI .O N -
INDEPENDENCE -
I
FEDERATION
,- '
I Y'/AS AN OFFICER IN THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY
THE SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
DECL.:ARATION -
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SLOVAKS
ADDRE•SS OF, PH I LIP A. H ROBAK
MARCH 14 -
SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY
THE SLOVAKS AND KING SAMO'S EMPIRE
WHO SAID IT ? -
*
*
P.
64
*
Edited and compile.d by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Published by
· THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
ts to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U.S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa .
�SLOVAKIA,
Published quarter ly by the Slova k
VO L. IV
JU N E 1954
DR. HUBERT RIPKA, one of
the founders of tlhe so-called
" Coun c il of F r ee Czechoslovaki a," and former mem1ber of the
Communist-dmninated "Nation a 1
Fron.t" government of Benes and
Gottwald, tried hard to e."plain
a.way his coilla'boraJtion wHh the
Reds of his country and wi-th
Moscow in a s·e ries of articles pUJblished -in the NEW YORESKY
DENINiK, last March (March 1226, 19'54). His record, however,
stands. To our readers we recommend Ripka's book "EAISl'l' ANiD
WEST" (London, 1944) so that
they might see just :hO<W Mr.
Ripk,a and otJher Bene.s Czechs
fought Communism at home and
aJbroad . Since the book is no:t
easy to get, the s ,LOV!A.K NEWS·
LElT'DER, might serve the pul'lpose,
since it has -published lerugthy
quotations from it since Miairch,
1954. Copies gf .the NiIDWSLETTER are still available for those
who wish t hem. Send 25 cents to
SLOVAKIA to pay for the cost
of handling and postage.
DR. FEDOR HODZA, son of the
Ia te premier of Czecho,S!ova:kia,
s igned
the
letter
protesting
" forced I·a:bor" which was published- in the NEW YORK
TIIM ES, April 8, 1954. He signed
it as a member of ithe "'Steering
Committee, Council of Free Czechosfovakia." With the contents
of the · letter prnbaib ly we could
all agree, but was no.t the same
Hodza, as were other Czecll politicians now organized in the
"Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
a member of the ''National
Front As semibly in Pra.g ue whiC1h
Leag ue of Ame rica
N O. 2 (1 1)
,p ;assed Law No. 88, the Compulsory LaJbor Decree, October 1,
19'45? Furthermore, ·w e und erstand that Hodza declared in tlie
Prague Assembly on No·vembe.r
14, 1945, that ,hifs ,>arty (The Let.
'trLch "democrats") " unreservedly
accepts its slb.are of resipon·s ibility
for esta,blislhing complete co ntrol
by the State of aJl! productive
laibor." Would he no,w want us to
'b elieve .that he and his poli<ti,cal
f,riend.s were not aware of the
fact that s lave or forced la bor
oa,mps did exist in Czecho-Slova.
kia when they ruled that country together? Well !·
"CZECHOSLOVAKISM
AME,RICANIS M" a
v ersus
48-page
expose of the pro-Soviet " N•a tional Fronters" in the so-caBe.d
",Council of Free Czecllosiovakia"
- Slhould be read by ever:9" one
seeking the ansrwer to the question why "Czechosloviak demo craoy" converted so ea:shly to a
R ed ·"people's denioc-i,a,cy." Send
25 ce nts in sta1I11Ps or coin and
your co1py will •be se nt promptly.
MORE THAN FORTY Catholic
priests were arrested last M,arch
by the Communist authorities in
Slovakia in the wake of "illegal"
celeibrations comm emorating the
1'5th anniversary of the proclamation of Slovakia's independence,
according to rep'Or:ts · from Vienna. T<he .priests were arres.ted for
off.erirug "unlta.wful" Masses a,nd
paying tribute to Dr. Josepih Tiso, first .president of independent Slovakia, who •was hanged in
194,7 by Vhe Benes-Gottwald regime. ·'I1housands of Slovaks were
�2
SLOVAKli
questioned and detained by the ·
,security police for takin-g par.t in
"illegal" independence demonstra.
tions. The spirit of freedom and
independence lives on in Slovakia!
DR. HUBERT RIPKA, promoter of the pro,Soviet policy of the
Czech National ,SO!cialdsts (the
Czech Naz'is) and author of the
"we-must-colla:boraite-wti.th-1:!he U.
S. S. R. book EAJST AND WEST
(London, 1944), received a ho,t
reception
from ,the
Chtca:go
Czechs the evening of May 10th.
Police were called in to quell the
distunbance when Rilpka ma.de his
,a p;pearance to lecture. -Pic<kets
barred RLpka's entrance to a. lecture hall and one. of them even
l:Yanged Ri pka over the head wit,h
a po!>ter he was carirying. The
Czechs are finalcy- 1beginning .to
s-e parate tJhe chaff from the
wheat.
1
TISO DAY, April 18:th, was reverently ·c ommemorated by true
Slovaks everywhere, Americans
of Slovak descent includ•e d. Dr.
Joseph Tiso, .president of the Slovak Repub1ic (19.39-19145), was
murdered April 18, 1'947, by the
Communist-do:mina:ted "National
Front" gove.rnment of the iBenesGottw'a.ld coalition. Tiso grows in
s,tature with the passing years
and hi s memory lives on in the
hearts of •Slovaks every,w'here.
Con•g ress. Brom'inent American
•personalities are g,radwally learning the. awful trutih about the po1i tical me.ss that wa;s Czecho-Slova:kia ,a nd the peoJ.}le directly and
indirectly resJ.}ons~ble for the sellOLLt of the Czech and Slov01k nations ,to the USSR It is especially gratifying th-at responsible people in Go.v e;rnment a.re finially
le.arning to distinguish ,Slova/ks
from Czechs. 'l'he stirr.i ng and inspiring mess,a ges of President
Eisenhower, V. P. Richard Nixon,
S-ec retary of S·tate John Foster
Dulles, were well received and
,aJ.)pfauded lustily.
BOL•SHEVISM s.till devours its
own cb1ldren. Last April, five
leading Slovak Reas Husak,
HorvaJth, Oka.Li, Holdos and Novomes•ky - were given sentences
of ten years to life for "cons·piring aga inst tJhe integrity of the
State." The Czech Reds are sup11eme rulers in Czecho-Slovakia,
but even they do not know whose
,h eau wHl lbe on the block next.
JOH,N HVASTA, American citizen of Slovak descent, Hillside,
N. J ., told the story of his ar-r est
and escape from Red Cze.cho:SilOIV'akiia In the. SA'DtJIR'OA'Y EVE.
NIING POST (May 15•22, 1~&4) .
Hva,sta expects to have a book
pUJblislhed 'before .the end of the
year.
1
Sl •S TER
THE
NAT1IOiNAL
CONFER-
ENCE of Americans of Silovak
Descent, sponsored by the. Slovak
League of America, in WaSihington, D. C.. May 24-25, 19'54, was
attended ,b y some 1,3,5 delegates
from pra-ctically all parts of
.A:merica settled 'b y the Slova:ks
and some 50 honored guests,
wlhich included three senators and
32 representatives of the U. S.
MAKARIA
BARATH,
a Slovak nun -w ho fled tJhe Communists in Czecho•Slovwkia, told
the story of her underground
rwor.k .anu the success of her
flight in LI•F E mwg,azine, May 17,
19,54. The niun esca-ped from Slovakia in 195.2, spent the next .two
yeiars in Ba..varia and arrived in
'New York last February_ She
aame to · PihiJ.adelphia for a brief
visit June Nth.
�SLOVAKIA
THE SLOVAKS aire not taking
to Marxist sociaUsm quickly
enough, so the Czech Reds of
Prague held new elections to local "national" committees in Sfovakia M.ay l&tlh. Zaipotoeky, Red
Czech president, asked to have
the "1b est" citizens elected, and
the "!best" of the wornit that
could be .found were elected.
Poor SlovakJa!
MR. JOHN PAPI\NEK, former
Czecho-Slovak delegate to the
UN, writes the column "From
the United Nations" Wihich appears in the Ozech "progres,s ive"
papers and the NEW YORK'8KY
DillNN1K, the Czechosfovak daHy
pu,blislhed in. Slovak lan'g uage"(!).
Pa,panek now tells ho,w Communists might be stop,ped or weak•
ened, but he does not want to be
asked how he vote·d on various
issues, ru· why he voted with the
U SISR, when a delegate of Mr.
Benes to the U.N. Papanek might
make his stories a 1bit shorter and
more to the point ,b y saying:
Beihold, hmv I promoted Dr. Benes's
,pro-iSoviet
,p olicy
and
backed tlhe Red-s in the U.N. by
voting wi•th them - now, I, Pa•
panek, admit that is not the w,a y
to stop or wea,ken Communist'S.
Or is confession no longer good
for the soul?
HAVE YOU READ "This is
.Slovakia" by Dr. F,rancis Hrusovs ky, eminent Slovalk historian?
If not, do so at your earliest convenience. You ,oan order your
COPf, , trom SWVAKIA only
$1.0().
THE "MATICA SLOV,ENSKA"
(Slovak Institute) is no more.
The famous cultural institution
of learning was outlawed by decree of the Slovak National Coun-
3
cil on April 27th. T,he Matica
1b,ui:lding is now a lilbra;ry. The
diS1Solution of the institution wias
expected since ·t he Reds estrublished tlhe "Slovak Academy of
Sciences" la.st year whiclb. allegedly took over mos.t of the func.
tions of the Mtatica, the guardian
of Slovak national and cultural
traditions.
"MOST" (Brid,ge), quarterly for
<Slovak culture, estaJbliSihed in
1953, contains many noteworthy
contri,b utions of Slovak intellec·tuals. We recomemnd it to a:11
our readers who C'an read Slovak.
Issue No. 3 has just come off the
press. 'I1he quarterly is edited by
Rev. Niooolas Sprinc of the Slovak Benedictine High School,
Cleveland, Ohio. You can have
'IMOST" for five dollars per annum. Send subscriptions to:
MOST, 2006 Slchrage Avenue,
Whiting, Ind.
"DR.
JOZEF T,IISO
O SEBE"
(Dr. Joseph Tiso .Aibout Himself)
is the title of a book p,ulblished
by the Slovak Catholic Sokol
Press, Passaic, N. J. It was authored by Dr. Joseph Pauco, Middle.t01Wn. Pa., former editor of the
S100VAK, the largest Slovak
daily in Slovakia during tlhe war
years. T-h e speech of Dr. Tiso,
president of the Slovak Republic
(19,39-1945), made in !his own
defense at the conclusion of his
trial in 1-94'7, lasting eleven full
hours, forms the contents of the
book. EX:planatory notes are supplied by Dr. Pauco, who prepared
the speech for puiblic.ation. We
,heartily recommend it to the
readers of Slovakiia who have
a reading ·knowle<lgi'l of Slovak.
You can get a copy by sending
$1.50 to : Dr. Joseph Pauco, 114
N. U nion Street, Middletown, Pa.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
VOL. IV
JUNE ,1954
NO. 2 (11i
IN TillS ISSUE:
Tf;IE CA§E OF DR. HUBERT RIPKA AND COMPANY
.r-;
. ·,:p·,:,cASTLES OF SLOVAKIA:
I
f"
. .....
LIKAVA
f
LIBERATI .O N -
INDEPENDENCE -
I
FEDERATION
,- '
I Y'/AS AN OFFICER IN THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY
THE SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE
DECL.:ARATION -
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SLOVAKS
ADDRE•SS OF, PH I LIP A. H ROBAK
MARCH 14 -
SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE DAY
THE SLOVAKS AND KING SAMO'S EMPIRE
WHO SAID IT ? -
*
*
P.
64
*
Edited and compile.d by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Published by
· THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
SLOVAKIA is published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
ts to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U.S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa .
SLOVAKIA,
Published quarter ly by the Slova k
VO L. IV
JU N E 1954
DR. HUBERT RIPKA, one of
the founders of tlhe so-called
" Coun c il of F r ee Czechoslovaki a," and former mem1ber of the
Communist-dmninated "Nation a 1
Fron.t" government of Benes and
Gottwald, tried hard to e."plain
a.way his coilla'boraJtion wHh the
Reds of his country and wi-th
Moscow in a s·e ries of articles pUJblished -in the NEW YORESKY
DENINiK, last March (March 1226, 19'54). His record, however,
stands. To our readers we recommend Ripka's book "EAISl'l' ANiD
WEST" (London, 1944) so that
they might see just :hO<W Mr.
Ripk,a and otJher Bene.s Czechs
fought Communism at home and
aJbroad . Since the book is no:t
easy to get, the s ,LOV!A.K NEWS·
LElT'DER, might serve the pul'lpose,
since it has -published lerugthy
quotations from it since Miairch,
1954. Copies gf .the NiIDWSLETTER are still available for those
who wish t hem. Send 25 cents to
SLOVAKIA to pay for the cost
of handling and postage.
DR. FEDOR HODZA, son of the
Ia te premier of Czecho,S!ova:kia,
s igned
the
letter
protesting
" forced I·a:bor" which was published- in the NEW YORK
TIIM ES, April 8, 1954. He signed
it as a member of ithe "'Steering
Committee, Council of Free Czechosfovakia." With the contents
of the · letter prnbaib ly we could
all agree, but was no.t the same
Hodza, as were other Czecll politicians now organized in the
"Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
a member of the ''National
Front As semibly in Pra.g ue whiC1h
Leag ue of Ame rica
N O. 2 (1 1)
,p ;assed Law No. 88, the Compulsory LaJbor Decree, October 1,
19'45? Furthermore, ·w e und erstand that Hodza declared in tlie
Prague Assembly on No·vembe.r
14, 1945, that ,hifs ,>arty (The Let.
'trLch "democrats") " unreservedly
accepts its slb.are of resipon·s ibility
for esta,blislhing complete co ntrol
by the State of aJl! productive
laibor." Would he no,w want us to
'b elieve .that he and his poli<ti,cal
f,riend.s were not aware of the
fact that s lave or forced la bor
oa,mps did exist in Czecho-Slova.
kia when they ruled that country together? Well !·
"CZECHOSLOVAKISM
AME,RICANIS M" a
v ersus
48-page
expose of the pro-Soviet " N•a tional Fronters" in the so-caBe.d
",Council of Free Czecllosiovakia"
- Slhould be read by ever:9" one
seeking the ansrwer to the question why "Czechosloviak demo craoy" converted so ea:shly to a
R ed ·"people's denioc-i,a,cy." Send
25 ce nts in sta1I11Ps or coin and
your co1py will •be se nt promptly.
MORE THAN FORTY Catholic
priests were arrested last M,arch
by the Communist authorities in
Slovakia in the wake of "illegal"
celeibrations comm emorating the
1'5th anniversary of the proclamation of Slovakia's independence,
according to rep'Or:ts · from Vienna. T<he .priests were arres.ted for
off.erirug "unlta.wful" Masses a,nd
paying tribute to Dr. Josepih Tiso, first .president of independent Slovakia, who •was hanged in
194,7 by Vhe Benes-Gottwald regime. ·'I1housands of Slovaks were
2
SLOVAKli
questioned and detained by the ·
,security police for takin-g par.t in
"illegal" independence demonstra.
tions. The spirit of freedom and
independence lives on in Slovakia!
DR. HUBERT RIPKA, promoter of the pro,Soviet policy of the
Czech National ,SO!cialdsts (the
Czech Naz'is) and author of the
"we-must-colla:boraite-wti.th-1:!he U.
S. S. R. book EAJST AND WEST
(London, 1944), received a ho,t
reception
from ,the
Chtca:go
Czechs the evening of May 10th.
Police were called in to quell the
distunbance when Rilpka ma.de his
,a p;pearance to lecture. -Pic<kets
barred RLpka's entrance to a. lecture hall and one. of them even
l:Yanged Ri pka over the head wit,h
a po!>ter he was carirying. The
Czechs are finalcy- 1beginning .to
s-e parate tJhe chaff from the
wheat.
1
TISO DAY, April 18:th, was reverently ·c ommemorated by true
Slovaks everywhere, Americans
of Slovak descent includ•e d. Dr.
Joseph Tiso, .president of the Slovak Repub1ic (19.39-19145), was
murdered April 18, 1'947, by the
Communist-do:mina:ted "National
Front" gove.rnment of the iBenesGottw'a.ld coalition. Tiso grows in
s,tature with the passing years
and hi s memory lives on in the
hearts of •Slovaks every,w'here.
Con•g ress. Brom'inent American
•personalities are g,radwally learning the. awful trutih about the po1i tical me.ss that wa;s Czecho-Slova:kia ,a nd the peoJ.}le directly and
indirectly resJ.}ons~ble for the sellOLLt of the Czech and Slov01k nations ,to the USSR It is especially gratifying th-at responsible people in Go.v e;rnment a.re finially
le.arning to distinguish ,Slova/ks
from Czechs. 'l'he stirr.i ng and inspiring mess,a ges of President
Eisenhower, V. P. Richard Nixon,
S-ec retary of S·tate John Foster
Dulles, were well received and
,aJ.)pfauded lustily.
BOL•SHEVISM s.till devours its
own cb1ldren. Last April, five
leading Slovak Reas Husak,
HorvaJth, Oka.Li, Holdos and Novomes•ky - were given sentences
of ten years to life for "cons·piring aga inst tJhe integrity of the
State." The Czech Reds are sup11eme rulers in Czecho-Slovakia,
but even they do not know whose
,h eau wHl lbe on the block next.
JOH,N HVASTA, American citizen of Slovak descent, Hillside,
N. J ., told the story of his ar-r est
and escape from Red Cze.cho:SilOIV'akiia In the. SA'DtJIR'OA'Y EVE.
NIING POST (May 15•22, 1~&4) .
Hva,sta expects to have a book
pUJblislhed 'before .the end of the
year.
1
Sl •S TER
THE
NAT1IOiNAL
CONFER-
ENCE of Americans of Silovak
Descent, sponsored by the. Slovak
League of America, in WaSihington, D. C.. May 24-25, 19'54, was
attended ,b y some 1,3,5 delegates
from pra-ctically all parts of
.A:merica settled 'b y the Slova:ks
and some 50 honored guests,
wlhich included three senators and
32 representatives of the U. S.
MAKARIA
BARATH,
a Slovak nun -w ho fled tJhe Communists in Czecho•Slovwkia, told
the story of her underground
rwor.k .anu the success of her
flight in LI•F E mwg,azine, May 17,
19,54. The niun esca-ped from Slovakia in 195.2, spent the next .two
yeiars in Ba..varia and arrived in
'New York last February_ She
aame to · PihiJ.adelphia for a brief
visit June Nth.
SLOVAKIA
THE SLOVAKS aire not taking
to Marxist sociaUsm quickly
enough, so the Czech Reds of
Prague held new elections to local "national" committees in Sfovakia M.ay l&tlh. Zaipotoeky, Red
Czech president, asked to have
the "1b est" citizens elected, and
the "!best" of the wornit that
could be .found were elected.
Poor SlovakJa!
MR. JOHN PAPI\NEK, former
Czecho-Slovak delegate to the
UN, writes the column "From
the United Nations" Wihich appears in the Ozech "progres,s ive"
papers and the NEW YORK'8KY
DillNN1K, the Czechosfovak daHy
pu,blislhed in. Slovak lan'g uage"(!).
Pa,panek now tells ho,w Communists might be stop,ped or weak•
ened, but he does not want to be
asked how he vote·d on various
issues, ru· why he voted with the
U SISR, when a delegate of Mr.
Benes to the U.N. Papanek might
make his stories a 1bit shorter and
more to the point ,b y saying:
Beihold, hmv I promoted Dr. Benes's
,pro-iSoviet
,p olicy
and
backed tlhe Red-s in the U.N. by
voting wi•th them - now, I, Pa•
panek, admit that is not the w,a y
to stop or wea,ken Communist'S.
Or is confession no longer good
for the soul?
HAVE YOU READ "This is
.Slovakia" by Dr. F,rancis Hrusovs ky, eminent Slovalk historian?
If not, do so at your earliest convenience. You ,oan order your
COPf, , trom SWVAKIA only
$1.0().
THE "MATICA SLOV,ENSKA"
(Slovak Institute) is no more.
The famous cultural institution
of learning was outlawed by decree of the Slovak National Coun-
3
cil on April 27th. T,he Matica
1b,ui:lding is now a lilbra;ry. The
diS1Solution of the institution wias
expected since ·t he Reds estrublished tlhe "Slovak Academy of
Sciences" la.st year whiclb. allegedly took over mos.t of the func.
tions of the Mtatica, the guardian
of Slovak national and cultural
traditions.
"MOST" (Brid,ge), quarterly for
<Slovak culture, estaJbliSihed in
1953, contains many noteworthy
contri,b utions of Slovak intellec·tuals. We recomemnd it to a:11
our readers who C'an read Slovak.
Issue No. 3 has just come off the
press. 'I1he quarterly is edited by
Rev. Niooolas Sprinc of the Slovak Benedictine High School,
Cleveland, Ohio. You can have
'IMOST" for five dollars per annum. Send subscriptions to:
MOST, 2006 Slchrage Avenue,
Whiting, Ind.
"DR.
JOZEF T,IISO
O SEBE"
(Dr. Joseph Tiso .Aibout Himself)
is the title of a book p,ulblished
by the Slovak Catholic Sokol
Press, Passaic, N. J. It was authored by Dr. Joseph Pauco, Middle.t01Wn. Pa., former editor of the
S100VAK, the largest Slovak
daily in Slovakia during tlhe war
years. T-h e speech of Dr. Tiso,
president of the Slovak Republic
(19,39-1945), made in !his own
defense at the conclusion of his
trial in 1-94'7, lasting eleven full
hours, forms the contents of the
book. EX:planatory notes are supplied by Dr. Pauco, who prepared
the speech for puiblic.ation. We
,heartily recommend it to the
readers of Slovakiia who have
a reading ·knowle<lgi'l of Slovak.
You can get a copy by sending
$1.50 to : Dr. Joseph Pauco, 114
N. U nion Street, Middletown, Pa.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (11)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c8967aaa42bc5a289ba209343bfe2261.pdf
e5f62adc476fb0b67db9fd19f4af9cef
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organ ized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
Honorary
Dr, Peter
1943 W.
Chi cago
John J. Sirotnak
610-612 L inco ln Trust B ldg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
President
P. Hletko
48th Street
9, Illin ois
Dr. Julius Janci
215 East Mason Street
Owosso , Micl1.
President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. 0. Box 150, Midd letown, Pa. Ste phanie 0. Husek
Georgian Court Coll ege
Lakewood, N. J.
Vice-President
Jacob Kocis
ADVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Street
Michael J. Vargov ich
Hammond, Ind.
National President
First Catholi c S lovak Un ion
Vice-President
of U. S. A.
Julia Krajcovlc
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
Rec01·d ing Secretary
Fra ncis H rusovsky
2900 East Boul evard
Cleveland 4, Ohio
Frank Sobus
National President
S lovak Catholi c Sokol
Sec re ta ry-Treas u rer
Milan V. Blazek
4205 W . Cullerton Street
Ch icago 23, 111.
EXECUTIVE
Helen Kocan
National P r es ident
F irst Catholi c Slovak
Ladies Union
Stephen J . Tkach
National President
Penna. Slovak Union
Gabr iela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
P ittsb urgh 10, P a.
Joseph Prusa
205 Mad ison St., Passaic, N. J .
SLOVAK
John Rozboril
National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of Amer ica )
JEDNOTA
Midd letown, Pa.
SLOVEN SKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.
.ZENSKA JEDNOTA
BRATSTVO
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
SLOVENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland, Oh io.
ZORNICKA
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KA TOL i CKY SOKO L
Passaic, N. J.
S VORNOST
Wh1taker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill .
Cleveland, Ohio.
�General Milan R. Stefanik, soldier, statesman and
astronomer, whose tragic death occurred May 4, 1919, when
his plane was "accidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison
near Vajnory, Slovakia.
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organ ized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
Honorary
Dr, Peter
1943 W.
Chi cago
John J. Sirotnak
610-612 L inco ln Trust B ldg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
President
P. Hletko
48th Street
9, Illin ois
Dr. Julius Janci
215 East Mason Street
Owosso , Micl1.
President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. 0. Box 150, Midd letown, Pa. Ste phanie 0. Husek
Georgian Court Coll ege
Lakewood, N. J.
Vice-President
Jacob Kocis
ADVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Street
Michael J. Vargov ich
Hammond, Ind.
National President
First Catholi c S lovak Un ion
Vice-President
of U. S. A.
Julia Krajcovlc
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
Rec01·d ing Secretary
Fra ncis H rusovsky
2900 East Boul evard
Cleveland 4, Ohio
Frank Sobus
National President
S lovak Catholi c Sokol
Sec re ta ry-Treas u rer
Milan V. Blazek
4205 W . Cullerton Street
Ch icago 23, 111.
EXECUTIVE
Helen Kocan
National P r es ident
F irst Catholi c Slovak
Ladies Union
Stephen J . Tkach
National President
Penna. Slovak Union
Gabr iela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
P ittsb urgh 10, P a.
Joseph Prusa
205 Mad ison St., Passaic, N. J .
SLOVAK
John Rozboril
National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of Amer ica )
JEDNOTA
Midd letown, Pa.
SLOVEN SKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.
.ZENSKA JEDNOTA
BRATSTVO
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
SLOVENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland, Oh io.
ZORNICKA
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KA TOL i CKY SOKO L
Passaic, N. J.
S VORNOST
Wh1taker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill .
Cleveland, Ohio.
�General Milan R. Stefanik, soldier, statesman and
astronomer, whose tragic death occurred May 4, 1919, when
his plane was "accidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison
near Vajnory, Slovakia.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organ ized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio.)
•
Honorary
Dr, Peter
1943 W.
Chi cago
John J. Sirotnak
610-612 L inco ln Trust B ldg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
President
P. Hletko
48th Street
9, Illin ois
Dr. Julius Janci
215 East Mason Street
Owosso , Micl1.
President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. 0. Box 150, Midd letown, Pa. Ste phanie 0. Husek
Georgian Court Coll ege
Lakewood, N. J.
Vice-President
Jacob Kocis
ADVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Street
Michael J. Vargov ich
Hammond, Ind.
National President
First Catholi c S lovak Un ion
Vice-President
of U. S. A.
Julia Krajcovlc
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
Rec01·d ing Secretary
Fra ncis H rusovsky
2900 East Boul evard
Cleveland 4, Ohio
Frank Sobus
National President
S lovak Catholi c Sokol
Sec re ta ry-Treas u rer
Milan V. Blazek
4205 W . Cullerton Street
Ch icago 23, 111.
EXECUTIVE
Helen Kocan
National P r es ident
F irst Catholi c Slovak
Ladies Union
Stephen J . Tkach
National President
Penna. Slovak Union
Gabr iela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
P ittsb urgh 10, P a.
Joseph Prusa
205 Mad ison St., Passaic, N. J .
SLOVAK
John Rozboril
National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of Amer ica )
JEDNOTA
Midd letown, Pa.
SLOVEN SKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.
.ZENSKA JEDNOTA
BRATSTVO
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
SLOVENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland, Oh io.
ZORNICKA
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
KA TOL i CKY SOKO L
Passaic, N. J.
S VORNOST
Wh1taker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill .
Cleveland, Ohio.
General Milan R. Stefanik, soldier, statesman and
astronomer, whose tragic death occurred May 4, 1919, when
his plane was "accidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison
near Vajnory, Slovakia.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10)
Description
An account of the resource
includes portrait of Gen. Milan R. Štefánik
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/06ffe1aed7fe2ac7435cb40bb8e506df.pdf
95d24e9b5d08db54f68d08c75203d2fb
PDF Text
Text
63
SLOVAKIA
Lieta:va ,p robably witnessed its most glorious day at the
time when Francis Thul'zo mrurried Kostika's daughter and
received Lietava as a dowry. Thurzo, however, ;preferred to
live in the Orava Castle. When he left Lletava without an
occupant, it gradually 1beca.me neglected and the teeth of
time and weather toolk their toll. During the time od: Francis Raik6czi M, the stronghold of Lletaiva wa·s ,partly repaired, ibut shortly thererufter was completely abandoned
to its sad fate.
• • •
WIDTE MOUNTAIN -
IDSTOR'ICAL FORGERY
Soone Czechs, Ozech historians and their aipologists indulge in descrilbing tJhe anti-Hussite .crusades as national
swppression and the "Hussite Century" as a period of enlightemnent and Czech "national" rule in BO'hemia. Their
claim that the Czechs lost their "national" independence
in 1620 (Battle of White Mountain) has 1been rnpeated so
often that finally most Ozechs have come to believe it. T. G.
Masaryik, Dr. Edward Benes and their !followers haive propagated this legend consistently sin.ce the foundation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. It is a singular example of historkal
forgery.
The overthrow of Hussitism has been consciously misinterpreted as a siUippress:ion of the Czech n1a tion lby the
Czechs th~se1ves to gain the symaipthy of other nations.
The White Mountain !battle was not a nationaJl, but strictly
a religious allld dynastic a,ffair.. After the battle was O'Ver,
the emperor had some 27 od: the "relbel" :l eaders decapitated.
Six were of German odgin. But none was executed because
of his nationality.
1
We know that the Thirty Years' War started in Bohemia in 1'618, when the Pmtestant aristocraits there refused
to elect Feroinand of Austria, iHoly Roman IDmipe;ror, to the
vrucant throne od: Bohem'ia, 1preforring yo1Un,g Fredericlk,
Elector Palatine, instead. This rularmed the Protestant
princes, especially John George of Saxony, to such an. extent that they declared themselves neutral and let Frederick
�64
SLOVAKIA
do the reibeUing against the emperor by himself. The emperor's generai, Tilly, defeated Frederick and the Czech
ma;g;nates ·at White Moiuntain in 1620. Frederick fled the
country while the emperor was rounding up his enemies.
The emperor abrogated the ipr1vileges orf the aristocratic
estates with the wcclaim of the common Czech pe01ple. The
Thirty Years' Wa;r raged with like fury in Bohemia -and the
Germanies. There ,certainly was no national pumpose, especially no Czech national punpose - 'behind it a,t all After
the smoke ,orf the lb attle cleia,r~d, there was -little evidence
of Czech national co;nsciousness until the mid<ile orf the nineteenth century.
1
In the liight of historic~l facts,, the legend tha,t the
Czechs lost their political (national) indeipendence in 1620
remains just what it was - a legend. As much so as the
legend or fiction o;f a single, united "Ozechoslava;k" nation!
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Sfova;ks. . . So important was the Siova,k
problem in the minds of both Czech and Slorvak leaders, that
it was a major subject of study a11d debate during the war
and has continued to .be ever since. An effort was made to
solve the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice Programme, in which
Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations
united by common interest in a single state. This is in
itse'lf a complete reversal orf .the ethnic theory on which
the first Repulblic was built: the. belief that Czechs and
Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kpsice , Program
further provided that the Slovaks should be the masters in
their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs in their Czech homeland, and that the gorvernment will regard the Slorvak Na-.
tional Counici.J not only as the rightfiu[ re<presentatirve of the
indirviduwl Siorvak nation, but aJlso as, the bearer of so:verei,gn
right on SlorvaJk territory." ~ William Diamond, CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEIDN EAST AND WEST, Londoo., 1947.
�
63
SLOVAKIA
Lieta:va ,p robably witnessed its most glorious day at the
time when Francis Thul'zo mrurried Kostika's daughter and
received Lietava as a dowry. Thurzo, however, ;preferred to
live in the Orava Castle. When he left Lletava without an
occupant, it gradually 1beca.me neglected and the teeth of
time and weather toolk their toll. During the time od: Francis Raik6czi M, the stronghold of Lletaiva wa·s ,partly repaired, ibut shortly thererufter was completely abandoned
to its sad fate.
• • •
WIDTE MOUNTAIN -
IDSTOR'ICAL FORGERY
Soone Czechs, Ozech historians and their aipologists indulge in descrilbing tJhe anti-Hussite .crusades as national
swppression and the "Hussite Century" as a period of enlightemnent and Czech "national" rule in BO'hemia. Their
claim that the Czechs lost their "national" independence
in 1620 (Battle of White Mountain) has 1been rnpeated so
often that finally most Ozechs have come to believe it. T. G.
Masaryik, Dr. Edward Benes and their !followers haive propagated this legend consistently sin.ce the foundation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. It is a singular example of historkal
forgery.
The overthrow of Hussitism has been consciously misinterpreted as a siUippress:ion of the Czech n1a tion lby the
Czechs th~se1ves to gain the symaipthy of other nations.
The White Mountain !battle was not a nationaJl, but strictly
a religious allld dynastic a,ffair.. After the battle was O'Ver,
the emperor had some 27 od: the "relbel" :l eaders decapitated.
Six were of German odgin. But none was executed because
of his nationality.
1
We know that the Thirty Years' War started in Bohemia in 1'618, when the Pmtestant aristocraits there refused
to elect Feroinand of Austria, iHoly Roman IDmipe;ror, to the
vrucant throne od: Bohem'ia, 1preforring yo1Un,g Fredericlk,
Elector Palatine, instead. This rularmed the Protestant
princes, especially John George of Saxony, to such an. extent that they declared themselves neutral and let Frederick
�64
SLOVAKIA
do the reibeUing against the emperor by himself. The emperor's generai, Tilly, defeated Frederick and the Czech
ma;g;nates ·at White Moiuntain in 1620. Frederick fled the
country while the emperor was rounding up his enemies.
The emperor abrogated the ipr1vileges orf the aristocratic
estates with the wcclaim of the common Czech pe01ple. The
Thirty Years' Wa;r raged with like fury in Bohemia -and the
Germanies. There ,certainly was no national pumpose, especially no Czech national punpose - 'behind it a,t all After
the smoke ,orf the lb attle cleia,r~d, there was -little evidence
of Czech national co;nsciousness until the mid<ile orf the nineteenth century.
1
In the liight of historic~l facts,, the legend tha,t the
Czechs lost their political (national) indeipendence in 1620
remains just what it was - a legend. As much so as the
legend or fiction o;f a single, united "Ozechoslava;k" nation!
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Sfova;ks. . . So important was the Siova,k
problem in the minds of both Czech and Slorvak leaders, that
it was a major subject of study a11d debate during the war
and has continued to .be ever since. An effort was made to
solve the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice Programme, in which
Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations
united by common interest in a single state. This is in
itse'lf a complete reversal orf .the ethnic theory on which
the first Repulblic was built: the. belief that Czechs and
Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kpsice , Program
further provided that the Slovaks should be the masters in
their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs in their Czech homeland, and that the gorvernment will regard the Slorvak Na-.
tional Counici.J not only as the rightfiu[ re<presentatirve of the
indirviduwl Siorvak nation, but aJlso as, the bearer of so:verei,gn
right on SlorvaJk territory." ~ William Diamond, CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEIDN EAST AND WEST, Londoo., 1947.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
63
SLOVAKIA
Lieta:va ,p robably witnessed its most glorious day at the
time when Francis Thul'zo mrurried Kostika's daughter and
received Lietava as a dowry. Thurzo, however, ;preferred to
live in the Orava Castle. When he left Lletava without an
occupant, it gradually 1beca.me neglected and the teeth of
time and weather toolk their toll. During the time od: Francis Raik6czi M, the stronghold of Lletaiva wa·s ,partly repaired, ibut shortly thererufter was completely abandoned
to its sad fate.
• • •
WIDTE MOUNTAIN -
IDSTOR'ICAL FORGERY
Soone Czechs, Ozech historians and their aipologists indulge in descrilbing tJhe anti-Hussite .crusades as national
swppression and the "Hussite Century" as a period of enlightemnent and Czech "national" rule in BO'hemia. Their
claim that the Czechs lost their "national" independence
in 1620 (Battle of White Mountain) has 1been rnpeated so
often that finally most Ozechs have come to believe it. T. G.
Masaryik, Dr. Edward Benes and their !followers haive propagated this legend consistently sin.ce the foundation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. It is a singular example of historkal
forgery.
The overthrow of Hussitism has been consciously misinterpreted as a siUippress:ion of the Czech n1a tion lby the
Czechs th~se1ves to gain the symaipthy of other nations.
The White Mountain !battle was not a nationaJl, but strictly
a religious allld dynastic a,ffair.. After the battle was O'Ver,
the emperor had some 27 od: the "relbel" :l eaders decapitated.
Six were of German odgin. But none was executed because
of his nationality.
1
We know that the Thirty Years' War started in Bohemia in 1'618, when the Pmtestant aristocraits there refused
to elect Feroinand of Austria, iHoly Roman IDmipe;ror, to the
vrucant throne od: Bohem'ia, 1preforring yo1Un,g Fredericlk,
Elector Palatine, instead. This rularmed the Protestant
princes, especially John George of Saxony, to such an. extent that they declared themselves neutral and let Frederick
64
SLOVAKIA
do the reibeUing against the emperor by himself. The emperor's generai, Tilly, defeated Frederick and the Czech
ma;g;nates ·at White Moiuntain in 1620. Frederick fled the
country while the emperor was rounding up his enemies.
The emperor abrogated the ipr1vileges orf the aristocratic
estates with the wcclaim of the common Czech pe01ple. The
Thirty Years' Wa;r raged with like fury in Bohemia -and the
Germanies. There ,certainly was no national pumpose, especially no Czech national punpose - 'behind it a,t all After
the smoke ,orf the lb attle cleia,r~d, there was -little evidence
of Czech national co;nsciousness until the mid<ile orf the nineteenth century.
1
In the liight of historic~l facts,, the legend tha,t the
Czechs lost their political (national) indeipendence in 1620
remains just what it was - a legend. As much so as the
legend or fiction o;f a single, united "Ozechoslava;k" nation!
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Slovak tradition and economy stand as a barrier between Czechs and Sfova;ks. . . So important was the Siova,k
problem in the minds of both Czech and Slorvak leaders, that
it was a major subject of study a11d debate during the war
and has continued to .be ever since. An effort was made to
solve the problem in 194'5 in the Kosice Programme, in which
Czechs and Slovaks are defined as two distinct nations
united by common interest in a single state. This is in
itse'lf a complete reversal orf .the ethnic theory on which
the first Repulblic was built: the. belief that Czechs and
Slovaks constituted a single nation. The Kpsice , Program
further provided that the Slovaks should be the masters in
their Slovak lands, just as the Czechs in their Czech homeland, and that the gorvernment will regard the Slorvak Na-.
tional Counici.J not only as the rightfiu[ re<presentatirve of the
indirviduwl Siorvak nation, but aJlso as, the bearer of so:verei,gn
right on SlorvaJk territory." ~ William Diamond, CZECHOSLOVAKIA BETWEIDN EAST AND WEST, Londoo., 1947.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
White Mountain - Historical Forgery
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 63-64
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/96d04a4a837ae0e45ee85998b4dff11a.pdf
9e5e206f00cb0421dba1339b2a117ae2
PDF Text
Text
60
SLOVAKIA
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
LIETAVA
Li etava was one of the most extensive castles of the
V ah region and ,pro\baibly one of the largest orf Slovakia.
With its locati,on and structure it al1s o is one of lthe most beautiful of ruins. Like Hricov and Sul'ov, Lieta,va was buHt on
hu1g e sandstone roicks which not only made a firm foundation, but also provided exceHent buiiding ma,terial. Because
it was practkally inaiccessilble, it afforded good protection
for its masters. The ea stern and northern sides orf Lietava
Castle espeicially are so steep that an approach from those
sides i,s whoHy impossi'ble . And this · characteristic most
likely gruve rise to the legend for the origin of the name
of the castle. Louis the Great, ,Slovaiks will teJl you, ordered
his burlders to !build him a new castle 1in about 1360 on such
a spot that would lbe inaccessible to an enemy who did not
know how to fly. Hence, the name LietaJVa from the, SlO!Vak
"lietat'" (to fily). Liefa'Va was one of a number of fortresses
and castles built at that time.
1
Lietawa is mosrt accessilble from the southern side, where
one can enter the castle grounds through the main gate.
At the western and eastern ends of the spacious courtyard
we see the remains of two ,s quare towers ,w ith gun oipeinings.
To gert to the 1inner courtyard, which housed the inhalbitants
of the castle, one has to pass throll1gh anotherr massive gate.
Here we <find ,a huge cistern carved inrto the rO'ck, into which
flowed the rainwater from the rooftops of the !buildings
close by through wooden and clay troughs.
,
In the center orf the yard there stood a mighty tower
with walls two meterrs thi,ok ; its circumference was 36
meters,. Accoroing to experts this was the oldest part of the
Lietava fortress - the last ref'll!ge of those, besieged by an
enemy. On the southern side of the dwelling pl~es ~an be
seen even today the escutcheon of the Kostka clan, i.e, a
hand gvilpipirng a siword with a half-moon and a 1brachial
star. On the eastern side there iprotrudes a mighty semicircU'lar -bastion with many gun-holes; on the ground floor
�SLOVAKIA
61
'large ones for cannons and small ones for musk~ts on the
upper floor.
At the foot of the castle, aJb,o ve the town of Lietava,
stands a historic churich with a Gothic tower, which probably was a ,g uard tower, since it was 'buult on the slope of the
hill. When the caSitle 1perished, two paintings, two, painted
and richly caTVed chureh pews and three bells were brought
to this ,c hurch from the castle chaipeJ. During Worrld War I,
the Hungarian government had these relics removed. According to an ancient story, there was a precious altar
painting in this chur,ch, whi-ch also had its origin in the
LietaJVa Castle. The painting depfoted a multitude o:f people
surrounding an old ,priest who was being thrown oiver the
cliff onto prepared siprked-lpoles by wi1d Tatars.
An · ancient legend teHs us that the painting originated
in the fol1lowi.nig imaniner. Aifter the historic battle near
Saj,wa, the Tataric hordes ,s cattered all o;ver the country.
One of their groUJps 1ca;me to Lietava, and the residents, fled
in terror before them, many hiding in the hills, while the
rest, mostly dlder men, ,w omen and ohildren, barric·a ded
themsel,ves :in the church. In those days, chu11ches were
fortified with walls so that in ti:me of need they did offer
some measure of ,protection. Among the unfortunates in the
chmch, wa;s a!lso an old priest who encouraged his fait:hfol
to ,prepare to defend themselves. As ,s oon as the Tatars
came to the chur,ch, they called out to the defende:ris to surrender the church willingly and then all wou1d 1b e free to go
their way. The old priest admonished his 1people not to believe the heathen ter,rorists, but the faithful eventually
gruve UJP and surrendered the church. They were basely
deceived. The Tatars rounded them all up and marched
them to the edge of a high rock: below, in the albyss, spilked
poles were driven in the ,g round. The wild Tatars screamed
at their prisoners to renounce their Christian fruith or be
thrown off the cliff onto the, spiked poles. The wged priest
pleaded with his faithfol to. remain true to Chri.st, and true
they did remain. The · enraged Tatars forced many oiver
the cliff with their ·spears and knives. When the rest would
not renounce their faith, the Tatars seized the old priest and
�SLOVAKIA
62
t!hrew him headlong into .the a:byss. But, lo and behold, a
miracle happened! T.he ,priest did not fall on ,t he spikes belorw. He siim:ply dis111Ppeared. The heathen Tatar brutes were
ama;zed and fri,gihtened; it did not ta:ke them long to clear
out of Lietava and the country.
What really happened to the aged ·priest? His fall to
certain doom was checked ·~ a staunch bush which projected out of the cliff and he mana;ged to hang on, out of
s~ght of the Tatars. When the residents of Lietava ireturned
f.rom the ,hills shortl,y after, they freed thek heroic and
saintly priest and buried the victims of Tatar brutality. Lietaiva commemorated the memo,ry of this. miraculous liberation for centuries. The paintiing resulted; it was hUIIlg above
the altar of the church.
'-'
According to tradition, long before the wills of Lieta va
Castle were built on the steep rock, a pagan shrine was built
on the site. It was. made of wood, and, hence, in time disaippeared completely. .Aibove the entrance to the shrine, on
a hU1ge beam, theire was caI"Ved an image of the sun, which
meant that the forefathers orf ,the Slo1vaJks. worrs.hiipped the
sun as the giver of life. Pagan priestesses: lived beneath the
shrine; it was 1Jhedr duty to bring honey water, ripened
grains and f,rurits, wreaths and other airtioles of sa;crifice to
their gods. Many years later a Christian church repl-a,ced the
pa:gan shrine.
History tells us that Lo:u.is the Great donated the Lieta;va stronghold in 1360 to Stephen Bwbek from Plesivec for
sel'!Vices rendered him during his wars in Italy. In 1403,
however, one of his descendants, Henry (Im.ro), fought
a;gainst King Zigimund, and because of this both Strecno
and Lietava were given to some Polisih nobleman by Zigmund. Later, however, the Bubelk clan was amnestied by the
king, who returned Lietwva to them. One of the Bubeiks
died near Luicenec in the, battle a:gaiinst Jiskra. Later, when
the castle •b ecame the ;property of the Zfupol'skys, John Zapol'sky donated it to Nkholas Kostka, a Bohemian nobleman. In 1538, General Ntcholas Turi ()(f Ferdinand I's army
SU!ITounded the castle, lb ut was not able to take it; Kostka
defended it successfully.
1
�63
SLOVAKIA
Lieta:va ,p robably witnessed its most glorious day at the
time when Francis Thul'zo mrurried Kostika's daughter and
received Lietava as a dowry. Thurzo, however, ;preferred to
live in the Orava Castle. When he left Lletava without an
occupant, it gradually 1beca.me neglected and the teeth of
time and weather toolk their toll. During the time od: Francis Raik6czi M, the stronghold of Lletaiva wa·s ,partly repaired, ibut shortly thererufter was completely abandoned
to its sad fate.
• • •
WIDTE MOUNTAIN -
IDSTOR'ICAL FORGERY
Soone Czechs, Ozech historians and their aipologists indulge in descrilbing tJhe anti-Hussite .crusades as national
swppression and the "Hussite Century" as a period of enlightemnent and Czech "national" rule in BO'hemia. Their
claim that the Czechs lost their "national" independence
in 1620 (Battle of White Mountain) has 1been rnpeated so
often that finally most Ozechs have come to believe it. T. G.
Masaryik, Dr. Edward Benes and their !followers haive propagated this legend consistently sin.ce the foundation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. It is a singular example of historkal
forgery.
The overthrow of Hussitism has been consciously misinterpreted as a siUippress:ion of the Czech n1a tion lby the
Czechs th~se1ves to gain the symaipthy of other nations.
The White Mountain !battle was not a nationaJl, but strictly
a religious allld dynastic a,ffair.. After the battle was O'Ver,
the emperor had some 27 od: the "relbel" :l eaders decapitated.
Six were of German odgin. But none was executed because
of his nationality.
1
We know that the Thirty Years' War started in Bohemia in 1'618, when the Pmtestant aristocraits there refused
to elect Feroinand of Austria, iHoly Roman IDmipe;ror, to the
vrucant throne od: Bohem'ia, 1preforring yo1Un,g Fredericlk,
Elector Palatine, instead. This rularmed the Protestant
princes, especially John George of Saxony, to such an. extent that they declared themselves neutral and let Frederick
�
60
SLOVAKIA
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
LIETAVA
Li etava was one of the most extensive castles of the
V ah region and ,pro\baibly one of the largest orf Slovakia.
With its locati,on and structure it al1s o is one of lthe most beautiful of ruins. Like Hricov and Sul'ov, Lieta,va was buHt on
hu1g e sandstone roicks which not only made a firm foundation, but also provided exceHent buiiding ma,terial. Because
it was practkally inaiccessilble, it afforded good protection
for its masters. The ea stern and northern sides orf Lietava
Castle espeicially are so steep that an approach from those
sides i,s whoHy impossi'ble . And this · characteristic most
likely gruve rise to the legend for the origin of the name
of the castle. Louis the Great, ,Slovaiks will teJl you, ordered
his burlders to !build him a new castle 1in about 1360 on such
a spot that would lbe inaccessible to an enemy who did not
know how to fly. Hence, the name LietaJVa from the, SlO!Vak
"lietat'" (to fily). Liefa'Va was one of a number of fortresses
and castles built at that time.
1
Lietawa is mosrt accessilble from the southern side, where
one can enter the castle grounds through the main gate.
At the western and eastern ends of the spacious courtyard
we see the remains of two ,s quare towers ,w ith gun oipeinings.
To gert to the 1inner courtyard, which housed the inhalbitants
of the castle, one has to pass throll1gh anotherr massive gate.
Here we <find ,a huge cistern carved inrto the rO'ck, into which
flowed the rainwater from the rooftops of the !buildings
close by through wooden and clay troughs.
,
In the center orf the yard there stood a mighty tower
with walls two meterrs thi,ok ; its circumference was 36
meters,. Accoroing to experts this was the oldest part of the
Lietava fortress - the last ref'll!ge of those, besieged by an
enemy. On the southern side of the dwelling pl~es ~an be
seen even today the escutcheon of the Kostka clan, i.e, a
hand gvilpipirng a siword with a half-moon and a 1brachial
star. On the eastern side there iprotrudes a mighty semicircU'lar -bastion with many gun-holes; on the ground floor
�SLOVAKIA
61
'large ones for cannons and small ones for musk~ts on the
upper floor.
At the foot of the castle, aJb,o ve the town of Lietava,
stands a historic churich with a Gothic tower, which probably was a ,g uard tower, since it was 'buult on the slope of the
hill. When the caSitle 1perished, two paintings, two, painted
and richly caTVed chureh pews and three bells were brought
to this ,c hurch from the castle chaipeJ. During Worrld War I,
the Hungarian government had these relics removed. According to an ancient story, there was a precious altar
painting in this chur,ch, whi-ch also had its origin in the
LietaJVa Castle. The painting depfoted a multitude o:f people
surrounding an old ,priest who was being thrown oiver the
cliff onto prepared siprked-lpoles by wi1d Tatars.
An · ancient legend teHs us that the painting originated
in the fol1lowi.nig imaniner. Aifter the historic battle near
Saj,wa, the Tataric hordes ,s cattered all o;ver the country.
One of their groUJps 1ca;me to Lietava, and the residents, fled
in terror before them, many hiding in the hills, while the
rest, mostly dlder men, ,w omen and ohildren, barric·a ded
themsel,ves :in the church. In those days, chu11ches were
fortified with walls so that in ti:me of need they did offer
some measure of ,protection. Among the unfortunates in the
chmch, wa;s a!lso an old priest who encouraged his fait:hfol
to ,prepare to defend themselves. As ,s oon as the Tatars
came to the chur,ch, they called out to the defende:ris to surrender the church willingly and then all wou1d 1b e free to go
their way. The old priest admonished his 1people not to believe the heathen ter,rorists, but the faithful eventually
gruve UJP and surrendered the church. They were basely
deceived. The Tatars rounded them all up and marched
them to the edge of a high rock: below, in the albyss, spilked
poles were driven in the ,g round. The wild Tatars screamed
at their prisoners to renounce their Christian fruith or be
thrown off the cliff onto the, spiked poles. The wged priest
pleaded with his faithfol to. remain true to Chri.st, and true
they did remain. The · enraged Tatars forced many oiver
the cliff with their ·spears and knives. When the rest would
not renounce their faith, the Tatars seized the old priest and
�SLOVAKIA
62
t!hrew him headlong into .the a:byss. But, lo and behold, a
miracle happened! T.he ,priest did not fall on ,t he spikes belorw. He siim:ply dis111Ppeared. The heathen Tatar brutes were
ama;zed and fri,gihtened; it did not ta:ke them long to clear
out of Lietava and the country.
What really happened to the aged ·priest? His fall to
certain doom was checked ·~ a staunch bush which projected out of the cliff and he mana;ged to hang on, out of
s~ght of the Tatars. When the residents of Lietava ireturned
f.rom the ,hills shortl,y after, they freed thek heroic and
saintly priest and buried the victims of Tatar brutality. Lietaiva commemorated the memo,ry of this. miraculous liberation for centuries. The paintiing resulted; it was hUIIlg above
the altar of the church.
'-'
According to tradition, long before the wills of Lieta va
Castle were built on the steep rock, a pagan shrine was built
on the site. It was. made of wood, and, hence, in time disaippeared completely. .Aibove the entrance to the shrine, on
a hU1ge beam, theire was caI"Ved an image of the sun, which
meant that the forefathers orf ,the Slo1vaJks. worrs.hiipped the
sun as the giver of life. Pagan priestesses: lived beneath the
shrine; it was 1Jhedr duty to bring honey water, ripened
grains and f,rurits, wreaths and other airtioles of sa;crifice to
their gods. Many years later a Christian church repl-a,ced the
pa:gan shrine.
History tells us that Lo:u.is the Great donated the Lieta;va stronghold in 1360 to Stephen Bwbek from Plesivec for
sel'!Vices rendered him during his wars in Italy. In 1403,
however, one of his descendants, Henry (Im.ro), fought
a;gainst King Zigimund, and because of this both Strecno
and Lietava were given to some Polisih nobleman by Zigmund. Later, however, the Bubelk clan was amnestied by the
king, who returned Lietwva to them. One of the Bubeiks
died near Luicenec in the, battle a:gaiinst Jiskra. Later, when
the castle •b ecame the ;property of the Zfupol'skys, John Zapol'sky donated it to Nkholas Kostka, a Bohemian nobleman. In 1538, General Ntcholas Turi ()(f Ferdinand I's army
SU!ITounded the castle, lb ut was not able to take it; Kostka
defended it successfully.
1
�63
SLOVAKIA
Lieta:va ,p robably witnessed its most glorious day at the
time when Francis Thul'zo mrurried Kostika's daughter and
received Lietava as a dowry. Thurzo, however, ;preferred to
live in the Orava Castle. When he left Lletava without an
occupant, it gradually 1beca.me neglected and the teeth of
time and weather toolk their toll. During the time od: Francis Raik6czi M, the stronghold of Lletaiva wa·s ,partly repaired, ibut shortly thererufter was completely abandoned
to its sad fate.
• • •
WIDTE MOUNTAIN -
IDSTOR'ICAL FORGERY
Soone Czechs, Ozech historians and their aipologists indulge in descrilbing tJhe anti-Hussite .crusades as national
swppression and the "Hussite Century" as a period of enlightemnent and Czech "national" rule in BO'hemia. Their
claim that the Czechs lost their "national" independence
in 1620 (Battle of White Mountain) has 1been rnpeated so
often that finally most Ozechs have come to believe it. T. G.
Masaryik, Dr. Edward Benes and their !followers haive propagated this legend consistently sin.ce the foundation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. It is a singular example of historkal
forgery.
The overthrow of Hussitism has been consciously misinterpreted as a siUippress:ion of the Czech n1a tion lby the
Czechs th~se1ves to gain the symaipthy of other nations.
The White Mountain !battle was not a nationaJl, but strictly
a religious allld dynastic a,ffair.. After the battle was O'Ver,
the emperor had some 27 od: the "relbel" :l eaders decapitated.
Six were of German odgin. But none was executed because
of his nationality.
1
We know that the Thirty Years' War started in Bohemia in 1'618, when the Pmtestant aristocraits there refused
to elect Feroinand of Austria, iHoly Roman IDmipe;ror, to the
vrucant throne od: Bohem'ia, 1preforring yo1Un,g Fredericlk,
Elector Palatine, instead. This rularmed the Protestant
princes, especially John George of Saxony, to such an. extent that they declared themselves neutral and let Frederick
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
60
SLOVAKIA
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
LIETAVA
Li etava was one of the most extensive castles of the
V ah region and ,pro\baibly one of the largest orf Slovakia.
With its locati,on and structure it al1s o is one of lthe most beautiful of ruins. Like Hricov and Sul'ov, Lieta,va was buHt on
hu1g e sandstone roicks which not only made a firm foundation, but also provided exceHent buiiding ma,terial. Because
it was practkally inaiccessilble, it afforded good protection
for its masters. The ea stern and northern sides orf Lietava
Castle espeicially are so steep that an approach from those
sides i,s whoHy impossi'ble . And this · characteristic most
likely gruve rise to the legend for the origin of the name
of the castle. Louis the Great, ,Slovaiks will teJl you, ordered
his burlders to !build him a new castle 1in about 1360 on such
a spot that would lbe inaccessible to an enemy who did not
know how to fly. Hence, the name LietaJVa from the, SlO!Vak
"lietat'" (to fily). Liefa'Va was one of a number of fortresses
and castles built at that time.
1
Lietawa is mosrt accessilble from the southern side, where
one can enter the castle grounds through the main gate.
At the western and eastern ends of the spacious courtyard
we see the remains of two ,s quare towers ,w ith gun oipeinings.
To gert to the 1inner courtyard, which housed the inhalbitants
of the castle, one has to pass throll1gh anotherr massive gate.
Here we <find ,a huge cistern carved inrto the rO'ck, into which
flowed the rainwater from the rooftops of the !buildings
close by through wooden and clay troughs.
,
In the center orf the yard there stood a mighty tower
with walls two meterrs thi,ok ; its circumference was 36
meters,. Accoroing to experts this was the oldest part of the
Lietava fortress - the last ref'll!ge of those, besieged by an
enemy. On the southern side of the dwelling pl~es ~an be
seen even today the escutcheon of the Kostka clan, i.e, a
hand gvilpipirng a siword with a half-moon and a 1brachial
star. On the eastern side there iprotrudes a mighty semicircU'lar -bastion with many gun-holes; on the ground floor
SLOVAKIA
61
'large ones for cannons and small ones for musk~ts on the
upper floor.
At the foot of the castle, aJb,o ve the town of Lietava,
stands a historic churich with a Gothic tower, which probably was a ,g uard tower, since it was 'buult on the slope of the
hill. When the caSitle 1perished, two paintings, two, painted
and richly caTVed chureh pews and three bells were brought
to this ,c hurch from the castle chaipeJ. During Worrld War I,
the Hungarian government had these relics removed. According to an ancient story, there was a precious altar
painting in this chur,ch, whi-ch also had its origin in the
LietaJVa Castle. The painting depfoted a multitude o:f people
surrounding an old ,priest who was being thrown oiver the
cliff onto prepared siprked-lpoles by wi1d Tatars.
An · ancient legend teHs us that the painting originated
in the fol1lowi.nig imaniner. Aifter the historic battle near
Saj,wa, the Tataric hordes ,s cattered all o;ver the country.
One of their groUJps 1ca;me to Lietava, and the residents, fled
in terror before them, many hiding in the hills, while the
rest, mostly dlder men, ,w omen and ohildren, barric·a ded
themsel,ves :in the church. In those days, chu11ches were
fortified with walls so that in ti:me of need they did offer
some measure of ,protection. Among the unfortunates in the
chmch, wa;s a!lso an old priest who encouraged his fait:hfol
to ,prepare to defend themselves. As ,s oon as the Tatars
came to the chur,ch, they called out to the defende:ris to surrender the church willingly and then all wou1d 1b e free to go
their way. The old priest admonished his 1people not to believe the heathen ter,rorists, but the faithful eventually
gruve UJP and surrendered the church. They were basely
deceived. The Tatars rounded them all up and marched
them to the edge of a high rock: below, in the albyss, spilked
poles were driven in the ,g round. The wild Tatars screamed
at their prisoners to renounce their Christian fruith or be
thrown off the cliff onto the, spiked poles. The wged priest
pleaded with his faithfol to. remain true to Chri.st, and true
they did remain. The · enraged Tatars forced many oiver
the cliff with their ·spears and knives. When the rest would
not renounce their faith, the Tatars seized the old priest and
SLOVAKIA
62
t!hrew him headlong into .the a:byss. But, lo and behold, a
miracle happened! T.he ,priest did not fall on ,t he spikes belorw. He siim:ply dis111Ppeared. The heathen Tatar brutes were
ama;zed and fri,gihtened; it did not ta:ke them long to clear
out of Lietava and the country.
What really happened to the aged ·priest? His fall to
certain doom was checked ·~ a staunch bush which projected out of the cliff and he mana;ged to hang on, out of
s~ght of the Tatars. When the residents of Lietava ireturned
f.rom the ,hills shortl,y after, they freed thek heroic and
saintly priest and buried the victims of Tatar brutality. Lietaiva commemorated the memo,ry of this. miraculous liberation for centuries. The paintiing resulted; it was hUIIlg above
the altar of the church.
'-'
According to tradition, long before the wills of Lieta va
Castle were built on the steep rock, a pagan shrine was built
on the site. It was. made of wood, and, hence, in time disaippeared completely. .Aibove the entrance to the shrine, on
a hU1ge beam, theire was caI"Ved an image of the sun, which
meant that the forefathers orf ,the Slo1vaJks. worrs.hiipped the
sun as the giver of life. Pagan priestesses: lived beneath the
shrine; it was 1Jhedr duty to bring honey water, ripened
grains and f,rurits, wreaths and other airtioles of sa;crifice to
their gods. Many years later a Christian church repl-a,ced the
pa:gan shrine.
History tells us that Lo:u.is the Great donated the Lieta;va stronghold in 1360 to Stephen Bwbek from Plesivec for
sel'!Vices rendered him during his wars in Italy. In 1403,
however, one of his descendants, Henry (Im.ro), fought
a;gainst King Zigimund, and because of this both Strecno
and Lietava were given to some Polisih nobleman by Zigmund. Later, however, the Bubelk clan was amnestied by the
king, who returned Lietwva to them. One of the Bubeiks
died near Luicenec in the, battle a:gaiinst Jiskra. Later, when
the castle •b ecame the ;property of the Zfupol'skys, John Zapol'sky donated it to Nkholas Kostka, a Bohemian nobleman. In 1538, General Ntcholas Turi ()(f Ferdinand I's army
SU!ITounded the castle, lb ut was not able to take it; Kostka
defended it successfully.
1
63
SLOVAKIA
Lieta:va ,p robably witnessed its most glorious day at the
time when Francis Thul'zo mrurried Kostika's daughter and
received Lietava as a dowry. Thurzo, however, ;preferred to
live in the Orava Castle. When he left Lletava without an
occupant, it gradually 1beca.me neglected and the teeth of
time and weather toolk their toll. During the time od: Francis Raik6czi M, the stronghold of Lletaiva wa·s ,partly repaired, ibut shortly thererufter was completely abandoned
to its sad fate.
• • •
WIDTE MOUNTAIN -
IDSTOR'ICAL FORGERY
Soone Czechs, Ozech historians and their aipologists indulge in descrilbing tJhe anti-Hussite .crusades as national
swppression and the "Hussite Century" as a period of enlightemnent and Czech "national" rule in BO'hemia. Their
claim that the Czechs lost their "national" independence
in 1620 (Battle of White Mountain) has 1been rnpeated so
often that finally most Ozechs have come to believe it. T. G.
Masaryik, Dr. Edward Benes and their !followers haive propagated this legend consistently sin.ce the foundation of Czecho-Slovakia in 1918. It is a singular example of historkal
forgery.
The overthrow of Hussitism has been consciously misinterpreted as a siUippress:ion of the Czech n1a tion lby the
Czechs th~se1ves to gain the symaipthy of other nations.
The White Mountain !battle was not a nationaJl, but strictly
a religious allld dynastic a,ffair.. After the battle was O'Ver,
the emperor had some 27 od: the "relbel" :l eaders decapitated.
Six were of German odgin. But none was executed because
of his nationality.
1
We know that the Thirty Years' War started in Bohemia in 1'618, when the Pmtestant aristocraits there refused
to elect Feroinand of Austria, iHoly Roman IDmipe;ror, to the
vrucant throne od: Bohem'ia, 1preforring yo1Un,g Fredericlk,
Elector Palatine, instead. This rularmed the Protestant
princes, especially John George of Saxony, to such an. extent that they declared themselves neutral and let Frederick
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Lietava
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 60-63
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fe0355c840d12e4ad582c385f3c8f471.pdf
7ea5d1e0e8149451a3c37eaf429c9a58
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
55
DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
The name of Dr. Stephen Osusky, mentioned from time
to time in the American press, has a)gam aippeared jll!st recently. Educated in Ameri'oo, Dr. OsUSlky went on a mission foT the Slovak Loogue of America aft~ WoI'ld War I ,
after Czeoho-lSlOVlaJkia was born, burt did not return to report to the Leaigue. Instead, he was retained by T. G. Masaryk to do special wo:vk and, later, was appointed amb.ass~doir of Czecho-Slovalkiia to F'ran'Ce. OSIUiSky served in that
capacity in Paris until the collapse of Czecho...SlwaJkia in
1939 and then fell out with Dr. Edward Benes. Today he is
one of the leaders orf the so-called "Council of Free CzechoSlovaki1a ," which is srtiJ1l dominated by the poilitical followers
of Dr. Edwiard Benes, the Czech National Socialists.
O'bjectiwty would not 'b e serwed if we were to deny
that Dr. Stephen Osusky is the best known living personafity of Slo vaik origin in international circles. At the same
time, however, we mu:st make it clear that Dr. Stephen
Os'USlky is so regarded both in Ozeich as well as international
cirrcles only becaJU!se he is of Slwak origin. Lt may be welJ,
then, to state cleady o'Il!ce rugain just how the Slovaks view
the po1iti~l !Plans and exile actiivity of the contradiotocy
personality of Dr. Oswsky.
If it were not for the fact that American puiblic opinion
suP!I)Orts anti-Oommunisrt politicians from behind the IToo
Ourlain and is seelking out a part of the Czooh poUticai
exiles - featuriing at ail costs Slovaks who support the plan
of contiinuing the Czecho-,Slova)k Repulblic - Dr. Stephen
Osusky woUJld not have a pla;tfo:r,m to stand on in foreign
circles. lif it were not fOT his "Czeoho.JSIJ.o!Va!kia must be preserved at a1l costs" stand, OSJU:Sky wotrld not eivoo be noticed. His broad education, his professiori,a i and pU!blicationaiJ.
activities would hardly be noticed, i.f it were not fo:r the
polii.tical ba)cikisitJa!ge scenes in which and f.or which Dr.
Osusky is represented in the role of "representatirve of th.e
Sl~aks."
Keeipmg thls fact in mind, let us at least oorsorily
anal,yze the relationshilp of Dr. Osusky to Slovakia and vice-
�56
SLOVAKIA
versa. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks in the free woTld,
many of whom Juwe e:,cpended much effort and surffering
in the struggle for the na,tural rights od' the Slovak nation,
certaim.y do have a right to speak their minds rubout the
question whether Dr. Stephen Osusky has the authority to
spealk for the SlovaJk nation, especially as long as his policy
is anti-Slaviak .
.Several years a:go this writer pointed to the hiStorical opportunity wh:i!ch circumstances in the contemporary sirbuation presented Dr. Osuslky with so that he mi1g ht
play a historic role in the Slovalk nation. As I said then I
repeat now: Dr. Osusky could have played that role only
if his political plans and his political activity were in accord with the aspirations and natural rights of the Slovak
nation. We must remetmlber that Dr. Osusky, excepti.ll!g for
the mandate giiven him by the Slovaik League oif America
af:ter Wodd War I, never possessed, nor does even nOIW poSsess, any mandate or legitimation from the peqple oif SlovaJkia to represenlt it in any manner whatsoever. By the fact
that he is o!f Sl'(Walk birth, Osuslky would have the right
to speak in the .rra,me of the Slovaks only when wihate;ver he
might say, pl1an, or present to the world would be in fuhl
accord with the will of the majority oif the SlovaJk nation.
Dr. Stephen Osusky grew wp and was educated outside
of Slovakia. He did not live in Slo;vakia for over thirty
years; he witnessed the temfiic struggle of the Slovak n:atinn for its b,asic ,h uman rights and its intense spiritual and
material development from a plush diplomatic chair, or as
a professor at various American unilversities. Dr. Osusky,
therefore, is not justified in considering his own conceptions better than those of the Slovak nation itsclf and those
of the majority oif Sloivak exiles, who during the past thirty
years grew up with the Slovak people, suffered with 1t and
fOUJght for its freedom and equality. If, .therefore, the politica:l credo of Dr. OsUJSky is expressed by his fUIIllctions and
by hls - presence in the "Council of Free Ozeichoslovakia,"
we must place him in the rruruks of those people oif Slo-vruk
origin, who con.scfously or unconsciously are working
ag,ainst the moot vital interests of the Slo1Vak nation and,
�57
SLOVAKIA
therefore, belong not among its representatives, but among
its evil-doers and enemies. In the question of whether we
are for or against the Ozecho-Slovak Repuiblic, we are not
concerned wiith partisan-political d~!fferences, with a diiffereTIJCe of opinion aJbout a poHrtical system o.r administraUve
adjustment, but definitely with the elementa!1y rughrt of the
Slo.va!ks to their OIW'.Il lid'e, their very own existence and
their future as a free nation.
After what the Slovaks have gone through and are
still suffering in the Ozecho-,Slwak Reipulblic, it is c!1ystal
clea:r that the Czechs and Slavak,s can live in one state only
at the expense af the Sfovaks. Therefore, flirting with the
idea of the cont-in1Ued existence of Ozecho-1SlovaJkia only
helps to uphold Ozech imperialistic tendencies in the world
which deny even a bare national exfatence to the Slovalk
nation. For that reason "Ozechoslovakism" is only a viariation of Magyarism, and, in the last ana'l ysis, a synonym for
trea:chery, such as was per.petrated by Kosurth and Masaryk,
and many others in the recent past.
We do not doubt in the least that these matters are
clear to the experienced dlipl'Olmat and learned university
professor, Dr. Stephen Osusky, unless his complete separiation from Slovakia during his l,i fetime, or the influences of
his enviironment, prevent him from seeing clearly Slovak
reality and the aJbiJ.ity of the Slovak nation to live. If, however, Dr. Osusky is not suffering from a feelring of national
inferiority and is not looildng at the Slovak Il!ation through
the spectacles, of several Slwailc Communist co1l a:borators,
who fear that they would niot be alble to return to Slovakia
without Czech aid, then we cannot regard his past a:cti,v ity
and his present memlbershirp in the "Council of Free CzechoSlovakia" as a matter of ta;c,tJics, as some of his adherents
claim.
The international puibliic thinks in completely clear
categories: if Dr. Osusky is in the "Council of Free O.reohds~ovaJkia," he is for the continuance of Czecho-Slo:vakia,
and, therefore, against the effort of the Sl01Vruks to lirve thei'l'
own indeipendent life. Inasmuch as the majority of the Slovak nation is for a different solution Of the Slovak problem
1
�58
SLOVAKIA
than being included in the framewo:r.k of the Czecho-Slovak
Repwblic, Dr. Stephen Osusky, with his presence in the
"Cou:nicil .o f Free Ozechoslova!kia," is really woTking against
the ldgitimaite aspirations of the Slovak nation for equality
with the other nations of central Europe and, consequently,
does not have the least authorization to s,pe,ak as a representaJtive of the S101V1ak nation. The SlovaJks in the s.o.- called
"Counoil of Free 0zechoslova:kia" are and can only be representaitives of the nation which no longer considers it
necessary to delbate with any one aJbout its SlovaJk individuality and its inherent right to its own political life.
ATgurrnents that the SlovaJk question can be aided by the
"Council of Free Ozecho:s!lova!kia," inasmlllich as oeritain circles on this continent are supporting the Council, are log,icaUy and olbjectively sheer nonsense. It must be quite olbvious
to ·a ll concerned that if there were no Slovaks in the service of Czech tendencies, then no democratic power would
recogn±ze the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," and the
Slovaks would then hawe their own representation recognized and surpported in New York, Washington and elsewihere, just as aN the other natfon:s from behind the Iron
CuTtain. Only as long as people a;re found to whom Rtpka,
Zenlcl, etc., are dearer than the American Slovaks and the·
entire Slovak nation at home, and to whom the 0zechoSlovaJk Repu!blic is closer than the freedom oif the Slovak
niation, can the State Dejpartment and the Foreign Office
prefer the recognition of the "Council of Free 0zechoslova.
kia" to a separate Slova;k representation, without prejudicing the future, as has been told to us on various 0::::::asions.
From this viewipoint, the presence of Dr. 0susky in the
"Council of Flree 0zecho,slova!kfa" means that he is against
the vitaJl interests of the Slovak nation. And his fight with
the Czechs for the recognition of Slovak rights, as some
would ha;ve us believe, evokes only the view that even in his
~e we are concerned with nothing else than what he himoolf wrote in his book "The Wiaiy of the Free": "His:to-ry
teaches, and practiocal eX!perience corroborates, that when
politicians are engaged in bitter struggle against their rivals, they never Like to admit plllblicly that they axe fight-
�SLO\.AKIA
59
ing for SUlpI'emacy and power. They prefer to disguise their
ambiti()IIlS by c1aiming to de.fend high principles."
The greatness of people in polii.tics res.ts on the fact
that they had recognized the Hand of God in history, the
needs of the times, and at critical moments spalce aibout
principles clearly and unequiivoca[ly. By cloa!king hiJI:nself in
a diplomatic fog and remaining in a Czech exile organization Dr. Osu!Sky can gain only one thing: in Sl0ivak history
he will be placed a[ongsride of Derer, Iivanka, Srolbar and
J ehl'rcka - and not among the greatest Sloivaks. But that
is Dr. Osusky's concern and not ours. The Slmnaik nation
will win in its fight for freedom and equality in central
Euro,pe even without his help and despite his opposition and
treachery. Czecho-SlQIVa/kia is today a Russi:a,n satelilite, and
in a free Europe there shall be no place for satellites. - (J. K.)
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
· " On November 23rd at the congress of the National
Socialist Agricultural and Forestry Workers the Minister of
Education, Stransky, appealed to those present 'not to allow
disgust to deprive them of their real love for Russia, or
of their admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Government. Nor must they allow disgust to make them lose
IDA.ST
their understanding of the National Front'." EUROPE, Dec. 4, 1947; London .
•
•
•
"Since, in the new situation, it was imposs~ble to colla-borate officially with the Soviet Union, we . . . did nothing
which might prejudice or prevent the reim.O!Val of co-0peration at the earliest possible moment; I need on!ly recall
how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many
others during the SQIViet-Finnish War. Morewer, even in
that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves. and
important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND
WEST, London, 1944.
1
�
SLOVAKIA
55
DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
The name of Dr. Stephen Osusky, mentioned from time
to time in the American press, has a)gam aippeared jll!st recently. Educated in Ameri'oo, Dr. OsUSlky went on a mission foT the Slovak Loogue of America aft~ WoI'ld War I ,
after Czeoho-lSlOVlaJkia was born, burt did not return to report to the Leaigue. Instead, he was retained by T. G. Masaryk to do special wo:vk and, later, was appointed amb.ass~doir of Czecho-Slovalkiia to F'ran'Ce. OSIUiSky served in that
capacity in Paris until the collapse of Czecho...SlwaJkia in
1939 and then fell out with Dr. Edward Benes. Today he is
one of the leaders orf the so-called "Council of Free CzechoSlovaki1a ," which is srtiJ1l dominated by the poilitical followers
of Dr. Edwiard Benes, the Czech National Socialists.
O'bjectiwty would not 'b e serwed if we were to deny
that Dr. Stephen Osusky is the best known living personafity of Slo vaik origin in international circles. At the same
time, however, we mu:st make it clear that Dr. Stephen
Os'USlky is so regarded both in Ozeich as well as international
cirrcles only becaJU!se he is of Slwak origin. Lt may be welJ,
then, to state cleady o'Il!ce rugain just how the Slovaks view
the po1iti~l !Plans and exile actiivity of the contradiotocy
personality of Dr. Oswsky.
If it were not for the fact that American puiblic opinion
suP!I)Orts anti-Oommunisrt politicians from behind the IToo
Ourlain and is seelking out a part of the Czooh poUticai
exiles - featuriing at ail costs Slovaks who support the plan
of contiinuing the Czecho-,Slova)k Repulblic - Dr. Stephen
Osusky woUJld not have a pla;tfo:r,m to stand on in foreign
circles. lif it were not fOT his "Czeoho.JSIJ.o!Va!kia must be preserved at a1l costs" stand, OSJU:Sky wotrld not eivoo be noticed. His broad education, his professiori,a i and pU!blicationaiJ.
activities would hardly be noticed, i.f it were not fo:r the
polii.tical ba)cikisitJa!ge scenes in which and f.or which Dr.
Osusky is represented in the role of "representatirve of th.e
Sl~aks."
Keeipmg thls fact in mind, let us at least oorsorily
anal,yze the relationshilp of Dr. Osusky to Slovakia and vice-
�56
SLOVAKIA
versa. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks in the free woTld,
many of whom Juwe e:,cpended much effort and surffering
in the struggle for the na,tural rights od' the Slovak nation,
certaim.y do have a right to speak their minds rubout the
question whether Dr. Stephen Osusky has the authority to
spealk for the SlovaJk nation, especially as long as his policy
is anti-Slaviak .
.Several years a:go this writer pointed to the hiStorical opportunity wh:i!ch circumstances in the contemporary sirbuation presented Dr. Osuslky with so that he mi1g ht
play a historic role in the Slovalk nation. As I said then I
repeat now: Dr. Osusky could have played that role only
if his political plans and his political activity were in accord with the aspirations and natural rights of the Slovak
nation. We must remetmlber that Dr. Osusky, excepti.ll!g for
the mandate giiven him by the Slovaik League oif America
af:ter Wodd War I, never possessed, nor does even nOIW poSsess, any mandate or legitimation from the peqple oif SlovaJkia to represenlt it in any manner whatsoever. By the fact
that he is o!f Sl'(Walk birth, Osuslky would have the right
to speak in the .rra,me of the Slovaks only when wihate;ver he
might say, pl1an, or present to the world would be in fuhl
accord with the will of the majority oif the SlovaJk nation.
Dr. Stephen Osusky grew wp and was educated outside
of Slovakia. He did not live in Slo;vakia for over thirty
years; he witnessed the temfiic struggle of the Slovak n:atinn for its b,asic ,h uman rights and its intense spiritual and
material development from a plush diplomatic chair, or as
a professor at various American unilversities. Dr. Osusky,
therefore, is not justified in considering his own conceptions better than those of the Slovak nation itsclf and those
of the majority oif Sloivak exiles, who during the past thirty
years grew up with the Slovak people, suffered with 1t and
fOUJght for its freedom and equality. If, .therefore, the politica:l credo of Dr. OsUJSky is expressed by his fUIIllctions and
by hls - presence in the "Council of Free Ozeichoslovakia,"
we must place him in the rruruks of those people oif Slo-vruk
origin, who con.scfously or unconsciously are working
ag,ainst the moot vital interests of the Slo1Vak nation and,
�57
SLOVAKIA
therefore, belong not among its representatives, but among
its evil-doers and enemies. In the question of whether we
are for or against the Ozecho-Slovak Repuiblic, we are not
concerned wiith partisan-political d~!fferences, with a diiffereTIJCe of opinion aJbout a poHrtical system o.r administraUve
adjustment, but definitely with the elementa!1y rughrt of the
Slo.va!ks to their OIW'.Il lid'e, their very own existence and
their future as a free nation.
After what the Slovaks have gone through and are
still suffering in the Ozecho-,Slwak Reipulblic, it is c!1ystal
clea:r that the Czechs and Slavak,s can live in one state only
at the expense af the Sfovaks. Therefore, flirting with the
idea of the cont-in1Ued existence of Ozecho-1SlovaJkia only
helps to uphold Ozech imperialistic tendencies in the world
which deny even a bare national exfatence to the Slovalk
nation. For that reason "Ozechoslovakism" is only a viariation of Magyarism, and, in the last ana'l ysis, a synonym for
trea:chery, such as was per.petrated by Kosurth and Masaryk,
and many others in the recent past.
We do not doubt in the least that these matters are
clear to the experienced dlipl'Olmat and learned university
professor, Dr. Stephen Osusky, unless his complete separiation from Slovakia during his l,i fetime, or the influences of
his enviironment, prevent him from seeing clearly Slovak
reality and the aJbiJ.ity of the Slovak nation to live. If, however, Dr. Osusky is not suffering from a feelring of national
inferiority and is not looildng at the Slovak Il!ation through
the spectacles, of several Slwailc Communist co1l a:borators,
who fear that they would niot be alble to return to Slovakia
without Czech aid, then we cannot regard his past a:cti,v ity
and his present memlbershirp in the "Council of Free CzechoSlovakia" as a matter of ta;c,tJics, as some of his adherents
claim.
The international puibliic thinks in completely clear
categories: if Dr. Osusky is in the "Council of Free O.reohds~ovaJkia," he is for the continuance of Czecho-Slo:vakia,
and, therefore, against the effort of the Sl01Vruks to lirve thei'l'
own indeipendent life. Inasmuch as the majority of the Slovak nation is for a different solution Of the Slovak problem
1
�58
SLOVAKIA
than being included in the framewo:r.k of the Czecho-Slovak
Repwblic, Dr. Stephen Osusky, with his presence in the
"Cou:nicil .o f Free Ozechoslova!kia," is really woTking against
the ldgitimaite aspirations of the Slovak nation for equality
with the other nations of central Europe and, consequently,
does not have the least authorization to s,pe,ak as a representaJtive of the S101V1ak nation. The SlovaJks in the s.o.- called
"Counoil of Free 0zechoslova:kia" are and can only be representaitives of the nation which no longer considers it
necessary to delbate with any one aJbout its SlovaJk individuality and its inherent right to its own political life.
ATgurrnents that the SlovaJk question can be aided by the
"Council of Free Ozecho:s!lova!kia," inasmlllich as oeritain circles on this continent are supporting the Council, are log,icaUy and olbjectively sheer nonsense. It must be quite olbvious
to ·a ll concerned that if there were no Slovaks in the service of Czech tendencies, then no democratic power would
recogn±ze the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," and the
Slovaks would then hawe their own representation recognized and surpported in New York, Washington and elsewihere, just as aN the other natfon:s from behind the Iron
CuTtain. Only as long as people a;re found to whom Rtpka,
Zenlcl, etc., are dearer than the American Slovaks and the·
entire Slovak nation at home, and to whom the 0zechoSlovaJk Repu!blic is closer than the freedom oif the Slovak
niation, can the State Dejpartment and the Foreign Office
prefer the recognition of the "Council of Free 0zechoslova.
kia" to a separate Slova;k representation, without prejudicing the future, as has been told to us on various 0::::::asions.
From this viewipoint, the presence of Dr. 0susky in the
"Council of Flree 0zecho,slova!kfa" means that he is against
the vitaJl interests of the Slovak nation. And his fight with
the Czechs for the recognition of Slovak rights, as some
would ha;ve us believe, evokes only the view that even in his
~e we are concerned with nothing else than what he himoolf wrote in his book "The Wiaiy of the Free": "His:to-ry
teaches, and practiocal eX!perience corroborates, that when
politicians are engaged in bitter struggle against their rivals, they never Like to admit plllblicly that they axe fight-
�SLO\.AKIA
59
ing for SUlpI'emacy and power. They prefer to disguise their
ambiti()IIlS by c1aiming to de.fend high principles."
The greatness of people in polii.tics res.ts on the fact
that they had recognized the Hand of God in history, the
needs of the times, and at critical moments spalce aibout
principles clearly and unequiivoca[ly. By cloa!king hiJI:nself in
a diplomatic fog and remaining in a Czech exile organization Dr. Osu!Sky can gain only one thing: in Sl0ivak history
he will be placed a[ongsride of Derer, Iivanka, Srolbar and
J ehl'rcka - and not among the greatest Sloivaks. But that
is Dr. Osusky's concern and not ours. The Slmnaik nation
will win in its fight for freedom and equality in central
Euro,pe even without his help and despite his opposition and
treachery. Czecho-SlQIVa/kia is today a Russi:a,n satelilite, and
in a free Europe there shall be no place for satellites. - (J. K.)
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
· " On November 23rd at the congress of the National
Socialist Agricultural and Forestry Workers the Minister of
Education, Stransky, appealed to those present 'not to allow
disgust to deprive them of their real love for Russia, or
of their admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Government. Nor must they allow disgust to make them lose
IDA.ST
their understanding of the National Front'." EUROPE, Dec. 4, 1947; London .
•
•
•
"Since, in the new situation, it was imposs~ble to colla-borate officially with the Soviet Union, we . . . did nothing
which might prejudice or prevent the reim.O!Val of co-0peration at the earliest possible moment; I need on!ly recall
how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many
others during the SQIViet-Finnish War. Morewer, even in
that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves. and
important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND
WEST, London, 1944.
1
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
55
DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
The name of Dr. Stephen Osusky, mentioned from time
to time in the American press, has a)gam aippeared jll!st recently. Educated in Ameri'oo, Dr. OsUSlky went on a mission foT the Slovak Loogue of America aft~ WoI'ld War I ,
after Czeoho-lSlOVlaJkia was born, burt did not return to report to the Leaigue. Instead, he was retained by T. G. Masaryk to do special wo:vk and, later, was appointed amb.ass~doir of Czecho-Slovalkiia to F'ran'Ce. OSIUiSky served in that
capacity in Paris until the collapse of Czecho...SlwaJkia in
1939 and then fell out with Dr. Edward Benes. Today he is
one of the leaders orf the so-called "Council of Free CzechoSlovaki1a ," which is srtiJ1l dominated by the poilitical followers
of Dr. Edwiard Benes, the Czech National Socialists.
O'bjectiwty would not 'b e serwed if we were to deny
that Dr. Stephen Osusky is the best known living personafity of Slo vaik origin in international circles. At the same
time, however, we mu:st make it clear that Dr. Stephen
Os'USlky is so regarded both in Ozeich as well as international
cirrcles only becaJU!se he is of Slwak origin. Lt may be welJ,
then, to state cleady o'Il!ce rugain just how the Slovaks view
the po1iti~l !Plans and exile actiivity of the contradiotocy
personality of Dr. Oswsky.
If it were not for the fact that American puiblic opinion
suP!I)Orts anti-Oommunisrt politicians from behind the IToo
Ourlain and is seelking out a part of the Czooh poUticai
exiles - featuriing at ail costs Slovaks who support the plan
of contiinuing the Czecho-,Slova)k Repulblic - Dr. Stephen
Osusky woUJld not have a pla;tfo:r,m to stand on in foreign
circles. lif it were not fOT his "Czeoho.JSIJ.o!Va!kia must be preserved at a1l costs" stand, OSJU:Sky wotrld not eivoo be noticed. His broad education, his professiori,a i and pU!blicationaiJ.
activities would hardly be noticed, i.f it were not fo:r the
polii.tical ba)cikisitJa!ge scenes in which and f.or which Dr.
Osusky is represented in the role of "representatirve of th.e
Sl~aks."
Keeipmg thls fact in mind, let us at least oorsorily
anal,yze the relationshilp of Dr. Osusky to Slovakia and vice-
56
SLOVAKIA
versa. Hundreds of thousands of Slovaks in the free woTld,
many of whom Juwe e:,cpended much effort and surffering
in the struggle for the na,tural rights od' the Slovak nation,
certaim.y do have a right to speak their minds rubout the
question whether Dr. Stephen Osusky has the authority to
spealk for the SlovaJk nation, especially as long as his policy
is anti-Slaviak .
.Several years a:go this writer pointed to the hiStorical opportunity wh:i!ch circumstances in the contemporary sirbuation presented Dr. Osuslky with so that he mi1g ht
play a historic role in the Slovalk nation. As I said then I
repeat now: Dr. Osusky could have played that role only
if his political plans and his political activity were in accord with the aspirations and natural rights of the Slovak
nation. We must remetmlber that Dr. Osusky, excepti.ll!g for
the mandate giiven him by the Slovaik League oif America
af:ter Wodd War I, never possessed, nor does even nOIW poSsess, any mandate or legitimation from the peqple oif SlovaJkia to represenlt it in any manner whatsoever. By the fact
that he is o!f Sl'(Walk birth, Osuslky would have the right
to speak in the .rra,me of the Slovaks only when wihate;ver he
might say, pl1an, or present to the world would be in fuhl
accord with the will of the majority oif the SlovaJk nation.
Dr. Stephen Osusky grew wp and was educated outside
of Slovakia. He did not live in Slo;vakia for over thirty
years; he witnessed the temfiic struggle of the Slovak n:atinn for its b,asic ,h uman rights and its intense spiritual and
material development from a plush diplomatic chair, or as
a professor at various American unilversities. Dr. Osusky,
therefore, is not justified in considering his own conceptions better than those of the Slovak nation itsclf and those
of the majority oif Sloivak exiles, who during the past thirty
years grew up with the Slovak people, suffered with 1t and
fOUJght for its freedom and equality. If, .therefore, the politica:l credo of Dr. OsUJSky is expressed by his fUIIllctions and
by hls - presence in the "Council of Free Ozeichoslovakia,"
we must place him in the rruruks of those people oif Slo-vruk
origin, who con.scfously or unconsciously are working
ag,ainst the moot vital interests of the Slo1Vak nation and,
57
SLOVAKIA
therefore, belong not among its representatives, but among
its evil-doers and enemies. In the question of whether we
are for or against the Ozecho-Slovak Repuiblic, we are not
concerned wiith partisan-political d~!fferences, with a diiffereTIJCe of opinion aJbout a poHrtical system o.r administraUve
adjustment, but definitely with the elementa!1y rughrt of the
Slo.va!ks to their OIW'.Il lid'e, their very own existence and
their future as a free nation.
After what the Slovaks have gone through and are
still suffering in the Ozecho-,Slwak Reipulblic, it is c!1ystal
clea:r that the Czechs and Slavak,s can live in one state only
at the expense af the Sfovaks. Therefore, flirting with the
idea of the cont-in1Ued existence of Ozecho-1SlovaJkia only
helps to uphold Ozech imperialistic tendencies in the world
which deny even a bare national exfatence to the Slovalk
nation. For that reason "Ozechoslovakism" is only a viariation of Magyarism, and, in the last ana'l ysis, a synonym for
trea:chery, such as was per.petrated by Kosurth and Masaryk,
and many others in the recent past.
We do not doubt in the least that these matters are
clear to the experienced dlipl'Olmat and learned university
professor, Dr. Stephen Osusky, unless his complete separiation from Slovakia during his l,i fetime, or the influences of
his enviironment, prevent him from seeing clearly Slovak
reality and the aJbiJ.ity of the Slovak nation to live. If, however, Dr. Osusky is not suffering from a feelring of national
inferiority and is not looildng at the Slovak Il!ation through
the spectacles, of several Slwailc Communist co1l a:borators,
who fear that they would niot be alble to return to Slovakia
without Czech aid, then we cannot regard his past a:cti,v ity
and his present memlbershirp in the "Council of Free CzechoSlovakia" as a matter of ta;c,tJics, as some of his adherents
claim.
The international puibliic thinks in completely clear
categories: if Dr. Osusky is in the "Council of Free O.reohds~ovaJkia," he is for the continuance of Czecho-Slo:vakia,
and, therefore, against the effort of the Sl01Vruks to lirve thei'l'
own indeipendent life. Inasmuch as the majority of the Slovak nation is for a different solution Of the Slovak problem
1
58
SLOVAKIA
than being included in the framewo:r.k of the Czecho-Slovak
Repwblic, Dr. Stephen Osusky, with his presence in the
"Cou:nicil .o f Free Ozechoslova!kia," is really woTking against
the ldgitimaite aspirations of the Slovak nation for equality
with the other nations of central Europe and, consequently,
does not have the least authorization to s,pe,ak as a representaJtive of the S101V1ak nation. The SlovaJks in the s.o.- called
"Counoil of Free 0zechoslova:kia" are and can only be representaitives of the nation which no longer considers it
necessary to delbate with any one aJbout its SlovaJk individuality and its inherent right to its own political life.
ATgurrnents that the SlovaJk question can be aided by the
"Council of Free Ozecho:s!lova!kia," inasmlllich as oeritain circles on this continent are supporting the Council, are log,icaUy and olbjectively sheer nonsense. It must be quite olbvious
to ·a ll concerned that if there were no Slovaks in the service of Czech tendencies, then no democratic power would
recogn±ze the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," and the
Slovaks would then hawe their own representation recognized and surpported in New York, Washington and elsewihere, just as aN the other natfon:s from behind the Iron
CuTtain. Only as long as people a;re found to whom Rtpka,
Zenlcl, etc., are dearer than the American Slovaks and the·
entire Slovak nation at home, and to whom the 0zechoSlovaJk Repu!blic is closer than the freedom oif the Slovak
niation, can the State Dejpartment and the Foreign Office
prefer the recognition of the "Council of Free 0zechoslova.
kia" to a separate Slova;k representation, without prejudicing the future, as has been told to us on various 0::::::asions.
From this viewipoint, the presence of Dr. 0susky in the
"Council of Flree 0zecho,slova!kfa" means that he is against
the vitaJl interests of the Slovak nation. And his fight with
the Czechs for the recognition of Slovak rights, as some
would ha;ve us believe, evokes only the view that even in his
~e we are concerned with nothing else than what he himoolf wrote in his book "The Wiaiy of the Free": "His:to-ry
teaches, and practiocal eX!perience corroborates, that when
politicians are engaged in bitter struggle against their rivals, they never Like to admit plllblicly that they axe fight-
SLO\.AKIA
59
ing for SUlpI'emacy and power. They prefer to disguise their
ambiti()IIlS by c1aiming to de.fend high principles."
The greatness of people in polii.tics res.ts on the fact
that they had recognized the Hand of God in history, the
needs of the times, and at critical moments spalce aibout
principles clearly and unequiivoca[ly. By cloa!king hiJI:nself in
a diplomatic fog and remaining in a Czech exile organization Dr. Osu!Sky can gain only one thing: in Sl0ivak history
he will be placed a[ongsride of Derer, Iivanka, Srolbar and
J ehl'rcka - and not among the greatest Sloivaks. But that
is Dr. Osusky's concern and not ours. The Slmnaik nation
will win in its fight for freedom and equality in central
Euro,pe even without his help and despite his opposition and
treachery. Czecho-SlQIVa/kia is today a Russi:a,n satelilite, and
in a free Europe there shall be no place for satellites. - (J. K.)
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
· " On November 23rd at the congress of the National
Socialist Agricultural and Forestry Workers the Minister of
Education, Stransky, appealed to those present 'not to allow
disgust to deprive them of their real love for Russia, or
of their admiration for the achievements of the Soviet Government. Nor must they allow disgust to make them lose
IDA.ST
their understanding of the National Front'." EUROPE, Dec. 4, 1947; London .
•
•
•
"Since, in the new situation, it was imposs~ble to colla-borate officially with the Soviet Union, we . . . did nothing
which might prejudice or prevent the reim.O!Val of co-0peration at the earliest possible moment; I need on!ly recall
how strongly our attitude contrasted with that of many
others during the SQIViet-Finnish War. Morewer, even in
that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchange of information between ourse1ves. and
important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." - Dr. Hubert Ripka, EAST AND
WEST, London, 1944.
1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dr. Stephen Osuský and the Slovaks
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 55-59
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f2ad07509c80b9071281fcec807f2ce1.pdf
0a55e7d08c78272e510ec71b44796bee
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
47
have fought for the liberation. of his people from all alien
tyranny, including the Czech brand as represented by T. G.
Masaryk an.d Benes. S,lo,vaJks eveTywhere commemorate May
4th as Stefani'k Day, because it was on May 4, 1919, that
their beloved wair hero crashed to his death in a plaine which
was "a~cidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison at Vajnory, Slovakia. Many Slovaiks even todiay will tell you 1:!hat
Stefanik haid to die, because he never consented to his Slovakiia being a colony o,£ the imperialistic Czechs led by T. G.
Masarylk and Benes. On May 4, 1954, Slova,ks everywhere
will recall: "it was 35 yeaI'S ago thait Stefarnk was killed by
the men who resented his warnings rugainst Bolshevism.
"
•
•
•
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
GOLDILOCKS
Once UlpOn a time there was a very poor blacksmith.
At one time 'he fared weH, but then hard times struck, he
had little work to do., and his wiife and small children were
always hungry. Finally he lost everything; at hOlme he had
not!hing left but seven ,pennies. His undernourished children
cried constantly for something to eat until the blacksmith
could stand it no longer. In his despair he boU!ght a rope
witlh his last seven ,p ennies and started out for the hills to
end it all.
When he came into the hills, he sought out a stout
branch on a mighty tree to which he fixed the roipe. As the
bla;cksmith was a;bout to tie the rope albout his neck, a
,pretty black maiden suddenly appeared .b efore him and
pleaded wHJh him not to hang himself, 1b ecause that was not
a nice thing to do and, then, it was also a sin. The b,lacksmith was stunned when the black maiden disappeared into
the nowhere whence she had come. As he waliked along, his
mind wandered baok home where misery and want ruled and
again he became despondent. U!P went his rope onto another
stout ,h ranch. .&gain the blaJCk maiden s,uddemy appeaired
out of the blue and begged him not to commit such an ugly
deed. In a quadary, the blactksmith shoo'k his head, bwt
said nothing. He did not throw away his rope, but stood
�48
SLOVAKIA
motionless for some moments. When the maiden disa:ppea.rred
once a:gain, file hl.ooksmith pondered his misery over again
and again, reruched the deci'sion to end it all. Once more the
rope went wp airound the stQ!Ut branch. As he was nixing
the other end rubout his neck, however, file bea,utiful black
maiden aippeared directly before him and said:
"Do not ha:n1g yourself, iblalCiksmith, do not hang yourse1f ! I will he1p you in yoUT misery. I wiH give you all the
weali!h you desire, if you only promise me something you
haJVe at home but about whiich you are not awa,re."
"Huh, well whait can this be in my 'barren home about
which I know nothing?" pondered the blaclrnmith, "this
must undoulbtedly be some kind of a jo!ke!"
But the blaciksmith promised the black maiden what
she had requested, if she would only help him out of his
misery. Fortiliiwith, the lo;ve:ly yourng black maiden filled a
pouch with money and go ld and said:
"Here you have what I promised you. And for what you
ha,ve promised me I shall come in seven years."
The lovely blaiok lady disaippeared just as mysteriously
as she had appeared. The blaclksmith couhl scarcely believe
what had haippened, but there was· the pouch with money
and gold! He snatched it and hurried home.
He cried joyously as he burst into his humble shack
and poured the money and gold on the truble. His wife and
children were stunned momentarily. Soon they had plenty
of food on the taJble with which the SJtaI1Ved children stuffed
themselves. Mter aN had had their fill, the wife turned to
her husband and asked how he hrud come by all that money
and goJ.d.
"Thinlk nothing of it," reiplied the blacksmith, "it was
just some kind oif a jolke. To get this money and gold I only
had to promise to give something aJbout which I know
nothing."
As he sipoike these words, his wife beca:me frightened
and screaJmed: "Noiw you did it. Why, you sold yoUT own
child before it was born."
The blaok,s mith also became frightened, but what could
he do ? He gaJVe his word and had to keep it.
1
�49
SLOVAKIA
Soon after the blaciksmith's wife gave birth to a beautiful, deHghtful girl with golden hair and a golden star on
her forehead. Na:tura:lly, they called their little girl "Goldilocks." They cared for the child with love and tenderness
and brought her U!p as best the¥ could. Their haippiness was
marred only .by the thought that Goldilociks was their
own and, yet, she was not.
Exactly seven years after Goldilocks was bo rn, a
black coach stopped in front of the blacksmith's ho:rne and
out of it carrne the bladk maiden. The parents pleaded with
the maiden, but to no awail. She placed Goldilocks beside her
in the coach and started off. The blacksmith and his wife
wailed and cried as they ran after the coach to the end of
the viHruge. They woUJld hacve followed it farther, but the
black maiden threatened to bewitch them id: they did. Sorrowfully they returned home and cried pitifUJlly for their
beautiful Goidilociks, whom they thought they had lost
forever.
1
.
The blaick lady and· Goldilo:clks literally flew in the
bla~k coach OJVer desolate lands rund dense forests until
they firnillly came to a 'great, beaiutiful castle. The black
maiden took Goldilociks into the castle, led heir through
ninety-nine rooms and then said to her: "Here, my child,
you shall res,ide. Ta.O{e care of these ninety-nine rooms for
me. You can walk into and stay in any of the rooms yo:u
please, but do not dare to look in the remaining room the hundredth room - belcause you shall fare badly. In
seven years we shall meet again; until then fare thee weM!"
As she spoke these words, the !black maiden disa;ppeared.
For se'Ven whole years there was no sound or trace of
the black maiden. And for seven long years our Goldilocks
lived contentedly in the castle. She walked in and out of
the ninety-nine rooms, sweeipinig and cleaning them so that
everything glittered lilke gold. Of course, she was tempted
to look into t:he hundredth room manry times, but resisted
the temptation successfully, even though the thought of
that room kept her awake many ni'ghts.
�50
SLOVAKIA
SuTe enoUJgh, when seven years had passed by, the
blaclk maJden returned to the ,c astle and Goldilodks.
"Did you look into the hundredth room?" she asked.
GoldilO'C/k1s replied that she had not. Of course, the bl8.1Ck
maiden lkneiw that; she was very hruppy that Goldilocks
spO!ke the tmth. After repeating the order to Goldilocks,
the black maiden a;gain disaippeared.
·
Our Gold.ilodks kept going throUJg,h the 1beautifu:l, spacious ninety-nine rooms day after day, cileanmg them so
that they sparkled l.ilke mirrors.. Year after year ,p assed like
a drnrum. As the second seven year period was coming to a
close, our GoldUocks thoUJght how the black maiden would
praise her :fior keepmg the rooms in such good order, when
suddenly she heand deligh'bf.wl m1US1i.c flowing out of the last
room, the hiUildTetltih room. L:i!ke a deer she ran to the door
and paused mornentarilry. Enchanted by the sweet strains,
Go'1dilook,s turned the iknob and, before she could realize
what she had done, she was inside the room.
In this hlJIIldiredith room twelve b,ewitiched persons were
sitting behind •a talble. They were sitting there exa,ctly as
they had been ait the time they were put under the spell.
Still another man stood behind the door and this one said
to Goldi-looks :
"Goldilocks, for heaven's sake, do not diV11.1lge what you
harve nOIW seen in this room! No matter what the · b1ack
maiden does to you, do not let her know the sooret of thls
ro.om. If you sary e1Ven one wo,nd aJbout this, you yourse:llf
shall be unhappy eternaJlly and we wiU continue to remain
here ac-cursed.''
Witlh this a dead silence followed. Goldilocks, frightened
and stunned, ran out of the roo,m as speedily as she had
entered it.
Goldilocks did not e1Ven notice how or when the blaok
maiden a;ppearetl beifo.re her, but there s:he was! Of course,
t!he maiden knew that Goldilocks had seen that last room
in the castle. Pointing aocusingly at Goldilooks, the black
-ma,i den said: "Go1ldilociks, Goldilocks, what have you ·done?
You haive looked into that hundredth- r-oom! Now, tell me,
what did you see there'?"
�SLOVAKIA
51
Goldilocks, however, denied she had seen anything.
When the black maiiden realized that she could get no pl'cree
wit'h Goldi.looks iby being nice, she begaJil to threaten her in
various ways, but Goldilocks stood her ground and refused
to divulge what she had seen in that last room. Finally, the
bladk maiden screamed angrHy: "You have one more
chance to teH me what you sa;w in that last room. If you
do not tell, I shaJl throw you into the well and you shall become dumb!"
Goldiloclks stead!fastly refused to answer, and the black
maiden aictual:Iy threw her into a deep well and put a spell
on her so that she could not sipeaJk with any one except the
black lady.
When Goldilocks regaii.ned her senses in the weill, she
found herselrf on a sand bottom, and, lo and behold, she saw
a large tunnel on the one side. She went into the passage
and followed it until she eme11ged onto a delightful meadow.
She remained there feeding herse1f with strawiberries and
roots Olf plants. The blacik maiden, however, kept on appearing quite frequently. She continued to beg and threaten
Goldilocks to learn the secret of the hundredth room in the
castle, but Goldilocks fi:rnnly red'used to divulge the secret .
•
It so happened that in the vicinity of the meadow a
youthful king went ahuntmg. As he hunted, he came wpon
the meadow and fo.un.d our beautifiul Goldi.looks fast asleep
on the grass. The young king ga;zed on Goldilocks in amazement and wondered how in t.l-ie world such a 1beautirful girl
could be found on a meadow. And the more he looked at her,
the more he, was eniamored of her. Finally, he decided to
a,w aken her, taJke her home and maJke her his 'bride, no matter what t'he people might say aJbout it.
He touched Goldilocks and awoke her. The young king
asked her who she was and where she came from. But our
Goldifodks could utter not a worn. The king thought this
was 'because she was frightened or that she was bashful.
He repeated tJhe· questions and then asked her whether she
would go witih him to hi's castle. In answer to hi:s last question, Goldi-looks gesticulated with her hands and head that
�52
SLOVAKIA
she would be hruppy to go. So· the young king took her to his
castle, dressed her up in beautiful clothes and soon after
married her.
Althouigih Goldilooks could not utter a word, the youthful king loved her so mUJoh that he did not care whether she
could sipeaJk oir not and he lived with her peacefully and
h~ily. After rubout a year, Goldilocks became very sad and
fearf,u l; something troulbled her as the day drew near to
give birth to her clhild. Wihen that time ca'Ine, our Goldilocks
gruve birth to a delightd'ul boy with golden hair and witlh
a golden star on his forehead. The . young king was overcome with joy. Ii:mmediately he invited all the landlords of
the vicinity to a great feast so that they could share his
joy with him. His happiness, however, soon changed into. a
great sorrow.
One night the black maiden ruppeared before Goldilocks
and threatened to strangle her golden-haired boy, if she did
not divulge what she had seen in that last room of the
castle. Goldilooks became cold with fright and shook like an
aSlpell tree, but she revealed norbhi1llg. "You yourself shall
not fare well," screamed the blacik maiden. When Goldilocks
refused to reiveal what she saw in that last room, the lady
in black seized her beautiful boy and choked him. Smearing Goldilocks' mouth with blood, t!he 'blaclk maiden diSaippeared as mysteriously as she had appeared.
When the i:nlfant boy was found dead the next morning,
confusion and fright seized all in the castle. 'Dhe king was
paled with fear and sorrow. He had every nook and cranny
of the castle searched to find the guilty one, but the search
proved fruitless. Since GoldHoclks' mouth was covered with
blood, :people began to say that she had killed her own son:
Our Goldilocks, of course, was innocent, but she oould not
say a word in her own defense. The people of the castle said
that she desenved to die for what she had done. The king
heard all this, but continiued to liive with GoJidHooks in peace
because he loved her intensely.
A year later our Goldilocks gave birth to a charming
girl with golden loclcs and a golden star on her forehead.
The king was wi'ld with joy. To forestall all misfortune,
1
�SLOVAKIA
53
however, he immediately ordered a guard pla~ in Goldilocks' room throughout the night.
But even this precaution meant nothing, because the
blaok maiden bewitched the entire guard so that the men
fell a,sloop lhl{e logs of wood. Then she approached Goldilooks and saiid:
"You see, y;ou cannot escape me," she cacikled, "and
I aan deternnined to learn what you sa,w in that last room of
the castle. If you do not ten me noiw, you shall perish in o.ne
way or another. 1if I now strangle your daughter, the king
will most certainly haNe you burned."
Goldilocik.s, however, remained as firm as a rock and
said nothing. The black maiden then seized the infant girl
and choked her. Again she smeared Goldilocks' mouth with
blood and then disappeared.
When the infant princess was found dead the next
morning and the guard insisted that no one entered or left
the room all n~ght, the king became exiceedingly angry,
Again he had every nooik and cranny of the castle searched
for the murderer, but to no avail. The king simply could not
believe that Goldilociks was guilty of strangling her own
child. But people said that under the circumstan,ces no1body
could have ·k illed the child except the queen herself,
because the room was under guard the whole night. Even
her mouth was bloody, they sa,id, and she could not utter
a word. A strange, dreadful creature, indeed, they thought.
Overcome with grief, the king was at last influenced
by what was being said rubowt GoJ.dilocks and he ordered
her to be put to death. The hrupless GoldilO'dk:s wrus led outside the town and tied to a stake. A£ter dTy wood was placed
all around her, the kinig ordered it to be fired. But at that
moment a bla:cik coa:ch thundered through the dense throng
witnessing the exooution and came to .a sudden halt near
Goldilocks. Out came the black maiden who said:
"You see, my words are being fulfilled. Your destruction is at hand. This is your last opportunity to tell me what
you saiw in that last room in my castle. Now, tell me what
did you see there?"
�54
SLOVAKIA
Goldilocks, however, kept her silence a:nd adamantly
refused to tell the black maiden what she had seen. in that
hundrndth roam of her castle.
When the wood was lighted and the flames began to
lerup toward Goldtlook s, the bl,a ck maiden suddenly began to
chaJil!ge and her faJce became white. She ordered the fire extinguished, beca:U!se Goldilocks was innocent. Then she
turned to Goldilocks and said:
"It is your good fortune as well as mine, that you did
not betra.y the secret olf that laist room in my castle. And
because you keipt yoll!r secret well, the evil spell over me and
the twelve men you saiw in that last room is broken. If you
haid betrayed the seJCret, rul:I oif us, including y,ournelf, would
have been doomed eternally! "
To the utter SU11Prise olf the confoll!11ded throng, the
beautifwl maiden then reached Ol\lt to Gol<lilOIC:ks a:nd returned her tiwo ch!ildren U!Ilhairmed and. whole. Within a
flas h the coach disruppeared - a;s if a hurricane had carried
it away.
Goldilodkis then told the king the story from the very
beginmg. '!1he 'king was dwmfounded; he coi.rl.d scan:ely
believe his eyes and ears. But what could he do? His children, straingled under mysterious civcumstances, were alive
and haippy. Overtaken with joy, the king emlbrruced his wife
and his chi:1dren, tea:rfu!lly begging Goldilocks to forgirve
hi'In for the terrible mistaJke he had made. Then he too>k his
wife and ohildren to his east:le, where they lived happily
thereafter. Of course, the king sought out the parents of
Goldilocks, the b'la'dksmith and his wife, and had them
brought to his ca_stle where they all lived hruppily together
until the end of their da;ys.
1
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"LONG I.JIVE THE SOWET UNION AND MAY I'DS
SOVIET LEADER AND .SKllPPER, J. V. STA.LEN LIVE
IN FULL HEALTH TO SIDE M,ANY MORE OF ITS JOYOUS JUB1L:IDES!" - (Dr. Joseiph Lettrich, Vfoe-Chair1man
of the Execl.lltive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslava,kia," C.NS, Norvem/ber 7, 1947).
�
SLOVAKIA
47
have fought for the liberation. of his people from all alien
tyranny, including the Czech brand as represented by T. G.
Masaryk an.d Benes. S,lo,vaJks eveTywhere commemorate May
4th as Stefani'k Day, because it was on May 4, 1919, that
their beloved wair hero crashed to his death in a plaine which
was "a~cidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison at Vajnory, Slovakia. Many Slovaiks even todiay will tell you 1:!hat
Stefanik haid to die, because he never consented to his Slovakiia being a colony o,£ the imperialistic Czechs led by T. G.
Masarylk and Benes. On May 4, 1954, Slova,ks everywhere
will recall: "it was 35 yeaI'S ago thait Stefarnk was killed by
the men who resented his warnings rugainst Bolshevism.
"
•
•
•
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
GOLDILOCKS
Once UlpOn a time there was a very poor blacksmith.
At one time 'he fared weH, but then hard times struck, he
had little work to do., and his wiife and small children were
always hungry. Finally he lost everything; at hOlme he had
not!hing left but seven ,pennies. His undernourished children
cried constantly for something to eat until the blacksmith
could stand it no longer. In his despair he boU!ght a rope
witlh his last seven ,p ennies and started out for the hills to
end it all.
When he came into the hills, he sought out a stout
branch on a mighty tree to which he fixed the roipe. As the
bla;cksmith was a;bout to tie the rope albout his neck, a
,pretty black maiden suddenly appeared .b efore him and
pleaded wHJh him not to hang himself, 1b ecause that was not
a nice thing to do and, then, it was also a sin. The b,lacksmith was stunned when the black maiden disappeared into
the nowhere whence she had come. As he waliked along, his
mind wandered baok home where misery and want ruled and
again he became despondent. U!P went his rope onto another
stout ,h ranch. .&gain the blaJCk maiden s,uddemy appeaired
out of the blue and begged him not to commit such an ugly
deed. In a quadary, the blactksmith shoo'k his head, bwt
said nothing. He did not throw away his rope, but stood
�48
SLOVAKIA
motionless for some moments. When the maiden disa:ppea.rred
once a:gain, file hl.ooksmith pondered his misery over again
and again, reruched the deci'sion to end it all. Once more the
rope went wp airound the stQ!Ut branch. As he was nixing
the other end rubout his neck, however, file bea,utiful black
maiden aippeared directly before him and said:
"Do not ha:n1g yourself, iblalCiksmith, do not hang yourse1f ! I will he1p you in yoUT misery. I wiH give you all the
weali!h you desire, if you only promise me something you
haJVe at home but about whiich you are not awa,re."
"Huh, well whait can this be in my 'barren home about
which I know nothing?" pondered the blaclrnmith, "this
must undoulbtedly be some kind of a jo!ke!"
But the blaciksmith promised the black maiden what
she had requested, if she would only help him out of his
misery. Fortiliiwith, the lo;ve:ly yourng black maiden filled a
pouch with money and go ld and said:
"Here you have what I promised you. And for what you
ha,ve promised me I shall come in seven years."
The lovely blaiok lady disaippeared just as mysteriously
as she had appeared. The blaclksmith couhl scarcely believe
what had haippened, but there was· the pouch with money
and gold! He snatched it and hurried home.
He cried joyously as he burst into his humble shack
and poured the money and gold on the truble. His wife and
children were stunned momentarily. Soon they had plenty
of food on the taJble with which the SJtaI1Ved children stuffed
themselves. Mter aN had had their fill, the wife turned to
her husband and asked how he hrud come by all that money
and goJ.d.
"Thinlk nothing of it," reiplied the blacksmith, "it was
just some kind oif a jolke. To get this money and gold I only
had to promise to give something aJbout which I know
nothing."
As he sipoike these words, his wife beca:me frightened
and screaJmed: "Noiw you did it. Why, you sold yoUT own
child before it was born."
The blaok,s mith also became frightened, but what could
he do ? He gaJVe his word and had to keep it.
1
�49
SLOVAKIA
Soon after the blaciksmith's wife gave birth to a beautiful, deHghtful girl with golden hair and a golden star on
her forehead. Na:tura:lly, they called their little girl "Goldilocks." They cared for the child with love and tenderness
and brought her U!p as best the¥ could. Their haippiness was
marred only .by the thought that Goldilociks was their
own and, yet, she was not.
Exactly seven years after Goldilocks was bo rn, a
black coach stopped in front of the blacksmith's ho:rne and
out of it carrne the bladk maiden. The parents pleaded with
the maiden, but to no awail. She placed Goldilocks beside her
in the coach and started off. The blacksmith and his wife
wailed and cried as they ran after the coach to the end of
the viHruge. They woUJld hacve followed it farther, but the
black maiden threatened to bewitch them id: they did. Sorrowfully they returned home and cried pitifUJlly for their
beautiful Goidilociks, whom they thought they had lost
forever.
1
.
The blaick lady and· Goldilo:clks literally flew in the
bla~k coach OJVer desolate lands rund dense forests until
they firnillly came to a 'great, beaiutiful castle. The black
maiden took Goldilociks into the castle, led heir through
ninety-nine rooms and then said to her: "Here, my child,
you shall res,ide. Ta.O{e care of these ninety-nine rooms for
me. You can walk into and stay in any of the rooms yo:u
please, but do not dare to look in the remaining room the hundredth room - belcause you shall fare badly. In
seven years we shall meet again; until then fare thee weM!"
As she spoke these words, the !black maiden disa;ppeared.
For se'Ven whole years there was no sound or trace of
the black maiden. And for seven long years our Goldilocks
lived contentedly in the castle. She walked in and out of
the ninety-nine rooms, sweeipinig and cleaning them so that
everything glittered lilke gold. Of course, she was tempted
to look into t:he hundredth room manry times, but resisted
the temptation successfully, even though the thought of
that room kept her awake many ni'ghts.
�50
SLOVAKIA
SuTe enoUJgh, when seven years had passed by, the
blaclk maJden returned to the ,c astle and Goldilodks.
"Did you look into the hundredth room?" she asked.
GoldilO'C/k1s replied that she had not. Of course, the bl8.1Ck
maiden lkneiw that; she was very hruppy that Goldilocks
spO!ke the tmth. After repeating the order to Goldilocks,
the black maiden a;gain disaippeared.
·
Our Gold.ilodks kept going throUJg,h the 1beautifu:l, spacious ninety-nine rooms day after day, cileanmg them so
that they sparkled l.ilke mirrors.. Year after year ,p assed like
a drnrum. As the second seven year period was coming to a
close, our GoldUocks thoUJght how the black maiden would
praise her :fior keepmg the rooms in such good order, when
suddenly she heand deligh'bf.wl m1US1i.c flowing out of the last
room, the hiUildTetltih room. L:i!ke a deer she ran to the door
and paused mornentarilry. Enchanted by the sweet strains,
Go'1dilook,s turned the iknob and, before she could realize
what she had done, she was inside the room.
In this hlJIIldiredith room twelve b,ewitiched persons were
sitting behind •a talble. They were sitting there exa,ctly as
they had been ait the time they were put under the spell.
Still another man stood behind the door and this one said
to Goldi-looks :
"Goldilocks, for heaven's sake, do not diV11.1lge what you
harve nOIW seen in this room! No matter what the · b1ack
maiden does to you, do not let her know the sooret of thls
ro.om. If you sary e1Ven one wo,nd aJbout this, you yourse:llf
shall be unhappy eternaJlly and we wiU continue to remain
here ac-cursed.''
Witlh this a dead silence followed. Goldilocks, frightened
and stunned, ran out of the roo,m as speedily as she had
entered it.
Goldilocks did not e1Ven notice how or when the blaok
maiden a;ppearetl beifo.re her, but there s:he was! Of course,
t!he maiden knew that Goldilocks had seen that last room
in the castle. Pointing aocusingly at Goldilooks, the black
-ma,i den said: "Go1ldilociks, Goldilocks, what have you ·done?
You haive looked into that hundredth- r-oom! Now, tell me,
what did you see there'?"
�SLOVAKIA
51
Goldilocks, however, denied she had seen anything.
When the black maiiden realized that she could get no pl'cree
wit'h Goldi.looks iby being nice, she begaJil to threaten her in
various ways, but Goldilocks stood her ground and refused
to divulge what she had seen in that last room. Finally, the
bladk maiden screamed angrHy: "You have one more
chance to teH me what you sa;w in that last room. If you
do not tell, I shaJl throw you into the well and you shall become dumb!"
Goldiloclks stead!fastly refused to answer, and the black
maiden aictual:Iy threw her into a deep well and put a spell
on her so that she could not sipeaJk with any one except the
black lady.
When Goldilocks regaii.ned her senses in the weill, she
found herselrf on a sand bottom, and, lo and behold, she saw
a large tunnel on the one side. She went into the passage
and followed it until she eme11ged onto a delightful meadow.
She remained there feeding herse1f with strawiberries and
roots Olf plants. The blacik maiden, however, kept on appearing quite frequently. She continued to beg and threaten
Goldilocks to learn the secret of the hundredth room in the
castle, but Goldilocks fi:rnnly red'used to divulge the secret .
•
It so happened that in the vicinity of the meadow a
youthful king went ahuntmg. As he hunted, he came wpon
the meadow and fo.un.d our beautifiul Goldi.looks fast asleep
on the grass. The young king ga;zed on Goldilocks in amazement and wondered how in t.l-ie world such a 1beautirful girl
could be found on a meadow. And the more he looked at her,
the more he, was eniamored of her. Finally, he decided to
a,w aken her, taJke her home and maJke her his 'bride, no matter what t'he people might say aJbout it.
He touched Goldilocks and awoke her. The young king
asked her who she was and where she came from. But our
Goldifodks could utter not a worn. The king thought this
was 'because she was frightened or that she was bashful.
He repeated tJhe· questions and then asked her whether she
would go witih him to hi's castle. In answer to hi:s last question, Goldi-looks gesticulated with her hands and head that
�52
SLOVAKIA
she would be hruppy to go. So· the young king took her to his
castle, dressed her up in beautiful clothes and soon after
married her.
Althouigih Goldilooks could not utter a word, the youthful king loved her so mUJoh that he did not care whether she
could sipeaJk oir not and he lived with her peacefully and
h~ily. After rubout a year, Goldilocks became very sad and
fearf,u l; something troulbled her as the day drew near to
give birth to her clhild. Wihen that time ca'Ine, our Goldilocks
gruve birth to a delightd'ul boy with golden hair and witlh
a golden star on his forehead. The . young king was overcome with joy. Ii:mmediately he invited all the landlords of
the vicinity to a great feast so that they could share his
joy with him. His happiness, however, soon changed into. a
great sorrow.
One night the black maiden ruppeared before Goldilocks
and threatened to strangle her golden-haired boy, if she did
not divulge what she had seen in that last room of the
castle. Goldilooks became cold with fright and shook like an
aSlpell tree, but she revealed norbhi1llg. "You yourself shall
not fare well," screamed the blacik maiden. When Goldilocks
refused to reiveal what she saw in that last room, the lady
in black seized her beautiful boy and choked him. Smearing Goldilocks' mouth with blood, t!he 'blaclk maiden diSaippeared as mysteriously as she had appeared.
When the i:nlfant boy was found dead the next morning,
confusion and fright seized all in the castle. 'Dhe king was
paled with fear and sorrow. He had every nook and cranny
of the castle searched to find the guilty one, but the search
proved fruitless. Since GoldHoclks' mouth was covered with
blood, :people began to say that she had killed her own son:
Our Goldilocks, of course, was innocent, but she oould not
say a word in her own defense. The people of the castle said
that she desenved to die for what she had done. The king
heard all this, but continiued to liive with GoJidHooks in peace
because he loved her intensely.
A year later our Goldilocks gave birth to a charming
girl with golden loclcs and a golden star on her forehead.
The king was wi'ld with joy. To forestall all misfortune,
1
�SLOVAKIA
53
however, he immediately ordered a guard pla~ in Goldilocks' room throughout the night.
But even this precaution meant nothing, because the
blaok maiden bewitched the entire guard so that the men
fell a,sloop lhl{e logs of wood. Then she approached Goldilooks and saiid:
"You see, y;ou cannot escape me," she cacikled, "and
I aan deternnined to learn what you sa,w in that last room of
the castle. If you do not ten me noiw, you shall perish in o.ne
way or another. 1if I now strangle your daughter, the king
will most certainly haNe you burned."
Goldilocik.s, however, remained as firm as a rock and
said nothing. The black maiden then seized the infant girl
and choked her. Again she smeared Goldilocks' mouth with
blood and then disappeared.
When the infant princess was found dead the next
morning and the guard insisted that no one entered or left
the room all n~ght, the king became exiceedingly angry,
Again he had every nooik and cranny of the castle searched
for the murderer, but to no avail. The king simply could not
believe that Goldilociks was guilty of strangling her own
child. But people said that under the circumstan,ces no1body
could have ·k illed the child except the queen herself,
because the room was under guard the whole night. Even
her mouth was bloody, they sa,id, and she could not utter
a word. A strange, dreadful creature, indeed, they thought.
Overcome with grief, the king was at last influenced
by what was being said rubowt GoJ.dilocks and he ordered
her to be put to death. The hrupless GoldilO'dk:s wrus led outside the town and tied to a stake. A£ter dTy wood was placed
all around her, the kinig ordered it to be fired. But at that
moment a bla:cik coa:ch thundered through the dense throng
witnessing the exooution and came to .a sudden halt near
Goldilocks. Out came the black maiden who said:
"You see, my words are being fulfilled. Your destruction is at hand. This is your last opportunity to tell me what
you saiw in that last room in my castle. Now, tell me what
did you see there?"
�54
SLOVAKIA
Goldilocks, however, kept her silence a:nd adamantly
refused to tell the black maiden what she had seen. in that
hundrndth roam of her castle.
When the wood was lighted and the flames began to
lerup toward Goldtlook s, the bl,a ck maiden suddenly began to
chaJil!ge and her faJce became white. She ordered the fire extinguished, beca:U!se Goldilocks was innocent. Then she
turned to Goldilocks and said:
"It is your good fortune as well as mine, that you did
not betra.y the secret olf that laist room in my castle. And
because you keipt yoll!r secret well, the evil spell over me and
the twelve men you saiw in that last room is broken. If you
haid betrayed the seJCret, rul:I oif us, including y,ournelf, would
have been doomed eternally! "
To the utter SU11Prise olf the confoll!11ded throng, the
beautifwl maiden then reached Ol\lt to Gol<lilOIC:ks a:nd returned her tiwo ch!ildren U!Ilhairmed and. whole. Within a
flas h the coach disruppeared - a;s if a hurricane had carried
it away.
Goldilodkis then told the king the story from the very
beginmg. '!1he 'king was dwmfounded; he coi.rl.d scan:ely
believe his eyes and ears. But what could he do? His children, straingled under mysterious civcumstances, were alive
and haippy. Overtaken with joy, the king emlbrruced his wife
and his chi:1dren, tea:rfu!lly begging Goldilocks to forgirve
hi'In for the terrible mistaJke he had made. Then he too>k his
wife and ohildren to his east:le, where they lived happily
thereafter. Of course, the king sought out the parents of
Goldilocks, the b'la'dksmith and his wife, and had them
brought to his ca_stle where they all lived hruppily together
until the end of their da;ys.
1
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"LONG I.JIVE THE SOWET UNION AND MAY I'DS
SOVIET LEADER AND .SKllPPER, J. V. STA.LEN LIVE
IN FULL HEALTH TO SIDE M,ANY MORE OF ITS JOYOUS JUB1L:IDES!" - (Dr. Joseiph Lettrich, Vfoe-Chair1man
of the Execl.lltive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslava,kia," C.NS, Norvem/ber 7, 1947).
�
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
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SLOVAKIA
47
have fought for the liberation. of his people from all alien
tyranny, including the Czech brand as represented by T. G.
Masaryk an.d Benes. S,lo,vaJks eveTywhere commemorate May
4th as Stefani'k Day, because it was on May 4, 1919, that
their beloved wair hero crashed to his death in a plaine which
was "a~cidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison at Vajnory, Slovakia. Many Slovaiks even todiay will tell you 1:!hat
Stefanik haid to die, because he never consented to his Slovakiia being a colony o,£ the imperialistic Czechs led by T. G.
Masarylk and Benes. On May 4, 1954, Slova,ks everywhere
will recall: "it was 35 yeaI'S ago thait Stefarnk was killed by
the men who resented his warnings rugainst Bolshevism.
"
•
•
•
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
GOLDILOCKS
Once UlpOn a time there was a very poor blacksmith.
At one time 'he fared weH, but then hard times struck, he
had little work to do., and his wiife and small children were
always hungry. Finally he lost everything; at hOlme he had
not!hing left but seven ,pennies. His undernourished children
cried constantly for something to eat until the blacksmith
could stand it no longer. In his despair he boU!ght a rope
witlh his last seven ,p ennies and started out for the hills to
end it all.
When he came into the hills, he sought out a stout
branch on a mighty tree to which he fixed the roipe. As the
bla;cksmith was a;bout to tie the rope albout his neck, a
,pretty black maiden suddenly appeared .b efore him and
pleaded wHJh him not to hang himself, 1b ecause that was not
a nice thing to do and, then, it was also a sin. The b,lacksmith was stunned when the black maiden disappeared into
the nowhere whence she had come. As he waliked along, his
mind wandered baok home where misery and want ruled and
again he became despondent. U!P went his rope onto another
stout ,h ranch. .&gain the blaJCk maiden s,uddemy appeaired
out of the blue and begged him not to commit such an ugly
deed. In a quadary, the blactksmith shoo'k his head, bwt
said nothing. He did not throw away his rope, but stood
48
SLOVAKIA
motionless for some moments. When the maiden disa:ppea.rred
once a:gain, file hl.ooksmith pondered his misery over again
and again, reruched the deci'sion to end it all. Once more the
rope went wp airound the stQ!Ut branch. As he was nixing
the other end rubout his neck, however, file bea,utiful black
maiden aippeared directly before him and said:
"Do not ha:n1g yourself, iblalCiksmith, do not hang yourse1f ! I will he1p you in yoUT misery. I wiH give you all the
weali!h you desire, if you only promise me something you
haJVe at home but about whiich you are not awa,re."
"Huh, well whait can this be in my 'barren home about
which I know nothing?" pondered the blaclrnmith, "this
must undoulbtedly be some kind of a jo!ke!"
But the blaciksmith promised the black maiden what
she had requested, if she would only help him out of his
misery. Fortiliiwith, the lo;ve:ly yourng black maiden filled a
pouch with money and go ld and said:
"Here you have what I promised you. And for what you
ha,ve promised me I shall come in seven years."
The lovely blaiok lady disaippeared just as mysteriously
as she had appeared. The blaclksmith couhl scarcely believe
what had haippened, but there was· the pouch with money
and gold! He snatched it and hurried home.
He cried joyously as he burst into his humble shack
and poured the money and gold on the truble. His wife and
children were stunned momentarily. Soon they had plenty
of food on the taJble with which the SJtaI1Ved children stuffed
themselves. Mter aN had had their fill, the wife turned to
her husband and asked how he hrud come by all that money
and goJ.d.
"Thinlk nothing of it," reiplied the blacksmith, "it was
just some kind oif a jolke. To get this money and gold I only
had to promise to give something aJbout which I know
nothing."
As he sipoike these words, his wife beca:me frightened
and screaJmed: "Noiw you did it. Why, you sold yoUT own
child before it was born."
The blaok,s mith also became frightened, but what could
he do ? He gaJVe his word and had to keep it.
1
49
SLOVAKIA
Soon after the blaciksmith's wife gave birth to a beautiful, deHghtful girl with golden hair and a golden star on
her forehead. Na:tura:lly, they called their little girl "Goldilocks." They cared for the child with love and tenderness
and brought her U!p as best the¥ could. Their haippiness was
marred only .by the thought that Goldilociks was their
own and, yet, she was not.
Exactly seven years after Goldilocks was bo rn, a
black coach stopped in front of the blacksmith's ho:rne and
out of it carrne the bladk maiden. The parents pleaded with
the maiden, but to no awail. She placed Goldilocks beside her
in the coach and started off. The blacksmith and his wife
wailed and cried as they ran after the coach to the end of
the viHruge. They woUJld hacve followed it farther, but the
black maiden threatened to bewitch them id: they did. Sorrowfully they returned home and cried pitifUJlly for their
beautiful Goidilociks, whom they thought they had lost
forever.
1
.
The blaick lady and· Goldilo:clks literally flew in the
bla~k coach OJVer desolate lands rund dense forests until
they firnillly came to a 'great, beaiutiful castle. The black
maiden took Goldilociks into the castle, led heir through
ninety-nine rooms and then said to her: "Here, my child,
you shall res,ide. Ta.O{e care of these ninety-nine rooms for
me. You can walk into and stay in any of the rooms yo:u
please, but do not dare to look in the remaining room the hundredth room - belcause you shall fare badly. In
seven years we shall meet again; until then fare thee weM!"
As she spoke these words, the !black maiden disa;ppeared.
For se'Ven whole years there was no sound or trace of
the black maiden. And for seven long years our Goldilocks
lived contentedly in the castle. She walked in and out of
the ninety-nine rooms, sweeipinig and cleaning them so that
everything glittered lilke gold. Of course, she was tempted
to look into t:he hundredth room manry times, but resisted
the temptation successfully, even though the thought of
that room kept her awake many ni'ghts.
50
SLOVAKIA
SuTe enoUJgh, when seven years had passed by, the
blaclk maJden returned to the ,c astle and Goldilodks.
"Did you look into the hundredth room?" she asked.
GoldilO'C/k1s replied that she had not. Of course, the bl8.1Ck
maiden lkneiw that; she was very hruppy that Goldilocks
spO!ke the tmth. After repeating the order to Goldilocks,
the black maiden a;gain disaippeared.
·
Our Gold.ilodks kept going throUJg,h the 1beautifu:l, spacious ninety-nine rooms day after day, cileanmg them so
that they sparkled l.ilke mirrors.. Year after year ,p assed like
a drnrum. As the second seven year period was coming to a
close, our GoldUocks thoUJght how the black maiden would
praise her :fior keepmg the rooms in such good order, when
suddenly she heand deligh'bf.wl m1US1i.c flowing out of the last
room, the hiUildTetltih room. L:i!ke a deer she ran to the door
and paused mornentarilry. Enchanted by the sweet strains,
Go'1dilook,s turned the iknob and, before she could realize
what she had done, she was inside the room.
In this hlJIIldiredith room twelve b,ewitiched persons were
sitting behind •a talble. They were sitting there exa,ctly as
they had been ait the time they were put under the spell.
Still another man stood behind the door and this one said
to Goldi-looks :
"Goldilocks, for heaven's sake, do not diV11.1lge what you
harve nOIW seen in this room! No matter what the · b1ack
maiden does to you, do not let her know the sooret of thls
ro.om. If you sary e1Ven one wo,nd aJbout this, you yourse:llf
shall be unhappy eternaJlly and we wiU continue to remain
here ac-cursed.''
Witlh this a dead silence followed. Goldilocks, frightened
and stunned, ran out of the roo,m as speedily as she had
entered it.
Goldilocks did not e1Ven notice how or when the blaok
maiden a;ppearetl beifo.re her, but there s:he was! Of course,
t!he maiden knew that Goldilocks had seen that last room
in the castle. Pointing aocusingly at Goldilooks, the black
-ma,i den said: "Go1ldilociks, Goldilocks, what have you ·done?
You haive looked into that hundredth- r-oom! Now, tell me,
what did you see there'?"
SLOVAKIA
51
Goldilocks, however, denied she had seen anything.
When the black maiiden realized that she could get no pl'cree
wit'h Goldi.looks iby being nice, she begaJil to threaten her in
various ways, but Goldilocks stood her ground and refused
to divulge what she had seen in that last room. Finally, the
bladk maiden screamed angrHy: "You have one more
chance to teH me what you sa;w in that last room. If you
do not tell, I shaJl throw you into the well and you shall become dumb!"
Goldiloclks stead!fastly refused to answer, and the black
maiden aictual:Iy threw her into a deep well and put a spell
on her so that she could not sipeaJk with any one except the
black lady.
When Goldilocks regaii.ned her senses in the weill, she
found herselrf on a sand bottom, and, lo and behold, she saw
a large tunnel on the one side. She went into the passage
and followed it until she eme11ged onto a delightful meadow.
She remained there feeding herse1f with strawiberries and
roots Olf plants. The blacik maiden, however, kept on appearing quite frequently. She continued to beg and threaten
Goldilocks to learn the secret of the hundredth room in the
castle, but Goldilocks fi:rnnly red'used to divulge the secret .
•
It so happened that in the vicinity of the meadow a
youthful king went ahuntmg. As he hunted, he came wpon
the meadow and fo.un.d our beautifiul Goldi.looks fast asleep
on the grass. The young king ga;zed on Goldilocks in amazement and wondered how in t.l-ie world such a 1beautirful girl
could be found on a meadow. And the more he looked at her,
the more he, was eniamored of her. Finally, he decided to
a,w aken her, taJke her home and maJke her his 'bride, no matter what t'he people might say aJbout it.
He touched Goldilocks and awoke her. The young king
asked her who she was and where she came from. But our
Goldifodks could utter not a worn. The king thought this
was 'because she was frightened or that she was bashful.
He repeated tJhe· questions and then asked her whether she
would go witih him to hi's castle. In answer to hi:s last question, Goldi-looks gesticulated with her hands and head that
52
SLOVAKIA
she would be hruppy to go. So· the young king took her to his
castle, dressed her up in beautiful clothes and soon after
married her.
Althouigih Goldilooks could not utter a word, the youthful king loved her so mUJoh that he did not care whether she
could sipeaJk oir not and he lived with her peacefully and
h~ily. After rubout a year, Goldilocks became very sad and
fearf,u l; something troulbled her as the day drew near to
give birth to her clhild. Wihen that time ca'Ine, our Goldilocks
gruve birth to a delightd'ul boy with golden hair and witlh
a golden star on his forehead. The . young king was overcome with joy. Ii:mmediately he invited all the landlords of
the vicinity to a great feast so that they could share his
joy with him. His happiness, however, soon changed into. a
great sorrow.
One night the black maiden ruppeared before Goldilocks
and threatened to strangle her golden-haired boy, if she did
not divulge what she had seen in that last room of the
castle. Goldilooks became cold with fright and shook like an
aSlpell tree, but she revealed norbhi1llg. "You yourself shall
not fare well," screamed the blacik maiden. When Goldilocks
refused to reiveal what she saw in that last room, the lady
in black seized her beautiful boy and choked him. Smearing Goldilocks' mouth with blood, t!he 'blaclk maiden diSaippeared as mysteriously as she had appeared.
When the i:nlfant boy was found dead the next morning,
confusion and fright seized all in the castle. 'Dhe king was
paled with fear and sorrow. He had every nook and cranny
of the castle searched to find the guilty one, but the search
proved fruitless. Since GoldHoclks' mouth was covered with
blood, :people began to say that she had killed her own son:
Our Goldilocks, of course, was innocent, but she oould not
say a word in her own defense. The people of the castle said
that she desenved to die for what she had done. The king
heard all this, but continiued to liive with GoJidHooks in peace
because he loved her intensely.
A year later our Goldilocks gave birth to a charming
girl with golden loclcs and a golden star on her forehead.
The king was wi'ld with joy. To forestall all misfortune,
1
SLOVAKIA
53
however, he immediately ordered a guard pla~ in Goldilocks' room throughout the night.
But even this precaution meant nothing, because the
blaok maiden bewitched the entire guard so that the men
fell a,sloop lhl{e logs of wood. Then she approached Goldilooks and saiid:
"You see, y;ou cannot escape me," she cacikled, "and
I aan deternnined to learn what you sa,w in that last room of
the castle. If you do not ten me noiw, you shall perish in o.ne
way or another. 1if I now strangle your daughter, the king
will most certainly haNe you burned."
Goldilocik.s, however, remained as firm as a rock and
said nothing. The black maiden then seized the infant girl
and choked her. Again she smeared Goldilocks' mouth with
blood and then disappeared.
When the infant princess was found dead the next
morning and the guard insisted that no one entered or left
the room all n~ght, the king became exiceedingly angry,
Again he had every nooik and cranny of the castle searched
for the murderer, but to no avail. The king simply could not
believe that Goldilociks was guilty of strangling her own
child. But people said that under the circumstan,ces no1body
could have ·k illed the child except the queen herself,
because the room was under guard the whole night. Even
her mouth was bloody, they sa,id, and she could not utter
a word. A strange, dreadful creature, indeed, they thought.
Overcome with grief, the king was at last influenced
by what was being said rubowt GoJ.dilocks and he ordered
her to be put to death. The hrupless GoldilO'dk:s wrus led outside the town and tied to a stake. A£ter dTy wood was placed
all around her, the kinig ordered it to be fired. But at that
moment a bla:cik coa:ch thundered through the dense throng
witnessing the exooution and came to .a sudden halt near
Goldilocks. Out came the black maiden who said:
"You see, my words are being fulfilled. Your destruction is at hand. This is your last opportunity to tell me what
you saiw in that last room in my castle. Now, tell me what
did you see there?"
54
SLOVAKIA
Goldilocks, however, kept her silence a:nd adamantly
refused to tell the black maiden what she had seen. in that
hundrndth roam of her castle.
When the wood was lighted and the flames began to
lerup toward Goldtlook s, the bl,a ck maiden suddenly began to
chaJil!ge and her faJce became white. She ordered the fire extinguished, beca:U!se Goldilocks was innocent. Then she
turned to Goldilocks and said:
"It is your good fortune as well as mine, that you did
not betra.y the secret olf that laist room in my castle. And
because you keipt yoll!r secret well, the evil spell over me and
the twelve men you saiw in that last room is broken. If you
haid betrayed the seJCret, rul:I oif us, including y,ournelf, would
have been doomed eternally! "
To the utter SU11Prise olf the confoll!11ded throng, the
beautifwl maiden then reached Ol\lt to Gol<lilOIC:ks a:nd returned her tiwo ch!ildren U!Ilhairmed and. whole. Within a
flas h the coach disruppeared - a;s if a hurricane had carried
it away.
Goldilodkis then told the king the story from the very
beginmg. '!1he 'king was dwmfounded; he coi.rl.d scan:ely
believe his eyes and ears. But what could he do? His children, straingled under mysterious civcumstances, were alive
and haippy. Overtaken with joy, the king emlbrruced his wife
and his chi:1dren, tea:rfu!lly begging Goldilocks to forgirve
hi'In for the terrible mistaJke he had made. Then he too>k his
wife and ohildren to his east:le, where they lived happily
thereafter. Of course, the king sought out the parents of
Goldilocks, the b'la'dksmith and his wife, and had them
brought to his ca_stle where they all lived hruppily together
until the end of their da;ys.
1
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"LONG I.JIVE THE SOWET UNION AND MAY I'DS
SOVIET LEADER AND .SKllPPER, J. V. STA.LEN LIVE
IN FULL HEALTH TO SIDE M,ANY MORE OF ITS JOYOUS JUB1L:IDES!" - (Dr. Joseiph Lettrich, Vfoe-Chair1man
of the Execl.lltive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslava,kia," C.NS, Norvem/ber 7, 1947).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Slovak Folklore: Goldilocks
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 47-54
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d5f7f6fa2d884fea026daa44c7d1ae64.pdf
3387c724a4bcb04334ba11fb8b611e73
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
33
MILAN RASTISLAV STEFA.NIK
Stephanie 0. Husek
This year mar,ks the thirty-sixth anniversary of two
events which considerwbly changed the national developmeint
of the Slo:vaJks both here and abroad.
On May 30, 1918, the Pittsibwgh Pact was drawn up
and on Noveimlber 14 was signed by Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, then President ad: the 0zecho-iSlo1V1ak Republic. This
Slovruk Magna Carta suimmarirzed Sloivak rights in the newly fomied state amd formed the platform of the Slova;,k
People's Party, the largest Slovalk political party in pre..war
Cz~ho-Slova1da.
On 0ctolber 28, 1918, the independence ad: 0zeeho--iSlovakia was pro:claimed and a new era oJf national development
began for fue Slovak and Czech nations.
Both these events were the result of the Czecho..,Slovak Relbellion, both at home and beyond the ,bo'UJildaries oif
the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. SlOIVaks and Czechs, no
matter where they lived, joined in the struggle for independence and each groUJp contributed towaTds gaining the
final victory. The cond'Ulot of the reibellion lay in the hands
of the National 0zecho-1Slov.aik Committee in Paris of whicih
Thomas G. Masaryk was president, Edward Benes secretairy,
and Milan Rastislav Ste!anik represented the Sloivaks.
No single factor carried so much weight with the Allies
in favor of an independent Czecho-Slo,va.'kia as the organization and later suiocesses of the independent Czecllo.-B1ovalk
Army. It was the a'I'!my which proved that the Sloivaks and
Czechs were will.mg to, make the swpreme sacrifice in order
that they and their children might liive independenrtl:y. It is
to the glory of the Sl01Va,ks that the formation and organization of this army was the tfuought and wonk of Milan Rastislav Stefan.ilk who later ,b ecame the first Minister of War
ill1 the Czecho-,Slova,k State.
The movement for Czecho-Sloivalk independence was not
begun at the ourt:Jbreruk -of the Wax. Years before, both individuals and organized giroups sought to alleviate conditions
�34
SLOVAKIA
existing in the Austro-HUI11garian Kingdom. Stefaniik already dreamed of an in.d.€4)00.dent Slovakia in 1914 when he
arrived in F1rance as a young astronomer, soon to gain prominence there and become a memiber of the French A~adem.y. No ocicasion arose which Sted:anik d.i:d not use to acquaint those in influenice with Hu1nga,r.ian tyranny and to
gain sympathy for the oppressed Slo;vruk nation.
As soon as Austria dec1ared war on .Serbia, Stefaniik
left Morocco, where he was engaged in astronomical observation, and returned to France. He joined the French Air
Cor,ps in. January 191'5 and in March requested to be sent
to Serbia. Having no contact as yet with Miresruryk, not even
familiair with the latter's plans, he already thought of organh:ing a ~arate corps c_o nsisting of t.he ~ruvs fighting
aigainst thefr convictions on the enemy,..s side and being
gradually ooncoort~a;ted in prison camps. Due .t o, the Serbian
retreat whii!ch began one day before Stefanik's arri;val in
SeI'lbia, the thought of organizing this corps had to be
abandoned.
But Stefanik renewed his worlk upon his return to Paris where he became assOICiarted with Thomas G. Masacyk
and Dr. ffidlward Benes: Soon the nucleus of the Ozeoho-,Slovak Legion was orgamzed in France and Stefruni,k extended
his work to inlclude Rm.ssia, the United States, and Italy;
in fact, aJ1l countries where Czechs and Sfovruk,s were to be
found, either in prison camps OT as settlers.
Thus, from Jrtill,,y 1916 until Mairch 1917 he was in
Russia. While the.re he made a trip to Roucrnania. After returning from Russia he crume to. the United States, returned
to France and then went to litaly. He met wirth many diftfioulties in organizing the Legion. Nevertheless, he succeeded
i:n winning the. permission of government authorities and 'i n
persuading moo to join.
1n the work orf Q!I'ganiizing the army Stefan:iik also did
mooh to gain the sympartihy orf Allied statesmen and men
ranking high in goiveirnment and military cincles and to
convm:ce those with whom he came into contact of the necessity of breaking up the Austro-Hungaria:n Kingdom.
Milan Rastislav Stefanik did much more- foir gaining
�35
SLOVAKIA
the independeince of Czetjio-Slovaikia than he is credited
with doing. Benes and Ma:saryk boith wrote an account of
the mOfVement for independence and tihe part which each
played in it. Stefan.ilk, run.fortunately, was not given this
O!plpOrtunity. But even from the sketchy references to his
wo'l1k and the Sl1mprisingly meagre sources avaHaJble to the
hisrtorian of today, it is dearly evident that in cowa:ge, in
scl!f-saicrifice, in tact and wbility in diplomacy, in integrity,
and in zeal for the ca:use of freedom of his people, he was
not SUI'lpassed by anyone of the leaders in the OzeichoSlovaJk movement for independence .
•
•
•
•
Stefanilk had exaggeirated hopes of his success in America. As stated in his report to the French Ministcy o!f Foreign Affairs, he 1b el ieved that they would gain around
20,000 volunteers for the Ozecho-,Slovruk Legion. It is not
definitely known where he got his information, but there
were many Czechs and Slovaks in America who cherished
the same ho,pe and Stefaruk was certainly inforrmed b~ some
of them. In the official newspaper of tihe First Catholic
Slovak Union the "Jednota," it was estimated that if only
ten per cent of the male memlbers of the Slo1va,k organizations joined the Czeicho-Slo:vak army, there would be 15,140
Slovak vnlunteers. One Slo,va'k reported to Steifani!k that
among the Slovaks alone 25,000 ,volunteers could be, expected 0). Joseph 'Dvirziieky, Seciretary of the Ozech National
Society in America, was also one of those, who, during the
entire caimpaiign, added to Stef8iruk's optimism(2).
The work of tile Poles at the same time and in the
same direction facilitated Steifaniik's mission. O:n the other
hand, America's entraJnce info the World War changed conditions existing here which were not favoraJble. Many American Czechs and Slorvarks joined the Canadian army e,ven
beforre the United Staites entered the War and forty thousand Ozechs and SkwaJks joined the Amer.iJcaJD. 8!Imy in
1917 (3). The American government itself placed certain
1
(1) Karol Pergler: "Z ame1ic.ke fron.ty a naseho osvobozenskeho
boje_ - Nase revoluce." Vol II, p. 318.
(2) "Nase revoluce.." Vol. 1,1, P. 325.
(3) Ibid. p. 325.
�36
SLOVAKIA
obstacles which made the fu1fillment of Stefani:k's mission
more difficult. On the grounds that if special concessioo.s
were granted the Czechs and Slovaiks othe,r nationality
grOUJps would make. similar requests, the government was
relUICtant to girve permission for recruiting soldiers for the
Czecho~Slov~ Airmy in F1rance.
America's entrance into the War was looked wpon by
many groiups as an opportunity to be exploited toward the
realimtion of their aim Olf corrnpletel,y Americanirzing the
foreign national~ty groups living here. It presented an oppoI1tunity to unite all immigrants undeir one motto and for
one ideal. America was to enter the Wax as one consolidated nation fighting a;gainst a single enemy. To add to
the difrfic,u1ties, a mo;vement was started by Senator Hitchcoc,k of Nebraska to form a spe'cial Shw conps similar to the
Foreign Legion of France. This was oontrary to the wishes
and plans of General Stefanik and the Ozecho,-SlovaJk National Committee. Had it succeeded, the influence and the
opportunity of the Czechs and Slovaks to aJCt independently
would hruve been greatly minimized.
IF'inally, it is impossible not to mention the large German and Austro-Hiung arian grolliPS who distributed pamphlets and used various other meains to carry on a continuous
propaganda against the leaders Olf the Allied nations and
against their appeals. Much time and effort was expended
by Slovak national leaders to disclose these intrigues and to
offset their effects. In March 1915 the German government aippealed to the America.n people not to manufacture
powder shraipnels, and other arms, stating that this was
ag:ainst the honoir of the American people and against the
integrity of the nation; that it was neicessary to show
once and for all that such things could not be bought with
money dipped in human blood Even before this, Germany
had sent an appeal to America, addressed to prominent
men, in which she defended her position in the war, related
the wrongs committed on her and denied all responsibility
for the acts to which Ger,many had .b een forced (4). It is
small wonder that this German propaganda gained ground
(4) Karol Sidor: " Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji," pp, 44-4ii.
�SLOVAKIA
37
in Ameri~. There were many Gernnan imrmgranits and EWen
more citizens of Ger.rnan descent, financiaNy well estaJblished, who were sentimentally sympathetic to their native
land.
Edward Benes, as Secretary of the National Committee,
requested the French goivernment to entrust Stefanik with
the mission to deal with the American authorities for permission to. organize volunteers among the Ozechs and Slovaks for the army in France. The consent of Rebprt, ::Mlinister
of Foreign Alffairs, was gained uh.rough Philip Berthelot and
permission from the Ministry ad: Wiar was received, through
the inter1cession of Franklirn--Bouillon, directly f.rom Minister
PainlEWe with whOim both Benes and Stefanik were on good
terms. Thi'S perunission was granted while Stefanik was still
in Russia but he IPostjponed the trip in order to. complete his
work in Roumania where he gained 1000 prisoners for the
Czecho-SloiV'a'k army. The order for the j()IUJI'ney commissioning Stefanik wifu a special mission in the United States
was issued May 20, 1917 and he arrived in America the following month. Before Stefamk's departure,. however, the
French Government had aliready sent a spe:cial political commission headed 'by FrankJin-1Bouillon to gain the permission of the United States for recruiting volunteers. among
the immigrants for Slav national arunies in France. This
mission of F:raniklin-Bo:uillin, as well as his personal aid in
the Czec<ho.-1Slova:k wrmy question, greatly helped Stefa.Mk.
Stefanik qumkly adjusted himself to the conditions
brougihrt rubout by America's entrance into the war and
through the French Arrnlbassado•r , Jussocand, immediately
contacted the go;vernment offfuia1s in Washington. He had a
short 'but successif:ul conference with Lansing during which
he also presented: him with a;n expression of loyalty of the
Ozechs and 'Sloivruks to the United Srtates of Ameri~. Wirth
the aid of the Frenlch Commissioner A. Tardieu, the French
Mi•n ister Jussevam.d, and Franldin.J3ou:illon Stefan:iik gained
his object and the Arrnerican government granted pemnission to al[ Czechs and SlovaJks not subject to military duty
in the Am.errean M1IDY to join the Ozecho-,S1ovak Legion in
France. On August 4, he already report.ea to his friends in
�38
SLOVAKIA
New Yorlc th~t he had received this perrmss1on and that
4,000 men oOIU!ld be sent to the French military school. After
permission for recruiting was granted, negotiatiOllls were
begun for the transipwtatio n of the Czec:ho-Sl'OVa;k soldiers
to France and for obtaining the financial means necessary
to keep them concentrated in camps in New Yonk and Boston where they awaited their depar-ture. Oonsideration
was also given to the question of SU!pporting families deprived of wa;ge erurner,s and, later, to ca;ses of widowed
wives Mld or,phaned children.
In October, Stefanik uncovered some Austro-Hunga rian
intdgues in Washing.ton. A telegram had been sent to Tardieu fram Paris suggesting that, due to difficulties in transportation, the Poles should be sent to France finst and the
transpovtatio n of the Ozecho ..Slovak soldiers shO!Uld be postponed for a few months. Stefanik suicceede.d in defeating
this attempt by uncovering its moUves and, on the basis of
this 1nfoI1Ination, Tardieu telegraphed to his swperiors that
the posbponemen t of the transport of the Ozecho-SlOIVak
soldiers would mean the breaking of a promise and that he
would have no part i.in such a disho:noraJble act (15). Other
difficulties arose in the matterr of transporting trooips; fifty
Czech and Slovak soldiers were detained in New Yonk in
Decem~ because no exceptions were made foir Czechs and
Slovaiks in the instructions sent by the American governmeil!t cOillCerniing kuistro-Hung arian su!bjects. At the intervention O(f the French Ambassador and of General Vignal
this maJtter was also straightened out.
Steifan:ik contacted American joUTrralists and wrote
several articles on the cause for· the newsprupers. He aroused
the interest orf F. H. Allen ("World"), Go,rdo:n Srruth am'd, at
a dinner given in his honor on J,u ly 23 in New York, he
gained the swpport of "The New Repu!blic." Stefanik used
these oontaots for propaganda purposes. Early in September
the "World" carried a long article on the Czecho~Slovak
movement written by Stefanik and Pisecky and an account
of the Battle of Halie by Stefani~ appeared later in Chicago
news,paipers.
(5) Karol Pergler : "Nase revolnce." Vol. II, p. 319 .
�SLOVAKIA
39
Although Stefanik did not entirely trurst Wilson and
did not rugree with his views, he ,g ained the good will of
the ever popular Theodore Rooseivelit and of representative
Frank L. Polle, who devoted much consideration to the
Ozecho-4Slovak question when he later headed the American
delegation at the Peace Oonrference after Lansing's departure from Paris.
It is generally conceded that Stefanik achieved his
greatest success in America by seicuring the cooperation of
the Czechs and Slovaks in the Czecho-Slovak movement.
Pisec'ky writes: "Stefanik did most in the United States in
that he succeeded in convincing the Sloiva.ks of the necessity
and the horrorableness of the Czecho-SlOIVak rebeU.ion, that
he succeeded in paralyiZing autonomistic and opportunistic
UJpshoots of persons of the character of Daxner, Bielelk,
Panilmch and others and gained them for the common advance with the Czechs (6) . From this statement one could
infer that the American Slo:va.ks resisted the movement for
freedom. On the contrary, it was the Slovaiks who, with a
few exceptions, first brought UJP the question of freedom
from the Hungarian yoke, and who, long before the war,
had organized to gaiin recognition of Slo:vak national rights.
The Slovak League was founded in 1907 for the punpose of
supporting and helping national leaders in the old country.
In the year 1910 it requested the U. S. Census officials to
list Slovaks, not as immigrants from Ausitria-iH kmgary, but
according to their native, tongue.
B efore the outbreak of the war, at the beginning o:f the
year 1914, a memorandum, signed by representatives of 21
organizations, 23 newspaipers, by many Catholic priests
and Protestant ministe,ns, was printed. in five languages in
addition to English This memorandum, sent to i:nflmmtial
diP'lomats and statesmen, descrilbed the sufferings of the
Slova.l{s under Hungarian tyranny and demanded in the
name o:f justice and humanity that Slovaks be given the
rights which were ri!ghtfully tlheirs. Slovalk journalists and
national leaders forll!ght unremittingly through newsprupers
and brosuires against Austro,-,H ungarian and German propa(6) Ferdinand Pisecky: "M. R. i§tefanik," p . 81.
�40
SLOVAKIA
ganda. Moreover, they aided financially. Already in 1914
the Slov:aJk League started a Million Dollar Drive, the proceeds of which were to go to the sw£fering and war-,impoverished Slovaks a,broa<l. When their fellow SlaJVs, the Seribians,
were fortced to retreat bef-ore the enemy in the winter of
1915 and felt hearvi1y t:he weight of defeat, the American
Slova,ks rallied to their swpport. In a movement Which they
themselrves financed they obtained more than a hundred
Slovak priJsoners from prison crumps in Canada.
Even from this very ibrieif sketch it is evident that the
Slovaks in America were, from the very beginning, fully
aware and prepared to ma,ke the most of the opportunities
which the World Wax presented. They were well on their
way in their wo11k for the Slovaks when the Ozecho-{Slovruk
National Committee, headed by Masarytk, asked them for
their cooperation.
In rerviewing the rclations of the Ozechs and Slovaks in
the early yea11s of t:he war, one lll/U!st bear in mind foat the
creation of the Ozecho-,Slorva;k State was not a sine qua non
for the realization of natitonal and cultural independ~e
for the Slovruks. Neither were the Allied states determined
at the beginning, upon the, dismem1be11ment oif the AustroHUil'garian Kingdom. The brea;k up of Austr.ia-HW11gary
evo1ved from later dervefopments , and the Slo'V'ak1s seriously
weighed all possilbilities beiforn deciding to cast their lot
with the Ozechs. Dm-ing this period of indecision only one
thing was cemain, that is, no matter under what form of
government, no maitter with whom ailied, Slovak national
autonomy had to be g,uiairanteed.
In an open letter, pwbli'shed in the "Jednota," December 9, 19'14, Allbert Mamafoy, president of the Slovak
Lea•g ue, wrote: "The American Czechs turned to me, as president of the Siov,aJk Lerugue, regarddng the Sltland that the
Slovaks wish to taJke in this critical situation. . . . I answered that (ruocording to my convictions) we Slovaks
would demand sclf-i:m1e, regardless of the tyipe of government to which we would belong as a result of this war,
whether we would lwe UJI1der a Russian, or whether we
would be left in old Hungary, (should it remain intact), or
�SLOVAKIA
41
whether we would be pla,ced in the Ozecho-!Slo!Wlk State,
which the Ozechs hoped would :be formed. In my opinion,
we S1ovaks must demand ruutonomy from whomsoever we
must, whether fiiom Hwrugary or Russia, or from the hoped.for Czech state. And whosoever should get us, irf peaice be
desired in the counitry, care must be truken that our demands
be satisfied."
Reporting on the proceedings of the Congress of the
Slovak LeaJgue, held in Pittsburgh, Fe!brua:riy 22, 1915,
Joseph Huse'k, editor of the "Jednota," wrote in the March
3rd issue of that year: "One Czech acoused us of hating the
Czechs. Thi1s is not true. We love our closest brother. Lf only
they loved us as much as we love them. But to date, they
have not given us any proof orf this. If matt~s sholl!ld lead
to a change in the ,p olitical and governmental form of
Austria-iHlwrngary, irf a federation will be formed composed
of Bohemia, Moraivia, Silesia, and Slovll!kia, we will be satisfied. I:f they give us complete independence,, we ,vill. 1be sa,tis,.
fied, rund, irf this later should not justify itself there will be
time enough to joiin ourselves politically and gOivern.meintally
more closely with the Bohemians and the Momv,i ans. However, if such a radical change does no,t ta:ke place after the
war and we should 0/Illy be guaranteed independence within
the limits of the Martin De:clairation, we will hiwe to be
satisfied. Erven that woruld be a great concession. When we
sha:H have our sc!hools, when we shall be master in our districrts, when we shall also hme representati1Ves, comparable
to our nll!mbers, in parliament and a guarantee of free, ind~endent industrial development, we will not lose ourselrves.
The rest we will then win by our own strength." And, agai~,
in an article entitled "With the Czechs or Without the
Ozechs," printed on March 24: "We are sincere and we e:m-phaisize again and again that we are supporteiI's. of the
movement which aims to cu1tirv,a te Czecho-Slovak re:c1procity. But the reciprocity for whk,h we are so zealously working mrust be founded upon complete equality of rig1hts and
equal value as pem;ains to our national, economic, and cuiltural interests."
The first attempt to bring the Czechs and ,Slovaks to-
�42
SLOVAKIA
gether in America occurred in 1916. At the suggestion of
Joseph Tvrzidky, Secretary of the Czech National Society,
who was sUJm.rmoned to twke this step by Masaryk, a meeting
of the Czech Society and of the Slo.vaik League was called
at Cleveland, Ohio. On October 25, 191·5, a pact, proposed
and written by Tvrzic:ky, was w0cepted. The conditions under which the SlovaJks were to accept cooperation with the
Czechs were summari·z ed in this pact. Nati0J1.al autonomy of
S1av8Jkia with an independent parliament, an independent
state administration, and free oulrtusrial deveiloipment were
guaranrteed. These demands were not the princi,p les Olf indi,vidiual autonormistic groups. This was the platiform of all
American Slovaks, with very few exceptions, and the considerations under which they entered the struggle,; the aims
they wanted to reali-ze. The extent to which the Slovaks and
Czechs in America did not surcceed in reaching a colill'plete
unde11standi.ng was deter.mined by the degree in which the
American Czechs and the National Ozecho-;Slovak Committee deflected from these prmciples.
Thus the Pact Olf Kiev, although signed by the representative of 1:Jhe Slova/k League, Gustav Kosik, incited consteirn:ation armong the American Slovaiks because it referred
to "Ozecho,slova,ks," as an ethnic entity - a term not ac~ted by them. In li:ke manner, the newspaper "Czeichosloviak" was not warunly received. There were those among
the Slovak leadeirs who, from the ve:r'Y beginning, opposed
the use of the woro "Ozechoslo~ak" even in diplomatic
agreements, holding to the opinion that the Sl~a!ks Sihould
stand as an independent nation.
The Parisian Czecho-,Slovak National Committee was
looked lllpon wirth Sll!Slpicion by the Catho1ics who were uncertain of the status of religion in the, new state. These
suspidoi!liSi, however, were not so strong that they could not
be eliminated, and Masaryk himself, when he late:r came to
Ameri1ca, quieted the Catholic Slovaks by his promise that
there would be complete religious freedom in Ozecho-,Slova'kia.
On July 1, 1917, Stefanik ar.ranged a meeting with
the Slovaks and the Ozechs at the Congress Hall Hotel in
�SLOVAKIA
43
Washington at which the following were present: Dr.
Fisher, President of the Czech Nrutional Society; Albert
Ma:matey, President of the Slova:k -Leag,ue; Emil Voska,
ChaJrles Pergler, Dr. HrcHicika, Ivan Daxner, Iivan Bielek,
and Ferdinad Pisecky. Stefani:k reported on conditions in
Russia, 'but the main object of the meeting was to arrange
for a mihtary o,r ga:nization and the cooipeTation of the
Czechs and Slwaws. At this meeting Daxner raised the
Czeicho-iS1ov,aJk question . .Aigainst his SO-!Called "aurtonomistic attibude" Stefani.ik emphaSlized the necessity of forming
a politically inseparaJble state and not an ethnographically
insepamble one (7).
Con:cerning Stefani•k 's opinion relatirve to the Czechoslovak question and, especially, his oipimon as expressed in his
dealings with the American .Slovaks, Poogler asse:rlts: "NaturaUy, the represerntatives of the Slova:k organiJZations of
the foturre Czecho-tSlovak state often came to Stefanik.
Stefanik al.ways insisted that it was the ooncern of the nation at hoime, that it alone must decide concerning its future
origani1zrution, in short, that it is impossible to dictate firom
beyond the bo~ders of the country and that every such ruttempt wou1d be futile Whenever the question of Sloivak
autonomy aI'ose, he decidedly pointed out, that no guarantees could be demanded £ro:m those living outside of the new
state" (8).
But even if we should aioceipt this untoo•a ble position, it
is impossilble to deny the fact that Stefanik, although he
gave no written priomise, did reach an agreement with the
America,n Slovaks and succeeded in gaining t'heir cooperation with the .American Cze~hs witlhouit the Slovaks relinquishing their demands. This was pr01Ved at the mooting
held in New YoI'k, SeptembeT 20; 1914, where American
Slovak priests were present with Stefanik and at which a
resolution was a:doipted, stating that they stand on the platform orf the SlovaJk League. The pvograim of the Slovak
League was the Cleveland Pact, tlhe · principles of whioh
were incorporated into the Pittsburgh Pact which Masariyik
(7) Ferdinand Pisecky: "M. R. S.teJanik," p, 72.
(8) K. Pergler: "Z americke fronit.y naseho osvo'bozenskeho boje.
Nase revoluce.'' Vol. II, pp. 313- 325.
· ·
�44
SLOVAKIA
himself drafted and signed with the American SlOIVruks a
year later. Stefanik approved the program olf the Slovak
Leaigue. With this rupproval he gained the confidence of the
groups considered the most consoovative in the work for
0zecho-1Slovalk independence. Of this Benes writes : "The
meeting with the Slovak priests was very important because
at this meeting Stefanilk dispelled all sm,iprcion and unwillingness of the priests as regards the, movement for independence with which the drive for funds olf the Slovak
League was strengthened (9).
Because of his deli1cate health Stefanik did not ma:ke
many public appearances but when he did speak, he succeeded in maJking a deep impression upon his listeners. He
spoke in Slovak and in 0zech a:nd sometimes passed from
one language, into another in the same speech. He gained
the confidence of the 'Peorple by his enthusia,s m and his fascinating manner as well as with his firm and uncompromising atti1mde towards all righteous demands.
In addition to the aJbove mentioned meetings, Stefanik
met with the presidents of t!he Slovruk and 0zech organizations on July 1, 1917, in New Yo.rik where tihe misunderstaniling with Ho.nky pertaining to the Durich affaiT in Russia came to the forefront. Horiky especially critidzed Benes
whom Stefarui,k defended, stating that he himself directed
everything in Russia and Horky, therefore, should turn to
him. On July 24 Stef2.ni1k received a deputation of Slovaks
headed by Milan Getting w,ho later became the OzeichoSlo,v ak consul in Pittsburgh. On August 13 he was present
at a meeting of 0zecho-.Slovak artists and in Seipte.miber he
addressed the Cooch and SlovaJk women orf New Yo'I'ik.
Between the 16th and 18th of October a large meeting
was held in Chicago• at which the ques,t!ion cxf rooruiting was
considered. Proceedings at this meeting were somewhat agitated since voices of t!hose who feared the final success
of the military m01Vement were raised against Stefanik. A
Owcho-Slo,valk mHitary committee was formed in order that
the recruiting could proceed in an o:r,g,anized manner. Both
(9) Edward Benes: "Sveto'Vii. vii.lka a nase revoluce."
�45
SLOVAKIA
Protestant and Catholic Ozechs and Sloivaks were r1~pre:sented in the Committee (10).
After this meeting recruiting was begun by a proclamation for mdbilization by Stefaruk, coached in classical
terms. Stefani1k also issued instnuiotions for the CzechoSlova!k soldiers in America. He divided the country into
four districts, each with a separate reporter to which position the following were appointed: Milan Geitting, Gustav
Kosik and su!b-;reporter Ivan Gess:a,y; J. Cermak and subreporter J. Tvr.z ioky; J. Stra;ka and swb-reporteir Vojta Benes. This plan, written under the impression of the Chicago
comereTIJce, though not essentila:lly changed, had to be adjusted to existing conditions when the time came for actual
work. For reasons already ex,plained the recruiting was not
as successifiul as Stefanik haid hoped it would be. Despite all
efforts the number of volunteers was not quite 2,500
men (11).
Of great importance was the demonstration meeting
held in Carnegie Hall in New York whl ch SterfanjJk arranged
for September 1'6. Because of his friendship for Stefaruk,
Fran:kHn...Bouillon accepted the in,Vitation to be the principal spea;ker just before his return to France as Minister
of Bropaganda in the caJbinet of Painleve. John P. Mitchell,
the may;or of New Yol'lk presided. This meeting, at which
the repre,sen!batives of the Ailied armies were present, had a
consideraible pro1p aganda significance since it broke the ice
of indifference of American journalists. Franklin-Bouillon,
who spdke in E':nglish, addressed the men of the "CzechoSlovak" nation and appealed to t:hem to join the Legion. He
was the first influential sitatesman who pulblicly voiced the
dismemberment of Austria~Hungary. This statement of
Franklin-Bouillon created a sensation in Amer1can political
circles; (12).
1
In order to facilitate contaict between our groups and
government officials, Stefanik changed the Slav Press Bu(10) Vojta Benes: "Nase revoluce." Vol. II, PP. 46-49.
(11) K. Pergler: "Nase revoluce." Vol. II ,p. 321.
(12) Ar. Bares: "Stefanikuv memorial," p_ · 36.
�46
SLOVAKIA
reau, originally formed as a bureau of propaganda, into a
branch of the Czecho-.Slo,v ak National Committee. He gave
the authority to deal in political matters to Charles Pergler. Stefanik thus sucoeeded in realizing his pre-,war dream.
of gaining his American countrymen in an armed r~bellion
against Austria-Hungary although, in truth, not to the extent he had hoped for. Having completed his. worlk in Ame'l'ica he again turned his efforts and energies toward Europe
where much still remained to be done.
At the request presented on Octolber 14, 1917, to the
War Ministry by General Vignal oif Washington in which he
reported that Stefanik had aJbout completed his mission,
Stefanik was granted permission to return to France. In
November, Vignal telegraphed that Stefani!k would return
with the first transport of Czecho""Slorvak troo'Ps and that
he would be. free to organize the Czechs in France. In his
reports to the Minister of Wa~, Vignal highly praised Stefaniik's work in America. I quote from the tefogirams sent
on November 5 and December 5:
"He proved to posse,s s the highest degree of tact, disciipline and sense :for orga.n ization. His pel'.'.sonal influence
in all matters was such that no mis'OOderstanding arose during his stay and all the Cz~~h groll!ps followed his directions. . . . I aim not aJble to praise suffi~iently this great
patriot, coolheaded and insipi:red 'by the most honest and
highest feelings. F'ull of taot and wisdom, he gained the
sympathies of the highest officials of the American Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and he o:rganized with the greatest success the re:cnciting oif the Czecho-SlovaJks (13).
Acc,o rding to Benes, Steifaniik :returned to Paris on Novemiber 16 whe:re he con;tinued in his wor,k of organizing
the Czecho ...Slovak army.
•
Editor's Note: Today it is customar;y even for the
Ozechs and so--called "Ozechoslovaks" to cl'aim and acclaim
Stefanik But Stefanik was not a Czech, nor a "Orechoslovia:k" (a SlO'VaJk in the pay of the Czoohs), but a true
Slovak paitriot. Had he lived, Stefanik undou!btedly would
(13) From the "Fren,oh Military Archives."
�SLOVAKIA
47
have fought for the liberation. of his people from all alien
tyranny, including the Czech brand as represented by T. G.
Masaryk an.d Benes. S,lo,vaJks eveTywhere commemorate May
4th as Stefani'k Day, because it was on May 4, 1919, that
their beloved wair hero crashed to his death in a plaine which
was "a~cidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison at Vajnory, Slovakia. Many Slovaiks even todiay will tell you 1:!hat
Stefanik haid to die, because he never consented to his Slovakiia being a colony o,£ the imperialistic Czechs led by T. G.
Masarylk and Benes. On May 4, 1954, Slova,ks everywhere
will recall: "it was 35 yeaI'S ago thait Stefarnk was killed by
the men who resented his warnings rugainst Bolshevism.
"
•
•
•
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
GOLDILOCKS
Once UlpOn a time there was a very poor blacksmith.
At one time 'he fared weH, but then hard times struck, he
had little work to do., and his wiife and small children were
always hungry. Finally he lost everything; at hOlme he had
not!hing left but seven ,pennies. His undernourished children
cried constantly for something to eat until the blacksmith
could stand it no longer. In his despair he boU!ght a rope
witlh his last seven ,p ennies and started out for the hills to
end it all.
When he came into the hills, he sought out a stout
branch on a mighty tree to which he fixed the roipe. As the
bla;cksmith was a;bout to tie the rope albout his neck, a
,pretty black maiden suddenly appeared .b efore him and
pleaded wHJh him not to hang himself, 1b ecause that was not
a nice thing to do and, then, it was also a sin. The b,lacksmith was stunned when the black maiden disappeared into
the nowhere whence she had come. As he waliked along, his
mind wandered baok home where misery and want ruled and
again he became despondent. U!P went his rope onto another
stout ,h ranch. .&gain the blaJCk maiden s,uddemy appeaired
out of the blue and begged him not to commit such an ugly
deed. In a quadary, the blactksmith shoo'k his head, bwt
said nothing. He did not throw away his rope, but stood
�
SLOVAKIA
33
MILAN RASTISLAV STEFA.NIK
Stephanie 0. Husek
This year mar,ks the thirty-sixth anniversary of two
events which considerwbly changed the national developmeint
of the Slo:vaJks both here and abroad.
On May 30, 1918, the Pittsibwgh Pact was drawn up
and on Noveimlber 14 was signed by Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, then President ad: the 0zecho-iSlo1V1ak Republic. This
Slovruk Magna Carta suimmarirzed Sloivak rights in the newly fomied state amd formed the platform of the Slova;,k
People's Party, the largest Slovalk political party in pre..war
Cz~ho-Slova1da.
On 0ctolber 28, 1918, the independence ad: 0zeeho--iSlovakia was pro:claimed and a new era oJf national development
began for fue Slovak and Czech nations.
Both these events were the result of the Czecho..,Slovak Relbellion, both at home and beyond the ,bo'UJildaries oif
the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. SlOIVaks and Czechs, no
matter where they lived, joined in the struggle for independence and each groUJp contributed towaTds gaining the
final victory. The cond'Ulot of the reibellion lay in the hands
of the National 0zecho-1Slov.aik Committee in Paris of whicih
Thomas G. Masaryk was president, Edward Benes secretairy,
and Milan Rastislav Ste!anik represented the Sloivaks.
No single factor carried so much weight with the Allies
in favor of an independent Czecho-Slo,va.'kia as the organization and later suiocesses of the independent Czecllo.-B1ovalk
Army. It was the a'I'!my which proved that the Sloivaks and
Czechs were will.mg to, make the swpreme sacrifice in order
that they and their children might liive independenrtl:y. It is
to the glory of the Sl01Va,ks that the formation and organization of this army was the tfuought and wonk of Milan Rastislav Stefan.ilk who later ,b ecame the first Minister of War
ill1 the Czecho-,Slova,k State.
The movement for Czecho-Sloivalk independence was not
begun at the ourt:Jbreruk -of the Wax. Years before, both individuals and organized giroups sought to alleviate conditions
�34
SLOVAKIA
existing in the Austro-HUI11garian Kingdom. Stefaniik already dreamed of an in.d.€4)00.dent Slovakia in 1914 when he
arrived in F1rance as a young astronomer, soon to gain prominence there and become a memiber of the French A~adem.y. No ocicasion arose which Sted:anik d.i:d not use to acquaint those in influenice with Hu1nga,r.ian tyranny and to
gain sympathy for the oppressed Slo;vruk nation.
As soon as Austria dec1ared war on .Serbia, Stefaniik
left Morocco, where he was engaged in astronomical observation, and returned to France. He joined the French Air
Cor,ps in. January 191'5 and in March requested to be sent
to Serbia. Having no contact as yet with Miresruryk, not even
familiair with the latter's plans, he already thought of organh:ing a ~arate corps c_o nsisting of t.he ~ruvs fighting
aigainst thefr convictions on the enemy,..s side and being
gradually ooncoort~a;ted in prison camps. Due .t o, the Serbian
retreat whii!ch began one day before Stefanik's arri;val in
SeI'lbia, the thought of organizing this corps had to be
abandoned.
But Stefanik renewed his worlk upon his return to Paris where he became assOICiarted with Thomas G. Masacyk
and Dr. ffidlward Benes: Soon the nucleus of the Ozeoho-,Slovak Legion was orgamzed in France and Stefruni,k extended
his work to inlclude Rm.ssia, the United States, and Italy;
in fact, aJ1l countries where Czechs and Sfovruk,s were to be
found, either in prison camps OT as settlers.
Thus, from Jrtill,,y 1916 until Mairch 1917 he was in
Russia. While the.re he made a trip to Roucrnania. After returning from Russia he crume to. the United States, returned
to France and then went to litaly. He met wirth many diftfioulties in organizing the Legion. Nevertheless, he succeeded
i:n winning the. permission of government authorities and 'i n
persuading moo to join.
1n the work orf Q!I'ganiizing the army Stefan:iik also did
mooh to gain the sympartihy orf Allied statesmen and men
ranking high in goiveirnment and military cincles and to
convm:ce those with whom he came into contact of the necessity of breaking up the Austro-Hungaria:n Kingdom.
Milan Rastislav Stefanik did much more- foir gaining
�35
SLOVAKIA
the independeince of Czetjio-Slovaikia than he is credited
with doing. Benes and Ma:saryk boith wrote an account of
the mOfVement for independence and tihe part which each
played in it. Stefan.ilk, run.fortunately, was not given this
O!plpOrtunity. But even from the sketchy references to his
wo'l1k and the Sl1mprisingly meagre sources avaHaJble to the
hisrtorian of today, it is dearly evident that in cowa:ge, in
scl!f-saicrifice, in tact and wbility in diplomacy, in integrity,
and in zeal for the ca:use of freedom of his people, he was
not SUI'lpassed by anyone of the leaders in the OzeichoSlovaJk movement for independence .
•
•
•
•
Stefanilk had exaggeirated hopes of his success in America. As stated in his report to the French Ministcy o!f Foreign Affairs, he 1b el ieved that they would gain around
20,000 volunteers for the Ozecho-,Slovruk Legion. It is not
definitely known where he got his information, but there
were many Czechs and Slovaks in America who cherished
the same ho,pe and Stefaruk was certainly inforrmed b~ some
of them. In the official newspaper of tihe First Catholic
Slovak Union the "Jednota," it was estimated that if only
ten per cent of the male memlbers of the Slo1va,k organizations joined the Czeicho-Slo:vak army, there would be 15,140
Slovak vnlunteers. One Slo,va'k reported to Steifani!k that
among the Slovaks alone 25,000 ,volunteers could be, expected 0). Joseph 'Dvirziieky, Seciretary of the Ozech National
Society in America, was also one of those, who, during the
entire caimpaiign, added to Stef8iruk's optimism(2).
The work of tile Poles at the same time and in the
same direction facilitated Steifaniik's mission. O:n the other
hand, America's entraJnce info the World War changed conditions existing here which were not favoraJble. Many American Czechs and Slorvarks joined the Canadian army e,ven
beforre the United Staites entered the War and forty thousand Ozechs and SkwaJks joined the Amer.iJcaJD. 8!Imy in
1917 (3). The American government itself placed certain
1
(1) Karol Pergler: "Z ame1ic.ke fron.ty a naseho osvobozenskeho
boje_ - Nase revoluce." Vol II, p. 318.
(2) "Nase revoluce.." Vol. 1,1, P. 325.
(3) Ibid. p. 325.
�36
SLOVAKIA
obstacles which made the fu1fillment of Stefani:k's mission
more difficult. On the grounds that if special concessioo.s
were granted the Czechs and Slovaiks othe,r nationality
grOUJps would make. similar requests, the government was
relUICtant to girve permission for recruiting soldiers for the
Czecho~Slov~ Airmy in F1rance.
America's entrance into the War was looked wpon by
many groiups as an opportunity to be exploited toward the
realimtion of their aim Olf corrnpletel,y Americanirzing the
foreign national~ty groups living here. It presented an oppoI1tunity to unite all immigrants undeir one motto and for
one ideal. America was to enter the Wax as one consolidated nation fighting a;gainst a single enemy. To add to
the difrfic,u1ties, a mo;vement was started by Senator Hitchcoc,k of Nebraska to form a spe'cial Shw conps similar to the
Foreign Legion of France. This was oontrary to the wishes
and plans of General Stefanik and the Ozecho,-SlovaJk National Committee. Had it succeeded, the influence and the
opportunity of the Czechs and Slovaks to aJCt independently
would hruve been greatly minimized.
IF'inally, it is impossible not to mention the large German and Austro-Hiung arian grolliPS who distributed pamphlets and used various other meains to carry on a continuous
propaganda against the leaders Olf the Allied nations and
against their appeals. Much time and effort was expended
by Slovak national leaders to disclose these intrigues and to
offset their effects. In March 1915 the German government aippealed to the America.n people not to manufacture
powder shraipnels, and other arms, stating that this was
ag:ainst the honoir of the American people and against the
integrity of the nation; that it was neicessary to show
once and for all that such things could not be bought with
money dipped in human blood Even before this, Germany
had sent an appeal to America, addressed to prominent
men, in which she defended her position in the war, related
the wrongs committed on her and denied all responsibility
for the acts to which Ger,many had .b een forced (4). It is
small wonder that this German propaganda gained ground
(4) Karol Sidor: " Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji," pp, 44-4ii.
�SLOVAKIA
37
in Ameri~. There were many Gernnan imrmgranits and EWen
more citizens of Ger.rnan descent, financiaNy well estaJblished, who were sentimentally sympathetic to their native
land.
Edward Benes, as Secretary of the National Committee,
requested the French goivernment to entrust Stefanik with
the mission to deal with the American authorities for permission to. organize volunteers among the Ozechs and Slovaks for the army in France. The consent of Rebprt, ::Mlinister
of Foreign Alffairs, was gained uh.rough Philip Berthelot and
permission from the Ministry ad: Wiar was received, through
the inter1cession of Franklirn--Bouillon, directly f.rom Minister
PainlEWe with whOim both Benes and Stefanik were on good
terms. Thi'S perunission was granted while Stefanik was still
in Russia but he IPostjponed the trip in order to. complete his
work in Roumania where he gained 1000 prisoners for the
Czecho-SloiV'a'k army. The order for the j()IUJI'ney commissioning Stefanik wifu a special mission in the United States
was issued May 20, 1917 and he arrived in America the following month. Before Stefamk's departure,. however, the
French Government had aliready sent a spe:cial political commission headed 'by FrankJin-1Bouillon to gain the permission of the United States for recruiting volunteers. among
the immigrants for Slav national arunies in France. This
mission of F:raniklin-Bo:uillin, as well as his personal aid in
the Czec<ho.-1Slova:k wrmy question, greatly helped Stefa.Mk.
Stefanik qumkly adjusted himself to the conditions
brougihrt rubout by America's entrance into the war and
through the French Arrnlbassado•r , Jussocand, immediately
contacted the go;vernment offfuia1s in Washington. He had a
short 'but successif:ul conference with Lansing during which
he also presented: him with a;n expression of loyalty of the
Ozechs and 'Sloivruks to the United Srtates of Ameri~. Wirth
the aid of the Frenlch Commissioner A. Tardieu, the French
Mi•n ister Jussevam.d, and Franldin.J3ou:illon Stefan:iik gained
his object and the Arrnerican government granted pemnission to al[ Czechs and SlovaJks not subject to military duty
in the Am.errean M1IDY to join the Ozecho-,S1ovak Legion in
France. On August 4, he already report.ea to his friends in
�38
SLOVAKIA
New Yorlc th~t he had received this perrmss1on and that
4,000 men oOIU!ld be sent to the French military school. After
permission for recruiting was granted, negotiatiOllls were
begun for the transipwtatio n of the Czec:ho-Sl'OVa;k soldiers
to France and for obtaining the financial means necessary
to keep them concentrated in camps in New Yonk and Boston where they awaited their depar-ture. Oonsideration
was also given to the question of SU!pporting families deprived of wa;ge erurner,s and, later, to ca;ses of widowed
wives Mld or,phaned children.
In October, Stefanik uncovered some Austro-Hunga rian
intdgues in Washing.ton. A telegram had been sent to Tardieu fram Paris suggesting that, due to difficulties in transportation, the Poles should be sent to France finst and the
transpovtatio n of the Ozecho ..Slovak soldiers shO!Uld be postponed for a few months. Stefanik suicceede.d in defeating
this attempt by uncovering its moUves and, on the basis of
this 1nfoI1Ination, Tardieu telegraphed to his swperiors that
the posbponemen t of the transport of the Ozecho-SlOIVak
soldiers would mean the breaking of a promise and that he
would have no part i.in such a disho:noraJble act (15). Other
difficulties arose in the matterr of transporting trooips; fifty
Czech and Slovak soldiers were detained in New Yonk in
Decem~ because no exceptions were made foir Czechs and
Slovaiks in the instructions sent by the American governmeil!t cOillCerniing kuistro-Hung arian su!bjects. At the intervention O(f the French Ambassador and of General Vignal
this maJtter was also straightened out.
Steifan:ik contacted American joUTrralists and wrote
several articles on the cause for· the newsprupers. He aroused
the interest orf F. H. Allen ("World"), Go,rdo:n Srruth am'd, at
a dinner given in his honor on J,u ly 23 in New York, he
gained the swpport of "The New Repu!blic." Stefanik used
these oontaots for propaganda purposes. Early in September
the "World" carried a long article on the Czecho~Slovak
movement written by Stefanik and Pisecky and an account
of the Battle of Halie by Stefani~ appeared later in Chicago
news,paipers.
(5) Karol Pergler : "Nase revolnce." Vol. II, p. 319 .
�SLOVAKIA
39
Although Stefanik did not entirely trurst Wilson and
did not rugree with his views, he ,g ained the good will of
the ever popular Theodore Rooseivelit and of representative
Frank L. Polle, who devoted much consideration to the
Ozecho-4Slovak question when he later headed the American
delegation at the Peace Oonrference after Lansing's departure from Paris.
It is generally conceded that Stefanik achieved his
greatest success in America by seicuring the cooperation of
the Czechs and Slovaks in the Czecho-Slovak movement.
Pisec'ky writes: "Stefanik did most in the United States in
that he succeeded in convincing the Sloiva.ks of the necessity
and the horrorableness of the Czecho-SlOIVak rebeU.ion, that
he succeeded in paralyiZing autonomistic and opportunistic
UJpshoots of persons of the character of Daxner, Bielelk,
Panilmch and others and gained them for the common advance with the Czechs (6) . From this statement one could
infer that the American Slo:va.ks resisted the movement for
freedom. On the contrary, it was the Slovaiks who, with a
few exceptions, first brought UJP the question of freedom
from the Hungarian yoke, and who, long before the war,
had organized to gaiin recognition of Slo:vak national rights.
The Slovak League was founded in 1907 for the punpose of
supporting and helping national leaders in the old country.
In the year 1910 it requested the U. S. Census officials to
list Slovaks, not as immigrants from Ausitria-iH kmgary, but
according to their native, tongue.
B efore the outbreak of the war, at the beginning o:f the
year 1914, a memorandum, signed by representatives of 21
organizations, 23 newspaipers, by many Catholic priests
and Protestant ministe,ns, was printed. in five languages in
addition to English This memorandum, sent to i:nflmmtial
diP'lomats and statesmen, descrilbed the sufferings of the
Slova.l{s under Hungarian tyranny and demanded in the
name o:f justice and humanity that Slovaks be given the
rights which were ri!ghtfully tlheirs. Slovalk journalists and
national leaders forll!ght unremittingly through newsprupers
and brosuires against Austro,-,H ungarian and German propa(6) Ferdinand Pisecky: "M. R. i§tefanik," p . 81.
�40
SLOVAKIA
ganda. Moreover, they aided financially. Already in 1914
the Slov:aJk League started a Million Dollar Drive, the proceeds of which were to go to the sw£fering and war-,impoverished Slovaks a,broa<l. When their fellow SlaJVs, the Seribians,
were fortced to retreat bef-ore the enemy in the winter of
1915 and felt hearvi1y t:he weight of defeat, the American
Slova,ks rallied to their swpport. In a movement Which they
themselrves financed they obtained more than a hundred
Slovak priJsoners from prison crumps in Canada.
Even from this very ibrieif sketch it is evident that the
Slovaks in America were, from the very beginning, fully
aware and prepared to ma,ke the most of the opportunities
which the World Wax presented. They were well on their
way in their wo11k for the Slovaks when the Ozecho-{Slovruk
National Committee, headed by Masarytk, asked them for
their cooperation.
In rerviewing the rclations of the Ozechs and Slovaks in
the early yea11s of t:he war, one lll/U!st bear in mind foat the
creation of the Ozecho-,Slorva;k State was not a sine qua non
for the realization of natitonal and cultural independ~e
for the Slovruks. Neither were the Allied states determined
at the beginning, upon the, dismem1be11ment oif the AustroHUil'garian Kingdom. The brea;k up of Austr.ia-HW11gary
evo1ved from later dervefopments , and the Slo'V'ak1s seriously
weighed all possilbilities beiforn deciding to cast their lot
with the Ozechs. Dm-ing this period of indecision only one
thing was cemain, that is, no matter under what form of
government, no maitter with whom ailied, Slovak national
autonomy had to be g,uiairanteed.
In an open letter, pwbli'shed in the "Jednota," December 9, 19'14, Allbert Mamafoy, president of the Slovak
Lea•g ue, wrote: "The American Czechs turned to me, as president of the Siov,aJk Lerugue, regarddng the Sltland that the
Slovaks wish to taJke in this critical situation. . . . I answered that (ruocording to my convictions) we Slovaks
would demand sclf-i:m1e, regardless of the tyipe of government to which we would belong as a result of this war,
whether we would lwe UJI1der a Russian, or whether we
would be left in old Hungary, (should it remain intact), or
�SLOVAKIA
41
whether we would be pla,ced in the Ozecho-!Slo!Wlk State,
which the Ozechs hoped would :be formed. In my opinion,
we S1ovaks must demand ruutonomy from whomsoever we
must, whether fiiom Hwrugary or Russia, or from the hoped.for Czech state. And whosoever should get us, irf peaice be
desired in the counitry, care must be truken that our demands
be satisfied."
Reporting on the proceedings of the Congress of the
Slovak LeaJgue, held in Pittsburgh, Fe!brua:riy 22, 1915,
Joseph Huse'k, editor of the "Jednota," wrote in the March
3rd issue of that year: "One Czech acoused us of hating the
Czechs. Thi1s is not true. We love our closest brother. Lf only
they loved us as much as we love them. But to date, they
have not given us any proof orf this. If matt~s sholl!ld lead
to a change in the ,p olitical and governmental form of
Austria-iHlwrngary, irf a federation will be formed composed
of Bohemia, Moraivia, Silesia, and Slovll!kia, we will be satisfied. I:f they give us complete independence,, we ,vill. 1be sa,tis,.
fied, rund, irf this later should not justify itself there will be
time enough to joiin ourselves politically and gOivern.meintally
more closely with the Bohemians and the Momv,i ans. However, if such a radical change does no,t ta:ke place after the
war and we should 0/Illy be guaranteed independence within
the limits of the Martin De:clairation, we will hiwe to be
satisfied. Erven that woruld be a great concession. When we
sha:H have our sc!hools, when we shall be master in our districrts, when we shall also hme representati1Ves, comparable
to our nll!mbers, in parliament and a guarantee of free, ind~endent industrial development, we will not lose ourselrves.
The rest we will then win by our own strength." And, agai~,
in an article entitled "With the Czechs or Without the
Ozechs," printed on March 24: "We are sincere and we e:m-phaisize again and again that we are supporteiI's. of the
movement which aims to cu1tirv,a te Czecho-Slovak re:c1procity. But the reciprocity for whk,h we are so zealously working mrust be founded upon complete equality of rig1hts and
equal value as pem;ains to our national, economic, and cuiltural interests."
The first attempt to bring the Czechs and ,Slovaks to-
�42
SLOVAKIA
gether in America occurred in 1916. At the suggestion of
Joseph Tvrzidky, Secretary of the Czech National Society,
who was sUJm.rmoned to twke this step by Masaryk, a meeting
of the Czech Society and of the Slo.vaik League was called
at Cleveland, Ohio. On October 25, 191·5, a pact, proposed
and written by Tvrzic:ky, was w0cepted. The conditions under which the SlovaJks were to accept cooperation with the
Czechs were summari·z ed in this pact. Nati0J1.al autonomy of
S1av8Jkia with an independent parliament, an independent
state administration, and free oulrtusrial deveiloipment were
guaranrteed. These demands were not the princi,p les Olf indi,vidiual autonormistic groups. This was the platiform of all
American Slovaks, with very few exceptions, and the considerations under which they entered the struggle,; the aims
they wanted to reali-ze. The extent to which the Slovaks and
Czechs in America did not surcceed in reaching a colill'plete
unde11standi.ng was deter.mined by the degree in which the
American Czechs and the National Ozecho-;Slovak Committee deflected from these prmciples.
Thus the Pact Olf Kiev, although signed by the representative of 1:Jhe Slova/k League, Gustav Kosik, incited consteirn:ation armong the American Slovaiks because it referred
to "Ozecho,slova,ks," as an ethnic entity - a term not ac~ted by them. In li:ke manner, the newspaper "Czeichosloviak" was not warunly received. There were those among
the Slovak leadeirs who, from the ve:r'Y beginning, opposed
the use of the woro "Ozechoslo~ak" even in diplomatic
agreements, holding to the opinion that the Sl~a!ks Sihould
stand as an independent nation.
The Parisian Czecho-,Slovak National Committee was
looked lllpon wirth Sll!Slpicion by the Catho1ics who were uncertain of the status of religion in the, new state. These
suspidoi!liSi, however, were not so strong that they could not
be eliminated, and Masaryk himself, when he late:r came to
Ameri1ca, quieted the Catholic Slovaks by his promise that
there would be complete religious freedom in Ozecho-,Slova'kia.
On July 1, 1917, Stefanik ar.ranged a meeting with
the Slovaks and the Ozechs at the Congress Hall Hotel in
�SLOVAKIA
43
Washington at which the following were present: Dr.
Fisher, President of the Czech Nrutional Society; Albert
Ma:matey, President of the Slova:k -Leag,ue; Emil Voska,
ChaJrles Pergler, Dr. HrcHicika, Ivan Daxner, Iivan Bielek,
and Ferdinad Pisecky. Stefani:k reported on conditions in
Russia, 'but the main object of the meeting was to arrange
for a mihtary o,r ga:nization and the cooipeTation of the
Czechs and Slwaws. At this meeting Daxner raised the
Czeicho-iS1ov,aJk question . .Aigainst his SO-!Called "aurtonomistic attibude" Stefani.ik emphaSlized the necessity of forming
a politically inseparaJble state and not an ethnographically
insepamble one (7).
Con:cerning Stefani•k 's opinion relatirve to the Czechoslovak question and, especially, his oipimon as expressed in his
dealings with the American .Slovaks, Poogler asse:rlts: "NaturaUy, the represerntatives of the Slova:k organiJZations of
the foturre Czecho-tSlovak state often came to Stefanik.
Stefanik al.ways insisted that it was the ooncern of the nation at hoime, that it alone must decide concerning its future
origani1zrution, in short, that it is impossible to dictate firom
beyond the bo~ders of the country and that every such ruttempt wou1d be futile Whenever the question of Sloivak
autonomy aI'ose, he decidedly pointed out, that no guarantees could be demanded £ro:m those living outside of the new
state" (8).
But even if we should aioceipt this untoo•a ble position, it
is impossilble to deny the fact that Stefanik, although he
gave no written priomise, did reach an agreement with the
America,n Slovaks and succeeded in gaining t'heir cooperation with the .American Cze~hs witlhouit the Slovaks relinquishing their demands. This was pr01Ved at the mooting
held in New YoI'k, SeptembeT 20; 1914, where American
Slovak priests were present with Stefanik and at which a
resolution was a:doipted, stating that they stand on the platform orf the SlovaJk League. The pvograim of the Slovak
League was the Cleveland Pact, tlhe · principles of whioh
were incorporated into the Pittsburgh Pact which Masariyik
(7) Ferdinand Pisecky: "M. R. S.teJanik," p, 72.
(8) K. Pergler: "Z americke fronit.y naseho osvo'bozenskeho boje.
Nase revoluce.'' Vol. II, pp. 313- 325.
· ·
�44
SLOVAKIA
himself drafted and signed with the American SlOIVruks a
year later. Stefanik approved the program olf the Slovak
Leaigue. With this rupproval he gained the confidence of the
groups considered the most consoovative in the work for
0zecho-1Slovalk independence. Of this Benes writes : "The
meeting with the Slovak priests was very important because
at this meeting Stefanilk dispelled all sm,iprcion and unwillingness of the priests as regards the, movement for independence with which the drive for funds olf the Slovak
League was strengthened (9).
Because of his deli1cate health Stefanik did not ma:ke
many public appearances but when he did speak, he succeeded in maJking a deep impression upon his listeners. He
spoke in Slovak and in 0zech a:nd sometimes passed from
one language, into another in the same speech. He gained
the confidence of the 'Peorple by his enthusia,s m and his fascinating manner as well as with his firm and uncompromising atti1mde towards all righteous demands.
In addition to the aJbove mentioned meetings, Stefanik
met with the presidents of t!he Slovruk and 0zech organizations on July 1, 1917, in New Yo.rik where tihe misunderstaniling with Ho.nky pertaining to the Durich affaiT in Russia came to the forefront. Horiky especially critidzed Benes
whom Stefarui,k defended, stating that he himself directed
everything in Russia and Horky, therefore, should turn to
him. On July 24 Stef2.ni1k received a deputation of Slovaks
headed by Milan Getting w,ho later became the OzeichoSlo,v ak consul in Pittsburgh. On August 13 he was present
at a meeting of 0zecho-.Slovak artists and in Seipte.miber he
addressed the Cooch and SlovaJk women orf New Yo'I'ik.
Between the 16th and 18th of October a large meeting
was held in Chicago• at which the ques,t!ion cxf rooruiting was
considered. Proceedings at this meeting were somewhat agitated since voices of t!hose who feared the final success
of the military m01Vement were raised against Stefanik. A
Owcho-Slo,valk mHitary committee was formed in order that
the recruiting could proceed in an o:r,g,anized manner. Both
(9) Edward Benes: "Sveto'Vii. vii.lka a nase revoluce."
�45
SLOVAKIA
Protestant and Catholic Ozechs and Sloivaks were r1~pre:sented in the Committee (10).
After this meeting recruiting was begun by a proclamation for mdbilization by Stefaruk, coached in classical
terms. Stefani1k also issued instnuiotions for the CzechoSlova!k soldiers in America. He divided the country into
four districts, each with a separate reporter to which position the following were appointed: Milan Geitting, Gustav
Kosik and su!b-;reporter Ivan Gess:a,y; J. Cermak and subreporter J. Tvr.z ioky; J. Stra;ka and swb-reporteir Vojta Benes. This plan, written under the impression of the Chicago
comereTIJce, though not essentila:lly changed, had to be adjusted to existing conditions when the time came for actual
work. For reasons already ex,plained the recruiting was not
as successifiul as Stefanik haid hoped it would be. Despite all
efforts the number of volunteers was not quite 2,500
men (11).
Of great importance was the demonstration meeting
held in Carnegie Hall in New York whl ch SterfanjJk arranged
for September 1'6. Because of his friendship for Stefaruk,
Fran:kHn...Bouillon accepted the in,Vitation to be the principal spea;ker just before his return to France as Minister
of Bropaganda in the caJbinet of Painleve. John P. Mitchell,
the may;or of New Yol'lk presided. This meeting, at which
the repre,sen!batives of the Ailied armies were present, had a
consideraible pro1p aganda significance since it broke the ice
of indifference of American journalists. Franklin-Bouillon,
who spdke in E':nglish, addressed the men of the "CzechoSlovak" nation and appealed to t:hem to join the Legion. He
was the first influential sitatesman who pulblicly voiced the
dismemberment of Austria~Hungary. This statement of
Franklin-Bouillon created a sensation in Amer1can political
circles; (12).
1
In order to facilitate contaict between our groups and
government officials, Stefanik changed the Slav Press Bu(10) Vojta Benes: "Nase revoluce." Vol. II, PP. 46-49.
(11) K. Pergler: "Nase revoluce." Vol. II ,p. 321.
(12) Ar. Bares: "Stefanikuv memorial," p_ · 36.
�46
SLOVAKIA
reau, originally formed as a bureau of propaganda, into a
branch of the Czecho-.Slo,v ak National Committee. He gave
the authority to deal in political matters to Charles Pergler. Stefanik thus sucoeeded in realizing his pre-,war dream.
of gaining his American countrymen in an armed r~bellion
against Austria-Hungary although, in truth, not to the extent he had hoped for. Having completed his. worlk in Ame'l'ica he again turned his efforts and energies toward Europe
where much still remained to be done.
At the request presented on Octolber 14, 1917, to the
War Ministry by General Vignal oif Washington in which he
reported that Stefanik had aJbout completed his mission,
Stefanik was granted permission to return to France. In
November, Vignal telegraphed that Stefani!k would return
with the first transport of Czecho""Slorvak troo'Ps and that
he would be. free to organize the Czechs in France. In his
reports to the Minister of Wa~, Vignal highly praised Stefaniik's work in America. I quote from the tefogirams sent
on November 5 and December 5:
"He proved to posse,s s the highest degree of tact, disciipline and sense :for orga.n ization. His pel'.'.sonal influence
in all matters was such that no mis'OOderstanding arose during his stay and all the Cz~~h groll!ps followed his directions. . . . I aim not aJble to praise suffi~iently this great
patriot, coolheaded and insipi:red 'by the most honest and
highest feelings. F'ull of taot and wisdom, he gained the
sympathies of the highest officials of the American Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and he o:rganized with the greatest success the re:cnciting oif the Czecho-SlovaJks (13).
Acc,o rding to Benes, Steifaniik :returned to Paris on Novemiber 16 whe:re he con;tinued in his wor,k of organizing
the Czecho ...Slovak army.
•
Editor's Note: Today it is customar;y even for the
Ozechs and so--called "Ozechoslovaks" to cl'aim and acclaim
Stefanik But Stefanik was not a Czech, nor a "Orechoslovia:k" (a SlO'VaJk in the pay of the Czoohs), but a true
Slovak paitriot. Had he lived, Stefanik undou!btedly would
(13) From the "Fren,oh Military Archives."
�SLOVAKIA
47
have fought for the liberation. of his people from all alien
tyranny, including the Czech brand as represented by T. G.
Masaryk an.d Benes. S,lo,vaJks eveTywhere commemorate May
4th as Stefani'k Day, because it was on May 4, 1919, that
their beloved wair hero crashed to his death in a plaine which
was "a~cidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison at Vajnory, Slovakia. Many Slovaiks even todiay will tell you 1:!hat
Stefanik haid to die, because he never consented to his Slovakiia being a colony o,£ the imperialistic Czechs led by T. G.
Masarylk and Benes. On May 4, 1954, Slova,ks everywhere
will recall: "it was 35 yeaI'S ago thait Stefarnk was killed by
the men who resented his warnings rugainst Bolshevism.
"
•
•
•
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
GOLDILOCKS
Once UlpOn a time there was a very poor blacksmith.
At one time 'he fared weH, but then hard times struck, he
had little work to do., and his wiife and small children were
always hungry. Finally he lost everything; at hOlme he had
not!hing left but seven ,pennies. His undernourished children
cried constantly for something to eat until the blacksmith
could stand it no longer. In his despair he boU!ght a rope
witlh his last seven ,p ennies and started out for the hills to
end it all.
When he came into the hills, he sought out a stout
branch on a mighty tree to which he fixed the roipe. As the
bla;cksmith was a;bout to tie the rope albout his neck, a
,pretty black maiden suddenly appeared .b efore him and
pleaded wHJh him not to hang himself, 1b ecause that was not
a nice thing to do and, then, it was also a sin. The b,lacksmith was stunned when the black maiden disappeared into
the nowhere whence she had come. As he waliked along, his
mind wandered baok home where misery and want ruled and
again he became despondent. U!P went his rope onto another
stout ,h ranch. .&gain the blaJCk maiden s,uddemy appeaired
out of the blue and begged him not to commit such an ugly
deed. In a quadary, the blactksmith shoo'k his head, bwt
said nothing. He did not throw away his rope, but stood
�
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1954
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SLOVAKIA
33
MILAN RASTISLAV STEFA.NIK
Stephanie 0. Husek
This year mar,ks the thirty-sixth anniversary of two
events which considerwbly changed the national developmeint
of the Slo:vaJks both here and abroad.
On May 30, 1918, the Pittsibwgh Pact was drawn up
and on Noveimlber 14 was signed by Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, then President ad: the 0zecho-iSlo1V1ak Republic. This
Slovruk Magna Carta suimmarirzed Sloivak rights in the newly fomied state amd formed the platform of the Slova;,k
People's Party, the largest Slovalk political party in pre..war
Cz~ho-Slova1da.
On 0ctolber 28, 1918, the independence ad: 0zeeho--iSlovakia was pro:claimed and a new era oJf national development
began for fue Slovak and Czech nations.
Both these events were the result of the Czecho..,Slovak Relbellion, both at home and beyond the ,bo'UJildaries oif
the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom. SlOIVaks and Czechs, no
matter where they lived, joined in the struggle for independence and each groUJp contributed towaTds gaining the
final victory. The cond'Ulot of the reibellion lay in the hands
of the National 0zecho-1Slov.aik Committee in Paris of whicih
Thomas G. Masaryk was president, Edward Benes secretairy,
and Milan Rastislav Ste!anik represented the Sloivaks.
No single factor carried so much weight with the Allies
in favor of an independent Czecho-Slo,va.'kia as the organization and later suiocesses of the independent Czecllo.-B1ovalk
Army. It was the a'I'!my which proved that the Sloivaks and
Czechs were will.mg to, make the swpreme sacrifice in order
that they and their children might liive independenrtl:y. It is
to the glory of the Sl01Va,ks that the formation and organization of this army was the tfuought and wonk of Milan Rastislav Stefan.ilk who later ,b ecame the first Minister of War
ill1 the Czecho-,Slova,k State.
The movement for Czecho-Sloivalk independence was not
begun at the ourt:Jbreruk -of the Wax. Years before, both individuals and organized giroups sought to alleviate conditions
34
SLOVAKIA
existing in the Austro-HUI11garian Kingdom. Stefaniik already dreamed of an in.d.€4)00.dent Slovakia in 1914 when he
arrived in F1rance as a young astronomer, soon to gain prominence there and become a memiber of the French A~adem.y. No ocicasion arose which Sted:anik d.i:d not use to acquaint those in influenice with Hu1nga,r.ian tyranny and to
gain sympathy for the oppressed Slo;vruk nation.
As soon as Austria dec1ared war on .Serbia, Stefaniik
left Morocco, where he was engaged in astronomical observation, and returned to France. He joined the French Air
Cor,ps in. January 191'5 and in March requested to be sent
to Serbia. Having no contact as yet with Miresruryk, not even
familiair with the latter's plans, he already thought of organh:ing a ~arate corps c_o nsisting of t.he ~ruvs fighting
aigainst thefr convictions on the enemy,..s side and being
gradually ooncoort~a;ted in prison camps. Due .t o, the Serbian
retreat whii!ch began one day before Stefanik's arri;val in
SeI'lbia, the thought of organizing this corps had to be
abandoned.
But Stefanik renewed his worlk upon his return to Paris where he became assOICiarted with Thomas G. Masacyk
and Dr. ffidlward Benes: Soon the nucleus of the Ozeoho-,Slovak Legion was orgamzed in France and Stefruni,k extended
his work to inlclude Rm.ssia, the United States, and Italy;
in fact, aJ1l countries where Czechs and Sfovruk,s were to be
found, either in prison camps OT as settlers.
Thus, from Jrtill,,y 1916 until Mairch 1917 he was in
Russia. While the.re he made a trip to Roucrnania. After returning from Russia he crume to. the United States, returned
to France and then went to litaly. He met wirth many diftfioulties in organizing the Legion. Nevertheless, he succeeded
i:n winning the. permission of government authorities and 'i n
persuading moo to join.
1n the work orf Q!I'ganiizing the army Stefan:iik also did
mooh to gain the sympartihy orf Allied statesmen and men
ranking high in goiveirnment and military cincles and to
convm:ce those with whom he came into contact of the necessity of breaking up the Austro-Hungaria:n Kingdom.
Milan Rastislav Stefanik did much more- foir gaining
35
SLOVAKIA
the independeince of Czetjio-Slovaikia than he is credited
with doing. Benes and Ma:saryk boith wrote an account of
the mOfVement for independence and tihe part which each
played in it. Stefan.ilk, run.fortunately, was not given this
O!plpOrtunity. But even from the sketchy references to his
wo'l1k and the Sl1mprisingly meagre sources avaHaJble to the
hisrtorian of today, it is dearly evident that in cowa:ge, in
scl!f-saicrifice, in tact and wbility in diplomacy, in integrity,
and in zeal for the ca:use of freedom of his people, he was
not SUI'lpassed by anyone of the leaders in the OzeichoSlovaJk movement for independence .
•
•
•
•
Stefanilk had exaggeirated hopes of his success in America. As stated in his report to the French Ministcy o!f Foreign Affairs, he 1b el ieved that they would gain around
20,000 volunteers for the Ozecho-,Slovruk Legion. It is not
definitely known where he got his information, but there
were many Czechs and Slovaks in America who cherished
the same ho,pe and Stefaruk was certainly inforrmed b~ some
of them. In the official newspaper of tihe First Catholic
Slovak Union the "Jednota," it was estimated that if only
ten per cent of the male memlbers of the Slo1va,k organizations joined the Czeicho-Slo:vak army, there would be 15,140
Slovak vnlunteers. One Slo,va'k reported to Steifani!k that
among the Slovaks alone 25,000 ,volunteers could be, expected 0). Joseph 'Dvirziieky, Seciretary of the Ozech National
Society in America, was also one of those, who, during the
entire caimpaiign, added to Stef8iruk's optimism(2).
The work of tile Poles at the same time and in the
same direction facilitated Steifaniik's mission. O:n the other
hand, America's entraJnce info the World War changed conditions existing here which were not favoraJble. Many American Czechs and Slorvarks joined the Canadian army e,ven
beforre the United Staites entered the War and forty thousand Ozechs and SkwaJks joined the Amer.iJcaJD. 8!Imy in
1917 (3). The American government itself placed certain
1
(1) Karol Pergler: "Z ame1ic.ke fron.ty a naseho osvobozenskeho
boje_ - Nase revoluce." Vol II, p. 318.
(2) "Nase revoluce.." Vol. 1,1, P. 325.
(3) Ibid. p. 325.
36
SLOVAKIA
obstacles which made the fu1fillment of Stefani:k's mission
more difficult. On the grounds that if special concessioo.s
were granted the Czechs and Slovaiks othe,r nationality
grOUJps would make. similar requests, the government was
relUICtant to girve permission for recruiting soldiers for the
Czecho~Slov~ Airmy in F1rance.
America's entrance into the War was looked wpon by
many groiups as an opportunity to be exploited toward the
realimtion of their aim Olf corrnpletel,y Americanirzing the
foreign national~ty groups living here. It presented an oppoI1tunity to unite all immigrants undeir one motto and for
one ideal. America was to enter the Wax as one consolidated nation fighting a;gainst a single enemy. To add to
the difrfic,u1ties, a mo;vement was started by Senator Hitchcoc,k of Nebraska to form a spe'cial Shw conps similar to the
Foreign Legion of France. This was oontrary to the wishes
and plans of General Stefanik and the Ozecho,-SlovaJk National Committee. Had it succeeded, the influence and the
opportunity of the Czechs and Slovaks to aJCt independently
would hruve been greatly minimized.
IF'inally, it is impossible not to mention the large German and Austro-Hiung arian grolliPS who distributed pamphlets and used various other meains to carry on a continuous
propaganda against the leaders Olf the Allied nations and
against their appeals. Much time and effort was expended
by Slovak national leaders to disclose these intrigues and to
offset their effects. In March 1915 the German government aippealed to the America.n people not to manufacture
powder shraipnels, and other arms, stating that this was
ag:ainst the honoir of the American people and against the
integrity of the nation; that it was neicessary to show
once and for all that such things could not be bought with
money dipped in human blood Even before this, Germany
had sent an appeal to America, addressed to prominent
men, in which she defended her position in the war, related
the wrongs committed on her and denied all responsibility
for the acts to which Ger,many had .b een forced (4). It is
small wonder that this German propaganda gained ground
(4) Karol Sidor: " Slovaci v zahranicnom odboji," pp, 44-4ii.
SLOVAKIA
37
in Ameri~. There were many Gernnan imrmgranits and EWen
more citizens of Ger.rnan descent, financiaNy well estaJblished, who were sentimentally sympathetic to their native
land.
Edward Benes, as Secretary of the National Committee,
requested the French goivernment to entrust Stefanik with
the mission to deal with the American authorities for permission to. organize volunteers among the Ozechs and Slovaks for the army in France. The consent of Rebprt, ::Mlinister
of Foreign Alffairs, was gained uh.rough Philip Berthelot and
permission from the Ministry ad: Wiar was received, through
the inter1cession of Franklirn--Bouillon, directly f.rom Minister
PainlEWe with whOim both Benes and Stefanik were on good
terms. Thi'S perunission was granted while Stefanik was still
in Russia but he IPostjponed the trip in order to. complete his
work in Roumania where he gained 1000 prisoners for the
Czecho-SloiV'a'k army. The order for the j()IUJI'ney commissioning Stefanik wifu a special mission in the United States
was issued May 20, 1917 and he arrived in America the following month. Before Stefamk's departure,. however, the
French Government had aliready sent a spe:cial political commission headed 'by FrankJin-1Bouillon to gain the permission of the United States for recruiting volunteers. among
the immigrants for Slav national arunies in France. This
mission of F:raniklin-Bo:uillin, as well as his personal aid in
the Czec<ho.-1Slova:k wrmy question, greatly helped Stefa.Mk.
Stefanik qumkly adjusted himself to the conditions
brougihrt rubout by America's entrance into the war and
through the French Arrnlbassado•r , Jussocand, immediately
contacted the go;vernment offfuia1s in Washington. He had a
short 'but successif:ul conference with Lansing during which
he also presented: him with a;n expression of loyalty of the
Ozechs and 'Sloivruks to the United Srtates of Ameri~. Wirth
the aid of the Frenlch Commissioner A. Tardieu, the French
Mi•n ister Jussevam.d, and Franldin.J3ou:illon Stefan:iik gained
his object and the Arrnerican government granted pemnission to al[ Czechs and SlovaJks not subject to military duty
in the Am.errean M1IDY to join the Ozecho-,S1ovak Legion in
France. On August 4, he already report.ea to his friends in
38
SLOVAKIA
New Yorlc th~t he had received this perrmss1on and that
4,000 men oOIU!ld be sent to the French military school. After
permission for recruiting was granted, negotiatiOllls were
begun for the transipwtatio n of the Czec:ho-Sl'OVa;k soldiers
to France and for obtaining the financial means necessary
to keep them concentrated in camps in New Yonk and Boston where they awaited their depar-ture. Oonsideration
was also given to the question of SU!pporting families deprived of wa;ge erurner,s and, later, to ca;ses of widowed
wives Mld or,phaned children.
In October, Stefanik uncovered some Austro-Hunga rian
intdgues in Washing.ton. A telegram had been sent to Tardieu fram Paris suggesting that, due to difficulties in transportation, the Poles should be sent to France finst and the
transpovtatio n of the Ozecho ..Slovak soldiers shO!Uld be postponed for a few months. Stefanik suicceede.d in defeating
this attempt by uncovering its moUves and, on the basis of
this 1nfoI1Ination, Tardieu telegraphed to his swperiors that
the posbponemen t of the transport of the Ozecho-SlOIVak
soldiers would mean the breaking of a promise and that he
would have no part i.in such a disho:noraJble act (15). Other
difficulties arose in the matterr of transporting trooips; fifty
Czech and Slovak soldiers were detained in New Yonk in
Decem~ because no exceptions were made foir Czechs and
Slovaiks in the instructions sent by the American governmeil!t cOillCerniing kuistro-Hung arian su!bjects. At the intervention O(f the French Ambassador and of General Vignal
this maJtter was also straightened out.
Steifan:ik contacted American joUTrralists and wrote
several articles on the cause for· the newsprupers. He aroused
the interest orf F. H. Allen ("World"), Go,rdo:n Srruth am'd, at
a dinner given in his honor on J,u ly 23 in New York, he
gained the swpport of "The New Repu!blic." Stefanik used
these oontaots for propaganda purposes. Early in September
the "World" carried a long article on the Czecho~Slovak
movement written by Stefanik and Pisecky and an account
of the Battle of Halie by Stefani~ appeared later in Chicago
news,paipers.
(5) Karol Pergler : "Nase revolnce." Vol. II, p. 319 .
SLOVAKIA
39
Although Stefanik did not entirely trurst Wilson and
did not rugree with his views, he ,g ained the good will of
the ever popular Theodore Rooseivelit and of representative
Frank L. Polle, who devoted much consideration to the
Ozecho-4Slovak question when he later headed the American
delegation at the Peace Oonrference after Lansing's departure from Paris.
It is generally conceded that Stefanik achieved his
greatest success in America by seicuring the cooperation of
the Czechs and Slovaks in the Czecho-Slovak movement.
Pisec'ky writes: "Stefanik did most in the United States in
that he succeeded in convincing the Sloiva.ks of the necessity
and the horrorableness of the Czecho-SlOIVak rebeU.ion, that
he succeeded in paralyiZing autonomistic and opportunistic
UJpshoots of persons of the character of Daxner, Bielelk,
Panilmch and others and gained them for the common advance with the Czechs (6) . From this statement one could
infer that the American Slo:va.ks resisted the movement for
freedom. On the contrary, it was the Slovaiks who, with a
few exceptions, first brought UJP the question of freedom
from the Hungarian yoke, and who, long before the war,
had organized to gaiin recognition of Slo:vak national rights.
The Slovak League was founded in 1907 for the punpose of
supporting and helping national leaders in the old country.
In the year 1910 it requested the U. S. Census officials to
list Slovaks, not as immigrants from Ausitria-iH kmgary, but
according to their native, tongue.
B efore the outbreak of the war, at the beginning o:f the
year 1914, a memorandum, signed by representatives of 21
organizations, 23 newspaipers, by many Catholic priests
and Protestant ministe,ns, was printed. in five languages in
addition to English This memorandum, sent to i:nflmmtial
diP'lomats and statesmen, descrilbed the sufferings of the
Slova.l{s under Hungarian tyranny and demanded in the
name o:f justice and humanity that Slovaks be given the
rights which were ri!ghtfully tlheirs. Slovalk journalists and
national leaders forll!ght unremittingly through newsprupers
and brosuires against Austro,-,H ungarian and German propa(6) Ferdinand Pisecky: "M. R. i§tefanik," p . 81.
40
SLOVAKIA
ganda. Moreover, they aided financially. Already in 1914
the Slov:aJk League started a Million Dollar Drive, the proceeds of which were to go to the sw£fering and war-,impoverished Slovaks a,broa<l. When their fellow SlaJVs, the Seribians,
were fortced to retreat bef-ore the enemy in the winter of
1915 and felt hearvi1y t:he weight of defeat, the American
Slova,ks rallied to their swpport. In a movement Which they
themselrves financed they obtained more than a hundred
Slovak priJsoners from prison crumps in Canada.
Even from this very ibrieif sketch it is evident that the
Slovaks in America were, from the very beginning, fully
aware and prepared to ma,ke the most of the opportunities
which the World Wax presented. They were well on their
way in their wo11k for the Slovaks when the Ozecho-{Slovruk
National Committee, headed by Masarytk, asked them for
their cooperation.
In rerviewing the rclations of the Ozechs and Slovaks in
the early yea11s of t:he war, one lll/U!st bear in mind foat the
creation of the Ozecho-,Slorva;k State was not a sine qua non
for the realization of natitonal and cultural independ~e
for the Slovruks. Neither were the Allied states determined
at the beginning, upon the, dismem1be11ment oif the AustroHUil'garian Kingdom. The brea;k up of Austr.ia-HW11gary
evo1ved from later dervefopments , and the Slo'V'ak1s seriously
weighed all possilbilities beiforn deciding to cast their lot
with the Ozechs. Dm-ing this period of indecision only one
thing was cemain, that is, no matter under what form of
government, no maitter with whom ailied, Slovak national
autonomy had to be g,uiairanteed.
In an open letter, pwbli'shed in the "Jednota," December 9, 19'14, Allbert Mamafoy, president of the Slovak
Lea•g ue, wrote: "The American Czechs turned to me, as president of the Siov,aJk Lerugue, regarddng the Sltland that the
Slovaks wish to taJke in this critical situation. . . . I answered that (ruocording to my convictions) we Slovaks
would demand sclf-i:m1e, regardless of the tyipe of government to which we would belong as a result of this war,
whether we would lwe UJI1der a Russian, or whether we
would be left in old Hungary, (should it remain intact), or
SLOVAKIA
41
whether we would be pla,ced in the Ozecho-!Slo!Wlk State,
which the Ozechs hoped would :be formed. In my opinion,
we S1ovaks must demand ruutonomy from whomsoever we
must, whether fiiom Hwrugary or Russia, or from the hoped.for Czech state. And whosoever should get us, irf peaice be
desired in the counitry, care must be truken that our demands
be satisfied."
Reporting on the proceedings of the Congress of the
Slovak LeaJgue, held in Pittsburgh, Fe!brua:riy 22, 1915,
Joseph Huse'k, editor of the "Jednota," wrote in the March
3rd issue of that year: "One Czech acoused us of hating the
Czechs. Thi1s is not true. We love our closest brother. Lf only
they loved us as much as we love them. But to date, they
have not given us any proof orf this. If matt~s sholl!ld lead
to a change in the ,p olitical and governmental form of
Austria-iHlwrngary, irf a federation will be formed composed
of Bohemia, Moraivia, Silesia, and Slovll!kia, we will be satisfied. I:f they give us complete independence,, we ,vill. 1be sa,tis,.
fied, rund, irf this later should not justify itself there will be
time enough to joiin ourselves politically and gOivern.meintally
more closely with the Bohemians and the Momv,i ans. However, if such a radical change does no,t ta:ke place after the
war and we should 0/Illy be guaranteed independence within
the limits of the Martin De:clairation, we will hiwe to be
satisfied. Erven that woruld be a great concession. When we
sha:H have our sc!hools, when we shall be master in our districrts, when we shall also hme representati1Ves, comparable
to our nll!mbers, in parliament and a guarantee of free, ind~endent industrial development, we will not lose ourselrves.
The rest we will then win by our own strength." And, agai~,
in an article entitled "With the Czechs or Without the
Ozechs," printed on March 24: "We are sincere and we e:m-phaisize again and again that we are supporteiI's. of the
movement which aims to cu1tirv,a te Czecho-Slovak re:c1procity. But the reciprocity for whk,h we are so zealously working mrust be founded upon complete equality of rig1hts and
equal value as pem;ains to our national, economic, and cuiltural interests."
The first attempt to bring the Czechs and ,Slovaks to-
42
SLOVAKIA
gether in America occurred in 1916. At the suggestion of
Joseph Tvrzidky, Secretary of the Czech National Society,
who was sUJm.rmoned to twke this step by Masaryk, a meeting
of the Czech Society and of the Slo.vaik League was called
at Cleveland, Ohio. On October 25, 191·5, a pact, proposed
and written by Tvrzic:ky, was w0cepted. The conditions under which the SlovaJks were to accept cooperation with the
Czechs were summari·z ed in this pact. Nati0J1.al autonomy of
S1av8Jkia with an independent parliament, an independent
state administration, and free oulrtusrial deveiloipment were
guaranrteed. These demands were not the princi,p les Olf indi,vidiual autonormistic groups. This was the platiform of all
American Slovaks, with very few exceptions, and the considerations under which they entered the struggle,; the aims
they wanted to reali-ze. The extent to which the Slovaks and
Czechs in America did not surcceed in reaching a colill'plete
unde11standi.ng was deter.mined by the degree in which the
American Czechs and the National Ozecho-;Slovak Committee deflected from these prmciples.
Thus the Pact Olf Kiev, although signed by the representative of 1:Jhe Slova/k League, Gustav Kosik, incited consteirn:ation armong the American Slovaiks because it referred
to "Ozecho,slova,ks," as an ethnic entity - a term not ac~ted by them. In li:ke manner, the newspaper "Czeichosloviak" was not warunly received. There were those among
the Slovak leadeirs who, from the ve:r'Y beginning, opposed
the use of the woro "Ozechoslo~ak" even in diplomatic
agreements, holding to the opinion that the Sl~a!ks Sihould
stand as an independent nation.
The Parisian Czecho-,Slovak National Committee was
looked lllpon wirth Sll!Slpicion by the Catho1ics who were uncertain of the status of religion in the, new state. These
suspidoi!liSi, however, were not so strong that they could not
be eliminated, and Masaryk himself, when he late:r came to
Ameri1ca, quieted the Catholic Slovaks by his promise that
there would be complete religious freedom in Ozecho-,Slova'kia.
On July 1, 1917, Stefanik ar.ranged a meeting with
the Slovaks and the Ozechs at the Congress Hall Hotel in
SLOVAKIA
43
Washington at which the following were present: Dr.
Fisher, President of the Czech Nrutional Society; Albert
Ma:matey, President of the Slova:k -Leag,ue; Emil Voska,
ChaJrles Pergler, Dr. HrcHicika, Ivan Daxner, Iivan Bielek,
and Ferdinad Pisecky. Stefani:k reported on conditions in
Russia, 'but the main object of the meeting was to arrange
for a mihtary o,r ga:nization and the cooipeTation of the
Czechs and Slwaws. At this meeting Daxner raised the
Czeicho-iS1ov,aJk question . .Aigainst his SO-!Called "aurtonomistic attibude" Stefani.ik emphaSlized the necessity of forming
a politically inseparaJble state and not an ethnographically
insepamble one (7).
Con:cerning Stefani•k 's opinion relatirve to the Czechoslovak question and, especially, his oipimon as expressed in his
dealings with the American .Slovaks, Poogler asse:rlts: "NaturaUy, the represerntatives of the Slova:k organiJZations of
the foturre Czecho-tSlovak state often came to Stefanik.
Stefanik al.ways insisted that it was the ooncern of the nation at hoime, that it alone must decide concerning its future
origani1zrution, in short, that it is impossible to dictate firom
beyond the bo~ders of the country and that every such ruttempt wou1d be futile Whenever the question of Sloivak
autonomy aI'ose, he decidedly pointed out, that no guarantees could be demanded £ro:m those living outside of the new
state" (8).
But even if we should aioceipt this untoo•a ble position, it
is impossilble to deny the fact that Stefanik, although he
gave no written priomise, did reach an agreement with the
America,n Slovaks and succeeded in gaining t'heir cooperation with the .American Cze~hs witlhouit the Slovaks relinquishing their demands. This was pr01Ved at the mooting
held in New YoI'k, SeptembeT 20; 1914, where American
Slovak priests were present with Stefanik and at which a
resolution was a:doipted, stating that they stand on the platform orf the SlovaJk League. The pvograim of the Slovak
League was the Cleveland Pact, tlhe · principles of whioh
were incorporated into the Pittsburgh Pact which Masariyik
(7) Ferdinand Pisecky: "M. R. S.teJanik," p, 72.
(8) K. Pergler: "Z americke fronit.y naseho osvo'bozenskeho boje.
Nase revoluce.'' Vol. II, pp. 313- 325.
· ·
44
SLOVAKIA
himself drafted and signed with the American SlOIVruks a
year later. Stefanik approved the program olf the Slovak
Leaigue. With this rupproval he gained the confidence of the
groups considered the most consoovative in the work for
0zecho-1Slovalk independence. Of this Benes writes : "The
meeting with the Slovak priests was very important because
at this meeting Stefanilk dispelled all sm,iprcion and unwillingness of the priests as regards the, movement for independence with which the drive for funds olf the Slovak
League was strengthened (9).
Because of his deli1cate health Stefanik did not ma:ke
many public appearances but when he did speak, he succeeded in maJking a deep impression upon his listeners. He
spoke in Slovak and in 0zech a:nd sometimes passed from
one language, into another in the same speech. He gained
the confidence of the 'Peorple by his enthusia,s m and his fascinating manner as well as with his firm and uncompromising atti1mde towards all righteous demands.
In addition to the aJbove mentioned meetings, Stefanik
met with the presidents of t!he Slovruk and 0zech organizations on July 1, 1917, in New Yo.rik where tihe misunderstaniling with Ho.nky pertaining to the Durich affaiT in Russia came to the forefront. Horiky especially critidzed Benes
whom Stefarui,k defended, stating that he himself directed
everything in Russia and Horky, therefore, should turn to
him. On July 24 Stef2.ni1k received a deputation of Slovaks
headed by Milan Getting w,ho later became the OzeichoSlo,v ak consul in Pittsburgh. On August 13 he was present
at a meeting of 0zecho-.Slovak artists and in Seipte.miber he
addressed the Cooch and SlovaJk women orf New Yo'I'ik.
Between the 16th and 18th of October a large meeting
was held in Chicago• at which the ques,t!ion cxf rooruiting was
considered. Proceedings at this meeting were somewhat agitated since voices of t!hose who feared the final success
of the military m01Vement were raised against Stefanik. A
Owcho-Slo,valk mHitary committee was formed in order that
the recruiting could proceed in an o:r,g,anized manner. Both
(9) Edward Benes: "Sveto'Vii. vii.lka a nase revoluce."
45
SLOVAKIA
Protestant and Catholic Ozechs and Sloivaks were r1~pre:sented in the Committee (10).
After this meeting recruiting was begun by a proclamation for mdbilization by Stefaruk, coached in classical
terms. Stefani1k also issued instnuiotions for the CzechoSlova!k soldiers in America. He divided the country into
four districts, each with a separate reporter to which position the following were appointed: Milan Geitting, Gustav
Kosik and su!b-;reporter Ivan Gess:a,y; J. Cermak and subreporter J. Tvr.z ioky; J. Stra;ka and swb-reporteir Vojta Benes. This plan, written under the impression of the Chicago
comereTIJce, though not essentila:lly changed, had to be adjusted to existing conditions when the time came for actual
work. For reasons already ex,plained the recruiting was not
as successifiul as Stefanik haid hoped it would be. Despite all
efforts the number of volunteers was not quite 2,500
men (11).
Of great importance was the demonstration meeting
held in Carnegie Hall in New York whl ch SterfanjJk arranged
for September 1'6. Because of his friendship for Stefaruk,
Fran:kHn...Bouillon accepted the in,Vitation to be the principal spea;ker just before his return to France as Minister
of Bropaganda in the caJbinet of Painleve. John P. Mitchell,
the may;or of New Yol'lk presided. This meeting, at which
the repre,sen!batives of the Ailied armies were present, had a
consideraible pro1p aganda significance since it broke the ice
of indifference of American journalists. Franklin-Bouillon,
who spdke in E':nglish, addressed the men of the "CzechoSlovak" nation and appealed to t:hem to join the Legion. He
was the first influential sitatesman who pulblicly voiced the
dismemberment of Austria~Hungary. This statement of
Franklin-Bouillon created a sensation in Amer1can political
circles; (12).
1
In order to facilitate contaict between our groups and
government officials, Stefanik changed the Slav Press Bu(10) Vojta Benes: "Nase revoluce." Vol. II, PP. 46-49.
(11) K. Pergler: "Nase revoluce." Vol. II ,p. 321.
(12) Ar. Bares: "Stefanikuv memorial," p_ · 36.
46
SLOVAKIA
reau, originally formed as a bureau of propaganda, into a
branch of the Czecho-.Slo,v ak National Committee. He gave
the authority to deal in political matters to Charles Pergler. Stefanik thus sucoeeded in realizing his pre-,war dream.
of gaining his American countrymen in an armed r~bellion
against Austria-Hungary although, in truth, not to the extent he had hoped for. Having completed his. worlk in Ame'l'ica he again turned his efforts and energies toward Europe
where much still remained to be done.
At the request presented on Octolber 14, 1917, to the
War Ministry by General Vignal oif Washington in which he
reported that Stefanik had aJbout completed his mission,
Stefanik was granted permission to return to France. In
November, Vignal telegraphed that Stefani!k would return
with the first transport of Czecho""Slorvak troo'Ps and that
he would be. free to organize the Czechs in France. In his
reports to the Minister of Wa~, Vignal highly praised Stefaniik's work in America. I quote from the tefogirams sent
on November 5 and December 5:
"He proved to posse,s s the highest degree of tact, disciipline and sense :for orga.n ization. His pel'.'.sonal influence
in all matters was such that no mis'OOderstanding arose during his stay and all the Cz~~h groll!ps followed his directions. . . . I aim not aJble to praise suffi~iently this great
patriot, coolheaded and insipi:red 'by the most honest and
highest feelings. F'ull of taot and wisdom, he gained the
sympathies of the highest officials of the American Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and he o:rganized with the greatest success the re:cnciting oif the Czecho-SlovaJks (13).
Acc,o rding to Benes, Steifaniik :returned to Paris on Novemiber 16 whe:re he con;tinued in his wor,k of organizing
the Czecho ...Slovak army.
•
Editor's Note: Today it is customar;y even for the
Ozechs and so--called "Ozechoslovaks" to cl'aim and acclaim
Stefanik But Stefanik was not a Czech, nor a "Orechoslovia:k" (a SlO'VaJk in the pay of the Czoohs), but a true
Slovak paitriot. Had he lived, Stefanik undou!btedly would
(13) From the "Fren,oh Military Archives."
SLOVAKIA
47
have fought for the liberation. of his people from all alien
tyranny, including the Czech brand as represented by T. G.
Masaryk an.d Benes. S,lo,vaJks eveTywhere commemorate May
4th as Stefani'k Day, because it was on May 4, 1919, that
their beloved wair hero crashed to his death in a plaine which
was "a~cidentally" shot down by a Czech garrison at Vajnory, Slovakia. Many Slovaiks even todiay will tell you 1:!hat
Stefanik haid to die, because he never consented to his Slovakiia being a colony o,£ the imperialistic Czechs led by T. G.
Masarylk and Benes. On May 4, 1954, Slova,ks everywhere
will recall: "it was 35 yeaI'S ago thait Stefarnk was killed by
the men who resented his warnings rugainst Bolshevism.
"
•
•
•
SLOVAK FOLKLORE
GOLDILOCKS
Once UlpOn a time there was a very poor blacksmith.
At one time 'he fared weH, but then hard times struck, he
had little work to do., and his wiife and small children were
always hungry. Finally he lost everything; at hOlme he had
not!hing left but seven ,pennies. His undernourished children
cried constantly for something to eat until the blacksmith
could stand it no longer. In his despair he boU!ght a rope
witlh his last seven ,p ennies and started out for the hills to
end it all.
When he came into the hills, he sought out a stout
branch on a mighty tree to which he fixed the roipe. As the
bla;cksmith was a;bout to tie the rope albout his neck, a
,pretty black maiden suddenly appeared .b efore him and
pleaded wHJh him not to hang himself, 1b ecause that was not
a nice thing to do and, then, it was also a sin. The b,lacksmith was stunned when the black maiden disappeared into
the nowhere whence she had come. As he waliked along, his
mind wandered baok home where misery and want ruled and
again he became despondent. U!P went his rope onto another
stout ,h ranch. .&gain the blaJCk maiden s,uddemy appeaired
out of the blue and begged him not to commit such an ugly
deed. In a quadary, the blactksmith shoo'k his head, bwt
said nothing. He did not throw away his rope, but stood
Dublin Core
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Title
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Milan Rastislav Štefánik
Description
An account of the resource
Stephanie O. Hušek
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 33-47
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hušek, Stephanie O.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
name
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d4a40864f4ca207f9aaad30ab4a5e70e.pdf
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26
SLOVAKIA
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1
1
•
•
•
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-
�SLOVAKIA
27
pendent, the enemies of Slovak freedom and independence
began to howl, naturally. Speculating on their circumstances
under which the .SlovaJks gained their indeipenden:ce, the
followers of Dr. Edward Benes - the so-called Bein.es Czechs
(Socialists) and "CzechosiovaJks" {!SlovaJk renegades in the
pay of the Benes Czechs) - smeared and vilified true Slo~
v,aJk pat11iots who dared to speak up for what was rightfully
theirs. But no matter what the circumstances under which
the SlovaJks gained their independence, we as Americans
must contend that the Repwblic af Slovakia never should
have been destroyed against the will of the Slo.vaJk nation.
By what law of God or man was the Slovak Repulblic
destroyed? Certainly its destrlllCtion cannot 'be justified
by or reconciled with our poHtical beliefs. Its destruction
was cont11ary to 8Jll Christian and democratic principles in short., it was irnm<Yrail and criminal. And let us not f<Yrget that SlovaJkia was destro,yed: by the victorious United
Nations u;nder the guise of liiberation!
The present ter!1iible plight of the Slovak nation, like
that oif the other nations of central Europe which had been
"lilberated" in 1945, is due to the blundering, undemocratic
policy pursued and the secret agreements negotiated in the
name of expediency hy men of democrati'C governments.
In a way, therefore, we are all resp<;msiible for the Red enslavement of the nations behind the Iron Curtain and the
inhumanities suififered by them. Definitely, we should do
something aJbout it. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and the world amd admit th8Jt it was morally wrong
and contrary to every democratic and Chri'Sti8Jn principle
to surrender the SlovaJk nation and the other nations of
central and eastern Europe to the men of the Kremlin.
Today much is being said and written rubout crises, crucial days ahead, human rights and man's inhumanity to
man. The struggle a-gain.st tyranny, however, is nothing
new to the Slovaks. The history of the Slovak nation is a
history replete wi:th thrald:om and ex;ploitation. For over ten
centuries the Slovak nation - one of the oldest Christian
nations of central Europe - has been a pawn in the . hands
of alien rulers. Its econ01IDy, freedom, security and territo-
�28
SLOVAKIA
rial integrity haive a:lways been determined by foreigners.
The SlOIV'a'k s have suf.fered longer under alien domination
than any other nation Olf Europe. No other nation has been
so thoroughly misunders tood, misr~presented, degraded, maligned and vilified - at times even by the veJ"y people who
were supposed to represent it and protect its interests, by
men who prOlfessed to be and were g~o,r ified as the very
epitome of the democratic way of life.
Many of us thought, as did many SlovaJks at home, that
the trials anxl trilbulations of the Slovak nation were at an
end with the estaJblishment of the Cze:cho...Sl01Va'k Repulblic
in 1918, which the Slovaks and the Ozeichs were to govern
as equal partners. But we were mistaken, badly mistaiken.
It soon became evident that the Prague government, headed
by T. G. Masarylk, did not regard the SlovaJk,s as equal partners, but only as a colony to be e:x:ploited for the benefit
of the Czech nation. The Slovaks soon realized that they
had rid themselves of the Magyar despot only to be ruled
over by i.miperialistk Czechs, who sought to destroy them
eventually as a nation.
The Slovaiks, however, outlived the tyranny of the past
and today are more dete.I"mined than ever to outlive the presoot scourge of Ozecho.-Oommunist terror and violence and
to continue on their way to complete ·p olitical freedom and
independence. Despite the many 'bitter memories of injustices suffered from ruling groU!ps of neiighlboring nations,
some of whreh blatantly claimed to the exemplary democracies, the SlovaJks are fully consdous of the fact that
a free Poland, a free Ukraine, a free Bohemia, and even a
free Russia are also necessary to form a better, free and
more just order in EJurrope. The SlovaJks know that the
stru,ggle for freedom and independeil!ce cannot and must not
be waiged in isolation; the goal of Uberation from communist tyranny and all foreign domination must be the unified aiim of all ensl:wed nations and Of all fri~ds of all the
oppressed peoples.
The Slovaik nation has proven itself one of the greatest small natiOillS of Europe. The Slov.alks are healthy of
mind and body, intelligent, industrious, intensely religious,
�SLOVAKIA
29
tolerant, and devoted to the pe,ace£ul development of their
national life and culture. As a nation they committed no
aggression against their neighbors, nor did they violate the
rights of others. It is a matter of record that they are always staunchly loyal to the countries of their adoption,
contributing handsomely, in proportion to their numbers,
to their material and spiritual growth. This is attested to
by our own America, the true friend of the perse<mited and
the oppressed. To Slovaks everyiwhere, at home and in
exile, America is looked upon as the living symbol of freedom, tolerance, and justice. More than that, the Slovaks
look to America as their salvation; they expect to be truly
Hbemted by the land of Washington and Lincoln. Let us
pray God that we do not disruppoint them .
The descendants of the Slovak na:tion in America
should be hruppy amd proud to stress the fact that the
SlovaJk nation has fought the plague of materialistic Comm'UIIlism consistently and resolutely for over a hundTed
years. It is a matter of record that Louis Srur, Slovak
writer and champion of Slova'k freedom, repudiated the
godless philosophy of Marx in 1849 and warned his people against it; the political party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlilllka, the Slovaik Poipulist Party, repudiated Communism at its very first session in 1905; in 1919 General Milan
R. Stefanik, Sl01VaJk war hero and one of the founders of
the Czecho-1Slov.aJk Repulblic, cautioned T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Benes to maike no compromises with Bolshevism;
and Dr. Joseph Tiso, first president of the SlOIVaJk Republic, begged his peoiple to persevere in its fight against the
dread plague of Communism even as he was being led to
the gallows iby order of the Communist-dominated National
Front g01Vernment of Dr. Edward Benes on Arpril 18, 1947.
Indeed, it is a matter of record that the Slovalk people
fought Communism, the implacable foe of democracy, in
and out of season. And they are deter.mined to fight it until
it is w1ped off the face of the earth.
And what after Communism? Are the SlorvaJks willing
to be exploited by another form of Czeicho-iSlovaJkia? Certainly not! The Slovaks want only what rightfuUy belongs
�30
SLOVAKIA
to them. No more, no less. They want the United States of
America and the rest of the free world to reco:grtIBe and
respect their inherent ri1g ht to freedom and inde:pendence.
The Slov8Jks seek onl~ the opportunity to play a useful role
in the struiggle for freedom. And it is the responsiibility. of
the free democrat:iic world to afford them this opportiunity.
The S1'ovruks want the demO'cratJic world to recogni.!ze at long
last a s,imple truth which the Czechs and Slovaks have
knoiwn for many cenbITies past, that is, that the Czechs
are not and do not want to be SlovaJks, and that the Sl0iva:ks
are n!Ot and do not want to be Ozechs. This fact has been
clearly demonstrated by both the Czechs and the Slova;ks
during the past forty years, that is, ever since the start of
World War I.
The Slovaks do not want anything tha>l is not rightfully theirs; they do not c<1Vet the spiritual and material
wealth of the O.zech nation; they do not make any claims to
Ozooh history, national traditions and customs; they have
rubsolutely no desire for Ozech lMlds; and they do not ask
the Czechs to represent them in any field of endeavor,
whether spiritual, cultural or political.
And, of course, the Slovak nation did not and does not
make any claim to the criminal acts committed by the
post-iwar Communist-0ominated Czech National Front government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald. The
Slo,v,aks had nothing to do with the criminal exipulsion of
Ge.rnnans from Ozeicho-1SLovakia, o,r the brutal persecution
and swppression Of all anti-Communist opposition in that
hrupless country. Flor the betrayal of the Czech and Slovruk
nations to the Communists and Red Moscow, the Slo'V'aks
shall give full credit to. Dr. ffidward Benes and his socialist
foHawera, who a1w:ays 1promoted .pro-1Soviet policy.
The Slovruks respeot the r,i ght of the Czech nation to
c~lete freedom and politi·c al independence, ·b ut they also
eX!peot leaders of the Czech nation to realiize that the Slova:k nation, too, possesses that right. The Slovaks do not
intend to surrender their right to freedom and indeipendence; they are not willing to comirn:it national suicide.
A-nd it would be immoral for us even to surggest that they do
�SLOVAKIA
31
so. Why then should any governmen ts, especially governments of democratic countries, insist that the SlovaJks and
the territory they have inhabited for at lea.st the past 1500
years must continue to be exploited by another nation?
Let us .e ver be mindful of the farct that we are the
apostles of the true democratic way of life. As such, we
must always be willing and ready to share the blessings
of our democ11acy with the less fortunaJte and oppressed
peoples of the earth. 1it is our sacred duty to spread the
gospel and share the blessings of ,t he deanocraJtic way of
life which gives so much to so many for so little. True, at
times it is a diftfiimtlrt and unigrateful task, but it is one
which we must do for the sake of our country, for the cause
of freedom to wh:itch we are dedicated as a nation, the cause
which is common even to the nation the American Slovaks
are descended from.
America,ns of Slova!k descent must tell the story of the
long, enduring struggle of the Slovak nation for freedom
and ind~nden ce to all democratic peoples of the earth and
their governmen ts. Unfortunat el,y, many poople in governn:ient, particularl y in our own American Governmen t, hruve
allowed themse1ves to be influenced and corufused by the
slanderous, villainous and vicious anti-1Slovak campaign.
waged by the enemies of SlovaJk freedom and independen ce.
It is the duty of every true American, especially Americans
of SlOIViak descent, to expose and embarrass all streh pseudodemocratic elements and disamn them completel,y, because
the enemies of Slovak freedom amd independen ce are in fact
the enemies of the democraJtic way of life itself.
Naturally, the Slovia. ks cannot stand idly ·b y while sucll
people pe11petmte the destrwction of the nation they rure descended from. We must tell this story to om duly elected
representat ives in Washingto n and insist tihat they, in turn,
as our representrutiives, see to it thait our Governmen t adopts
a more realistic and just policy toward the Sl01Va!k nation
and its representat ives. It is, after all, in the intersts of
America and all other democratic coU'Iltries that the Slo;vaiks,
too, be free and independen t, that even they be allowed to
1
�32
SLOVAKIA
determine by their own free choice the state or form of
political organfaation under which they wish to li,v e.
History has taught us this one great lesson: no nation
can have a monopoly on freedom. Freedom is the grandest
of all of God',s gifts to manhnd; freedom is the universal
heritage of all the aiges. The more we ,p romote and share it,
the more aJbundant are its fruits. Of comse, peace without
freedom is unthink:ruble. If we li1re tru1y interested in a permanent and just -peace, let us not deny freedom to any
nation.
When evalll.l'ating the historical fact of the declaration
orf independence of the Slovak nation, let us bear in mind
thait the only question of real sig.nificance is whether the
Slova!k nation had the right to declare its country an independent repUJblic. Believing as Americans do, we know they
did and committed neither crime nor treason in exercising it.
Let people say what they will about MM'ch 14, 1939 Slovak Independence Day - or the circumstances that led
to it, Slova·k s at home and abroad stiH claim that it was the
most beautiful and joyous day in the history of the Slovak
nation. Today all SlOIVaks are storming the heruvens with
prayers that :Sloiva!kia's independence might soon be restored. And Americans believe that it will be. - P. A. Hrobak .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialists, BUT BY ALL
THE PARTIES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike . . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CENSORSHIP on foreign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. • . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. I have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Jan Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annual New York Herald Trf.bune
Forum on Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, N . Y., October
30, 1946, 4th session) .
•
•
•
"Just as Munk·h was undone and does not exist, Just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem is our Internal pro·blem and
It is reeognize<I as such even by our allies." - (Dr. Benes, 5-22-43).
�
26
SLOVAKIA
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1
1
•
•
•
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-
�SLOVAKIA
27
pendent, the enemies of Slovak freedom and independence
began to howl, naturally. Speculating on their circumstances
under which the .SlovaJks gained their indeipenden:ce, the
followers of Dr. Edward Benes - the so-called Bein.es Czechs
(Socialists) and "CzechosiovaJks" {!SlovaJk renegades in the
pay of the Benes Czechs) - smeared and vilified true Slo~
v,aJk pat11iots who dared to speak up for what was rightfully
theirs. But no matter what the circumstances under which
the SlovaJks gained their independence, we as Americans
must contend that the Repwblic af Slovakia never should
have been destroyed against the will of the Slo.vaJk nation.
By what law of God or man was the Slovak Repulblic
destroyed? Certainly its destrlllCtion cannot 'be justified
by or reconciled with our poHtical beliefs. Its destruction
was cont11ary to 8Jll Christian and democratic principles in short., it was irnm<Yrail and criminal. And let us not f<Yrget that SlovaJkia was destro,yed: by the victorious United
Nations u;nder the guise of liiberation!
The present ter!1iible plight of the Slovak nation, like
that oif the other nations of central Europe which had been
"lilberated" in 1945, is due to the blundering, undemocratic
policy pursued and the secret agreements negotiated in the
name of expediency hy men of democrati'C governments.
In a way, therefore, we are all resp<;msiible for the Red enslavement of the nations behind the Iron Curtain and the
inhumanities suififered by them. Definitely, we should do
something aJbout it. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and the world amd admit th8Jt it was morally wrong
and contrary to every democratic and Chri'Sti8Jn principle
to surrender the SlovaJk nation and the other nations of
central and eastern Europe to the men of the Kremlin.
Today much is being said and written rubout crises, crucial days ahead, human rights and man's inhumanity to
man. The struggle a-gain.st tyranny, however, is nothing
new to the Slovaks. The history of the Slovak nation is a
history replete wi:th thrald:om and ex;ploitation. For over ten
centuries the Slovak nation - one of the oldest Christian
nations of central Europe - has been a pawn in the . hands
of alien rulers. Its econ01IDy, freedom, security and territo-
�28
SLOVAKIA
rial integrity haive a:lways been determined by foreigners.
The SlOIV'a'k s have suf.fered longer under alien domination
than any other nation Olf Europe. No other nation has been
so thoroughly misunders tood, misr~presented, degraded, maligned and vilified - at times even by the veJ"y people who
were supposed to represent it and protect its interests, by
men who prOlfessed to be and were g~o,r ified as the very
epitome of the democratic way of life.
Many of us thought, as did many SlovaJks at home, that
the trials anxl trilbulations of the Slovak nation were at an
end with the estaJblishment of the Cze:cho...Sl01Va'k Repulblic
in 1918, which the Slovaks and the Ozeichs were to govern
as equal partners. But we were mistaken, badly mistaiken.
It soon became evident that the Prague government, headed
by T. G. Masarylk, did not regard the SlovaJk,s as equal partners, but only as a colony to be e:x:ploited for the benefit
of the Czech nation. The Slovaks soon realized that they
had rid themselves of the Magyar despot only to be ruled
over by i.miperialistk Czechs, who sought to destroy them
eventually as a nation.
The Slovaiks, however, outlived the tyranny of the past
and today are more dete.I"mined than ever to outlive the presoot scourge of Ozecho.-Oommunist terror and violence and
to continue on their way to complete ·p olitical freedom and
independence. Despite the many 'bitter memories of injustices suffered from ruling groU!ps of neiighlboring nations,
some of whreh blatantly claimed to the exemplary democracies, the SlovaJks are fully consdous of the fact that
a free Poland, a free Ukraine, a free Bohemia, and even a
free Russia are also necessary to form a better, free and
more just order in EJurrope. The SlovaJks know that the
stru,ggle for freedom and independeil!ce cannot and must not
be waiged in isolation; the goal of Uberation from communist tyranny and all foreign domination must be the unified aiim of all ensl:wed nations and Of all fri~ds of all the
oppressed peoples.
The Slovaik nation has proven itself one of the greatest small natiOillS of Europe. The Slov.alks are healthy of
mind and body, intelligent, industrious, intensely religious,
�SLOVAKIA
29
tolerant, and devoted to the pe,ace£ul development of their
national life and culture. As a nation they committed no
aggression against their neighbors, nor did they violate the
rights of others. It is a matter of record that they are always staunchly loyal to the countries of their adoption,
contributing handsomely, in proportion to their numbers,
to their material and spiritual growth. This is attested to
by our own America, the true friend of the perse<mited and
the oppressed. To Slovaks everyiwhere, at home and in
exile, America is looked upon as the living symbol of freedom, tolerance, and justice. More than that, the Slovaks
look to America as their salvation; they expect to be truly
Hbemted by the land of Washington and Lincoln. Let us
pray God that we do not disruppoint them .
The descendants of the Slovak na:tion in America
should be hruppy amd proud to stress the fact that the
SlovaJk nation has fought the plague of materialistic Comm'UIIlism consistently and resolutely for over a hundTed
years. It is a matter of record that Louis Srur, Slovak
writer and champion of Slova'k freedom, repudiated the
godless philosophy of Marx in 1849 and warned his people against it; the political party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlilllka, the Slovaik Poipulist Party, repudiated Communism at its very first session in 1905; in 1919 General Milan
R. Stefanik, Sl01VaJk war hero and one of the founders of
the Czecho-1Slov.aJk Repulblic, cautioned T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Benes to maike no compromises with Bolshevism;
and Dr. Joseph Tiso, first president of the SlOIVaJk Republic, begged his peoiple to persevere in its fight against the
dread plague of Communism even as he was being led to
the gallows iby order of the Communist-dominated National
Front g01Vernment of Dr. Edward Benes on Arpril 18, 1947.
Indeed, it is a matter of record that the Slovalk people
fought Communism, the implacable foe of democracy, in
and out of season. And they are deter.mined to fight it until
it is w1ped off the face of the earth.
And what after Communism? Are the SlorvaJks willing
to be exploited by another form of Czeicho-iSlovaJkia? Certainly not! The Slovaks want only what rightfuUy belongs
�30
SLOVAKIA
to them. No more, no less. They want the United States of
America and the rest of the free world to reco:grtIBe and
respect their inherent ri1g ht to freedom and inde:pendence.
The Slov8Jks seek onl~ the opportunity to play a useful role
in the struiggle for freedom. And it is the responsiibility. of
the free democrat:iic world to afford them this opportiunity.
The S1'ovruks want the demO'cratJic world to recogni.!ze at long
last a s,imple truth which the Czechs and Slovaks have
knoiwn for many cenbITies past, that is, that the Czechs
are not and do not want to be SlovaJks, and that the Sl0iva:ks
are n!Ot and do not want to be Ozechs. This fact has been
clearly demonstrated by both the Czechs and the Slova;ks
during the past forty years, that is, ever since the start of
World War I.
The Slovaks do not want anything tha>l is not rightfully theirs; they do not c<1Vet the spiritual and material
wealth of the O.zech nation; they do not make any claims to
Ozooh history, national traditions and customs; they have
rubsolutely no desire for Ozech lMlds; and they do not ask
the Czechs to represent them in any field of endeavor,
whether spiritual, cultural or political.
And, of course, the Slovak nation did not and does not
make any claim to the criminal acts committed by the
post-iwar Communist-0ominated Czech National Front government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald. The
Slo,v,aks had nothing to do with the criminal exipulsion of
Ge.rnnans from Ozeicho-1SLovakia, o,r the brutal persecution
and swppression Of all anti-Communist opposition in that
hrupless country. Flor the betrayal of the Czech and Slovruk
nations to the Communists and Red Moscow, the Slo'V'aks
shall give full credit to. Dr. ffidward Benes and his socialist
foHawera, who a1w:ays 1promoted .pro-1Soviet policy.
The Slovruks respeot the r,i ght of the Czech nation to
c~lete freedom and politi·c al independence, ·b ut they also
eX!peot leaders of the Czech nation to realiize that the Slova:k nation, too, possesses that right. The Slovaks do not
intend to surrender their right to freedom and indeipendence; they are not willing to comirn:it national suicide.
A-nd it would be immoral for us even to surggest that they do
�SLOVAKIA
31
so. Why then should any governmen ts, especially governments of democratic countries, insist that the SlovaJks and
the territory they have inhabited for at lea.st the past 1500
years must continue to be exploited by another nation?
Let us .e ver be mindful of the farct that we are the
apostles of the true democratic way of life. As such, we
must always be willing and ready to share the blessings
of our democ11acy with the less fortunaJte and oppressed
peoples of the earth. 1it is our sacred duty to spread the
gospel and share the blessings of ,t he deanocraJtic way of
life which gives so much to so many for so little. True, at
times it is a diftfiimtlrt and unigrateful task, but it is one
which we must do for the sake of our country, for the cause
of freedom to wh:itch we are dedicated as a nation, the cause
which is common even to the nation the American Slovaks
are descended from.
America,ns of Slova!k descent must tell the story of the
long, enduring struggle of the Slovak nation for freedom
and ind~nden ce to all democratic peoples of the earth and
their governmen ts. Unfortunat el,y, many poople in governn:ient, particularl y in our own American Governmen t, hruve
allowed themse1ves to be influenced and corufused by the
slanderous, villainous and vicious anti-1Slovak campaign.
waged by the enemies of SlovaJk freedom and independen ce.
It is the duty of every true American, especially Americans
of SlOIViak descent, to expose and embarrass all streh pseudodemocratic elements and disamn them completel,y, because
the enemies of Slovak freedom amd independen ce are in fact
the enemies of the democraJtic way of life itself.
Naturally, the Slovia. ks cannot stand idly ·b y while sucll
people pe11petmte the destrwction of the nation they rure descended from. We must tell this story to om duly elected
representat ives in Washingto n and insist tihat they, in turn,
as our representrutiives, see to it thait our Governmen t adopts
a more realistic and just policy toward the Sl01Va!k nation
and its representat ives. It is, after all, in the intersts of
America and all other democratic coU'Iltries that the Slo;vaiks,
too, be free and independen t, that even they be allowed to
1
�32
SLOVAKIA
determine by their own free choice the state or form of
political organfaation under which they wish to li,v e.
History has taught us this one great lesson: no nation
can have a monopoly on freedom. Freedom is the grandest
of all of God',s gifts to manhnd; freedom is the universal
heritage of all the aiges. The more we ,p romote and share it,
the more aJbundant are its fruits. Of comse, peace without
freedom is unthink:ruble. If we li1re tru1y interested in a permanent and just -peace, let us not deny freedom to any
nation.
When evalll.l'ating the historical fact of the declaration
orf independence of the Slovak nation, let us bear in mind
thait the only question of real sig.nificance is whether the
Slova!k nation had the right to declare its country an independent repUJblic. Believing as Americans do, we know they
did and committed neither crime nor treason in exercising it.
Let people say what they will about MM'ch 14, 1939 Slovak Independence Day - or the circumstances that led
to it, Slova·k s at home and abroad stiH claim that it was the
most beautiful and joyous day in the history of the Slovak
nation. Today all SlOIVaks are storming the heruvens with
prayers that :Sloiva!kia's independence might soon be restored. And Americans believe that it will be. - P. A. Hrobak .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialists, BUT BY ALL
THE PARTIES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike . . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CENSORSHIP on foreign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. • . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. I have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Jan Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annual New York Herald Trf.bune
Forum on Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, N . Y., October
30, 1946, 4th session) .
•
•
•
"Just as Munk·h was undone and does not exist, Just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem is our Internal pro·blem and
It is reeognize<I as such even by our allies." - (Dr. Benes, 5-22-43).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
26
SLOVAKIA
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1
1
•
•
•
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-
SLOVAKIA
27
pendent, the enemies of Slovak freedom and independence
began to howl, naturally. Speculating on their circumstances
under which the .SlovaJks gained their indeipenden:ce, the
followers of Dr. Edward Benes - the so-called Bein.es Czechs
(Socialists) and "CzechosiovaJks" {!SlovaJk renegades in the
pay of the Benes Czechs) - smeared and vilified true Slo~
v,aJk pat11iots who dared to speak up for what was rightfully
theirs. But no matter what the circumstances under which
the SlovaJks gained their independence, we as Americans
must contend that the Repwblic af Slovakia never should
have been destroyed against the will of the Slo.vaJk nation.
By what law of God or man was the Slovak Repulblic
destroyed? Certainly its destrlllCtion cannot 'be justified
by or reconciled with our poHtical beliefs. Its destruction
was cont11ary to 8Jll Christian and democratic principles in short., it was irnm<Yrail and criminal. And let us not f<Yrget that SlovaJkia was destro,yed: by the victorious United
Nations u;nder the guise of liiberation!
The present ter!1iible plight of the Slovak nation, like
that oif the other nations of central Europe which had been
"lilberated" in 1945, is due to the blundering, undemocratic
policy pursued and the secret agreements negotiated in the
name of expediency hy men of democrati'C governments.
In a way, therefore, we are all resp<;msiible for the Red enslavement of the nations behind the Iron Curtain and the
inhumanities suififered by them. Definitely, we should do
something aJbout it. Let us at least be honest with ourselves and the world amd admit th8Jt it was morally wrong
and contrary to every democratic and Chri'Sti8Jn principle
to surrender the SlovaJk nation and the other nations of
central and eastern Europe to the men of the Kremlin.
Today much is being said and written rubout crises, crucial days ahead, human rights and man's inhumanity to
man. The struggle a-gain.st tyranny, however, is nothing
new to the Slovaks. The history of the Slovak nation is a
history replete wi:th thrald:om and ex;ploitation. For over ten
centuries the Slovak nation - one of the oldest Christian
nations of central Europe - has been a pawn in the . hands
of alien rulers. Its econ01IDy, freedom, security and territo-
28
SLOVAKIA
rial integrity haive a:lways been determined by foreigners.
The SlOIV'a'k s have suf.fered longer under alien domination
than any other nation Olf Europe. No other nation has been
so thoroughly misunders tood, misr~presented, degraded, maligned and vilified - at times even by the veJ"y people who
were supposed to represent it and protect its interests, by
men who prOlfessed to be and were g~o,r ified as the very
epitome of the democratic way of life.
Many of us thought, as did many SlovaJks at home, that
the trials anxl trilbulations of the Slovak nation were at an
end with the estaJblishment of the Cze:cho...Sl01Va'k Repulblic
in 1918, which the Slovaks and the Ozeichs were to govern
as equal partners. But we were mistaken, badly mistaiken.
It soon became evident that the Prague government, headed
by T. G. Masarylk, did not regard the SlovaJk,s as equal partners, but only as a colony to be e:x:ploited for the benefit
of the Czech nation. The Slovaks soon realized that they
had rid themselves of the Magyar despot only to be ruled
over by i.miperialistk Czechs, who sought to destroy them
eventually as a nation.
The Slovaiks, however, outlived the tyranny of the past
and today are more dete.I"mined than ever to outlive the presoot scourge of Ozecho.-Oommunist terror and violence and
to continue on their way to complete ·p olitical freedom and
independence. Despite the many 'bitter memories of injustices suffered from ruling groU!ps of neiighlboring nations,
some of whreh blatantly claimed to the exemplary democracies, the SlovaJks are fully consdous of the fact that
a free Poland, a free Ukraine, a free Bohemia, and even a
free Russia are also necessary to form a better, free and
more just order in EJurrope. The SlovaJks know that the
stru,ggle for freedom and independeil!ce cannot and must not
be waiged in isolation; the goal of Uberation from communist tyranny and all foreign domination must be the unified aiim of all ensl:wed nations and Of all fri~ds of all the
oppressed peoples.
The Slovaik nation has proven itself one of the greatest small natiOillS of Europe. The Slov.alks are healthy of
mind and body, intelligent, industrious, intensely religious,
SLOVAKIA
29
tolerant, and devoted to the pe,ace£ul development of their
national life and culture. As a nation they committed no
aggression against their neighbors, nor did they violate the
rights of others. It is a matter of record that they are always staunchly loyal to the countries of their adoption,
contributing handsomely, in proportion to their numbers,
to their material and spiritual growth. This is attested to
by our own America, the true friend of the perse<mited and
the oppressed. To Slovaks everyiwhere, at home and in
exile, America is looked upon as the living symbol of freedom, tolerance, and justice. More than that, the Slovaks
look to America as their salvation; they expect to be truly
Hbemted by the land of Washington and Lincoln. Let us
pray God that we do not disruppoint them .
The descendants of the Slovak na:tion in America
should be hruppy amd proud to stress the fact that the
SlovaJk nation has fought the plague of materialistic Comm'UIIlism consistently and resolutely for over a hundTed
years. It is a matter of record that Louis Srur, Slovak
writer and champion of Slova'k freedom, repudiated the
godless philosophy of Marx in 1849 and warned his people against it; the political party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlilllka, the Slovaik Poipulist Party, repudiated Communism at its very first session in 1905; in 1919 General Milan
R. Stefanik, Sl01VaJk war hero and one of the founders of
the Czecho-1Slov.aJk Repulblic, cautioned T. G. Masaryk and
Edward Benes to maike no compromises with Bolshevism;
and Dr. Joseph Tiso, first president of the SlOIVaJk Republic, begged his peoiple to persevere in its fight against the
dread plague of Communism even as he was being led to
the gallows iby order of the Communist-dominated National
Front g01Vernment of Dr. Edward Benes on Arpril 18, 1947.
Indeed, it is a matter of record that the Slovalk people
fought Communism, the implacable foe of democracy, in
and out of season. And they are deter.mined to fight it until
it is w1ped off the face of the earth.
And what after Communism? Are the SlorvaJks willing
to be exploited by another form of Czeicho-iSlovaJkia? Certainly not! The Slovaks want only what rightfuUy belongs
30
SLOVAKIA
to them. No more, no less. They want the United States of
America and the rest of the free world to reco:grtIBe and
respect their inherent ri1g ht to freedom and inde:pendence.
The Slov8Jks seek onl~ the opportunity to play a useful role
in the struiggle for freedom. And it is the responsiibility. of
the free democrat:iic world to afford them this opportiunity.
The S1'ovruks want the demO'cratJic world to recogni.!ze at long
last a s,imple truth which the Czechs and Slovaks have
knoiwn for many cenbITies past, that is, that the Czechs
are not and do not want to be SlovaJks, and that the Sl0iva:ks
are n!Ot and do not want to be Ozechs. This fact has been
clearly demonstrated by both the Czechs and the Slova;ks
during the past forty years, that is, ever since the start of
World War I.
The Slovaks do not want anything tha>l is not rightfully theirs; they do not c<1Vet the spiritual and material
wealth of the O.zech nation; they do not make any claims to
Ozooh history, national traditions and customs; they have
rubsolutely no desire for Ozech lMlds; and they do not ask
the Czechs to represent them in any field of endeavor,
whether spiritual, cultural or political.
And, of course, the Slovak nation did not and does not
make any claim to the criminal acts committed by the
post-iwar Communist-0ominated Czech National Front government of Dr. Edward Benes and Clement Gottwald. The
Slo,v,aks had nothing to do with the criminal exipulsion of
Ge.rnnans from Ozeicho-1SLovakia, o,r the brutal persecution
and swppression Of all anti-Communist opposition in that
hrupless country. Flor the betrayal of the Czech and Slovruk
nations to the Communists and Red Moscow, the Slo'V'aks
shall give full credit to. Dr. ffidward Benes and his socialist
foHawera, who a1w:ays 1promoted .pro-1Soviet policy.
The Slovruks respeot the r,i ght of the Czech nation to
c~lete freedom and politi·c al independence, ·b ut they also
eX!peot leaders of the Czech nation to realiize that the Slova:k nation, too, possesses that right. The Slovaks do not
intend to surrender their right to freedom and indeipendence; they are not willing to comirn:it national suicide.
A-nd it would be immoral for us even to surggest that they do
SLOVAKIA
31
so. Why then should any governmen ts, especially governments of democratic countries, insist that the SlovaJks and
the territory they have inhabited for at lea.st the past 1500
years must continue to be exploited by another nation?
Let us .e ver be mindful of the farct that we are the
apostles of the true democratic way of life. As such, we
must always be willing and ready to share the blessings
of our democ11acy with the less fortunaJte and oppressed
peoples of the earth. 1it is our sacred duty to spread the
gospel and share the blessings of ,t he deanocraJtic way of
life which gives so much to so many for so little. True, at
times it is a diftfiimtlrt and unigrateful task, but it is one
which we must do for the sake of our country, for the cause
of freedom to wh:itch we are dedicated as a nation, the cause
which is common even to the nation the American Slovaks
are descended from.
America,ns of Slova!k descent must tell the story of the
long, enduring struggle of the Slovak nation for freedom
and ind~nden ce to all democratic peoples of the earth and
their governmen ts. Unfortunat el,y, many poople in governn:ient, particularl y in our own American Governmen t, hruve
allowed themse1ves to be influenced and corufused by the
slanderous, villainous and vicious anti-1Slovak campaign.
waged by the enemies of SlovaJk freedom and independen ce.
It is the duty of every true American, especially Americans
of SlOIViak descent, to expose and embarrass all streh pseudodemocratic elements and disamn them completel,y, because
the enemies of Slovak freedom amd independen ce are in fact
the enemies of the democraJtic way of life itself.
Naturally, the Slovia. ks cannot stand idly ·b y while sucll
people pe11petmte the destrwction of the nation they rure descended from. We must tell this story to om duly elected
representat ives in Washingto n and insist tihat they, in turn,
as our representrutiives, see to it thait our Governmen t adopts
a more realistic and just policy toward the Sl01Va!k nation
and its representat ives. It is, after all, in the intersts of
America and all other democratic coU'Iltries that the Slo;vaiks,
too, be free and independen t, that even they be allowed to
1
32
SLOVAKIA
determine by their own free choice the state or form of
political organfaation under which they wish to li,v e.
History has taught us this one great lesson: no nation
can have a monopoly on freedom. Freedom is the grandest
of all of God',s gifts to manhnd; freedom is the universal
heritage of all the aiges. The more we ,p romote and share it,
the more aJbundant are its fruits. Of comse, peace without
freedom is unthink:ruble. If we li1re tru1y interested in a permanent and just -peace, let us not deny freedom to any
nation.
When evalll.l'ating the historical fact of the declaration
orf independence of the Slovak nation, let us bear in mind
thait the only question of real sig.nificance is whether the
Slova!k nation had the right to declare its country an independent repUJblic. Believing as Americans do, we know they
did and committed neither crime nor treason in exercising it.
Let people say what they will about MM'ch 14, 1939 Slovak Independence Day - or the circumstances that led
to it, Slova·k s at home and abroad stiH claim that it was the
most beautiful and joyous day in the history of the Slovak
nation. Today all SlOIVaks are storming the heruvens with
prayers that :Sloiva!kia's independence might soon be restored. And Americans believe that it will be. - P. A. Hrobak .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL
OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialists, BUT BY ALL
THE PARTIES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike . . . . Any American or foreign cor.
respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CENSORSHIP on foreign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated
Press and United Press. • . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which
has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. I have an
ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Jan Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annual New York Herald Trf.bune
Forum on Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, N . Y., October
30, 1946, 4th session) .
•
•
•
"Just as Munk·h was undone and does not exist, Just so there is
no Slovakia and it does not exist internationally as a state! There is
no Slovak problem, the Slovak problem is our Internal pro·blem and
It is reeognize<I as such even by our allies." - (Dr. Benes, 5-22-43).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Fifteenth Anniversary of Slovakia's Declaration of Independence
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 26-32
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/574089206b642f83a9cda68af3648a4b.pdf
c2acc0b496c7bfee40ab932cc3769fde
PDF Text
Text
22
SLOVAKIA
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!
•
•
•
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-
�SLOVAKIA
23
tions with it. And not-even the worst distortion oif the truth
can deny the incontrovertible reality that the Sloivak nation
accepted the decision of the Slovruk Ass,emlbly spontaneously,
but even with sincere enthusiasm. Whoever obsevved the internail developmelllt of the Sloivak Republic with open eyes
and without prejudice, and whoever wanted to see how bhe
relationship of the Slovak nation to Slo,vaik independence
was being for.med, very easily could have convinced himself
that their relationship was always positive and was constantly becoming more ardent. It was really and truly
only a natural developcnent.
Even though the historical facts were and still are
easily ascertainaJble, some people, nevertheless. did not and
still do not like the simple and plain truth and, therefore,
dress the historical e,v ent in garments orf false legends. The
gist o,f the matter is lost to them in a flood of details, and
by stressing secondary, frequently insignificaint phenomena,
the,y stun or cover up the real sUJbSitance. Of cours z, they
know what they are doing; they know what they wish to
attain by doing so.
When e,v aluating a historical fact, such as the declaration o,,f the state independence of Slovakia, the only question
of real s,i:gnifiicance is whether the SloiVruk nation had the
rrght to declare its country an independent state. It may
be interesting, .but utterly secondary, whether this historical
dedsion of the Slovak Assembly was made under this or
that international situation which, aifter all, fol'med only the
outer frame for March 14, 1939.
The Slovak nation itself never doubted arbout its inherent right to. freedom and state independernJCe. And it
will not debate about this right with aruy one. '.Dhe incontr01Vertible truth is that it does possess this right in the
same measure as do other nations of the earth. The people
who created and are still creating false legends rubout March
14, 1939, do not have the courage to openly denry the Slovak nation the r:ght to state inclepe,n dence: in fact, b principle they recognize this right_ and th€1oretiically hruve no
objections a:gainst it. Nevertheless, for reasons olbvious and
best known to themselves, they present the very event of
�24
SLOVAKIA
the declaration of the independence of the Slov,ak State in a
fal:se light. Into the forefront of the historical scene they
are pushing per.sons who did not have a deciding role in the
issue and are magnifying phenomena whi'ch were only secondary ~isodes. Even though they know that Dr. Joseph Tiso
and Karol Sidor repudiated Hitler's proposition, and even
though they know that neither Hitler nor his people had
any influence on the members of the Slovak Assembly,
nevertheless they maintain and continue to ~peat that the
decl·a ration of the state independence of Slovakia was dictated to the Slovalks from the outside.
This is a conscious and intentional falsification of a
historical fact. Such a presentation o.f the matter is proof
of not comprehending historical development and is an insult for the Slovak nation which is thereby pre,se,nted as a
child without its own will. They created this false legend
so that they might devaluate the state independence of SlovaJkia and validate their own interests .
.Am,other false legend is the story that by declaring the
ind~ndence cxf Slovakia the Slovaiks committed treason
against the state, the state which during 1ts entire existence
never fol.!f,Bled the dghteous demands of the Slovalk nation
and with its political ideo.Jogy and its internal management stood in opposition to the ,vital interests of Slovakia.
Allegations of "treason" against the. Sl01Va)k nation are
proof that, a:ccording to such- an opinion, the SlOIVak nation
was db1rged to r emain until the end of time in union with a
state whrch did not satisfy the needs of a free Sl01Vaik way
of life. That Js, the SJ01VaJks, even though theoretically the
right to independence was not denied them, were not to be
allowed to use this right in practice, nay, even had to surrend<eT it.
The ,p eople who .talik about the "treason" of the Slovak
nation in thts fashion naturally would have to see even a
greater treason in the declaration olf independence of the
United S'tates and would have to condemp. the course of
every nation whi!ch has already declared the independence
of its country or which is still endeavori.I.J:g- to attain_its in-
�SLOVAKIA
25
dependence. Of course, ithey are wise eno1UJgh not to mention
any such nonsense.
The srume ,people - the Benes Czeohs ( Czech Socialists
and pro-1Soviet Czechs) and the so-ica11ed "Czechoslovaks"
(Slovak renegades in the pay oif the Benes Czechs) - talJked
long and loudly alboiut the "treason" of the Slovak nation
against Slavdom. But this legend lasted only as long as
coonmtmist Moscow appeared in a Slovruk mamtie so thait it
might thereby more effectiively realize its own designs in the
ensl·a ved .SlOV1anic (1Shwic) countries. When Ml()SICow discarded this imam.tle., these people immediately ceased talking
about Slawdom, 1because the legend lost tts attraictiveness.
Perhrups the greatest inconsistency and confused contriadiction was found in ,tJhe legend aJbout SlOIVak "fascism,"
whiich stated that by declaring its independence Slovakiia
had ,t hrwst herself into the embrace. of nruzism. If the authors of this legend really were interested in the truth, they
would necessarily have to adrmit and give pulblic testimony
to the fact that the Slovak Reipubl.ic, mana;ged in ,t he spirit
of the slogan "loyal to ourselrves . . ." by President J oseiph
Tiso,, was the most secure iprotection of SlovaJk lilfe against
the influence of German nruzism.
The legend, whiich was farthest from historical truth
and is the crown of a}ll falsehoods and misrepresentations
about the Slwak RepU!blic, is the legend aJbout tilie SO'-lealled
"national uprising" and its "great a·chievemeruts," which the
"CzechoslovaJks" invented in their fantasy and described. in
such glowing teI'lmS, declaring that in the union oif the
Comm'UI1ist-dominated National Front "the Sl'OIVruks were
governing themselves." As shameful as was the content of
this legend with all its details, so just as shamel:f.trl and inglorious was also its end.
All these legends, blown wp beyond credi!ble dimensions
by the fanfare of irresistible propaganda, were dispelied li!ke
a dirty, ma}odorous mist. There remained onil.y lbare rea}lity
and historical triuth. And suich a reality and clerur, undenia;ble
and unaltera'b le histoTiical truth is the fact that the Slovalk
nation did have its -own indepernderut staite and that in this
state. even .with all its faults and shortcomings, the Slo-
�26
SLOVAKIA
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1
1
•
•
•
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-
�
22
SLOVAKIA
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!
•
•
•
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-
�SLOVAKIA
23
tions with it. And not-even the worst distortion oif the truth
can deny the incontrovertible reality that the Sloivak nation
accepted the decision of the Slovruk Ass,emlbly spontaneously,
but even with sincere enthusiasm. Whoever obsevved the internail developmelllt of the Sloivak Republic with open eyes
and without prejudice, and whoever wanted to see how bhe
relationship of the Slovak nation to Slo,vaik independence
was being for.med, very easily could have convinced himself
that their relationship was always positive and was constantly becoming more ardent. It was really and truly
only a natural developcnent.
Even though the historical facts were and still are
easily ascertainaJble, some people, nevertheless. did not and
still do not like the simple and plain truth and, therefore,
dress the historical e,v ent in garments orf false legends. The
gist o,f the matter is lost to them in a flood of details, and
by stressing secondary, frequently insignificaint phenomena,
the,y stun or cover up the real sUJbSitance. Of cours z, they
know what they are doing; they know what they wish to
attain by doing so.
When e,v aluating a historical fact, such as the declaration o,,f the state independence of Slovakia, the only question
of real s,i:gnifiicance is whether the SloiVruk nation had the
rrght to declare its country an independent state. It may
be interesting, .but utterly secondary, whether this historical
dedsion of the Slovak Assembly was made under this or
that international situation which, aifter all, fol'med only the
outer frame for March 14, 1939.
The Slovak nation itself never doubted arbout its inherent right to. freedom and state independernJCe. And it
will not debate about this right with aruy one. '.Dhe incontr01Vertible truth is that it does possess this right in the
same measure as do other nations of the earth. The people
who created and are still creating false legends rubout March
14, 1939, do not have the courage to openly denry the Slovak nation the r:ght to state inclepe,n dence: in fact, b principle they recognize this right_ and th€1oretiically hruve no
objections a:gainst it. Nevertheless, for reasons olbvious and
best known to themselves, they present the very event of
�24
SLOVAKIA
the declaration of the independence of the Slov,ak State in a
fal:se light. Into the forefront of the historical scene they
are pushing per.sons who did not have a deciding role in the
issue and are magnifying phenomena whi'ch were only secondary ~isodes. Even though they know that Dr. Joseph Tiso
and Karol Sidor repudiated Hitler's proposition, and even
though they know that neither Hitler nor his people had
any influence on the members of the Slovak Assembly,
nevertheless they maintain and continue to ~peat that the
decl·a ration of the state independence of Slovakia was dictated to the Slovalks from the outside.
This is a conscious and intentional falsification of a
historical fact. Such a presentation o.f the matter is proof
of not comprehending historical development and is an insult for the Slovak nation which is thereby pre,se,nted as a
child without its own will. They created this false legend
so that they might devaluate the state independence of SlovaJkia and validate their own interests .
.Am,other false legend is the story that by declaring the
ind~ndence cxf Slovakia the Slovaiks committed treason
against the state, the state which during 1ts entire existence
never fol.!f,Bled the dghteous demands of the Slovalk nation
and with its political ideo.Jogy and its internal management stood in opposition to the ,vital interests of Slovakia.
Allegations of "treason" against the. Sl01Va)k nation are
proof that, a:ccording to such- an opinion, the SlOIVak nation
was db1rged to r emain until the end of time in union with a
state whrch did not satisfy the needs of a free Sl01Vaik way
of life. That Js, the SJ01VaJks, even though theoretically the
right to independence was not denied them, were not to be
allowed to use this right in practice, nay, even had to surrend<eT it.
The ,p eople who .talik about the "treason" of the Slovak
nation in thts fashion naturally would have to see even a
greater treason in the declaration olf independence of the
United S'tates and would have to condemp. the course of
every nation whi!ch has already declared the independence
of its country or which is still endeavori.I.J:g- to attain_its in-
�SLOVAKIA
25
dependence. Of course, ithey are wise eno1UJgh not to mention
any such nonsense.
The srume ,people - the Benes Czeohs ( Czech Socialists
and pro-1Soviet Czechs) and the so-ica11ed "Czechoslovaks"
(Slovak renegades in the pay oif the Benes Czechs) - talJked
long and loudly alboiut the "treason" of the Slovak nation
against Slavdom. But this legend lasted only as long as
coonmtmist Moscow appeared in a Slovruk mamtie so thait it
might thereby more effectiively realize its own designs in the
ensl·a ved .SlOV1anic (1Shwic) countries. When Ml()SICow discarded this imam.tle., these people immediately ceased talking
about Slawdom, 1because the legend lost tts attraictiveness.
Perhrups the greatest inconsistency and confused contriadiction was found in ,tJhe legend aJbout SlOIVak "fascism,"
whiich stated that by declaring its independence Slovakiia
had ,t hrwst herself into the embrace. of nruzism. If the authors of this legend really were interested in the truth, they
would necessarily have to adrmit and give pulblic testimony
to the fact that the Slovak Reipubl.ic, mana;ged in ,t he spirit
of the slogan "loyal to ourselrves . . ." by President J oseiph
Tiso,, was the most secure iprotection of SlovaJk lilfe against
the influence of German nruzism.
The legend, whiich was farthest from historical truth
and is the crown of a}ll falsehoods and misrepresentations
about the Slwak RepU!blic, is the legend aJbout tilie SO'-lealled
"national uprising" and its "great a·chievemeruts," which the
"CzechoslovaJks" invented in their fantasy and described. in
such glowing teI'lmS, declaring that in the union oif the
Comm'UI1ist-dominated National Front "the Sl'OIVruks were
governing themselves." As shameful as was the content of
this legend with all its details, so just as shamel:f.trl and inglorious was also its end.
All these legends, blown wp beyond credi!ble dimensions
by the fanfare of irresistible propaganda, were dispelied li!ke
a dirty, ma}odorous mist. There remained onil.y lbare rea}lity
and historical triuth. And suich a reality and clerur, undenia;ble
and unaltera'b le histoTiical truth is the fact that the Slovalk
nation did have its -own indepernderut staite and that in this
state. even .with all its faults and shortcomings, the Slo-
�26
SLOVAKIA
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1
1
•
•
•
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-
�
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Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
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22
SLOVAKIA
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!
•
•
•
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-
SLOVAKIA
23
tions with it. And not-even the worst distortion oif the truth
can deny the incontrovertible reality that the Sloivak nation
accepted the decision of the Slovruk Ass,emlbly spontaneously,
but even with sincere enthusiasm. Whoever obsevved the internail developmelllt of the Sloivak Republic with open eyes
and without prejudice, and whoever wanted to see how bhe
relationship of the Slovak nation to Slo,vaik independence
was being for.med, very easily could have convinced himself
that their relationship was always positive and was constantly becoming more ardent. It was really and truly
only a natural developcnent.
Even though the historical facts were and still are
easily ascertainaJble, some people, nevertheless. did not and
still do not like the simple and plain truth and, therefore,
dress the historical e,v ent in garments orf false legends. The
gist o,f the matter is lost to them in a flood of details, and
by stressing secondary, frequently insignificaint phenomena,
the,y stun or cover up the real sUJbSitance. Of cours z, they
know what they are doing; they know what they wish to
attain by doing so.
When e,v aluating a historical fact, such as the declaration o,,f the state independence of Slovakia, the only question
of real s,i:gnifiicance is whether the SloiVruk nation had the
rrght to declare its country an independent state. It may
be interesting, .but utterly secondary, whether this historical
dedsion of the Slovak Assembly was made under this or
that international situation which, aifter all, fol'med only the
outer frame for March 14, 1939.
The Slovak nation itself never doubted arbout its inherent right to. freedom and state independernJCe. And it
will not debate about this right with aruy one. '.Dhe incontr01Vertible truth is that it does possess this right in the
same measure as do other nations of the earth. The people
who created and are still creating false legends rubout March
14, 1939, do not have the courage to openly denry the Slovak nation the r:ght to state inclepe,n dence: in fact, b principle they recognize this right_ and th€1oretiically hruve no
objections a:gainst it. Nevertheless, for reasons olbvious and
best known to themselves, they present the very event of
24
SLOVAKIA
the declaration of the independence of the Slov,ak State in a
fal:se light. Into the forefront of the historical scene they
are pushing per.sons who did not have a deciding role in the
issue and are magnifying phenomena whi'ch were only secondary ~isodes. Even though they know that Dr. Joseph Tiso
and Karol Sidor repudiated Hitler's proposition, and even
though they know that neither Hitler nor his people had
any influence on the members of the Slovak Assembly,
nevertheless they maintain and continue to ~peat that the
decl·a ration of the state independence of Slovakia was dictated to the Slovalks from the outside.
This is a conscious and intentional falsification of a
historical fact. Such a presentation o.f the matter is proof
of not comprehending historical development and is an insult for the Slovak nation which is thereby pre,se,nted as a
child without its own will. They created this false legend
so that they might devaluate the state independence of SlovaJkia and validate their own interests .
.Am,other false legend is the story that by declaring the
ind~ndence cxf Slovakia the Slovaiks committed treason
against the state, the state which during 1ts entire existence
never fol.!f,Bled the dghteous demands of the Slovalk nation
and with its political ideo.Jogy and its internal management stood in opposition to the ,vital interests of Slovakia.
Allegations of "treason" against the. Sl01Va)k nation are
proof that, a:ccording to such- an opinion, the SlOIVak nation
was db1rged to r emain until the end of time in union with a
state whrch did not satisfy the needs of a free Sl01Vaik way
of life. That Js, the SJ01VaJks, even though theoretically the
right to independence was not denied them, were not to be
allowed to use this right in practice, nay, even had to surrend<eT it.
The ,p eople who .talik about the "treason" of the Slovak
nation in thts fashion naturally would have to see even a
greater treason in the declaration olf independence of the
United S'tates and would have to condemp. the course of
every nation whi!ch has already declared the independence
of its country or which is still endeavori.I.J:g- to attain_its in-
SLOVAKIA
25
dependence. Of course, ithey are wise eno1UJgh not to mention
any such nonsense.
The srume ,people - the Benes Czeohs ( Czech Socialists
and pro-1Soviet Czechs) and the so-ica11ed "Czechoslovaks"
(Slovak renegades in the pay oif the Benes Czechs) - talJked
long and loudly alboiut the "treason" of the Slovak nation
against Slavdom. But this legend lasted only as long as
coonmtmist Moscow appeared in a Slovruk mamtie so thait it
might thereby more effectiively realize its own designs in the
ensl·a ved .SlOV1anic (1Shwic) countries. When Ml()SICow discarded this imam.tle., these people immediately ceased talking
about Slawdom, 1because the legend lost tts attraictiveness.
Perhrups the greatest inconsistency and confused contriadiction was found in ,tJhe legend aJbout SlOIVak "fascism,"
whiich stated that by declaring its independence Slovakiia
had ,t hrwst herself into the embrace. of nruzism. If the authors of this legend really were interested in the truth, they
would necessarily have to adrmit and give pulblic testimony
to the fact that the Slovak Reipubl.ic, mana;ged in ,t he spirit
of the slogan "loyal to ourselrves . . ." by President J oseiph
Tiso,, was the most secure iprotection of SlovaJk lilfe against
the influence of German nruzism.
The legend, whiich was farthest from historical truth
and is the crown of a}ll falsehoods and misrepresentations
about the Slwak RepU!blic, is the legend aJbout tilie SO'-lealled
"national uprising" and its "great a·chievemeruts," which the
"CzechoslovaJks" invented in their fantasy and described. in
such glowing teI'lmS, declaring that in the union oif the
Comm'UI1ist-dominated National Front "the Sl'OIVruks were
governing themselves." As shameful as was the content of
this legend with all its details, so just as shamel:f.trl and inglorious was also its end.
All these legends, blown wp beyond credi!ble dimensions
by the fanfare of irresistible propaganda, were dispelied li!ke
a dirty, ma}odorous mist. There remained onil.y lbare rea}lity
and historical triuth. And suich a reality and clerur, undenia;ble
and unaltera'b le histoTiical truth is the fact that the Slovalk
nation did have its -own indepernderut staite and that in this
state. even .with all its faults and shortcomings, the Slo-
26
SLOVAKIA
vruks soon became cOiIWinoed that Slova;kia was self-suffie,ient
economically and that they were mature enough politically
to live a free and independent life.
After the false legends, the puripose of which it was to
stupefy the Slovak naition and stifle in it the yearning for
independence, there came a period of suffering, misery and
enslavement. But the burden of this sad fate only strengthened in the Slovak nation the consciousness of its ri ght to
fz:eedom and fo11tified its desire for the restoration of the
state independence of Slovrukia. The Slovaik nation, ooe of
the oldest Christian nruti ons o,f central Europe, will never
rest satisfied until it is free of all tyranny and all foreign
domrinatioo..
1
1
•
•
•
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATI ON OF INDEPENDE NCE
N3 citiizens of the democraitic Republic of the United
States of America, we firimly hold to the beLief that all nations without exception. have the inherent, God-given right
the right to establish
to freedom and independence to- freely elect a
right
the
and
state
their own ,p olitical
government of their orwn choice.
On March 14, 1939, after centuries of alien domination,
the 1peo.ple of Slovrukia exercised their inherenit right when
their druly elected representative s in the autonomous Slovak Asseimlbly proclaimed the independence of their country and estaJblished the Republic of Slovakia. Of course,
the:re are people in Amen-ca even today who present this
historical fact in a false light and endeavor to debase and
vilify everything connected with it. Nevertheless, the utterly .s imple historical truth is that the Slovak Asse:m!bly unanimously declared the land of the Slovaks an independent
repulblic - the Republic of Slovakia.
The Slova'k Repll!blic, the dream of Slovak generations,
became a reality and was recogmzed by twenty-seven countries, ilncluili.ng the governments of Great Britain, France
and the Soviet Union. After Slovakia was declared inde-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Historical Truth and False Legends
Description
An account of the resource
Francis Hrušovský
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 22-26
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrušovský, František, 1903-1956
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b03279cd81b9ebd4601ac1ffca8df81a.pdf
b6dad0a741d4e3eb02e2c574d5551baa
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
17
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
Joseph Pauco
Americans of Slovak descent participated honorably
and in no small measure in the struggle for 'SlovaJk independerl'ce. The foundation of the program of the aurtonlOmistic
movement in Slova;kia cannot be imagined without them.
In fact, they were responsiJble for its structure with the
prin:::i;ples contained in the Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918,
the same princiiples which some American Slovaks defended
more consistently than did the Hlinka Slovaik Peo.p le's
Party itself.
One need not ,b e surprised, therefore, at the great joy
evinced by American Slovaks when the autonomy of Sloivakia was 1proclaimed at Zilina on October 6, 1938, after iit was
granted by the Czecho-,Slovak go.vernment at Prague. The
Slovak League of America not only eX!pre.ssed its congratulations, but also hurried to help the autonomous government of Slovrukia financially with a gift of $10,000.
The government of Dr. Joseph Tiso was aware of the
role played by American Slovruks in rthe l~beration movement. At the very first opportunity it wanted to greet a
delegation in free Bratislaiva, so Premier Tiso sent an invitation to the Sloivak Lea;gue on December 16, 1938, to be
present at rthe opening of the Slovak Srtate Assembly. In
his letter of invitation, Dr. Tiso said among other things:
"Your coming here will be a holiday of infinite joy over the
victorious concllIBion of the struggle for the rights of the
sovereign Slovak naition and a holiday of cmr sincere gratitude for eveeything .that you ha'Ve done in the United
States to ccmtrilbute either ideologically or financially to
the vi:ictOlry of the SlovaJk nation."
Dr. Tiso sent a similar message to ,t he Supreme Office
of the Catholiic Slovalk Federation, in'Virting "our entiTe fraternal America" to Bratisl:wa.
On March 14, 1939, when the belJ.s of freedom resounded throughout the whole of Slovakia, the Slovak Government again was mindful of the American Slovalks. At
�18
SLOVAKIA
that time Dr. Joseph Tiso sent the following telegram to
the Slovak Lea:gue of Amevka :
"Today we have founded the independent Slovaik
State, not only to preserive Slovak tradition, but also to
guarantee bread and soil for the Slova.Jks. We are basing our nuture on our independence. In ,this tense politiJcal situaition, in wh~ch states and nations are changing
their forms, we can presenve oursel;ves only if we become an independent state.
"Therefore, beloved brothers and sisters in the
United States, stand by us and rejoice with us. Today
you can rest aissured ,t hat Slovaikia is no longer a suffered aippendaige, hut is everywhere the master in its
own home and is able to present itself to the world
under its very own name.
"For you, beloved 1brothers and sistevs in the
United States, this iis very important, rbec-ause we shall
be able to ma,ke contaots with yOIU direotlry without
having to go in a circuitous way thvough diplomatic
,connections. May God protect you and 1b e with us so
that the Slovaik nati!on might f1ourish in what has b een
initiated today."
1
Dr. Tiso sent an eX1tensive messaige to .the American
Slovaks, .i n which he explained in detail how the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia had come aibout and
sketichoo especia:Uy the politkal principles by which the Slovak Government would guide itself. This message is such
a penm.rating and serious dommnent of Slovak history that
it will be necessary to devote indiviidual attention to it
some time.
It is necessary to note that the Slovaik Leaigue of America, which stood at the head of the movement for autono-mous SlovaJkia, was ag,a inst the dismembe:mnent of OzechoSlovakia up to Mav~h 14, 1939. In those .s tirring Mavch days,
when President Hrucha dismissed Tiso as premier of the
antonomous Slova,k · Government and appointed Karol -Sidor
in his pla,ce, the Slovak League of Almeri,ca sent Sidor this
caiblegra,m: "Advise strong stand rugai:nst secession. Slo-
�SLOVAKIA
19
v.ak League is for federation with Czechs on an equal
basis."
This stand of the League need not surprise us. U;p to the
day when the SlovaJk League sent the caiblegram to Sidor,
not even responsible Slovak circles were for any other political program. 'Ilhe ffi1I1Jka SlovaJk People's Pal'ty honootl,y
sought a peaceful solution of mutual relationship with the
Ozechs. It did not find such a solution and, therefore, after
the aruned putsch of the Czech Genera1's on Ma·r ch 10, 1939,
and at the same time fully aiware of the internaitional situation as a whole, it chase ,s ecession despite the fact that
Americans of Slova;k descent advised against it. But even
American S1'ovaks did not ta!ke the situation literally as expressed in the cablegram. Its autho,r, the president of the
Slovalk League at that time, Joseph Husek, comrrnentmg on
the events transpiring in Bratishwa and quoting the crublegram of the Leaigue, explained: "This stand ( against secession) was accepted by the last Congress of the Slovak
Leaigue. We stand upon our word. But whatever the result
of this conflict, we shall stand loyally by SlovaJkia and the
Slovak nation. Prague committed not only a mistake, but in
fact has committed an hostile act against the Slovak nation.
This, in its own drastic intervention, it cannot justify. For
the consequences thereof it alone is respons~ble."
That is how Joseph Husek wrote when he still did not
have any reports of what had happened in BraitiisJ.,a va on
March 14, 1939. It was iprobably only a few houra lbeifore or
after that the Slovak Assemlbly unanimously declared the
independence of SlovaJkia and the founding of the independent SlovaJk Republic.
When the telegram of Dr. Joseph Tiso arrived in the
USA, Husek ipublidy congratulated and greeted the government of the Slovak Repuibli:c in the Slorvak press of America. Among o.ther things, he stated: "The Slova!k League
was against secession. But si,nce the Slovaks at home have
proclaime!d their independence, we greeted independent Slovakia and wished her a hearty 'Good Luok' ."
Immediately after March 14, 1939, the SlovaJk League of
America staunchly defended Slova;k statehood and in prin-
�20
SLOVAKIA
ciple backed the SlovaJk Republic. In this regard we must
mention the letteT which the ,pres1dent of the Slovak League
of .America, Joseiph HU!sek, sent ,to President F. D. Roosevelt on .AJPril 24, 1939. The letter, requesting recognition of
the Slovak RepuJblic •b y the United States of America, contained also the following:
"T'he secession of Slovatlcia from the Cze,cho...Sloviak Rep'l.llblic was not the result of intrigues between
the Slovak leadern and Germany, not for a desire for
annexation to Hungary. The Slovaks proved by recent
srucri:fice Of hll!ITlan life and their present firm resistance to the unjust territorial demands of H'UJilgaory how
4ounded this accusation, made frequently during the
.past twenty years by the proponents of the Ozechoslo'Vak theory, has .b een. The secession of Slovakia was,
at least, as much the result of intolerable condi:tions
within the Repwblic, cu1minating in the unjustifiable
military occupation of its capi,tol of Slovaikia, Bratislava, and the arrest of the pri:me minister, Dr. Joseph
Tiso, b;y orde r c.f the Prague government, as of the existing conditions outside of the small country over
which, naturally, the Slovaikis had no control. There
was, and is, perhrups, no nation which has been so wilfully misrepresented to the world as has, and is even
today, Slovakia. Explo,i ted by non-4Slovak g c-vernments,
·h er le aders silenced by foreign masters, p ersecuted and
often incarcerated, her people have s uffered national
oppression for more than a hundred years; first , under
the Magyars, later under the Czechs, who, under the
gui.se of 'democr.aicy' made of Slovakia a Czech colony.
Today, an autonomous state, her fate lies entirely in
the hands of those who haive, or shall have, the power
to determine the futUTe of Europe and the world at
large. "
At the same time the president of the Slova:k League
expressed this request :
"It is the fer.vent desire of the Slovak Americans that
the -,United States will be one of the first to recognize the
R~pulblic of Slovalkia, ther~by giving its people. courage and
�SLOVAKIA
21
faith with which to. meet the future and strengthening the
spirit of democrrucy, already so firmly imlbedded in the
hearts of Slovak people.."
On May 12, 1939, the Central Committee of the Slovak
league of America met in Pittsiburgh, Pa., and declared officially that "the Slova;k League of America stands and
shall stand intrepidly behind Slo1vaJkra, sympathizes with
her, shall he1p her and in every way defend her against all
eneimies, whether internal or external."
At that session, the sixth point of the resolution passed
at that meeting of the league read: "The Slovak Lea·gue
shall make the necessary steps to get a hear:ing before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington
so that it could ,p resent its arguments why the United
States, following the example od: another great democracy
- Britain, should at least give de facto recognition to the
Slovak State."
The Catholic Slovak Federation of America reacted
just as favorrubly to the Sloiva!k State as diid the Slovak
League. Immediately after March 14, 1939, the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Stephen Kocis and Mr. John Lesko, president and se:cretary of the CSF respectively, issued a declaration in which
they defended the honor and good name of the Slovak
leaders and forcefully answered all attacks of enemies of
the Slovak cause. In the declaration we read: " . . .personally
we know Dr. Joseph Tiso, his Sloivak patriotism and his
noble character; therefore, we cannot believe, and do not
believe that he has committed the base betray;al against his
Slovak nation and Slovakia which certain people accuse
him of today."
The late Rt. Rev. Msgr. John E. Rura of Perth Amboy,
N. J., who was very a;ctive in the OSF in the east, wrote an
article for the Slovak press prior to the meeting of Slovaik Catholi'c priests in New Yoi,k on April 19, 1939, condemning those who slandered and viilified Slovruk leaders in
Slovakia. In that artide he said that for certiain people
"October 6, 1938, was fatal, because the Pittsburgh Pact
was then incor,porated in the life of the history of the Slovak nation. And now aigain March 14, 1939, that mortal
�22
SLOVAKIA
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!
•
•
•
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-
�
SLOVAKIA
17
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
Joseph Pauco
Americans of Slovak descent participated honorably
and in no small measure in the struggle for 'SlovaJk independerl'ce. The foundation of the program of the aurtonlOmistic
movement in Slova;kia cannot be imagined without them.
In fact, they were responsiJble for its structure with the
prin:::i;ples contained in the Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918,
the same princiiples which some American Slovaks defended
more consistently than did the Hlinka Slovaik Peo.p le's
Party itself.
One need not ,b e surprised, therefore, at the great joy
evinced by American Slovaks when the autonomy of Sloivakia was 1proclaimed at Zilina on October 6, 1938, after iit was
granted by the Czecho-,Slovak go.vernment at Prague. The
Slovak League of America not only eX!pre.ssed its congratulations, but also hurried to help the autonomous government of Slovrukia financially with a gift of $10,000.
The government of Dr. Joseph Tiso was aware of the
role played by American Slovruks in rthe l~beration movement. At the very first opportunity it wanted to greet a
delegation in free Bratislaiva, so Premier Tiso sent an invitation to the Sloivak Lea;gue on December 16, 1938, to be
present at rthe opening of the Slovak Srtate Assembly. In
his letter of invitation, Dr. Tiso said among other things:
"Your coming here will be a holiday of infinite joy over the
victorious concllIBion of the struggle for the rights of the
sovereign Slovak naition and a holiday of cmr sincere gratitude for eveeything .that you ha'Ve done in the United
States to ccmtrilbute either ideologically or financially to
the vi:ictOlry of the SlovaJk nation."
Dr. Tiso sent a similar message to ,t he Supreme Office
of the Catholiic Slovalk Federation, in'Virting "our entiTe fraternal America" to Bratisl:wa.
On March 14, 1939, when the belJ.s of freedom resounded throughout the whole of Slovakia, the Slovak Government again was mindful of the American Slovalks. At
�18
SLOVAKIA
that time Dr. Joseph Tiso sent the following telegram to
the Slovak Lea:gue of Amevka :
"Today we have founded the independent Slovaik
State, not only to preserive Slovak tradition, but also to
guarantee bread and soil for the Slova.Jks. We are basing our nuture on our independence. In ,this tense politiJcal situaition, in wh~ch states and nations are changing
their forms, we can presenve oursel;ves only if we become an independent state.
"Therefore, beloved brothers and sisters in the
United States, stand by us and rejoice with us. Today
you can rest aissured ,t hat Slovaikia is no longer a suffered aippendaige, hut is everywhere the master in its
own home and is able to present itself to the world
under its very own name.
"For you, beloved 1brothers and sistevs in the
United States, this iis very important, rbec-ause we shall
be able to ma,ke contaots with yOIU direotlry without
having to go in a circuitous way thvough diplomatic
,connections. May God protect you and 1b e with us so
that the Slovaik nati!on might f1ourish in what has b een
initiated today."
1
Dr. Tiso sent an eX1tensive messaige to .the American
Slovaks, .i n which he explained in detail how the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia had come aibout and
sketichoo especia:Uy the politkal principles by which the Slovak Government would guide itself. This message is such
a penm.rating and serious dommnent of Slovak history that
it will be necessary to devote indiviidual attention to it
some time.
It is necessary to note that the Slovaik Leaigue of America, which stood at the head of the movement for autono-mous SlovaJkia, was ag,a inst the dismembe:mnent of OzechoSlovakia up to Mav~h 14, 1939. In those .s tirring Mavch days,
when President Hrucha dismissed Tiso as premier of the
antonomous Slova,k · Government and appointed Karol -Sidor
in his pla,ce, the Slovak League of Almeri,ca sent Sidor this
caiblegra,m: "Advise strong stand rugai:nst secession. Slo-
�SLOVAKIA
19
v.ak League is for federation with Czechs on an equal
basis."
This stand of the League need not surprise us. U;p to the
day when the SlovaJk League sent the caiblegram to Sidor,
not even responsible Slovak circles were for any other political program. 'Ilhe ffi1I1Jka SlovaJk People's Pal'ty honootl,y
sought a peaceful solution of mutual relationship with the
Ozechs. It did not find such a solution and, therefore, after
the aruned putsch of the Czech Genera1's on Ma·r ch 10, 1939,
and at the same time fully aiware of the internaitional situation as a whole, it chase ,s ecession despite the fact that
Americans of Slova;k descent advised against it. But even
American S1'ovaks did not ta!ke the situation literally as expressed in the cablegram. Its autho,r, the president of the
Slovalk League at that time, Joseph Husek, comrrnentmg on
the events transpiring in Bratishwa and quoting the crublegram of the Leaigue, explained: "This stand ( against secession) was accepted by the last Congress of the Slovak
Leaigue. We stand upon our word. But whatever the result
of this conflict, we shall stand loyally by SlovaJkia and the
Slovak nation. Prague committed not only a mistake, but in
fact has committed an hostile act against the Slovak nation.
This, in its own drastic intervention, it cannot justify. For
the consequences thereof it alone is respons~ble."
That is how Joseph Husek wrote when he still did not
have any reports of what had happened in BraitiisJ.,a va on
March 14, 1939. It was iprobably only a few houra lbeifore or
after that the Slovak Assemlbly unanimously declared the
independence of SlovaJkia and the founding of the independent SlovaJk Republic.
When the telegram of Dr. Joseph Tiso arrived in the
USA, Husek ipublidy congratulated and greeted the government of the Slovak Repuibli:c in the Slorvak press of America. Among o.ther things, he stated: "The Slova!k League
was against secession. But si,nce the Slovaks at home have
proclaime!d their independence, we greeted independent Slovakia and wished her a hearty 'Good Luok' ."
Immediately after March 14, 1939, the SlovaJk League of
America staunchly defended Slova;k statehood and in prin-
�20
SLOVAKIA
ciple backed the SlovaJk Republic. In this regard we must
mention the letteT which the ,pres1dent of the Slovak League
of .America, Joseiph HU!sek, sent ,to President F. D. Roosevelt on .AJPril 24, 1939. The letter, requesting recognition of
the Slovak RepuJblic •b y the United States of America, contained also the following:
"T'he secession of Slovatlcia from the Cze,cho...Sloviak Rep'l.llblic was not the result of intrigues between
the Slovak leadern and Germany, not for a desire for
annexation to Hungary. The Slovaks proved by recent
srucri:fice Of hll!ITlan life and their present firm resistance to the unjust territorial demands of H'UJilgaory how
4ounded this accusation, made frequently during the
.past twenty years by the proponents of the Ozechoslo'Vak theory, has .b een. The secession of Slovakia was,
at least, as much the result of intolerable condi:tions
within the Repwblic, cu1minating in the unjustifiable
military occupation of its capi,tol of Slovaikia, Bratislava, and the arrest of the pri:me minister, Dr. Joseph
Tiso, b;y orde r c.f the Prague government, as of the existing conditions outside of the small country over
which, naturally, the Slovaikis had no control. There
was, and is, perhrups, no nation which has been so wilfully misrepresented to the world as has, and is even
today, Slovakia. Explo,i ted by non-4Slovak g c-vernments,
·h er le aders silenced by foreign masters, p ersecuted and
often incarcerated, her people have s uffered national
oppression for more than a hundred years; first , under
the Magyars, later under the Czechs, who, under the
gui.se of 'democr.aicy' made of Slovakia a Czech colony.
Today, an autonomous state, her fate lies entirely in
the hands of those who haive, or shall have, the power
to determine the futUTe of Europe and the world at
large. "
At the same time the president of the Slova:k League
expressed this request :
"It is the fer.vent desire of the Slovak Americans that
the -,United States will be one of the first to recognize the
R~pulblic of Slovalkia, ther~by giving its people. courage and
�SLOVAKIA
21
faith with which to. meet the future and strengthening the
spirit of democrrucy, already so firmly imlbedded in the
hearts of Slovak people.."
On May 12, 1939, the Central Committee of the Slovak
league of America met in Pittsiburgh, Pa., and declared officially that "the Slova;k League of America stands and
shall stand intrepidly behind Slo1vaJkra, sympathizes with
her, shall he1p her and in every way defend her against all
eneimies, whether internal or external."
At that session, the sixth point of the resolution passed
at that meeting of the league read: "The Slovak Lea·gue
shall make the necessary steps to get a hear:ing before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington
so that it could ,p resent its arguments why the United
States, following the example od: another great democracy
- Britain, should at least give de facto recognition to the
Slovak State."
The Catholic Slovak Federation of America reacted
just as favorrubly to the Sloiva!k State as diid the Slovak
League. Immediately after March 14, 1939, the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Stephen Kocis and Mr. John Lesko, president and se:cretary of the CSF respectively, issued a declaration in which
they defended the honor and good name of the Slovak
leaders and forcefully answered all attacks of enemies of
the Slovak cause. In the declaration we read: " . . .personally
we know Dr. Joseph Tiso, his Sloivak patriotism and his
noble character; therefore, we cannot believe, and do not
believe that he has committed the base betray;al against his
Slovak nation and Slovakia which certain people accuse
him of today."
The late Rt. Rev. Msgr. John E. Rura of Perth Amboy,
N. J., who was very a;ctive in the OSF in the east, wrote an
article for the Slovak press prior to the meeting of Slovaik Catholi'c priests in New Yoi,k on April 19, 1939, condemning those who slandered and viilified Slovruk leaders in
Slovakia. In that artide he said that for certiain people
"October 6, 1938, was fatal, because the Pittsburgh Pact
was then incor,porated in the life of the history of the Slovak nation. And now aigain March 14, 1939, that mortal
�22
SLOVAKIA
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!
•
•
•
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
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Text
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SLOVAKIA
17
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
Joseph Pauco
Americans of Slovak descent participated honorably
and in no small measure in the struggle for 'SlovaJk independerl'ce. The foundation of the program of the aurtonlOmistic
movement in Slova;kia cannot be imagined without them.
In fact, they were responsiJble for its structure with the
prin:::i;ples contained in the Pittsburgh Pact of May 30, 1918,
the same princiiples which some American Slovaks defended
more consistently than did the Hlinka Slovaik Peo.p le's
Party itself.
One need not ,b e surprised, therefore, at the great joy
evinced by American Slovaks when the autonomy of Sloivakia was 1proclaimed at Zilina on October 6, 1938, after iit was
granted by the Czecho-,Slovak go.vernment at Prague. The
Slovak League of America not only eX!pre.ssed its congratulations, but also hurried to help the autonomous government of Slovrukia financially with a gift of $10,000.
The government of Dr. Joseph Tiso was aware of the
role played by American Slovruks in rthe l~beration movement. At the very first opportunity it wanted to greet a
delegation in free Bratislaiva, so Premier Tiso sent an invitation to the Sloivak Lea;gue on December 16, 1938, to be
present at rthe opening of the Slovak Srtate Assembly. In
his letter of invitation, Dr. Tiso said among other things:
"Your coming here will be a holiday of infinite joy over the
victorious concllIBion of the struggle for the rights of the
sovereign Slovak naition and a holiday of cmr sincere gratitude for eveeything .that you ha'Ve done in the United
States to ccmtrilbute either ideologically or financially to
the vi:ictOlry of the SlovaJk nation."
Dr. Tiso sent a similar message to ,t he Supreme Office
of the Catholiic Slovalk Federation, in'Virting "our entiTe fraternal America" to Bratisl:wa.
On March 14, 1939, when the belJ.s of freedom resounded throughout the whole of Slovakia, the Slovak Government again was mindful of the American Slovalks. At
18
SLOVAKIA
that time Dr. Joseph Tiso sent the following telegram to
the Slovak Lea:gue of Amevka :
"Today we have founded the independent Slovaik
State, not only to preserive Slovak tradition, but also to
guarantee bread and soil for the Slova.Jks. We are basing our nuture on our independence. In ,this tense politiJcal situaition, in wh~ch states and nations are changing
their forms, we can presenve oursel;ves only if we become an independent state.
"Therefore, beloved brothers and sisters in the
United States, stand by us and rejoice with us. Today
you can rest aissured ,t hat Slovaikia is no longer a suffered aippendaige, hut is everywhere the master in its
own home and is able to present itself to the world
under its very own name.
"For you, beloved 1brothers and sistevs in the
United States, this iis very important, rbec-ause we shall
be able to ma,ke contaots with yOIU direotlry without
having to go in a circuitous way thvough diplomatic
,connections. May God protect you and 1b e with us so
that the Slovaik nati!on might f1ourish in what has b een
initiated today."
1
Dr. Tiso sent an eX1tensive messaige to .the American
Slovaks, .i n which he explained in detail how the proclamation of the independence of Slovakia had come aibout and
sketichoo especia:Uy the politkal principles by which the Slovak Government would guide itself. This message is such
a penm.rating and serious dommnent of Slovak history that
it will be necessary to devote indiviidual attention to it
some time.
It is necessary to note that the Slovaik Leaigue of America, which stood at the head of the movement for autono-mous SlovaJkia, was ag,a inst the dismembe:mnent of OzechoSlovakia up to Mav~h 14, 1939. In those .s tirring Mavch days,
when President Hrucha dismissed Tiso as premier of the
antonomous Slova,k · Government and appointed Karol -Sidor
in his pla,ce, the Slovak League of Almeri,ca sent Sidor this
caiblegra,m: "Advise strong stand rugai:nst secession. Slo-
SLOVAKIA
19
v.ak League is for federation with Czechs on an equal
basis."
This stand of the League need not surprise us. U;p to the
day when the SlovaJk League sent the caiblegram to Sidor,
not even responsible Slovak circles were for any other political program. 'Ilhe ffi1I1Jka SlovaJk People's Pal'ty honootl,y
sought a peaceful solution of mutual relationship with the
Ozechs. It did not find such a solution and, therefore, after
the aruned putsch of the Czech Genera1's on Ma·r ch 10, 1939,
and at the same time fully aiware of the internaitional situation as a whole, it chase ,s ecession despite the fact that
Americans of Slova;k descent advised against it. But even
American S1'ovaks did not ta!ke the situation literally as expressed in the cablegram. Its autho,r, the president of the
Slovalk League at that time, Joseph Husek, comrrnentmg on
the events transpiring in Bratishwa and quoting the crublegram of the Leaigue, explained: "This stand ( against secession) was accepted by the last Congress of the Slovak
Leaigue. We stand upon our word. But whatever the result
of this conflict, we shall stand loyally by SlovaJkia and the
Slovak nation. Prague committed not only a mistake, but in
fact has committed an hostile act against the Slovak nation.
This, in its own drastic intervention, it cannot justify. For
the consequences thereof it alone is respons~ble."
That is how Joseph Husek wrote when he still did not
have any reports of what had happened in BraitiisJ.,a va on
March 14, 1939. It was iprobably only a few houra lbeifore or
after that the Slovak Assemlbly unanimously declared the
independence of SlovaJkia and the founding of the independent SlovaJk Republic.
When the telegram of Dr. Joseph Tiso arrived in the
USA, Husek ipublidy congratulated and greeted the government of the Slovak Repuibli:c in the Slorvak press of America. Among o.ther things, he stated: "The Slova!k League
was against secession. But si,nce the Slovaks at home have
proclaime!d their independence, we greeted independent Slovakia and wished her a hearty 'Good Luok' ."
Immediately after March 14, 1939, the SlovaJk League of
America staunchly defended Slova;k statehood and in prin-
20
SLOVAKIA
ciple backed the SlovaJk Republic. In this regard we must
mention the letteT which the ,pres1dent of the Slovak League
of .America, Joseiph HU!sek, sent ,to President F. D. Roosevelt on .AJPril 24, 1939. The letter, requesting recognition of
the Slovak RepuJblic •b y the United States of America, contained also the following:
"T'he secession of Slovatlcia from the Cze,cho...Sloviak Rep'l.llblic was not the result of intrigues between
the Slovak leadern and Germany, not for a desire for
annexation to Hungary. The Slovaks proved by recent
srucri:fice Of hll!ITlan life and their present firm resistance to the unjust territorial demands of H'UJilgaory how
4ounded this accusation, made frequently during the
.past twenty years by the proponents of the Ozechoslo'Vak theory, has .b een. The secession of Slovakia was,
at least, as much the result of intolerable condi:tions
within the Repwblic, cu1minating in the unjustifiable
military occupation of its capi,tol of Slovaikia, Bratislava, and the arrest of the pri:me minister, Dr. Joseph
Tiso, b;y orde r c.f the Prague government, as of the existing conditions outside of the small country over
which, naturally, the Slovaikis had no control. There
was, and is, perhrups, no nation which has been so wilfully misrepresented to the world as has, and is even
today, Slovakia. Explo,i ted by non-4Slovak g c-vernments,
·h er le aders silenced by foreign masters, p ersecuted and
often incarcerated, her people have s uffered national
oppression for more than a hundred years; first , under
the Magyars, later under the Czechs, who, under the
gui.se of 'democr.aicy' made of Slovakia a Czech colony.
Today, an autonomous state, her fate lies entirely in
the hands of those who haive, or shall have, the power
to determine the futUTe of Europe and the world at
large. "
At the same time the president of the Slova:k League
expressed this request :
"It is the fer.vent desire of the Slovak Americans that
the -,United States will be one of the first to recognize the
R~pulblic of Slovalkia, ther~by giving its people. courage and
SLOVAKIA
21
faith with which to. meet the future and strengthening the
spirit of democrrucy, already so firmly imlbedded in the
hearts of Slovak people.."
On May 12, 1939, the Central Committee of the Slovak
league of America met in Pittsiburgh, Pa., and declared officially that "the Slova;k League of America stands and
shall stand intrepidly behind Slo1vaJkra, sympathizes with
her, shall he1p her and in every way defend her against all
eneimies, whether internal or external."
At that session, the sixth point of the resolution passed
at that meeting of the league read: "The Slovak Lea·gue
shall make the necessary steps to get a hear:ing before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate in Washington
so that it could ,p resent its arguments why the United
States, following the example od: another great democracy
- Britain, should at least give de facto recognition to the
Slovak State."
The Catholic Slovak Federation of America reacted
just as favorrubly to the Sloiva!k State as diid the Slovak
League. Immediately after March 14, 1939, the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Stephen Kocis and Mr. John Lesko, president and se:cretary of the CSF respectively, issued a declaration in which
they defended the honor and good name of the Slovak
leaders and forcefully answered all attacks of enemies of
the Slovak cause. In the declaration we read: " . . .personally
we know Dr. Joseph Tiso, his Sloivak patriotism and his
noble character; therefore, we cannot believe, and do not
believe that he has committed the base betray;al against his
Slovak nation and Slovakia which certain people accuse
him of today."
The late Rt. Rev. Msgr. John E. Rura of Perth Amboy,
N. J., who was very a;ctive in the OSF in the east, wrote an
article for the Slovak press prior to the meeting of Slovaik Catholi'c priests in New Yoi,k on April 19, 1939, condemning those who slandered and viilified Slovruk leaders in
Slovakia. In that artide he said that for certiain people
"October 6, 1938, was fatal, because the Pittsburgh Pact
was then incor,porated in the life of the history of the Slovak nation. And now aigain March 14, 1939, that mortal
22
SLOVAKIA
wownd was adm1nistered anew, when a free and independent
Slow.Ilda was born. They are squirnl.in,g like a wounded
snaJke and wd:11 not recognize the truth that there was no
other way out for the .sa1viation of the Slovak nation, except that wMch the ,present lead~s in Slovakia had
taken . . . . "
Amedcans of .Slovffik descent kneiw the meaning o.f freedom and independence. They enjoyed the bJess,i ngs of the
American way of life. As tTue Ameniicans they CO'llld not
wish less to the nation they descended from. It is to their
everliasting oredit that the,y ruoted as manfully as they did
when the Slovak Republic wrus born on March 14, 1939. God
bles,s Amerioa, God 1bless and protect the Slovak nation in
this darkest period of its history!
•
•
•
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND :F ALSE LEGENDS
Francis Hrusovsky
Theil'e rure people who are not bl1nd, b1u t do not want
to see the true face of reality. They aTe not deaif, but their
ears are not a;c,cessi:ble to the voice of truth. Nor are they
inteHectuaUy so dull as nOlt to ,be aJble to comprehend a matter in its .sulbstance, :if they only wanted to. Such people
distort even the s1mplest matter and enravel it with a veil
of confusion oocording to their o,w n conceptions and their
own selfish interests. The,y are cowardly to kno,w and confess the truth and PTefer to deceive themse1ves and ha;ve
suf:fiicient courage to deceive others.
In this manner it is possiible to charructerize the ,p eople
who present the historical fact of the proclamation of the
state independence of Slovrukia in a false light and then with
consistent stubbornness endeavo,r to 1present in a false light
everything that is connected with the Slovak Republic.
The utterly simple historical fact is that on March 14,
1939, the Slovak Assembliy declared Slovakia an independent Slovruk State This historical fact was acknowledged by
many states (27), which recognized the SlovaJk Republic
either de jure or de facto and esta:blished drplomaUc rela-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
American Slovaks and March 14, 1939
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Paučo
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 17-22
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0e4f9c285a353ca219a393203f06f902.pdf
1ef8e803ea2aa6cba32fe038b354f134
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
13
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945
Joseph A. Mikus
(A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.)
"Between law and discipline the Judge must, without
any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a
form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_
Prelitninary Observations
The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries
behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives
.o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his
book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental
ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State
nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic
state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for
the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of
the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a
power imposed on the majority of the population, which is
little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests,
hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ>erlfectly all
the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends.
Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of
its legitimity.
t
If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power,
its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the
price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties.
Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is
known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies,
such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no
place in a totalitarian State.
In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a
clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic
State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power
in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality
�14
~LOVAKIA
of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive
laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just
hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy
went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous
sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit.
I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak
Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948.
The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29,
1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~
tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring
entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty
from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech
nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens
of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent
of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could
exist only by its system of international alliances and a
police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity
of all individual rights.
It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had
coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian
Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID.
Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated
into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German
Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State.
During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed
to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the
status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined
opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by
concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing
�SLOVAKIA
15
State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity
and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he
was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes
thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on
its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW
and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and
aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945,
assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the
government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly
their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer..
Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947,
pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle
of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the
State. According to this principle, the Communists had a
veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive
been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!"
- that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes
to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943.
This principle had been put into practice from the
beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May
1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could
have coooteracted their political aims.
At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed
various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome,
the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population
into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension.
of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow
Red MetrQPOlitan.
As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted
by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard
�16
SLO VAKIA
b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions
(~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was
ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950,
whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a
higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of
Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of
Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges
of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the
S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the
regional Government of SlovaJkia.
The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really
j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its
omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by
aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They
present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles
attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are
not for sale . .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East
since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we
never participated in any political combination directed
· against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any
attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our
treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration
with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY
0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .
�
SLOVAKIA
13
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945
Joseph A. Mikus
(A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.)
"Between law and discipline the Judge must, without
any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a
form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_
Prelitninary Observations
The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries
behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives
.o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his
book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental
ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State
nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic
state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for
the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of
the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a
power imposed on the majority of the population, which is
little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests,
hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ>erlfectly all
the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends.
Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of
its legitimity.
t
If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power,
its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the
price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties.
Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is
known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies,
such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no
place in a totalitarian State.
In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a
clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic
State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power
in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality
�14
~LOVAKIA
of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive
laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just
hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy
went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous
sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit.
I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak
Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948.
The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29,
1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~
tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring
entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty
from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech
nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens
of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent
of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could
exist only by its system of international alliances and a
police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity
of all individual rights.
It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had
coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian
Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID.
Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated
into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German
Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State.
During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed
to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the
status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined
opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by
concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing
�SLOVAKIA
15
State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity
and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he
was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes
thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on
its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW
and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and
aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945,
assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the
government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly
their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer..
Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947,
pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle
of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the
State. According to this principle, the Communists had a
veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive
been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!"
- that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes
to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943.
This principle had been put into practice from the
beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May
1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could
have coooteracted their political aims.
At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed
various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome,
the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population
into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension.
of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow
Red MetrQPOlitan.
As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted
by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard
�16
SLO VAKIA
b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions
(~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was
ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950,
whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a
higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of
Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of
Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges
of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the
S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the
regional Government of SlovaJkia.
The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really
j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its
omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by
aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They
present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles
attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are
not for sale . .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East
since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we
never participated in any political combination directed
· against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any
attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our
treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration
with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY
0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
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Text
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SLOVAKIA
13
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFrER 1945
Joseph A. Mikus
(A rev ised text of the lecture d elivered July 29, 1952, a t the In.ternational Congress of Juri sts in W est Berlin, Germany.)
"Between law and discipline the Judge must, without
any hesitation, choose tlhe second, since law is but a
form of the Party discipline." Andrey Wishinsky_
Prelitninary Observations
The recent evolution in PU!blic Law of the oountries
behind the Iron Ourta~n is insipired by ideas and directives
.o f theorebcians of the Socia1list State. Lenin, who in his
book "State and Revolution" laid down the fundamental
ideas of the Communist State, does not believe in the fun~tion of integration anid coordination of interests the State
nomnally exercises in the framework of a certain community. In contradistinction to tlhe teaching O!f the democratic
state, Communism does concei!Ve the State as a power organized by the "elite" which brings aibout the ends fixed for
the society in advance by hii.storical materialism. The idea of
the Communist Stale corresponds, therefore, to that of a
power imposed on the majority of the population, which is
little or not at all oonsd01Us of its own 001rnmon interests,
hy a highly dlisciplined minority which knowns iJ>erlfectly all
the steps to be taJken toward those pre-determined ends.
Conquest of ,p ower is, therefore, the main aim of Communism and successful attainment of it the unique criterion of
its legitimity.
t
If the primary ta-sk of Communism is to seize power,
its further arim is to maintain it by all means, even at the
price of a complete s111ppression of all individual liiberties.
Therefore, the separation of the Sibate powers, as it is
known by tlhe Constituti•o ns orf some classical Democracies,
such_ as the United States, France, and Great Britain, has no
place in a totalitarian State.
In the perspecUve orf these general ideas, estalblishing a
clear distinction between a Communist and a Democratic
State, I shall try to explain how Communism seized power
in Czecho-Slovakia and how - through the instrumentality
14
~LOVAKIA
of the Oonstitution of May 9, 1948, and other successive
laws - it could consolidate its victory. I shall show just
hoiw t!he Czecho-lSI-ovak State, after 1950, in practical policy
went beyond the Constitution itself, repudiating its "natiooail" character to become simply one of the numerous
sociaHst repuibhcs of the Soviet orfuit.
I. The policy of accomplished facts of the Czecho-Slovak
Government before the ConstitutJion of 1948.
The first Ozecho.,Slovak Constitution of February 29,
1920, was voted by a "Parliament" which had been nominated by a sel!f-a.ppointed Go1Vernment. That was a "Oonstitu~
tion" granting ind!i;viidual rights to the -citizens, .b ut ignoring
entirely the fundamental proiblem of the Republic: its heterogeneo1Us ethnic charncter. It requested the same lo,y alty
from all citizens, hut all those who were of tlhe non-Ozech
nationality were regarded, by the official poliicy, as. citizens
of second: rank only. Deprived. of the sipontameous consent
of alb.out half its population, this heterogeneous State could
exist only by its system of international alliances and a
police regime whreh came into being by the Internal Security Act of 1923, whi1cih pradi'Cally suspended the validity
of all individual rights.
It was only after Munich, in 1938, when her system had
coUrupsed, that Ozeciho-Slorvrukia changed her unrealistic Constitution. From a strictly unifarian State, she finally became what she should have been in 1918: a tri-ipartite federation c01InJposed of Czechia, Slorvakia and the Carpathian
Ukraine (Ruthenia). Six months after the "death bloiw" CID.
Benes) recei1Ved at Munich, Czecho-SlorvaJkia disintegrated
into her constituents parts. Thus Ozechia became a German
Protecto,r ate and SlovaJkia a free State.
During World War II, Dr. Ed.ward Benes ·managed
to convince the Allies of the necessity of reestaJblisthing the
status quo ante Munich and recreating on~e mo.re the Czecho-S:lovaJk State. Because of the stubborn and deternnined
opposition of the Siovaks, he pla!ced the destiny of the future Ozecho.- Slovakia in the hands of Sta1in. He did so by
concluding, as a sel!f-wppointed Presideillt of a non-existing
SLOVAKIA
15
State, on December 12, 1943, in Moscow, a Treaty of Amity
and OollaJboration with the Soviet Union. Decei;ved as. he
was by his alHance with France before Munich, Benes
thought that the Czech peqple, surrounded ,by Genmany on
its west f.rontiier, could be saved from another German embrace onJ..y by rel,yi:ng closely on the So,v iet Union. MoscOIW
and the Czech Corm1munist refugees in Soviet Rllissia congratulated themselves on this aiccomplishiment of Benes and
aiwaited the moment when they wou:ld reap the political harvest of this immoral b.etrayaiJ. oif the prospective CzechoSlO!Vaik State to Moscow. Thus, the agreements Benes concluded in MoSico,w in DecemibeT, 194'3, and in February, 1945,
assured to the Ozech Communists the -key ,positions in the
government of Ozecho-Slovakia and faciiitated considerarbly
their struggle for aibso[ute po,wer..
Edward Benes cooifesses in his "Memoirs" (Pra:gue, 1947,
pp. 409-419) that already in 1943 he admitted the principle
of the so.called "National Front Government," an anti001I1:Stitutional organism standing above both the Parliament and Government and controHing a:11 the life in the
State. According to this principle, the Communists had a
veto power aJg8!inst any project of law which would haive
been contrary to their politics. "Not'hinlg without the Communists, nothing against them and nothing aibo:ve them!"
- that wa•s the !political ;pledge given by Edward Benes
to Gottwald in Moscow, ·already in 1943.
This principle had been put into practice from the
beginning of the reconstructed Czecho-Slol\7lakia in May
1945. The Communist Party salbotaged all legislatirve ,p rojects or executive measures of other parties which could
have coooteracted their political aims.
At the sam.e tirm.e, a!ter haMing recognized and installed
various cle~g,ymen who had been e~ommunicated ,by Rome,
the Pra;gue Government is pushing the Catholic population
into schism. The final .g oal of this policy is the extension.
of the Orthodox religion in Czecho~Slovakia and subordinating it to the supreme spiritual direction of the Moscow
Red MetrQPOlitan.
As to the "autonomous position of SlovaJkia, granted
by the Kosice agreement on Apr~l 5, 1945,.it recei.Jved a hard
16
SLO VAKIA
b'lo:w by the new organization oif the State into, regions
(~upy), which are under the direct suiperivision of the Ministry of Interior in Prague. Slovruk territorial autonomy was
ipracticaHy aJbolished completely in the Spring of 1950,
whoo Pragrue created the new Miruistry of State Security, a
higMy centraliized ruge.ncy with unlimited power oiver Slovrukia. Since that time, no,t orilly anti-Com!murust forces of
Sloivakia, but eiven the leading Slovak Communist memibeirs of
Parliament or Government, have become victims orf purges
of this Ministry: Mr. CJementis, former Minister of Foreign
Affairs; Mr. Husalk, for.mer Chieif of the regional Government of SlovaJkia; Mr. Schmidtke, former · Chaimran of the
S'lov,a,k regional Diet of Bratislaiva ; Mr. Noiv·o mesky, former Minister of Ed'lllcation in the Slovak regionaJl Government,. and many other leading members of the Slovak Communist Party. Most reicently the Prrugue Government apipointed a Czech Commuruist, Anton Nedved, as Chief of the
regional Government of SlovaJkia.
The Praig;ue Government cannot countenance · a really
j'U!ridi:cal State system whicrh would be able to, limit its
omnipotence. Law is being pushed aside more and more by
aroitrary decisions. The Constitutions of the "People's Democracies" harve something in common with the windowdressing in the countries .behind the Iron Curtain. They
present a good-loolking arrangement of different articles
attractiive to the eyes of the pulblffic, but t!hose articles are
not for sale . .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"We aspired to achieve collaboration with the East
since 1922.. .. We never changed our ideas or our plans, we
never participated in any political combination directed
· against the Soviet Union and we always worked against any
attempts to isolate Russia in Europe. . . . In 1935 our
treaty of alliance was signed .. : . Our fight for collaboration
with the east was systematic and it was the natural expression of our Slav sentiment." - (Dr Edward Benes, UV AHY
0 SLOVANSTVi (Thoughts on Slavism), pg. 8; LincolnsPrager Publishers, London, 1945) .
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Public Law in Czecho-Slovakia After 1945
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph A. Mikus
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 13-16
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
LCNAF+dates
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/70a4867303c04e6d7f7c38fdeeaa91fe.pdf
f12c1aaa283e8bd5f8a3fc454ecf7894
PDF Text
Text
SLOYAKI A
3
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON
SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE
JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H.
Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right
of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the
fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and
defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing
iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered
Austria-<HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the
premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1).
From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration
of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when
Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at
home and abroa<l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it
seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a
brilliant history-<:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the
ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and
s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries.
In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed
the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as
well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke
the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and <pride. Czech politicians were quite aware
of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal
with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ .
�SLOVAKIA
f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary,
Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires
and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did
in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in
Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political
situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the
Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic.
In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe
presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which
later became invohed in a total war against the democratic
powers of the western world, many American and British
statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a
very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without
hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they
regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man
e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to
. the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the
anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and
other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination
over Slovakia after the war wias ended.
1
Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the
American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the
matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence?
The Germans and Slovakia
Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the
Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the
Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on
Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938,
Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely
fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there
are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll:
S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the
Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated
toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into
�SLOVAKIA
5
incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward
Poiand."
The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed
itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain
advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And
Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support
the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation
toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in
our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be
sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence''
(Doc . No. 39).
When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932,
and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time
Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State."
At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk
Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question
with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent
Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment,
political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune"
and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present
time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be
touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense"
(Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46).
1
Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague,
Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according
�b
S LOVAKIA
to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda
is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-<rea:ohing autonomy is now
demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly
were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939,
Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he
had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion
with Hll:Illgary."
Did the Slovaks Want Independence?
Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the
clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be
independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938.
When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and
Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber
19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims
·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length
his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an
autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of
Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros
the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that
"it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence
with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l
as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168).
But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show
that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was
gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the
younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its
hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most
learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at
that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use
he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the
Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions
of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed
1
�SLOVAKIA
7
by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7,
1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central
Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that
they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their
country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic."
According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and
Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement
than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day,
howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk:
representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last
night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the
Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because
the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they
would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they
prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for
Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed.
President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime
Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky
from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186).
Declaration of Slovak Independence
The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous
Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied
by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over
three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events:
1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the
part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on
the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the
Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but
aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by
fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe
through the medium of the V~enna radio.
�8
SLOVAKIA
In the documents it says that "the illegal measures
taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted
in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by
the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly
and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po.
litical factors. When the latter were taken out o<f Slovrukia ,
the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from
the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain
extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's
Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of
the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people
to preserve peace and order and promised the release of
political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation
became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some
agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing
couild be done with him" (2).
The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of
the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso
with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso
wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and
the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk
Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on
March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another
memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet.
According to the extensive record about the conference
of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak
representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the
presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy
I
(2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans
to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l
compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only
by 't he SloYak Assembly.
�SLOVAKIA
9
monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the
Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and
were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these
conditions.''
Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia.
"Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in
1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as
the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had
alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that
now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short
a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the
Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead
an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that
·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time,
"he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving
something that did not want to be preserved."
Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the
fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only,
and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany
had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged
to Germany."
The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign
Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned
and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision
quickly" (Doc. No. 202).
�10
SLOVAKIA
How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler
during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just
how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British
Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr.
Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's
visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso
thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to
hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the
Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon
problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke
a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl
r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question
calmly."
Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld,
after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come
to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the
S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave
and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om
BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to
the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After
Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence
of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3).
The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence
The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its
neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan
countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain,
Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the
oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the
original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of
Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of
their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by
the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of
t he Us.A.
�SLOVAKIA
11
ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries.
How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances?
As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard
m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were
without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI
adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen,
on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the
Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the
independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and
desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik
Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's
wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky,
the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that
"if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague
wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He
was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion
calmly."
But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by
President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak
Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also
sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl<Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny
occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and
led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d
Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia"
and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened
in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha,
"that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of
speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia
wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined
more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS
only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had
been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1
�12
SLOVAKIA
tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able
to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad
that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone
in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him."
Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and
conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that
hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc.
No. 228).
Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic,
cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a
genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity
in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students
thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that
the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the
SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent.
But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles
headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind
the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the
aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech
lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the
will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and
failed to. escrupe, hung and shot.
The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of
Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk
who dares to work for the independence oif his nation.
After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes
"OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy
talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic
principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no
means without bizarreness.
�
SLOYAKI A
3
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON
SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE
JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H.
Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right
of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the
fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and
defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing
iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered
Austria-<HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the
premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1).
From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration
of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when
Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at
home and abroa<l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it
seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a
brilliant history-<:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the
ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and
s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries.
In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed
the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as
well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke
the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and <pride. Czech politicians were quite aware
of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal
with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ .
�SLOVAKIA
f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary,
Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires
and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did
in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in
Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political
situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the
Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic.
In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe
presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which
later became invohed in a total war against the democratic
powers of the western world, many American and British
statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a
very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without
hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they
regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man
e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to
. the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the
anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and
other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination
over Slovakia after the war wias ended.
1
Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the
American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the
matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence?
The Germans and Slovakia
Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the
Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the
Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on
Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938,
Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely
fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there
are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll:
S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the
Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated
toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into
�SLOVAKIA
5
incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward
Poiand."
The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed
itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain
advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And
Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support
the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation
toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in
our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be
sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence''
(Doc . No. 39).
When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932,
and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time
Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State."
At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk
Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question
with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent
Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment,
political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune"
and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present
time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be
touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense"
(Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46).
1
Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague,
Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according
�b
S LOVAKIA
to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda
is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-<rea:ohing autonomy is now
demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly
were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939,
Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he
had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion
with Hll:Illgary."
Did the Slovaks Want Independence?
Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the
clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be
independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938.
When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and
Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber
19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims
·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length
his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an
autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of
Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros
the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that
"it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence
with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l
as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168).
But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show
that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was
gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the
younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its
hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most
learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at
that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use
he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the
Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions
of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed
1
�SLOVAKIA
7
by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7,
1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central
Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that
they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their
country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic."
According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and
Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement
than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day,
howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk:
representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last
night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the
Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because
the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they
would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they
prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for
Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed.
President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime
Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky
from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186).
Declaration of Slovak Independence
The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous
Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied
by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over
three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events:
1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the
part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on
the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the
Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but
aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by
fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe
through the medium of the V~enna radio.
�8
SLOVAKIA
In the documents it says that "the illegal measures
taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted
in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by
the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly
and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po.
litical factors. When the latter were taken out o<f Slovrukia ,
the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from
the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain
extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's
Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of
the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people
to preserve peace and order and promised the release of
political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation
became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some
agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing
couild be done with him" (2).
The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of
the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso
with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso
wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and
the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk
Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on
March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another
memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet.
According to the extensive record about the conference
of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak
representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the
presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy
I
(2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans
to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l
compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only
by 't he SloYak Assembly.
�SLOVAKIA
9
monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the
Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and
were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these
conditions.''
Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia.
"Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in
1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as
the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had
alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that
now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short
a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the
Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead
an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that
·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time,
"he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving
something that did not want to be preserved."
Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the
fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only,
and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany
had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged
to Germany."
The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign
Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned
and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision
quickly" (Doc. No. 202).
�10
SLOVAKIA
How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler
during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just
how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British
Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr.
Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's
visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso
thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to
hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the
Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon
problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke
a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl
r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question
calmly."
Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld,
after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come
to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the
S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave
and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om
BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to
the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After
Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence
of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3).
The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence
The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its
neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan
countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain,
Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the
oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the
original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of
Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of
their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by
the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of
t he Us.A.
�SLOVAKIA
11
ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries.
How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances?
As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard
m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were
without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI
adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen,
on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the
Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the
independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and
desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik
Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's
wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky,
the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that
"if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague
wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He
was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion
calmly."
But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by
President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak
Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also
sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl<Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny
occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and
led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d
Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia"
and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened
in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha,
"that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of
speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia
wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined
more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS
only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had
been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1
�12
SLOVAKIA
tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able
to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad
that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone
in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him."
Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and
conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that
hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc.
No. 228).
Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic,
cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a
genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity
in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students
thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that
the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the
SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent.
But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles
headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind
the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the
aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech
lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the
will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and
failed to. escrupe, hung and shot.
The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of
Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk
who dares to work for the independence oif his nation.
After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes
"OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy
talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic
principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no
means without bizarreness.
�
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1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1954
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SLOYAKI A
3
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS ON
SLOVA~'S DECLARATION OF lL"VDEPENDENCE
JOSEPH KIRSCHBAUM
A verry interesting Olbserwation was made ,b y E. H.
Carr, weH-lknown EngJiJSh scfuolar,. ,i n regard to CentraJEurorpe8ill m01Vernents for ind€1I)en:dence based on the right
of self-determination, when he said: "The ,s ettlement of the
fust World War can ,by no means be regarded as fin!al and
defmi'tiJVe. National ·s e1f.;determination becrum.e a standing
iniv1tation to secession. The morvemeint wh!icll di'.Smembered
Austria-<HUil'gary and created Yugioslia via and Czecho..,Slovakia was bound to be succeeded by mo.vements for the dismemberment of Yugosilavia and ~eicho-Sioivakia. Given the
premtlses of nation18Jlism, the pro!Cess was naturnil and legitimate, and no end could be set to it" (1).
From the his'tiorical point oif view, Slovakia's declaration
of independence on March 14, 1939, did nothing else but folLow the cOIUI'se indicated lby Profe.ssor Carr. In 1918, when
Cenbral Europe was formed acoordfung to President Wilson's prinrci:ple of self-determination, the SflO;vaJr people at
home and abroa<l agreed to apply the new doctrine in common with the Czech people. In the given circumstances, it
seemed to be the bes t solution for a people, who, after a
brilliant history-<:reating e:poch o,f s ome 80 years in the
ninth century, was fo11ced to fight for its ba.re exiSlten.ce and
s urvi:va.1 du ring the following t en centuries.
In 19·1 8, the trend o,f Europe's evolution towards democracy was quite general. The democratic idea unle,a shed
the moral and biological forces of the Slo;v'cl;k people as
well. Despite a,U the attempts of the Prague regime to bralke
the cultural and economic development of Slnivrukia, the Slova'ks made ~urprisinig progre!?s in all fields of national endeavor and became possessed with a r eal national selfconfidence and <pride. Czech politicians were quite aware
of the chiange, but did not take appropriate mea·s ures to deal
with Slovak demands for more rights and less Ce:ech inter(1) Nati onalis m and After, London, 1945; P. 2~ .
SLOVAKIA
f~rcnce in Slovakia's internal affairs. On t!J.e contrary,
Prague's regime showed less under.standing for the desires
and jw,t claims of the Slovak people in 1938 than it did
in 1918. 'Dhe anti-Slovak policy of the Czech regime in
Prague w~s bound to lbaC!kfire with a vengeance. The Slowtk people, leadered by a new, se[f~conscious and courageous intelligentsia decided to take advantage of the political
situation in 1938-39 and declared its sepamtion from the
Czechs, establiishing its own state, the Slovak Republic.
In wew oif the fact that au chamges in Central Europe
presupposed at least the tacit consent of Ge-rmany, which
later became invohed in a total war against the democratic
powers of the western world, many American and British
statesmen, diplomats, politicians and publicists adopted a
very hostile attitude to,w aros the Sl,ovak StJate. Without
hearing and weighing the Sfovak side of the story, they
regiaTded SlovaJk politiJ0ians as docile instruments cf (',.er,man
e}G!)ansion and presented the cir,oumstances which led to
. the declaration of SloiVaJkia's indeipeindence in the Hght of the
anti-,Slovalk propaganda hatched by Dr. Edward Benes and
other Czech exiles, W:h'O wished to assure their domination
over Slovakia after the war wias ended.
1
Now, what do diplomatic documents, pub~ished by the
American and Briitilsh Govern!!Ilents, hruve to say rubout the
matter of Slovakia's decltaration of independence?
The Germans and Slovakia
Independent Slorvakia, as one of the solutions of the
Slovruk problem, is mentioned for the first time in the Gernrnn cHp1'omatic documents, which were prepared by the
Chief of the Political Devartment for Chancellor Hitler, on
Octo'ber 7, 1938. Three days earlier, on October 4, 1938,
Wei1z sacker told AtoJico, the ltaAian aJinlba.ssador, that Germany "in regard to Slovakia had not yeit any absolutely
fixed line of policy." In the memorandum for Hi't:ler, there
are mentioned "four possibilities in theory: 1. Independenll:
S1ovakia; 2 . Slovruk autonomy within the framework of the
Ozecho-Slovak State; 3. 3,utonomous Slow.kfa orientated
toward Hungary, which might 'develop from an alliance into
SLOVAKIA
5
incorporation; 4. autonomous Slovalkia orientated toward
Poiand."
The Genman Miinistry of Fore,ign Afmirs exipressed
itself for t.lie continuance of Sloivalkia within Ozeoho-1Slovakia and held to t!he opini'On that this '"even rpres.ents certain
advantages compared with an independent Sio:va.kia." And
Hitler himself, we learn, tl1'ought it "opportJune to support
the Sillein (Zi.'lina) resolution" (autonomy and orientation
toward Prague). The General Staff o;f the Wehrmacht (German Defense Porwer) , on October 6, 1938, held that "it is in
our (German) miilitJary interest that Slovakia s!hould not be
sepa'r ated from the Ozecho-1Slrovak Union, but should remain with Ozooho-1Sl0iVa:kia under strong German influence''
(Doc . No. 39).
When the Germans wanted to annex Devin, Dr. F&dinand :Dwcansky went to Berlin in Navember 11, 1932,
and appealed to Goering not to fuke Devin. At that time
Goering wa·s of the oipinion that "the SlOVlalk and the Ukrainian questions could be derult with o.nl;y withrin the framework of the Czecho--1Slovruk State."
At the end of 1938, when the fate o;f the Ozecho-Slorvalk
Republic was completely ,i n ,tfue hands o;f Germany, representatives ,o f Hitler's regime were definitely for the continuance of Ozecho-Silorvalkia. F1urlhenmore, o:fifi:cilal documents telrl us that they not only were a,gamst the independence of Slovalkia, but that on Noveimlber 17, 1938, Ri:bbenrtro,p issued an order fmibiddmg to speaJk albout the question
with Slovalks, iand Goeriillg, who mentioned independent
Slovakia as a question Oif the future in his talk with :DurcanSlky, wa:s swpposed to be notified that "at the moment,
political negotiations wii.th tlhe Sl ova.ks were not opportune"
and that the Fuhrer had deicided "tha.t at the present
time, the question of .sepairation of Slovalkila ShouJ.d not be
touched U1pon either in a positive or in a neigaitive sense"
(Doc. Nos. 26, 39, 45, 46).
1
Such, then, was the stand taken by Berlin on the question Oif .Slovalk independence, despite the fact that, 01ccordmg to doooments, the German Charge d' Affaires in Prague,
Heneike, told Berlin as early a,s Octdber 4th that "according
b
S LOVAKIA
to reports here, the independence movement in Slovauda
is gain.mg ground steadily. F'ar-<rea:ohing autonomy is now
demanded by poHtioal circles in Slova,kfa whiich formerly
were loyal to Pra:gue." And as late as February 12, 1939,
Hitler told Professor Tl.lika that "up to six months ago he
had 'been under the impression that Slovalkia desired reunion
with Hll:Illgary."
Did the Slovaks Want Independence?
Ofifidal Gemnan dooUIIIlen.ts definitely disprove the
clai!rns of propaganda that Germany wanted Slovakia to be
independent before 1939. But they a!so show that the Slovaks considered that poss~bility al-ready in 1938.
When representa:tiJVes of SlQlVaJkia, Dr. Joseph Tiso and
Dr. F. Durlca.nsky, visited Miniister Riibbentroip on Oc'bolber
19, 1938, to defend Slova'kia against the territorial claims
·o f the Maigyars, Dr. Tiso, we read, "el1aJborated at length
his ami of an a:utonomoos SlovaJkia coUaJborabing with an
autonomous Cat1patho-Ulkraine under Prague." Dr. Duircansky, however, aC'cording to the record, "seemed .to be striving rather for the complete independence of Sloivalkia, perhaps in union with Canpatho-.Ukraine." Indepen'dence of
Slova,kia i's also mentioned in the document wlhich recoros
the meeting of Duircansky with Miarshall Goering on Novemer 11, 1938. And 'Dulka told Hitler, February 12, 1939, that
"it was oibivious that for the Slovaks continn.led coexistence
with the Czechs had ibeoome impossiible from a psyicholog,ica:l
as we'll as an economic point of v,iew" (Doc. No. 168).
But the docUIIIlents, in a;ocord with reality, also show
that this opinion was not held by tJhe entire Slovak Government, even tholJlgh the idea of Slova!k independence was
gaining ground among the Sl01Vaks, esipecially among the
younger Slovaks, w'here Czech influence was fast losing its
hold. Even though Dr. Vojtech Tuka was one of the most
learned politicians, yet he was only a priV\ate individual at
that time. True, he was quite popular in SloiVa:kia bec~use
he had served so mue'h time in jail at the hands of the
Czech government; but he had no influence on the decisions
of the autonomous Sloviaik Government which was headed
1
SLOVAKIA
7
by Dr. Joseph 'l'iso. That is why, even as. late as March 7,
1939, we read in the documents tha;t when "the Central
Government in Prague had told the SiJ.ovak Miniisltern that
they were at HJberty to procla,im the independeillCe of Slovakfa, if they thought this possi:ble and desirable for their
country, t!he SlO!Vall{ Ministers in reply again e,cpressed Slovakia's wish to remain in the joint Rep,u;blic."
According to the dooument orf Marich 9, 1939, "'l'iso and
Sidor are said to be more indmed r~ently to a;greement
than to breaikinig away." A doc,ument dated the same day,
howe'Ver, says that the Prime Minister of the Pra;gue Government, Dr. Chrvalkovsky, informed the German diiplorrnatk:
representati've in Prague, Hencike, that "ta!lks held last
night between Tiso and Sidor, the SlOIVruk Ministers, and the
Central Goivemment in Prague had broken down because
the SlovaJks were not willing to g~ve any assurance tJhat they
would refrain from proclaiming the in.d~ndence of Slovakia - if they would think thi-s necessary - nor were they
prepared to ~ve assurances that propaganda actirvity for
Slo-vak independence in tJhe country would be suppressed.
President Ha.cha, theTeifore, had decided to dismiss Prime
Minister Tiso, Miniister :Durcans'ky and Minister Prulzinsky
from their posts" (Doc. Nos. 184, 186).
Declaration of Slovak Independence
The deposition of Dr. Joseph Tiso and the am.tonomous
Slova:k Government by Prague - whioh was aJ~companied
by a de0laration of Martial Law, the incarcerati'On of over
three hundred Slovak po'1d.ti:ciiains and the mH.it•a ry oocupation of Slovakiia by the Ozeich army - was responsible, according to avail1aible doouiments, for the following events:
1. the preparation of an u[timatum for tJhe Czechs on the
part of Germany; 2. a concentration of the Magyar army on
the eastern boU111daries of Slorvrukia and Sulb-Ca:npathoUkraine; 3. the demand of the SloJVaks to, parrt: with the
Ozechs, W'hiich resounded not only throughout ~ovailria, but
aiJ.so - throug;h Dr. :Dureansky, who had esooiped arrest by
fleeing to Vienna throug,hout the whole of Europe
through the medium of the V~enna radio.
8
SLOVAKIA
In the documents it says that "the illegal measures
taken by Prague in Slorvrukia against raurtonomy have resulted
in a declaration of the independen ce o;f the SlO!Vruk State by
the Slovak Diet." But this did not come rubout so suddenly
and simpl,y, as some woU!ld haive us .believe. SlOVlalkia undoubtecily was stirred up by the unconstitut ional regulations of Prague, and es:peciall,y by the arrest oif some 300 po.
litical factors. When the latter were taken out o<f Slovrukia ,
the people of Slavia!kia demanded a definlite ~aration from
the Czechs. The situation, however, did change to a certain
extent, when, on the motion of the presidi'U!Ill of the autonomous Slovak Governmen t and the Hlinka Slovruk People's
Party, Prag,ue narrned minister Charles Sidor as Premier of
the SlovaJk Governmen t, and when Sidor asked the people
to preserve peace and order and promised the release of
political priisoner.s. Alocord'ing to the documents the situation
became "somewhat jammed," and tlhe German representat:ives, who visited Sidor in the hope of coming to some
agreement with him, announced amgr-ily in Berlin that "Sidor had ruwrurently been bribed by the Czechs and nothing
couild be done with him" (2).
The same day that Pmgue had named Sidor premier of
the Slovak Governmen t, Berl~n sent messengers to Dr. Tiso
with an inivitation to come to Berlin for a conference . Tiso
wias removed from tJhe premiership unconstitut ionally and
the Germans stil'l regarded him as pre:mier of the Slovruk
Governmen t. After the presidium of the SloV13!k Diet, Hlinka's Party and Sidor's Governmen t concurred in the matter of the wsi.Jt, Dr. Tiso flew from Vienna to Berlin on
March 13, 19·39, acc01mpanie d by Dr. :Du11cansky and another
memiber of 1:Jhe Slovak Diet.
According to the extensive record about the conference
of Dr. Tiso and his ,party with Chancellor Hitler, the Slovak
representatiive:s were received 'b y Hitler at 6 :40 P. M. in the
presence of the 'highest German functionari es. In a lengthy
I
(2 ) Sidor lat.er e~pl ained th at he r efused to promise the Germans
to proclaim th e indepen de nce of Slo vaki a because he did no t fee l
compete.rut to do so inasmuch as this qu estion could b e decided only
by 't he SloYak Assembly.
SLOVAKIA
9
monologue, Hitler at first sipOike a.bout the o.bstinacy of the
Czechs who, he said, failed to understand the .situation and
were sitilil tryiing to continue the policies of Dr. Edward Be_nes so that "conditions became intoJeralble" and, consequently, he stated that "Germany could no longer tolerate these
conditions.''
Hitler, however, was not satisfied even with Sl01Va1kia.
"Our second disaippointment had been the attitude of Slovakia," he told Tiso and his companions, and added tlhat in
1938 he "had 'been faced with a difficult decision as to whether or not to aHow Slova,kia to be occupied by the Hung8.'rians." Because he had accepted the ethnic principle as
the basis of Murach discussions, Hitler said he thereby had
alienated the friends/hip of Hungary. Hitler contioo.ed that
now he had called Tiso to clarify the situation in as short
a time as possilble. "Gennamy had no interests east of the
Car,pat!hians," Hitler said, and "it was a matter of complete indifference to him what haipipened there." But Hitler did want to know whether "SlO!Vakia did want to lead
an independent existence or not." F1u.rthermore, he said that
·he wanted "nothing from Slovakia," but, at the same time,
"he did not wamt Hungary to reproach him for preserving
something that did not want to be preserved."
Then Hitler told Tiso that the question had to be decided not in da)'is, but m hours. "1f Slovrulda resisted or refused to be separated from Prague, Hitler would leaJVe the
fate of Slovaikia to events for which he was no longer responsible. Then he would look after German interests only,
and they diid not extend east od: tlhe Carpatlhians. Germany
had nothmg to do with Slovalk,i a. She had never belonged
to Germany."
The document further states that Hitler "asked Ribbentrop if he had anything more to add. The Reich Foreign
Mill.lister emphasized that hours not daYIS were concerned
and handed Hitler a report just received from Regent Horthy rubout Hungarian troop movements on the Slova.!k frontier. Hitler read the report, told Tiso of its contents and expressed the hope that Slovakia woudd reach a decision
quickly" (Doc. No. 202).
10
SLOVAKIA
How did Dr. Joseiph T1so act in the presence of Hitler
during this historiool moment? We might reca:J..l here just
how a few mlOnths beifore the Prime Minister of the British
Empire, Mr. Oharrnlberlain, and the Premier of France, Daladli.er, had acted. Mso the visit of Dr. E. Haicha and Dr.
Chva:JJw:vsky of the Prague Goverillment the day after 'Diso's
visit, March 14, 193·9. According to the record, "Tiso
thanlked the Flihrer for his words. He had long desired to
hear from the 1-i,ps of the Flihrer his attitude toward the
Siovak people and their country, and how he looked upon
problems. The FlihTer would pardon him if, under the impact of the Flihrer's words, he couitl not immeillately m~ke
a definite statement, let alone render a decision. He woukl
r.eti•r e with his colleague and consider the whole question
calmly."
Dr. Tiso and Dr. Durcanslky ructuaUy did retire 8Jlld,
after a short time, announced to Hitler that they had come
to the con'Olusion tJhat the decision really ibeloniged to the
S'1o1VaJk Parliament. BecaUJSe tihe situation was very grave
and tense, they immediately contaJCted Bresident Ha:cha f,r om
BerJin and requested him to cOillVOke the Slo;viak Parliament on Mwch 14th - proceeding, therefore, according to
the Czecho-SlOIVruk Constitutfon. Dr. Ha.cha complied. After
Dr. Tiso !Presented the report albout his Berlin vii.sit, the Slovak Parliament unanimolUSly proclaimed the independence
of ~ova1ki•a - the SlOIV•a k Republic (3).
The Czechs and Slovakia's Indepenaence
The SlOIVaJk Repulbliie was quicld.~ recognized by its
neiighlbors: Hungary, Poland, Genmany. Then by tlhe Balkan
countriies, and, sever-a1 months laiter, by Great Britain,
Fran'Ce and the USSR, and the neutra~ states - Switzerland, the Vatican, Sweden and Spain. Slova!kia was recog(3) This historical session has been faithfully recorded in the
oilfucial Minutes of the meeting, as well as on recording tape, the
original of the latter still exis.ts, and these refute all falsehoods of
Czech propaganda which·· would have the world believe tha,t the Slovak deputies were hesitant a•b out proclaiming the independence of
their countcy and that the text of the proclamation was prepared by
the Germans. The document was published in the Slovak press of
t he Us.A.
SLOVAKIA
11
ni1zed 1and had diiplomatic conta:cts with altogether 27 different countries.
How did the Czechs act under the ci-~cum stances?
As soon as tJhe cry for independence ~an to be heard
m Slovaikia, the Ozeichs, according to documents, were
without a definite, fil1ffi stand, necessary V'iision and poliHcaI
adroitness. They acted quite senselessilry. A,s we haJVe seen,
on March 7, 1939, the Prague GovernimenJt "had Wld the
Slovak Minri:sters that they were at liberty to prO!C'laim the
independence of Sl~vakia if they thought this pos:si'ble and
desiraible for thcir country." Aind even though the Slo,vaik
Miini,sters at that time had again expressed ":S1'ovaikia's
wish to reima.iin in the joint Republic," Dr. Chwlko:vsky,
the Min~ster of Foreign Atffa,irs visited the diplomatic representatirve of Ge:rman,y in Brague to :ftind out whether Germ8.Illy wanted Slovakia to be i:indeipendent. He learned that
"if Berlin wanted an independent Slovak[a, then Prague
wOU!ld somethow haJVe to reconcile itse1f to this solution. He
was a:Iso man enough to accept this difficult solJU.tion
calmly."
But despite all tJhis, the Prague Government, headed by
President Hacha, not only deposed the autonomoU!S Sloiv;ak
Government ll'Ilconstitutionalliy on March 10, 1939, but also
sent mi1itary units to ooc'll'py Sl<Wiailcia. The Prague Gwernment had hundreds of Slovak political leaders arrested many regardless of parliamentary immun:i.ty~had the anny
occupy puJbl,ic bll!i,l dings and proclaimed Mlartia:I Law in Slovalkia. When this act brolke the Slovak camel's back and
led to the prod1amation of independence, Dr. Ha.cha . toiJ.d
Hitler that "he was not shedding any tears over SloivaJkia"
and that "he had no need to deplore what had haJPpened
in SlO'V'rukia. He had long boon conivinJCed," coillt:Jinrued Ha.cha,
"that the different nation:ai,ities in thi,s bod~ politic (Ozecho.,SJ.oviaJda) could not li,v e together. Despite siimilariity of
speech, they had deiveloiped very differently, and Ozechia
wa:s more alkin to Germiany than to Slovakia, whli.ch inclined
more to the Magyars. They (tihe Oz~chs) had had relatio!IlS
only with the EvangeHcal Slo~s. whi1le tihe CathoJi'cs had
been rejected by the Czechs (there are-aJbout 80 per cent Ca1
12
SLOVAKIA
tholics in Slovrukia and some 14 per cent Protestants. Ekl.). Those were the reasons why they had never been able
to arrive at a satisfiaotory l1Ilidetstandiing, and he wrus glad
that developments had taken this coUTse. He was not a:lone
in tlris opinion, :f.or certainly 80 ,p er cent o;f the Czech population shared it with him."
Ha.cha added that "he thought that the Fli:hrer's experiences wirth the Sl0V1aks would be none too good,'' and
conicluded his requested conference with Hitler sa:yinig that
hls decision to aic1c ept the Ge11man Proteotoraite "woulJ.d probrubliy be regarded as a blessing fifty years hence" (Doc.
No. 228).
Shortly after the estaJbl~shment of the Sloivak Repulblic,
cliplomatiic relations were estaJblished with the Ozeichs; a
genera:l consulate was opened in Prague. More Czech students coonpleted thcir studies at the Bratislava Unii,veirsity
in firve years of the SlovaJk RepuJb1ic, than Sloviak students
thereto had graduated in Prague. lit seemed, therefore, that
the Czeoh nation-had 'become reconciled to the idea that the
SIJ.ovaks, too, had the inherent right to be free and independent.
But the situation was not accepted by the Czech exiles
headed by Dr. Ediwaro Benes. Retiurning in 1945 behind
the Red Ar.my, Benes and his goverrunenrt-in-eocille, wit:h the
aid of Communti:srts, nort only annexed SlO!ViaJkia to Czech
lands and made it subordinate to Prague again a,g,a.inst the
will of the SIJ.ovaJks, but also had SOl:me of the leaJding SlovaJk politici1a ns, who stood for Slovak independence and
failed to. escrupe, hung and shot.
The new Czech group of exiiles, excepting several honora;ble exceptions, is stHi continuing the ruinous rpolicy of
Dr. Ediwaro Benes and is morally exeouting every Slovruk
who dares to work for the independence oif his nation.
After the sad exiperience of t:he past, these so-.calied Benes
"OzoohoslovaJks" and Ozeichs have learned nothing. Theiy
talk democracy and friendly relations, but flout the basic
principles of true democracy and spread hatred for democratic Slovak,s. The stand of the Czechs, therefore, is by no
means without bizarreness.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Diplomatic Documents on Slovakia's Declaration of Independence
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Kirschbaum
Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10), March 1954
pp. 3-12
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
SNK
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7f68aa3b3ab73fc5174bfe9403bf490f.pdf
44843f16862ee9fedbfe590bc127c54e
PDF Text
Text
VOL . IV
MARCH 1954
NO. 1 (10)
IN THiJS ISSUE:
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER 1945
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND FALSE LEGENDS
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOVAKIA' S DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
MILAN RASTISLAV STEF.ANIK
SLOVAK FOLKLORE: GOLDILOCKS
DR. STE PH EN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
CASTLES OF S L OVAKIA : LIETAVA
WHITE MOUNTAIN -
HISTORICAL FORGERY
WHO SAID I T? -- PP. 16, 32, 54, 59, 64
. .
Edit ed a nd co mpile d by
PHILIP A . HROBAK
Published by
T H E SLOVA K LE A GUE OF AMERICA
�SLOV AKlA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV AKI.A
1s to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to :
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown. Pa.
�SLOV AKIA
Publ ish ed
V OL. IV
q ua rterly
by
th e S lov a k
MARCH 1954
With this issu e SLOVAKIA is
beginning its tounth year. Thus
far it has appeared ten times:
twice the first year, three the
next, four times in 1Jl53, and once
this year. The total number of
issues ap·pears parentheticalliy
on the cover alongside the current number.
DR. HUBERT RIPKA , one of
the leading lights of the so-called
"Counci l of Free Czechoslovakia"
and former member oJ' the Communist-dominated
"Nation al
Front " government o.f Benes and
Gottwald, is all fury, because a
certain Senate sub-Commiittee
had dared to call him to Washington for qu estioning. His lamentations are published by the
" New Yorkske Listy" in Czech
and the " New Yorksky Dennik"
in Slovak, the very sheets which
just some years back featured
edito.rials 1by such Red worthies
as llja Ehrenburg, Zdenek NejedJy, Dezider Benau, Elo Sandor,
Joseph S oltesz, Vlado Clemerutiis,
Karol Schmidke, ·Alex 'Bogomolov, Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky, Rudolph Slansky, Marek CuJen, A. Hoffineister, Karel
Leitner, etc., etc. Ripka certain·
ly -h as the connections - and has
had them in tbe past. He a lone
is responsible for them, and especially for his actions.
JAMES B. CAREY, secretarytreasurer of the Gl'O, took UJP the
caus-e of Mr. Rirpka and wrote a
letiter to Vice-,President Richard
Nixon, a.ocusing Senator Herman
Welker oJ' smearing the Czeclls
organized in the "Council of Free
Czechoslovakia," especially Dr.
Hwbert Ripka, former Minister
L ea gue
of
Americ a
NO. 1 ( 10)
of Fore i,g n Trade in the BenesGottwald regime. What made Mr.
Carey, one of the leading figures
of a great Labor organization,
exipose his neck and embarrass
the CIO for a man like Ripka
about whom he knew littl e or nothing_ It is obvious that Ripka
has connections; s ome one c lose
to Carey and the CLO, pro!balbly a
representative of some international labor outfit, used his infmence.
On e of the " A ces" of the Czech
National Soci alists of 'Dr. Edward Benes, Ripka o,penly admits that he collaborated with
the C-ze-ch Reds of Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. but
he deeply resen ts bein.g questioned on it by any congressional
committee, or anyone else. Of
course, there are many people
who, for obvious reasons, resent
being questioned today. If any of
our readers, and especially members of our Congress and the
Executive branch of our Government are interested in knowing
just how Mr. Ripka felt about the
Soviet Union. we recommend
that they read Ripka's "EAST
AND WESff" (Lincolns..Prage.r
Ltd., iLondon, 19,44). An avowed
Communist could hardly have
given the USSR a 1better plug!
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR A FREE EUROPE, which
sponsors Radio Free Europe and
other ,projects, took Ripka and
other Czech 'Socialists in s01Veral
years ago. ff/he NlOFE Is supposed
to operate on the money contr~buted by Ameri cans during the
annual "Crus.a de for Freedoon"
drives; and it has 1the blessing
�SLOVAKIA
2
of our State Department. Why
did the NCFE use this money
to pay Czech 1Socialis-ts, who
were members o.f the Communistdominatoo Ben-e.s•Gottr.vald gove r n m e n t of Czecho..Slovakia,
when Ameri-cans contriJburtie<l the
money to fight Communism? Another "GzechoslQlVak" hoax? Or
is the N0FE itself a socialist
venture? The people who voluntariJy contrilbute money to the
Crusad,e for Freed,om ha,ve a
right to ask ,that question. It's
time we knew who and what
rnake.s the NOFE tick.
JOHN
HVASTA, ex-GI, who
es,c aped from 1Czecho..Slovakia
some time ago and returned
home recently, is of SLOVAK
parentage. Willen he -escaped
fro m prison he hid out in Slovakia with various Slovak families,
not with Czech or ''Czechoslovak" peo,ple. The Czechs ar,e not
Slovaks, and 1\!he Slovaks are not
Czechs. Let's keep the records
straight.
" GET
McCARTH Y
N OW !"
seems to be th,e new 1,h,eme song
of the DAILY WORKIDR and
even others who call themselves
Aimerican.s but" are dds:satiSifioo
with 1the Senator's methods in
ferretting out \Reds and 1>roSoviets in Government and govel"hmental agencies. But it reailly
is ,nothing new, •exicept that it
mighb 1be a new version oif an old
Red theme: stop any one and
every one wlho dares to investigate Reds and pro,Soviets ! The
fact, ,however, remains that Communist agents in ,g overnment
still 1>resent ·a definite d,anger.
We .s hould spare no effort to unmask and eliminate them without regard for the pel.'sonal and
political stock of any individual.
The welfare and security of
America oversha,dows all parties,
all individuals, all political ofifices. McCarthy is doing the jo'b
he was assigned to do, is doing
it conscientiously a,nd as well as
mi,g ht be exipected under the circumstances, He, tlh-er€<fore, deserves help from all parties and
individuals primarily interested
in the welfare and security of
our c ountry. Let's not lose sight
of the main issue.
CZECHS and so-ea ll ed " Czech oslova ks"
(Slovak renegades
in the pay O'f the Czechs)
celebrated Masaryk Day March
Hh. Slovaks, how ever, did not;
they remember Masaryk as the
man who broke faiith with the
Slo:r,1k nation, -wh-en he repudiated the Pitt~bu11gh Pa;ct of May
30, 1918, W'.hich he drafted and
signed to gain the Slovaks in
AmeTica for the establishment ·
of a oommon Czecho..Slovak
State. T. G. Masaryk !belongs to
11lhe
"progressive" Ozechs, who
call ,th,e,mselves the nation of Masaryk, Hus and Zi~ka - some·
thing the Slovaks never were,
nor shall •be. And they can have
a ll of him.
March 14th marked the fif.
teenth anniversary O'f the procla•
mation of the ind®eindence of
Slovakia. It was on Mareh 14,
1939, that the duly elected re1>·
resentaitives of the S,lovak· nation
unanimously declared :their country an independent R•e11mb1ic.
Slovaks everywhere comm emorate March 14 as one of tne great
milestones in their history. Their
struggle for freooom and ind&
'J}endence is without .parallel.
Through no rfault of their own
they were lbetrayed to the Reds
and the Kremlin in 194'5, but are
determined to !fight to the last
man for the most precious of all
God's gifts: freedom.
�
VOL . IV
MARCH 1954
NO. 1 (10)
IN THiJS ISSUE:
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER 1945
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND FALSE LEGENDS
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOVAKIA' S DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
MILAN RASTISLAV STEF.ANIK
SLOVAK FOLKLORE: GOLDILOCKS
DR. STE PH EN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
CASTLES OF S L OVAKIA : LIETAVA
WHITE MOUNTAIN -
HISTORICAL FORGERY
WHO SAID I T? -- PP. 16, 32, 54, 59, 64
. .
Edit ed a nd co mpile d by
PHILIP A . HROBAK
Published by
T H E SLOVA K LE A GUE OF AMERICA
�SLOV AKlA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV AKI.A
1s to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to :
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown. Pa.
�SLOV AKIA
Publ ish ed
V OL. IV
q ua rterly
by
th e S lov a k
MARCH 1954
With this issu e SLOVAKIA is
beginning its tounth year. Thus
far it has appeared ten times:
twice the first year, three the
next, four times in 1Jl53, and once
this year. The total number of
issues ap·pears parentheticalliy
on the cover alongside the current number.
DR. HUBERT RIPKA , one of
the leading lights of the so-called
"Counci l of Free Czechoslovakia"
and former member oJ' the Communist-dominated
"Nation al
Front " government o.f Benes and
Gottwald, is all fury, because a
certain Senate sub-Commiittee
had dared to call him to Washington for qu estioning. His lamentations are published by the
" New Yorkske Listy" in Czech
and the " New Yorksky Dennik"
in Slovak, the very sheets which
just some years back featured
edito.rials 1by such Red worthies
as llja Ehrenburg, Zdenek NejedJy, Dezider Benau, Elo Sandor,
Joseph S oltesz, Vlado Clemerutiis,
Karol Schmidke, ·Alex 'Bogomolov, Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky, Rudolph Slansky, Marek CuJen, A. Hoffineister, Karel
Leitner, etc., etc. Ripka certain·
ly -h as the connections - and has
had them in tbe past. He a lone
is responsible for them, and especially for his actions.
JAMES B. CAREY, secretarytreasurer of the Gl'O, took UJP the
caus-e of Mr. Rirpka and wrote a
letiter to Vice-,President Richard
Nixon, a.ocusing Senator Herman
Welker oJ' smearing the Czeclls
organized in the "Council of Free
Czechoslovakia," especially Dr.
Hwbert Ripka, former Minister
L ea gue
of
Americ a
NO. 1 ( 10)
of Fore i,g n Trade in the BenesGottwald regime. What made Mr.
Carey, one of the leading figures
of a great Labor organization,
exipose his neck and embarrass
the CIO for a man like Ripka
about whom he knew littl e or nothing_ It is obvious that Ripka
has connections; s ome one c lose
to Carey and the CLO, pro!balbly a
representative of some international labor outfit, used his infmence.
On e of the " A ces" of the Czech
National Soci alists of 'Dr. Edward Benes, Ripka o,penly admits that he collaborated with
the C-ze-ch Reds of Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. but
he deeply resen ts bein.g questioned on it by any congressional
committee, or anyone else. Of
course, there are many people
who, for obvious reasons, resent
being questioned today. If any of
our readers, and especially members of our Congress and the
Executive branch of our Government are interested in knowing
just how Mr. Ripka felt about the
Soviet Union. we recommend
that they read Ripka's "EAST
AND WESff" (Lincolns..Prage.r
Ltd., iLondon, 19,44). An avowed
Communist could hardly have
given the USSR a 1better plug!
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR A FREE EUROPE, which
sponsors Radio Free Europe and
other ,projects, took Ripka and
other Czech 'Socialists in s01Veral
years ago. ff/he NlOFE Is supposed
to operate on the money contr~buted by Ameri cans during the
annual "Crus.a de for Freedoon"
drives; and it has 1the blessing
�SLOVAKIA
2
of our State Department. Why
did the NCFE use this money
to pay Czech 1Socialis-ts, who
were members o.f the Communistdominatoo Ben-e.s•Gottr.vald gove r n m e n t of Czecho..Slovakia,
when Ameri-cans contriJburtie<l the
money to fight Communism? Another "GzechoslQlVak" hoax? Or
is the N0FE itself a socialist
venture? The people who voluntariJy contrilbute money to the
Crusad,e for Freed,om ha,ve a
right to ask ,that question. It's
time we knew who and what
rnake.s the NOFE tick.
JOHN
HVASTA, ex-GI, who
es,c aped from 1Czecho..Slovakia
some time ago and returned
home recently, is of SLOVAK
parentage. Willen he -escaped
fro m prison he hid out in Slovakia with various Slovak families,
not with Czech or ''Czechoslovak" peo,ple. The Czechs ar,e not
Slovaks, and 1\!he Slovaks are not
Czechs. Let's keep the records
straight.
" GET
McCARTH Y
N OW !"
seems to be th,e new 1,h,eme song
of the DAILY WORKIDR and
even others who call themselves
Aimerican.s but" are dds:satiSifioo
with 1the Senator's methods in
ferretting out \Reds and 1>roSoviets in Government and govel"hmental agencies. But it reailly
is ,nothing new, •exicept that it
mighb 1be a new version oif an old
Red theme: stop any one and
every one wlho dares to investigate Reds and pro,Soviets ! The
fact, ,however, remains that Communist agents in ,g overnment
still 1>resent ·a definite d,anger.
We .s hould spare no effort to unmask and eliminate them without regard for the pel.'sonal and
political stock of any individual.
The welfare and security of
America oversha,dows all parties,
all individuals, all political ofifices. McCarthy is doing the jo'b
he was assigned to do, is doing
it conscientiously a,nd as well as
mi,g ht be exipected under the circumstances, He, tlh-er€<fore, deserves help from all parties and
individuals primarily interested
in the welfare and security of
our c ountry. Let's not lose sight
of the main issue.
CZECHS and so-ea ll ed " Czech oslova ks"
(Slovak renegades
in the pay O'f the Czechs)
celebrated Masaryk Day March
Hh. Slovaks, how ever, did not;
they remember Masaryk as the
man who broke faiith with the
Slo:r,1k nation, -wh-en he repudiated the Pitt~bu11gh Pa;ct of May
30, 1918, W'.hich he drafted and
signed to gain the Slovaks in
AmeTica for the establishment ·
of a oommon Czecho..Slovak
State. T. G. Masaryk !belongs to
11lhe
"progressive" Ozechs, who
call ,th,e,mselves the nation of Masaryk, Hus and Zi~ka - some·
thing the Slovaks never were,
nor shall •be. And they can have
a ll of him.
March 14th marked the fif.
teenth anniversary O'f the procla•
mation of the ind®eindence of
Slovakia. It was on Mareh 14,
1939, that the duly elected re1>·
resentaitives of the S,lovak· nation
unanimously declared :their country an independent R•e11mb1ic.
Slovaks everywhere comm emorate March 14 as one of tne great
milestones in their history. Their
struggle for freooom and ind&
'J}endence is without .parallel.
Through no rfault of their own
they were lbetrayed to the Reds
and the Kremlin in 194'5, but are
determined to !fight to the last
man for the most precious of all
God's gifts: freedom.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1954, Vol. 4
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1954
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
VOL . IV
MARCH 1954
NO. 1 (10)
IN THiJS ISSUE:
SLOVAKIA'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
PUBLIC LAW IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA AFTER 1945
AMERICAN SLOVAKS AND MARCH 14, 1939
HISTORICAL TRUTH AND FALSE LEGENDS
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SLOVAKIA' S DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE
MILAN RASTISLAV STEF.ANIK
SLOVAK FOLKLORE: GOLDILOCKS
DR. STE PH EN OSUSKY AND THE SLOVAKS
CASTLES OF S L OVAKIA : LIETAVA
WHITE MOUNTAIN -
HISTORICAL FORGERY
WHO SAID I T? -- PP. 16, 32, 54, 59, 64
. .
Edit ed a nd co mpile d by
PHILIP A . HROBAK
Published by
T H E SLOVA K LE A GUE OF AMERICA
SLOV AKlA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV AKI.A
1s to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to :
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown. Pa.
SLOV AKIA
Publ ish ed
V OL. IV
q ua rterly
by
th e S lov a k
MARCH 1954
With this issu e SLOVAKIA is
beginning its tounth year. Thus
far it has appeared ten times:
twice the first year, three the
next, four times in 1Jl53, and once
this year. The total number of
issues ap·pears parentheticalliy
on the cover alongside the current number.
DR. HUBERT RIPKA , one of
the leading lights of the so-called
"Counci l of Free Czechoslovakia"
and former member oJ' the Communist-dominated
"Nation al
Front " government o.f Benes and
Gottwald, is all fury, because a
certain Senate sub-Commiittee
had dared to call him to Washington for qu estioning. His lamentations are published by the
" New Yorkske Listy" in Czech
and the " New Yorksky Dennik"
in Slovak, the very sheets which
just some years back featured
edito.rials 1by such Red worthies
as llja Ehrenburg, Zdenek NejedJy, Dezider Benau, Elo Sandor,
Joseph S oltesz, Vlado Clemerutiis,
Karol Schmidke, ·Alex 'Bogomolov, Gustav Husak, Ladislav Novomesky, Rudolph Slansky, Marek CuJen, A. Hoffineister, Karel
Leitner, etc., etc. Ripka certain·
ly -h as the connections - and has
had them in tbe past. He a lone
is responsible for them, and especially for his actions.
JAMES B. CAREY, secretarytreasurer of the Gl'O, took UJP the
caus-e of Mr. Rirpka and wrote a
letiter to Vice-,President Richard
Nixon, a.ocusing Senator Herman
Welker oJ' smearing the Czeclls
organized in the "Council of Free
Czechoslovakia," especially Dr.
Hwbert Ripka, former Minister
L ea gue
of
Americ a
NO. 1 ( 10)
of Fore i,g n Trade in the BenesGottwald regime. What made Mr.
Carey, one of the leading figures
of a great Labor organization,
exipose his neck and embarrass
the CIO for a man like Ripka
about whom he knew littl e or nothing_ It is obvious that Ripka
has connections; s ome one c lose
to Carey and the CLO, pro!balbly a
representative of some international labor outfit, used his infmence.
On e of the " A ces" of the Czech
National Soci alists of 'Dr. Edward Benes, Ripka o,penly admits that he collaborated with
the C-ze-ch Reds of Czecho-Slovakia and the Soviet Union. but
he deeply resen ts bein.g questioned on it by any congressional
committee, or anyone else. Of
course, there are many people
who, for obvious reasons, resent
being questioned today. If any of
our readers, and especially members of our Congress and the
Executive branch of our Government are interested in knowing
just how Mr. Ripka felt about the
Soviet Union. we recommend
that they read Ripka's "EAST
AND WESff" (Lincolns..Prage.r
Ltd., iLondon, 19,44). An avowed
Communist could hardly have
given the USSR a 1better plug!
THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR A FREE EUROPE, which
sponsors Radio Free Europe and
other ,projects, took Ripka and
other Czech 'Socialists in s01Veral
years ago. ff/he NlOFE Is supposed
to operate on the money contr~buted by Ameri cans during the
annual "Crus.a de for Freedoon"
drives; and it has 1the blessing
SLOVAKIA
2
of our State Department. Why
did the NCFE use this money
to pay Czech 1Socialis-ts, who
were members o.f the Communistdominatoo Ben-e.s•Gottr.vald gove r n m e n t of Czecho..Slovakia,
when Ameri-cans contriJburtie<l the
money to fight Communism? Another "GzechoslQlVak" hoax? Or
is the N0FE itself a socialist
venture? The people who voluntariJy contrilbute money to the
Crusad,e for Freed,om ha,ve a
right to ask ,that question. It's
time we knew who and what
rnake.s the NOFE tick.
JOHN
HVASTA, ex-GI, who
es,c aped from 1Czecho..Slovakia
some time ago and returned
home recently, is of SLOVAK
parentage. Willen he -escaped
fro m prison he hid out in Slovakia with various Slovak families,
not with Czech or ''Czechoslovak" peo,ple. The Czechs ar,e not
Slovaks, and 1\!he Slovaks are not
Czechs. Let's keep the records
straight.
" GET
McCARTH Y
N OW !"
seems to be th,e new 1,h,eme song
of the DAILY WORKIDR and
even others who call themselves
Aimerican.s but" are dds:satiSifioo
with 1the Senator's methods in
ferretting out \Reds and 1>roSoviets in Government and govel"hmental agencies. But it reailly
is ,nothing new, •exicept that it
mighb 1be a new version oif an old
Red theme: stop any one and
every one wlho dares to investigate Reds and pro,Soviets ! The
fact, ,however, remains that Communist agents in ,g overnment
still 1>resent ·a definite d,anger.
We .s hould spare no effort to unmask and eliminate them without regard for the pel.'sonal and
political stock of any individual.
The welfare and security of
America oversha,dows all parties,
all individuals, all political ofifices. McCarthy is doing the jo'b
he was assigned to do, is doing
it conscientiously a,nd as well as
mi,g ht be exipected under the circumstances, He, tlh-er€<fore, deserves help from all parties and
individuals primarily interested
in the welfare and security of
our c ountry. Let's not lose sight
of the main issue.
CZECHS and so-ea ll ed " Czech oslova ks"
(Slovak renegades
in the pay O'f the Czechs)
celebrated Masaryk Day March
Hh. Slovaks, how ever, did not;
they remember Masaryk as the
man who broke faiith with the
Slo:r,1k nation, -wh-en he repudiated the Pitt~bu11gh Pa;ct of May
30, 1918, W'.hich he drafted and
signed to gain the Slovaks in
AmeTica for the establishment ·
of a oommon Czecho..Slovak
State. T. G. Masaryk !belongs to
11lhe
"progressive" Ozechs, who
call ,th,e,mselves the nation of Masaryk, Hus and Zi~ka - some·
thing the Slovaks never were,
nor shall •be. And they can have
a ll of him.
March 14th marked the fif.
teenth anniversary O'f the procla•
mation of the ind®eindence of
Slovakia. It was on Mareh 14,
1939, that the duly elected re1>·
resentaitives of the S,lovak· nation
unanimously declared :their country an independent R•e11mb1ic.
Slovaks everywhere comm emorate March 14 as one of tne great
milestones in their history. Their
struggle for freooom and ind&
'J}endence is without .parallel.
Through no rfault of their own
they were lbetrayed to the Reds
and the Kremlin in 194'5, but are
determined to !fight to the last
man for the most precious of all
God's gifts: freedom.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1954
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d01df4810d9810f72e330513bc129662.pdf
c058f72321a3e992748eda642e65cf85
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio
•
Frances L. Mizenko
Honorary President
3756 Lee Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1~ 13 W. -18th Street
Chicago 9, Ill inois
Stephen J. Tkach
173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
!'resident
A.
Philip
Hrobak
P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa.
Andrew J. Hamrock
61 Woodland Avenu e
Campbell, Ohio
Vice-President
Jacob Kocis
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J . Vargovich
1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
National President
Firs t Catholi c Slovak
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
Helen Kocan
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
National President
First Catholi c S lovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Francis
nion
H rusovsky
Fran k
2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio
Sobus
National Preside nt
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secretary-Treasu rer
Stephen J . Tka ch
Milan V. Blaz ek
National President
nion
Penna. Slovak
-1922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozboril
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.
National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKE
NOVINY
ZORNICKA
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Ill.
KATOLICKY SOKOL
SVORNOST
OSADN E H LASY
Passaic, N. J.
Whitaker, Pa.
Chicago, Ill.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
�~
N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~
~
~XL
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lw'♦,-.i:,.j>>"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•<<f~l'I:♦,
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l~«' , ..,;
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~
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i
.......... , lo
-~h'«< ti"'~,;-~,
" ' ~ . , . ~ , ..~
-~.,.~
~y
~""'l, ,-N:4•
!I,
; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~"
!.
Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'!
I
j
We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk
and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938,
is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed.
In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a
new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers
suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio
•
Frances L. Mizenko
Honorary President
3756 Lee Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1~ 13 W. -18th Street
Chicago 9, Ill inois
Stephen J. Tkach
173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
!'resident
A.
Philip
Hrobak
P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa.
Andrew J. Hamrock
61 Woodland Avenu e
Campbell, Ohio
Vice-President
Jacob Kocis
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J . Vargovich
1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
National President
Firs t Catholi c Slovak
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
Helen Kocan
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
National President
First Catholi c S lovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Francis
nion
H rusovsky
Fran k
2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio
Sobus
National Preside nt
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secretary-Treasu rer
Stephen J . Tka ch
Milan V. Blaz ek
National President
nion
Penna. Slovak
-1922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozboril
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.
National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKE
NOVINY
ZORNICKA
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Ill.
KATOLICKY SOKOL
SVORNOST
OSADN E H LASY
Passaic, N. J.
Whitaker, Pa.
Chicago, Ill.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
�~
N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~
~
~XL
,.<l♦ ><«V;!o,o.;.
k 6 - "·
Jw♦ jt.fff<l<t.
"-
t.>'>J~!'°"
,.( .. 4,,'"i, ~.......
<>4',~y..,1d.-,mf;>,j><J>><,tt ♦ ><IM ... >
'""""'"'J,,,A
\,,-:4.?,1
,i ~<-W.«·:. . .,
lw'♦,-.i:,.j>>"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•<<f~l'I:♦,
'-<j ,..,,, ,x,lk). >>.folj ~I>! ~~ 4
--.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.>·,, .. ,.11,#lt<P.~<I
><> _, ~tl\okll. l>llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"'
<I<
♦}:'
<,y.,, ... ,..:,
l~«' , ..,;
»·to
~
♦
!:S~ s.11>»,,.,. «<+~
i
.......... , lo
-~h'«< ti"'~,;-~,
" ' ~ . , . ~ , ..~
-~.,.~
~y
~""'l, ,-N:4•
!I,
; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~"
!.
Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'!
I
j
We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk
and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938,
is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed.
In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a
new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers
suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Obio
•
Frances L. Mizenko
Honorary President
3756 Lee Road
Cleveland 28, Ohio
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1~ 13 W. -18th Street
Chicago 9, Ill inois
Stephen J. Tkach
173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
!'resident
A.
Philip
Hrobak
P. 0. Dox 150, Middletown, Pa.
Andrew J. Hamrock
61 Woodland Avenu e
Campbell, Ohio
Vice-President
Jacob Kocis
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J . Vargovich
1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
National President
Firs t Catholi c Slovak
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
Helen Kocan
1648 W. 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
National President
First Catholi c S lovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Francis
nion
H rusovsky
Fran k
2900 East Boulevard
Cleveland 4, Ohio
Sobus
National Preside nt
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secretary-Treasu rer
Stephen J . Tka ch
Milan V. Blaz ek
National President
nion
Penna. Slovak
-1922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozboril
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J.
National President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America )
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKE
NOVINY
ZORNICKA
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Ill.
KATOLICKY SOKOL
SVORNOST
OSADN E H LASY
Passaic, N. J.
Whitaker, Pa.
Chicago, Ill.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
~
N:ddaa:«.w , ......... ~
~
~XL
,.<l♦ ><«V;!o,o.;.
k 6 - "·
Jw♦ jt.fff<l<t.
"-
t.>'>J~!'°"
,.( .. 4,,'"i, ~.......
<>4',~y..,1d.-,mf;>,j><J>><,tt ♦ ><IM ... >
'""""'"'J,,,A
\,,-:4.?,1
,i ~<-W.«·:. . .,
lw'♦,-.i:,.j>>"l"''"'-"'i-!ml♦ h•<<f~l'I:♦,
'-<j ,..,,, ,x,lk). >>.folj ~I>! ~~ 4
--.fl♦lo;·:,:,,.(.>·,, .. ,.11,#lt<P.~<I
><> _, ~tl\okll. l>llt. ~~- •~ ' fl-"'
<I<
♦}:'
<,y.,, ... ,..:,
l~«' , ..,;
»·to
~
♦
!:S~ s.11>»,,.,. «<+~
i
.......... , lo
-~h'«< ti"'~,;-~,
" ' ~ . , . ~ , ..~
-~.,.~
~y
~""'l, ,-N:4•
!I,
; !!l-'4"f~n n:.Ut.~, ~---~"'~"
!.
Nebudeme sa pred nikym exkuzo·rcti'!
I
j
We heard and read that freedom of the press was guaranteed in the "Czecho-Slovak" democracy of T. G. Masaryk
and Dr. Edward Benes. This front page of Sept. 14, 1938,
is a typical example of the freedom the Slovaks enjoyed.
In the upper left hand corner we see "After confiscation a
new, corrected issue." In 1922 alone Slovak newspapers
suffered 1498 instances of censorship and confiscation.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9d0ab676ff2e6ce5e3da3c983e1f8c77.pdf
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SLOVAKIA
63
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had
�64
SLOVAKIA
it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450
by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders.
King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of
Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve
11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not
ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with
his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it.
In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky
clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer.
The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates
until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He
it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby
building a one-story renaissance structure around three
sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is
completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle:
he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When
Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky
Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who
held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it
another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky
Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country;
when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from
1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state .
.Since the time it has been under state management and
now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a
paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a
verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras,
the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-•
zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras .
•
•
•
'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.
�
SLOVAKIA
63
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had
�64
SLOVAKIA
it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450
by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders.
King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of
Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve
11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not
ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with
his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it.
In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky
clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer.
The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates
until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He
it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby
building a one-story renaissance structure around three
sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is
completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle:
he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When
Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky
Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who
held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it
another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky
Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country;
when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from
1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state .
.Since the time it has been under state management and
now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a
paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a
verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras,
the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-•
zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras .
•
•
•
'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
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SLOVAKIA
63
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had
64
SLOVAKIA
it only nine years, when he was thrown out of it in 1450
by Peter Komorovsky, one of John Jiskra's commanders.
King Mathias donated the castle to· the Pan:krac clan of
Llptovsky Svaty M~kulas; but Komo,11ovsky would not gi,ve
11; up . .Pankrac attaciked Liptovsky Hradok but could not
ta,ke it. King Mathias intervened, stormed the castle with
his army in 1'474 and forced Komorov,s ky to surrender it.
In 1485 the castle passed into the hands of the ·z apol'sky
clan who held it until 1'527, when it was seized by the imperial army under the command orf G€nera:l Katzianer.
The historic castle was then held :b y various magnates
until 1600, when Nicholas Sandorfi b,ecame the owner. He
it was who made additions to, the Liptovsky Hra,dok, lby
building a one-story renaissance structure around three
sides of the original structure. This part of the castle is
completely preserved and today is the home of the district court. In 1623, 'Stephen Ost:rosich bought the castle:
he lost it to the army of George Rakoczy in 1644. When
Rakoczy concluded 1peace with Ferdinand II[, Liptovsky
Hradok passed into the hands of Nicholas Ostrosich, who
held it to his death in 1660. The Ostrosich family held it
another ten years, G€neral Spork of the imperial army seizing it in 1670. Thereafter, the residents of Liiptovsky
Hradok changed often; rebellions. plagued the country;
when Francis Rakoczy II rebelled, the castle was practically ruined. !Prince Lichtenstein owned the castle from
1709 to 1731, when it_ was !bought from him by the state .
.Since the time it has been under state management and
now is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture.
Because of its location, Liptovsky Hradok is called a
paradise. Its scenic 'beauty attracts many visitors; it is a
verita)ble vacationla.nd. Thousands of visitors come to Liptovisky Hradok to make excursions into the High 'Datras,
the plateaus of Liptov, the Demauc;v Caverns, the Va-•
zec Cave, and the Lower Tatras .
•
•
•
'DRE SLOVAKS by Peter P. Yurchak, should be in
every plliblic libra:ry, in every college ·a nd university, in the
home of every American oif Slovak descent. Get your copy
NOW. Paper bound copy-· $2.00; in cloth $3.00.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: The New Castle of Liptov
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 63-64
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/108886e603427dc15d464e5d907bb6dc.pdf
e015e64f1ff9a2b6b9129d0ca848f992
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
55
Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925),
and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of
Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc.
•~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their
aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one
hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came
to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious
editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that
year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period
and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized
importance in the family of nations" (p. 71).
"lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l
cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be
interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and
Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom"
(p. 72).
This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un.
known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got
the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York
'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches,
etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by
Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in
such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role.
"As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the
greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his
"The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor
Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put
Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the
American Government.
�56
SLOVAKIA
This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w
Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the
Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is
that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik
and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast
mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited
Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the
various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do
you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to
whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply
states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented
the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the
other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything
is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An
illustration:
"Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion.
The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public
opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did
in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in
Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized
and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The
Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the
purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just
demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the
Slovaks came in" (p. 73).
The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as
active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic,
simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the
Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of
America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only
too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that
Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y
�57
SLOVAKIA
accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America.
The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic
leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom
Rome!) and <killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks
were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he
met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell
apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis.
Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-<letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply
the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable.
OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern
European History, Smith College; J.D., German University
of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations,
Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among
them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-,
tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East
(1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ."
This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor
Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of
'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the
history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak
cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out
the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it.
The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky,
"who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism,"
gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre
1
�58
SLOVAKIA
for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of
history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the
secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a
"living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons.
of Czech life."
'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of
Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech
history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the
culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive
.period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering
on the Czech Brethren."
T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn
tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated
the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as
the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he
tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the
conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically
independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions
of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech
history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was
criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as
a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn
he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_,
strosity.
OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con•
ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and
Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned
societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope
(1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The
Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and
the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of
Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ,"
etc.
�SLOVAKIA
59
"The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands
of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by
(p. 106).
its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" -
The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the
"Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none,
how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close
"a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this
falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here
"Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of
the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was
in relating historical facts.
"In its
ent from its
strument of
constituent
•
genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected
assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought
into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created
through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority
and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future
boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not
be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional
flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable,
definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly
supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown
Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political
normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10,
1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks
to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of
October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the
body to give fundamental represe<ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of
virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty
of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to
Slovakia" - (p. 109).
Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and
Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of
�60
SLOVAKIA
Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic"
State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods
were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham
should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That
is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by
saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought
into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through
a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not
know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was
brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it?
Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into
the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental
representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr.
G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to
represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that
the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new
State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the
independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the
Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the
b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a
part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation.
"AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr.
Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the
provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of
the nation . .."
But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen.
tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political
clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer
only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of
Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka,
leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde-
�SLOVAKIA
61
pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia.
The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other
nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a
single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims
on their ibehalf.
Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made
to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was
decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to
amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk
and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was
<lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in
prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-·
mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but
were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything.
The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas
Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-·
sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth .
•
Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details
of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their
significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-·
ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how
the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was
translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly
redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in
itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk
and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the
Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads:
"We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect
unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic,
�SLOVAKIA
62
to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land,
to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and
to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in
our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the
Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be
our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws
of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in
the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and
progressive."
To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on
the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe
above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble,
which reads as follows:
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility,
p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of
America."
Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads
like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is
"perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why
should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut
"our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly
presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes
constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE
THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We
the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia,"
instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"!
Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this
manner:
"The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the
nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so
far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to
be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October
revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist
tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist
movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the
country dlifferential status" (p. 116).
Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze-
�SLOVAKIA
63
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had
�
SLOVAKIA
55
Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925),
and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of
Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc.
•~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their
aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one
hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came
to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious
editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that
year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period
and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized
importance in the family of nations" (p. 71).
"lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l
cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be
interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and
Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom"
(p. 72).
This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un.
known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got
the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York
'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches,
etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by
Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in
such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role.
"As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the
greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his
"The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor
Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put
Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the
American Government.
�56
SLOVAKIA
This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w
Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the
Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is
that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik
and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast
mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited
Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the
various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do
you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to
whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply
states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented
the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the
other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything
is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An
illustration:
"Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion.
The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public
opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did
in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in
Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized
and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The
Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the
purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just
demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the
Slovaks came in" (p. 73).
The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as
active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic,
simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the
Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of
America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only
too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that
Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y
�57
SLOVAKIA
accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America.
The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic
leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom
Rome!) and <killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks
were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he
met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell
apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis.
Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-<letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply
the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable.
OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern
European History, Smith College; J.D., German University
of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations,
Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among
them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-,
tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East
(1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ."
This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor
Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of
'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the
history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak
cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out
the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it.
The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky,
"who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism,"
gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre
1
�58
SLOVAKIA
for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of
history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the
secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a
"living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons.
of Czech life."
'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of
Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech
history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the
culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive
.period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering
on the Czech Brethren."
T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn
tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated
the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as
the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he
tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the
conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically
independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions
of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech
history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was
criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as
a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn
he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_,
strosity.
OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con•
ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and
Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned
societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope
(1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The
Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and
the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of
Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ,"
etc.
�SLOVAKIA
59
"The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands
of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by
(p. 106).
its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" -
The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the
"Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none,
how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close
"a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this
falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here
"Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of
the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was
in relating historical facts.
"In its
ent from its
strument of
constituent
•
genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected
assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought
into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created
through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority
and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future
boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not
be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional
flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable,
definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly
supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown
Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political
normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10,
1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks
to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of
October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the
body to give fundamental represe<ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of
virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty
of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to
Slovakia" - (p. 109).
Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and
Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of
�60
SLOVAKIA
Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic"
State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods
were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham
should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That
is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by
saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought
into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through
a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not
know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was
brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it?
Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into
the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental
representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr.
G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to
represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that
the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new
State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the
independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the
Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the
b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a
part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation.
"AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr.
Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the
provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of
the nation . .."
But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen.
tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political
clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer
only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of
Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka,
leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde-
�SLOVAKIA
61
pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia.
The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other
nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a
single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims
on their ibehalf.
Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made
to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was
decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to
amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk
and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was
<lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in
prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-·
mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but
were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything.
The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas
Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-·
sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth .
•
Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details
of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their
significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-·
ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how
the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was
translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly
redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in
itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk
and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the
Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads:
"We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect
unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic,
�SLOVAKIA
62
to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land,
to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and
to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in
our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the
Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be
our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws
of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in
the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and
progressive."
To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on
the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe
above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble,
which reads as follows:
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility,
p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of
America."
Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads
like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is
"perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why
should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut
"our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly
presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes
constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE
THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We
the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia,"
instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"!
Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this
manner:
"The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the
nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so
far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to
be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October
revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist
tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist
movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the
country dlifferential status" (p. 116).
Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze-
�SLOVAKIA
63
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
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SLOVAKIA
55
Kerner's "Czechoslovakia" (Cont'd.)
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
ORAPTER V - "What Woodrow Wilson and America Meant to Czechoslovakia" - rb y Her:bert Adolphus Miller, .Ph.D., "Lecturer on Social Economy, Bryn Mawr College; Professor of Sociology; Oberlin College (1'914-1925),
and Ohio State Universi,ty (1924-,1931) ; chief, Division of
Immigrant !Heritages, Carnegie Cor,poration; director, MidEuropean Union; president, Masaryk Institut,e," etc.
•~in the year 1914 the number of non-Czech and non-Slovak Americans who had intimate know,l edge of the Czechoslova,ks and their
aspirations could almost 1h,ave been counted on the fingers or one
hMlld. ,E ven up to 1M,ay, 1918, iwhen Thomas Garrigue !Masaryk came
to Amer.lea, the New York Times •h ad not carried a single serious
editorial on the Czec•hoslov,aks. When he left in December of that
year, he was one of the acknowledged g;reat men of the war period
and also president-e,l ect of a country soon to become of recognized
importance in the family of nations" (p. 71).
"lln the face of such ,a complete la,ck of information it waa imposs.ilble for the Ameri= people to give any help to a nationa:l
cause. There w,as a traditional predisposition for Americans to be
interested in ,freedom but it was necessary for the Czechs and
Slovaks in the United States to estahlish their rigiht to freedom"
(p. 72).
This chapter confirms the story that "Czecho-Slovakia" was a state 'born out of propaganda. Masaryk, the un.
known "even up to May 1918," became a celebrated rpoJitical figure 1by DecemJber 1918. it all happened !because Masaryk got to know the "right" people, who in turn got
the U. 1S. Army, the YlMCA and the YWCA, the New York
'l'imes, Woodrow Wilson, the ivarious sectarian churches,
etc., to push the estrublishment of the state proposed by
Masaryk ,a nd Benes. lgnorance of the facts, as usual in
such cases, ,p layed a very, if not the most important role.
"As often hruppens in such cases, the less knowledge, the
greater the enthusioom," M:asary,k himself wrote in his
"The M81king of a 1State" (rS vetova revoluce). Professor
Miller unlblu:.shingly describes the role he played to put
Masaryk's ideas across to the American pulblic and the
American Government.
56
SLOVAKIA
This chapter should have been titled "What Woodro,w
Wilson and America Meant to· Masaryk, Benes and the
Czechs." True, without Wilson and America Ozecho-Sloivakia would not have been born, lbut the fact nevertheless is
that Ozecho-Slo,vaikia served the interests of the Masaryik
and Benes Ozechs more than it did the interests of the vast
mrujority of the population of that Republic. When MajooGenera1 E. F. Glenn, commander of the iDivision invited
Mr. iMiHer "again to discuss what oould be done rubout reestablishing an eastern front through revolutionary activity," Mr. Miller arranged 1a meeting of the "leaders of the
various g;roups of central Europe' (p. 76). And who, do
you suppose, represented the .Slovaiks? '.Dwo Ozechs to
whom Mr. 'Miller does not refer as Czechs, lbut simply
states: "Charles Pergler and Professor Pisecky reipresented
the Czecho-1Slovaik1s." With Miller, much like most of the
other writers on Czecho-:Slovakia, just albout everything
is "Czech," and "Slovak" is only casually mentioned. An
illustration:
"Att·ention then was turn-ed to the education of public opinion.
The story was told to the !Committee on 'Public ,Information, and immediately the national aspirations of the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs began to get space in the new,s,papers. . . Americ,a n public
opiruion wa;s stimulated, first, by what the Czechs themselves did
in America fr.om the very beginning of the war, ,a nd then later in
Europe; and, secondly, through the immediate acceptance of Professor Masaryk (pp. 76-77) . . . . The ,Czech colonies in Chicago, Cle~land, Cedar Rap'ids, and many other pl:aces had Jon,g b een organized
and respected. At the outbreak of the war they got into action. The
Czech National Alliance w,as formed on August 18, 1914, with the
purpos-e of informing the people of America and Europe of the just
demands of the Czech nation for independence. Very soon the conflicting elements of ,Oa;tholics and anti-Catholics that had long divided the Czechs wer,e ,brought together, and soon afterwards the
Slovaks came in" (p. 73).
The :Slovak League of America, which rp layed just as
active, if not a more active part than the Czech organizations for the estaJblishment of the Ozecho-SloivaJk (Republic,
simply was ignored by 'M;r. Miller. Slovak colonies and the
Slovak organi,z ations a:fifiliated with the iSlovak Lea,gue of
America meant nothing to Mr. Miller. The tendency is only
too obvious. Then, too,. Mr. Miller would have us believe that
Masaryk was spontaneously a:cclaimed and "immediaite1y
57
SLOVAKIA
accepted" 1by Slovaks and Czechs everywhere in America.
The fact is that he was not. Czech and Slovruk Catholic
leader~ in America knew how Masaryk felt aibout Catholicism (Rome must lbe tried and convicted! Away f:rom
Rome!) and <killed him at length about the status of religion in the !proposed Czecho-:Slovak Republic. The Slovaks
were not satisfied with Masarylk's oral picture of the status of ·Slovakia within the iRepulblic ; to win them over he
met with them, drafted and signed the Pittsburgh Agreement, !May 30, 1918, which ,g uaranteed the SlOIVaks autonomy (IState.s' rights) ,w ithin the framework o,f OzechoSlova!kia. The artificial sibate, created by ipropaganda, fell
apart li:ke a house .o f cards when it faced its fkst crisis.
Miller and others, who rpushed the principles. of self-<letermination for the Ozechs, did not follow through to apply
the principle to other nations. What followed was inevitable.
OH.APTER VI - "The Historical Roots of Czech Democracy" - /by Hans Kohn, J.D. , "professo;z- of Modern
European History, Smith College; J.D., German University
of Prague; visiting Lecturer on Internationia;l Relations,
Harvard University (19317-1938) ; Guggenheim ·F ellow (19401941); author of numerous 'boo~s and articles, among
them: A History of NaJtionalisim in the East (192,9); Na-tiona:lism and Imperialism in the Hither East (1932); Na-,
tionalism in the !Soviet Union (1933) ; Orient and Occident (1934); West(ern Civilization in the Near East
(1936); iForce of Reason (1937); Revolutions and -DictaJtorships (1939) ."
This is strictly another Czech chapter. In it Professor
Kohn does not concern himself with the "historical roots of
'SlovaJk [)emocracy." How this cha,pter lbecaime a 1part of the
history of Ozecho-Slovakia, without a corresponding Slovak
cha!pter might best be expf.ained by Kerner, who sought out
the authors of the chapters of the lbook he edited and published. Kerner ,p robably could not find a Czech to do it.
The whole narrative rrevol,ves around 1F rantisek P,a l,a cky,
"who was much more than the first great Czech historian." PalMky, "the father of modern Czech nationalism,"
gave to the Czechs the "sense of a mission, a raison d'etre
1
58
SLOVAKIA
for the aspiration to take anew their place o,n the field of
history"; his interpretat ion of the Czech i)ast "created the
secure foundation for Czech democracy " and became a
"living intellectual tradition, ,v italizing all manifestati ons.
of Czech life."
'Palaoky "deeply steeped in the moral philosoiphy of
Kant," set himself to the task of "reinterpre ting" Czech
history, so that he might make "the Czech Reformatio n the
culminatio n and the meaning of Czech history, the decisive
.period of which ,b egan with Jan Hus and the Hussite movement and experience d its last and most sUJblime flowering
on the Czech Brethren."
T. G. Masaryk, Palacky's "great disciple," Mr. Kohn
tells us, "saw rightly not only that Palacky had educated
the Czech people .to democracy , but that he had established in the eyes of Europe the Hussite refonnatio n as
the most valid Czech title to recognition" (p. 104). But he
tells us that "T. G. Masaryk points out rightly in his Palackeho idea naroda ceskeho (Prague, 1926; pp. 42 f.) 'the
conviction that the Czech people cannot become politically
independent is one of the fundament al political conceptions
of Palacky'." The Palacky-Ma sary;k conception of Czech
history is adhered to lby Mr. Kohn, even though it was
criticized by the eminent Czech historian, Josef 'Pekar, as
a falsificatio n of Czech history. The chapter by Mr. Kohn
he1ps prove that Czecho-Slo vakia was a political mon_,
strosity.
OHA!PTER V!III - "Constitutional and Political Structure" - By iMalbone W. Graham, Ph.D., "Professor of Political :Science, University of California, Los Angeles; member, Advisory Committee, Institute of Czechoslovak Studies, Columbia University (1925); member, European Con•
ference of American tProfessors of Internation al Law and
Relations (1926); member of numecrous American learned
societies; author of New Governmen ts of Central :Eiurope
(1924) ; New Governmen ts of Eastern Europe (1927) ; The
Soviet 1S ecurity System (1929); The League of Nations and
the Recognitio n of States (1933); In Quest of a Law of
Recognitio n (1933); The Soviet Union and Peace (1935) ,"
etc.
SLOVAKIA
59
"The medieval Bohemian State, whose overthrow at the hands
of the iHabsburgs closed a long chapter in Czechoslovak national development and opened a darker one of subjugation, was, if only by
(p. 106).
its historical origins, essenti-ally a feudal structure" -
The very first sentence of Mr. Graham's chapter reveals what is coming. What is the connection !between the
"Bohemian" State and the ISlava:ks? 1Since there is none,
how could the destruction o,f the "Bohemian" !State close
"a long ,c hapter in CZECHOSLOVAK national development"? ·F or what purpo,s e did Mr. Graham resort to this
falsification of history? To us it is quite obvious that here
"Czechoslova k" means "Czech." 'But, Mr. Graham, apparently was more interested in building up the "antiquity" of
the "Czechoslovak " business of chauvinistic ~echs (political reconstruction of the Czechoslo:vak State) than he was
in relating historical facts.
"In its
ent from its
strument of
constituent
•
genesis, the Constitution of Czochoslovakia was differcompeers of the postwar period. Whereas every other ingovernment was the -product of a democratically elected
assembly, the Czechoslovak Constitution was brought
into being without elections, by a strictly national assembly created
through a distinctive cooperative process. This apparently anti-democratic procedure was occasioned by the necessity of having availab le for the country from the outset a body with plen,a ry authority
and full responsibility for its actions. At the moment the future
boundaries of the new state were undecided, and elections could not
be held lawfully in unassigned territory. Moreover, the institutional
flux accompanying the wholesale liquidation of the Habsburg Monarchy ,c alled for the prompt creation of _a. substitute authority - stable,
definite and unchallenged. This the Czechoslovak National Assembly
supplied. It was a unicameral ·body made up of the Reichsrat representatives from the Bohemian, Moravian, and .Silesian Crown
Lands, ai;; .el ected in 1911. Taking this prewar standard of political
normalcy as a point of departure, in accordance with the prescriptions of Emperor Oharles's Federalization Manifesto of October 10,
1938, the Czech leaders awaited the formal adhesion of the Slovaks
to tire new state, by the [)oclaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin of
October 31, 1918, then coopted a bloc of fifty-five Slovaks into the
body to give fundamental represe<ntation to that part of the Czechoslovak nation which, under Hungarian rule, had been deprived of
virtually all means of political self-exvression. Later, when the definite boundaries of the country had been laid down in the draft treaty
of Trianon with Hungary, addit'ional representatives were allotted to
Slovakia" - (p. 109).
Simple was it not? The "democracy" of Masaryk and
Benes was given a Constitution about which the peoples of
60
SLOVAKIA
Czecho ..Slova:kia had nothing to say. The new "democratic"
State was just ,b orn and already "undemocratic" methods
were resorted to. It is significant .that Professor Graham
should try to excuse it or act as an apologist for it. That
is not the task of a true historian. What does he mean by
saying that the Czecho-1Slova:k Constitution was brought
into being "by a strictly natlonal assembly created through
a distinctive cooperative process"? I,f Mr. Graham did not
know the details of how the Czecho-SlovaJk Constitution was
brought into 1b eing, why did he attempt to write about it?
Who were the Slovaks coopted by the Czech leaders into
the "Czechoslovak National Assembly" to give fundamental
representation TO THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK Nation ... m:ider Hungarian rule"? Did not Mr.
G:mhaim 1know that Benes and other Czechs presumed to
represent the Slovaks? It should ibe significant, too, that
the Slovaks declared their "formal adhesion to the new
State" on October 31, 1918, that is, three days after the
independence of Czecho-Slovakia was proclaimed, by the
Czech •Mruffia in Prague. There was no "Czechoslo,vaik nation" - ethnically or politically s:peaking - before the
b.irth of Ozecho-:Slorvaikia, so how could the Slo,va!ks be a
part of it? The implication seems to be that the run.democratic "Czechoslo1vaJk Constitution" created such a nation.
"AH formal aspects aside, however," continues Mr.
Graham (,p. 11), "the assemlbly which adopted lboth the
provisional and deifinibve constitutions for the Czechoslovak StaJte was decidedly national, that is, fully representative of the political currents at work in the prewar life of
the nation . .."
But the historical fact is that the "lawful" represen.
tatives, who prepared. and voted the Czecho-'Slova:k Constitution, were anything but lawful. We know that the members of the National Assembly, the first Czecho-Slovak Parliament, were not elected, but handpicked by the political
clique headed lby Masaryk and Benes, who came into po:wer
only with the help of the AHies. When the Constitution of
Czecho ..SlovaJkia was approved on February 29, 1920, Slovakia was occupied by the Czech army and Andrew HJinka,
leader of the Slovaks in their fight for freedom and inde-
SLOVAKIA
61
pendence, was still in a Czech prison at Mirov in -Moraivia.
The Germans and Hungarians, as well as people of other
nations in the new Czecho-!Slovak State, did not haive a
single representative in this ',undemocratic" National Assemlbly, the Masaryk and Benes Ozechs ignoring all claims
on their ibehalf.
Furthermore, so that no aimendrments might be made
to the Constitution against the will o.f the Ozechs, it was
decreed that a two-thirds majority would be required to
amend it. After the National Assemfbly, picked lby Masaryk
and Benes, ,r atified the Constitution, the .A!ssembly was
<lissolved, ,a nd four weeks Jater new parliaimentary elections were held. Hlinka was elected while he was stiH in
prison; after his election he was released. At the first session Hilir.uka and other Slovaik members of Parliament de-·
mantled the implemtcntation of the Pittsburgh Pact, but
were told that it was contrary to the Ozecho-S'lovak Constitution. Masaryk and Benes had control of everything.
The few !Slovaks who went along with them - called Judas
Slovaks ~v 'Slova;k patriots - were given highly paid po-·
sitions in the !State administration, and the fiction of "Czechoslovak" unity was 1pushed in all corners of the earth .
•
Stating that "it is unnecessary to recount the details
of the actual enactment of the Constitution," because today its temporary or transitional stipulations have lost their
significance and do not require consideration," !Mr. Gra-·
ham says (p. 114) : "Rather is it of interest to discern how
the basic ideolo,gy underlying the repubHcan. regime was
translated into fundamental law." And that ideology, continues Mr. Graham, "is admirably eX!pressed in the preamble of the Constitution, whose phraseology, strongly
redolent of that of the .A!rnerican Constitution, is also in
itself a synthesis of the political philosophy of Masaryk
and Benes." Be that as- Mr. Graham says it is, hut it certainly is not a synthesis of the ,political philosophy of the
Czech and 'Slovak nations. The preamble to the OzechoSlova'k Constitution reads:
"We, the Czechoslovak nation, desiring to consolidate the perfect
unity of our people, to establish t,he reign of justi ce in the Republic,
SLOVAKIA
62
to assure the peac,e ful development of our native Czechoslovak land,
to con tribute to the common welfare of all citizens of this State, and
to secure the blessings of. freedom to coming generations, have in
our National A,ssembly adopted the following Cons titution for the
Czechoslovak Republic and in doing so we decla.re that it will be
our endeavor to s ee that this Constitution, to·g et•h er with all the laiws
of our land, be carried out in the spirit of our history, as well as in
the spkit of those modern principles embodied in the idea of selfdetermination, for we desir.e to take our place in the Family of Nations as a member at once cultured, peace-loving, democratic and
progressive."
To compare the "eX!act degree of American influence on
the ideology," expressed in the foggy, intellectual tripe
above, Mr. Graham footnotes the American preamble,
which reads as follows:
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, i n order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, -insure domestic tranquility,
p:rovide for the common Defense, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the blessirngs of Liberty to ourselves ·a nd our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this ,Constitution for the United States of
America."
Now, the American preamble makes sense and reads
like a song, but not so the Czecho-Slovak preamible. What is
"perfect unity" if not perfect consolidation? And why
should "We, the Czechoslovak nation" mean anything lbut
"our people"? Or did the handpicked National Asse:mibly
presume its.elf, and not "our people," to be the "Czechoslovalk nation"? It is significant that the Masaryk-B~nes
constitution makers did not start the preamlble with "'WE
THE PEOBLE oif the Czech0-:Sio,v ak 'State," or with "We
the 1people of the Bohemian Crown Lands and 1Slo'Vakia,"
instead of with :the fiction "We, the OzechosloJVak nation"!
Mr. Graham explains the Czecho-'Slovak preamlble in this
manner:
"The primorcliat principle enunciated is that of the unity of the
nation, not as a goal to be attained, and therefore executory, but, so
far as the Czechs ,and Slovaks were concerned, as an achievement to
be consolidated. W•hat is important in this affirmation o.f achieved constitutional ml'ity is not only its validation of the acts of th€ October
revolution . . . but particularly its absolute rejection of all separatist
tendencies (,p. 115) __ . '1t w,a s not the, intent of the Czechoslovak founding fathers to create legal pediments for future racist or separatist
movements by conceding to the inha:bitants of various p.rurts of the
country dlifferential status" (p. 116).
Mr. Graham somehow conveniently forgot that Cze-
SLOVAKIA
63
cho--Slovia;kia was supposed to be a federation, patterned after the United States or Switzerland. Nevertheless, he knew
the "intent" of the "Czechoslorvak" founding fathers! Mr.
Graham fouled UJP on the false premise of "unity" of the
"Ozechoslovak" nation, which his fertile imagination traced
all the way ibaok to the "medieval Bohemian State."
(More Coming)
•
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIIA
THE NEW CASTLE OF LIPTOV
Beneath the Slovak Tatras, under the ibowed head of
Krivaii, in the valley of the serpentine Vah river, lies the
hidden town of Liiptovsky Hradok (the Little Castle of
Lipto,v) . :Lt is oompletely encircled by mountains and the
red roofs of the dwellings are shariply contrasted iby the fresh
green of the surrounding forests. The town has its name
from the castle there which today is in ruins, its walls increasing the romanticism of the reigion. The fortress, situated on a plain and surrounded 1by a moat, was built by
Magistrate Done, son of iDominic, at the ibeginning of the
14th century. It took twenty years to build. Novy Hrad
(New Castle), as Liptovsky Hradok is called, is near the
river Bela and behind it rises the cliff Skalka.
The vicinity of Hradok was once an ancient forest;
even today many forests exist there, the source of much
of the wood which can be seen on rafts ,p lying the Vah
during most of the year. The castle itself was a twowinged affair with a small courtyard with a well. The
center of the northern wall is ,completely demolished; the
western part resembles a wide bastion in which is pre~
served a vaulted room.
Done, the original occwpant of the castle, did not
enjoy it very long; he was followed hy many others. In 1398,
the Moravian warrior Procopius s'eiized it and held it for
a · short time; in 143·3 L:iiptovs:ky Hradok was ta:ken by
the Hussites and held several months. When they were
evicted in 141,1, the management of the castle was taken
over 'by magistrate Ladislaus z .u:baie Riikolf; the latter had
Dublin Core
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Title
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Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (2/8)
Description
An account of the resource
P. A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 55-63
Creator
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Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
Relation
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continued from <a href="/items/show/186">Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), pp. 38-62</a><br />continues in <a href="/items/show/222">Vol. 6, No. 1 (18), pp. 57-64</a>
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fde68cf3e2a138c471cf9a7af8a0f1b8.pdf
422c447b0c47a3b463fa9461a996b44b
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
49
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.
•
•
•
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the
�50
SLOVAKIA
trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip.
A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were
at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's
mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova
Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to
Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the
Benes followers present it now.
Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in
his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not
Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England."
The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided
to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr.
Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured
the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek
and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised
Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings
about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote
in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk
news rugency.
The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ.,
1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda,
the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that
the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced
today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and
defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign
Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that
the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked
Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-•
port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze
cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of
the Council's decision. In the United States the report
�SLOVAKIA
51
was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in
abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement
is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action
resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted
f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in
1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that
both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better
for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The
pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech.
How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with
the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of
the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went
to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~
sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who
asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will
of the British Government. This is a matter orf record.
Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil
of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate
in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth.
In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts
and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan
Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka,
Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned
trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their
speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943,
and through the first week of November.
It is of interest to note here that during this same time
Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers,
reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the
Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18,
1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De ..
claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen..
eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how-
�52
SLOVAKIA
ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could
not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested
through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity.
I am referring to this incident in order to show that
the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the
first exile (World War I), they did the same during the
second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had
published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency.
One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely
cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from
new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time
in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New
Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy.
It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home.
DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which
had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945,
when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union
by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in
flagrant violation of th e Constitution.
As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia
began earlier than 1943. According to the official report
handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik,
Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky
in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a
common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and
Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as
Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an
agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal
�SLOVAKIA
53
question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs
on page 207.
Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow,
in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed
that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the
annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population
will wish it."
rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-·
cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that
time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with
Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states
that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred
with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with
the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince
can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia."
Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in
London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included.
It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions."
On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that
the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec
IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed
'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes.
It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested.
When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in
the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me
in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~
viet Union." This quotation is according to the official
1
�54
SLOVAKIA
Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me
there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they
were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to
Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier
statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with
Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first
time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~
tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe."
Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were
informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries,
and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands."
It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while
an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and
Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of
Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in
1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied
in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave
consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia
to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except
'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers.
1
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we
surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is
Socialism? Socialism is government control, government
operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and
cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e
life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business,
all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become
public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).
�
SLOVAKIA
49
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.
•
•
•
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the
�50
SLOVAKIA
trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip.
A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were
at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's
mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova
Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to
Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the
Benes followers present it now.
Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in
his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not
Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England."
The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided
to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr.
Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured
the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek
and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised
Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings
about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote
in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk
news rugency.
The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ.,
1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda,
the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that
the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced
today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and
defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign
Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that
the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked
Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-•
port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze
cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of
the Council's decision. In the United States the report
�SLOVAKIA
51
was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in
abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement
is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action
resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted
f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in
1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that
both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better
for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The
pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech.
How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with
the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of
the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went
to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~
sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who
asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will
of the British Government. This is a matter orf record.
Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil
of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate
in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth.
In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts
and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan
Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka,
Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned
trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their
speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943,
and through the first week of November.
It is of interest to note here that during this same time
Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers,
reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the
Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18,
1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De ..
claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen..
eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how-
�52
SLOVAKIA
ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could
not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested
through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity.
I am referring to this incident in order to show that
the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the
first exile (World War I), they did the same during the
second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had
published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency.
One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely
cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from
new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time
in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New
Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy.
It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home.
DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which
had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945,
when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union
by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in
flagrant violation of th e Constitution.
As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia
began earlier than 1943. According to the official report
handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik,
Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky
in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a
common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and
Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as
Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an
agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal
�SLOVAKIA
53
question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs
on page 207.
Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow,
in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed
that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the
annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population
will wish it."
rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-·
cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that
time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with
Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states
that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred
with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with
the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince
can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia."
Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in
London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included.
It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions."
On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that
the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec
IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed
'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes.
It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested.
When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in
the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me
in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~
viet Union." This quotation is according to the official
1
�54
SLOVAKIA
Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me
there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they
were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to
Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier
statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with
Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first
time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~
tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe."
Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were
informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries,
and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands."
It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while
an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and
Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of
Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in
1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied
in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave
consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia
to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except
'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers.
1
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we
surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is
Socialism? Socialism is government control, government
operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and
cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e
life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business,
all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become
public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
49
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.
•
•
•
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the
50
SLOVAKIA
trip. Lausman and Uhlir, too, iboth of whom had just returned foom Moscow, stressed the necessity of the trip.
A different view of the tTirp is held also ,b y those who were
at the meetings of the Council during September and Octoiber, 1943, or those who read the minutes of these meetings, or even those who in the fall of 11943 read Ripka's
mouthpiece in London, the "Czeichoslovak' and the "Nova
Doha." In these minutes and newspapers, the Benes trip to
Moscow appears in quite a dilfferent light from that the
Benes followers present it now.
Communist Vafo !best characterized the situation in
his speech when he declared that Benes must go to Moscow whether the Englishmen liked it or not. If they do not
Hke it, he said, "we shO'Uild leave England."
The Ozecho-lSlovak State Council unanimously decided
to ask Benes to go to Moscow as soon as possible. Dr.
Riipka brought the Council's decision to iBenes and procured
the traivel means for him and his 0om,pany. Dr. Papanek
and Zenk~ •a t a co:mmemomtion of Benes's birthday praised
Benes's decision to go. to Moscow. Their present writings
about Benes's trip, however, disrugree with what they wrote
in 1943 and with the official news of the Ozecho-Slov8Jk
news rugency.
The Ozech newspaper Denni lllasatel for August lrJ.,
1943, puiblished a report from !Moscow that ,says, "Pravda,
the Communist organ, ::received a report from London that
the President of the Czecho-1Slaviak go,v eTnment, Dr. Benes, was forced to postpone his long-planned trip to Moscow 'because of the oppos~tion of English ci11cles." On Octolber 4, 1943, the same Denni masatel carried this report: • "The Cizecho-.Slovak govemment-in-e:x.Ue announced
today that it wishes to enter a paict of muitua:J. heip and
defense with Soviet Russia despite the demand of Foreign
Minister Eden and of the PoiJ.ish govermnOOJt...in.-exiJ.e that
the debate about the pact 'be postponed. . . Eden asked
Dr. Edward Benes, president of the Czecho~Slovak government-in-exile, to ipostrpone his trip to Moscow. . . " This re-•
port was issued for news agencies as well as for the Cze
cho~Slovak press by iD:r. Ripka himself, as the' ~esult of
the Council's decision. In the United States the report
SLOVAKIA
51
was published by IDr. Papanek. The Christian Science Monitor for October 13, 1943, had a long article aJbout Benes's tr1p to !Moscow, and Denni Hlasatel, reprinting it in
abbreviated form on October 14, said: "The postponement
is being e,cplained probrubly by the official British action
resulting from Eden's declaration in Parliament on September 22 this year, in which IDden stated that British intervention - for postponement of Benes's trip - resulted
f-rom discussion held du'l'ing Molotov's visit to London in
1942 . .. His Majesty's Government, said Eden thinks that
both governments are of the, opinion that it will be better
for them at present not to conclude such a paot.. ." The
pasS8Jges a.re from Eden's speech.
How then could Dr. Ripka state in his book "Cze,ehoslovakia Enslaved" that Dr. Benes went to iMoscow with
the consent of the Allies? How can .t he other members of
the Council of Free Ozecho-1Slovakia say that Benes went
to Moscow to sign an alli,ance with the USSR with the con~
sent of Was-hington and London? Yes, it was they who
asked Benes in 1943 to go to Moscow even a;gainst the will
of the British Government. This is a matter orf record.
Yet today in America the same people from the Oouncil
of Free Ozecho-·Slov~kia have the impudence to propagate
in official Washington exactly the opposite of the truth.
In 1943 the twenty-fifth anniversary of c~echo-Slovakia's creation was commemorated in radio broadcasts
and artides. In America bvoadcasts were made by Jan
Masaryk and Francis Nemec, and in London by Ripka,
Slavik and Sramek. AJl were inspired by Benes's planned
trip .to Moscow; they were very much in favor of it Their
speeches were published in the officiial Ozecho-S~ovak publications as well as in Denni Hlasatel from October 27. 1943,
and through the first week of November.
It is of interest to note here that during this same time
Denni masatel, as well as other Czecho-SJ:ovak papers,
reprinted the texts of various proclamations from the
Czecho-Slovak National Oouncil in Paris from October 18,
1918, and also the text of the so-caJ.led "Washington De ..
claration. " On these documents we find the name of Gen..
eral Dr. Milan R. Stefanik rus a signer. At that time, how-
52
SLOVAKIA
ever, General Stefanik was in Russia; therefore he could
not sign any declaration in October, 1918, eiitJher in Washington or in Paris. When Stefa·n ik learned aboot these documents,. according to the memoirs of Fre:noh General Janin, he not onJy did not aJgree with them, but also ,protested
through General Janin that his. signature ,w as used without his knowledge iand authorriity.
I am referring to this incident in order to show that
the Czecho-Slovak politicians did nort change. 'Dhey misrepresented the truth and forged signatures during the
first exile (World War I), they did the same during the
second exile (World Wax l[) and today diUTing the socalled thi·r d exile, they deny even what they themselves had
published earlier througih the Czecho-Slovak press agency.
One could document this. rkhly from 1'94·3 British newspapers, the records of the British Parliament, and particularly the Polish pulblications from 1943. I purposely
cited only the reference of Dr. Zenkl and Ripka from
new:sprupers. This material was ,p ublished at the same time
in New York in 'both of Papanek's newspapers, the New
Yorksky Dennik and New Yorkske Listy.
It is important to note· •t hat Dr. Benes'·s trip to Moscow in 1943 restclted in hiis signing an alliance with the Soviet Union without the approval of the nations at home.
DulI'ing this trip he promised Stia1in to cede Ruthenia, which
had been part of Czecho-lS lovakia before 19138. The fulfillment of Bene.s's promise materialized on June 2,9, 1945,
when Benes formally ceded Ruthenia to the Soviet Union
by treaty without consulting the will of its people and in
flagrant violation of th e Constitution.
As a matter of fact, Benes's dealings anent R.uthenia
began earlier than 1943. According to the official report
handled lby the chiefs of the Ozecho-1Slovaft{ press agencies in London and New Yovk, Dr. Ripka and Dr. IPaJpaneik,
Benes had a conference with ,So-wet Ambassador Majsky
in London on September 19, 19319, a:bout the matter of a
common boundary to be estalblished between the USS'.R and
Czecho-lSlovakia. Benes a:ssured Majsky that as far as
Ruthenia wa,s concerned he and StaJlin would come to an
agreement between themsel,v es, as this was an internal
SLOVAKIA
53
question. Benes himself admits this fact in his Memoirs
on page 207.
Jaromir Smutny, who accompanied Benes to Moscow,
in his publication The Case of Ruthenia (pubJished by Benes's Institute in London), writes on page 34: "When Benes in Moscow talked about Ruthenia he basically agreed
that Ozecho--Sl,ovrukia will not and cannot be against the
annexation of Ruthenia by t_h e USSR if the population
will wish it."
rm January, 19145, Dr. Fierlinger showed me his re-·
cords of Benes's ta:llks in Moscow. Dr. Fierlinger was at that
time Benes's amib assador in Moscow and together with
Smutny ,a ccompanied Benes during his Moscow conferences. Also Dr. Taborsky, then Benes's secretary, states
that Benes said ,o n August 28, 1941, when he conferred
with .Amlbaissador Majsky: "'Ruthema cannot remain with
the Hungarians; the Poles carmot have it; that pr{)!Vince
can only belong either to, Ozecho-Slovakia or to ,R:us,sia."
Despite aJll these commitments, the Benes proprugandists, particularly Papanek in Washington and Ripka in
London, were declaring that Stalin recogni,z ed pre-war Czecho~1Slov~a in its origin.al boundaries, Ruthenia included.
It was very important to them to assure everyone of Stalin's "good intentions."
On December 1, 1944, when Nemec was acting •a s Benes's representative in Ruthenia, he received from the regional convention of national councils its dedsion that Rutheniia was no lornger a part of Czecho~Slo,vaJldia, and that
the National Council of Ruthenia being estaJblished, Nemec
IliO '1ongeT represented Ruthenia. This decision was signed
'b y Nemec's adviser Turjanic, who with Communists Pctruscak and Valo had been assigned to Nemec by Benes.
It wa:s then that the Czecho-iSlova;k government protested.
When Fierlinger on behalf of his government submitted olbjections to what was going on in Ruthenia, Stalin wrote a letter to Benes on January 23, 1945. I was in
the office of Ambassadoir Fierlinger in Moscow. In his letter Stalin Uipbraided Benes, saying: "You yourself told me
in Moscow of your willingness to give R:uthenia to the So~
viet Union." This quotation is according to the official
1
54
SLOVAKIA
Czech embassy record. Dr. Fierlinger himself assrured me
there that Stalin was right and that Benes and his government in London were playing a comedy, because they
were afraid of the consequences. Wthen Benes replied to
Stalin on Feb.vuaJry 1, he did not deny to Stalin his earlier
statement rubout iRuthenria; he also conf:h med ,h is talks with
Miajsky, thus: ",J: did not .c hange my stand on this question from that moment when I udked a;bout it fOT the first
time with your ,a mbassado:r I. Majsky in London in Sep~
tember, 1939, no,r wiU I ,change it in the futUTe."
Stalin, therefore, came west of the Oar:pathi:ans according t9 a previous agreement aJbout whicih official circles in London and Washington did not know. They were
informed to the contrary, namely, that "the USSR recognizes and leaves Czecho~lov;akia in its former boundaries,
and that Stalin does not have any territorial demands."
It wais so that Benes informed Roosevelt in 1943 while
an a visit in Washington, and so ,he talked in America and
Canada. ThUS; also tJhe memlbers of the present Council of
Free Ozecho ..Slovaikia ibroadcast home over the BBC in
1943 and 1944, ,praising Benes as a "lilberator." They lied
in 'b oth instances, for neither Washington nor London gave
consent to Benes's tri:p to MoS<!OIW, nor did they know anythinig rubout Benes':s promise to Stalin to cede IRuthenia
to the 1So.viet Union. Nobody wanted this to haJPPen except
'Stalin, Benes, and their foHowers.
1
• • •
WHO SAID IT?
"Thus if we can a;void Sociwlism, we escape Communism. On the contrary, if we surrender to Socia1ism, we
surrender to Communism at the same time. But what is
Socialism? Socialism is government control, government
operation and government ownership of the Nation's business. Socialism thus caill!s for the continu'OU:s ex:pansion and
cenitraili:zation otf governmental power over prirvat.e production, privat.e property, private employment and privat.e
life. Under Socialism a11 'business becomes public 'business,
all property 1b ecomes public properl:y, all employees become
public employees, and thl\IS, all privacy is abolished." (Dean Clarence Ma;nion, MlBC, 1-16-05).
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Beneš's Trip to Moscow and Czecho-Slovak Propaganda
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An account of the resource
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 49-54
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Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968
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December 1955
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Text
SLOVAKIA
39
THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.
There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's
contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is
concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration
and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions:
First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora.
vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed?
Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can
we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me.
thodius and their immediate puipils?
Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia?
In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography,
especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists
whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades,
there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions.
R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l)
states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly
the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire,
is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of
today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by
no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)."
John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages"
omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic
gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire.
H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis
Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present
the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river
bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and
cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho-
�40
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history
of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2).
For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great
Moravia and the cultmal wor>k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan
Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3).
This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~
tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and
Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary
(Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans,
phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with
older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t
certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which
though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast
dou'bt on the aibove theses .
Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto
the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the
Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when
Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that
after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared
again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their
allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also
states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally
implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan
eoclesirus-tical organization" (5)
The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again
at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends
upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of
Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted
baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo
cir<:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of
�SLOVAKIA
41
the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in.
849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and
join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which
Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of
the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated
the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"< 8) .
Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in
the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and
the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore
since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes
were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even
though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third
ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech
trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and
sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together
witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9),
it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to
Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril
and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history.
The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of
could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began
a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-·
,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian
Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles,
from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity,
but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of
rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list
of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly
lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known
internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of
others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent
only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world
�42
SLOVAKIA
languages, nor were they presented to the learned world
even in a:bst:mct form.
Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the
Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk
university professors and e~perts of whom I might men.,
tion the following:
a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky,
Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan.
:b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis
Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik.
c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery.
d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner.
Every one of these men made a study of one or the
other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of
Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav,
Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several
,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in
foreign languaiges(l0).
To what conclusions does the scientific research of
these experts lead to, even though the results of their
studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to
Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in
suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes
them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that
they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal
dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic
Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll).
'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research
of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these:
1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825
wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and
in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp.
794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con.,
sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great
Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig"
was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country).
2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout
�43
SLOVAKIA
the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900
that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the
ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was
identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav,
Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-·
si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great
Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today.
3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the
above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the
literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius
related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day
Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work,
including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a
·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting
to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~
so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J.
Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- .
1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism."
By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend?
What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation
of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius?
Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources,
such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &ancormn,
Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the
chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name
Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which
we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources
spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State
is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and
"Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is
considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to
indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides
the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short
time to SvatoplUJk's empire.
1
a
�44
SLOVAKIA
"The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan,
"brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance
of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of
Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only
a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical
meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav.
The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek ,
V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry
of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book ,
legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of
people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions
and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm
the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c;
even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia.
According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists,
the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav
states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of
Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in
the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy
in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian
Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was
"in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar
empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from
the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia.
According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic
cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only
between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l.
As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and
their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the
�SLOVAKIA
45
;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also
many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque
aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend
of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the
legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the
entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav
writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the
Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and
that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the
Psa1ms(l9l.
St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the
work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the
glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic
liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the
twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of
the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid
writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to
them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and
New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months."
Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal;
written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from
the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian
tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-·
tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e
prayed in the Slovak translation.
Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the
translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e.,
a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers
and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek
against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd
the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among
the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius,"
written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great
1
�46
SLOVAKIA
Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and
"albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient
Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935.
Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity
developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work
along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons
of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) .
Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these
mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for
the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation
and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took
part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore,
this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to
our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure."
"Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the
Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by
Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we
have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to
Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We
have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as
you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) .
This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of
Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the
Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-·
kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations
is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius
and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations.
As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the
�SLOVAKIA
47
view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great
Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in
Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at..
temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there
"were l aid the foundations for the national Church and
nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft
and the directive of the future of the who>J.e subsequent
historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the
Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic
literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the
BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was
only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia."
Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall
iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a
scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia,
which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from
the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the
circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century.
In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655),
Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the
history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada"
_and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of
Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil
B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre.
futruble proofs of this.
Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &pected to
tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific
resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in
cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-•
tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which
1
1
�48
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke
moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases,
even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies.
References
1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism
and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers
U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol.
2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe,
London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc.
3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also
the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which
was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia.
'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian
centre of the Western Slavs."
4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18.
5. Ibidem , p. 21.
6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik
ibidem, p. 20.
7. Lbidem, p. 293.
8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et
potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... "
9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris,
1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89.
10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf
vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h
prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky
vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927;
Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik,
Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a ,
1948, etc.
11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78.
12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche
Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke
(Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) .
�SLOVAKIA
49
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.
•
•
•
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the
�
SLOVAKIA
39
THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.
There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's
contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is
concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration
and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions:
First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora.
vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed?
Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can
we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me.
thodius and their immediate puipils?
Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia?
In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography,
especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists
whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades,
there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions.
R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l)
states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly
the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire,
is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of
today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by
no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)."
John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages"
omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic
gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire.
H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis
Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present
the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river
bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and
cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho-
�40
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history
of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2).
For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great
Moravia and the cultmal wor>k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan
Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3).
This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~
tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and
Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary
(Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans,
phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with
older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t
certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which
though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast
dou'bt on the aibove theses .
Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto
the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the
Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when
Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that
after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared
again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their
allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also
states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally
implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan
eoclesirus-tical organization" (5)
The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again
at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends
upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of
Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted
baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo
cir<:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of
�SLOVAKIA
41
the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in.
849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and
join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which
Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of
the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated
the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"< 8) .
Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in
the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and
the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore
since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes
were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even
though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third
ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech
trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and
sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together
witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9),
it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to
Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril
and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history.
The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of
could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began
a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-·
,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian
Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles,
from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity,
but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of
rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list
of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly
lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known
internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of
others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent
only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world
�42
SLOVAKIA
languages, nor were they presented to the learned world
even in a:bst:mct form.
Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the
Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk
university professors and e~perts of whom I might men.,
tion the following:
a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky,
Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan.
:b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis
Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik.
c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery.
d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner.
Every one of these men made a study of one or the
other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of
Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav,
Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several
,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in
foreign languaiges(l0).
To what conclusions does the scientific research of
these experts lead to, even though the results of their
studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to
Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in
suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes
them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that
they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal
dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic
Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll).
'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research
of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these:
1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825
wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and
in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp.
794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con.,
sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great
Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig"
was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country).
2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout
�43
SLOVAKIA
the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900
that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the
ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was
identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav,
Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-·
si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great
Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today.
3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the
above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the
literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius
related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day
Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work,
including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a
·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting
to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~
so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J.
Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- .
1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism."
By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend?
What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation
of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius?
Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources,
such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &ancormn,
Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the
chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name
Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which
we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources
spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State
is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and
"Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is
considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to
indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides
the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short
time to SvatoplUJk's empire.
1
a
�44
SLOVAKIA
"The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan,
"brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance
of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of
Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only
a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical
meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav.
The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek ,
V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry
of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book ,
legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of
people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions
and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm
the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c;
even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia.
According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists,
the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav
states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of
Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in
the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy
in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian
Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was
"in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar
empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from
the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia.
According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic
cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only
between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l.
As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and
their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the
�SLOVAKIA
45
;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also
many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque
aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend
of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the
legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the
entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav
writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the
Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and
that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the
Psa1ms(l9l.
St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the
work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the
glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic
liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the
twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of
the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid
writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to
them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and
New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months."
Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal;
written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from
the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian
tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-·
tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e
prayed in the Slovak translation.
Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the
translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e.,
a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers
and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek
against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd
the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among
the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius,"
written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great
1
�46
SLOVAKIA
Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and
"albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient
Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935.
Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity
developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work
along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons
of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) .
Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these
mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for
the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation
and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took
part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore,
this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to
our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure."
"Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the
Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by
Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we
have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to
Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We
have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as
you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) .
This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of
Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the
Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-·
kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations
is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius
and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations.
As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the
�SLOVAKIA
47
view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great
Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in
Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at..
temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there
"were l aid the foundations for the national Church and
nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft
and the directive of the future of the who>J.e subsequent
historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the
Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic
literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the
BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was
only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia."
Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall
iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a
scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia,
which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from
the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the
circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century.
In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655),
Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the
history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada"
_and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of
Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil
B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre.
futruble proofs of this.
Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &pected to
tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific
resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in
cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-•
tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which
1
1
�48
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke
moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases,
even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies.
References
1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism
and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers
U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol.
2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe,
London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc.
3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also
the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which
was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia.
'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian
centre of the Western Slavs."
4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18.
5. Ibidem , p. 21.
6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik
ibidem, p. 20.
7. Lbidem, p. 293.
8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et
potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... "
9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris,
1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89.
10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf
vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h
prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky
vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927;
Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik,
Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a ,
1948, etc.
11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78.
12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche
Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke
(Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) .
�SLOVAKIA
49
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.
•
•
•
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
39
THE SLOVAKS AND SLAVONIC CIVILIZATION
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.
There seems to be some confusion even among ,specialists in the fi.eld of Slav,iic studies as far as Slorvalkia's
contribution to the civilization of other Slav peoples is
concerned. The question, then, as to· what role the SlovaJkis reaHy did 'Play in the civilization of the Slavonic peoples, is not only interesting, but worthy of consideration
and study. To answer that question, we must first consider several fundamental questions:
First: What role did IS'loviaikiia play in the Great Mora.
vian Empire, on the territory o.f which the cultura)l~reHgioll'S mission of Saints Cyril and Methodiius was developed?
Second: Into the cultural history of what nation can
we place the cuatural and literary work of Cyril and Me.
thodius and their immediate puipils?
Third: Are the Slovaks of today ethnically and culturally bound with the people of Great Moravia?
In a significant 1portion of ,Slavonic histriography,
especially in the works of sciientific workers and Slavists
whiich were !pUb1ished in English in the past three decades,
there is no agreemoot on these fundamental questions.
R. A. Kamn in hiis "The Multinational Empire"(l)
states, for example, that "the !Slav popuJ.ation, ,p articularly
the eastern SlaN populaition of the Great Moravian Ehnpire,
is unquestionaJbly the historic ancestor of the Slovaks of
today," but he adds that those historic ,p redcessors ·a re "by
no means ethnically identical with them (the Slovaks)."
John D. lJa Monte in his "World of the Middle Ages"
omits the 'Slovaks cOIIIllpletely when naming the ethnic
gro'll!ps which .formed the Great iMoiravian Empire.
H. S. Thompson, J. S. Roucek, Milan Hodza, Francis
Dvornik, and many other •less significant iSlavists ,present
the first ,Slavonic !State in Central Europe - which Porfyl'ogenetos named topogrruphically accordmg to the river
bearing that name - as if it belonged to the political and
cultural history of the Ozechs, or at best of the Ozecho-
40
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks. And thus they a:lso present the cultUTal-Ohristiarn work of Saints Cyril and Methodius.
Professor Francis Dvornik, one of the most acknowledged authorities of cultural and political history
of the IShwonic ,p eoples of the ninth century, regards "Bohemia the heir of .t he Mo11avian Empire"C2).
For ,p rofessor Rouceik (ISla;vonic Encyclopedia) Great
Moravia and the cultmal wor>k of Cyril-Methodius is exclusively a part of Czech history, while for Dr. Miilan
Hodza it is the first "CzechosJovaJk" State(3).
This -wew, which the aibove mentioned authors at~
tempt to support with the hypothesis that "Czechs and
Slova!ks of Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Hungary
(Silova;k,i•a ) fovmed a single group with a common language"( 4) - the iview held ,b y several Ozech histor1ans,
phil'()llogists and ethnographers, specially Cha1oupeoky, Niederle, Pra•z ak, and Pastmek - is, of course, at odds with
older views of some Czech, Slovak, German and otiher European histovians, philologists and ethnographers. And ,i t
certainly cannot find support in histor,ical sources, which
though not abundant are nevertheless sufficient to cast
dou'bt on the aibove theses .
Professor Dvornik himself, who- regards Czechia-Bohemi1a as the heir of the Great Moravian Elmpire, leads rto
the logical conclusion that the Czech tribes belonged to the
Great Moravian Empire only for a very sho-rt time, when
Svatoplulk was extending his power on a1'1 sides, and .that
after Svatopluk's death in 895 "the Bohemians appeared
again at the Re.ichrsita;g at Regensburg and renewed their
allegiance to the FrMllkish Empire. " And Dvornik also
states that "Bohemia's submission to the Franks naturally
implied severance of all !l'.'cligious ties with the Mora-wan
eoclesirus-tical organization" (5)
The statement that "the Bohemians appeared again
at Regensburg" requiTes supplementation from the Arnnales Fuldenses, which Dvornik himself quotes a;nd depends
upon, that is, tha;t in the year 8415 "fourteen chieftains of
Czech tribes a:ppeared at the court of Louis and accepted
baptism with their escorts"(6), which under the givoo
cir<:umstances clearly indicates the political dependence of
SLOVAKIA
41
the Czech tribes on Bavaria. According to the Armales Xantenses, the Czechs quarreled and fought with Bai\Tlaria in.
849, but could not rid themselves of Bavarian rule and
join the Ozech lands to the Great Moravian Empire, which
Dvornik regards as a "federation under the authority of
the Mojmir dynasty"(7), until aJbout 880. According to Novotny and the Annales Fuldenses •~svatopl,uk extricated
the Czech tribes from Frankish rule b.y force"< 8) .
Since the beginnings of Gre,a t MoTavia are placed in
the year 822 a:nd 'h istorical sources mention Pribina and
the dedication of the Church in Nitrn in 833; furthermore
since, even accordmg to, professor Dvornilk, Czech tribes
were still defin,itely :sUJbordinated to Bavaria in 8'49, even
though that was already the era of Rastis1av, the third
ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, and since the Czech
trilbes separated from the Great Moravian Empire and
sutbmitted to Bavaria and then even waged war together
witJh the Germans against the Great Moravian :EJmpire:(9),
it ,i s indeed quite difficult to find a historical or logical argument for the thesis that Great Moravia did belong to
Czech polirti'cal history and that the cultural work of Cyril
and Methodius belonged to Ozech cultm-al history.
The question of what tribes formed the Great Moravian Empire and what lands the empire consisted of
could not be considered satisfactorily and defi.n,i tely resolved and, therefore, a group of scientific workers began
a new search and technica{ researdh of sources. The historians were joined :b y philologists, archeo[og,ists and ex-·
,p erts on medieval history; the era of the Great Moravian
Emrpire was studied ~at only ,f rom 'a nnals and chronicles,
from legends and liturgical texts of iS lavonic antiquity,
but also on the baisis of archeological finds, names of
rivers and mountaiins, villages and towns, ·c hurches, Christi'an and fomily names, popular traditions, etc. The list
of speo~ali,s ts of the Great Moravian era is surprisingly
lange in the rpast years and while some of them are known
internationally (1Dvornik, Jam:ohson), significant works of
others are tJhus far unknown on the Amerfoan continent
only becruuse they were not trans.Jated into ,various world
42
SLOVAKIA
languages, nor were they presented to the learned world
even in a:bst:mct form.
Among the uruknown or little-known ,s pecialists in the
Anglo-Saxon world, we find a si,,gnif.icant group of Slovwk
university professors and e~perts of whom I might men.,
tion the following:
a) In history: Joseph Skultety, Francis lHruso,v sky,
Daniel Rapant, J. Dakan.
:b) In philofogy: John Stanislav, Henry Bartek, Louis
Novaik, Jizacenko, B. Varsi1k, V . Pogorielov, Anthony !Banik.
c) In literary histoiry: Andrew Mraz, Steplhen Krcmery.
d) In ar,cheology: John Eisner.
Every one of these men made a study of one or the
other phase of the em of Great Momvi,a and the work, of
Saiints Cyril and Methodiius, ,and some of them - Stanislav,
Hrusovsky, Bartek, ,:maicenlko, Pogorielov of several
,p hases and some of their studies were ,published even in
foreign languaiges(l0).
To what conclusions does the scientific research of
these experts lead to, even though the results of their
studies thus far ,a re available for the main part only to
Slavonic scholars and haive not been made availruble in
suita!ble form for the western world? Professo.r Otokar Odlozilik, in the ' ~Harvard Slavic Studies," summwri'zes
them 1.Jhiis way: "'1:t can ibe said of them in general that
they not only shed fuller light on po1'itical and cultuTal
dev~lopments in the Mor.avian State, but invalidated earlier concepts, aiccording to which the work of the Slavic
Apostles wais short-lived and doomed to failure"(ll).
'F undamentally, the results of the scienti.f1ic research
of Slovaik historians, philofogists., archeologists and cultural wovkers of the past decades are these:
1. In agreement with Dobrovsky, who alreaidy in 1825
wrote that ",S lovakia was really Great MoraJVlia" (12), and
in agreement with Safarik (:Slovanske starozitnosti, pp.
794-795), Skultety, Hrusovsky, Stanislav ,a nd Dekan con.,
sider Slovakia as 1Jhe central and main part of the Great
Moravian Elm.pi.re, which in the "Skazani o prelozeni knig"
was already called "1Slovensk,a zemlja" (Sloviak country).
2. In agreement with V. Jag-i:c, who in his wcmk a'bout
43
SLOVAKIA
the origin of the Church ISlaJV1onic tongue wrote in 1900
that "in Great Moravia ,p eople must have spoken dn the
ninth century with a tQ!1lgue which in its fundamental,s was
identkal witJh the !Slov•aik language of today"(13), Stamislav,
Bartek, Rapant, Varsik and No,vak arrived at the conclu-·
si•o n through .scientific study that the inhalbitants of Great
Moravia •w ere the direct ancestors of the 1Slovaks of today.
3. On the ,b asis of the abOIVe mentioned premi ses, the
above historians and philologists, as ,well ·a s A. Mraz, the
literary historian, oo.me to the conclusion that the cultural-Christianiz.ing adiv:ity of 1Sruints Cyril and Methodius
related to, iin tJhe first ,place, the ancestors of present-day
Slovltks and ISlovwkia and, therefore, their literary work,
including the literary activity of some of their ipupil.s, is a
·component ,part of SlOl\"aik 1iternture. It may be interesting
to note here that this .thesis is supported even by profes~
so:rs of the Bratislava University today (A. Mira~ and J.
Dek1an) , even though in present C'zecho-Slo,vaikia nationalism and everything which might be susipected of nationa:l- .
1sm is prmishable according to the lruw as "deviationism."
By what .scientif,i.c arguments are these tJheises supported? On what scientific order do they mainfy depend?
What new contributions do they bring to the evaluation
of the work of Cy11itl and Methodius?
Besides a new search and ev;aluation of known sources,
such as the Annales Fuldenses, Annales, regni &ancormn,
Libellus de conversione Bagoariorum et Carantanorum, the
chronicles of Heriman, Regino, Nestor, legends and biogrruphies, etc., the brusis for the above mentioned conclusions are in the main philological researches(14). The name
Mora;via and Miaravian.s, incidental~y also "Scalvi," which
we meet with mainly in Latin sources, whHe eastern sources
spook of ".Sfoveni" (in the S!K'A'Z ANi, the Mornvian State
is, as we have seen, alternatively ca:lled "Monwa" and
"Slovenska zemljia" - Morav;ia iand the Sl01vak l,and), is
considered a topo,g ra;phical term, which received its ,political character and was used ,in the etatistical meaning to
indica,te the inhabitants of the Moravian State, besides
the Czechs and the Se11bians wllw belonged only for short
time to SvatoplUJk's empire.
1
a
44
SLOVAKIA
"The fall of Great Moravia," writes Dr. J. Delkan,
"brings a. return to the original topographical signif.icance
of the name, and tJhe inhabitants of the eastern .part of
Great Morav;ia, i.e., the territory of Slovakia, ,b esides isolated toponomastk remiscences, are called iby their own ancient ethnic name of "Sclavi, Slovieni, namely, the Slovaks" (15). The thesis tha:t the term Moravians had only
a specifically topographic •a nd, later, a politicaHy ebatistical
meaning was unfolded long before Dekan by several Slo!Vak Slav;ists and hi,s torians, especially by Joseph Skultety(16), Hrusovsky and Stanis:lav.
The .philologists John 1Stantisliav, L. Novak, H. Bartek ,
V. Pogorielov, mcenko, and others, lby philologioa1 inquiry
of the Cyrilo-.Methodius texts, the Cividalian Gospel Book ,
legends and chronicles, as well as by searching names of
people, J'livers., mountains, villages, churches and traditions
and, furthermOTe, the dia!lects and "loan words", confirm
the theses and the hypotheses ,o;f the historians. as regard..c;
even the ethnical nature of the inhia,bitants of Great Moravia as well as the mission of Cyril and Methodius in relation to Slovaikia.
According to the latest researches, of Slovak Sl-avists,
the mission of Saints Cyril and Methodius took pla:ce mainly on the territo-ry o,f the Slova,ks - professor Stanislav
states with certainty that Method's residence was in Nitra(l 7) and the great cultural-Christianizing work of
Cynil and MetJhodius is consequently placed first of all in
the cultural history of the Slovaks. Even Dvornik confiir.ms this indirectly when he states that "Slo,vam.ic liturgy
in Slovakia outlived the catastrophe of the Great Morawian
Empire," that the territory o.f present-day Slo,vrukia was
"in a definite sense the most cultured part of the Magyar
empire" (,correctly, the Hungarian empire), and the Slavonic monks, after being ex,pelled from Czech lands (from
the Monastery at Sazavia) in 1055, found refuge in !Slovakia.
According to Dvornilk, Slovakia and her ancient Slavonic
cente11s served as ''half~way transmitting centers" not only
between Croatia, but even Kievian Russia08l.
As far as tJhe literary work of Cyril-Methodius and
their immedi,a te .students is ,c oncerned, we know from the
SLOVAKIA
45
;'SKAZANI" that they translated "i proceJe knigy" (also
many other books) and from Latin legends "pluraque
aliia documenta sacrae scri,ptuare" (according to the legend
of Bodescens), or only ".plura que a'lia," according to the
legend of Christian. ,Sbanisla'V reco.rds that "after his arri'Val in Great Mora'Via, Constantine translated almost the
entire ecclesiastical rituial." We know definiteJy, Stanislav
writes, that Constantine completed the translation of the
Gospel texts of all four ev,angelists in Great Mora'Via, and
that he also translated the Acts of the Apostles and the
Psa1ms(l9l.
St . Methodius, according to Stanis1a'V, continued in the
work ,b egun by his brother and after the issuance of the
glorious Bull "I:ndustriae tuae," by which the Sla'V•Onic
liturgy a;gain was confirmed and permitted, "made a compendium of everything that was translated during the
twel1Ve years (869-881) oif hris independent '1eadership of
the Great Moravian mission. He selected -t wo priest 'rapid
writers' a111d with them translated - probably dictated to
them - the entire text of the Holy B ible - tJhe Old and
New Testaments, besides the books of the 1faccalbees, within eight months."
Methodius also t:mnslated, or had translated, the Latin Missal, which is •.p reserved as the so-•called Kiev Missal;
written in Gl agolic letters it is preserved in a copy from
the 10th century wi,1fu the elements of the Great Mora1Vian
tongue. Stanisla'V aJso mentions the translation of the ri-·
tual, the fbrev;iary and the credo•, which, according to Methiodius' biog,r,ruphy, Sva.toplUik was Slllpposed to hav,e
prayed in the Slovak translation.
Of the non..Jiturgica11 books, Sfanislav mentions the
translation of the Nomocanon, or the Korm'.caja bodk, i.e.,
a collection of laiws and regulations o.f the By,zantian rulers
and Chwch Fiatlhers, then Cyril's po~emic treatise in Greek
against the Jews, which was translated :b y Methodius, ,a nd
the original works "A Preface to the Gospels" and "Writings A'bout the True Faith," both written by Cyril. Among
the original mementoes belong the so-caUed iPannonianMO'ravian Legends, "The Life of St. Cyril and iMethodius,"
written, according to, Stanjslav, without a doubt in Great
1
46
SLOVAKIA
Moravia, also the "Praiises of Cyril and Metihodius" and
"albou;t the end of the ancient Slovak epoch of Slovak culture" - the 'legend aJbout Naum. One of the "MoravianSloviak sons" - Stanislav says - composed also the ancient
Slovalk legend about St. Wenceslaius around the year 935.
Stan:is1aiv states quite clearJy that this literacy activity
developed on rSlovaJk territory and that in the "great work
along wiith Cyril and .M ethod.ius undoubtedly other sons
of the Slovak nation had a part, especially Gorazd(20) .
Traces of thii:s are found especially in many words of these
mementoes." And since "tlhese memoirs were written for
the religious, i.e., the cultural needs of the Slovak nation
and prompted by it, the predecessors of the Slovaks took
part in this work passi'Vely and actively and, therefore,
this literary wor.k, according to Sta.nislav, belongs also to
our (Slovak) nationaJl treasure."
"Old Slavonic was the first liter,a ry language of the
Slwa;k nation," J. Stanrislav wrote in 1944 at the conolusion of his studies. This the.sis was taken up after him by
Dr. A. Mra:z, professor orf Slova,k literature at ,t he Bratisl1a va U-p.iversity today. The Slovaik nation actuaHy regards it as lits langua:ge, states Stanislav. Prnof of this we
have, for example, in tihe letter of Pope Hadrian IT to
Rastislav, Svatophrk and Kocel, in which is written: "We
have decided . . . to send Methodius . . . to teach you as
you requested, e~laining the Bible in your language (21) .
This clarif,ioation of the re'1ation of the mission of
Saints Cyril and Methodius to Slo;vakia appeared to be necessary to find the answer to the question what role the
Slova;ks and !Slovakia ,p layed in the ibegiinnings of civilization of the 1Slruvonic rpeoples. -If we accept the thesis, demonstrated by Slovak IS lavists, ,tJhen the matlter is in surbstance simple : the participation oif the Slovaks and Slova-·
kia in the civilization of the rest of the Slavonic nations
is proved by .the signifioance of Saints Cyril and Methodius
and their immediate pupils in the cultural life .of the individua:l Sliwonic nations.
As for as the content and extent of the cultural-Christian~ing work of Cyri'l .and Methodius is concerned, SlovaJk Slavists, wiit:h their scientific inquiries, confirm the
SLOVAKIA
47
view ,o f professor K. J. Grot(22), who wrote rub-Out Great
Moravia and the work of the Slovak Aipostles that in
Great Moravia was made not only "the most important at..
temrpt at a politicail unification of the Slovanic peoples the Greater Moravian Union - but also that: 1. there
"were l aid the foundations for the national Church and
nati.onal Christian education; 2. there origina,ted the draft
and the directive of the future of the who>J.e subsequent
historic development of Slavdom, its world :riole and re.1ation to Roman-Germaillic Europe, to the West and to the
Asiatic question; 3. the foundation of Church-1Slov,a nic
literature and education in the .Slovanic South among the
BuLgars and the 1Seribs, and in the East among the Russians, and pa:rtly also among other western Slavs, was
only a continuation of that work whfoh Cyril and Methodius had begun in Great Moravia."
Before concluding, it is iperhaps necessary to recall
iha:t bortih histori'Oal and cu1tural conclusions here indicated are nothing new in ,Slovak cultUTal life, but onily a
scientific support of the tradition and endu:riing consciousness of the continuity of Great Mora'\ria w1th Slovakia,
which already in rthe 17th and 18th centuries found expression in several scientific and literary wo-:r,ks b-Oth from
the ci~de of Trnavia University (1635), and also from the
circle of Bernol1ruk's school at the end of the 18th century.
In the preface to 1:Jhe significant Cantus Catholiic,i (1655),
Benedict ,S zolosi (1609-56) tells ·clearly about the consciousness of historical continuity of the Slovaks wiith the
history of Great Moravia; the greia.t epic "Cy:rifoimertodiada"
_and "IS vatoplulk" from John Holly and the Latin work of
Samu~l Timon (16'715-1736), .the distinguished wor:k of Johlil
B. Magin from 1712-8 •~Maurices sive Arpologda" aTe irre.
futruble proofs of this.
Of couTse, :Slavists of other nations are &pected to
tell how far the results and conclusions of .the scientific
resoo.rdh of ISlov,a;k Slaviists are in agreement with the histo~ical truth aind where the theses and hypoitheses are in
cases in disagreement with their scientifdc research. Therefore the aim of this dissertation is not only to call at.ten-•
tion to Slovruk -scientific inquiries, to the ·c ontri1bution which
1
1
48
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks m'ade to Slavistics from Safarlk and Kollar to present-day scientific woiikers in Slovaiki1a and outside its territory, but this short treatise has for its aim also to evoke
moire interest to inquire .into and evaluate a,nd, in cases,
even to refute some theses of contemporary Sfova:k scientific woDkers in ,tJhe field of Slavic studies.
References
1. Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire Nationalism
and National Re.form in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918, Ruil:gers
U niversity, New Y,ork, Columbia Un iversity Press, 1950, 2 vol.
2. ,F rancis Dvornik, The Making of Central and Eastern Europe,
London, 1949, ,p. 241. etc.
3. Dr. Milan Hodza, Federation in Central Europe, Jarold-s , London, 1942, p. 86: "Slovakia was hlle fiTst cultured and, mayb e also
the first pol'itical centre .of thait Great Moravi-a of A :D. 8,26-907 which
was the early mediev.al precedent of the -modern OzechoJSlovakia.
'l'his original Czecho•Sfovak State mad e 'i tself the first Chrisitian
centre of the Western Slavs."
4. Dvornik, ,i bidem, p. 18.
5. Ibidem , p. 21.
6. "Hludovicus quatuordecim ex ducibus Boemanorum cum hominibus -s ui s Christianam religionem desiderantes suscepit et in octavis ,theopihaniae haptizar.i juss,i t," M. G. H . S ., I, p. 364; Dvornik
ibidem, p. 20.
7. Lbidem, p. 293.
8. V. Novotny, Ceske dejiny, Praha, 1912, p. 380: Annales Fuldenses. p. 126: "(.:B!oemani ) quos Zwentibaldus dux a consortio et
potestate Baio,aricae ,g entis per vim dudum divelendo detr.axerat ... "
9. Ernest Deni-s , La question d' Autriche et les Slovaques, Paris,
1917; Louis Leger, Histoire de I' Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1920, p. 89.
10. The principal bo,o k,s dealing with the question of Great Moravia a nd the Mission of Cyri,J and Methodius are as follows: J. Skultety, Sketches from Slovak History, Middletown, P.a ., 1930; F. Hrus ovsky, Gesch ichte der Slowakei, Bratis'lava, 1943, and Slovenskf
vladari , Scranton, Pa., 1948; Jan 'Stanislav, Kultura starych Slovakov, Bratislava, 1944, ,and Rfsa Vel'komoravska , Sbo-r nik v,edeckye'h
prac, Prague, 1933, and Slovanskf apostoli Cyril a Metod a ich cinnosf vo Vel ' komoravskej rfsi , Bratislava, 1945; Izacenko, Zaciatky
vzdelanosti vo Vel'komoravskej rfsi, T. sv. Martin, 1948; V . Pogor,ielov, O narodnosti slovanskych apostolov, Bratislava, No. 2, 1927;
Rap.ant, Pribynov nitriansky kostolik, .Bratislava, 1941; A. Banik,
Apostol Gorazd ; A . Mraz, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislav,a ,
1948, etc.
11. Harvard Slavic Studies, Vol. I.I, p. 77-78.
12. " . . . die heutige Slorwakey in Oberungern is das eigen,tliche
Gross,Mli.hren . .. " wrote •Dobrovsky in a l etter to J. S. Bandtke
(Correspondence o,f J . Dobrovsky, II, p. 163) .
SLOVAKIA
49
13. See V. J agic, Entstehungsg eschichte der Kirchenslawischen
Sprache, Vjenna, 1900.
14. Annales Fuldenses and Annales r egni Francorum mention
'·Sclavos Marabenses" . . . "duces Sclavorum circa Danubiu m habitantium .. ." or "legationes Marvanorum . . ." distingui>shin,g
them fro m "legaitiones !Beheimorum," i.e., C2Jechs. In the Reg,e nsburg continuation of Annales Fuldenses we find only "Maravi,
M·aravaui, Marehenses, Marabi, Marahav.i," etc.
15. ,see !Dr. J an Dekan, Slovenske dejiny, Iii, Bratislava, 1951,
p. 42.
16. J . SkuJ.tety already in 1926 writes in this regard: "With the
,d evelopment of science, particularly Slavonic ph ilology, talk of Carpatho,Danubian and Pannonian Slavs w:ill cease, -a nd t!he SloveneSlovaks w'il'l be def,i nitely m entioned . When it is once clear that
ihe inhabitants of present-day Moravia were nothing but Slovaks,
t h e nation of Rastislav and Svatopluk will not be called Moravlans
.a nd Slovaks, but persistently and definitely Slovaks" (Sketches from
Slovak History, p. 30).
17. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 42 .
18. See Chapter, Kievan Russia and Central Europe, p. 236-261.
19. See Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 10-14.
20. Pogorielov s•a ys em ph a ti cally th at t he Slovakisms in the
Slavonic text of th e H oly Scriptures are th e work of Gorazd and
calls Gorazd the third h oly apos tl e of Slavdom .
21. Kultura starych Slovakov, p. 14.
22. K. J . Grot, Karpato-dunajs kija zemli v sud'bach slavianstva,
1905, p. 18, and Metodijevskij jubilejnij sbornik, W arsaiw, 1885, p. 5.
•
•
•
BENES'S 'JIRiiP TO MOSCOW AND CZECHOSLOVAK PROPAGANDA
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Benes admits in his Memoirs that Eden made some forJ
mal objecUons aigainst his 1943 trip to Moscow, yet he tries
to mmimti:ze the opposition of the IDnglish cabinet . Benes
pr.opaJgandists of today, h owever, do not admit ev~ this
faot and t hey praiise the Benes t rip to Moscow as something
by which Benes greatly ,helped the Allies and to which
Washington and London consented.
Anyone who heard Dr. Ripka's report before the
CzechoJSlovak State Council in London, July 26, 19'43 when he talked aib,out the preparaUons for Benes's trip
to Moscow, made in a;greement with Ozecho.;S1ov,ak Communists, and how Dr. Benes was expected in Moscow in
any case - has an entirely different picture rubout the
Dublin Core
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Title
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The Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization
Description
An account of the resource
Joseph Kirschbaum, LL.D., Ph.D.
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 39-49
Creator
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Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
SNK
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c672884b42cfb02d25713c71e2a2e99a.pdf
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PDF Text
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SLOVAKIA
21
LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA
By Constantine Oulen
We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik,
because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics
were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they
were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ...
fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic.
We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on
as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks
at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms.
We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even
an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich
really belongs under the Czechs.
We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~
titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall
not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the
Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter
of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the
beauty of colors with a color-blind person.
The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich,
however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts.
L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia
made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938
"had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by
referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities
(p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop
and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population.
But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are
we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not
practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms
for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the
influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into
1
�22
SLOVAKIA
the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase
in population of those cities.
But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics
even in this case? He could have proved his case even with
correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of
inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase
the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~
Slovruk Republic.
According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants
in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know,
already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the
census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the
Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had
1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic
(Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400
i.nhabitants in 1949.
According to Lettrich, Turciansky &vaty Martin had
3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we
know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900;
4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k
census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the
other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source
was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953).
But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T.
Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only
10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's
book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the
figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or
for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there
the figures for 1940 and 1946.
It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the
growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area."
Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various
Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946.
�SLOVAKIA
23
When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some
cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the
decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different;
he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic
was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example,
the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent;
Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an
interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed
'modern"!
"Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for
political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000
Crowns" (p. 38).
That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution,
but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some
ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years
and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item
with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he
probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the
SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is
quite familiar.
It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution,
oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from
1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme
in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and
unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove
that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we
need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey
are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially
.p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the
ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar
nation.
On the other hand, however, what was done to the
Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW,
and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the
�24
SLOVAKIA
thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime
pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken
skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes.
At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars,
when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them
already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property
of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the
beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19
months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14
days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could
save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's
cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent
higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time
did not even happen in Hungary.
But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which
the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years!
What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was
responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs
and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police?
Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped
by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with
Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave
la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight
car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January
without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was
given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the
300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was
a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in
his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"?
1
".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children
of Slovak nationality" (p. 37).
But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year
showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd .
.Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE
S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed
statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919).
Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others.
1
�SLOVAKIA
25
Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118
Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but
even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show
30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They
left .that to Lettrioh !
"In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic
The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) ,
Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right
when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with
the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar•
guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace
Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for
the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number
of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the
whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees:
12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18
were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts.
Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that
in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom
were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the
loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what
are the facts ?
1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State
emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of
Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there
were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed
by the Hungarian State.
2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the
Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those
who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their
willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic.
3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the
1
�26
SLOVAKIA
Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would
not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to
establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute
majority of State employees, even those of German and
Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . .
vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty
oath; the number of those who r&fused was never recorded
statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok).
Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that
only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40).
At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that
there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ;
10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the
floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said
that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary.
Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and
10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school
year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors.
Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept
teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation.
But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated
many of them to teach in Magyar schools!
Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to,
name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran
faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically
in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors
who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'.,
Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky,
Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek,
FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy.
Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the
Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously
�SLOVAKIA
27
by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this
is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is
strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists"
should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even
against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava
to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was
accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of
Czech professo:vs,, were they not?
It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all
equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand
the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e
and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich
regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote
the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics:
1
"The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to
even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of
the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3
percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that
same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks
(16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of
Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to
teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak,
that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised,
suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life.
"This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a
great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among
the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned
Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his
book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000
'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who
did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) .
And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually >Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar
statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under-
�28
SLOVAKIA
took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the
Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a
historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even
what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what
was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his
eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices.
"Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million
Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United
States" (p. 40) .
Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is ·
diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of
the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds.
From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to
manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this
cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns.
There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika
Slo;v enska").
How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia?
Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs
said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of
the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State,
hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs
to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-·
va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their
properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce
more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were
produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter
must be liquidated.
The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put
into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply
�SLOVAKIA
29
ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The
Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should
have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do
the r eports of that Federation tell us?
In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only
3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical
plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but
only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass
enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000
hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting
enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000
hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000
hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal
enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000
hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in
1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose
and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000
hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914,
but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building
materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours
in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises
2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923;
in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only
898,000 hours in 1003.
These figures tell us that there must have b.een
greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia
than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of
Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their
attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has
been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost
40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was
pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes
from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order:
1
1
1
1
"In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny
that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the
Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . ..
"No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with
disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e-
�30
SLOVAKIA
nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general,
that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should
name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more
of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need
not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended
to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the
first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is
owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de·
gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak
industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it
represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which
is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction
of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and
Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in
any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union
of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as
the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half
of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be
done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the
result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian
firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting
the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus
Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great
deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to
compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86).
"The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such
as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who
already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth
to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood
before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich
and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery
deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since
Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the
or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other
deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side.
What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would
have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non-
�SLOVAKIA
31
Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad
in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was,
during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of
Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr.
Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's
behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship
a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great
extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with
the poor economy of the Czech lands.
At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed
that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the
average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the
production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some
15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5
thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for
the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after
the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in
Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony
gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he
,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just
the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that
is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~
terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171).
Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in
behalf of the ecorromic e:,q>erls before the National Court
was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of
frauds and falsificatio ns?
Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great
and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of
this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history."
The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted
to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he
borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which
means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald.
Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke
the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his..
t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in
�32
SLOVAKIA
Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have
contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been
something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish
women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided
writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he
simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest
to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering
several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is
only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception
and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine
historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites
in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so
he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts.
According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an
acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but
he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even
states .that the Jews were co·- foun<lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news.
Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling
in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing.
Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter ..
ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a
single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it
can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in .
There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews
pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what
that role wa.s.
The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed
in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica,
which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran)
preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of
1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of
Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a
�SLOVAKIA
33
publication was after the first world war - and it came
from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily
in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk
ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled
in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie
Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik.
The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder
who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one
regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in
'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a
memiber only because most of the people who visited the
Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his
tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the
Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany;
he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak
candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak
Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection.
To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were
anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies;
they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these
very same words were used a countless number of times by
Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians,
scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection.
T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement
(the Hlasists) with these counsels:
"Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your
land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural
efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from
the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national;
the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself
economically from Jewish capital. . •."
Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism,
preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews
�34
SLOVAKIA
always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak
people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire
world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19.
Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK
(August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more
harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us
Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the
greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically
proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22,
1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the
most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is
the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be
protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ."
T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused
by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews
to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a
Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be
an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes,
and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The
irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about
the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938).
And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that
they might go to the lands of those nations, which they
voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the
Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8).
Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to
go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland.
in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko,
another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the
so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal
with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner:
"Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than
�SLOV.AKI.A
35
Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other
words, he recommended Hitler's methods.
Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration
from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in
the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid
ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question
which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must
rid ourselves of all parasites!"
Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel,
a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as
follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop
reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside."
Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts,
wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State
of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians."
But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the
Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must
endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings
and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars
or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and
they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars."
And those he did expel !
Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak
nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in
Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in
1910 only 2 percent did.
It is both interesting and significant to the informed
reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his
"history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and
ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets
to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik,
Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak,"
�36
SLOVAKIA
but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals.
Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the
sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even
though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious,
which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with
this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated
that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge
of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the
uprising against the German army at the end of August
1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in
the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps,
where living and housing conditions were adequate, the
prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions
which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in
Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~
ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947).
The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese
of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that
a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows
that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under
Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0>vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President
Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved.
After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons
of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families
objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and
the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former
members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in
SlovaJkia at that time!
History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called
"Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich
�SLOVAKIA
37
used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals."
Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example,
we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard
cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what
Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf
course, those who were present on that occasion know that
a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now
that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical
(Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus
Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and
were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's
book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German
officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting
out the name of Canon Korper.
Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He,
too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly
will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the
occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it
resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful
nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided
to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich
bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the
names of very distinguished scholars and representatives
of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka.
And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though
he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite
a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that
theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists.
Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to
Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves
all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on
their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to
shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and
trivial.
1
�38
SLOVAKIA
The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it
was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had
its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which
the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At
that time there was no force, single or combined, which
could or did intervene to change the course o!f events.
Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself,
were forced to do things under given circumstances, which
they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~
tions. And that is und~rstandable.
But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the
Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of
the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along
in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his
intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the •
"Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming
majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than
the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs.
In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most
shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat
was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in
comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he
gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of
Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's
,p olitical and moral stature!
•
•
•
"CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which
should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the
queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a
",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to
the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.
�
SLOVAKIA
21
LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA
By Constantine Oulen
We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik,
because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics
were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they
were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ...
fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic.
We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on
as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks
at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms.
We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even
an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich
really belongs under the Czechs.
We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~
titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall
not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the
Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter
of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the
beauty of colors with a color-blind person.
The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich,
however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts.
L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia
made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938
"had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by
referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities
(p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop
and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population.
But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are
we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not
practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms
for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the
influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into
1
�22
SLOVAKIA
the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase
in population of those cities.
But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics
even in this case? He could have proved his case even with
correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of
inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase
the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~
Slovruk Republic.
According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants
in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know,
already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the
census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the
Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had
1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic
(Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400
i.nhabitants in 1949.
According to Lettrich, Turciansky &vaty Martin had
3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we
know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900;
4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k
census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the
other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source
was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953).
But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T.
Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only
10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's
book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the
figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or
for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there
the figures for 1940 and 1946.
It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the
growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area."
Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various
Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946.
�SLOVAKIA
23
When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some
cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the
decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different;
he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic
was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example,
the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent;
Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an
interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed
'modern"!
"Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for
political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000
Crowns" (p. 38).
That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution,
but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some
ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years
and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item
with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he
probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the
SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is
quite familiar.
It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution,
oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from
1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme
in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and
unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove
that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we
need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey
are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially
.p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the
ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar
nation.
On the other hand, however, what was done to the
Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW,
and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the
�24
SLOVAKIA
thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime
pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken
skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes.
At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars,
when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them
already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property
of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the
beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19
months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14
days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could
save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's
cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent
higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time
did not even happen in Hungary.
But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which
the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years!
What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was
responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs
and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police?
Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped
by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with
Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave
la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight
car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January
without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was
given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the
300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was
a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in
his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"?
1
".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children
of Slovak nationality" (p. 37).
But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year
showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd .
.Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE
S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed
statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919).
Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others.
1
�SLOVAKIA
25
Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118
Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but
even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show
30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They
left .that to Lettrioh !
"In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic
The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) ,
Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right
when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with
the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar•
guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace
Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for
the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number
of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the
whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees:
12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18
were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts.
Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that
in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom
were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the
loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what
are the facts ?
1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State
emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of
Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there
were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed
by the Hungarian State.
2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the
Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those
who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their
willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic.
3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the
1
�26
SLOVAKIA
Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would
not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to
establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute
majority of State employees, even those of German and
Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . .
vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty
oath; the number of those who r&fused was never recorded
statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok).
Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that
only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40).
At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that
there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ;
10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the
floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said
that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary.
Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and
10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school
year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors.
Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept
teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation.
But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated
many of them to teach in Magyar schools!
Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to,
name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran
faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically
in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors
who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'.,
Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky,
Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek,
FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy.
Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the
Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously
�SLOVAKIA
27
by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this
is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is
strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists"
should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even
against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava
to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was
accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of
Czech professo:vs,, were they not?
It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all
equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand
the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e
and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich
regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote
the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics:
1
"The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to
even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of
the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3
percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that
same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks
(16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of
Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to
teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak,
that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised,
suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life.
"This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a
great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among
the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned
Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his
book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000
'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who
did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) .
And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually >Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar
statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under-
�28
SLOVAKIA
took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the
Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a
historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even
what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what
was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his
eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices.
"Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million
Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United
States" (p. 40) .
Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is ·
diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of
the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds.
From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to
manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this
cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns.
There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika
Slo;v enska").
How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia?
Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs
said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of
the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State,
hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs
to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-·
va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their
properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce
more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were
produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter
must be liquidated.
The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put
into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply
�SLOVAKIA
29
ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The
Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should
have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do
the r eports of that Federation tell us?
In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only
3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical
plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but
only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass
enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000
hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting
enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000
hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000
hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal
enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000
hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in
1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose
and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000
hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914,
but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building
materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours
in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises
2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923;
in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only
898,000 hours in 1003.
These figures tell us that there must have b.een
greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia
than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of
Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their
attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has
been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost
40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was
pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes
from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order:
1
1
1
1
"In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny
that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the
Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . ..
"No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with
disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e-
�30
SLOVAKIA
nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general,
that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should
name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more
of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need
not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended
to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the
first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is
owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de·
gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak
industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it
represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which
is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction
of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and
Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in
any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union
of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as
the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half
of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be
done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the
result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian
firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting
the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus
Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great
deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to
compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86).
"The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such
as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who
already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth
to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood
before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich
and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery
deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since
Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the
or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other
deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side.
What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would
have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non-
�SLOVAKIA
31
Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad
in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was,
during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of
Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr.
Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's
behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship
a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great
extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with
the poor economy of the Czech lands.
At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed
that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the
average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the
production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some
15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5
thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for
the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after
the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in
Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony
gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he
,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just
the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that
is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~
terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171).
Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in
behalf of the ecorromic e:,q>erls before the National Court
was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of
frauds and falsificatio ns?
Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great
and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of
this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history."
The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted
to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he
borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which
means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald.
Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke
the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his..
t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in
�32
SLOVAKIA
Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have
contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been
something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish
women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided
writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he
simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest
to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering
several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is
only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception
and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine
historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites
in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so
he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts.
According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an
acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but
he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even
states .that the Jews were co·- foun<lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news.
Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling
in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing.
Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter ..
ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a
single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it
can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in .
There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews
pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what
that role wa.s.
The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed
in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica,
which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran)
preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of
1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of
Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a
�SLOVAKIA
33
publication was after the first world war - and it came
from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily
in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk
ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled
in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie
Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik.
The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder
who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one
regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in
'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a
memiber only because most of the people who visited the
Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his
tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the
Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany;
he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak
candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak
Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection.
To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were
anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies;
they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these
very same words were used a countless number of times by
Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians,
scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection.
T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement
(the Hlasists) with these counsels:
"Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your
land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural
efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from
the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national;
the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself
economically from Jewish capital. . •."
Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism,
preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews
�34
SLOVAKIA
always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak
people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire
world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19.
Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK
(August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more
harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us
Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the
greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically
proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22,
1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the
most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is
the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be
protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ."
T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused
by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews
to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a
Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be
an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes,
and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The
irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about
the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938).
And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that
they might go to the lands of those nations, which they
voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the
Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8).
Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to
go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland.
in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko,
another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the
so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal
with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner:
"Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than
�SLOV.AKI.A
35
Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other
words, he recommended Hitler's methods.
Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration
from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in
the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid
ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question
which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must
rid ourselves of all parasites!"
Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel,
a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as
follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop
reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside."
Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts,
wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State
of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians."
But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the
Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must
endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings
and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars
or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and
they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars."
And those he did expel !
Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak
nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in
Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in
1910 only 2 percent did.
It is both interesting and significant to the informed
reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his
"history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and
ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets
to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik,
Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak,"
�36
SLOVAKIA
but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals.
Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the
sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even
though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious,
which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with
this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated
that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge
of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the
uprising against the German army at the end of August
1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in
the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps,
where living and housing conditions were adequate, the
prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions
which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in
Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~
ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947).
The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese
of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that
a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows
that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under
Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0>vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President
Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved.
After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons
of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families
objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and
the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former
members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in
SlovaJkia at that time!
History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called
"Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich
�SLOVAKIA
37
used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals."
Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example,
we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard
cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what
Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf
course, those who were present on that occasion know that
a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now
that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical
(Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus
Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and
were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's
book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German
officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting
out the name of Canon Korper.
Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He,
too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly
will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the
occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it
resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful
nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided
to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich
bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the
names of very distinguished scholars and representatives
of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka.
And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though
he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite
a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that
theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists.
Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to
Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves
all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on
their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to
shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and
trivial.
1
�38
SLOVAKIA
The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it
was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had
its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which
the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At
that time there was no force, single or combined, which
could or did intervene to change the course o!f events.
Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself,
were forced to do things under given circumstances, which
they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~
tions. And that is und~rstandable.
But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the
Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of
the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along
in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his
intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the •
"Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming
majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than
the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs.
In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most
shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat
was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in
comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he
gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of
Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's
,p olitical and moral stature!
•
•
•
"CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which
should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the
queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a
",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to
the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
21
LETI'RIOH'S IDSTORY OF SLOVAK.IA
By Constantine Oulen
We shall not criticize the ideological side of his booik,
because according to Letitric,h only the Slovak Catholics
were Nazis, only they praised Hitler, only they wrote derogatively of the Jews, only they Aryanized, only they
were in the Hlinka Guards, and only they were dissatis ...
fied in the Czecho.,Slovak Reipu1blic.
We shall not carry on polemics with Lettrich even on
as, for example, the Sudanians, because we know that Lettrich is of the conviction that what is the right of the unclothed Sudanian at home, does not belong to the Slovaks
at home even if they were to weM' fro-cks and uniforms.
We know that from a feeling of his own inferio,r 'ity even
an under-average Czech is an unattainable ideal. Lettrich
really belongs under the Czechs.
We shall not d~bate about whether Lettrich was en~
titled to let thousands od' Slova;ks lhe jailed, and we shall
not deJbate ,a bout the Magyarism of the politicians of the
Slo,vaik People's Party, beC'ause that is, after aJll, a matter
of personal opinion, and it is useless to talik about the
beauty of colors with a color-blind person.
The statistics presented or ref erred to by Lettrich,
however, really is not 'history, but news. They demonst11ate the superficiality, irresponsiibility and outright falsification of facts.
L ettrich wanted to prove Urat the progress Slovakia
made in the Czecho-iSlovak Repu:bli·c from 1918 to 1938
"had never been surpassed in any phase of history" by
referring to the gigantic growth of various Slovak cities
(p. 64). He compares the 1919 with the 1948 numlber of inha:bitants of some cities. Many cities, indeed, did develop
and grow, while otihers showed a decrease in population.
But we see that everywhere, not only in .Slovakia. So, are
we to regard that as a "Czecho..,Slovaik" miracle? Is it not
practically a universal oustom that :people leave the farms
for the cities? And even Lettrich should know that the
influx of some 200,000 Czechs into Slovakia, especially into
1
22
SLOVAKIA
the cities, certainly had something to do with the increase
in population of those cities.
But why shou1d Lettrich resort to false statistics
even in this case? He could have proved his case even with
correct statistics, selected from official statistical publications. It is obvious that Leittrich preferred to use other statistics: those which sulbstantially decrease the numlber of
inhabitants from Magyar times and su:b stantially increase
the number of inhaJbitants from the times of the Czecho~
Slovruk Republic.
According to Lett.rich, Zilina had 9,000 inh~bitants
in 1919 and 18,000 in 1948 (p. 64). But Zilina, we know,
already :had 9,166 inhaJbitants in 1910; 12,073 after the
census was taken in Ozecho-Slo•v akia; and in 1940, in the
Slovak Republic, 19,329 (Vd. SOZNAM OBOI NA SLOVEN~U, p. 161). Aooording to Lettrich, then, Zilina had
1~ people in 1948 than in 1940. According to Dr. Palic
(Vd. OIDSKOSLOVENSKY PR!EHLED), Zilina had 16,400
i.nhabitants in 1949.
According to Lettrich, Turciansky &vaty Martin had
3,000 inhabitants in 1919, but 20,000 in 1948. However, we
know that T. iSv. M. had 3,351 inha,bitants already in 1900;
4,101 in 11910; and 5,6'57 after the first Czecho--,Slova:k
census. Where did Lettrich get the 20,000 figure? And the
other statistics? In the footnote (ip. 64), he says his source
was (pp. '118-157) of "':NIE POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOV~ " by Waller Wynne, Jr. (Washington, 1953).
But that source does not show 20,000 inha:bitants. for T.
Sv. M . ! It shows 11,300 for the year 1940; in 1946 only
10,600, hence, less t'han during the time of the Slovak Republic. In fact a closer loolk at pages 47-57 shows Wynne's
book of afificfal American statistics does not carry the
figures either for 1919, with which Lettrich begins, or
for 1948, with which Lettrich ends; but we do find there
the figures for 1940 and 1946.
It seems that pseudohistorian Lettrich did not understand ,w hat he read. Wynne gives the figures for the
growth of cities between 1930 and 1947 "in 1948 area."
Lettrich quotes the number of inhabitants of the various
Slovak cities for 194i8 from statistics, of Octolber 1, 1946.
SLOVAKIA
23
When . a historian writes a:bout ithe growth of some
cities and towns, it is not unusual for him to mention the
decrease in populat'ion of others. But Lettrich is different;
he is determined to pmve that the Czecho--•SltoviaJk Republic
was responsible only for "growth" figures,. For example,
the following cities and towns decreased as indicated: Skalica 2.3 percent; Myjava 2.7 percent; Pukanec 2.9 percent;
Bansika Stiavnica 8.3 •p ercent; Doib,sina 12:3 percent; Gelnica 24.1 percent; Reviuca 32.2 percent. Why these old industria~ centers decreased in populatfon could also form an
interesting chapter in a SlovaJk history, which is cal,l ed
'modern"!
"Between 1906 and 1908 alone, 56·0 Slovaks were sentenced for
political crimes to a total of 91 years in jail and fines of 42,000
Crowns" (p. 38).
That's what Lettrfoh says rubout Magyar persecution,
but even here there seems to :b e a slight error of some
ten years. The figures given are for a period of 12 years
and not two. We suggest that Lettrich c'hook .this item
with the figures given by R. W. Seton-·Watson, whom he
probaibly wanted to quote (RAOIAL BROBLEM!S IN HUNGARY, p. 466). To check this item, he might also use the
SLOVENISKY OB~OR and the PIRUDY, with which he is
quite familiar.
It is, significant, too, that, in the matter of persecution,
oppression and suppression, Mr. Lettrich quite conveniently forgets to rememb.er what the Slovaks suffered from
1945 to 1'948, when he and Communist Schmidke ,w ere cocha_imnen of the SlovaJk National Council, the lbody supreme
in Slovakia. The Magyars treated the Slo1vaks harshly and
unjustly, it is true; Magyar statistics themselves prove
that. There is no need to add anything to thek figures; we
need not magnid'y those statistics in 1955. As they are, tihey
are a monument to intolerance., dishonesty, and especially
.p olitical short-sightedness. In the final analysis, what the
ruling Magyaris did was a crime even against the Magyar
nation.
On the other hand, however, what was done to the
Slovaks during the Benes-Lettrich er.a is so terribfo, r8JW,
and criminal that it simply is without parallel in the
24
SLOVAKIA
thousand-year history O!f the Slovaks. Lettrich's regime
pa:s:ses into Sliovak history as a regime O!f an unbroken
skein of the most terrilble and blo·odiest crimes.
At one of the meetings of the Board of Commissars,
when Lettrirch ruled, a reiport was given that 19,740 persons, most of them in:tellectuals, were jailed; 56 of them
already were sentenced to death and the rest o£ them received a total of 12,555 years in jail; and the property
of most of them ,w a s confiscated. And that was only the
beginning. In 19416, the a'Verage jail senitence was 19
months; at the end of 1'947, it was 33 months and 14
days. 'Dhiat was in the days when Lettrich's word could
save a person's life, or a:meliorate a sentence. Lettrioh's
cowts meted out jail sentenices which were 1,250 percent
higher, besides that also executions, which in peace time
did not even happen in Hungary.
But Lettrilch makes a lb ig issue of 91 yearn in jail which
the Magyar-s meted out to 560 Slovaks in twelve years!
What is 1:lhaJt in •c omparison to what Leittrich's regime was
responsible for? Hias, Lettrich already fongotten the Slova:ks executed, the thousands in Silberia, the crammed jaHs
and concentration camps, the people beaten by his police?
Hias he forgotten the thous•a nds of women who were raped
by rhis glorified partisans, the freight cars crammed with
Magyars whom he tra:nsferred to Czech lands for slave
la!bor, the 15 frozen Magyar children in one of those ft-eight
car-s, which waited under the Bratis1a~a bridge in January
without any heat for over rbwo weeks until an order was
given to move? Yes, and what is that in comparison to the
300,000 ,b eaten Germans? Lettrich made thi,s history, was
a respoinsilble patt of it, so why should he not include it in
his "History of Modern Slo'Vakia"?
1
".fn 1918 Hungarian statistics listed no more than 30,118 children
of Slovak nationality" (p. 37).
But the truth is that Magyar staUstiJcs for that year
showed 255,7'92 school child.rein of Slovak natli onality (Vd .
.Judr Fojifr: NAIRODNi SKOLY V REPUBillCE Cs DLE
S'DAVU ZID DNIE 31. PROS. 1'92,1, which contains detailed
statistics of Slovak elementary schiools from 11881 to 1919).
Lettrich is a bit befuddled or wants to befuddle others.
1
SLOVAKIA
25
Magyar statistics show that in 1'918 there were 30,118
Slovalk children in 365 Slovak schooJs, but the same statistics showed that there were 255,792 Slovak school children, the rubsolute majority of which, of course, had to attend Magyar schools. Magyar statli.stics were false, but
even Magyar statisticians were not so stupid .as to show
30,000 school children for a nation of three million. They
left .that to Lettrioh !
"In 1918 ... there were 12,447 Hungarian civil servants on Slovak territory. Only 35 offered their services to the new Republic
The others, being of Magyar nat ionality, refused to serve" (p. 39) ,
Now, -if that were kue, then Count Apponyi was right
when he said that the Slovaks were against uniting with
the Czechs. But Lettrich is wrong again. Ho,w did he arrive at those figures? Lettrich not only accepts the statistics supplied by Count Al1bert Apponyd. to support his ar•
guments to save the unity of greater Hungairy at the Peace
Conference, 1b ut even e~plains them more unfavorably for
the Slovaks than Apponyi himself. At .the Peace Oonference CoU!nt A,pponyi presented stabstics about the number
of offidals and teachers in Hungary. He said th'at in the
whole of Hungary there were 12,447 state employees:
12,412 Magyars and 35 Slo,vaks. Of the 35 SlQIV'akS, 18
were employed in 17 ISl,ova;k districts.
Lettrich, not understanding what he read, wrote that
in Slovakia there were 12,447 Magyar officiaJs, 35 of whom
were Slovak, and the rest (12,412) refused to ta;ke the
loyalty oath to the Ozecho-Slovruk Reip,ublic. Now, what
are the facts ?
1. It is not true that there were 12,447 Magyar State
emip loyees in Slo,v a1kia. The figure relates to, the whole of
Hungiary, with the e:x:ception of Croatia. In Slovakia there
were 920 Magyars, 11 Germans and 18 Slovaks employed
by the Hungarian State.
2. lt is not true that only 3'5 were willing to serve the
Czecho-•Slova;k Repulb1iic. The figures refer only to those
who were 'listed as Slovalks, but say nothing about their
willingness or unwillingless to serve the Czecho-1Slova:k Republic.
3. It is not true that the rest ref.used to• serve the
1
26
SLOVAKIA
Ozecho-lSlovruk Repulblic. If that were so, then it would
not have been possilble even ,w ith the help of the Ozechs to
establish a Cze:cho-SlovaJk regime in Slovakia. The absolute
majority of State employees, even those of German and
Mrugyar origin, took the oath of loyalty to the Czecho-Slo . .
vak Repu:blk. Only ,a minority ref.used to take the loyalty
oath; the number of those who r&fused was never recorded
statistically (Vd. .Dr. H. Rashofer: Die Tschechoslowa,kischen Denks-chriften fiir die Friedenskonference von Paris 1919-1920, pp. 187~193; and Magyar Beketargyalasok).
Continuing to falsify statistics, Lettrich states that
only "10 of the 660 high school teachers and college professors" offered their services to the new Repulblic of Czecho-iSlovakia (,p. 40).
At the Peace Conference, Count Apponyi stated that
there ,w ere 23 Slovaks teaching in the secondary schools ;
10 of these taught in Slwaikia. Dr. Derer, speaiking on the
floor of the Prague Parliament, February 7, 1931, said
that there was only 1 Slovak professor under Hungary.
Michael Slavik counted 25 in his 'book : 115 Lutherans and
10 Catho'.1 ks. The fact is, however, that the 11918-19 school
year began in SlovaJkia. with over a 100 Slov8Jk professors.
Many left good positions in large Magyar cities to accept
teaching positions in Slovruk towns and villages; they sacrificed muoh just so th'at they might serve their nation.
But the Czechs rejected ·s:ome of them and relegated
many of them to teach in Magyar schools!
Certainly Lettrich himself could, if he only wanted to,
name more than 10 Slovak professors of the Lutheran
faith alone w'ho served the young Repulblic enthusiastically
in HH8. We might mention the following Sl~vak professors
who definitely did tea.ch in SlovaJkia in 191'8: Rozim, Kmet'.,
Branecky, Potkan, Fr. Tiso, Kra.jniak, Vallo, Kovalik, Mruirgas, Hlavaty, Hronec, Ohra.pa, Lisy, Klein--Tesnoskals:ky,
Horniaik, BeniaJC, Poto:cky, Misik, Bezak, '.Domaja, Resek,
FJorek, Necikar, Bu;jnaik, Vo~ko-Starohorsky, Twdy.
Count Aipponyi ma.de all kinds of statements at the
Paris Pea.:ce Coruferenice; but he did not go as far as Lettrich. What Lettrich says could be used adrvantageously
SLOVAKIA
27
by Magyar revisionist propaganda. And yet he thmks this
is an argument for the "Czecho-lSlovak" concept! It is
strange, indeed, tha,t we who are considered "seiparatists"
should have to defend the Czecho-iSlavak Republic even
against Lettrich. Did he forget about the five Slovak university pro,fessors from Budapest who came to Bratislava
to, offer their services to the new Republic, but not ooe was
accepted? Tuka and Kviatcala, too, were rejected in favor of
Czech professo:vs,, were they not?
It is almost useaess to attempt to analyize otther statistics given 'by Lettrich in his "history." They are all
equally false. Lettriich simply either did not understand
the significance of what he read, or, if he did, then he falsified knowingly. In this category he outdid Apponyi. Lettrich could have proved his point easHy in an hooest manner, but he preferred to use the Magyar system: minim.ie.e
and vilify everything that was SloV'ak. Slovaks never regarded tMagyar figures as reliable, so why should Lettrich
regard them as the last word? A Ozech statistician Wl'ote
the foUowing a;bout Magyar statistics:
1
"The incorrectness of Magyar official statistics is attested to
even by official Magyar data about the spreading of knowledge of
the individual languages. On the territory of the 16 Slovak counwhich either completely or partly fell to Czecho-Slovakia ties in 1910, there were 300,584 Magyars who knew Slovak; that is, 25.3
percent of all the Magyar inhabitants of those 16 counties. On that
same territory, in 1910, it was recorded that only 281,230 Slovaks
(16.5 percent) knew Magyar, even though the great majority of
Slovaks was educated in Magyar schools whose main job was to
teach Magyar. On the other hand, it is still more odd that 25.3 percent of the Magyars in the 16 Slovak counties could speak Slovak,
that is, the language of the Pariahs, the language that was despised,
suppressed and cast out of the schools, offices and public life.
"This discordance must be explained only by the fact that a
great number of ·Slovaks, who knew Magyar, were counted among
the Magyars. We need not conjecture that 300,000 Magyars learned
Slovak either out of love for Slovak or other motives. Mraz, in his
book "Slovensko vo svetle statistiky," estimates that of the 300,000
'Magyars who know Slovak,' there are at least 200,000 Slovaks who
did not learn Magyar, but were counted as Magyars when the census was taken" (Ph. Dr. VI. Slaninka: Narodnostni vyvoj Ceskoslovenske republiky, Pra,gue 1938 ; pp. 67-68) .
And that is a fad. There is a difference !between actually >Magy,ari'zed SlovaJks and 'Slovruks whom only Magyar
statistics regarded as Magyars. Lettrich obviously under-
28
SLOVAKIA
took the task of proving the miraculous "progre.ss" oif the
Slovaks in the Czecho-·S lovak Repuiblic by ma:gnifying Magyar injustices and aJbolishing all Czoch injustices. But a
historian should write olbjec·Uvely; he must not forget even
what was good in Hungary, jrust as he must record what
was good in Cz~cho-:Slovakia; and he must not close his
eyes ei.theT to Magyar o,r Czech injustices.
"Serious unemployment and perpetual depression reigned in Slovakia from the Austrian-Hungarian Settlement in 1867, unti I the outbreak of World War I. In that period three-quarters of a million
Slovaks emigrated to earn their bread abroad, mostly in the United
States" (p. 40) .
Why Lettrich uses the year 1867 as his initial year is ·
diffictrlt to understand, becaiuse it was just at the end of
the last and the 1beginning of the present century that Hungary began to ,b uild up_ industrially, and most of the enteriprises were built in .SlovaJkia with state funds.
From 1881 to 191'4, there we.:re 960 industrial enterprises built in Slovaikia; another 760 were remodeled to
manufacture various products. Jlt is estimated that this
cost the Hungarian State 63 million pre-war Gold Orowns.
There was one industrial enterprise for every 617 inhaJbitants in Slova;kia, according to lli. E. Stodola ("Statistika
Slo;v enska").
How did industry in Slovaikia fare under Ozecho-Slovakia?
Well, when the Cze·c hs came to power, Slov,a k industrial enterprises rwere graidually dosed up. The Czechs
said: 1. Slovakia should be the agricultural country of
the Staite; 2. Slovak industry did not have natural prerequisites; it was lb uilt with the he1p of the Magyar State,
hence, it had to be destroyed; 3. Slo,vaik industry belongs
to Magya:r Jews and foreigners, who suppressed the Slo-·
va:ks nationally; this must be aivenged by destroying their
properties; 4. More modern Ozech industry can produce
more cheaply and abundantly all the products which were
produced by faicfories in Sfovakia, therefore, the latter
must be liquidated.
The "Morgenthau" plan for Germany in 1945 was put
into effoct by the Benes Czechs for Slovakia in 1918 ! Lettrich might pretend not to ·know the facts, or may simply
SLOVAKIA
29
ignore them, lbut nevertheless facts they still remain. The
Federation of Slovak Industrialists pU!blished reports annually; Lettrich undoubtedly knows aJbout them, or should
have, if he wanted his "history" to be objective. What do
the r eports of that Federation tell us?
In the Slovak wood industry, in the 11 largest enterprises, workers put in 9,04'5,000 hours in 1914, tbut only
3,786,000 hours in 1923 ; in 19 of the largest chemical
plants, Sl()IVak workers put in 8,352,000 hours in 1914, but
only 4,5·38,000 hours in 1923; in three of the largest glass
enter,prises, 2,937,000 hours in 1914, but only 468,000
hours in 1 92,6 ; in 9 of the largest mining and smelting
enteriprises 11,469,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,684,000
hours in 1922; in 8 of the largest grain mills 1,·680,000
hours in 1914, but only 853,000 hours in 1926 ; in 19 metal
enter.prises 14,271,000 hours in 1914, but only 7,059,000
hours in 1923; in 12 textile enterprises 29,080,000 hours in
1914, ibut only 115,829,000 hours in 1922; in 9 cellulose
and paper mills 9,528,000 hours in 1914, but only 5,4155,000
hours in 1923 ; in three breweries 435,000 hours in 1914,
but only 236,000 hours in 1923; in 6 enterprises of building
materials 5,195,000 hours in 1914, but only 2,585,000 hours
in 1923 ; in 6 of the largest fur and leather enterprises
2,538,000 hours in 191'4 ; but only 1,024,000 hours in 1923;
in 6 food enterprises 4,155,000 hours in 1914, but only
898,000 hours in 1003.
These figures tell us that there must have b.een
greater unemployment in Slovakia under Czecho-1Slovakia
than prior to 1918. For the edification of the readers of
Lettirich's "his tory' and of Lettrich himself, we call to their
attention a 'book written by R. W. Seton-.Watson, who has
been known as an agent of Czech propaganda for almost
40 years ; it is ca:lled "THE NEW SLOV.AlKifA" and was
pulblished in 1924 by Fr. Borovy, Pvague. Several quotes
from Chaipter V (Economic Difficulties) may be in order:
1
1
1
1
"In the case of Slovakia today it would be quite idle to deny
that many serious economic grievances do exist, and further, that the
Centralist regime, as at present directed from Prague, is in many respects contr-ary to the economic interests of Slovakia" (p. 78) . ..
"No favo ur was shown even t o th e coal mines of H an dlova, with
disastrous effects upon industry in eastern Slovakia and in Ruth e-
30
SLOVAKIA
nia" (p. 84) . . . ",I rritation and suspicion are already so general,
that a leailing Slovak industrialist, whom no one to whom I should
name him could deny the titles of patriot and unionist, roundly declared to me that Slova,kia is .reg,a rded •b y 'Prague' as so much economic ballast! The argument that because 80 percent or even more
of Slovak industry is owned by Magyars or Jews it therefore need
not receive the same consideration, is a mere feebl-e pretext, intended
to justify a very doubtful operation. It ma,y be countered in the
first place by a reminder tihat 60-70 percent of Bohemian industry is
owned by Germa:ns or Jews, most of whom are - only to a lesser de·
gree than the Ma,gyars of Slovakia - unwilling citizens of the Republic. . . . However questionable may be the first origins of Slovak
industry - and on this point there is in the main no dispute - it
represents today the means of liv-e lihood of a large population which
is over,w heLmingly Slovak" (p. 94) . . . "The deliberate reduction
of Slovak industries, as a part of a Government programme, without any corresponding reduction in the industries of Bohemia and
Mol'lavia, would be a direct incitement to separatism, and would in
any case force Slovaks, Maigyars, Ruthenes and Germans into an economic alliance so strong as to overshadow the divergencies of political outlook" (P. 95) .. . "According to a calculation of "t,he Union
of Slovak Industrialists, the cost of transport in Slovakia, as late as
the autumn of 1922, was 50 .p ercent ·h igher than in the western half
of the Republic" (p. 84) . . . "But a great deal still requires to be
done in the way of adjusting the general tariff system. . . For the
result o.f these unequal tariffs is to favour still . further the competition of Czech and German firms in Slovakia and to make of Slovakia a dumping ,g round for their surplus goods, while rendering retaliation almost impossible. As a result, it is possible for Moravian
firms to import sand to Zilina and timber to Orava - thus refuting
the proverbial absurility of 'carrying coals to Newcastle' - and thus
Slovak fi.rms are undersold, and cheaper labor is brought from outside, under the eyes of the Slovak unemployed. This creates a great
deal of bad blood and gives rise to the demand, at once objectionable and impracticable, that Czech firms should not be allowed to
compete in Slovakia" (pp. 85-86).
"The Germans exploited SlovaJk natural resources, such
as lumber and o,r es" (p. 171), according to . Lettrich, who
already seems to have forigotten the arguments put forth
to save the skin of Dr. Ing. Zatko in 1946, when he stood
before the National Court in Bratislava. You see, Lettrich
and his SlovaJk National Council had decreed that eivery
deputy of the SlovaJk Parliament had to stand trial. Since
Zatko was such a deputy, he, too, had to •g o through the
or.deal. But he was more fortJunate than most of the other
deputies; being a Lutheran, he had Dr. Lett.rich on his side.
What~er was good in the SlovaJk Republic, Lettrich would
have us know, was the merit of the Lutheran or non-
SLOVAKIA
31
Catholic deputies; whatever was no good or just plain bad
in it was due to the Catholic deputies. Since Zafko was,
during the war, the mightiest man in the departmen t of
Slova:k economy, and he and Dr. Karvas (head of the Slovak National Bank), were really dictators in this field, Mr.
Lettrich and the other witnesses who testified in Zafko's
behalf tried to prove that it was a splendid dictatorship
a nd that economical ly Slov,aJkia prospered to such a great
extent tha,t its pos-ition could not even be coonpared with
the poor economy of the Czech lands.
At the trial Dr. Matura, an economic expert, showed
that while in the protectorat e 50 percent more than the
average amount of lumlber was exacted, in Slovakia the
production did not reach the norma:l average, so that some
15 million cubic feet of lwmlber, valued at 5 milliard (5
thousand million) Czecho-Sio vak crowns was saved for
the RepuJblic. At that trial Dr. Matura also said that after
the passage of the front "the supplies of raw materials in
Slovakia were higher than on January 1, 1939." Mr. Lettrich's official organ, the CAS, recorded the testimony
gi;ven during Zafko's trial ('CAS, Sept. 7, 1946) . What he
,a nd witnesses said in deferuse of Dr. Zafiko in 1946 is just
the opposite of what he contends in his "history," that
is, that "1Sl0V1akia also pro;vided valuaJble economic and ma~
terial aid to Germany" (ip. 171).
Is Lettrich now teYing us that the testimony given in
behalf of the ecorromic e:,q>erls before the National Court
was false? What else, unless hiis "history" is ,a record of
frauds and falsificatio ns?
Lettrich feels that the power of the Jews is great
and, hence, that it is necessary to flatter the mighty of
this world. So he attempts to do just that in his "history."
The greater ipart of the pictorial supiplemen t is devoted
to the fate of the Jews during the war. It seems that he
borrowed the pictures from a certain book Which was published by the Jews of Prague and Bratislawa in 1949, which
means that it was allowed by the Red regime of Gottwald.
Of course, Lettrich does not want us to know that. To ma!ke
the affair look as horrilble as possible, he graced his "his..
t:ory" with pictures of mass graves from somewhere in
32
SLOVAKIA
Poland or Germany with which Slovakia had no connection whatever. In this connection he proba:b ly would have
contri,buted to history had he published at least one picture of the hanging of the Jews in Zvolen by the CzechoSlovaJk legionnaires in 1919. At least it would have !been
something ,brused on fact. Looking at the pictures in Lettrich's book, the uninformed reader must get the impression, for example, that the hole filled with dead Jewish
women must lb e in SlovaJkia. Lettrich conveniently avoided
writing an introduction to his pictorial s111pplement; he
simply adds the ipictures arfter the index, and lets the rest
to the imagination of his readers, of course, first offering
several pictures of Slovak political figures. The intent is
only all too clear to all informed observers. But deception
and misrepresentation are hardly the devices of genuine
historians. Lettrich wamited to prove that the anti-Semites
in Slovakia were Catholics and separatists exclusively, so
he resorted to a daring falsification of the facts.
According to Lettrich, the Jews in Slovakia had an
acti;ve participation in Slovak national and cultural life, but
he does not dep~ct the extent of this participation. He even
states .that the Jews were co·- foun<lers of the Matica Slovenska (The Slova1k l!nstitute) . And that certainly is news.
Furthermore, Lettrich would hruve the readers of his "history" know that there never was any anti-Semi.tic feeling
in Slovakia until the "separatists" came into lbeing.
Up to 1919 there is not a single article in Slovak liter ..
ature which shows sympathy for the Jews. There is not a
single S1ovak cultural or national event, about which it
can be said that the Jews of SlovaJkia participated in .
There are very many proofs of the opposite. The Jews
pla,yed an important role only in the economic life of Slova;kia. There is a weal.th of literature depicting just what
that role wa.s.
The first anti-Semitic article in Slo,vakia was printed
in 1785, in the "Stare Noviny" (Old News) of Bystrica,
which was pu'blished and edited 'by IDvangelical (1L utheran)
preachers. In the "Orol TatranSlky" (The Tatra Eagle) of
1845 is an article by Stu.T, recommending the transfer of
Jews; the second time thi,s recommendation was made in a
SLOVAKIA
33
publication was after the first world war - and it came
from the NEW YORK.SKY DEJNN1K ("Czechoslovak daily
in Slovak language") ! The most radical anti-:Semite in Slovakia was Svetoizar Hurban Vajansky, the son of an Evangelical preacher and the father of the late Ozecho-Slo;vaJk
ambassador to, the US'A. The newspapers whiich excelled
in anti-Semitic articles at that time were the Narodnie
Noviny and the New York.sky Dennik.
The old Matica Slovenska did not have a single founder
who was a J ew. Lettrich iillVented one. It had only one
regular memiber who was Jewish, a certain tavern keeper in
'l'urciansky Svaty Martin. This fellow, h owever, became a
memiber only because most of the people who visited the
Matica were lodged in his home at night and ate in his
tavern. The other J ew, who up to 1919, openly iba;cked the
Slovaks, was a certain Jewish tavern keeper from Sucany;
he was the only J ew in 1S1ovakia who voted for a Slovak
candidate in the parliamentary elections. In the Slovak
Republic the families of both of these Jews enjoyed all privileges and had special protection.
To prove that oruy Catholics and "separatists" were
anti-Semites, Mr. Lettrich quotes from the writings of Gajdos-Breza, to wit: "The J ews are our greatest enemies;
they destroy, spread dissension and demoralize. But these
very same words were used a countless number of times by
Dr. M. Hbd.za, T. G. Masaryk, Mirrosla;v J. Hurban, Svetozar Hu:r'ban-Vajansky, Joseph Skultety, John Slavik, Julius Bodnar, and by many other •w riters and politicians,
scientists and clerics, who were more significant in 'Slovak life than was Gajdos-Breza. Lettrich, however, preferred to forget them in this connection.
T. G. Masaryk founded his "•p rogressive" movement
(the Hlasists) with these counsels:
"Anti-Semitism in Slovakia is warranted (just). . . . In your
land the Jews are everywhere, without exception , against the cultural
efforts of the people. They practice usury. People must be saved from
the yoke of alcohol and Jewish capital. • .. Priests must be national;
the Church must be anti.Semitic so that the people might free itself
economically from Jewish capital. . •."
Srobar, one of the greatest opponents of separatism,
preached the anti-Semitic gospel of Masaryk. "The Jews
34
SLOVAKIA
always were the exploiters and extortioners of the Slovak
people. The enemies of the State are punished in the entire
world," said -Mr. Vavro Srnlbar at a meeting of the 2upans (Distri:ct Administrators) on August 4, 19,19.
Dr. Anton Stefanek, another great antagonist o,f Slovak autonomy, wrote in the NEW YORKSKY DENNIK
(August 25, 1'920): "Neither the Germans, nor the Magyars, but not even any other nation on earth is more
harmful to our nation than the Jews. But not only to us
Slovaks, but also to the whole Slav world the Jews are the
greatest enemies, and this is a factually and historically
proven matter." Just aJbout a year 1b efore that (June 22,
1919), Stefanelk said in the same newspaper: "One of the
most difficult problems which we shall have to resolve is
the question how the vast masses of this nation shall be
protected from the flood of the Jews, that is, from the destructive and subversive vices that have taken hold. . . ."
T.he NEW YO!RJKISIKY DIDNNlK was quite enthused
by such words and offered this advice: "Send all the Jews
to hell" (N()lV. 11, 191'9) . . . "Since we do not allow a
Jew to become a Zupan, then we must not allow him to be
an owner or director of large factories, enterprises, homes,
and businesses in Slovakia," wrote 'Dvaroiz~k, one orf Lettrich's commissars, already in 191'9 in the NYD . . . "The
irrefutable fact is that something ought to be done about
the Jews in Slovakia already now" (NYD, Oct. 8, 1938).
And what ought to be done, the NYD explains: "So that
they might go to the lands of those nations, which they
voluntarily claimed as their own in 1930" (resolution of the
Czecho-iSlovak Sokol Community, Oct . 7, H)3'8).
Of cour,se, that meant that the Jews. were supposed to
go back to Germany, Hungary and Poland.
in 1938, the newspaper edited 1by Dr. Martin Kivetko,
another commissar of Lettrich's and no,w a significant factor in the Council of Free Czecho~S,lovrukia and one orf the
so-icalled lbig gl,lns of the Free Europe Committee, wrote unequivocally that there was only one effective way to deal
with the Jewish prolblem, so he presented it in this manner:
"Germany has shown us how we must deal with the foreign element. We must apply such methods even more than
SLOV.AKI.A
35
Germany" (Narodnie Noviny, Sept. 18, 1938). In other
words, he recommended Hitler's methods.
Gabo Rapos, who received the greatest decoration
from the hands of Dr. Lettrich, wrote the foJlorwing in
the Narodnie Noviny (Oct. 6, 1938). "We must also rid
ourselves of one more element which economically is pauperizfog Slovakia - we must resolve the Jewish question
which impedes the development of Slovakia, and we must
rid ourselves of all parasites!"
Did the situation change in 1945? Well, Senior Sensel,
a deputy of Lettrich's "democratic" party, prophesied as
follows: "We'll first lay aside our Lutheran garb and stop
reading the Passion, before we put anti-Semitism aside."
Dr. Martin BeHus, another o.f Lettri.ch's stalwarts,
wrote in a similar vein in· the Narodnie Noviny and recommended the use of Hitler's methods: "Every half-way solution ( of the Jewish question) supported by pseudodemo('ratic principles is bound to fail, because it opposes the interests of the whole of autonomous Slovakia and the State
of the Czechs, Slovaks and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians."
But even Dr. Lettrich himself, as co-ehairman of the
Slovaik National Coun'Cil, demanded that the Jews in Slovakia be treated or dealt with as with enemies, the Germans and Magyars. In 1945, he proclaimed: "We must
endeavor without mercy to chase the Magyars and Germans out of our countr:y. 'Ilhe Jews, who by their feelings
and their language show sympathy toward the Magyars
or Germans, we shall regard as Germans and Magyars and
they shall have to share the lot of Germans and Magyars."
And those he did expel !
Dry statistical figures say nothing about the Slovak
nationality of Jews. In 11890, 6 percent of the Jews living in
Slovakia claimed ,SlovaJk as their mother tongue, but in
1910 only 2 percent did.
It is both interesting and significant to the informed
reader that Lettrich devotes qll.lite a bit of his space in his
"history" to quotations of altogether unimportant and
ipoliticaUy, insignificant people, but conveniently forgets
to quote authorities,, such as 'Masaryk, Srolbar, Stefaneik,
Hodza, Jan Slavik, Sensel. He quotes from the "Slovak,"
36
SLOVAKIA
but forgets to do so from the "!Stare No,v iny, Orol Tatransky, Narodnie Noviny, Cirkevne Listy, New YorksJky Dennik, Slovensky Dennik, Slov,enstke :Pohfady" and other periodicals.
Lettrich tries to place the entire responsiibiUty for the
sufferings of the Jews on the Slovak Go;vernment, even
though an institution regarded as reS1ponsilble and serious,
which proba;bly was mo.re concerned than any other with
this prdblem the International Red Cross - stated
that: at certain times SlovaJkia was regarded as a refuge
of the Jews, especially Polish Jews; the Jews who remained in .Slovakia were comparatively protected until the
uprising against the German army at the end of August
1944; it is true that the law of . May 5, 1942, resulted in
the arrest of several thousands of Jews, but in the cam,ps,
where living and housing conditions were adequate, the
prisoners were aUowed to wovk for pay under conditions
which approximated free economy; in H,ungary, like in
Slovrukia, Israelites were spared as long as the local gov~
ernment hrud a certain freedom of action (Vd. Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge, Vol 29, No•. 348, Dec. 1947).
The EVA1NGEil.;]ST, t'he official organ of the Diocese
of A]bany, N. Y., carried a ,r eport from Prague sayi,nig that
a comparison of the ipre-,war andi ipost-war nUlilliber of ,perisons of the Jewish faith and r,a.ce in Czecho-Slova;kia shows
that while in Ozechia and 1M oravia - which were under
Ge.r,man rule - 85 pevcent of the Jews perished, in Sl0>vakia, on the other hand, during the reign of President
Joseph Tiso, 85 percent of the Jews were saved.
After 194!5, at the Bratislava University, several sons
of the foremost "Oze:cho-Slovak and Lutheran" families
objected to receiving doctorates together with Jews and
the university had to arrange another time for the ceremO'Ily; the Jews recei,v ed their doctorates with former
members of the Hllinlka youth. And Lettrich wa:S boss in
SlovaJkia at that time!
History !b,ooks usually carry pictures of leading personalities and events that made history. Lettrich's "history," however, is different; it tells the story of so-called
"Catholic crimes" and, quite understandably then, Lettrich
SLOVAKIA
37
used only photographs of so--called "Catholic criminals."
Under one ,p icture whi'ch is a,lmost ineligiible, for example,
we read: "Canon KaroJ Korper wearing a Hlinka Guard
cap while sperukirng." What the occasion was and what
Korper said is left to the imagination of the reader. Orf
course, those who were present on that occasion know that
a blessing of the Slovalk colors took place. They also ,k now
that the speaker who followed K6r,p er was the Eviangelical
(Lutheran) chaplain of the Hllinka Guard, Dr. Ladislaus
Jurkovilc. The latter and I went to school together and
were good friends; I was glad to see him in Lettrich's
book; he is to. the left of Ko:nper, 'b etween two German
officers. Lettrich obviously was only interested in lifting
out the name of Canon Korper.
Then there is the picture of Comrade Kaftanov. He,
too, made Lettrich's "history," even though he proibrubly
will not make Russian history. Kaftanov attended the
occasion of Dr. Tuka's instaH.ation as rector of the Bratislava University, at which he is reported to have predicted a "glorious future for the Slovak 'State, because it
resulted from the collaboration of the two. most powerful
nations, the Germans an.d the Russians, who had decided
to reorganize the a,ppearance of Euro,pe." Since Lettrich
bothered with Kaftanov, he should have also mentioned the
names of very distinguished scholars and representatives
of world-renowned uni.versities (American, French, English, Italian, '11unkish, etc.) who· sent congratulatory messages to Dr. Tuka.
And Lettrich's picture is lacking, too, even though
he was photographed while pinning decorations on quite
a few Red Russians. We are supposed to believe, too, that
theire are no ,p ictures of LeUrich with Tito, Gottwald, Siroky, Duris, Pull, Smidike, Husak, and other Communists.
Too bad, too, that he could not embellish his pictorial supplement with a few ,photos Off the German ambassador to
Slovaikia, of N a zi generals and economic represen.tat1ves
all orf whom enjoyed huntin,g wiitih Lettrich's friends on
their pri•v•a te hunting reserves and were very happy to
shruke hands with Na;zis. But even this is all petty and
trivial.
1
38
SLOVAKIA
The ,S lovak RepU!blic was the work of peo,ple and it
was managed ,b y people. It is, therefore, quite understandable that, like other states, the Slovruk RepUibliic also had
its faults ,a nd deficiencies. It was born during a world crisis, in the shadow of the gigantic German Reich, to which
the western ,p owers aJbandoned the whole of Europe. At
that time there was no force, single or combined, which
could or did intervene to change the course o!f events.
Lettrich states that Benes and others, including himself,
were forced to do things under given circumstances, which
they probably would not have done under no•I1Inal condi~
tions. And that is und~rstandable.
But why shotl!ld Lettrich create the impression that the
Slovruks and Tiso, w'ho were respons~ble for the welfare of
the Slovak Republic, willingly and voluntarily went along
in all things with the Nazis? The answer is obvious. Lettrich could not control or overcome his ,prejudices and his
intense hatred of Tiso and his group, which he calls the •
"Catholic Party" and which represented the overwhelming
majority of the Slov3;ks. In this he was no different than
the Communists and the chauvinistic Benes Czechs.
In a word, Lettrich's "history" is one of the most
shameful, vicious and malicious books about Sl01Vakia tihat
was ever published. Griinwald's infamous "Felvidek" in
comparison is an inno.c ent song. To those who read Lettrich's book, I say this: do not even believe the figures he
gives as the .p opulation for any Slovak town or city, because thev are most certainly falsified. The "History of
Modern 'Slovwkia" is, indeed, a true picture of Lettrich's
,p olitical and moral stature!
•
•
•
"CZEOHOSLOVAKISM VERSUS A'MERICANISIM" an ~pose of .t he pr~Soviet "National Froniters" in the socalled Oouncil of Free Ozechoslov-ailcia - is a 48 :page booklet pwbliished by the Slovak League o!f America, which
should be read 'by every one seekdng the answer to the
queQtion of how "Ozecho-.Slovak demoora·c y" ooniveirted to a
",p eople's demoocacy." Send 25 cents (coin or stamps) to
the SIJOVAKiiA for your copy today.
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Lettrich's History of Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Constantine Čulen
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 21-38
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/153ca7b8e0894787ec040bf3e8d190e4.pdf
ecc8df4f3de4b9451f36843379cd1f91
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
3
THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS
IN SLOVAKIA
Dr. Joseph Pauco
In recent months many evident proofs of the failures
of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied
by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only
in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists
themselves?
Centralization
1
On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in
Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is
true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of
communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism.
F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will
say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or
any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists.
The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the
Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22,
19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia:
"The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia;
it is its fighting diivision."
The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~
gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a."
Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two
of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime
in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary
for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is
apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the
1
1
�4
SLOVAKIA
Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field
as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled
"Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs.
As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact
openly, when he said:
"Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions."
For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is
today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans
about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under
the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party
·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for
all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony.
'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known
thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k,
Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited
their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked
for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them .
"Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak,
in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this
un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly
the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights."
Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the
anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly
�SLOVAKIA
5
dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and
Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had
dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a
fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though
he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause.
Slovak Nationalism
The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist
policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's
Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were
most violently attooked by the communists.
William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t
Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist
separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups."
Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter
ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices
are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes,
aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant,
stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them."
Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is
not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the
brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even
for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe
populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the
banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie."
Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie
and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the
Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences
we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois
ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~
structive variety - populist s~paratism."
!Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some
smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he
�6
said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with
dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism,
carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy."
Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k
nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~
ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . "
·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission,
the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did
not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's
speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda
are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are
losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This
holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections
of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be
aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological
wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices."
This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who
untitl recently held the first position in the Communist
Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long
as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~
gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those
by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the
politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more
concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of
the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions
whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to
it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the
Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze<:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just
like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union
- become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens."
Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of
Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot-
�SLOVAKIA
7
ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical
dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After
ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is
leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did
not materialize.
Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the
Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even
Bacile<k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns
his attention to the communist writers, saying:
"Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and
Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a
romantic novel which would depict the fact that without
the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti<: industria>liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks."
If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers
who stand in the service of communism and the so-called
"Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be
wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a
"Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as
is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~
ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates,
then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions,
we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple.
The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun•
ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of
the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which
wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said:
�8
SLOVAKIA
"If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic
task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation
of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . .
We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the
low level of the teaching and training work of our
teruohers."
That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with
its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers
or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or
training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can
agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not
care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were
party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that
these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the
communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the
youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of
the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by
a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-·
parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy
.Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the
Communist Party no end of trouble.
That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than
all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak
nationali<Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-·
cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly
of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead,
dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the
party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e
elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or
peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the
party.''
Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number
�SLOVAKIA
9
of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s
sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They
could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked
to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails
In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great
many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well
that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and
party.
Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their
main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere.
Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception.
The Resistance Movement
Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was
recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e
movement, Bernard Nemcek.
Reports from Prague about the communist verdict
tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in
Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the
br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by
its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement
to create an independent Slovak State.
The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own
state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists
on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this
idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is
not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In
Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight
against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to
free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every
a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for
state independence.
Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist?
In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com-
�10
SLOVAKIA
munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but
we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds
themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses.
Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions
taken by the communists themselves, there can be no
doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism.
In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently
escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served
how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of
the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was
active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers
and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked
him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence
for Slova!kia, he replied:
"I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks
is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be
Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the
determination to have their own state and there is no
power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with
any other state form ."
Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the
homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic.
And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of
the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is
obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental
questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing
its bitter fate.
It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would
not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What
does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-·
gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955,
definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in
Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first
1
�SLOVAKIA
11
one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be
rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have
1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by
the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over
comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948.
It is certain that under other circumstances the
strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater.
What do we mean by saying under other circumstances?
The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations
behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it
thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence
means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness.
Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac•
ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia
is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods
have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter.
Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the
very people, who together with tihe communists for three
years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col.,
•J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are
in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation
that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the
Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not
'be trusted by tlhe West.
Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after
February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S<>-<!alled
�12
SLOVAKIA
~'Council of Free Ozecho-<Slovrukia" - should not be used
or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the
F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe),
United States Information Agency (Voice of America),
and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United
States Government, because they are totally discredited
and cursed by the Slovaks at home.
1Should
anyone wish to, be corredly informed about
how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into
the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak
heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole
aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-·
lish a Slovak independent state.
The Reds Fear the West
.C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's"
court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the
Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that
fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders
from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator
called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis
i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots
in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times
attacks of this kind are made almost daily.
On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already
have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests
of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most
rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim
of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war."
Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend
"pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~
ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some
satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of
peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime,
reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central-
�SLOVAKIA
13
European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac.
tionary elements."
The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly
worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day
over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That
these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural
and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile,
who speak for state independence for their own nation,
is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able.
Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything
it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them
with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis,
reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs
and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as
the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective.
The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly
attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the
Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak
exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator,
"they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one
specialty. More than any other group they are concealing
their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian
morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even
went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union,
that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited
the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the
other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed
of Tiso's Legacy."
On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the
angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's
Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the
PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote
aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are
allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in
�14
SLOVAKIA
the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western
Germ.any."
The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that
from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against
"the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and
against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are
constantly warning escapees not to return home.
The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the
imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles.
It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds
are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they
began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and
confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists
say one thing at home, something else at the conference
ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever
,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the
other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have
always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm
against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of
the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian
sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly
against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of
Slovaks in the West look for thei<r sup,po<rt.
ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks
enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all
Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague
broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one
treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League
of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the
separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests."
To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1
�SLOVAKIA
15
tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh
small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the
periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if
thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will
alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious
nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the
situation, they would not have to concern themselves with
the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal
field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has
lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of
one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~
tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep.
Perhaps this is best refle<>Jro in the words of Karel
Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling
circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-.
pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile
propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in
various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party."
In other words, what is being done in the, West in the
interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit>n does have
a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously
this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid
of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of
the Slovak nation.
The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is
why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in
cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava
that Americans "iha<ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te."
The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak
State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very
much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would
-hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it.
�16
SLOV.AKIA
The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can
compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise
the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the
Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better
for them than a government of their own choice.
Against the Kersten Committee
The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question
justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the
rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the
struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the
communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a
barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee.
The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten
and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former
congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who
testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation."
The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he
was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions
now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul
of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked,
"rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged
suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~
triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not
escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the
Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said,
'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of
the methods, which are used by the American reaction to
slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time,
however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into
which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in."
On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked
Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law
�SLOVAKIA
17
about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among
federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive
plans to start a new war."
On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished
a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten
Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among
otiher things in that article, we read:
"On December 31, 1954, there was published in the
United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in
a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely
fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements',
and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet,
army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat
of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ...
The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the
basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . .
"About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has
intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators,
who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it
surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt
for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists
in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~
tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco,
Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could
not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute
secrecy, behind closed doors.
"The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character
was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his
twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred
against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country.
"Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern-
�18
SLOVAKIA
ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and
Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and
Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course,
there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for
anything _of value.
"The so...called document of the American Government,
prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists
clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk
in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this
lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-·
cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves
of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their
nati·o n to Hitler." .
We find the very same insults and abusive names also
jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government
of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the
United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery .
It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip,
which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign
against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war
against peace-J.oving countries."
The Prague government is also angry because the
Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism
and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist
dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus
and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out
especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the
Sl~va:k Republic.
As far as the reproaches of the Prague government
and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors
is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in
-a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of
unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however,
mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective
1
�SLOVAKIA
19
work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by
the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses
strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated
against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told
how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence.
Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a
thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._,
pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West
wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles
against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to
discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so
make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in
this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the
radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who
sympathized with them.
But it does not matter whom they single out for
abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~
munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:..
ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully
afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right
of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak
nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary
struggle to bring order and political balance in Central
Europe has no su'b stantiation.
While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective
in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting
facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course,
it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet
secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The
press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the
television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that
was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1
�.20
SLOVAKIA
lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record
.the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their
pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism .
The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL
,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as
:a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and
.has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the
years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest
crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny
them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers.
And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used.
It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the
communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy
return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the
Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to
ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have
committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have
done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To
.waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes
,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much
more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto
the ocean.
We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of
life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder
of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb
s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded
sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good
sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on
the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and
have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence,
must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native
"populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and
"imperialis tic American capitalism."
1
1
�
SLOVAKIA
3
THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS
IN SLOVAKIA
Dr. Joseph Pauco
In recent months many evident proofs of the failures
of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied
by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only
in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists
themselves?
Centralization
1
On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in
Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is
true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of
communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism.
F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will
say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or
any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists.
The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the
Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22,
19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia:
"The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia;
it is its fighting diivision."
The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~
gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a."
Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two
of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime
in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary
for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is
apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the
1
1
�4
SLOVAKIA
Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field
as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled
"Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs.
As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact
openly, when he said:
"Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions."
For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is
today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans
about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under
the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party
·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for
all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony.
'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known
thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k,
Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited
their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked
for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them .
"Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak,
in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this
un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly
the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights."
Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the
anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly
�SLOVAKIA
5
dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and
Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had
dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a
fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though
he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause.
Slovak Nationalism
The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist
policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's
Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were
most violently attooked by the communists.
William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t
Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist
separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups."
Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter
ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices
are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes,
aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant,
stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them."
Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is
not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the
brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even
for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe
populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the
banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie."
Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie
and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the
Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences
we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois
ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~
structive variety - populist s~paratism."
!Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some
smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he
�6
said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with
dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism,
carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy."
Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k
nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~
ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . "
·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission,
the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did
not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's
speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda
are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are
losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This
holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections
of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be
aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological
wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices."
This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who
untitl recently held the first position in the Communist
Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long
as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~
gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those
by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the
politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more
concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of
the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions
whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to
it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the
Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze<:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just
like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union
- become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens."
Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of
Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot-
�SLOVAKIA
7
ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical
dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After
ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is
leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did
not materialize.
Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the
Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even
Bacile<k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns
his attention to the communist writers, saying:
"Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and
Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a
romantic novel which would depict the fact that without
the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti<: industria>liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks."
If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers
who stand in the service of communism and the so-called
"Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be
wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a
"Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as
is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~
ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates,
then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions,
we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple.
The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun•
ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of
the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which
wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said:
�8
SLOVAKIA
"If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic
task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation
of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . .
We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the
low level of the teaching and training work of our
teruohers."
That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with
its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers
or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or
training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can
agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not
care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were
party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that
these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the
communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the
youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of
the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by
a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-·
parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy
.Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the
Communist Party no end of trouble.
That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than
all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak
nationali<Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-·
cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly
of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead,
dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the
party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e
elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or
peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the
party.''
Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number
�SLOVAKIA
9
of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s
sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They
could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked
to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails
In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great
many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well
that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and
party.
Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their
main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere.
Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception.
The Resistance Movement
Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was
recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e
movement, Bernard Nemcek.
Reports from Prague about the communist verdict
tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in
Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the
br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by
its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement
to create an independent Slovak State.
The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own
state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists
on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this
idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is
not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In
Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight
against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to
free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every
a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for
state independence.
Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist?
In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com-
�10
SLOVAKIA
munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but
we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds
themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses.
Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions
taken by the communists themselves, there can be no
doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism.
In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently
escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served
how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of
the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was
active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers
and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked
him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence
for Slova!kia, he replied:
"I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks
is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be
Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the
determination to have their own state and there is no
power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with
any other state form ."
Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the
homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic.
And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of
the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is
obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental
questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing
its bitter fate.
It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would
not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What
does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-·
gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955,
definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in
Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first
1
�SLOVAKIA
11
one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be
rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have
1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by
the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over
comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948.
It is certain that under other circumstances the
strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater.
What do we mean by saying under other circumstances?
The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations
behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it
thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence
means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness.
Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac•
ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia
is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods
have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter.
Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the
very people, who together with tihe communists for three
years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col.,
•J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are
in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation
that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the
Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not
'be trusted by tlhe West.
Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after
February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S<>-<!alled
�12
SLOVAKIA
~'Council of Free Ozecho-<Slovrukia" - should not be used
or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the
F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe),
United States Information Agency (Voice of America),
and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United
States Government, because they are totally discredited
and cursed by the Slovaks at home.
1Should
anyone wish to, be corredly informed about
how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into
the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak
heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole
aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-·
lish a Slovak independent state.
The Reds Fear the West
.C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's"
court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the
Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that
fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders
from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator
called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis
i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots
in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times
attacks of this kind are made almost daily.
On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already
have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests
of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most
rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim
of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war."
Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend
"pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~
ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some
satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of
peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime,
reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central-
�SLOVAKIA
13
European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac.
tionary elements."
The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly
worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day
over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That
these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural
and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile,
who speak for state independence for their own nation,
is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able.
Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything
it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them
with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis,
reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs
and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as
the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective.
The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly
attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the
Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak
exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator,
"they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one
specialty. More than any other group they are concealing
their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian
morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even
went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union,
that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited
the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the
other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed
of Tiso's Legacy."
On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the
angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's
Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the
PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote
aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are
allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in
�14
SLOVAKIA
the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western
Germ.any."
The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that
from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against
"the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and
against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are
constantly warning escapees not to return home.
The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the
imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles.
It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds
are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they
began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and
confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists
say one thing at home, something else at the conference
ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever
,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the
other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have
always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm
against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of
the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian
sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly
against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of
Slovaks in the West look for thei<r sup,po<rt.
ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks
enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all
Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague
broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one
treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League
of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the
separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests."
To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1
�SLOVAKIA
15
tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh
small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the
periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if
thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will
alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious
nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the
situation, they would not have to concern themselves with
the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal
field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has
lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of
one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~
tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep.
Perhaps this is best refle<>Jro in the words of Karel
Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling
circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-.
pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile
propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in
various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party."
In other words, what is being done in the, West in the
interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit>n does have
a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously
this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid
of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of
the Slovak nation.
The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is
why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in
cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava
that Americans "iha<ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te."
The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak
State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very
much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would
-hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it.
�16
SLOV.AKIA
The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can
compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise
the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the
Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better
for them than a government of their own choice.
Against the Kersten Committee
The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question
justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the
rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the
struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the
communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a
barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee.
The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten
and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former
congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who
testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation."
The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he
was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions
now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul
of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked,
"rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged
suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~
triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not
escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the
Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said,
'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of
the methods, which are used by the American reaction to
slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time,
however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into
which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in."
On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked
Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law
�SLOVAKIA
17
about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among
federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive
plans to start a new war."
On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished
a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten
Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among
otiher things in that article, we read:
"On December 31, 1954, there was published in the
United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in
a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely
fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements',
and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet,
army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat
of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ...
The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the
basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . .
"About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has
intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators,
who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it
surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt
for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists
in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~
tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco,
Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could
not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute
secrecy, behind closed doors.
"The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character
was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his
twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred
against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country.
"Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern-
�18
SLOVAKIA
ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and
Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and
Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course,
there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for
anything _of value.
"The so...called document of the American Government,
prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists
clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk
in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this
lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-·
cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves
of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their
nati·o n to Hitler." .
We find the very same insults and abusive names also
jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government
of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the
United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery .
It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip,
which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign
against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war
against peace-J.oving countries."
The Prague government is also angry because the
Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism
and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist
dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus
and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out
especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the
Sl~va:k Republic.
As far as the reproaches of the Prague government
and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors
is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in
-a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of
unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however,
mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective
1
�SLOVAKIA
19
work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by
the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses
strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated
against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told
how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence.
Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a
thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._,
pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West
wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles
against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to
discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so
make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in
this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the
radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who
sympathized with them.
But it does not matter whom they single out for
abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~
munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:..
ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully
afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right
of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak
nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary
struggle to bring order and political balance in Central
Europe has no su'b stantiation.
While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective
in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting
facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course,
it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet
secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The
press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the
television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that
was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1
�.20
SLOVAKIA
lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record
.the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their
pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism .
The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL
,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as
:a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and
.has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the
years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest
crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny
them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers.
And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used.
It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the
communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy
return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the
Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to
ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have
committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have
done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To
.waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes
,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much
more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto
the ocean.
We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of
life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder
of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb
s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded
sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good
sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on
the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and
have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence,
must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native
"populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and
"imperialis tic American capitalism."
1
1
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
3
THE FAILURES OF COMMUNIST POUTICS
IN SLOVAKIA
Dr. Joseph Pauco
In recent months many evident proofs of the failures
of the Communist Party .in Slovaikia have been supplied
by the communists themselves. Their policies flailed not only
in tlhe political dom aii:n, but also in the eoonomfoa!l and especiailly the agricultural fields. What is the situation in SlovaJkia today aicco:rding to the admissions of the communists
themselves?
Centralization
1
On the one hand, it is 'k nown that the communists in
Slovak!ia did SUipport the recognition of the national indiviiduality of the :S lovak naJtion, yet, on the other hand, it is
true thaJt in Slovakia power is no longer in the hands of
communists who respect tlhis principle and oppose the imperialIBtic influences of Ozech communism.
F'0trmally, the 1name o:f the CommUIIl1ist Party of Slovakia has been retained, but not a single commuru.srt: factor will
say thaJt it is ,representati.ve of Slovak communist forces, or
any kind of autonomoUJS organization of Slovak communists.
The first secretary of the Communist Parity of Slovald1a, the
Czech communJ.st ~arel Badlek, proc,laimed on April 22,
19'55, at the XI Congre ss of the Communist Party of Slo-vakia:
"The Communist Party of Slovakia is a region.a:! organization of the one Communist Party of Czecho-lSlovaJkia;
it is its fighting diivision."
The :flirst sec·r etary of the Communist Party of CzechoSlovakiia, the Czeclh .Amt onin Novotny, addressing that Con~
gress said thrut "the Communist Party of Slwaikia is an indivi:silble 1part and unit of the Communist Party of CzechoSloW!Jki,a."
Tit is clear, then, beyond all shadow of doubt, that two
of the pre-eminent leaJders of the present communist regime
in PTague and Bratislava no longer consider it n.ecessary
for the Slwak commundsts to appear independently. This is
apparent not oinly in the o,r ganization by the fact th•a t the
1
1
4
SLOVAKIA
Slovak Communist Party is suboirdinated to the Ozech Communist Party as its "division," but also in the .poili'tical field
as well, where the Czechs rule surpreme. ln the so-oalled
"Czeoho-Slovruk" Communist Barty, there were only Ozechs.
As an aip.pendage of the Czech Oommunist Party, the Slovak Communist Party is .powerless to ,i nitiate or realize anything; everything is done through the Czecho--Slovak (really CZECH) Communist Party. Bacilek attested to this fact
openly, when he said:
"Important and fundamental •p olitical questions concerning Slovakia were presented for resolution to the Central Committee od' the Communist Party of Czecho-iSlovakia, and we go,v erned ourselves iby those decisions."
For Slovakiia iit pr~baJbly is fortunate tJhat Prrugue is
today responsilble for all politics. On the other band, however, it is quite significant for the Soviets, who loudly demand the a,ssurance of aU national freedoms. In the Slo·vak case it is one orf the cleaTest 1proofs thaJt SOV'iet slo.gans
about independence a~e only a s:ham and delus,ion. Under
the communist reg,ime the Slovaks lost aitl remnants of autonomous government. IDven though the Communist Party
·of Slovakia exists fonmally, its first secretary is not a Slovruk, but a Czech - ~arel Bacilek - and that means, for
all practi'crul purposes, that SlnvaJkia is again a Ozech colony.
'Dhis situation conceals within itself many known
thinigs. While the Ozech comrmmists could rely on Husa'k,
Novomesiky, Okaly, and Clementis, they readily e~loited
their services. But just as soon as these Slovak communists, who possessed a certruin am'ount of national pride, began to make more and more demands, they were marked
for liquidiaJtion. And Ozech communists did liquidate them .
"Bourgeois nationalists," said Bacilek, "led by Husak,
in agreement with the Slovak reaction, oppo-s ed the validation of a uniform poHcy and a urniform agricultural program for the entire Czecho-iSlovalk Reipublic. And since this
un~formity wa;s a prerequisite of the politic•al, and mainly
the agriculturnJl, equality of the rig1hts of the Slovak nation, tihen, fa:ct:ually, they s1a:botaged this equa:lity orf rights."
Hlusak's ,g roup was no more considerate toward the
anti-communist Slova:k camp than was Bacilek. The oillly
SLOVAKIA
5
dif;ference between them was that Husak was a Slovak and
Bacilek a Ozec'h. Because Husak, a Slovak communist, had
dared to oppose the concept that his party was s.imrply "a
fighting division oif the Communist Party of Ozecho-,Slovakia," that is, subservient to tlhe CZECH CommU'Ilist Party - hiis name was added to the last of traitor:rs, even though
he did render inivaluaJble se:rwices to the commU'Ilist cause.
Slovak Nationalism
The greatest enemy of communism in Slovakia is nationa'1isrm - the real cause of the failures of communist
policy. Becau:se the foli:owers of the Hlinka 'Slo'V'ak People's
Party were identrified with Slovak nationaliism, they were
most violently attooked by the communists.
William Siroky recalled at the XI Congress of the Slovak CommU'Il.ist Prurty in Bratislava that the Communi,s t
Party "revealed the plague of tJhe anti~peop[e's populist
separatist traitocrs and the other nationa;lisbic groups."
Thus far Slovak nationalism could not be wiped out. Afrter
ten years Siroky had to admit that "national :wejudices
are very much allive especially among the Slovak intellectuals and officials; they are penetrating into other classes,
aTe influencing even cultural lifo, and that a constant,
stu!bborn ideofogiica1l war must be waged against them."
Bacilek also complained that Slovak nationalism is
not a sim,ple problem, saying: "While consolidating the
brotherhood of the Ozechs and the Slovaks, let us not even
for a moment storp waging a decisive battle against tJhe
populists, the ideolo,gical man.ifestation of one part of the
banikmpt Slovaik bourgeoisie."
Karel Brucilek is stumped by the Slovak bourgeoisie
and, therefore, oalils upon scientific workers to fight the
Slovak IJ.orpulists: "From the workers of the sociaJ sciences
we demand that they systematically and olbjectively uncover and help to oiveroome the manifestations of bourgeois
ideologies in the minds of the people, especiaUy the manifestations of bourgeois natiorrali:s m and its most de~
structive variety - populist s~paratism."
!Slovak natiO'Ilalism, however, is not a matter of some
smail[ group. Novotny understood that very well when he
6
said: ". . .Almost everywhere up to now we rmeet with
dangerous mainifestations of bourgeois nationaliSlm, es,peciaUy with one of its forms, with populist separatism,
carrying wi·t h it reactionary darkness, which was designedly kept up in Slovakiia by the htgh Church hieraTchy."
Judging ,a ccordingly, then, we can say that Slova:k
nation:aliSlm is the "Enemy No.. l" of the communist regime. So for Novotny it is very clear that "the commun~
ists, the natfona1 committee, and the basi,c partisan organizations must constantly exiplain the harmfulness of nationalistic views and e:,QJJose them . . . "
·s1ovaJk naticma1ism is still quite strong. 'J.1he communists did not khl[ it and, according to their own admission,
the propaganda they used against Slo,vaik nationrulism did
not he1p much. This is made quite clear from Sirdky's
speech, in which he says: "our agitation and ,propaganda
are not suifficiently penetrating and convincing; we are
losing sight of the increasjng claims of our people. This
holds for the press, lectures, and also for many sections
of cultura,1 practice. . . In Slovrukia es:pe:cially, we must be
aware of tJhe fact that any weakening of the ideological
wor,k will oniy strengthen national prejudices."
This is quite a sj_gnifican,t adrmission from a man who
untitl recently held the first position in the Communist
Party of Slo.vakfa. To, keep his. head a:bo,ve water as long
as possible, Sirdky, even though he is not a S'1ovaik by ori~
gin and sentiment, knows tha;t he must be grateful to those
by whose grace he is •s till tolerated as a member of the
politburo. So he encourages comm!Ullist propaganda "to devote itself more sy,stematically and profoundly and more
concretely to the greaJt and actual ideoilogica[ problems of
the present per,iod - to concern itself witlh t:he questions
whkh preoccupy the minds O!f our people. We must see to
it that the feeling of collectiveness and mutua'lity of the
Czechs and Slovaks, of Cze<:ho..Slovak patriotiSlm - just
like the feeling of lo,yalty and love towaTd the Soviet Union
- become the fundamental. lines orf the socialistic and pat.Piotic consciousness of our citizens."
Obviously, then, there is no so-·caNed "mutuality of
Slovaks and Czechs," there is no "Czecho-tSlovak patriot-
SLOVAKIA
7
ism." These concepts existed only in the minds of poHtical
dreamers in t!he past and, as we see, even communist prisons and concentration camps could not create them. After
ten years of terror and violence, comrade Siroky, who rendered great services iin Slovakia for Ozech communists, is
leaving the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party beca use the desired union of the Slovaks with the Ozechs did
not materialize.
Many people dreamed a:bout a brotherhood of the
Czechs and Slova'ks. But this was nothing but an unsuccessful dream . The situation has not changed even today. Even
Bacile<k would be happy if he couild change it. So, he turns
his attention to the communist writers, saying:
"Litemture and the arts o,we very much to the systematic conso[idation of the brotherhood o!f the Czechs and
Slova;ks. After ten years our literature has not produced a
romantic novel which would depict the fact that without
the aid qf the Czech working class there would be no penetrating successes in the soci'alisti<: industria>liza,tion of Slovakia. We do not have a book which would show the historical roots of the brotherhood of the Czechs and Slovaks."
If there is no such volume, then there are no, writers
who stand in the service of communism and the so-called
"Czecho-,Slo,v ak" union; there are no writern w'ho would be
wililing to serve communist propaganda and the policy of a
"Great Czec,hia." And this fact is as significam.t a reality as
is the strength of Slovak nationalism itself. Both comple~
ment and control each other mutually. Writers are the coo.science of a nation. In present-day Slovaki'a, if this conscience does .not subordinate itself to communist dictates,
then this is a matter of great significam.ce a,nd of an extraordinary hisitorical manifestati'on. In natinnal questions,
we know, a genuinely honest w_riter would not dare to misrepresent the thoughts of his own peo.ple.
The schools of Slova'kia are also• resisting commun•
ism very va1iantly; they .p refer to stand on the side of
the nation thian on the side of a foreign clique which
wants to demoralize the character of Slovak history. Bacilek obviously was fuily aware of the school situation, because in attacking SlO'Vak teachers he said:
8
SLOVAKIA
"If we arnailyre the work of the ,s chools from the standpoint of contemporary needs, we must come to the conclusion tihat thus far they are not performing their basic
task satisfoctorily and are little concerned a;bout the quality af education and, at the saime time, abourt 'the creation
of c•o mmunistic conviction and momls in all the youth. . .
We must seek the reason therefore albove aiH else in the
low level of the teaching and training work of our
teruohers."
That's the kind of talk we hear long after the Communiist Party of Slovakia repl'aced qualified teachers with
its most loyal followera whether they qualified .as teaahers
or not. That such people had no idea what the teaching or
training level was is l.mderstand01ble; on this point we can
agree with Ba;cilek, because the commurust regime did not
care whether the persons employed as t eachers ,w ere qualified to tea:ch, hut was onJ.y concerned whether bhey were
party memlbern. However, the admission of the fact that
these Red teaichers were not sufficiently relialb1e for the
communists, that they are not creating communist convictions, rund are not strengthening communist vices in the
youth - all this is one af the most reiveal,i ng proofo of
the failures of communist policy in Slovakia. The communists hurried to .produce intellectuals loyal to tlhem by
a wholesale process. Even though some intellectuals ap-·
parently did join them, they did not lose their healthy
.Sl·OVaJk core and are now causing the leadership of the
Communist Party no end of trouble.
That is the wo11k and the influence of Sloviak nationalism. And SlovaJk natiornalism is more irufluential than
all communist terror and vioO.errce. The iruflueillCe af Slovak
nationali<Slm rea:ches ,i nto the Communist Party itselrf. Ba-·
cilek admitted tihat from the time of the X Assembly
of the Slovak Coimmunist Party "the numiber of dead,
dropped and ex,pelled members and candidates £rom the
party wrus 12,940. The party rid itse'Lf of UillW:Orthy, hostiJ.e
elements, of violators of state and party mscirpline, or
peoiple who fai,l ed in their oibligations as members of the
party.''
Bacilek, however, did not dare publ,~Sh the number
SLOVAKIA
9
of expelled members and, of course, not even the detail.s
sUTrounding the deaith of some of the memb,e rs. They
could ha,ve lbeen eliminated or liq.uida,ted secretly, wor.ked
to death in .tlhe Uranium mines, or beaten to death in jails
In every instance, however, Bacilek reports that a great
many members were expelled. We understand fiuNy well
that they were enemies of the communist go:vernment and
party.
Communists evidently do no,t know exactly where their
main enemies are am.d, hence, look for them everywhere.
Nationalism .has its sharply designated posts am.d is perfonniin!g its duty. ,Slovak nationalism is no exception.
The Resistance Movement
Sl-ovak nationaJlism is alive and ,a gg,ressi,ve. This was
recently demonstrated, when on June 13, 1955, the communist military trilbunaJl con!Victed 12 memlbers of a Slovak resistam.ce movement, dealing out high penalties, including a sentenice of death for a leading memlber of t;h.e
movement, Bernard Nemcek.
Reports from Prague about the communist verdict
tell us more than all the explanations of the situation in
Slovaikfa. And that because, surprisingly enough, the
br,oadcast of June 16, 1955, designated the movement by
its ,r,ight name: a resistance movement and a movement
to create an independent Slovak State.
The supreme desire of every rnation is to h'ave its own
state. The Slovaks a,re n:o exception. If Slovak nationalists
on native soH can bring the supreme sacri.lfice for this
idea, this is irre.futalble proof that the Slovruk naroion is
not am.d iw:illl not be satisfied with foreign domiination. In
Slovrukia and in tlhe ranks of SlovaJk mo,vements, the fight
against commun~sm is comprehended as determination .to
free itself once and for all time from the yoke of every
a1ien hegemony. That is why the fight of 1Sllovaik nationalists tends in two directions: against communi-sm and for
state independence.
Does a Slovak resistance movement actuafily exist?
In the light of the a;bove, a str,ong resista,nce movement dbviiously does exist in Slovakia. At times, the com-
10
SLOVAKIA
munists may at:teinipt to minimize its efd'eetiiveness, but
we know that it must ,b e quite a movement, if the Reds
themselves see fit to discuss it during their congresses.
Basing OUT conviction on statements made and adions
taken by the communists themselves, there can be no
doubt that commun'ists really fear Slovak bomigeois :nationialism.
In my possession I have a letter from a well-informed Slovak in Western Gerunany who just recently
escaped from Slovakia. For nine long years he ob.served
how the Red regime worked in Slovai~ia. He took note of
the opinions and manifestations 'Of the population and was
active in western, central and eastern Slovakia. Thris person maide contacts with officials and wwkere, farmers
and priests, teachers and politiJCal prisoners. When I asked
him what the Slovaks thought a;bout state independence
for Slova!kia, he replied:
"I dare write that about 95 percent of the Slovaks
is for an independent state, a SlovaJk State wruiclh iwil[ be
Chri stian and democratic. The Slovaks are holding to the
determination to have their own state and there is no
power whrich wil!l force them to be satisfied with less, with
any other state form ."
Over 90 percent of the Slovruks who escaped from the
homeland during the past ten years have joined o;rganizations tJhat strun:d for an independent Slo-~a;k Repuiblic.
And this is clear testimony of the. political conviction of
the aJbso1ute maj'orirty of the Slovak naition, because it is
obvious that the thoughts of the exiles on fundamental
questions is identical with the thinking of the Slov•a k nation, witJh which just up to not long ago it was shaTing
its bitter fate.
It is not important to seek the answer to the questions of how many resi,s'tance movements tJhere are in Slovakia and how stroTIJg they might be. Certainly it would
not ibe p:mdent to discuss this question pulblicly. What
does count is the fact that they are causing the Red re-·
gime many emlbarassments and difficulties. June 13, 1955,
definitely tells us that resistance movements do exist in
Slovakfa. The rverdict of J·u ne 13, 1955, was not the first
1
SLOVAKIA
11
one - and most likely not the last one, either - to be
rendered against Slovak patriots. Many conspiracies have
1b een uncoivered in SlovaJkia 1b y Prague since 1945, both by
the communii.st-dominateld Benes-Gottwald coalition government and also by the Red regime whioh took over
comrplete power in Ozedh-0-Slovak'ia in February 1948.
It is certain that under other circumstances the
strength of .t he resistance mo,v ements wouild be greater.
What do we mean by saying under other circumstances?
The concept orf "peacefu11 coexistence" with the communists is creating a very confused situation; this nonsense ,is, in fact, breaking the backbone of the nations
behind the I11on Curtain. Fundamentally, coexistence betmys weakness, and the West is terribly mistaken, if it
thms it can over:come tlhe danger of communism by following such a policy. In practical poHtics coexistence
means a viofation of the fronts m tlhe cold war, which already have in many instances shown signs of great weakness.
Res·.iJstance movements of an anti-communist chiarac•
ter should be gebting more moral aid from sources designated for this pul1)0se. Unfortunately, as far as Slovakia
is corrcemed in this ,p sychological struggle, wrong methods
have frequently been used; whether intentional~y, o,r because of la:C!k of iruformation, does not change the matter.
Thi,s was and is undoubtedly due to the influence of the
very people, who together with tihe communists for three
years (194'5-·1948) were trying to break doWtn. al1l anticommunist re:s•.i!stance of the Sfovak nation. The West defirately does not bolster or build the morale of the Slov,a k resistance movements by aiding and comforting, employing and letting itself be influenced by people who col.,
•J aborated with communists and Moscow and, hen:ce, are
in a large measure responsilble for the terrible situation
that prev:ails in Slovakia today; Slovak Judases, as the
Slwaks at home and in exile refer to them, should not
'be trusted by tlhe West.
Dr. Joseplh Lettrich and his followers - who suddenly ·b ecame "demo:cratic exiles firom Czech0-Slovakia" after
February 2-5, 1948, and are now members of the S<>-<!alled
12
SLOVAKIA
~'Council of Free Ozecho-<Slovrukia" - should not be used
or employed in any capacity :b y such organizations as the
F!REE E}(JROPE COMIM!I'l'T'iIDE (iRadio F.ree Euroipe),
United States Information Agency (Voice of America),
and other offictla1 and semi--0fficial aigendes of the United
States Government, because they are totally discredited
and cursed by the Slovaks at home.
1Should
anyone wish to, be corredly informed about
how Slo,viakia thinks and feels a:bout its fate, what anticommuniist wor.keris are doing there, let him delve into
the verdict of June 13, 1955, against the tJweilve Slovak
heroes, and let him find time .t o study the attacks of communist propag,amda against ISlovruk nationalists, whose sole
aim ,i s to oause the downfall oif commumsm and to estrub-·
lish a Slovak independent state.
The Reds Fear the West
.C ommenting on the verdict rendered by the "people's"
court againist the tweilve Slovak anti-,c ommunists, the
Prague radio OIIl June 16, 1955, reminded its listeners that
fhis particular resistance orgrumzation receiyed its orders
from Slovak exiles in the West. The military prooorator
called the following Slovak patriots archtraitors : Du:rcansky, Cerna!k, Paiulco, Mikus, ·Mikula, and Hassik. 'Dhis
i,s not t!he forst time, and not the last, that Slovak patriots
in exile have 'been accused by Red Prague. In recent times
attacks of this kind are made almost daily.
On May 2, 1955, for example, the Prague Radio, referring to Slovak patriots in exile, said that "they already
have behind them ten furrl years of service in the interests
of foreigners, ten full years oif collaJboration with the most
rea:ctionary elemernts against the people . . . and the aim
of all exile origa.ni2Jations 1s war."
Thiat is how the Prague commtlillists comprehend
"pea'Ce:ful coexistence." While the West is leaning danger~
ously ibac!k waTd and even sacrificing tJhe interests of some
satellite nations behind the Iron Curtain fOT tJhe saxe of
peiace, the Retl sateJ..lite governments, in the meantime,
reg,ard freedom of expression, movement and political activiity in the states which have given asyilum to Central-
SLOVAKIA
13
European escapees as "colllalboration with the most reac.
tionary elements."
The .Prague communists, for example, are terribly
worried that Slovaks in exile can speak freely every day
over the tranS1mitting facilities of Spain and Ita:J.y. That
these broadcasts are completely identical with the natural
and democratic demands of rull patriotic Slovaks in exile,
who speak for state independence for their own nation,
is only n:aturrul and,( therefore, quit'e u:nderstand!able.
Communist propaganda, of course, is doing everything
it can do to silence 1:Jhem, disarm them, and discredit them
with the worn-·oU:t eipithets of "fascists, separatists, nazis,
reactionaries," etc. It is signific·a nt, too, that Benes Czechs
and Slovak Judases use the same epithets and tactics as
the Reds. Where they cannot successfully refute a statement, they resort to denunciation, viHfication, and invective.
The Pr31gue bvoadicast, red:erred to above, vicioosly
attacked the Christian character of the prog,r am of the
Slovak exiles. "Well, as far as the activity of the Slovak
exiles abroad is concerned," said the Prague commentator,
"they have in comparison with the rest of the groups one
specialty. More than any other group they are concealing
their actual aims /by a,ppealing to ChriJstianity, Christian
morals, Ohristian charity, etc. Dr. Francis Hrusorvsky even
went as far as to designate tJhe Central-Eu:ropean Union,
that is, tlhe rearming of German miilitarists, as an expression of Christian charity. Not even the former editor-inchief of the newspaper S:L0VAK, Dr. Pauco, who edited
the SLOVAK during the time of the greatest nazi massacre in Slova!kia, will l now never fail to appeal to ChrisHan ethics. And the Sloviak fascists from Madrid, on the
other hand, shall always recall that they are not aslhamed
of Tiso's Legacy."
On June 9, 1955, filie Bratislava broadcast quoted the
angry article of the PiRAVDA against the Slov;aJk People's
Party, distorting its historical role. On that occasion the
PRAY.DA - ac0ording to the radio commentator - wrote
aJbout "the dirty role of the populi,s t emigrants, who are
allying themselves not only with the aggressive groups in
14
SLOVAKIA
the United States, but aJso with the avengers in western
Germ.any."
The radio broadcast f.rom Prague on June 11 and that
from Bratislava on June 12, 1955, sollillded off against
"the provoc,ative Madrid and Rome tran1simitters," and
against the "Paucos, Cerna.ks, and :Dur:canskys," who are
constantly warning escapees not to return home.
The Brague 'broadcast of May 9, 1955, was :f.ull of insults and epithets aJbout the "madness of the rulers of the
imperi,a listic world and their humble ser,vrunts, the traitors of our nations," that is, the exiles.
It is symboli'c of communist audacity that the Reds
are using such propaganda at a time wlhen in Moscow they
began a new o£fensive so that they might again meet and
confer with "imperialistic rulers," and so whet tlheir ruppetite for "capitalistic" trade. Of course, the communists
say one thing at home, something else at the conference
ta!ble, and still something difrferent to exri1les. Whosoever
,p erforce walilts to be deaf will believe only one or the
other side of their story and will not compare the communist propaganda of an shades and tendencies. We have
always been of tlhe conviction that to come to an agreement with communism is the greatest trM1.Sg,ressicm
against the pri,n ciples of humanity, the basest violation of
the rights to freedom, and a grave insttlt to Christian
sentiment. Communism is most often irritated by the constant repetition and practical realization olf Christian-democratic principles. That is why they cry out loudly
against a poHticail prog,ram to which the v;ast majority of
Slovaks in the West look for thei<r sup,po<rt.
ChrJstianity and the !help of the West, whrreh Slovaks
enjoy, throw the communists off balance. They say all
Slovak exiil es "have one boss,." as reported by the Prague
broadcast of May 2, 195'5, aJUd "all are paid from one
treasury, the trea:sury of American militarilsm. The socalJ.ed Slovak N aitiona1 Coundl .Aibroad, the Sloviak League
of America, and the Canadian SloviaJk League - as the
separati'st organi~ations of iSlova.k :fascists - serve American military interests."
To show their hatred the communist madmen ini1
SLOVAKIA
15
tialed the names of tihe organizaitJions they attadked witJh
small letters wlhen tlhey pwbH,sihed the commentary in the
periodical L'UD ('People). This is qurite si,gnifica,nit. As if
thereby they could alter the facts. They a.Jltered and will
alter nothing; and their anger only attests to a serious
nervours condition. Iif eve-ryithing were in order in SlOIV'akia and the communists were in complete command of the
situation, they would not have to concern themselves with
the Slov;ak situation so excitedly on the inlternati:onal
field. However, when one once succumbs to fear and has
lost his conscience and has two gall bladders instead of
one heart, there hardly is any helrp for him. The commnnist dic-tators in S1ovakia have a very small sowl. The poon~
tom of American caipitalism and tihe activity of free Slovak or:ganization:s and individuals will not let t'hem sleep.
Perhaps this is best refle<>Jro in the words of Karel
Bacilek, who said at the XI Oommunist Congress at Bratislava: ". . . Imperialist aggressors, led by the ruling
circles of the USA and with tihe aid of treacherous esca-.
pees, are attemipting to srcore and deceive the working people, divert it from the path of social construction. Hostile
propaganda can at times penetr"ate and bear in:filuence in
various ways even oin memlbers olf the ;party."
In other words, what is being done in the, West in the
interest of the liberation of 1:lhe Slovak natit>n does have
a great influence on the Slo.vaks at home. But obviously
this influence also affects the communists. They are afraid
of every step that is taken in the defense of the ,rigihts of
the Slovak nation.
The COilllmunists in Prague and in Slovalkia fear nothing more than the concept of Slovak statehood. Tha;t is
why, for example, William Siroky practicaUy writhed in
cramps when he revealed at the Congress. in Bratislava
that Americans "iha<ve exhumed the compromised and bankrupt slogan of the so-.called S1'()1V'ak Sta:te."
The fact , however, is that the concept of the Slovak
State is not bankrupt and is not dead. It is a thing very
much aJiNe, otheriwiise Sirdky amd other communists would
-hardly concern themselves with it. The Slo,vaks are encouraged by it, while the communists are haruntetl by it.
16
SLOV.AKIA
The princilples of freedom are so strong that no one can
compromise them. Only dictators, and among them foremost are the communists, have attempted to compromise
the governmental form. But they shaH never convince the
Slovaks that an aJli.en and tyrannical government is better
for them than a government of their own choice.
Against the Kersten Committee
The Kersten Committee evaluated the Slova:k question
justly and correctly and published its findings how Slovakia was taken over by tJhe Reds so that America and the
rest of the free world might learn the truth a:bout the
struggles and demands of the Sl10V1a!k nation. For that the
communist propaganda of Prague and Bratislava fired a
barrage of smear and vilification at the Committee.
The BratislaN radio sharply attaoked Charles Kersten
and the Slovak witnesses on February 7, 1955. The former
congressman from MHwaukee, Wis., •w as called the "counsellor of the escapees," while the Slovak witnesses who
testifiied oof1ore tJhe Committee were designated as "traitors of the Slovak nation."
The 'b roadcast ,a ttacked Dr. Joseph Mikula, ,b ecause he
was supposed to have stated that '~he and his companions
now did not have the legal possilbility to poison the soul
of the 1Sl1ovax nation." Dr. Pauco, the commentator barked,
"rel,aJtekl fables before the Committee about an alleged
suppression of the freedom of the press in Czecho-Slovakia." Dr. Mikus was reviled because he defended the principles of private ownership. Matthew Cemalk, Slovak pa~
triot and leader of the S'lov,a k exiles in Germany, did not
escape the wrath of the Reds either. 'I1he communist propagandist stated that •a ll the Slova.lk witnesses before the
Committee wanted to start a war. In this instance, he said,
'in full nakedness wa:s demonstrated the wretchedness of
the methods, which are used by the American reaction to
slander the countries of tJhe peace camp. At the same time,
however, it aJlso shows the depth of filth and muck -into
which the traitors of the Slovak nation shall end up in."
On May 2, 1955, the Prague radio again attacked
Charles Kersten, declaring that "on the basis of h'is law
SLOVAKIA
17
about financing suib versi,v e ructivities in the countries promoting peace, he is distributing dollars generously among
federalists, separatists, unionists, and all kinds oif other organizations" fo,r rendering "servile service to aggressive
plans to start a new war."
On Miay 5, 1955, t!he PRAVDA of Bratislav,a ,p ublished
a lengthy article in regard to the actiivi-ties of the Ke:rsten
Committee and tihe testimony of Slov,ak witnesses. Among
otiher things in that article, we read:
"On December 31, 1954, there was published in the
United States a so..,caJl:led official document of the American Congress, which !insults the nations of OUT country in
a very c:m de and inept manner. In this gossiipy 'document', which was prepared by the special Keristen Committee, Ozecho.JSlorvak history is written up in a genuinely
fascist spirit, the glorious Slovak national uiprising is descri'b ed as 'an impro,vised rebellion of subversive elements',
and the liherati:on. of our country by the heroic Soviet,
army is depicted with the bitter sorrow over the defeat
of Hitler's occupat ion troops and thei:r native assistants ...
The Kersten Committee preparnd this 'document' on the
basis of the so--c alled 12 Slovak testimonies, which it collected from Slovak fascist outcasts. . .
"About Kersten it i'S generally known that he has
intimate, friendly contacts with fascists and cOIHalborators,
who fled the country after Wo:rld War II to escape punishment and found asylum in the United States. Therefore, it
surprised no one when the Kersten Committee on its hunt
for gossipy 'testimonies' sought out only genuiine fascists
in London, P,aris, Madrid, Rome, Munich and other Cen~
tral-European ciities. With witnesses like Cemak, Pauco,
Mikus, Mikula, Nahalka, and theiir hke, it naturally could
not be proud of in ,pU!bfic. So it met, with them in absolute
secrecy, behind closed doors.
"The g:reatest degree of deipra,vity a:nd lacik of character
was successfolly attained by Charles Kersten and his
twelve fascist 'witnesses', who in their hellpless hatred
against the Slavruk people incite, slander and cry for another war against o.ur country.
"Among the paid perjurers of the American Govern-
18
SLOVAKIA
ment of th~ tyipe of Harvey Matusow, Paul Crouch, Elizaibeth Bentley, and_Charle~ Ke:risten, on the one hand, and
Oernak, :Dur.canslky, Pauico, Kirschbaum, Mikus and company, on the other, there is no difference. American and
Slov,aJk fascis'ts alike 'betmy their own people. Of course,
there may be this difference: the former do tfuis for dollar.s while the fascist renegades of Cerna.k's type do it for
anything _of value.
"The so...called document of the American Government,
prepared on the basis of the gossip of 12 Slovak fascists
clearly proves how deep the traitorous escrupees have sunk
in their hatred against our people. And simultaneously this
lying document is further ,p roof that American r,u ling cir-·
cles willingly sl,a nder countries whlicih have rid themselves
of crupitalistic e,oploite:m, the creatures that betrayed their
nati·o n to Hitler." .
We find the very same insults and abusive names also
jn the official note of the Prague Coo:nmuni,s t government
of April 19, which is addressed to the Governmenlt of the
United States. The separate report of the Kersten Committee is designated as.. "bra:zen" and "is equal to t:he wildest product of Goeibbels' fascist proipagandisti'c mach'i nery .
It is nothing else but the pasting tog~her of lies and gossip,
which are supposed to deepen hatred against Czecho-,Slovrukfa, to encourage war hysteria, to incite and campaign
against coounl\.Ulism and to ,p repare a preventive war
against peace-J.oving countries."
The Prague government is also angry because the
Kersten report is opposed to coexi,s tence with communism
and warns the Whole world of the threats of communist
dictators. The Prrugue note attacked Dr. Joseph Mikus
and Matthew Cern.aJk, two act~ve Slov-a:k exiles, pointing out
especi,a lly that they sewed in the dtplomatic cOI1ps of the
Sl~va:k Republic.
As far as the reproaches of the Prague government
and its propaganda against American and Slovak factors
is concerned, it must be stated unequivocally tlhat not in
-a single testimony wrus there any talk aibout the need of
unleashing a war. In the testimonies we do find, however,
mention in seveTal places of the need of good and effective
1
SLOVAKIA
19
work in the puiblishing and broadcasting fields against communism, of the need of preparations for the spiritual renovation of the world whioh is slowly being crushed by
the satanic forces of ciom.munism. All Slovak witnesses
strongly condemne!d the crimes and the evil perpetrated
against the SlovaJk nation by communism; and tfu.ey told
how communism enslaves the Slovaks spiriturulJy and exploits them economicailly and suppresses every manifestation of the Slova;k people for freedom and state independence.
Tlhe wor'k of the Kersten Committee has become a
thorn in the eyes of communist aggressive politics and pro._,
pagainda. The Czech communi,s ts h'a d hoped that the West
wouM continue to beHeve blindly their old lies a.nd falbles
against the Sloviak nation; tihey did everything possilble to
discredit Slovaks in exile in the eyes of tfu.e West and so
make life as m[seraJble as possible for them. Flaiiing in
this, it was only natUII'al for the Reds of Prague and Bratislaiva to unleash the wildest war in the press and over the
radio ag,ainst Slovaks in exile and against every one who
sympathized with them.
But it does not matter whom they single out for
abuse and vilification; important it is, however, that com~
munists are afraid of the solidly organized anti-commun:..
ist Slovak camp and their friends. And they are frightfully
afraid of the thought that the whole principle of the right
of self-determination must once be accorded the Slovak
nation, without the reaJlization of which the conterruporary
struggle to bring order and political balance in Central
Europe has no su'b stantiation.
While communism must reso;rt to a;buse and invective
in its fits of anger, the Slova~s in exile are presenting
facts, they are building on them and witlh them are defending the righteousness of their demands. Of course,
it is not true that the Kersten Committeee used to meet
secretly with ,Slovaik witnesses. All the hearings were ,public. They were attended by reporters and the puiblic. The
press reported on the hearings, so did the radio and the
television. Expert stenographers recorded everything that
was said by every Slorvak witness and this was then pub1
.20
SLOVAKIA
lished iby t:he American Governmen t. The reports record
.the minds of those people, w:ho foom the beginning of their
pulblic activity adaimanfily opposed communism .
The SlovaJks in exile do- not deny that they are antL
,c ommuni,s,t. It is a historical fac:t that the Slovak nation as
:a w,hole condemned t:he tea•ching.s of Marx and Engels materialistic phHos0rphy soon after it was made pulb1ic and
.has fouight it consistentl y and persistently throughout the
years. The S1ova'ks in exile, then, do not even request secret sessions. Oommunist s, however, commit the foulest
crimes where there are no witnesses. But they •c annot deny
them, ,b ecause even the dead testify against murderers.
And communism will one day ,be on the be,n ch of the acc used.
It seems ,t he cards have faHen from the hands of the
communist rulers in ,Slova;kia, !because they sysit:ematica lJy
return to, the activity of the native "reaction" and the
Slovaiks in exile. This is nothing else but an attempt to
ma,sk all the crimes and grave injusti ces which they have
committed and are stil,l commiltinig against the SlovaJk nation. Communis ts cannot conceal or deny the evil they have
done. The entire nation is testifying against them. To
.waint to deny something and to- concea•l one's own crimes
,b y hurling poi sonous insu1,ts at others is, indeed, a much
more difficult and hopeless. task than pouring water inrto
the ocean.
We are profoundly touched by the heavy losses of
life, cultural, moral and economic values, which the .Slovak nation has suffered from the Red Moloch. The murder
of Matthew Cernak in Munich, Ju1y 5, 1955, by a bomb
s ent through the mail is still fresh in our minds. However, we see that tJhe communist s are writhing like wounded
sna!kes, hissing with anger and hate. And that is a good
sign. It is the beginning of the end. Thus far no communist ruler has remained long in po,w er; and those forced on
the Slovaks will be no exception. They are. he:Jipless and
have no defense for the failures of their policies and, hence,
must find scaipegoats : so they thunder againsit the native
"populist reaction" at home, the "traitorous exile," and
"imperialis tic American capitalism."
1
1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Failures of Communist Politics in Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Joseph Paučo
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 3-20
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Paučo, Jozef, 1914-1975
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
SNK
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b3f4e5263ce41309f048807e8d9ccfee.pdf
284f076f8b0d44613883b79dce9beb5a
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica
VOL. V
DECEMBER, 1955
NO. 4 ( 17)
??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ???
Wa:nt to fight Communism? You
don 't know how? Well, here's the
answer, according to CRUSADE
FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with
"TRJUTH DOLJLARS"
that's
how! American "Truth Dollars,"
we are told, " send words of truth
a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron
Curtain." But have you ever read
or ·heard those "words of truth
and hope" which bombard the
Iron Curtain countries? Neither
have most Americans!
Take the case of ,Slovakia, which
was wantonly destroyed by the
victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the
war in total d'isregard o.f the will
of the Slovak nation, what have
your "Truth Dollars" done for the
unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to
the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE,
which
oper,a tes
RA'DIO
FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has
not been •s ending words of truth
and hope to the Slovak people.
The "Czechoslovak" division or
unit of RFE is completely under
the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are
Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists
and Red collabomtors former
members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of
the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic
Slovaks, because they are and have
been opposed to freedom and poli-
tical independence for their own
nation. Both these groups have
a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak,
anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before,
during and after the laist war. And
we have not heard that they have
publicly repudiated those policies.
American "TRUTH DOLLARS"
are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs
and S lovak J udases in the service
of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And
yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH
DOLLARS fight Communism "by
exposing
Red
lies ... reveallng
news suppressed by Moscow and
by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have ·
been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators
in the_ "Czechoslovak"
(really
CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin<:e
it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have
been sent regularly to V'arious
leading lights of the Free Europe
Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican
Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM);
both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE
remains
practicall y unchanged.
Personal visits to the New York
Office of RFE have not helped
much either.
It seem s that the Fnee Europe
Committee people themseJ.ves are
not interested in knowing the
truth about what happened in
Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and.
after the war. In fact, they have
1
0
�2
SLOVAKIA
made it quite obvious that they
do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and
have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude
is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now
find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the
American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE
began operations with the blessing
of our State Department!
When the Slov·a ks fought the
Communists and pro-Soviet policy,
they were beaten down by the Be,.
nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer,
Vanek,
Tigrid,Schoenfeld,
Firt,
Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the
Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.).
These Red collaborators did not
know how to fight Communism at
home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and
.Czechs how to fight it. Of course,
for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" !
The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E
EUROPE is, we believe, a good
idea, but the way it is being put
a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit
or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo•
va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The
peopl,e preparing them certainly
must know that by now. But they
~e not in their jobs to tell that
Slovaks are entitled to freedom
,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing
or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the
.persons who got them the jobs,
so they are not impartial. And
those persons are the Benes
Czechs. If we wene to judge the
entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would
have to say that it is strictly a
socialistic enterpris·e. Since we
are not sufficiently informed on
the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time.
But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists.
"Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words
of truth; that's how hard 'Truth
Dollars' work. Your dollars will
.hel,2 70 million people resist the
Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are
by exiles in the native tongue of
the people to whom they a,re
beamed." All this, from a recent
advertisement of the Crusa,de for
Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well
as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent
say bluntly: We don't believe it
as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit
exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and
independence, distorts facts of the
past and favors enemies of the
Slov,a k nation, the enemies of
America, as well!
The Benes Czechs and •t heir
hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats,"
have deceived and embarrassed
Americans entirely too tong. Their
own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load
them with American "TRUTH
DOI,LARS"?
The Czechs are not and do not
want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to
be Czechs. That's all there 'is to
it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There
·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs
and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio
Free Europe are supposed to do.
Why not let them do it?
�
SLOVAKIA
Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica
VOL. V
DECEMBER, 1955
NO. 4 ( 17)
??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ???
Wa:nt to fight Communism? You
don 't know how? Well, here's the
answer, according to CRUSADE
FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with
"TRJUTH DOLJLARS"
that's
how! American "Truth Dollars,"
we are told, " send words of truth
a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron
Curtain." But have you ever read
or ·heard those "words of truth
and hope" which bombard the
Iron Curtain countries? Neither
have most Americans!
Take the case of ,Slovakia, which
was wantonly destroyed by the
victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the
war in total d'isregard o.f the will
of the Slovak nation, what have
your "Truth Dollars" done for the
unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to
the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE,
which
oper,a tes
RA'DIO
FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has
not been •s ending words of truth
and hope to the Slovak people.
The "Czechoslovak" division or
unit of RFE is completely under
the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are
Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists
and Red collabomtors former
members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of
the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic
Slovaks, because they are and have
been opposed to freedom and poli-
tical independence for their own
nation. Both these groups have
a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak,
anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before,
during and after the laist war. And
we have not heard that they have
publicly repudiated those policies.
American "TRUTH DOLLARS"
are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs
and S lovak J udases in the service
of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And
yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH
DOLLARS fight Communism "by
exposing
Red
lies ... reveallng
news suppressed by Moscow and
by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have ·
been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators
in the_ "Czechoslovak"
(really
CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin<:e
it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have
been sent regularly to V'arious
leading lights of the Free Europe
Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican
Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM);
both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE
remains
practicall y unchanged.
Personal visits to the New York
Office of RFE have not helped
much either.
It seem s that the Fnee Europe
Committee people themseJ.ves are
not interested in knowing the
truth about what happened in
Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and.
after the war. In fact, they have
1
0
�2
SLOVAKIA
made it quite obvious that they
do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and
have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude
is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now
find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the
American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE
began operations with the blessing
of our State Department!
When the Slov·a ks fought the
Communists and pro-Soviet policy,
they were beaten down by the Be,.
nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer,
Vanek,
Tigrid,Schoenfeld,
Firt,
Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the
Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.).
These Red collaborators did not
know how to fight Communism at
home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and
.Czechs how to fight it. Of course,
for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" !
The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E
EUROPE is, we believe, a good
idea, but the way it is being put
a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit
or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo•
va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The
peopl,e preparing them certainly
must know that by now. But they
~e not in their jobs to tell that
Slovaks are entitled to freedom
,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing
or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the
.persons who got them the jobs,
so they are not impartial. And
those persons are the Benes
Czechs. If we wene to judge the
entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would
have to say that it is strictly a
socialistic enterpris·e. Since we
are not sufficiently informed on
the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time.
But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists.
"Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words
of truth; that's how hard 'Truth
Dollars' work. Your dollars will
.hel,2 70 million people resist the
Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are
by exiles in the native tongue of
the people to whom they a,re
beamed." All this, from a recent
advertisement of the Crusa,de for
Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well
as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent
say bluntly: We don't believe it
as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit
exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and
independence, distorts facts of the
past and favors enemies of the
Slov,a k nation, the enemies of
America, as well!
The Benes Czechs and •t heir
hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats,"
have deceived and embarrassed
Americans entirely too tong. Their
own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load
them with American "TRUTH
DOI,LARS"?
The Czechs are not and do not
want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to
be Czechs. That's all there 'is to
it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There
·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs
and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio
Free Europe are supposed to do.
Why not let them do it?
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
Published quarter ly by the S lovak League of Ame r ica
VOL. V
DECEMBER, 1955
NO. 4 ( 17)
??? "TRUTH DOLLARS" ???
Wa:nt to fight Communism? You
don 't know how? Well, here's the
answer, according to CRUSADE
FOR FREEDOM: Fight it with
"TRJUTH DOLJLARS"
that's
how! American "Truth Dollars,"
we are told, " send words of truth
a nd hop e to the 70 million freedom loving people behind the Iron
Curtain." But have you ever read
or ·heard those "words of truth
and hope" which bombard the
Iron Curtain countries? Neither
have most Americans!
Take the case of ,Slovakia, which
was wantonly destroyed by the
victorious ,United Nations ,a fter the
war in total d'isregard o.f the will
of the Slovak nation, what have
your "Truth Dollars" done for the
unfortunate people of that country? The iORUSADE F10 R FREEDOM collects the "TRUTH DOLLA•RS" and hands them over to
the FRIDE EUROPE COMMITTEE,
which
oper,a tes
RA'DIO
FRIDE IDUROBE. But the latter has
not been •s ending words of truth
and hope to the Slovak people.
The "Czechoslovak" division or
unit of RFE is completely under
the influence of persons who collaborated with Moscow .and the Communists for many years. They are
Benes Czechs - Czech Soci'alists
and Red collabomtors former
members of the ·Communist-dominated National Front ,g overnment of
the Benes-Gottwald coalition (19451948). The Slovaks (/Lettrich "democrats") in their service are regarded ,as Judases by all patriotic
Slovaks, because they are and have
been opposed to freedom and poli-
tical independence for their own
nation. Both these groups have
a ctively supported the anWS'.ovak,
anti°Chri'Stian, and pro-Soviet policies of Dr. Edward Benes before,
during and after the laist war. And
we have not heard that they have
publicly repudiated those policies.
American "TRUTH DOLLARS"
are used to pay t.he Benes Czechs
and S lovak J udases in the service
of RADIO F,RJEE EIUIROPE. And
yet, the CRUSA DE F OR FIREEJDOM tells you that your TRUTH
DOLLARS fight Communism "by
exposing
Red
lies ... reveallng
news suppressed by Moscow and
by unmasking Communist collaborators." Patriotic Slovaks have ·
been ener,g etically trying to unmask the Co m munist collaborators
in the_ "Czechoslovak"
(really
CZ ECH) unit of RFE ever sin<:e
it was founded, ,but with little success. The SLOVAK NlEWSLETTER and the SLOVA~Ii.A have
been sent regularly to V'arious
leading lights of the Free Europe
Committee ,a nd the Am,e rican
Heritaige Foundation (which sponsors CRUS•A'DE F10R FREEDOM);
both periodicals exposed the Benes Czechs and Lettrich "democrats," but the situation in RFE
remains
practicall y unchanged.
Personal visits to the New York
Office of RFE have not helped
much either.
It seem s that the Fnee Europe
Committee people themseJ.ves are
not interested in knowing the
truth about what happened in
Czecho Slovakia ,b efore, during and.
after the war. In fact, they have
1
0
2
SLOVAKIA
made it quite obvious that they
do not know the difference between a Czech and a Slovak and
have adopted a "so what?" attitude in the matter. This attitude
is not helping the cause of freedom or the cause of justice. Patriotic Slovaks in exile and in Slova,kia are confused by this behavior of the FEC and even now
find it hard. to believe that it reflects the policy of our Government and the sentiments of the
American public. I know definitely that it does not. And yet, RFE
began operations with the blessing
of our State Department!
When the Slov·a ks fought the
Communists and pro-Soviet policy,
they were beaten down by the Be,.
nes Czechs ('Ripka, Zenk!, Majer,
Vanek,
Tigrid,Schoenfeld,
Firt,
Stransky, Peroutka, etc.) and the
Judas Slovaks (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Mudry-::§ebik, Kvetko, Belus, Viboch, Belak-Berger, etc.).
These Red collaborators did not
know how to fight Communism at
home, but we are supposed to !)elieve they can now show Americans and patriotic Slovaks and
.Czechs how to fight it. Of course,
for American "TRUTH DOLAIRS" !
The idea behind IRAIDIO FRE'E
EUROPE is, we believe, a good
idea, but the way it is being put
a.cross by the "Czechoslovak" unit
or division is defeating its purpose. The contents of the broadcasts ,are not the things the Slo•
va,ks at ho.me want to hear. The
peopl,e preparing them certainly
must know that by now. But they
~e not in their jobs to tell that
Slovaks are entitled to freedom
,a nd independence, or what Amerlcans of Slovak descent a.re doing
or thinking ,about various matters. They were instructed by the
.persons who got them the jobs,
so they are not impartial. And
those persons are the Benes
Czechs. If we wene to judge the
entire venture of •ThFE by the "Cz.echoslovak" unit, then we would
have to say that it is strictly a
socialistic enterpris·e. Since we
are not sufficiently informed on
the other sections of ThFE, we desist from saying so at this time.
But we do insist that the ",Cz-echoslovak" unit is under the influence of .Czec•h socialists.
"Every doU.ar 'buys 100 words
of truth; that's how hard 'Truth
Dollars' work. Your dollars will
.hel,2 70 million people resist the
Kremlin . . . . The broadcasts are
by exiles in the native tongue of
the people to whom they a,re
beamed." All this, from a recent
advertisement of the Crusa,de for
Freedom, sounds n~ce, but Slovaks at home ,a nd in exile, as well
as Ame1icans of •S lovak descent
say bluntly: We don't believe it
as long as the "Czechoslovak" unit
exists, because it denies our existence, our right to 'freedom and
independence, distorts facts of the
past and favors enemies of the
Slov,a k nation, the enemies of
America, as well!
The Benes Czechs and •t heir
hirelings, the Lettrich "democrats,"
have deceived and embarrassed
Americans entirely too tong. Their
own people at home have discredited them, so why should we load
them with American "TRUTH
DOI,LARS"?
The Czechs are not and do not
want to be Slovaks, and the Slovaks are not and do not want to
be Czechs. That's all there 'is to
it. And not even "T1RUTH iDO'LLARS" can alter that fact. There
·are plenty of non-Benes Czechs
and. non-Lettrich "democrat!!" all good characters, loved ,a nd esteemed by their people at ·home who can do the job the Free Europe Committee and its Radio
Free Europe are supposed to do.
Why not let them do it?
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
??? "Truth Dollars" ???
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), December 1955
pp. 1-2
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0bc301038cf82cccbb95f298f39f3f3e.pdf
c8a6e974fab72cceddd5eba2f36fa9c7
PDF Text
Text
\t OL. V
DECEMBER , · 1955
IN THIS ISSUE:
??? "Truth Dollars"???
Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia
( '
L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia
The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization
Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a
l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia":
Cast les of Slovakia:
WHO S AID IT ? -
History or Propag a nda ?
Liptovsky H ra dok
54
*
*
*
. Ed ited and comp il ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Publi s h ed by
TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA
NO. 4
( 17 )
�SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA
PRESS
Middletown, Pa,
�
\t OL. V
DECEMBER , · 1955
IN THIS ISSUE:
??? "Truth Dollars"???
Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia
( '
L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia
The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization
Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a
l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia":
Cast les of Slovakia:
WHO S AID IT ? -
History or Propag a nda ?
Liptovsky H ra dok
54
*
*
*
. Ed ited and comp il ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Publi s h ed by
TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA
NO. 4
( 17 )
�SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA
PRESS
Middletown, Pa,
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
\t OL. V
DECEMBER , · 1955
IN THIS ISSUE:
??? "Truth Dollars"???
Th e Failur es o f C o mmunist Politi cs in Slovakia
( '
L ettri c h' s Hist o r y o f Slovakia
The, Slovaks and Slavonic Civilization
Ben es' s· Trip to Moscow and Cz ec ho-Slov ak Propaga nd a
l( ern er's ·"Czechoslovakia":
Cast les of Slovakia:
WHO S AID IT ? -
History or Propag a nda ?
Liptovsky H ra dok
54
*
*
*
. Ed ited and comp il ed by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Publi s h ed by
TH E SLOVAK L E AGU E O F AME1R ICA
NO. 4
( 17 )
SLOVAKIA is' published periodically by the Slovak League of America,
a cultural and civic federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOVAKIA
is to promote a better understanding
and appreciation of the Slovak nation
and its long struggle for freedom and
independence.
As Americans, members of the
Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all
nations, has an inherent and God-given
right to freedom and independence.
They are dedicated to the cause of the
American way of life, Slovak freedom
and world peace and are determined to
oppose the plague of Communism and
all other totalitarian political systems.
Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per
year in the U . S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
Middletown, Pa.
Printed in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA
PRESS
Middletown, Pa,
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (17)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
December 1955
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/14d56edbe08d0137ffd15ed7c9a9214b.pdf
564a93caabf378580091ac196aa402af
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio
•
Honorary
Dr. Peter
19-13 W.
Chicago
Fran ce s L. Mizenko
3756 Lee Road
Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio
President
P. H letko
I th Street
~. Illinoi s
J
President
Philip A . Hro ba k
P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa.
\'ice-Pre sident
Jacob Kocis
15-17 - 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. L th St.,
St ephen J . Tka c h
173 N . Main Street
Wi l kes-Barre, Pa .
A ndre w J . H amrock
61 Woodland Av enue
Campbel l , Ohio
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mi c hael J . Vargovich
National President
l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n
'hie-ago 8, Ill.
Recording 'ecretary
Franc is H rusovsky
2900 East Bou l evard
Cleveland I, Ohio
H e l en Ko c an
.'fationa l Pre sident
Fir st Catholic Sl ovak
Ladie s 1-nion
F ra n k Sobus
- :-lational President
lovak Cathol i c- Soko l
Secretary-Treasurer
Milan V . Blazek
.J922 S. Lec laire Avenu
Chicago 38, Ill.
St ephen J . Tkach
National President
nion
Penna . Sl ovak
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J.
· Gabri el a E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsy lvania
Sl ovak Union
Jo h n Rozbor il
~ational President
Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica )
JEDNOTA
Middletown , Pa.
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleve l and, Ohio
BRATSTVO
Wi l kes-Barre , Pa.
SLOVENSKE NOVINY
C l eve l and, Ohio
ZORNICKA
Chica.go, Ill.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Passai c, N. J.
SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind .
�SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as
a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio
•
Honorary
Dr. Peter
19-13 W.
Chicago
Fran ce s L. Mizenko
3756 Lee Road
Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio
President
P. H letko
I th Street
~. Illinoi s
J
President
Philip A . Hro ba k
P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa.
\'ice-Pre sident
Jacob Kocis
15-17 - 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. L th St.,
St ephen J . Tka c h
173 N . Main Street
Wi l kes-Barre, Pa .
A ndre w J . H amrock
61 Woodland Av enue
Campbel l , Ohio
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mi c hael J . Vargovich
National President
l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n
'hie-ago 8, Ill.
Recording 'ecretary
Franc is H rusovsky
2900 East Bou l evard
Cleveland I, Ohio
H e l en Ko c an
.'fationa l Pre sident
Fir st Catholic Sl ovak
Ladie s 1-nion
F ra n k Sobus
- :-lational President
lovak Cathol i c- Soko l
Secretary-Treasurer
Milan V . Blazek
.J922 S. Lec laire Avenu
Chicago 38, Ill.
St ephen J . Tkach
National President
nion
Penna . Sl ovak
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J.
· Gabri el a E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsy lvania
Sl ovak Union
Jo h n Rozbor il
~ational President
Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica )
JEDNOTA
Middletown , Pa.
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleve l and, Ohio
BRATSTVO
Wi l kes-Barre , Pa.
SLOVENSKE NOVINY
C l eve l and, Ohio
ZORNICKA
Chica.go, Ill.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Passai c, N. J.
SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind .
�SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as
a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(Organized 1907 in Cleveland, Ohio
•
Honorary
Dr. Peter
19-13 W.
Chicago
Fran ce s L. Mizenko
3756 Lee Road
Cl eve l and 2 , Ohio
President
P. H letko
I th Street
~. Illinoi s
J
President
Philip A . Hro ba k
P. 0. Box 150, Middl etown, Pa.
\'ice-Pre sident
Jacob Kocis
15-17 - 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
1648 W. L th St.,
St ephen J . Tka c h
173 N . Main Street
Wi l kes-Barre, Pa .
A ndre w J . H amrock
61 Woodland Av enue
Campbel l , Ohio
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Mi c hael J . Vargovich
National President
l•'irst Cathol i c Sl ovak Unio n
'hie-ago 8, Ill.
Recording 'ecretary
Franc is H rusovsky
2900 East Bou l evard
Cleveland I, Ohio
H e l en Ko c an
.'fationa l Pre sident
Fir st Catholic Sl ovak
Ladie s 1-nion
F ra n k Sobus
- :-lational President
lovak Cathol i c- Soko l
Secretary-Treasurer
Milan V . Blazek
.J922 S. Lec laire Avenu
Chicago 38, Ill.
St ephen J . Tkach
National President
nion
Penna . Sl ovak
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madi son St., Passaic, N. J.
· Gabri el a E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies Pennsy lvania
Sl ovak Union
Jo h n Rozbor il
~ational President
Sl ovak 'atholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliat ed with th e Slova k League of Am erica )
JEDNOTA
Middletown , Pa.
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
Scranton, Pa.
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleve l and, Ohio
BRATSTVO
Wi l kes-Barre , Pa.
SLOVENSKE NOVINY
C l eve l and, Ohio
ZORNICKA
Chica.go, Ill.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Passai c, N. J.
SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind .
SLOVAK.IA: Ruins of Bzovik Castle, Hont County, built in the 12th century. It served as
a monastery for the Premonstratensians from 1130 until about 1433, when the Czech Hussites took it over and converted it into a fortress.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16)
Description
An account of the resource
includes photo of ruins of Bzovík Castle
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June-September 1955
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6ac7410f395676e02818cc53fe896984.pdf
6ee6848fb54c5fa492946fff146e6a3a
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAK.IA
72
The Czecho-Slovak Exile
CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE
Dr. Mi chael Zibrin
July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~
fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because
the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-.
zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on
a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a
diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This
proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think
only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true.
The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by
the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more
than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and
more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article
is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the
CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk
Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in
1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic
deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile
members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who
deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform.
The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the
Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the
leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the
bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always
Etood very close to the Communists, even during small
political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl,
Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes
pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once
they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate
�Sl.JOVAKIA
73
they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own.
History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo.
cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in
the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against
any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and
against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years
earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish
General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the
Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-·
jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military
material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that
lhis material was sent by France and a French military
mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier,
when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague
against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd
asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same
Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent
- stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less
surprising when one remembers that he was actually among
the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,
which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere.
ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout
end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not
only in Czecho-!Slovakia.
Certainly one of the most important persons in the
Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes,
the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially,
on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent
him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular
contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's
unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and
t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew
it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different
position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps
undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council.
Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important
representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the
ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic
1
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party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ
sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist
famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all
Czechs.
Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter
mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained
an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even
after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social
Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu.
cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France
Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July,
1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc."
T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is
today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio
Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee!
On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known
Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner
of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing
as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger.
A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote :
"The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free
Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not
- as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite
on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at
least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a
Communist-sponsored propaganda line.
"These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police.
"A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist a.gents or have criminal records.
'1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin
�SLOVAKIA
75
by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
'
"Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n
intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France
and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in
Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these
journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the
elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in
Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language
sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because
it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line."
I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right!
The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party
in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party
memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so
not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the
Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe
at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The
best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~
crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive
without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT
unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the
Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only.
To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one
can say that its activities during the second World War
are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians
fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi.
net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger,
who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead
of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it
came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled
him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however,
Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep
his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from
his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the
cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and
Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In
addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help
within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of
1
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the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated
with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party
supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where
Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid
Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for
Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the
Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second
front against Churchill's will.
We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943
against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared
the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he
did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without
the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it.
1
I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943,
in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in
London. They were made not only by the admirers of the
Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were
blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved
the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with
Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of
asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes
simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher
interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request
to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge
part of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements,
I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts
of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety
after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why
the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so
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77
smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war.
Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928,
"Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats
without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~
ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government,
formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all
governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was
no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia.
Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was
Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red
Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General
Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the
Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know,
that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after
February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to
Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among
the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted
comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
They all were united in their pro-Communist activities,
and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at
all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the
top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's
name will be forever connected not only with our fight for
national liberation, but also with the struggle for social
liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . .
Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his
understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great
qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter
of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats
came to the United States and suddenly discovered that
they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica-
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tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following
facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their
activities back home.
The first document signed by the ministers and the
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~
cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r
homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25,
1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement
shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party,
not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~
nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by
the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians
of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats.
But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all
signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse,
they put it into effect. The most important parts of this
agreement are the following:
1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational
independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and
follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life.
2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed
upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted
by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through
this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee
is being created with an equal numlber of representatives
from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance
of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership,
wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political
Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of
Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties.
This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the
Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1
�SLOVAKIA
79
ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist
Party by Peter Zenkl.
It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that
not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among
those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National
Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are
telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from
Government.
But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that
both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought
their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the
help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same
thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still
happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are
worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the' Working People" created
a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This
committee had the task of coordinating the work of the
socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for
the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward
a socialist dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the
Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle
organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such,
would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked
out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would
be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes,
together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions,
, would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also
created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the
United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed
to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but
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actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from
the instant they began to function.
Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem,
Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~
munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is
that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice
Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the
train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t
way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration "
to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the
fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help
of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy,
Christ'ianit y, and freedom.
This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate
with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own
graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it.
A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented
on major effects of this agreement in this manner:
"The aims of the socialist bloc were many:
"1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic
trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them,
through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by
maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi·
nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together.
"2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all,
and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the
Communists will divide them among themselves.
"3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and,
thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on
a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth
will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already
been published for this so-called united youth organization and are
led by the Commundsts.
"In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against
political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist
dictatorship."
Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member
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81
of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by
the editor Jandaceik.
Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~
ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the
University he expelled those students who had participated
in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February.
Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional
Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~
of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist
constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the
Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr.
Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia
and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is
not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had
earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx
at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States.
Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a
member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party.
Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called
"Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk
and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which
was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books
Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social
and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted
to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the
Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5.
Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and
lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he
wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his
articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he
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was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and
thorough propagator.
From Canada he came to the United States and at
the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania.
iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social
Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member
of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in
winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a
Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem,
however, before the voting day, and often at midnight,
cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger
lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One
of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to
vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee
memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because
of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva,
Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had.
The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party,
however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of
Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of
June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate
even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after
being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the
Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of
Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group.
The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely
closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator
of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced
Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the
spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka
and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most
despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers
unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable
�SLOVAKIA
83
results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked
for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe
rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many
very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and
are paid by the Amerilcan citizens.
In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only
staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly
that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague
government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-·
man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was
working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied
the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the
West, requesting political asylum.
Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to
the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily
seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the
Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at
the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West.
He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge
which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe.
Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain
explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent
by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered
enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich
and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad.
What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia?
The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining
how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr.
Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western
World and praising everything he found after his return to
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SLOVAK.IA
Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the
new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the
goods in their possession and the common people are
starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by
Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE.
When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of
Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we
feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of
State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances
and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in
the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there
have been, since the start, members who were sent West by
the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the
Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations
in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to
office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly
helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley.
The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the
invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains.
To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in
London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime
as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies.
But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty
of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe
and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the
payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and
they still do that and help to betray America. There is no
excuse for them, or is there?
Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1
�SLOVAKIA
86
inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything
about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were
brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention
to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal
negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio
Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?"
There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all
plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western
Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r
a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which
aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements.
Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time.
Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible.
but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~
cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are
working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of
Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL
known Communist in the old country. Why should we be
shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden•
tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are
neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington
and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks
out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised
will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts.
Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the
"Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his
enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman.
'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity
�86
SLOVAKIA
that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and
charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of
their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was
given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the
Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in
LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always
tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably
figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per.,
haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the
Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped
him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because
of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore
planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For
this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading
positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need
the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and
Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So
Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and
charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a
fOTgery .
Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in
the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of
articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free
Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled
and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the
Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a
for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were
not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the
who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the
"Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names
first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's
charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as
ridiculous and highly impossible.
In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada,
another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel
M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks"
�f?LOV,AKIA
87
in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military
attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to
the policy of the present members of the Council then in
Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him,
Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared
it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel
Miksche.
It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment,
with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does
not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods
among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels
at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There
he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides
Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own
failures and a!bandoned projects.
SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives.
Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times
it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times
as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue.
Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is
hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some
other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors
in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the
"Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist
parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-·
ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading
Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech
Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the
persons from the Council do not distinguish between a
1
�88
SLOVAKIA
Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first
of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also
pay for their protection and defense
It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a
leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free
Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry,
his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii
of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm
to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's
group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un.,
dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others
from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the
Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that
a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to
him only through representin g himself as from me.
When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak"
group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous
group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un.
derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by
Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where
there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n
and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio
Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko,
Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions.
If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would
try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army
with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who
ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at
home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present
group. What is broadcast and written now - for American
money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them.
�SLOVAKIA
89
These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy.
chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron
Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia
is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather
amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the
Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because
the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~
lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue
and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides
in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in
Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No
wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect
there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of
America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations
are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~
stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased
to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta
affairs they only curse them.
Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in
Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who
are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko,
much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and
Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their
comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague.
The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In.
vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer
to whom the security of the United States is of paramount
internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope,
therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~
ter also and that the organizations in question will be
cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group.
iLausman was so aggressive that during the second
World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he
succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip
to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in
Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry
by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As-
�90
SLOVAKIA
sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in
his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept.,
able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked
the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that
Russian territory extends for the first time in history west
of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn.
In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal.
Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol.,
lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over
the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance
with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully
with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months
they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the
whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through
the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another
Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the
proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of
S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however,
refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country.
Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia
at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions,
sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that
the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only
Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to
be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia.
After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika.
The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were
never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was
Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own
State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several
months later, as the premier by Benes.
Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted
�SLOVAKIA
91
to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission
to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he
could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io
conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were
going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was
doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~
ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts.
At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak
non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable
to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the
Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty,
because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal.
The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that
it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December,
1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith
Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of
thie SloViak National Council.
When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the
idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia
to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the
Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government
would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in
thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in
emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying
dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his
life.
Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to
Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them.
When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced
it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an
agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1
�92
SLOVAKIA
SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on
June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with
this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it
benefited him.
On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the
Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This
decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized"
on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~
lection of Laws and Regulations.
T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words:
". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly
of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . "
Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado
Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good
prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement !
Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not
stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2,
1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes
in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern
section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices
the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity.
WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great
extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the
Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not
ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them
without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators
act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of
MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one.
'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later
Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator"
of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very
•b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi-
�SLOVAKIA
93
zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl
view of Prague.
All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation,
and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's
caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the
boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik
Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols.
I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they
hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in
their books.
Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to
rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free
Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or
(Josef Konbel, the
with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade,
now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and
a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes).
Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to
note what has been written albout him here in the United
States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a
more serious character:
"Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16,
1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army.
" He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the
Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as
Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United
States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities."
I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what
pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-·
ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh
people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by
�94
SLOVAK.IA
the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole
expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and
ineffective.
About the others aJbove, I must confess the same
opinion as to character.
The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally
separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h
Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist
co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went
in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am
leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd
not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists
and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the
Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party.
But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity.
It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete
conformance with the Communists had negated the party
as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself
in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g
even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek
and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership
cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and
others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed
by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history.
During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the
agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos•
sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats,
Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of
February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt
against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was
�SLOVAKIA
95
clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the
Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help
the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats
is not very well known and evaluated in the United States;
if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as
anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S.
am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of
State Acheson could not have secured for them influential
positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll.
It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and
were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help
his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later
the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech
Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social
Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German
Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled,
and even JnUrdered.
They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks
in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy
the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of
1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner,
working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the
public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The
Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he
agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed
their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer
needed by the Communists.
Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and
their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot
understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under
Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction.
On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh
14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech
�96
SLOVAKIA
Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage
to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in
free England, the present representative of the "Council of
Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which
he said:
"WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE
WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S
TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM
THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES."
1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19,
1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert
Ri,pka.
In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist
victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25,
1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current
members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their
present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of
course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now
their only means of survival.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to
provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even
less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived
the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single
'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of
the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength
in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired
only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the
shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the
dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).
�
SLOVAK.IA
72
The Czecho-Slovak Exile
CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE
Dr. Mi chael Zibrin
July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~
fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because
the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-.
zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on
a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a
diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This
proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think
only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true.
The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by
the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more
than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and
more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article
is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the
CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk
Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in
1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic
deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile
members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who
deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform.
The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the
Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the
leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the
bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always
Etood very close to the Communists, even during small
political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl,
Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes
pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once
they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate
�Sl.JOVAKIA
73
they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own.
History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo.
cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in
the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against
any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and
against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years
earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish
General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the
Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-·
jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military
material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that
lhis material was sent by France and a French military
mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier,
when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague
against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd
asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same
Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent
- stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less
surprising when one remembers that he was actually among
the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,
which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere.
ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout
end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not
only in Czecho-!Slovakia.
Certainly one of the most important persons in the
Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes,
the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially,
on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent
him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular
contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's
unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and
t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew
it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different
position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps
undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council.
Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important
representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the
ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic
1
�74
SLOVAKIA
party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ
sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist
famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all
Czechs.
Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter
mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained
an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even
after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social
Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu.
cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France
Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July,
1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc."
T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is
today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio
Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee!
On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known
Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner
of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing
as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger.
A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote :
"The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free
Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not
- as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite
on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at
least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a
Communist-sponsored propaganda line.
"These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police.
"A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist a.gents or have criminal records.
'1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin
�SLOVAKIA
75
by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
'
"Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n
intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France
and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in
Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these
journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the
elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in
Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language
sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because
it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line."
I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right!
The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party
in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party
memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so
not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the
Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe
at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The
best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~
crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive
without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT
unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the
Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only.
To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one
can say that its activities during the second World War
are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians
fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi.
net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger,
who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead
of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it
came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled
him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however,
Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep
his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from
his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the
cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and
Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In
addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help
within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of
1
�76
SLOVAKIA
the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated
with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party
supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where
Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid
Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for
Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the
Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second
front against Churchill's will.
We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943
against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared
the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he
did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without
the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it.
1
I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943,
in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in
London. They were made not only by the admirers of the
Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were
blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved
the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with
Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of
asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes
simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher
interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request
to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge
part of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements,
I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts
of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety
after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why
the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so
�SLOVAKIA
77
smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war.
Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928,
"Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats
without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~
ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government,
formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all
governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was
no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia.
Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was
Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red
Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General
Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the
Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know,
that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after
February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to
Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among
the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted
comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
They all were united in their pro-Communist activities,
and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at
all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the
top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's
name will be forever connected not only with our fight for
national liberation, but also with the struggle for social
liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . .
Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his
understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great
qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter
of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats
came to the United States and suddenly discovered that
they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica-
�78
SLOVAKIA
tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following
facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their
activities back home.
The first document signed by the ministers and the
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~
cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r
homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25,
1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement
shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party,
not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~
nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by
the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians
of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats.
But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all
signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse,
they put it into effect. The most important parts of this
agreement are the following:
1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational
independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and
follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life.
2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed
upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted
by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through
this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee
is being created with an equal numlber of representatives
from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance
of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership,
wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political
Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of
Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties.
This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the
Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1
�SLOVAKIA
79
ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist
Party by Peter Zenkl.
It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that
not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among
those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National
Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are
telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from
Government.
But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that
both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought
their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the
help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same
thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still
happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are
worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the' Working People" created
a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This
committee had the task of coordinating the work of the
socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for
the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward
a socialist dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the
Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle
organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such,
would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked
out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would
be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes,
together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions,
, would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also
created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the
United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed
to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but
�80
SLOVAKlA
actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from
the instant they began to function.
Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem,
Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~
munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is
that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice
Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the
train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t
way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration "
to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the
fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help
of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy,
Christ'ianit y, and freedom.
This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate
with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own
graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it.
A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented
on major effects of this agreement in this manner:
"The aims of the socialist bloc were many:
"1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic
trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them,
through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by
maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi·
nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together.
"2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all,
and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the
Communists will divide them among themselves.
"3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and,
thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on
a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth
will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already
been published for this so-called united youth organization and are
led by the Commundsts.
"In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against
political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist
dictatorship."
Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member
�SLOVAKIA
81
of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by
the editor Jandaceik.
Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~
ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the
University he expelled those students who had participated
in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February.
Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional
Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~
of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist
constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the
Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr.
Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia
and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is
not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had
earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx
at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States.
Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a
member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party.
Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called
"Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk
and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which
was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books
Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social
and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted
to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the
Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5.
Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and
lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he
wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his
articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he
�82
SLOVAKIA
was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and
thorough propagator.
From Canada he came to the United States and at
the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania.
iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social
Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member
of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in
winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a
Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem,
however, before the voting day, and often at midnight,
cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger
lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One
of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to
vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee
memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because
of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva,
Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had.
The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party,
however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of
Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of
June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate
even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after
being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the
Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of
Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group.
The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely
closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator
of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced
Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the
spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka
and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most
despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers
unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable
�SLOVAKIA
83
results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked
for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe
rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many
very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and
are paid by the Amerilcan citizens.
In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only
staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly
that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague
government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-·
man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was
working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied
the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the
West, requesting political asylum.
Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to
the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily
seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the
Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at
the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West.
He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge
which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe.
Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain
explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent
by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered
enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich
and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad.
What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia?
The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining
how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr.
Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western
World and praising everything he found after his return to
�84
SLOVAK.IA
Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the
new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the
goods in their possession and the common people are
starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by
Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE.
When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of
Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we
feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of
State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances
and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in
the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there
have been, since the start, members who were sent West by
the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the
Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations
in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to
office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly
helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley.
The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the
invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains.
To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in
London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime
as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies.
But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty
of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe
and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the
payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and
they still do that and help to betray America. There is no
excuse for them, or is there?
Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1
�SLOVAKIA
86
inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything
about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were
brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention
to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal
negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio
Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?"
There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all
plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western
Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r
a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which
aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements.
Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time.
Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible.
but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~
cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are
working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of
Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL
known Communist in the old country. Why should we be
shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden•
tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are
neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington
and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks
out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised
will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts.
Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the
"Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his
enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman.
'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity
�86
SLOVAKIA
that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and
charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of
their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was
given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the
Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in
LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always
tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably
figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per.,
haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the
Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped
him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because
of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore
planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For
this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading
positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need
the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and
Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So
Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and
charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a
fOTgery .
Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in
the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of
articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free
Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled
and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the
Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a
for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were
not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the
who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the
"Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names
first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's
charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as
ridiculous and highly impossible.
In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada,
another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel
M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks"
�f?LOV,AKIA
87
in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military
attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to
the policy of the present members of the Council then in
Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him,
Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared
it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel
Miksche.
It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment,
with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does
not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods
among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels
at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There
he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides
Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own
failures and a!bandoned projects.
SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives.
Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times
it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times
as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue.
Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is
hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some
other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors
in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the
"Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist
parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-·
ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading
Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech
Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the
persons from the Council do not distinguish between a
1
�88
SLOVAKIA
Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first
of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also
pay for their protection and defense
It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a
leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free
Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry,
his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii
of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm
to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's
group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un.,
dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others
from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the
Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that
a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to
him only through representin g himself as from me.
When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak"
group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous
group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un.
derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by
Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where
there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n
and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio
Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko,
Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions.
If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would
try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army
with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who
ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at
home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present
group. What is broadcast and written now - for American
money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them.
�SLOVAKIA
89
These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy.
chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron
Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia
is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather
amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the
Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because
the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~
lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue
and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides
in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in
Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No
wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect
there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of
America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations
are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~
stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased
to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta
affairs they only curse them.
Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in
Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who
are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko,
much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and
Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their
comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague.
The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In.
vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer
to whom the security of the United States is of paramount
internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope,
therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~
ter also and that the organizations in question will be
cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group.
iLausman was so aggressive that during the second
World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he
succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip
to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in
Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry
by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As-
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SLOVAKIA
sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in
his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept.,
able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked
the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that
Russian territory extends for the first time in history west
of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn.
In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal.
Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol.,
lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over
the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance
with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully
with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months
they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the
whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through
the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another
Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the
proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of
S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however,
refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country.
Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia
at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions,
sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that
the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only
Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to
be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia.
After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika.
The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were
never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was
Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own
State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several
months later, as the premier by Benes.
Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted
�SLOVAKIA
91
to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission
to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he
could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io
conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were
going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was
doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~
ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts.
At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak
non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable
to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the
Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty,
because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal.
The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that
it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December,
1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith
Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of
thie SloViak National Council.
When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the
idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia
to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the
Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government
would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in
thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in
emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying
dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his
life.
Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to
Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them.
When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced
it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an
agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1
�92
SLOVAKIA
SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on
June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with
this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it
benefited him.
On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the
Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This
decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized"
on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~
lection of Laws and Regulations.
T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words:
". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly
of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . "
Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado
Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good
prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement !
Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not
stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2,
1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes
in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern
section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices
the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity.
WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great
extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the
Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not
ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them
without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators
act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of
MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one.
'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later
Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator"
of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very
•b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi-
�SLOVAKIA
93
zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl
view of Prague.
All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation,
and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's
caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the
boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik
Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols.
I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they
hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in
their books.
Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to
rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free
Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or
(Josef Konbel, the
with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade,
now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and
a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes).
Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to
note what has been written albout him here in the United
States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a
more serious character:
"Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16,
1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army.
" He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the
Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as
Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United
States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities."
I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what
pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-·
ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh
people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by
�94
SLOVAK.IA
the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole
expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and
ineffective.
About the others aJbove, I must confess the same
opinion as to character.
The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally
separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h
Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist
co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went
in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am
leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd
not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists
and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the
Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party.
But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity.
It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete
conformance with the Communists had negated the party
as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself
in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g
even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek
and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership
cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and
others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed
by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history.
During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the
agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos•
sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats,
Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of
February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt
against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was
�SLOVAKIA
95
clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the
Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help
the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats
is not very well known and evaluated in the United States;
if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as
anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S.
am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of
State Acheson could not have secured for them influential
positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll.
It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and
were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help
his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later
the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech
Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social
Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German
Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled,
and even JnUrdered.
They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks
in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy
the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of
1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner,
working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the
public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The
Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he
agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed
their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer
needed by the Communists.
Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and
their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot
understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under
Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction.
On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh
14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech
�96
SLOVAKIA
Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage
to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in
free England, the present representative of the "Council of
Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which
he said:
"WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE
WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S
TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM
THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES."
1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19,
1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert
Ri,pka.
In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist
victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25,
1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current
members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their
present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of
course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now
their only means of survival.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to
provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even
less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived
the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single
'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of
the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength
in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired
only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the
shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the
dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1955
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SLOVAK.IA
72
The Czecho-Slovak Exile
CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND RED ESPIONAGE
Dr. Mi chael Zibrin
July of l91J5 found the "Council of Free Ozechoslovaki:a" just as July of J.ast year left it; without eleded of~
fi.cials, without elected representatives. This is because
the CoUIIld, during the 20-month period of its re-organi-.
zation, could not reach !any agreement and is operating on
a rotation system, i.e., eacth month ,a reipresentati:ve of a
diifferent political iparty se:rves as its executive head. This
proves what we had said b,e fore: the Council is a coillglomerate of people of quite different bmnds and that Lettrich' s exdamation two years ago - "Gentlemen, I think
only dollars keep us here together" - was and is still true.
The present chaos in the Council is caused partly by
the fact that political partie.s are coming to prevail more
than personalities, and the Councril -resembJ.es more and
more an enlarged National Front. The purpose of .t his article
is to revie;w the past policies and deeds of that part.yin the
CoU!Ilcil which did most to communize the o~ooho-1Slov•8Jk
Republic and prepare an easy Communist take-over in
1948. ,Such a review is necessitated by the shocking pulblic
deception that hias gained influentiral positions for the exile
members of th±s ,p arty. Reformed Communists and coUaiboratom can perform valuable functions, but in men who
deny their Olbvfous politic,al actions there can be no question of reform.
The most flagrant a,id to Communism was given by the
Czecho-iSlovak Social ·D emocratic party. In exile today, the
leaders of this panty are men who, by their open colfa,boration wit:h Stalin, p~ayed the most important ,part in the
bolsheviz;ation o,f Czecho-Slova>k,i1a. These men have always
Etood very close to the Communists, even during small
political skirmishes like those occasion.any now among Zenkl,
Ripka, and Peroutka. Particularly after the Stalin-Benes
pact of 1943, they were the most efficient signers and executors of Benes':s bloody decrees, not reaHzing that, once
they had finished their jdbs for the Communists, the fate
Sl.JOVAKIA
73
they had prepared for others wo'Ulld become their own.
History shows that aliready in 1928 the Soc,i al Demo.
cr:ats formulated their program thus: "Today as also in
the past we are decided to protect the Soviet Union against
any inimical action of the capitalistic governments and
against any counter-revolutionary attack." Nine years
earlier this belief had been realized in action. When Polish
General Pilsudski was fighting a bloody (battle with the
Communist ar-my near Wairsaw in 1920, the socialistic ma-·
jority in Prague forbade the transportation of military
material t.lirnugh ,Ozocho-1Slo,v0Jkia, despite the fact that
lhis material was sent by France and a French military
mi,s sion was at that time already in Prague. A yea,r earlier,
when General Stefanik telegraiphed a wairning to Prague
against Bolshevism as the greatest plague o!I' mankind a:nd
asked for uruty in tihe f.ight to destroy it, it was this same
Social Democratic Party whiclh - wit:h Masarylk's consent
- stopped Stefamk's program. Masaryk's consent is less
surprising when one remembers that he was actually among
the first to hail the Octo!ber Bolshevik Revolution in 1917,
which now in Prague !is considered fundamental to the ere.
ation of Ozecho-,Slovaki:a. Thus one couid go on ,w ithout
end and show that the Social Democratic party was an effective avant garde of Communism in Central Europe, not
only in Czecho-!Slovakia.
Certainly one of the most important persons in the
Czecho-!Slovak .Social Democratic party was V ojta Benes,
the oldest brother of the !:ate president. Gottwald officially,
on the Cabinet's decision (and Moscow's aippro,vail) , sent
him into West Germany in 1949, where he keipt in. regular
contact with Prague and acted more oir less ,a,s Gottwald's
unofficial ambassador. He did not conce·a l this fact, and
t he members of the "Council of Free Czechoslova!ld:a" knew
it. Therefore, many times, VojJa Benes took a different
position from the official Council and o;piposed some steps
undertaken by non.JSocialists in the Council.
Benes's brother passed away, ,but equally important
representatives remain, particularly: Vacl:av Majer, B. Vilem, the former Sec:retary-General of the Party, and the
ill-ifamed Bohumiil Lausman. Ailso, the Social Democratic
1
74
SLOVAKIA
party has its two generalls, Sergei Ingr, and Hasal Niz!borJ
sky, and, jn Canada, the former minister Frantisek Nemec, who together with Hasal affected the cession of Ruthenia to .Stalin. To this party belongs also a Communist
famous in Europe, Milos Vanek, and some questionaJble individuals in Radio F,ree Europe in MUTI!ich. These are all
Czechs.
Milos Vanek, who is reported to hruve 1b een a charter
mem1ber of the "Czeohoslovak Communist Party," remained
an ardent adherent of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship even
after he 1had left that .p arty to ~me a left.;win.g Social
Democrat. I personaHy know Mr. Vanek and I must confirm that Vanek was one of the founders of the Communist Party in Europe. This is described in the book of Lu.
cien Laurat ",Du Komiintern au Kominfo·r m" (!Paris, France
Des 1'sles, 1'951), in which on page 10 we read: "The manifest issued by the second Congress of the Kominform, July,
1920, carries a great number of sigrra:tures - Lenin, Zinoviev, Boukarine, Trotski, for iRussia; Vane'k, Hlula, Zapotocky (the president of Ozecho-;Slovakia today), etc."
T,his signer and founder of the Communist Party is
today the Chief of the Economics Deparbment of Radio
Free Europe and a member of the "Colllilcil of Free Ozechoslovalcia" in New York, ·b oth financed by the Free Europe Committee!
On the Slovak side there are: Dr. Ziak, well-known
Czecho-'SlovaJk; Dr. Joseph Mrazek, the only •Slov;ak s~gner
of the oath of fidelity to Communism in 1948, and posing
as a Slovak, a certain Belak, whose real name is Berger.
A,bout these people, Kurt Glaser, American writer wrote :
"The principa.J Czechs and Slovaks associated with the Free
Europe Committee and those employed by Radio Free Europe are not
- as is commonly supposed - fi•g hters ag,a inst Communism. Quite
on the contrary, they fellow-travele<l. with t•he Communists rfrom at
least 1939 to 1948, helpe<l. t'hem to power, and even today follow a
Communist-sponsored propaganda line.
"These indivjduals belong to an or.ganlzation which has systematically be-trayed members of the democratic underground in CzechoSlovalda by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwald's secret police.
"A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either
Communist a.gents or have criminal records.
'1Radio Free Europe's Czecho-Slovak program is helping Stalin
SLOVAKIA
75
by s,a,botaging internation-a l understand ing and promoting rivalry and
hatred between European peoples.
'
"Mr. Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectdcal materialis m, Dr. Zak and Dr. (Berger) Belak. Dr. Zak is the editor of •a n
intellectual magazine called 'Tribuna' w-hich is forbidden in France
and a no-llher called 'Reality' (Sk,utecnost) which is fofibidden in
Switzerland. Unfortunately, I have not been able to peruse these
journals as I do not read c zech, but I am told that their basic thesis is the need for the party m asses to submit to leadership by the
elite cadre. Belak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in
Slovalda under the n ame of Berger. He puts out a Germ an-language
sheet called 'Militant Democracy' which few Germans read because
it takes S<talin's anti-Ger,man line."
I. who know this gentleman (Belak-Berger) persona1'ly, must confirm that Mr. Glaser's opinion is 100 percent right!
The former membe.r of the Social Democratic party
in 1Slov akia, Pavel Viboch, need not be dealt with as a party
memlber , and the other three Slovaks mentioned are al,so
not significant. Never receiving any mandate from the
Slovruk nation, they represent colonialism in Central Europe
at a time when oolonialism is. dying even in Africa. The
best proof is the elections in 1946, when the Social Demo~
crats in Slovakia could not elect even one representaitive
without Ozech help. It was an old Prague trick to transfeT
unneeded votes from one district to another. As a rule, the
Social Democratic ipanty has been a Czech origani·z ation only.
To return to the history of this _p arty, however, one
can say that its activities during the second World War
are very revooling. The majority of the party ,p oliticians
fled wiith Benes, or shoritly after, and served in his "c!libi.
net.,in-exile." An e~ception was Ambassador Fierlinger,
who remained in Moscow serving the Communists instead
of Benes, according to Ripka and Benes himself. When it
came to .the wol"st, Benes's "govennment-in-exile" reoolled
him to London. Having the support of Moscow, however,
Fierlinger refused to return, and Benes, in order .to keep
his presidency, ha:d :to. ,g o to Moscow and take ordern from
his personal enemy. These statements are proved by the
cablegrams exchanged by the "government-in--exile" and
Fierlinger, which were published in Fierlinger's hodk. In
addition to Moscow's rs upport, Fierlinger also had help
within the "government-in-exile." This was the left wing of
1
76
SLOVAKIA
the Social Democrats, wirth Lausman and Bechyne as leaders in London. This group, moreover, closely cooperated
with other admirers of the Soviet Union in the Czech National Sodalist party, Rip_ka, Firt, and others. This party
supporte'd several pro-Communistic organizations, where
Rip'ka rused to be president and Josef Ko!'bel and Tig.rid
Schonfeld were in leading ,positions, .pleadin,g for help for
Stalin. In 1942 and 1943, Vlase:k and Majer organized the
Commu:niisrt demonstrations that heiLpe<l to· force the second
front against Churchill's will.
We recall that Benes traveled to Moscow in 1943
against the wishes of Eden, Churchill, and other statesmen. There he approved the seill-out o<f Ruthenia and cleared
the roa:d to Ozecho-SloV'akia for the Soviet Union. This he
did without any regard for the will of the peoples of SlovaJki!a, Bohemia, Moravia and Ruthenia. Nay, even without
the full consent of the "Provisional Czechosloviruk Government" in London. The peoples of Slovakia, Bohemia, Moravia, and ,Ruthenia certainly had nothing to do with it.
1
I recaH the speeches of Octdber and November, 1943,
in the chambers of the "Czechoslovak State Council" in
London. They were made not only by the admirers of the
Kremlin, but also by the so-called civil politicians who were
blinded by Moscow. Among them were Lausman and Majer, Dr. Uhlir and Paul Macha.eek; all strongly approved
the journey to Moscow and insisrted on going along with
Communist Valo's proposition even if it meant the loss of
asylum in England and the good wiU of the allies. Benes
simply had to go to Moscow, they said, because the "higher
interests of our nations" demanded it. When Benes returned from his trip to Moscow, he brought the request
to Mikolajczyk and the Poles that they renounce a la!lge
part of Poland to the Soviets.
If any one should quesrtion ,t he truth of my statements,
I am ready and willing at all times to produce the repo~ts
of the "Czechoslovak Srtate Council,." the speeches Lausman and Uhlir, and even Benes's speech in its entirety
after he returned fa-om Moscow. They tel11 us clearly why
the Communist "putsch" of Februa:ry 1948 took place so
SLOVAKIA
77
smoothly. Repetition o.f these facts is important for understandmg the effective collaboration of the Social Democrats with the Communists after the ,second war.
Showing their allegiance to the principle from 1928,
"Never against the Soviet Union," tihe Social Demoorats
without an exception pressed for the Benes-Stalin agree~
ment in 1943. Therefore, in the first post-war government,
formed in Kosice in 1945, and the most communistic of all
governments returning ho.me, they dominated. There was
no Slovak representative - evidence that Social Democracy had praictically no influence in Slovakia.
Besides Prime Minister Zdenek Fierlinger, there was
Frantisek Nemec and the liaison officer between the Red
Armv and Benes, General Niziborsky (known now as General
Hasal), who is at present, I believe, a consultant in the
Pentagon Other ministers in that government were the infamous spy, Bohumil Lausman, and a present leader in the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," Vaclav Majer. We know,
that all except Fierlinger came unharimed into exile after
February, 1948. Lausman, of course, after having accomplished his espionage in Radio Free Europe, returned to
Pra:gue. Clearly Lausman has the lowest character among
the contemporary •politicians, but he was a most trusted
comrade of ,t he present so-called "anti-Communist" politicians in the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia."
They all were united in their pro-Communist activities,
and their claim now to belong to this or that wing is no.t at
all convincing. In 1946 the •s ame Vaclav Majer praised the
top Communist in Czecho-Slovakia lavishly: "Gottwald's
name will be forever connected not only with our fight for
national liberation, but also with the struggle for social
liberation as well as for new forms of life and work. . . .
Gottwald, not only by his determination, but also by his
understanding for the opinions of others, showed his great
qualities as politician and man." Sudh were then the expressions of Vaola.JV Majer, an "anti-Communist" fighter
of today. But Ma:jer is not alone in this. After working together for the Communists at home, the Social Democrats
came to the United States and suddenly discovered that
they, too, have fought Communism. Their present fabrica-
78
SLOVAKIA
tions rubout their post-war aotivity, which the following
facts disprove, are a deep offense to the witnesses of their
activities back home.
The first document signed by the ministers and the
members of the Executive Committee of the Social Demo~
cratic Party iby which a smooth Communi!zation of thei,r
homeland was assured, was their agreement of June 25,
1945, at once after returning to Praigue, to form the "National Front of the Working People." This agreement
shows the serviI.fty of the wholle Social Democralti1c Party,
not only of the leaders, because it was discussed and una~
nimously approved by aJll the ;party before being signed by
the Executive Commiittee. This means tha,t all politicians
of the $ociaJ Democratic Party, now posing as anti-Communists in exile, agreed to the bolshevi zation of CzechoSlovakta. Zenkl aind his National Socialists C'an at least attempt to excuse themsel,v es that they did not want to accept this ag,r eement lbut were forced to by the Social Democrats.
But it is not a question of who forced wlhom; they all
signed and pulblished this agreement and, what is woTse,
they put it into effect. The most important parts of this
agreement are the following:
1. While maintaining a politica:l and organizational
independence, the three parties wil.l closely cooperate and
follow a common policy in all matters of .p u!blio life.
2 . . The political iba;si,s o.f the National Front orf Working People is the government program, unanimously a:g-re.ed
upon in conference in MoS<:ow and unanimously accepted
by the government in Kosice on April 5, 1945. Through
this agreemenit, also a Central Coordinating Committee
is being created with an equal numlber of representatives
from all participating iparties, and also a United Alliance
of Trade Organizations, based on voluntary membership,
wJll be formed. F'urther wili be formed a Non-.Political
Alliance of Czech Farmers and a United Organization of
Czech Youth; both of these organizations shaH be supported ,by all parties.
This publicly dedared aigreement was signed for the
Social Democrats by Zdenek Fierlinger; for the Commun1
SLOVAKIA
79
ists by Klement Gottwald, and for the National Socialist
Party by Peter Zenkl.
It is both very int.eresting and quit,e significant that
not a single Slovak att.ended that meeting and that among
those who· called it were Dr. Peter Zenkl, Dr. Hubert Ripka, and other leaders of Dr. Benes's old Czech National
Socilalist Party - the very same people who today are
telling the American public and the world that they always hated the Reds and that the Reds "ousted" them from
Government.
But the truth is something else a;gatin. The fact is that
both Zenlcl and Ripika welcomed the Communists, sought
their favor, and wanted to win politicrul prestige with the
help of the Reds at the exipense of the other political parties. Of course, today we know that they failed. The same
thing happened to them ,that had happened and 1s still
happening to an tho.se who try to, collruborate with the Communists: The Communists exploit them for what they are
worth and then swallo;w them up or get rid of them.
The "National Front of the' Working People" created
a "Central Coordinating Committee," in which e'very affiliated party had an equal number of representatives. This
committee had the task of coordinating the work of the
socialist parties. The sooiwlfst bloc prepared the ground for
the various activities which led to the suppression of political and religious fireedom - the first st~s taken toward
a socialist dictatorship.
The Czech Socialists and Communists agreed that the
Agrarian Party would be suppressed, the Catholic IDaigle
organization outiawed, and that Catholic youth, as such,
would not be allowed to orgamize. Together t@y wo,r ked
out a plan whereby the non-Communist peasant votes would
be done away with and, at the same time, how these votes,
together with the Communist-contro lled ..peasant unions,
, would he brought into the Communist P,a,rty. They also
created and later legalized the Communist trade organizations, then the non-political Fedeiration of Farmers and the
United Youth Or,g,anization - all of which were SU!ppo.s ed
to be fornned by the joint participation of all parties, but
80
SLOVAKlA
actually served onlly to communize Ozecho-iSlovakia from
the instant they began to function.
Therefore, it is not true that Zenlkl, Rtpka, Vilem,
Majer, and other Czech Sooial DemocraJts opposed Com~
munist hegemony from the beginning, but the truth is
that from the moment they accepted the so--called "Kosice
Agreement ," they were aJlways subordinat ed to and in the
train of .t he Communis t Party and willingly continued tha,t
way not only on Russian soil, or in Russian-·occuipied Kosice, but a1so in "Jiberated" Pr'cllgue. The "Joint Declaration "
to the nation on June 28, 194'5, is indisputalble proof of the
fact that they wanted to get into governmen t with the help
of the Oommunist s, even at the roopense of democracy,
Christ'ianit y, and freedom.
This is the sound lesson for all who would col'la!borate
with Oommunist s. All such ,p eople are digging their own
graves, because Communism recogn.i'zes no agreements , concessions, or compromis es, and swallows wp all who collaborate with it.
A Czech Catholic editor, A. J. Jandacek, commented
on major effects of this agreement in this manner:
"The aims of the socialist bloc were many:
"1. First of all not to allow workers to organiz.e in Catholic
trade unions, and so far as they are alread,y organized in them,
through a mass effort .to storm them into the socialist bloc by
maintaining that Oatholic organizations wm anyhow be in the mi·
nority an d that, therefore, it is better to go together.
"2. Not to ,a llow an independent unification of Catholic farmers. The party of farm people wi ll not be allowed to exist at all,
and as far as the Catholics have their Catholic farmers organized, the
Communists will divide them among themselves.
"3. A United Organization of Czech Youth will be formed and,
thus, the Cat·holic you1Jh wJll not have an opportunity to organize on
a Oatholic platform, eitilier politiooJly or religiously. Simply, ,a ll youth
will be forced to go into the state-formed and socialist-led organization. Thus, organizing an "Alliance of Catholi c Youtll" or ,a "Czechoslovak Orel" will be .impossible. A daily and weekJ.y have already
been published for this so-called united youth organization and are
led by the Commundsts.
"In view of these three aims, it is possible to call the establishing and maintaining of t!he socialist bloc an intention-al act against
political and religious freedom and the establishmen t of a socialist
dictatorship."
Although I am not a Catholic and never was a member
SLOVAKIA
81
of any clerical party, I am ready to sign this analysis by
the editor Jandaceik.
Whereais, Ze:rukl and his party, in December, 11947, begain not to abide by the 1946 agreement, the Social Democrats kept it even after the Oommunist "putsch" in Februa:ry, 1948. Professor Macek, for instance, accepted lead~
ing positions in o,rganizations which bolsheviized the University, and as president of the Aotion Committee of the
University he expelled those students who had participated
in demO'Il!Strations against the Communists in February.
Furthermore, for a long time he helped the Constitutional
Oommittee of Ozecho-Slovakia:n P.arliam.ent and its chairman, Dr. Procha:zka, a leading Communist. As a matte~
of fact, the whole section on Economics in the Communist
constitution is his work. Both as an expert and as a member of the :Sociail Demo:cra,tic Party, he supported the
Communist bi1ls; a;ctua:1ly, rhe was the right hrui.d of Dr.
Procha:zka, the most Communist jurist in Czecho-Slovakia
and chairman of the Constitutional Committee. To us it is
not surprising that Macek led in the persecution of democratic students after the Communist putsch, since he had
earlier been well known as a fervent exponent of Marx
at the tUrnversity of Brno, where he was professor of National Eoonomics. The surprise is that he is now a university professor in the United States.
Professor Maicek, during the yearn 1929...1939, was a
member of Parliament for the Social Democratic Party.
Simultaneously, he edited a left-orientated monthly called
"Our Times" which was sponso,r ed by Presidents Masaryk
and Benes. He published numerous books, a base of which
was, repeatedly, the teachings of Marx. In these books
Professor Maicek defended the theories orf Marx very emphatica!lly and wanted to introduce them into our social
and economic life, evein as early as 1930-1938. He wanted
to sociailize everything. His aim was identical to that of the
Communi,s ts. They wanted to put it into practice after 194'5.
Origtlnafly, Professor Macek migrated to Canada and
lived on the fann of a certain Mr. Karel Buzek,. where he
wrote artides for the Ozech newspapers in Canada. In his
articles he rejeoted and condemned the very same ideas he
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SLOVAKIA
was not so long ago an apostle of and a very able and
thorough propagator.
From Canada he came to the United States and at
the present time he is active as a professor at some university m Pennsylvania.
iB. Vilem, as Genera'} Secretary of the Ozech Social
Democratic Party, was more a personal "whip" for Fierliniger than a "whip" for the ,party. While I was a member
of the Agricultural Committee, we succeeded sometimes in
winning over .t he chairman of the committee, who was a
Social Democrat, against the Communist proposa!ls. Vilem,
however, before the voting day, and often at midnight,
cal'led the members of 'his party and dictated: "Fierlinger
lets you know that the party cannot stand for your proposals; you have to vote with the Communist Party." One
of these Social Democrats that was forced by Vi1em to
vote with the Communists is in exile ; several committee
memlbers from the other parties who lost ,w ith me because
of Vil.em's actions are now in the "Council of Free Ozechosloviaikia," but they wil'l never forget those defeats (Sliva,
Torn, and other.s). Wathout this servility to the Communists, Gottwald would never have gained the majority he had.
The saddest chapter of the Social Democrati'C Party,
however, was written by its memiber who was the Minister of
Industry, Bohumil Dausman. He served the at!reernent of
June 25, 1945, so faithfully that he went out to disintegrate
even the exile and worked for three years as a spy, after
being employed by Radio Free Europe with the help of the
Social Democrats and other memlbers of the "Council of
Free Czechoslo;vakia," particularly Ripka and his group.
The case of Lausman's treason was not yet completely
closed when new espionage process was started against further exiponent of Prague government and close collaborator
of Dr. Hubert Riipka. Hardly had a French .court sentenced
Kubala on a charge of espionage for Communist OzechoSlovakia before the Prague radio reacted in this case and the
spea,keir, himself a collaJborator of Mr. Ferdinand Peroutka
and a former employee of Radio Free EuTope, used the most
despiooble language against the West. Slovak newspapers
unanimousily reported - unfOTtunaitely without desirable
SLOVAKIA
83
results on the aictions orf Radio F.ree Europe - that Lausman would be followed by the others. The newspapers asked
for effect1ve preventive measures in Radio Free Europe
rugainst subversive elements but nothing was done. Many
very dubious elements are sitting in Radio F,r ee Europe and
are paid by the Amerilcan citizens.
In the warning concerning espionage, we have not only
staJted several times that there are Marxists ood Oommunists in "Czechoslovak" organizations, but we also said openly
that they were, and silll are espionage agents of the Prague
government. The Prague broadcasts have confirmed our allegation. On the same ibroadlca;st where, some time a;go, Laus-·
man broadcast in Prague, now spoke Bruno Folta, who was
working as an employee of Radio Free Europe under the protection of Dr. M. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko. He minutely copied
the style of Lausrnan, H~ confessed that originally he betrayed the Communist government in Prague and filed to the
West, requesting political asylum.
Here in the West, in Radio Free Europe Folta came to
the conclusion that the western world was rotten and readily
seized the chance to return home and accept what was offered to him in the inteliligence service conducted by the
Czech General Moravec. He repented like Lausman and, hruving the desire to make some reparations, he put himself at
the disposal of the "people's Democracy" against the West.
He went on to threaten that he would use all the knowledge
which he ooquired as an employee of Radio Free Europe.
Our reports from Munich and behind the Iron Ourtain
explain the Folta case as foHo:ws: Like Lausman, he was sent
by the Prague government for espionage purposes and to esta:blish the contacts. When he succeeded and gathered
enough material and collaborators, especially in Munich
and Paris, he simply ,r eturned to Prague as a highly appreciruted a;gent, in order to accUJSe the anti-Communist citizens at home. of whose attitude he learned while abroad.
What is Folita telling the peoples of Czecho~Slova;kia?
The Vienna newspapers published long articles explaining
how Foll.ta, this confident servant of Mr. Peroutka and Dr.
Mudry, was blaming Radio Free Europe and the Western
World and praising everything he found after his return to
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SLOVAK.IA
Brague: •~Prague has everything good and new, all the
new technical inventions, and everything in plenty. Meantime, in the Weslt, o:nlly the capitalist dwpes have all the
goods in their possession and the common people are
starving." Thrut is the picture cxf the West presented by
Folt'a, who coJ:lected American doJlars from RJFE.
When will Washington be conV'inced? The case of
Folta is certainly a cha,pter of shameful history, but we
feair that even this fact will not be strong enough to convince the F1ree Europe Committee or the Department of
State in W8!Shi:nigton. We repeat that such exile orga.n±zations, which are SUipported at the ex;pense of genuine demo-cratic and anti-Communist organizations, wre nuisances
and wreckers of all the actiOIIlS of the Western. WorJd in
the cold war. In the "Ozechoslovak" orgarazations there
have been, since the start, members who were sent West by
the Prague go,v ernment only for tlhe purpose of serving the
Communists. On the roster of "Czechoslovak" organizations
in exile you wilil find many persons who were elected to
office on the Oommunist baHot, ,p oliticians who mostly
helped the Communists not only to gain control of CzechoSlova!kia, but also the whole Danube valley.
The same persons, who with Benes in 1939, in London, were in touch with SDalin's ambrussa.dor, agreed on the
invasion of U.iS.IS.IR. south of the Carpathian Mountains.
To the Americans in Washington and the Einglishmen in
London, they disiplayed an rug·r eement concerning the integrity of the Czecho-Slavaik State while knowing the deficiencies of this treaty. They .co!~JIBitted the same crime
as did Lausman and Bruno, Folta. These people simply betrayed the Allies.
But beyond that are their protectors, the "Council of
Free Czechoslovakia" and its leading representatives Zenkl, Lettrich, IPerou'bka, Mudry and others - iess guilty
of betrayal? They 1let Lausma.n into R1adio :ffiree Europe
and allowed him to• broadcast for American money. On the
payroll they kept Folta, R1.12icka, and others as well; and
they still do that and help to betray America. There is no
excuse for them, or is there?
Parrticipants in a crime are as punishable as the crim1
SLOVAKIA
86
inal. J>a:rtici:pan.ts in this betriayal can not excuse themselves on the grounds that they did not know anything
about suoh action. Several times suspicious caJSes were
brought to their notice but they did not pay any ,a ttention
to these warnings. What should we say to this criminal
negligence on the .part of responsible pemonaHties :in Radio
Free Europe Oir in the "Council of ~ree OzechoslovaJda ?"
There they are unanimous: Zenkl, Cerny, Osuis'ky -- all
plead for the innocence of Peroutka. The continuous scandaJls should waike up the security officials of the Western
Powers. Until now only the Germans in Munich asked fo-r
a c1erun-1.l'p of Marxists and other elements hostile to democracy in the whole territory of the German Federal Republfo. They aimed at "Czechoslovak" organizations which
aire infiltrated with highly suspicious elements.
Let us apply our knowledge whi'1e there is still time.
Many think that only in Germany are such cases possible.
but that is not true. The same oases, even more paradoxi~
cal, we find in Washington where the Czech officers are
working. They distinguished themselves in the sell~,ut of
Carpathian Ruthenia to the Soviets, or kept in the service of American Intelligence the sister-in-ilaw of a welL
known Communist in the old country. Why should we be
shocked that in rPairis the Communists received confiden•
tial materia'l? Even in Washington security mea5UJres are
neglected. We know the persons at wol'k in W81Shington
and we will not be surpri,s ed if the Lausman affair breaks
out a,gain despite our warning. Those who wHl be suT1prised
will be Americans. Let us take lessons from Parts.
Since Lausman's return to Prague, the whole CzechoSlovak exile, in its confusion, has been producing deceptions and charges of for.gery. When Mr. Osusky of the
"Council of F'lree Ozechoslovakia" does not succeed in his
enterprises, .o r the situation changes after his proclamations hawe been pulblished, he simply proclaims them unauthentic or falsified, o:r he simply a&:!rilbes them to Lausman.
'Sometimes the matter is trivial, as it was in the proclamation concerning the is udeten G€Tmans which was allegedly signed by Osusky. There he stressed the necessity
86
SLOVAKIA
that the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans are reconciled and
charged that Ripka and Zenk! were unsuitalble because of
their collaJboration with the Communists. The subj~ct was
given great publicity by Josten (a former official of the
Foreign Ministry and now editor of "Czechoslovak" in
LondO'Il) and his Marxist cell in London, w:hiich always
tries to please Prague. In this matter, Osusky probably
figured that a dea!l with the ,Sudeten GeI'IDans could per.,
haps be of he1p to him if he should have trouble in the
Council with Ripka and Zenk!. But here chance helped
him. R:iipka had difficulties in the United States because
of his colla;boration with the Communists and therefore
planned to return to his socialist friends in Europe. For
this reason he, as weU as Zenkl, did not fight for leading
positions .i n the Counchl - a fact that allowed the November reconciliation of the Council. Osusky does not need
the Sudeten Germany any longer, whereas for Zenk! and
Ripka the Sudeten German question will be a ,problem. So
Osusky denied his Sudeten German proclamation and
charged tha;t its publfoation in the "Czechoslovak" was a
fOTgery .
Simila.rly, "Nase Cesta," a Marxist paper printed in
the Czech language ,in Vienna, published a who[e issue of
articles written by several memibers of the "Council of Free
Czechoslovak ia.'' Arfter Osusik y and Zen kl were reconciled
and the articles did not fit into the changed opinion of the
Council, the editor procilaimed the whole earlier issue a
for,g ery. Thus, suddenly we are told that the ,articles were
not writt® by the members oif the Council, and that the
who'le issue was forged with the purpose of s,plitting the
"Czechoslova k" exile. Lt is interesting to see whose names
first a;ppea.r as authors o,f the disputed rurticles: Dr. Taiborsky, Benes's secretary; Jan Zak, Slovak socialist and confidant of MaTxists and "Ozechosloivaks" ; Jozef Dieska, member of the Council, etc. I can only dismiss the editor's
charge that the whole issue originated with Lau:sman as
ridiculous and highly impossible.
In the newspruper "Novy Domov," published in Canada,
another member of the Council, Fras'tacky, attacked Colonel
M~ksohe, who does not go along with the "Ozeichoslova!ks"
f?LOV,AKIA
87
in the Council. (Oolon~l Miksche, a Czecho-Slovak military
attache in Pa.r-is, resigned in December, 1947, in protest to
the policy of the present members of the Council then in
Praigue.) When Colonel Miiksche threatened to sue him,
Frastaoky quiokly denied writing the article and declared
it a forgery. Certainiy this comedy cannot be cailled anything but ridiculous; fortunately, it did not harm Colonel
Miksche.
It is regrettruble, however, that the exile "Czechoslovak" press sees in these and other incidents the intervention of Genera:! Molotka of P,r ague, whose assignment,
with Lausman, is to influence and distunb the exik It does
not at all seem to me that these .incidents, are of Lausman's making, for he would think of different methods
among the members of the Ooll!Ilcil. In the Council he feels
at home, after spending three years in its midst and working with Council members in Radio Free Europe. There
he does not need any mediators and can at any time directly interfere. Using Lausman's name, however, provides
Osusky and others wJth a handy scapegoat for the.i~ own
failures and a!bandoned projects.
SimHarly, the "CzechosloV'ak" exile press is not unanimous and constant in its aocount of the Council's November compromise and in its list of representatives.
Sometimes it leaves out Dr. Cerny',s name, and other times
it puts it in, depending on whom it serves . .Professor Hlavaty is referred to as a neutraJl sometimes, and at other times
as ·a former socialist representative in the temporary National Assembly in Prrugue.
Moreover, the "Czechoslovak" exile even today is
hel:ping and promoting the accessories of spies as did some
other memlbers of the Courrcil while they were ambassadors
in the United States and elsewhere. This is the way the
"Czechoslovak" organizations operate while the socialist
parties in the West do not realize their dange,r . So, for ex-·
ample Zdenka Schonova, in :Eingland one of the leading
Czech Social Democrats, is supported today by the "Czech
Trust Fund," even though her collaboration with the convicted spy, Peter Arton, was proved. It is evident that the
persons from the Council do not distinguish between a
1
88
SLOVAKIA
Czech patriot and a Czech spy. For them everyone is first
of aH Czech, from Benes down to Lausman, and in this belief they .not only help the spies and pay them, but also
pay for their protection and defense
It is also well known that Colonel Koenig, who is a
leader orf the reporting division of the "Council of Free
Ozechos!ovaktla" and also working for the West, still employs the same Hungarian Communis t as his secret,a ry,
his sister-in-ilaw, Klara Fedak. Fedfuk is in New York without letting the U. S. authorities know that she is a Oommunist. Her former "1b oy friend" is now chief of the espionage office in Bratislava; yet the persons from the "Co,u ncii
of Free Ozechoslov aikia" do not find it difficult to affirm
to the West the ,reliaJbiliity of these Communist s. Koonig's
group is also responsible for the murder of a Slovak un.,
dergrmLnd leader and patriot, Pavol Harusiak, and others
from Bratislava, whose bordeT-cro ssing they betrayed to the
Communis t police. Ifurusiak was my friend, an'd I kn.ow that
a member of Koenig's group, iDr. Patek, gained access to
him only through representin g himself as from me.
When the "Czechosio. vak" exile has such help and affiliations, how lO'Ilg must O'Ile state that this "Czechoslo vak"
group is not reliable? It is seen to be a very dangerous
group when we realize that it hrus, accomplice s in the un.
derground who were given money and introd1..1JCtions by
Zenkl and Ripka, as the spy Bohumil Cerny and his accompJices were. This situation is also true orf the "C'zechoslova!k" section of R:adio Flree Europe in Munich, where
there is always someone who helps such men as La.usma,,n
and Folta, or other ex-Commu nists and .future re-immigrants to Red Prague. Bures, who brought Folta to Radio
Free Europe, was dismissed, but his friends - Kvetko,
Mudry, and Peroutka - are still in leading positions.
If Radio Free Europe and the Voice of Ame11ica would
try to lbrea:k the reputation. oif this "Czechoslo vak"' army
with truth and with real anti-Comm unist speakers who
ha,ve a good reputation and an anti...Communist record at
home, it could be done. Not, however, with the present
group. What is broadcast and written now - for American
money - helps the Oommunis ts more than it harms them.
SLOVAKIA
89
These org,a nizations which are supposed to wage psy.
chological warfaire against Communism behind the !iron
Curtain do just the opposite - as far as Czecho-Slovakia
is concerned. Too often they he:lp spies and broadcast material which does not harm the Communists, but rather
amuses them. Sending pigeons and balloons across the
Iron Curtain maikes people there laugh or curse, because
the police always get some of those who pick up the leaf~
lets. When aJlmost every month someone returns to Pra•g ue
and te1'ls of the low moral tone, the scandals, and suicides
in the "Czechoslovak" section of Radio Tuee Europe in
Munich, the Communists give this excellent publicity. No
wonder that Radio· Free Europe does not have any respect
there! IDven when Radio Free Euroipe, or the Voice of
America, gains some SlovaJk renegade, these organizations
are not made 1:.iherelby eiffecti:ve, nor are their names re~
stored at home behind the Iron Curtain. People theTe ceased
to believe them loog ago, and after the Lausman and Folta
affairs they only curse them.
Folta, Ru!zicka, and Bures worked in Radio Free Europe; they were the proteges of those Siova.k employees in
Radio Free Europe - Dr. Mu.dry and Dr. Kvetko - who
are supposed to represent the r eal Slovak anti-Communist cause. And yet nothing happened to Mu.dry or Kvetko,
much less to Peroutka, because they brought Bures and
Ruzicka and Folta to RF'E, nor because they paid their
comrade Lausmrun, who is also back in Prague.
The new chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on In.
vesitigations, Senator McCleUan, who is a capable lawyer
to whom the security of the United States is of paramount
internst is, we hear, curious about many things. We hope,
therefore, thlat this suibcommittee will succeed in this mat~
ter also and that the organizations in question will be
cleansed of the ,present "Czecho,slovaJk" group.
iLausman was so aggressive that during the second
World War, after his return from Moscow to London, he
succeeded in the State Council in speeding up Benes's trip
to Moscow. Further, as he admits in his book, published in
Vienna, he forced Benes to na,tionalize aH private industry
by presidential decree before the Pro,v isional National As-
90
SLOVAKIA
sembly convened in October, 194'5. He also :points out in
his book that, whereas he admits his actions, the associates who agireed with hiim on aU the issues of col1aboration now are renouncing him only in order to be accept.,
able to Washington. In this way, Lausman has unmasked
the Sodal Democrats who in exile pre.tend to fight Communism, but actually are responsi!ble for the :f act that
Russian territory extends for the first time in history west
of the Carpathians into the Danube basJn.
In this bolshevik expansion it was two Social Democrats who represented Benes and the whoJ.e state leadership: Flrantisek Nemec and Generail Ni:ziborsky - Hasal.
Both went to Moscow from London in 1944 and then fol.,
lowed the Red Army into Ozecho-1Slovaiki,a to take over
the liberated territory :from the Red Army in accordance
with the Benes-lSta:li,n treaty. They did it so successfully
with the he1p of Fierlinger in Moscow that in three months
they gave Stalin the eastern part of Czecho-1Slovaikia, the
whole of Ruthenia. Russia ,o ffered to the Slovaks, through
the Communists Dr. Husak and Novomesky, an independent ,Slovak State, provided that it would be another
Soviet republic. When Husak and Novomesky made the
proposal to the Slov,a ks, to Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of
S'lovakia and the Slow.1Jk Government, the Slovaks, however,
refused the •bolshevi~atio!Il of their country.
Nemec was not given a cordial re:ception ~n Ruthenia
at all. The in'haibitants everywh&e were signing petitions,
sponsored by the Communist Petruscak, which started that
the Ruthenians no longer existed and that there were only
Sub-Carpathi an Ukrainians in Ruthenia who yearned to
be embrruced by their greait mother, Ukrainia.
After many long squabbles, Nemec fina:lly got a message through to Benes in London through General Pika.
The telegrams that Benes sent through F1ierlinger were
never seen by Nemec, ,b ecause Fierlinger already then was
Stalin's envoy and never a paitTiotic cii.ti,z en of his own
State. It is significant, therefore, that despite these experiences thi,s same traitor, Fierling&, was named, several
months later, as the premier by Benes.
Nemec was in a very trying position. When he wanted
SLOVAKIA
91
to be connected with London, he had to ask for permission
to do so from the Chief of the Russi,an ISJtafif so that he
could travel to Moscow, where with the heilp of the vad.io
conneotion of General Biika, who was the Chief of the Mtilitary Mission, Nemec could tell Benes how matters were
going and koop him informed on Fierlinger. The latter was
doing right well. He still is a minister in the Prague Gov~
ernment, but Genera,1 Bika was killed by the Commund.sts.
At that time the Communists had asked the Slovak
non-Communists whether it would not he more profitable
to support tJhe idea of a Slovak Soviet Republic so that the
Slovaks could go,vern their own territory rather than adhere to the "Czecho-slova;k" ideology which denied the existence of the Slovak nation. They added that such a Slovak Soviet Reipulblk could be promoted without diff,iculty,
because the Slovak State still existed. Husak and Novomesky, however, did not get anywhere with their proposal.
The Slova,k non-Commumsrts turned it down, declaring that
it was contrary to the Christmas Agreement of December,
1943, as well as the agreement which Ursiny concluded -w ith
Dr. Benes in Octolber, 1944, when he acted iJ?- the name of
thie SloViak National Council.
When Husak and N01Vomesky failed to promote the
idea of a Slovruk Soviet Repwblic in London, they imrmediiately contacted and ordered their followers in Slovakia
to present the ,p rop·a sal to President Joseph Tiso and the
Slovruk Govemment. But Tiso· and the Slovak Government
would not hear rubout it. Husak and N ovomesky failed in
thek mission. Several months later, with mMly Slova;ks in
emigration, Clemenitis took up the tune, but he also got nowhere. Today an the leading Reds of Slavrukia are paying
dearly for failing in theiT mission. Clementis paJid with his
life.
Ruthenia was loot. Benes's delegation had to go to
Trebisov ·a nd after that things went rather smoothly. ~erliillger ma:de the propositions and Benes aocepted them.
When he was returning from Moscow in March, 1945, Benes could no longer enter Ruthenia. In fact he renounced
it solemnly on severai occasions. FinaMy, Benes had an
agreement prepared which Fierlinger signed for the Czecho1
92
SLOVAKIA
SlovaJk Government with great solemnity in the Kremlin on
June 29, 1945. No one outside the CommU'Ilists agreed with
this act of Benes. No law, however, could contain or restrain Benes. He acted dictatori.ally at any time that it
benefited him.
On August 24, 1945, without even corum1tling the
Parliament, Benes issued his presidential decree No. 4, concluding the pa:ct between the U .S.S.<R. and the C.S.R. This
decree was the basis for assigning new borders to Slovakia in the East. In Octoher, 1946, everything "legalized"
on the ,b asis orf foregoing decrees was published in the Col~
lection of Laws and Regulations.
T.he text orf the rubove-mentioned agreement is interesting, as well as significant. It begins with the words:
". . . being certain that the provisional National Assembly
of the Orecho-1Slovaik Republic shal[ concur with this ag.reement . . . "
Benes did not wait. He and John Masaryk and VI-ado
Clementis decided matters without Pa.rlia,ment. As good
prophets, they knew tha't Parliament would certainly approve this ag,r eement !
Since Ruthenia was not a very big bite, Benes did not
stop there, but became even more generous. On June 2,
1945, he issued decree No. 8, whereby a numbeir of homes
in the most beautiful seo'tion of BUJbenec - in the modern
section of Prague - were donated to the Russian Communist State to commemorate, he said, the greaJt s•a crifices
the nations of the U .IS.S.R. had made on the altar of liberation of humanity.
WeM, it is a fact that the bolshevik armies to a great
extent did l,iibera-te SlwaJcia from a gre,aJt many things the
Slovaks could use themselves, but it certamly was not
ethical or democratic to sign over whole streets to them
without evsen consulting the nation about it. Only dictators
act like that. And Benes was a dictator by the grace of
MoS<!ow, even id: only a temporary one.
'Besides this generous gesture, several weeks later
Benes showed his aP!)Teoiation to the so-called "iLiberator"
of Prague, M<rurshaJ Konev, by giving him several very
•b eautiful vi1las which were oonfiscated from the 1g ood citi-
SLOVAKIA
93
zens .o f Prague. From these villas Konev has a beautiflrl
view of Prague.
All these decTees we re signed by General Hasal-Nizborsky, who was at that time Minister of Thansportation,
and •by Vaclav iMajer, who was also a member of Benes's
caJbinet. The servility to Stalin and Go'titwald, and the
boundless adulation iby HasaJl..,Niziborsky a,nd Frantiseik
Nemec would be best illustrated if we pu!blished the congratulatory telegrams sent by them to their idols.
I mtend to publish all these facts in a book, but they
hawe already !been quoted by Fierlinger and Lausman in
their books.
Later, many Communists who fell out of favor tried to
rescue their political careers in exile with the help of membership cards in the Social Democratic Party. Those Communists, rulmost without exception, we find in Radio Free
Europe - (Graf, Berger-!Belak, and Ti.grid Schonfeld), or
(Josef Konbel, the
with other American institutions Communist amlbas:sador from Prague to Tito in Belgrade,
now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" and
a uni,versity professor ,i n the United Staltes).
Regarding Tigrid Schonfeld, it is only necessary to
note what has been written albout him here in the United
States. As it is quite a lo't, I only quote some parts of a
more serious character:
"Tigrid is a former m emb er of the C2:ech Communist Party. According to tJhe newspaper Christ und Welt (Stuttgart, October 16,
1952), •his political ac tivjty began in 1932 when he published the illegal Communist paper Hal lo Noviny, w,hich specialhr.ed in subversion of morale in the Czecho slovak Army.
" He was also a contri butor to the Co mmunist magazine Leva Kultura (Left Culture). Dur:ing Wo r ld W ar II he w as a member of the
Communfot-domiuated Czechoslovak staff of t'he British Broadcasting Company, where one of his colleagues and iruti mate friend w.as
Colonel Otto BlheJer, the Czech mi.Jitary attache whom the United
States Government declared persona non grata in 1949 for es pionage activities."
I hope this short excerpt will be enough to show what
pro-Communist elements were picked 1by the U. S. Ad-·
ministration and by the Firee Europe Commitltee for importa,nt pos,itions. These quotations will also prove tha,t SUJCh
people cannot be expected to be trusted 'back a,t home by
94
SLOVAK.IA
the Nation as anti-Communist fighters and thaJt the whole
expensive propa,gand'a program is practicrully useless and
ineffective.
About the others aJbove, I must confess the same
opinion as to character.
The deeds of these men, however, I am intentionally
separating from the actions of the leaders of the Czec'h
Social Democratic Prurty. I am presenting the Communist
co1la:"boration of only those Social Democ~ats who represent the party in exile and who :firom 1945 until they went
in to exiile were also of some importance back home. I am
leaving aside those persons who are now abusing the sympath4es of the Labor Party in London, because they wd
not amount to much back home, being only opporlll!Il.ists
and regularly havmg two memib ership cards, one of the
Communist and the other of the Social Democratic Party.
But these also oannot claim that they opposed the agreement of June 25, 1945; everyone conisenited to it and carried it out in h:is capacity.
It is no wonder that :b y 1946 their policy of complete
conformance with the Communists had negated the party
as opposi,t ion. Simifarly now the party is destroying itself
in an attempt to gain strength by accepting and proteotin.g
even men who were strong Communrists, like Milos Vanek
and Tigrid Schonfeld, or men who possessed membership
cards of several Marxist parities, like M8!cek, Kwbel, and
others. Furthermore, an affidav1t of anti-Communism signed
by the Social Demoorat le·aders is ridiculous, indeed, beca use the party's claim to anti--Communism is itself destroyed by the evidence of its history.
During the February, 1948 c,r isis, the Social Democratic Party tried to look neutral, but the fact ilid everything to help t'he COIIllmunists succeed. Hol!cling to the
agreement of J.une, 1945, the party as a unit gave its support to the Commumsts and so broke the political equilibrium in favor of the Oorrum.1~sts. Even if it is not pos•
sible to .state that without the help of the Sociail. Democrats,
Gottwald would not have succeeded in the "putsch" of
February, 1948, nevertheless it remains a great guilt
against the Sooial Democrats that in the time when it was
SLOVAKIA
95
clear to everyone what tJhe Communists were doing, the
Czech Social Democrats stood by them and did not help
the opposition. This attitude of the Czech Social Democrats
is not very well known and evaluated in the United States;
if it were, not one of them could pose in Washington as
anti-Communists. And their protector, Steinhardt, U. S.
am:bassador to, •Prague in 1948, and former Secretary · of
State Acheson could not have secured for them influential
positions in the United States on the U. S. payroll.
It is worthwhile to note that up to 19-38 the Czech Sociall. Democrats cooperated strongly with the Sudeten German Sociail. Democrats in Ozecho-Slovakia. When the German Social Democrats got into trouble with the N a:llis and
were persecuted, there was no Czech Social Democrait to help
his coHeague in the Sudetenland; they were betrayed. Later
the expulsion. decrees bore the signature of aH the Czech
Social Democrat ministers, who had no social or human feeling. It will forever remain -a shame against the Czech Social
Democrats that they let their coUe,agues from the German
Social Democratic Party be so persecuted, robbed, expelled,
and even JnUrdered.
They ail.so had a similar attitude towards the Slovaks
in their domestic .p olky and always helped Prague centralism and imperia•1ism. Furtherimore, they helped to destroy
the Slov:ak Democratic Party ,b y dema.ndiing in the fall of
1947 the .p osition of one commissioner. Thiis commissioner,
working hand-in-hand with bloody Ferjencik, then commissioner of police but now in the United States, iru::reased the
public terror and forced the courts to serve the police. The
Social Democrats in the government of Slovakia held to ,t he
agreement from June 25, 1945, until they had performed
their jobs in 1945 and then were kioked out when no longer
needed by the Communists.
Looking over the record of the Czech SociaJl Democratic Party, their willing coUaiboration with Communists and
their fierce figiht against every anti-Communist, one cannot
understand their presel!t a;lilbi thait they acted only under
Russian pressure. One incident epitomizes this contradiction.
On the sixtieth anniversary of Karl Marx's death, Mareh
14, 1943, they were living in London. On that day the Czech
96
SLOVAKIA
Socia:l Democrats and the Communislts made a piJ.grimage
to Mairx's torn!b in an English ·c emetery. At this tomlb, in
free England, the present representative of the "Council of
Free Ozechosl'Ovakia" in Washington, then Benes's mmiister and member oif his State Council, Vaclav Miajer, delivered a speech in the name of t!he Social Democraits in which
he said:
"WE BELIEVE WITH MARX THAT SOCIALISM 1,s THE WAY
TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, TOWARD EVERLASTING PEACE, AND THE WELFARE OF NATIONS . TO•DAY HERE
WE ARE, A SMALL GROUP OF SOCIALIST EMIGRANTS FROM
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA . BUT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN MARX'S
TO,MB WILL BE THE SHRINE OF MANKIND LIBERATED FROM
THE BLIND IMPRISONMENT O,F DEAD SOCIAL DOCTRINES."
1M inister -Majer's speech was published on March 19,
1'943, in Benes's officiail newspaper in London, the "Czechoslovak," whikh was financed by Jan Masaryk and Hulbert
Ri,pka.
In conclusion, I say that the basis of the Communist
victory in Czecho-iSiovrukia was 1Jhe agreement of June 25,
1945, which was cauied out with the help of the current
members of the "Council of Free Czechoslov;rukia." Their
present pose as anti-Communists is undemtandable, of
course, because by continumg to deceive Americans is now
their only means of survival.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Himself a Slovak, though from Moravia, he had to
provide a future for the two million Slovaks, who were even
less a!ble to stand alone than the Ozechs. Masaryk revived
the radical idea of 1848 and proposed to create a single
'Czechoslovak' nation by will-power. Masaryk knew little of
the Slovaks; others !knew even less. This was hi's strength
in dealing wi,tll the allied leaders; it could not solve the Slovak prdblem. The few conscious Slovak politicians aspired
only to cll!ltural autonomy within Hungary; living in the
shadow of Magyar arrogance, they could not imagine the
dis8ippearance of the Hungarian frontier." - (A. J. P. Taylor, 'NIE HABSBURG MONARCHY, London, 1948; p . 240).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Czecho-Slovak Exile: Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Michael Zibrin
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp.72-96
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June-September 1955
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SLOVAKIA
63
THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS
Dr. Henrich Bartek
Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles
as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty ,
ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national
aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only
pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which
the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination.
The history of European nations and States during
the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when
small nations make marked social and cultural progress,
their desire for political independen ce - a national state of
their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not
handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e.
To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c
schemes is not historically correct, !because both world
wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great
powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main
arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their
smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily
against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves
eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and
justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are
at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by
brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of
small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able
to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of
human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater
powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so-
�64
SLOVAKIA
cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat
their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same
differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence,
one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t
statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty
nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and
independen ce?
In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to
defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small
nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could
maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case,
Europe would pass out of existence.
Before World War ill, half the European continent
was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain,
Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided
into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true
face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the
historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than
a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In
charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into
account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples,
who look forward to the historic future as a united people
with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds
equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The
question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of
smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the
emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn
out to be a detriment to modern civilization .
The political and national states which exist as such
at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not
questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss,
Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the
right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War
I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were
orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by
the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were
�SLOVAKIA
66
forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger
than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national
State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European
politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their
natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose
lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for
reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this
united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ
sistinig German aggression in 1941.
lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small
nations, would clamor for complete independence, although
this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and
a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded
on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual
welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of
Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia
which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small
nations of central and eastern Europe.
Slovakia -
a Democratic Nation
At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary,
which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes
without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change
its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar
statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct
of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their
efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native
language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their
old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak
common people, however, became the chief exponents of
SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope,
but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence,
their aims were social and oultural as well as political.
�66
SLOVAKIA
This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic
ideals among iSlova.k classes.
1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars,
but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which
was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that
this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir
history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged
natioo.al state.
Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of
the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho
were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra.,
dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with
Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak
Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks
in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made
Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary.
Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-·
vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in
Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after
1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national
rights to self-government and self-determination in the
first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for
political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and
reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a
time and under such unfavorable circumstances.
In the first Czecho->Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were
forced to defend their national individuality against the
officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native
Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak"
nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint
republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the
latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood.
�SLOVAKIA
67
At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938
gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure
their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they
had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time
of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-·
and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State.
Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The
Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous
national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and
Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities
in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition
to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de
jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives
with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the
Slovak Republic.
Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive
danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in
the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and
Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the
common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial,
educational a:nd cultural ,progress.
1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at
Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications
and books were published yearly, literary and scientific
wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im•
proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached
a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life
in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history
in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak
Republic.
�68
SLOVAKIA
All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a
small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made
sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing
state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the
worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation
was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a
,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family
of European nations.
The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent
from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to
Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-·
ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation
for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has
1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a
high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis
treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked
down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future
rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another
Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy
upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy.
Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition
of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt
to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as
futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the
Swedes and the Norwegians.
Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power
interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a
high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering
efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w<mk in the
interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks
were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one
that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world,
for they created their own national state, a creation at the
1
�SI..JOVAK.IA
69
same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl
and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement
of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future
in the history of central Europe.
Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not
a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic
traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full
bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant
creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol"
a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the
Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic!
The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest
achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this
sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief
moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds
of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause
of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history.
Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but
at any rate there are some very significant observations
to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that
a small nation, building its own national culture, labors
under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must
work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations
which eD'joy national independence generally have a high
cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which
show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge
capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~
der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less
complex.
'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative
�SLOVAKIA
70
necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards
and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal
responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a
large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows
to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence,
seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the
economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark
on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to
overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly
introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an
overpopulated Europe.
!Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may
be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large
nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger
for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the
goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in
its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily
manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than
a large state.
'I1here are many added advantages that small states
have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-·
creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders
progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small
nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that
reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies
on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies
the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right
to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-·
come the greatest boon for civilization.
The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world
must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry
nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own
state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1
�SLOVAK.IA
71
tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~
manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the
basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the
small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or
maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly
suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced
the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause
of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern
civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity
from total exUnction.
Today - ten years after the termination of the Great
War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~
turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of
losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the
pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear•
lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi
European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the
peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from
complete ruin and decay.
We who cherish our Western heritage still have the
will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we
. have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the
wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout
the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk
of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There
is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once,
all will be lost for a long time to come .
•
•
•
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak
$3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50
(the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50.
�
SLOVAKIA
63
THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS
Dr. Henrich Bartek
Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles
as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty ,
ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national
aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only
pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which
the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination.
The history of European nations and States during
the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when
small nations make marked social and cultural progress,
their desire for political independen ce - a national state of
their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not
handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e.
To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c
schemes is not historically correct, !because both world
wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great
powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main
arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their
smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily
against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves
eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and
justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are
at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by
brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of
small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able
to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of
human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater
powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so-
�64
SLOVAKIA
cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat
their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same
differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence,
one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t
statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty
nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and
independen ce?
In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to
defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small
nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could
maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case,
Europe would pass out of existence.
Before World War ill, half the European continent
was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain,
Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided
into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true
face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the
historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than
a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In
charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into
account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples,
who look forward to the historic future as a united people
with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds
equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The
question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of
smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the
emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn
out to be a detriment to modern civilization .
The political and national states which exist as such
at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not
questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss,
Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the
right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War
I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were
orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by
the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were
�SLOVAKIA
66
forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger
than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national
State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European
politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their
natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose
lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for
reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this
united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ
sistinig German aggression in 1941.
lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small
nations, would clamor for complete independence, although
this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and
a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded
on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual
welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of
Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia
which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small
nations of central and eastern Europe.
Slovakia -
a Democratic Nation
At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary,
which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes
without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change
its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar
statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct
of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their
efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native
language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their
old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak
common people, however, became the chief exponents of
SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope,
but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence,
their aims were social and oultural as well as political.
�66
SLOVAKIA
This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic
ideals among iSlova.k classes.
1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars,
but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which
was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that
this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir
history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged
natioo.al state.
Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of
the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho
were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra.,
dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with
Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak
Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks
in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made
Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary.
Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-·
vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in
Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after
1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national
rights to self-government and self-determination in the
first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for
political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and
reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a
time and under such unfavorable circumstances.
In the first Czecho->Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were
forced to defend their national individuality against the
officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native
Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak"
nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint
republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the
latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood.
�SLOVAKIA
67
At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938
gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure
their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they
had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time
of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-·
and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State.
Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The
Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous
national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and
Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities
in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition
to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de
jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives
with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the
Slovak Republic.
Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive
danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in
the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and
Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the
common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial,
educational a:nd cultural ,progress.
1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at
Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications
and books were published yearly, literary and scientific
wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im•
proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached
a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life
in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history
in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak
Republic.
�68
SLOVAKIA
All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a
small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made
sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing
state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the
worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation
was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a
,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family
of European nations.
The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent
from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to
Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-·
ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation
for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has
1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a
high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis
treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked
down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future
rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another
Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy
upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy.
Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition
of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt
to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as
futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the
Swedes and the Norwegians.
Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power
interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a
high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering
efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w<mk in the
interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks
were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one
that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world,
for they created their own national state, a creation at the
1
�SI..JOVAK.IA
69
same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl
and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement
of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future
in the history of central Europe.
Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not
a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic
traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full
bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant
creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol"
a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the
Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic!
The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest
achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this
sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief
moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds
of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause
of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history.
Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but
at any rate there are some very significant observations
to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that
a small nation, building its own national culture, labors
under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must
work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations
which eD'joy national independence generally have a high
cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which
show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge
capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~
der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less
complex.
'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative
�SLOVAKIA
70
necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards
and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal
responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a
large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows
to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence,
seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the
economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark
on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to
overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly
introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an
overpopulated Europe.
!Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may
be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large
nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger
for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the
goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in
its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily
manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than
a large state.
'I1here are many added advantages that small states
have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-·
creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders
progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small
nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that
reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies
on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies
the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right
to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-·
come the greatest boon for civilization.
The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world
must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry
nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own
state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1
�SLOVAK.IA
71
tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~
manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the
basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the
small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or
maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly
suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced
the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause
of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern
civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity
from total exUnction.
Today - ten years after the termination of the Great
War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~
turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of
losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the
pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear•
lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi
European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the
peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from
complete ruin and decay.
We who cherish our Western heritage still have the
will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we
. have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the
wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout
the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk
of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There
is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once,
all will be lost for a long time to come .
•
•
•
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak
$3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50
(the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50.
�
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Title
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
63
THE SIGNIFICA NCE OF SMALL NATIONS
Dr. Henrich Bartek
Tonrmediate results of the first bloody, world-wide conflict, which ended in 191.8, were such conflicting principles
as: the right to se1f-determ ination, national sovereignty ,
ctrltural self-existen ce, buffer states and spheres of influence. At the sll!me time, small nations with national
aSpirations were blamed for igniting catastrophi c, international upheavals when, as a matter ,of fact, they were only
pawns in the internation al ,g ame of power 1politics in which
the greait nations engage from time to time for world domination.
The history of European nations and States during
the past century and a half demonstrat es clearly that when
small nations make marked social and cultural progress,
their desire for political independen ce - a national state of
their own - increases, in order to secure their future development as :a free people whose contributio ns are infinitely more valuable to civilization and progress when not
handioo.pped by foreign influences and ,p olitical subservienc e.
To accuse small countries of harboring imperialisti c
schemes is not historically correct, !because both world
wars were caused by intense rivalries among the great
powers of the world. It is interesting to note that the main
arguments against the existence of small nations as independent political states, according to the chief exponents of aggressi~e imperialism of the big ,powers, are their
smallness, their inaibility to protect themselves militarily
against their stronger neighlbors and to sustain themselves
eco111omically. ,F rom the standpoint of historical truth and
justice, however, it is always the bigger powers which are
at fault when they attempt to subjugate a smaH ,power by
brute force. It is significant that no cultural or .social ll!rguments are advanced against :the independen t existence of
small nations. '11he truth is that alil small nations are able
to hold their own and prove their ability in all fields of
human endeavor, if they are not molested by the greater
powers. lit is true that there are political, cultural and so-
64
SLOVAKIA
cial differences among the several small nations and t:hat
their living standards differ, too-, but we find these same
differences even in the larger nations and states. Hence,
one cannot rightfully determine the right to independen t
statehood for SIITlaill. nations merely by such superficial arguments. And who shall say that only the large and mighty
nations and states shall possess the right to freedom and
independen ce?
In the last war, neith·e r France nor Poland were a!ble to
defend themselves successfull y - and they a·r e not small
nations. If one were to limit the right to statehood on military might, then on:ly those states and nations which could
maintain their independen ce against the most powerf.ul nation o.r state would have a "right" to exist. In that case,
Europe would pass out of existence.
Before World War ill, half the European continent
was dominated iby three major powers - Great Britain,
Germany and Russia. The other half of Europe was divided
into large, middle-size d and small states. That was the true
face of the map of Europe; and nothing can change the
historic reality that there exists considerabl y more than
a score of different nationalitie s on the Continent. In
charting the future course of Europe, we must fake into
account the national aspirations of these historic ,peoples,
who look forward to the historic future as a united people
with rights to political freedom and statehood. 'Dhis holds
equally true for all nations, the large and the small. The
question may arise, hoiWever, whether the recognition of
smaU states is for the betterment of mankind and for the
emlbellishm ent of European culture, or whether it may turn
out to be a detriment to modern civilization .
The political and national states which exist as such
at present are recognized ; their right to statehood is not
questioned. For example, the Norwegian s, Finns, Swiss,
Danes, and even the Albanians are officially conceded the
right to an independen t political status. After Wocld War
I, the Baltic !States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were
orga:ni~ as independen t, political states as called for by
the princuple of nationail self-determ ination. Other nationalities, less fortunate and sulbject to power politics, were
SLOVAKIA
66
forced to aissert their :right to statehood. Thus, the Slovenes, a highly cultured nation with a pop_ulation larger
than the Alibanians, failed to organize their own national
State .because of geopolitical reasons. And as long as aggressive militarism and imperialism hold sway in European
politics, the Slovenes will. not be able to establish their
natural right to national independence. In 1918, they chose
lo become incorporated in the kingdom of Yugoslavia for
reasons of self-preservation and security. Nevertheless, this
united southern Slavic monarchy -proved incapable of reJ
sistinig German aggression in 1941.
lt is not at all certain that the Slovenes, or other small
nations, would clamor for complete independence, although
this is the ideal of all peoP'les -w ith national traditions and
a common language, iif international relations iwere.,. founded
on genuine democratic prindples of justice and mutual
welfare. There are many similar cases in the history of
Eurapea,n nationalities. A typical case is that of Slovalkia
which has made 1great strides in its cultural, social, and political life. The :Slovaks, as a progressive and democraticminded people, are an idool representative of all the small
nations of central and eastern Europe.
Slovakia -
a Democratic Nation
At the close of the 18th century when feudal Hungary,
which h.ad been ruled for centuries by pri'Vileged classes
without oonsideratiOIIl of national origin, began to change
its tradition of supra-nationalism into a national Magyar
statism, the various nationalities, moved by their instinct
of self..ip.reservation, naturally resisted the new Magyarization program. Accordingly, the Slova:ks intensified their
efforts to promote the study of their own ancient native
language and national traditions. Slovruk aristocrats, unfortunately, aJbandoned their nationru traditions and succumbed to the Magyar influence for fear of losing their
old prerogatives as members of the nobility. The Slovak
common people, however, became the chief exponents of
SlOV1a;k nationalism; their dbjectives were national in scope,
but they aimed at a higher standard of living and, hence,
their aims were social and oultural as well as political.
66
SLOVAKIA
This, then, is proof of the existence of truly democratic
ideals among iSlova.k classes.
1D uring the 19th .c entury, the Slov.aiks repeatedly attempted to oome to an undeMtanding with the Magyars,
but the rulers refused to grant their subjects local selfgovernment within the confines of the kingdom. As a direct consequence of their failure .to secUTe national recognition, the Slovaks resolved on a cultural program which
was designed for a 1ong range future with the hope that
this ,w ould prepare them for the opportune moment in the_ir
history when .they would inevi.taJbly emerge ru, a f,uH-fledged
natioo.al state.
Obstacles in the way of the cultural development of
the 'Slovaks were constantly placed "by state authorities rwho
were determined to destroy all vestiges of a national tra.,
dition ainong the tVarious nationalities in the kingdom except those of the Ma:gyar nation. Inspired by their c-hauvinistic mood, the Magyars, following their union with
Austria in 1867, closed a:11 schools, suppressed the Slovak
Institute (Matica 'Slovenska), imprisoned leading Slova!ks
in s•ocia:l, political, educational and cultural life, and made
Ma:gyar the sole official language in Hungary.
Despite official proscription of all non-Magyar acti-·
vities in Hungary, the struggle for national survival in
Slovakia went on for more than a century. And even after
1918 the Slovaks resumed the struggle for their national
rights to self-government and self-determination in the
first Czecho--Slova'k Republic. In their unending fight for
political freedom and national equality, the Sl()lVaJks attained a high degree of! eoonomic self-sufficiency and
reached a new high in cultural and social ,p rogress,, scarcely equalled by any small nation in Europe in so short a
time and under such unfavorable circumstances.
In the first Czecho->Slovak Republic, the Slovaks were
forced to defend their national individuality against the
officiail attempt of the Czechs to suJbmerge their native
Sl-ovaJk origin in an artificial ideological "Czechoslovak"
nationality. Moreover, due to. the economic crisis in the joint
republic of the Czechs and Slovruks, ten per cent of the
latter emigrated to foreign lands to seek a livelihood.
SLOVAKIA
67
At last, the inte:maticmal situation in the fall of 1938
gave the Slova,k,s their long-.awaited opportunity to secure
their nati01I1al aiutonomy on October 6, 1938, for which they
had hoped in vain for a score of years during the life-time
of the first Ozecho-lSlo:vruk Republic and during the thous-·
and-yeair-rule o:f the Hungarian 'State.
Post-\Munich Cz-ooho-lSlova:kia disintegrated rapidly. The
Slov.aJks, lbhrootened ,w ith national extinction by being divided among their neig.hlbors as a protectorate of the German Reich, like Bohemia and Moravia, declared their independence on March 14, 1939, through their autonomous
national iparjiament in Bratislava. And when Poland and
Hungary recognilzed the ISlova;k ,State, Germany, after annexing Bohemia and Moravia, a1so recognized the newlycreated 8'lovak Republic. Before the outlbreak of hostilities
in the autumn of 19319, the 1S lovak Republic became a fuMfledged subject of international la:w. Many nations, including the U .IS.1S.R, not only gave their official recognition
to the new democratic state in central Europe and its de
jure goveirnrnent, ibut exchanged d1plomatic representatives
with the newly-.organi!Zed Slovak national state on the Danulbe in central Europe, henceforth to be known as the
Slovak Republic.
Neutrality was the national policy of the ,Slo,vak Republic in the second World War. The Slovaks were in graive
danger of national destruction, caurght as they were in
the midst of the mor.ta;l oombat .b etween the Germans and
Russians. Nevertheless, they continued to work for the
common welfiare of their new state, so, that the Slovruk RepubJic made unprecedented social, economic, industrial,
educational a:nd cultural ,progress.
1Slovaik coUeges were founded, the Slova;k lJIIliversity at
Bratislava made great progress, thousands of publications
and books were published yearly, literary and scientific
wo:i:iks appeared in lailge numlbers, living ·s tandards im•
proved considera;bly, ,s ocial and industrial relations reached
a new hltgh. So ,s pirited amd pros'Perous wes this new life
in their pwn !State that the SlovaJks really maJde history
in the short span of six years of self-rule in the 'Slovak
Republic.
68
SLOVAKIA
All these facts have /been cited merely to show how a
small nation, freed from fore:ign domination, and then made
sulbject to the Ozechs, at last emerged as a self-governing
state, and demonstrated beyond a doubt that even in the
worst possible situation, that of war, this small nation
was aJble to .govern itself wisely and jusUy, ond become a
,p riosperous country and a worthy member of the family
of European nations.
The present Ozecho-1SJavak regime is far diffeJ"ent
from the first Czecho-iSlovak government that attempted to
Ozechi·ze the Slovaks and which refused to grant self-.gov-·
ernment to. them. The persistent fight of the Sloivak nation
for its_ rights for more than a century and a half has
1brought the 1Sl01Vaks some notewo-rthy gains, namely, a
high social and cultural standa.rrd, so that the Czechs today must treat them as equals, not as the Czech politiciruis
treated them during the years 19118-•19,38, when they looked
down upon the Slovaks as an inferior race. What the future
rcla,tions between the Czechs and Slovaks will be uncertain, although there are ,s igns of the rene;wal of another
Ozech attempt to force the old "Czechoslovak" ideoJogy
upon the SloivaJks who defiantly oppose this political heresy.
Whatever may be said of the bitterness of the opposition
of the Sloiva'ks in the 'Past, it is certain that this opposition in the future shall .be even greater, because the Slovaks proved their ability to govern themselves. The attempt
to fuse the Ozechs and Slovaks into one nation is just as
futile as the attempt to make .a united nation out of the
Swedes and the Norwegians.
Slovakia's e:iGperience has amply illustrated the ca;pabiiJ.ity of ,a small country, without the interference of power
interests, to work out her national destiny a,nd reach a
high standard of living and attain a high degree of culture. This she was ,a ble to do solely through the persevering
efforts of her native sons who were inspired to w<mk in the
interests of their country and mankind. That the Slovaiks
were newcomers on the world's political st.age did not alter the fact that they accomplished a worthwhile feait, one
that merits the admiration of the whole civmzed world,
for they created their own national state, a creation at the
1
SI..JOVAK.IA
69
same time of their innate skill and their social, oulturlrl
and biological ,p owers as a. virile nation. This achievement
of an entire race assures the tSlovaiks a promising future
in the history of central Europe.
Nationalistic aspkations among ·t he Slovaks were not
a new thing, for they had cherished their naUve historic
traditions for centuries /before they blossomed into the full
bloom of statehood in the spring of 1939. The dormant
creative energies of a people, kept in political :bondage fol"
a thousand years, were suddenly released and, behold, the
Sloviaks erected a monumental and amazingly beautiful national edifice, known forever in history as. the SlovaJk Republic!
The miraculous ·CTeation of the Slovak national movement, namely, the tSlo;vak State, was truly the greatest
achievement af the Slovak people in all history. And this
sha,U continue to inspire them in all their trials and vicissitudes in the .future, for the glorious memory of this brief
moment (}If freedom cannot be obliterated from the minds
of a gallant people who dedicated themselves to the cause
of democracy at the very daiwn af their naition's history.
Does this brief review of historic events in the national Hfe of Slovakia hiave any lesson for us? Perhaips, but
at any rate there are some very significant observations
to be deri!Ved fl'om this consideration. One of these is that
a small nation, building its own national culture, labors
under greater handica:ps than a large nation; and it must
work more intensely to secure its ,p roper place in the social and cultural life of nations. That is why small nations
which eD'joy national independence generally have a high
cultural standard ,t hat is borne out by statistics which
show that, as a rule, they have ·a much smaller percentage of illiterates than the larger nations. fu a small nation, the conditions are lacking for creaiting widely divergent social classes which a.rise from the formation of huge
capitalistic monopolies. For that reason, too, the socia:l or~
der in small nations is far more democratic by its· very nature than thait of large countries, and certainly far less
complex.
'Small states are oonstaintly aware of the imperative
SLOVAKIA
70
necessity of maintaining high social and cultural standards
and, consequently, the individual citi,z en feels his personal
responsilbility more keenly than the average citi'zen of a
large country. Every ,p rivate citi~n of a small state knows
to •w hat extent his country depends on hi:rn and, hence,
seeks to make a personal contribution to his society. In the
economic field, a small nation cannot afford to emlbark
on a large ex-pansion program that ultimately leads to
overproduction. Every parcel of land must be made productive and new scientific methods. must lbe constantly
introduced into agriculture. 'I1his system of mtensi;ve farming is vitally necessaxy to th~ international economy of an
overpopulated Europe.
!Social, 'Political, economic, or cultural experiments may
be tried with greater safety ,b y sman nations, rfor large
nations cannot exiperiment in these fieJds without endangering the very existence of their entire system ,o f government and nationra1 economy. Moreover, there is less danger
for the usurpation of porwer in a smalf state, 1becau.se the
goal of a111y particular political trend is eaJSHy detected in
its incipient stages. In short, a small country is more easily
manaiged, and by its very nature is more democratic than
a large state.
'I1here are many added advantages that small states
have. Not the least among them is the one that small nations are not confined rwithin the narrow limits of a non-·
creatiive and non-progres,s ive traditionalism that hinders
progress and shuts the door on new ideas. But for humanity the most significant of all is the fact that the small
nations cannot harbor imperialistic aims and, for that
reason, they concentrate all their resources and energies
on cultural and economic endeavor. T,hi,s alone justifies
the existence of small nations whioh have a natural right
to be founded and maintained. Small states ca:n well be-·
come the greatest boon for civilization.
The !bitter ex:periences of two World Wars in quick succession haive clearly shorwn that, sooner or later, the world
must recognize as an incontrovertible principle that eve;ry
nation has a right to its national existence unde,r its own
state ,government. Complete equality of all European na1
SLOVAK.IA
71
tion.s, which are willing to cooperate for universal and 1per~
manent peace among the nations of the world, rmust be the
basic principle of civiililzation and the ideal of every national culture. Until this universal ideal is reali~ed, the
small nations must persevere in their struggle to attain or
maintain their statehood, as the ca.se may be. The middlesized and great nations of Europe, which have ,repeatedly
suffered the ravages of war and have just experienced
the worst disaster in all history, ought to support the cause
of the small states if they hope to preserve our modern
civilization and, ,w hat is more important, save humanity
from total exUnction.
Today - ten years after the termination of the Great
War - the situation in Europe is well nigh hopeless cul~
turally, as it is economically. There is a real danger of
losing the priceless 01.cltural heritage that has been the
pride of Western ·E urope for centuries. lit is the ,g rave responsi'bility of those in power to work honestly and fear•
lessly for the preservaition of the high cultural values oi
European cirvilization and, through international cooperation among the natiolllS that oherish this age-old inheritance, inaugurate an era of genuine democracy for the
peoples of Euroipe, for this alone can save IDurope from
complete ruin and decay.
We who cherish our Western heritage still have the
will and courage to 1preserve it from destruction and we
. have high hopes of restoring it to its former ,p restige under the inspiration of true democracy, but we need the
wholehearted support of all democratic for-c es throughout
the world. If we unite these forces, we can revive the sparlk
of life in the smouldering ruins of Europe and save European culture from spiritual ana'.I1chy and desolation. There
is still .time, hut only predous little ,t ime, for time is running out. It is the eleventh hour. If we do not act at once,
all will be lost for a long time to come .
•
•
•
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slorvaiks" (Juirchak
$3.00; SLOVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I-ill!) $1.50
(the set) ; "Htrdbailr's English-Slovak Dictioniary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK LIESSONS" (!Hrdbak) $3.50.
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Title
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The Significance of Small Nations
Description
An account of the resource
Dr. Henrich Bartek
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp. 63-71
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Bartek, Henrich, 1907-1986
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June-September 1955
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9cccf38bc22879e70dd339fdc97c1403.pdf
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38
SLOVAKIA
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P. A. HIROBAK
In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished
the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA"
(504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather
professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe
book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his
preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and
alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an
honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important
contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the
history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars."
Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may
be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the
condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or,
possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record!
But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished
and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their
competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true
history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the
"twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of
Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which,
in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" !
Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts,
but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly
Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia,"
t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived.
The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when
we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug-
�SLOVAKIA
39
geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is
rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The
impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of
a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their
history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that
the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers,"
who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia"
were little or not at all concerned with the history of the
Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the
history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the
history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an
honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history.
Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his
"twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers,"
does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is
not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their
lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in
line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the
propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history
should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of
history, su<!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for
better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or
for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations.
I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers
who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia"
were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work
co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they
did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments
of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general,
without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no
regard for the Slorvaks and their history.
,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among
them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed-
�40
SLOVAKIA
ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in
Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and
other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch"
(strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious
sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and
correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the
information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of
T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will
undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and
even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this
line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past
thirty-seven years.
Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation,
while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts
are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire
,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are
supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes,
but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive"
Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics.
,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles,
Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin
Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many
,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the
Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were
included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l<_?ng, so the shorter "Czech"
is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term
"Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile
more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however,
mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in-
�SLOVAKIA
41
variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the
Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of
"mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The
tendency is too olbviou.s.
Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of
the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&e
and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians,
Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest
guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious.
They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the
prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re,
when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors
that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that
time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed
the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had
settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii.
And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands
of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown
lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us.
The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd,
co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be
Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common
history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past
1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry.
In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he
Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the
Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs
and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should
also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood
writers" of our time.
It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political
State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would
be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk
�42
SLOV.AKIA
federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights.
The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the
"stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition.
Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation.
They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is
not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers"
who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book
"CzechoslovaJkia."
Propaganda oa.- history?
Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by
chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat
on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak,"
mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St.
Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs
which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to
indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct
nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was
dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because
of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless"
editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen
should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all!
1
•
"C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND
Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .."
By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National
Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague,
Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and
in the following is mine.
"The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918,
l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence
of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak
�SLOVAKIA
43
Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&n of the main Slav
tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP,
3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn
of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting
struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to
1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma•
gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds
iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6).
It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit
confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being.
Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav
trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit"
with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who
the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the
reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the
Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was
not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit
with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~
fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river
Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii,
which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the
size of present-day Bohemia .
•
"The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S.
Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc.
CI:I\A.PrIDR III -
"Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes
freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing
(623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have
been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to
be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic
tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in
different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the
peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba•
bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants
or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic
chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9).
�SLOVAKIA
44
Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory
occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain
nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not
on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic
peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who
were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to
indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S
EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954).
The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be
identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the
territory of ISrum<>'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led
the SlovaJks.
As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they
were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY,"
Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede,
without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute
to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to
exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in
building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were
completely independent during the time of Charlemagne
(8th-9th cenrtury). Why?
1
•
"Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora.
11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s
,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the
Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland,
Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube
and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian
Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes
of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the
Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de•
feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the
ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10).
Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the
"Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not
�SLOVAKIA
45
identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by
Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the
Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia.
This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison
does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though
he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained
independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the
Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained
their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian
Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs,
then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian
ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the
country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the
Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans,
invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great
Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to
sue for peace.
Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the
Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed
greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little
resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what
people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history
tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t
territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found
the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say.
As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great
Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the
Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars,
the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it
in 907.
Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it
seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and
�46
SLOVAKIA
the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity
Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the
"Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when
the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five
years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber
30, 1944.
•
•~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances
for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted
his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to
the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility
for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many
Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal
court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13).
Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar
was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the
benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the
"Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration,
and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German
women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church
in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc.
It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up
his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans,
or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the
Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime.
The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken
up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the
word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were
any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for
Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia
and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall
of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention
(p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents
1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination.
The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did
�SLOVAKIA
47
more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and
aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering
their population.
Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that
the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic
affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is
the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant
Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot
Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were
beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality.
Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that
the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth
century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal
representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf
the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa,
zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us
from whom they might have acquired those words, since
they are rarely used !by the Czechs .
•
CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle
of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J.
Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University;
Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member,
Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order
of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert
Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to
Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc.
"The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620,
uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of
Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his
period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most
eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its
national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place
in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho•
slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the
�48
SLOVAKIA
Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts
as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained
its independence" (P. 29).
!Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor
Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What
"Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What
Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?.
Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle
of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds
of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He
could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks
and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the
chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from
the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language,
literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at
writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason
why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should
try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that
the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual
Monarchy.
What Kerner means to imply when he says that the
"Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in
Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us:
"All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that
Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory,
dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of
the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why
Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree
which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re·
volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states,
including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based
�SLOVAKIA
49
their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was
very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to
the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in
the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k
government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and
product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,'
which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the
Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the
constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles
had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107).
To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the
Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of
the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution
that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt
as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy.
In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during
the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund
Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same
development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary
as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not
know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did
not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison,
because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly
solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know,
too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered
during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia
with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57).
Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates
and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian"
magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars
were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er
the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech"
and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns
today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however,
remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past:
the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia.
�50
SLOVAKIA
"A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak
nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the
Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically
and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of
Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in
the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the
Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with
the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church."
Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled
and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept
of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even
in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had
any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and
the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent
Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were
threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the
policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars,
Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity"
(p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes,
and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when
he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time
or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious.
On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened
"w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later,
according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the
Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same
reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . .
the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step
as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II
sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When
Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1
�SLOVAKIA
51
guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the
Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development
that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among
the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge
(35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose
its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment
by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791."
What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria
Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious
about <the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and
reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried
to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in
time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~
ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America
peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the
press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they
are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books
in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my
mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must
be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner.
•
"A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd
literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted
amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky
from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik.
The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the
Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried
to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'<IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because
a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli•
tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks"
(p. 36) .
,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but
only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by
�52
SLOVAKIA
omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per
cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks
only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a
"dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part
of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used
that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live"
language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they
used Sloiv•aik.
Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk
not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but
actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak
which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There
was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose
the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech.
Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the
comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal
of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks .
1
•
"Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their
fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security,
not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking
to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once
more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a
separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and
Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak
peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle
central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned
in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years.
·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the >benefit of the
Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38).
This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not
safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-,
fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did
not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any
more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize
�SLOVAKIA
53
the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for
the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their
ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence
- to become masters of their own household, of their own
destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later,
eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the
Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs.
Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other
Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl
estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve"
language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people,
both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for
the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not
say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur,
Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they
did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using
Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men
they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a
language they did not consider their own.
Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning
Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice
of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks,
b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech
language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does
Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by
Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen
Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and
their ,w riters.
1
•
"The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the
Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda,
worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history
and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and
did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44).
�54
SLOVAKIA
It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on
"Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and
omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb..
bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the
Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the
national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is
nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who
should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual
ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch"
of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of
the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of
the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it!
1
•
I
"Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the
economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that
h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and
the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48).
The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was
the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the
Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free
to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on
trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history;
the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation,
hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation
of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy.
Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem
of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon
of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant
cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened
after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r
first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and
�SLOVAKIA
55
thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and
their national wealth!
CHA[PTER [V -
Peace Conference" -
•
"The World War, Revolution and
iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er.
'10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd.
After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign
Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence
in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been
agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech
and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point
on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53).
'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech
and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France?
The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans
at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies
in various countries still less!
•
"This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the
creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under
Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of
goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council,
which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by
the nation at home" (p. 56).
1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is
credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council,
which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact
that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at
home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive
Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went
abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known,
he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t
home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course,
wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home.
When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied
reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand:
"Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio-
�56
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and
Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well
the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and
Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the
British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-·
vakis," the ra nswer was "no."
The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the
NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it:
1
"It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the
love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that
those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors."
In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a
solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of
the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty,
called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party
leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor."
After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the
society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following
letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary:
"In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the
liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is
convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only
under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy"
(Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75).
The very same Czech members of parliament requested
Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said:
"We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by
him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible
�SLOVAKIA
57
with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that
we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims
of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of
the realm and under the Habsburg crown."
It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the
Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council
were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the
Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech
delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech
State within a federated Austria-Hungary."
Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on
Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m
Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the
destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore,
say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he
said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the
nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work
"Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ).
When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the
"Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for
the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&al Milan R.
Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A.,
Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the
twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name
of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single
thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might
become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give
credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe?
Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the
"OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had
fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and
which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He
almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis"
legend.
�58
SLOVAKIA
The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a
short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence
British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in
France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and
not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via
Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy
reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted,
without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and
Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for
Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it,
in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend
that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83
of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully,
even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce."
•
"In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat
time. It s eems most probrul>le that when it ,was first uttered it
meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it
wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62).
Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve
that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk
and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say
"pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following:
" In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in
composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the
matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech
regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for
the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights
of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) .
So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in
a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the
Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly
the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists
on having a "Orechoslovak" nation!
�SLOVAKIA
69
AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies
was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze-
choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks
got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only
as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth,
however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the
Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other
"historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary
notwithstandi ng.
If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let
him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should
know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that
druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be
conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to
belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course,
was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would
be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation.
The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows:
''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations
we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the
freest opportunity of autonomous development."
What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean
to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except
the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e
Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that
alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not
one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to
believe otheIWise?
•
"The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the
hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo,
under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0-
�60
SLOVAKIA
slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three
millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of
less than fifteen millions" (p. 63).
But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert"
information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs,
who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the
Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population
was in the majority, and this included some three and a
half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for
the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on
the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should
be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans"
(p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They
needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to
m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs
and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"!
•
"The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the
Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized
fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the
Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy
had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd
acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu·
nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her
Western allies" (p. 68) .
It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge
about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the
readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and
Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif
history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a.
Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was
"forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious.
Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without
the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully
well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her
non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They
�SLOVAKIA
61
chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends,"
because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the
world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish
majority of her population was not ready to die for a
tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for
ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the
Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did
not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate
friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his
pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that.
Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied:
"The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a
triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e
te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the
Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite
as powerfully as today."
•
"Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the
bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e
drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace
Cont rence had access to and used the best available information
and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ).
After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r
I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that
Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even
the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains
t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II.
At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were
quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered
when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout
having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd
George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT
Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe
350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead..,
ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a
nasvigalble river.
Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in
A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma-
�62
SLOVAKIA
cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd
George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M.
Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's
"Svet<Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite
effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the
last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads:
"Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be
sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of
the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism.
U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference
was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured
a durable settlement" (p. 69).
Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem.
her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and
American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today
that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient
"common sense and intelligence" at that time.
(More coming)
WHO SAID IT?
"In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian
a<bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their
aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in
Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they
demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and
the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary
possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars
had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with
historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve
the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic
rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights
of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).
�
38
SLOVAKIA
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P. A. HIROBAK
In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished
the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA"
(504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather
professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe
book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his
preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and
alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an
honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important
contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the
history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars."
Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may
be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the
condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or,
possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record!
But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished
and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their
competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true
history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the
"twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of
Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which,
in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" !
Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts,
but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly
Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia,"
t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived.
The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when
we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug-
�SLOVAKIA
39
geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is
rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The
impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of
a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their
history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that
the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers,"
who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia"
were little or not at all concerned with the history of the
Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the
history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the
history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an
honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history.
Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his
"twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers,"
does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is
not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their
lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in
line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the
propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history
should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of
history, su<!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for
better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or
for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations.
I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers
who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia"
were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work
co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they
did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments
of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general,
without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no
regard for the Slorvaks and their history.
,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among
them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed-
�40
SLOVAKIA
ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in
Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and
other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch"
(strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious
sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and
correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the
information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of
T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will
undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and
even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this
line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past
thirty-seven years.
Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation,
while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts
are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire
,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are
supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes,
but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive"
Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics.
,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles,
Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin
Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many
,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the
Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were
included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l<_?ng, so the shorter "Czech"
is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term
"Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile
more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however,
mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in-
�SLOVAKIA
41
variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the
Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of
"mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The
tendency is too olbviou.s.
Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of
the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&e
and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians,
Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest
guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious.
They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the
prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re,
when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors
that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that
time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed
the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had
settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii.
And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands
of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown
lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us.
The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd,
co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be
Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common
history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past
1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry.
In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he
Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the
Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs
and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should
also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood
writers" of our time.
It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political
State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would
be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk
�42
SLOV.AKIA
federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights.
The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the
"stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition.
Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation.
They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is
not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers"
who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book
"CzechoslovaJkia."
Propaganda oa.- history?
Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by
chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat
on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak,"
mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St.
Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs
which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to
indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct
nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was
dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because
of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless"
editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen
should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all!
1
•
"C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND
Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .."
By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National
Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague,
Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and
in the following is mine.
"The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918,
l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence
of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak
�SLOVAKIA
43
Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&n of the main Slav
tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP,
3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn
of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting
struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to
1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma•
gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds
iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6).
It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit
confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being.
Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav
trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit"
with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who
the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the
reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the
Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was
not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit
with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~
fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river
Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii,
which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the
size of present-day Bohemia .
•
"The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S.
Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc.
CI:I\A.PrIDR III -
"Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes
freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing
(623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have
been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to
be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic
tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in
different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the
peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba•
bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants
or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic
chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9).
�SLOVAKIA
44
Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory
occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain
nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not
on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic
peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who
were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to
indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S
EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954).
The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be
identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the
territory of ISrum<>'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led
the SlovaJks.
As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they
were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY,"
Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede,
without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute
to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to
exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in
building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were
completely independent during the time of Charlemagne
(8th-9th cenrtury). Why?
1
•
"Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora.
11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s
,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the
Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland,
Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube
and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian
Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes
of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the
Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de•
feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the
ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10).
Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the
"Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not
�SLOVAKIA
45
identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by
Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the
Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia.
This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison
does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though
he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained
independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the
Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained
their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian
Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs,
then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian
ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the
country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the
Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans,
invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great
Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to
sue for peace.
Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the
Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed
greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little
resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what
people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history
tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t
territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found
the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say.
As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great
Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the
Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars,
the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it
in 907.
Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it
seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and
�46
SLOVAKIA
the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity
Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the
"Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when
the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five
years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber
30, 1944.
•
•~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances
for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted
his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to
the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility
for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many
Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal
court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13).
Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar
was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the
benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the
"Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration,
and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German
women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church
in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc.
It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up
his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans,
or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the
Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime.
The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken
up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the
word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were
any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for
Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia
and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall
of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention
(p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents
1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination.
The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did
�SLOVAKIA
47
more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and
aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering
their population.
Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that
the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic
affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is
the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant
Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot
Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were
beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality.
Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that
the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth
century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal
representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf
the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa,
zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us
from whom they might have acquired those words, since
they are rarely used !by the Czechs .
•
CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle
of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J.
Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University;
Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member,
Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order
of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert
Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to
Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc.
"The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620,
uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of
Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his
period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most
eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its
national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place
in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho•
slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the
�48
SLOVAKIA
Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts
as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained
its independence" (P. 29).
!Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor
Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What
"Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What
Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?.
Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle
of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds
of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He
could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks
and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the
chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from
the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language,
literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at
writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason
why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should
try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that
the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual
Monarchy.
What Kerner means to imply when he says that the
"Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in
Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us:
"All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that
Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory,
dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of
the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why
Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree
which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re·
volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states,
including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based
�SLOVAKIA
49
their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was
very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to
the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in
the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k
government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and
product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,'
which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the
Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the
constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles
had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107).
To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the
Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of
the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution
that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt
as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy.
In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during
the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund
Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same
development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary
as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not
know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did
not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison,
because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly
solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know,
too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered
during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia
with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57).
Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates
and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian"
magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars
were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er
the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech"
and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns
today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however,
remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past:
the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia.
�50
SLOVAKIA
"A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak
nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the
Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically
and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of
Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in
the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the
Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with
the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church."
Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled
and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept
of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even
in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had
any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and
the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent
Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were
threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the
policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars,
Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity"
(p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes,
and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when
he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time
or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious.
On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened
"w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later,
according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the
Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same
reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . .
the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step
as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II
sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When
Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1
�SLOVAKIA
51
guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the
Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development
that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among
the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge
(35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose
its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment
by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791."
What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria
Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious
about <the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and
reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried
to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in
time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~
ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America
peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the
press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they
are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books
in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my
mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must
be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner.
•
"A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd
literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted
amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky
from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik.
The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the
Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried
to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'<IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because
a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli•
tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks"
(p. 36) .
,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but
only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by
�52
SLOVAKIA
omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per
cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks
only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a
"dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part
of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used
that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live"
language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they
used Sloiv•aik.
Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk
not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but
actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak
which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There
was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose
the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech.
Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the
comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal
of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks .
1
•
"Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their
fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security,
not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking
to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once
more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a
separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and
Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak
peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle
central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned
in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years.
·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the >benefit of the
Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38).
This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not
safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-,
fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did
not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any
more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize
�SLOVAKIA
53
the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for
the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their
ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence
- to become masters of their own household, of their own
destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later,
eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the
Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs.
Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other
Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl
estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve"
language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people,
both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for
the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not
say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur,
Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they
did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using
Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men
they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a
language they did not consider their own.
Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning
Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice
of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks,
b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech
language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does
Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by
Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen
Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and
their ,w riters.
1
•
"The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the
Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda,
worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history
and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and
did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44).
�54
SLOVAKIA
It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on
"Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and
omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb..
bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the
Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the
national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is
nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who
should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual
ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch"
of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of
the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of
the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it!
1
•
I
"Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the
economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that
h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and
the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48).
The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was
the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the
Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free
to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on
trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history;
the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation,
hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation
of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy.
Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem
of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon
of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant
cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened
after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r
first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and
�SLOVAKIA
55
thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and
their national wealth!
CHA[PTER [V -
Peace Conference" -
•
"The World War, Revolution and
iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er.
'10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd.
After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign
Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence
in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been
agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech
and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point
on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53).
'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech
and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France?
The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans
at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies
in various countries still less!
•
"This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the
creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under
Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of
goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council,
which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by
the nation at home" (p. 56).
1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is
credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council,
which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact
that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at
home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive
Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went
abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known,
he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t
home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course,
wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home.
When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied
reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand:
"Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio-
�56
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and
Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well
the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and
Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the
British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-·
vakis," the ra nswer was "no."
The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the
NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it:
1
"It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the
love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that
those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors."
In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a
solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of
the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty,
called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party
leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor."
After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the
society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following
letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary:
"In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the
liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is
convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only
under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy"
(Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75).
The very same Czech members of parliament requested
Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said:
"We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by
him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible
�SLOVAKIA
57
with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that
we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims
of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of
the realm and under the Habsburg crown."
It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the
Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council
were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the
Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech
delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech
State within a federated Austria-Hungary."
Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on
Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m
Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the
destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore,
say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he
said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the
nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work
"Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ).
When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the
"Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for
the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&al Milan R.
Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A.,
Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the
twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name
of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single
thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might
become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give
credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe?
Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the
"OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had
fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and
which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He
almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis"
legend.
�58
SLOVAKIA
The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a
short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence
British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in
France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and
not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via
Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy
reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted,
without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and
Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for
Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it,
in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend
that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83
of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully,
even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce."
•
"In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat
time. It s eems most probrul>le that when it ,was first uttered it
meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it
wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62).
Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve
that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk
and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say
"pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following:
" In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in
composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the
matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech
regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for
the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights
of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) .
So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in
a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the
Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly
the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists
on having a "Orechoslovak" nation!
�SLOVAKIA
69
AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies
was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze-
choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks
got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only
as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth,
however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the
Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other
"historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary
notwithstandi ng.
If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let
him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should
know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that
druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be
conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to
belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course,
was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would
be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation.
The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows:
''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations
we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the
freest opportunity of autonomous development."
What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean
to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except
the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e
Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that
alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not
one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to
believe otheIWise?
•
"The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the
hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo,
under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0-
�60
SLOVAKIA
slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three
millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of
less than fifteen millions" (p. 63).
But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert"
information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs,
who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the
Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population
was in the majority, and this included some three and a
half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for
the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on
the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should
be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans"
(p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They
needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to
m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs
and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"!
•
"The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the
Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized
fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the
Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy
had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd
acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu·
nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her
Western allies" (p. 68) .
It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge
about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the
readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and
Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif
history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a.
Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was
"forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious.
Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without
the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully
well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her
non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They
�SLOVAKIA
61
chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends,"
because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the
world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish
majority of her population was not ready to die for a
tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for
ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the
Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did
not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate
friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his
pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that.
Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied:
"The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a
triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e
te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the
Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite
as powerfully as today."
•
"Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the
bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e
drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace
Cont rence had access to and used the best available information
and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ).
After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r
I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that
Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even
the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains
t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II.
At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were
quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered
when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout
having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd
George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT
Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe
350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead..,
ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a
nasvigalble river.
Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in
A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma-
�62
SLOVAKIA
cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd
George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M.
Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's
"Svet<Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite
effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the
last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads:
"Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be
sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of
the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism.
U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference
was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured
a durable settlement" (p. 69).
Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem.
her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and
American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today
that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient
"common sense and intelligence" at that time.
(More coming)
WHO SAID IT?
"In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian
a<bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their
aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in
Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they
demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and
the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary
possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars
had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with
historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve
the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic
rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights
of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1955
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38
SLOVAKIA
HISTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P. A. HIROBAK
In 1'9149, the Uniiversity of California Press, ipulblished
the "third printing" of the !book "CZEOHOSW VAKIA"
(504 pages) which was edited iby Rolbert J. Kerner, Sather
professor of history in the Unilversity :of California. 'Dhe
book was made ipossilble, ,p rofessor Kerner states in his
preface, iby "the oolla!boration of twenty distinguished and
alble scholiars and writers" and that, concludes Mir. Kerner, "has made it ;possiible to present a vo1ume ,which is an
honest, unprejudiced:, and frank appraisal of the important
contrilbution which the Czechoslovak nation made to the
history of our time in its two short decades of independence between two world wars."
Just how honest, unprejudiced and frank that aipp:r,aisal of the "important" contribution is, the ireader may
be a;ble to g,ather from what follows here and arrive at the
condusion, stated so aiptly iby professor Kerner, that, indeed, "few nations, if any can show such a record" or,
possibly, go a bit .farther and state cate.gorically that, indeed, no niation can show .such a record!
But how honest and unprejudiced are "distinguished
and able scholars" who set out to do a job beyond their
competency? Can a distinguished historian write a true
history of CZIDCH0-1SUOVAKITA without a thorough lmowledge of the SlovaJks and the land they 'haive occupied during the past 1500 years? And yet that is exaotly what the
"twenty distinguished and aJble scholars and writers" of
Kerner's "Ozechoslovaikia" did to ,produce something which,
in his opinion, was "hQlrulst, unprejudiced" !
Kerner's "Ozechoslovikia' is dirvided into six parts,
but the tendency in all parts is much the same: strictly
Czech. Kerner should haive named the 1b ook "Czechia,"
t'hen the wonk might ibe called, by a stretch of the imagination, a semlblance of something "hlOlll.est and unprejudiced." Otherwise, informed readers know rthat it definitely is not, and the uninformed axe cruelly deceived.
The s~gniificance of this may be !better understood when
we glance at the remarkaible selection of books in the sug-
SLOVAKIA
39
geeted bibliog,r aphy at the end of each cha;pter. The list is
rema.r.kaJble not only for the !books and literary woi,ks included, but for the 1bodks and literary works omitted. The
impression created is that the Slovruks had no ,w riters of
a!lly impor-t and that no sourees of informatiO!ll on their
history are availruble. iBut that i.'S not so. '.Dhis proves that
the "twenty distinguished a:nd able scholars and writers,"
who collalborated with Kerner .cm his "Czechoslovakia"
were little or not at all concerned with the history of the
Sl01Vak people and their land. To magnify and glorify the
history of the Ozechs and minimize, practically ignore, the
history of the Slavruks, certainly cannot be the aim of an
honest, UDJprejudiced and abjecti;ve writer of Ozecho~lovak history.
Ozecho-Blovakia, as presented ,b y Kerner and his
"twenty distinguished and aJble .s cholars and writers,"
does not give us a true picture of Czech-0-1Slovakia; it is
not a true history of the Ozechs and SlOIV'aJks and their
lands; it is definitely more propaga:nda than history - in
line with other .such wm,ks which were promoted by the
propaganda apparatus of Prag,ue. !Students of history
should not 'be exposed to faJsifications and distortions of
history, su<!h as that exemplified ·b y Kerner's "Ozechoslovakia," because. that does not make for the truth, or for
better relations ibetween the Ozechs and the Slovalks, or
for a ·pr.oper understanding of those nations.
I do not want to say unequirvocally that the writers
who collaborated to produce Kerner's "Ozechoslovrukia"
were knowingly dishonest ,a nd prejudiced, but their work
co.n,vinced me definitely that ,w ittingly or uniwitti.ngly they
did ibeoome Ozech propa:gandists. The writers have an undu:ly high regard for the chairacter and accomplishments
of T. G. Masaryk amd Benes and the Ozechs in general,
without an equa:lJy high reg,aro for facts, and little or no
regard for the Slorvaks and their history.
,M ost writers of Ozeolio..Slovaik history and "Ozecho..slovak" democracy (IS. Harrison Thomson, Joseph S. Roucek, Herbert AdolJphus ,Miller, Brackett Lewis, among
them), follow the Ozech line of T. G. Masaryik and Ed-
40
SLOVAKIA
ward Benes and their governmeints ,w ho ,c ontrolled the entire propaganda apparatus• o;f ,Czecho-1Slov8Jkia. This Masaryk~enes line was and e;ve:n now is adhered to iby exchange students and iprofessors, heads of official and unofficial information !bureaus, the America.n Institute in
Prague, the YMCA and YWCA of 0zecho-Slovrukia and
other countries, the "OzechoslQIViruk N ationa,1- Ohurch"
(strictly a Czech enteriprise) and most other religious
sects, and practically all "eminent" writers, scholars and
correspondents. And today the governments of all countries of the ,w orld still lbase their knowledge 'Of OzechoSlovakia and the vario:us nations that comprise it on the
information supplied by the state propaganda apparatUJS of
T. G. iMasaryk and Edward Benes. The import Ol:f this will
undouibtedly be appreciated iby students of history, and
even historians themselves, if they rememlber that this
line has been followed and ipvopagaJted for ·a t least the past
thirty-seven years.
Accordirrrgly, the Czechs are a "historical" nation,
while the SlovaJks are oruy a •~branch" of it and their language just a "dialect" orf the Czech. Ridiculous attempts
are made to trace the histo,r y of the non-.existent "Ozechoslovruk" nation to the times of the Great Moravian Empire
,a nd Sts. Cyril and [Methodius. The "CzechoslOW!Jks" are
supposed to 1b e the nation of Hus, Masaryk, and Benes,
but also the nation of Sts. Cyril and Methoilius, WenceslaUJS and Ludlmila. The Ozechs, however, are ",p rogressive"
Catholics and the 1Slovruks "reactionary" Catholics.
,F rom officiail statistics we learn how many Poles,
Germruns, Jews, 'Magyars and Uikrainians there Weir'e iin
Czecho-1Slovakia at any ,g iven time,. but not how many
,SlQIVlaks. That is explained ruway by the s1Jateme.nt th:at the
Slovaks were not considered a tminority, hence, they were
included under the category of "0zechosloivaiks." The latter term, however, is terr1bly l<_?ng, so the shorter "Czech"
is used in many in,stainces as an "aJbbreviation." The term
"Slovalk" could not •b e us.ed, I suppose, because it has O'Ile
more letter than "Czech"! When statistics do, however,
mention Czechs and .Slovaks se,pairately, the figures are in-
SLOVAKIA
41
variably magnified on bhe Ozech side and minim1zed on the
Slovak side. The !Magyars were experts at this sort of
"mathematics" long before Ozecho-iSlova!kia was !born. The
tendency is too olbviou.s.
Many distinguished and aJble scholars and writers of
the tyipe mentioned lby Kerner, can tell us exactly wh&e
and albout when the Czechs, Poles, Russians, Slovenians,
Croatians, rSe11bs, etc., fust settled in their respective territories, lbut, it seems, they cannot even venture a.in honest
guess when it comes to the Slovaks. I say again: the tendency is dl:wious.
They tell us that the Great Moraivian Empilre was the
prede•cessor of the Czecho-Slol\TaJk RepU!blic, a Czech venttl!re,
when in fact it was not. The Slova:ks, their predecesors
that is, occupied both sides of the Morawa River at that
time (whence, the name of :the empire) aind, hence, formed
the very heart of the shor-Uived emipire, which was destroyed by the GermaJI1s with the aid of the Ozechs who had
settled in, Bohemia, the land of the Boii.
And we used to hear and read aJboot the "Crown lands
of Bohemia," lbut now it seems to be the mode in "1p rogress,ive" historical ch'cles, to use the expression "Crech crown
lands." I repeat : the tendency is only too. ohvio.us.
The Czechs are not and do, not ,wa,,nt to be Slovaks a,nd,
co,ruversely, the Slorva'ks are not and do not want to be
Czechs. The SlovaJks .a nd the Ozechs did not have a common
history, language, culture and tradition du.ring the past
1500 years, ~ause they did not occupy the same territQry.
In a word, the Cizechs 0JI1d the Sl01Vaks developed sepaJTa tely and are, therefore, two distinct ethnic nations. 'l'he
Slovaks never were, nor are they now, a "part" of the
Czech nation. This simple truth, recognized 'by fille Czechs
and SlOIVaJks themselves for many centuries ;past, should
also be recognized lby "distinguished and alble scholars ood
writers" of our time.
It is tiiue that the SlovaJks formed a common political
State with the Czechs in 19'.18, but only on certain conditions, the most important of which was that they would
be a completely autonomous unit of the Ozecho-SlovaJk
42
SLOV.AKIA
federatio.n, that is, that they would en~oy full states' rights.
The condition not obeiirrg fulfilled, spelled the end of OrechoSlovaJkia. Because Benes insisted that the Czechs be the
"stat~ation," Czecho-Slo1vaJk ia was doomed to perdition.
Today the Slovaks do not want to be contained in any common State wti.th the Czechs or any other foreign nation.
They can be kept so temporarily only lby force. !But that is
not what the "distinguished and aJble sch~lars and writers"
who oo1lalboraJted with professor Kerner tell us in the book
"CzechoslovaJkia."
Propaganda oa.- history?
Let us anailyize Kerner's ''Czechoslovakia" chapter by
chapter to prove our contentions. But let me note first t!hat
on page xvii, at the end of the "contents," professor Kerner tells us how to pronounce "Czech" (not "Czechoslovak,"
mind you) letters; and on p. xxi, the poem by Edna St.
Vincent Millay is entitled "Ozecho-iSlovakia" (:not "Czechoslovalkia") , which b,rings uip the question of hyphenization of the 1political state of tihe 1SlovaJks and the Czechs
which was 'b orn iln 1918. The treaty 1b y which Czecho--Slova1kia came into being spelled ithe name with a hyphen to
indicate that two indiividual ethnic entities, two distinct
nations, 'had formed one political state. The hyiphen was
dropped lby Masaryk and Ben-es and their followers. Whether the hyphen was J.eft in the title of the ipoem because
of the author's insistence, or prof. Kerner's "careless"
editing, I do not know, but it is singular that the hyphen
should a;ppear in a book liike "Ozechoslova;lcia" at all!
1
•
"C~ECHOSLOVA:KIA, Part I: BACKGROUND
Chapter I-"The Czechoslovaiks-Anthropol ogical Notes . .."
By Ales Hrdlfclka, M.D., Sc.D., Gura.tor, Division of Physical Anthropology, United States National Museum; Huxley 'Medal Lecturer, London (1927) ; memlber, National
Academy of Scien-ces; honorary Doctor of 1S cience (Prague,
Br.no)," etc., etc. Please not.e: The underscoring here and
in the following is mine.
"The term Czechoslovak ,i,s o! r ecen t coinage, dating from 1918,
l\·hen the united Cze chs and Slovaks proclaimed. thei r independence
of the Dual Mon,archy and th eir est abHshmi:mt of the Czeohoslovak
SLOVAKIA
43
Republic. . . . 'Illie name Czech (pronounced Chekh) ls derived, accord Ing to an old tradition, from the chiefta&n of the main Slav
tribe who brought them some time during the dawn, of ihistory probably in tihe fifth cent\.U'ly A.!D. - to the heart of the land (IP,
3) . . . In fact, the hLstoTY of the Czechoslovak tribes, from the dawn
of written ,r ecords to the present day, has •be.en one of ever.Jiasting
struggles ·a.galns,t dnvooers (PP. 4.-5) . . . Tihe Slovaks, who u.p to
1029 formed a unit with Moravia, were then torn away by the Ma•
gya,rs, isolated from the west, for,c ed .away from the best grounds
iu the warm •lolwland,s, and eventuaUy repressed. in every way" (p. 6).
It is evident that even Dr. Ales Hrrdli6ka, distinguished ,anthropologist of ~ech origin, :seems to be a bit
confused about when the "Czechslovruks" came into being.
Whether the Ozechs -are descendants ,of the "main. 'Slav
trilbe" is open to ·question. The 'SlO!Vaks fo:nrned a "unit"
with Moravia up to. 1029, according to Hrdlicka, 1but who
the people were who settled in Morruvia is Jeft to the
reader. Mora,via, of ooUTse, came under the influence of the
Ozechs in time, at least the western portion of it, :b ut was
not settled lby the Ozechs when the .Slovruks formed a unit
with it, for the simple reason, it seems, that the for~
fathers of ithe Slovaiks settled on iboth sides of the river
Morava, w'hile the Ozechs settled in fue J.and of the Boii,
which was a distinot geographical unit, ,prolbaJbly a/bout the
size of present-day Bohemia .
•
"The Czechoslovaks to 1620'' - ,b y S.
Harrison Thomson, Ph ..D., BLitt. - Professor of Medieval History, Unirversity of Co-lorado; Ph.D., Charles Uni'Vers,ty, Prague; B.Litt., Omord University; Ewtor, Magistri Johannis Hus Tractatus Res-ponsivus; Johannis Wyclif Summa de Ente (1930) ;" etc., etc.
CI:I\A.PrIDR III -
"Led ,b y a travelln,g IFI'lankish merchant, Samo, tihe Slavic tribes
freed themselves ,from the Av,a r rule, and chose Samo for their •k ing
(623-624) . . . This ,e arly kingdom, which would appea,r to !have
been pr.emature, iw,as ,neither Czech nor Slovak. It would have to
be called Western ·s1av, ,b y .reason or a large intermixture of Slavic
tribes which became gra.dua:l!y differentiated as they settled in
different local!tes . . . The names of the princess Llbuiie and the
peasant Premysl whom she cih ose to be her husband are in all proba•
bility tJhe names of real persons. At any rate ,t he male descendants
or this ,s-emilegendaxy .Pfemysl were to rule over ,Bohemia and neighboring regions until 1306 . . . It is not certain whether tihe Slavic
chi,eftalne. enga,ged at this time to pay .tribute to the Fr,alllk.is~ emperor or not" (P. 9).
SLOVAKIA
44
Id: Samo, the "traveling 1F ranlkish merchant," established a kingdom, he necessarily must hruve stopped traveling somewhere, and that "somewhere" ,w as on territory
occupied 'by "S1'arvic" tr.i!bes, out of which later a certain
nation, or certain nations, arose. ,s amo's kingdom was not
on the territory settled by the Czechs or other Sla-vonic
peoples, 1b ut Olll the terri1lory settled by the "Slavs" who
were later oalled ISlorvaks. Fredegar's Chronicles seem to
indicate as much (THIE ISI.JOV~S AND !UNG SAMO'S
EMiP]RE, by iDr. Henrich Bartelk, SU)VA.KIA, June 1954).
The "Slavic trilbes" whioh ibecame gradually differentiated as they settled in "different localities" could not be
identical witll the "Slruvic tribes" which remained on the
territory of ISrum<>'s kingdom and, later, came to ~ ca1led
the SlovaJks.
As far ,as, the Ozech "Llbuse and Pfemysl" are concerned, let us talke the word Olf learned Czechs that they
were legendary characters ("Ottuv SLOVN1K NAUONY,"
Vol.. XV, p. 1038; Vol. XX, rp. 625). We might a.loo concede,
without offending historical truth, t!hat all "1S1'avic" chieftains, including the forefathers of the 'Czechs, paid tribute
to the Frankish emperor, when he was strong enough to
exact it. Why should the 'Slavs of Bohemia" be an exception? II t seems that professor Harrison is interested in
building up a case for the Czechs to prove that they were
completely independent during the time of Charlemagne
(8th-9th cenrtury). Why?
1
•
"Later in the ,c entury (846) !Louis the German su,bju,g-ated Mora.
11ia, •b ut suffered defeat wihen he ,a ttacked the Slavs of Bohemia. Th1s
,a ttack of tLouis the German n,vas directed ,against the empire of the
Moravian prince Mojmir, who had shown rem arkable abllity in consolidating his rule south, east •a nd west to include southern Poland,
Silesia, Bohemia, Moravia, and the valleys of the middle Danube
and Theiss rivers a,s far as the northern boundaries of the Byzantine Empil'e . .. After the death of Svato,pluk (894) the Moravian
Empire rapidly broke up into its component parts. The Czech princes
of the Pi'emyslide line .gained independence for Bohemia, and the
Magyars, new arrivals dn. t,he east, -extended llieir power over n~rthern Pannonia. German's and Slavs, united for the moment, were de•
feated by the Ma,gyars in 907 neax (Bratislava (Pressburg), and the
ruin of the Moravian state was complete" (P. 10).
Louis subjugaited iMoravia, but was defeated by the
"Slavs of Bohemia," which means that the latter were not
SLOVAKIA
45
identioal with the Slavs of Moravia, who were ruled by
Mojmir. !Professor !Harrison also tells us that Mojmir, the
Moravian prince, consolidated his rule by consolidating various ISlmrianic ('Slavic) trilbes, including those of Bohemia.
This Mojmir did by force. It is significant that Harrison
does not refer to Mojmir as a "Slovak" ,p rince, though
he does not hesitate to say that 'Czech" princes gained
independence fur Bohemia. He also omits to say that the
Czechs, not the ",Slavs of Bohemia," mind you, gained
their independence by !breaking ·a way from ,t he !MO!'aJVian
Empire in 895, :aJfter the death of S,v atopluk. The Czechs,
then, heliped to destro¥ the integrity of the Grea,t Moravian
ffimpire, the heart of which ,was in Slovak country, the
country of the Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia. In 900 the
Czechs, the Slavs of Bohemia, together with the Germans,
invaded the territory of the Sl01VaJks, the Slavs of Great
Moravia, aJild after a terrific /battle forced !Mojmir II to
sue for peace.
Svatoplulk's three sons, ruling various areas of the
Empire and constantly •a t each others throats, contributed
greatly to the dissolution of Great Moravia. When the !Magyars moved into northern IPannonia, they met with little
resistance, lbut professor Harriso n neglects to say what
people settled in northern Pannonia, even though history
tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks occu'Pied tha.t
territooy at the time. And where professor Harrison found
the legend that "Germans and Slavs, uni.ted for the moment,." tried to save t!he Great Morawian Empire from falling into the hands of the Magyars in 907, he does !IlOt say.
As mentioned rubove, the Germans, and the 'Slavs of Bohemia" (the Coochs) contributed to the downfall of Great
Morawia. It is not, I thinlk, unreasonaJble to say that if the
Germans and Slavs were really united to sruve the Moravian Em'Pire from falling into the hands of the Magyars,
the latter would hardly have taken what was left of it
in 907.
Careless reporting of history? Probably, ·b ut to me it
seems to be tendencious and puTposeful. Professor Harrison, it seems, was doing a jolb for the Brague regime and
46
SLOVAKIA
the Ozechs. This is all the more obvious in his !book "Czechoslovakia in EmQpean H!istory" (Princeton Uniiversity
Press, 1943, 1195'3), for which Harrison was ·aJWarded the
"Czechoslovak State Prize for Literature" in 1944, when
the Ozecho-1Slova'k State factually did not exist for five
years. 'Dhe award was made iby Dr. Benes's ·g overnmentin.J..ondon at the Uni:versity Clulb in New Yorik, Decem.lber
30, 1944.
•
•~remysl Otaka.r [ (1197-1230:) was able to use circumstances
for the •b enefit of his dynrusty and the Czech kingdom . . . iHe shifted
his allegiance four times. eadh time gaining conoession:s or confirmation of eonc-essions .previously granted ,b y another claimant to
the throne . . . . But to Pfomysl must be assigned the responsibility
for inviting tJhe German immig,r ation. Encouraged by the court, many
Czech nobles. had married Germ,a;n ,w omen; some of the best positions of the ·churoh in ,Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by German clerics; ·German mf.nnesin,g ers ,w,ere in high favor at the royal
court and at the courts of the Ticher nobles" (P. 13).
Here professor !Harrison tells us tJhat 1P rem.ysl Otakar
was quite a "shifity" ruler, using circumstances for the
benefit of his dynasty and the "Czech" kingdom, not the
"Boh,emian" ikingdom, but favored German immigration,
and "Czech" (not Bohemian) ndbles married: German
women, and some of the best ;positions of ,t he Church
in Bohemia and Moravia were held lby German clerics, etc.
It is evident here rthat professor Harrison cannot make up
his mind whether the Bohemians were Ozechs or GelUllans,
or both! It is quite clear, however, that the Slovaiks, the
Slavs of Moravia and Pannonia, did not .fit into the picture of the "Cz,ech" ikingdom at that ,t ime.
The twenty ipa,ges of Kerner's "OzechosloivaJlda" taken
up iby Harrison's "'IJhe Czechoolovaks to 1620" use the
word Slovak(ia) some seven times and, therefore, repudiate the idea, insinuation or implication, that .there were
any "Czechoslovaks" up ,t o 1620. Not only that, but for
Harrison, it seems, the ISlo.vaJks - the Slavs of Moravia
and Pannonia - simply do not exist at all after the fall
of the Great iMoraivian Empire, except for the mention
(p. 17) of "a consideraJble number of (Hussiite) adherents
1? Sfovalkia," which is quite a stretch of the imagination.
The Hussite !business was strictly Cezch; the Hussites did
SLOVAKIA
47
more damage than good for the Czechs themselves, and
aibsolutely no good for the Slovaks, whose lands they invaded, pillaging and !burning their homes, and murdering
their population.
Furthermore, !Harri.son oreaites the impression that
the !Battle of White !Mountain (1620) was ,a; nationalistic
affair, W1aJged lby the Ozechs against the Genmans. That is
the legend fabricated 'Mld propagated by some Protestant
Czechs. The White 1MoU1DJtain affair, however, was definitely a religious and dynastic aifafir. After Tilly, the emperor's general, defeated Frederiok and the Bohemian (111ot
Czech!) maignates, some 27 of the leading "rebels" were
beheaded: one a Catholic; six were Germans. Not one, however, was executed becaJUse of his nationality.
Not without interest is Harrison's mention (p. 11) that
the Premyslide iprinces di'Vided the country, in .t he tenth
century, "into administrative distrfots (zupy) with a royal
representative (zupan) at the head of each distTiot." wf
the Czech Premys.lides actually used the terms "zupa,
zupan," I wonder if professor Harrison mi,g ht enlighten us
from whom they might have acquired those words, since
they are rarely used !by the Czechs .
•
CHA!PTER III - "The Czechoslovaks from the Battle
of White ,Mountain to the World War" - by RO'bert J.
Kerner, Ph. D ., i.lL.D., /Litt.D. - Sather Professor of History, Uni'Versity of California; LL.D., Omaha University;
Litt.iD., Paiik College; foreign memlber, Royal Bohemian Society of Letters and Sciences (Prague); foreign member,
Safarik Learned Society (Bratislava); commander, Order
of the Whlite Lion (Ozecho~SlovaJkia); memlber, Expert
Staff, Colonel House Inquiry and American Commission to
Negotiate Peace (!Paris); etc., etc.
"The dlsa,strous battle of W•h ite Mountain on November 8, 1620,
uslhered lin a period of three centur.les in which the Klngdom of
Bohemia was reduced to .three provinces, Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia, in ,t he Habs,b urg MOIIlarchy. During the first centUTY of •t his
period the nation lost three-fourths of its native nobility, its most
eminent and wealthy citizens, its schools and noted scholara, and its
national independen-ce. A remarkable national renaissance took place
in the second century. In the remainder of the period, the Czecho•
slovak nation, after tlailin.g to bring •about a reorganization of the
48
SLOVAKIA
Ha;bsburg Monarchy on ,a federal -basis, or to secure the same dg,h ts
as tfue Magyars, ,c arried out a ,s uccessful revolution a,nd obtained
its independence" (P. 29).
!Referring to the underscored words, I ask professor
Kerner: 1. What nation, the Czech or Bohemian? 2. What
"Czechoslovak." nraition, when there was none? 3. What
Magyars, ,o r does iKerner mean Hungarians? 4. What revolution 1by the "Ozechoslovaik" nation?.
Kerner used the title he did for this chapter delilberately, because he must haJVe known there were no "CzechoslO'V8Jks," ethnically spooking, ,b efore or after the battle
of White Mol.l.[ltain, to the World War, except in the minds
of dreamers and chauvinistic, imperialistic Creohs. He
could easily haJVe ,o mitted the d:ew references to Slovaks
and the m8Jny to "Orechos}ovaiks" in the 211 1pages of the
chrupter and had ,a rpretty good ,s tory on the "Czechs'' from
the Battle of White Mountain to the World War." Practically everything in the chapter is "Czech" - language,
literature, nation, historians, pe3Jsants noblemen, renaissance, Catholics, Pr.otestants, opera, national anthem, Lutherans, journalists - lbut Kerner still makes pretense at
writing aJbout "Czechoslovaks." Is there any good ,r eason
why an honest, Ulliprejudiced, objective historian should
try to fool even himself? Surely, Kerner musrt !know that
the ~echs devel01ped in the Austrian ,p art, ,w hile the Slova!ks developed in ,t he Hungarirun prurt of the Dual
Monarchy.
What Kerner means to imply when he says that the
"Czechoslovak nafilon . . . . . . carried out a successful revolution" and db.tamed its independence is at least questionaJble. We know that there was not even a revolution in
Prague. !Robert Ingrim tells us:
"All that J:J.a;ppened ,was tJhat Emperor-King Charles, seeing that
Wilson :a:bandoned his former program in the hour of victory,
dropped tJhe fed,ema;listic idea and ordered his minds.tern and lieutenant-governors to surrend,e r the admi'llistration to coonmittees of
the various nationalities. Thi,s explains among other things why
Masaryk, as the first president of Czecho-Slovakia, had to decree
which date was to be regarded as the beginning of the Czech re·
volution. It simply had not taken place. All bhe successor states,
including little. Austria, needed the legal fiction of a ,r evolution, because as• new states they repudiated the idea of continuity and based
SLOVAKIA
49
their la/\V,s upon a revolutionary origin. For the Czechs this was
very important. When, in 1921, .the .Sudeten Germans complained to
the League of Nations t:hat they had not been allowed to take par.t in
the making of the constitution of the new State, the Czecho-Siov•a k
government replied. that 'the Cz~ho./Slovak State was the work and
product of the revolution, made solely by the Czecho-Slovak nation,'
which was, therefore, 'the only constitutional factor.' Hence, 'the
Natiooru Revolutionary Assembly was alone authorized to set up the
constitution' by W1h1ch Germans, \Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Poles
had •b een made second-class citizens" (After Hitler Sta11n? P. 107).
To complete the above piotu.re, '.I might add that the
Slovak memlbers of the "Na,tional Revolutioaiary Assembly" were lhand-'I)icked lby Masaryk and Benes and, included firve Czechs, hence, were not truly representa.tirve of
the political will of the 1S101Vaik nation. The constitution
that resulted, therefore, was strictly a Czech product, j'llSt
as was Ozecho-lSlovak domestic iand foreign policy.
In referring to the development that took ipla.ce during
the Reformation and ICoU!Ilter-lReformation in Ozech rund
Slovak territories, Kerner says that "in general the same
development took place in the ISloivaJk counties od' Hungary
as in Bohemia, /Moravia and \S ilesia." If a person did not
know !better, he might be led to 1believe that Kerner did
not use the express-ion "Ozech counties" in his comparison,
because Bohemia, Moria.via and !Silesia were supposedly
solidly Czech. We know that they were not. And we know,
too, that Bohemia was not the only country that suffered
during the Thirty Yea.rs' War; that war "ravaged Bohemia
with the same fury it unleashed all over the Germanies. . . There was no, difference and certainly no national ,pll!'.pose" (I.n,g rim, op. cit., ,p. 57).
Kerner, furthermore, writes ab.9-ut "Magyar'' magnates
and "Magyar" nolbility, rwhen he really means "Hungarian"
magnates and noibility. There is a difference: the Magyars
were not the only inhabitants of Hungary before or aft-er
the 17th century. The same applies .to the terms "Czech"
and "Bohemian." Of course, we might say that the tenns
today - af.ter the expulsion of over three million Germans - are mo.re or less synonymous. Let us, however,
remember that they were not even in ,t he recent past:
the Czechs were not the only inhabitants of Bohemia.
50
SLOVAKIA
"A new period in .the history of the Czechoslovak
nation was inaJugurated" (p. 32), when 1Fredericik the
Great seirzed Silesia in 1740, Kerner states oaitegorically
and, fartiher down on the same page, that "the reforms of
Maria '.Dheresa and Joseph JiI . . . not only culminated in
the completion of the evolution ,which tra.nsf.ormed the
Kingdom of Bohemia into three provinces and hence virtual amalg,amaJtion of 1!he Austrian Hereditary Lands with
the Lands of the (Bohemim Crown into a single administrative unit, but they threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation 'by the process• of Germanization in schools, government, ,and church."
Here, it is obvious that Kerner w-..s a 1b it ~fuddled
and •a )pparently forgot, in his zeal to promot.e the concept
of a "Czoohoslovaik nation," that ,t he SkwaJks lived in HU!Ilg,ary and,. hence, !by no stretch of t'he imaigination, even
in this "enlightened" and "iprogres.sive" era, could have had
any connection with the "Austrian Hereditary Lands" and
the "Lamds of the Bohemi,a n Crown." It w.as the existent
Czechs and not the nJOn-existent "OzechoslwaJks" who were
threatened with the loss of identity as a nation iby the process of ~a.n:rzatiorn, in Austria. We can concede that the
policy of Joseph ll "of trying to denationalize" Magyars,
Italians, Poles, and Rumaniians "aroused them to activity"
(p. 34), as it did the ~echs, SlovaJks, Croats, Slovenes,
and Serbians, ibut why does Kerner lump the latter nations together as "Czeichoslovaiks" and "Jugoslavs" when
he knows that such did not exist either in Joseph !I's time
or even later? 'I'he reason fur this is only too obvious.
On page 3Q,. the "Czechoslovaks" we.re threatened
"w1t'h Joss of identity as a nation," but three pages later,
according to Kerner, "at the same time the situation of the
Slovaks in HWigary was somewhat improved by the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II" (p. 35). The same
reforms even led "to a great national revival (p. 32) . . .
the Czech renaissance develo ped momentum step by step
as decree after decree of Maria Theresa and Joseph II
sought to a'bolish the use of the Czech language. When
Joseph II completed t!he official demise of the Czech Ian1
SLOVAKIA
51
guage in school, government, allld church in 1790, the
Czech nation revwed. 1So mysterious was this development
that its exact oauses have been a su:bject: of dispute among
the best ·scholars" (1p. 34). Then on t:he following pa;ge
(35) Kerner states: "The Ohurch feared that it would lose
its ,g rip on the Czech nation i:f its priests spolke only German. These and other indications led to the establishment
by Leoipold rnr of a chair in the Czech language at the University of ,Praigue in 1791."
What, then, is this business ,th,a,t the reforms of Maria
Theresa and Joseph JiI ''threatened the Czechoslovaks with
loss of identity as a nation"? And what is so mysterious
about <the reviival of the Czech nation in 1790? Kerner certainly must ha,ve ,h eard a;bouit the principle of action and
reaction! If the iMa~rs, and laiter the Ozechs, had not tried
to suppress the Slovak lang,uage and oppressed the Slovaks, they would have rprobaibly .perished as a nation in
time . .Js it not olbtvious what ha,ppens to languages and peo~
ples in America rwhere freedom abounds? [n America
peoples of every color, .race and creed enjoy freedom of the
press, freedom of religion and freedom of asoomibly; they
are d':ree to !build their own churches, schools, liibraries, 'beneficial organi:zations and ipubHsh new.s,pa,pers and books
in their respective languages. Yet, there is no doufbt in. my
mind that in time non-®nglish iperiodioa1s and 1books, published in America, will /be a rarity. Certainly, this must
be just as olbvious - ,a nd not myst.erious - even to professor Kerner.
•
"A Protestant sc hool, -witJh a c hair in the Czech language a.nd
literature, was founded in Brati,s.lava, and this inst:i,tution counted
amQ/Ilg its s,t udents the future Czech his torian !FrantAse'k Palacky
from Moravia and tlhe Slovaks Jan Kolla r ia.n.d Pave.I Josef i:lafaiik.
The Protestant Slovaks followed closely the d·e velopment or the
Czechs, Wlhereas the Catholic Slovaks under Antonin Bernolak tried
to create, with indlff-erent success at the time, a. written Slovak dialect, which W'<IS s-eparate from .but closely akin to the Czech because
a western dialect of spoken ,Slovak was used. The course of poli•
tical events could not cheok the national revival of Czechoslovaks"
(p. 36) .
,P rofessor Kerner does not relate the whole story, but
only the part that s'l.lits his ipUTpOSe and, hence, sins by
52
SLOVAKIA
omi-ssion. The Catholic Slcwa!ks oonstituted rut least 75 per
cent of the Sl()IVaik nation, while the Protestant Slovaks
only aibout ill per cent. Koillar and Safarik cultivated ,a
"dead" 1amgiuage, a langu,a;ge tha;t was used iby a small part
of tile Slovak nation, the Lutherans. And the latter used
that language - "biblical" Czech, therefore, not the "live"
language of the vast masses of the Czech people - mostly for and during religious functions, while at home they
used Sloiv•aik.
Anton, not Antonin (the Czech equivalent), Bernolwk
not only "tried" to create a Slo.va!k literary language, but
actually did estaibLish such a literary medium of Slorvak
which was u:sed :some fifty years b,y S[ovak writers. There
was no need :for iBernolaik to. create "a written Slovak dialect," ;b ecause various 'Slova!k dialects already were existent at that time. And iBernola:k definitely did 111ot choose
the western dialect because it was "closely alkin" to Czech.
Kerner, however, is quite right when he says that "the
comse of political events could not check the nationa:I revival of the Ozechoslovalks," lbecaJuse they were non--existenrt. Those events could not check the national rerv:wal
of either the Ozechs or the :S'1ov0iks .
1
•
"Caug,h t between their sympathies with the Czechs and their
fears of their .Magyar ov•erlord:s, Slovak patri'ots saw their security,
not in coalescing at once with their Czech brethren, but in iworking
to create a separate Slovak national movement by taking up once
more the unsuccessful jdea of Bernolak that of developing a
separate written Slovak language. Ludevit Stur, Michal Hodza, and
Jo.:,ef Hurban, fearing the reproaches of the Magyars if they continued to use the Czech language, and hoping to attract the Slovak
peasant masses, chooe in 184-5 to make. a dialect spoiken. in tlle
central Slovak counties the '!lew literary language. The Czechs wa,r ned
in v,a in against this departure from t.he practice of a thousand years.
·T hey argued that dts r esults would only be. to the >benefit of the
Germans and Magy,ar.i" (p. 38).
This statement is not based on 'hone.sit, hi:sitorical research. ilt is a fabrication pure and simple. Slova!k patriots ,t hen, even as now, fully realized that they could not
safegu,,ard their nation.al existence !by playing second-,
fiddle to other nations in the political coTIJCert. They did
not fear the 'Maigyiars who sought to Magy.arme them any
more than they feared the Czechs who sought to Ozechize
SLOVAKIA
53
the:rn. True Slovak ·p atriots never let their sympathies for
the Ozechs or other oppressed nations interfere with their
ultimate natioo.a.1 aim: freedom and rpolitioal independence
- to become masters of their own household, of their own
destiny. '.Dhey rebelled against the Magyars and, later,
eiven against the Czechs, just as the Magyars and the
Ozechs had rebelled ag,ainst the HlaJbsburgs.
Stur, Hodza, Hurban (Jozef, not Josef) a,nd other
Slova,k patriots developed the literary SlovaJk medilllIIl
estrublished by iBen1i0laJk and his followers - the "lilve"
language used lby the vast masses of the Slovalk people,
both O~tholic and also Lutheran. They wrote in Czech for
the Cze.ohs and in Slovak for the Slov,aks. Kerner does not
say so directly, ibut the implication is ,t here that Stur,
Hod.fa •a nd Hurb-an did use the Czech language exclusively in rtheir writings. The fact is thaJt; they did not and they
did not fear the "reproaches of the Magyairs" for using
Czech at ,any time they desired to do so. As int.elligent men
they knew fully well they ieould not rouse their people nationally by using a language that was foreign to them, a
language they did not consider their own.
Why, then, the 'balderdash a:bout the Czechs warning
Slo;vak paitriots against their depa;rture "from the practice
of a thousand years"? '.Dhe vast majority of .the IS1ovruk natiO!Il, i!he Catholic Slovaiks, used their own Slovak language in their churches, homes and in their Hterary worlks,
b;ut 'Professorr Kerner wO'Uld hruve students of history "Czechoslovak" history - believe that they used the Czech
language forr a "thousand years" prior t,o 1845. Why does
Kerner resort to outright falsehoods and aJbsurrd falbrications? Czech was brought into Siovakia, it is true, by
Czech exiles during i!he Coun.ter..R.eformation to strengthen
Lutheranism, ibut it never 'became the predominant literary medium of the ,vast masses of the Slovak people and
their ,w riters.
1
•
"The Magyar large landholder, the Catholic clergyman, and the
Jewish merchant, screened, ,b ehind a blatant Magyar propaganda,
worked to denaclonalize the Slovak peasant by falsifying his history
and •by asserting tihat his language had no orelation to the Czech and
did not belong to the languages of western Europe" (p. 44).
54
SLOVAKIA
It is significant that Kerner should put the finger on
"Catholic clergymen" - without mentioning names - and
omit Protestant "progressilve" preachers and Jewish R3Jb..
bis who were equally interested in "denationiali ~ng" the
Slovalk peasant, practically always woTking aigainst :the
national interests of the ISlovalk nation. Of course, this is
nothing new in history. T. G. iMasaryik and Benes, who
should have learned the lesson of :A.ustr1a:-Hungary, denied the existence of it.he !Slovak nation as an individual
ethnic entity, declaring the ISlovia!ks were only a "branch"
of the Czech nation and their language only ,a "dialect" of
the Ozech. (Falsifying history seems to be a specialty of
the followem of Masaryk and Benes. And Kerner proves it!
1
•
I
"Whereas Kr-amai' became, so to ~,peak, the symbol of the
economic u,psm1ge of the Czech lboUTgeoisie, Masaryk became the intellectual and spiritual head of the entire nation, including the Slovaks . • • . He (~·a saryk) became a Protestant, a modern Czech Puritan. Influenced by his reading af Czech history, he ,b elieved that
h-e found. !ts plhilosophy 1n the religious ideal of il:he Hussites and
the Ozeoh !Brethren" (pp. 47-48).
The truth, however, is that T. G. Masaryk never was
the "intellectual and spiritual head" of the 1Slov•lrlLs. If the
Ozechs wish to consider Masaryk :as such, they are free
to do so. The o.vel'IWhelming Catholic majority oif the Slovak people could not. Hlas Kerner forgotten Masaryk's blatant cries "away from !R;ome!" and "Rcxme must (be put on
trial and condemned!"? Czech history is not Slovak history;
the philosophy of Slova:k history does not rest on the "religious ideal of the Hussites and the Czech Brethren." Catholic Czechs form ibhe majority of the Czech nation,
hence, we have good reason to doulbt Kerner's evaluation
of Masaryik -as far as •t hey ,a re concerned, lbecaJuse Masaryk never did represent or COlllcern himself !With their spiritual interests, in fact, put them in jeopardy.
Masaryik, according to Kerner, "viewed the problem
of the small oppressed n.a:tiO'IlS ,as the polilticai and international phase of the social question - the exploit,aitdon
of one nation by anot!her, for political exploitation meant
cheap lalbor to the laboring drasse.s." 'But what happened
after Czeoho-!Slovakiia was lborn and Masaryk !became he:r
first president? He denied staites' rights to Slovakia and
SLOVAKIA
55
thought nothing of the OLechs exploiting the ,S lovaks and
their national wealth!
CHA[PTER [V -
Peace Conference" -
•
"The World War, Revolution and
iby RO{'bert J. Kern.er.
'10n July 4 (191,5), Masaryk publicly in,a ugurated the revolutionary movement •by a ,l ecture on Jan Hus in Zurich, Srwitzerl•a nd.
After Benes succeeded in escaping J.irom Austria, the Czech Foreign
Committee issued its public manifesto for Czechoslovak independence
in Pans on !November 14, 1915. This manifesto had previously been
agreed upon by the leaders at home and by the leaders of Czech
and Slovak colonies In America, England, and France a point
on wihich !Masaryk insisted" (p. 53).
'W ho were those leaders "alt home" and in the Czech
and Slovak colonies in America, England, and France?
The record tells us that the leaders of the Czechs and Slovalks at home ikinew practically nothing of Masaryk's plans
at that time; and the leaders of their respective colonies
in various countries still less!
•
"This Committee (the Czech Foreign Committee) led to the
creation of the •Czechoslovak Nation-al Council in 1916., which under
Masaryk, Benes, and ~tefanlk gradually assumed the functions of
goverJlllilent" (pg. 153-54) . . . "The Czechoslovak National Council,
which was leading the struggle abroad, had not been disavowed by
the nation at home" (p. 56).
1t is quite clear, rt:hen, that the Czech Committee is
credited with the creation of the "Czechoslovak" Council,
which Masaryk headed. But it is not in accord with fact
that the Council "had not been disruvowed 1b y the nation at
home." Masaryk was the leader of the Czech (Progressive
Party, which he alone represented in the .Austrian ,parliament. When he left Austria, late .in 1914, Miasaryk went
abroad with a ipr.ogram of his own. As far as is !known,
he had not consulited wii.th Ozech and Siovalk leaders a:t
home and had no authorization f.ram the Czechs or the Slovaks at home ito represent their politioal will. Of course,
wherever Masaryk went, he did pose as a competent representative of the Czechs at home.
When President. Wilson, .late in Decemlber 1916, requested an lb;elligerents to state their war aims, the Allied
reply of January 1'2, 1917, included the following demand:
"Lilberation of Italians, Riumaniains, Slaws,. and Czeciio-
56
SLOVAKIA
Slovaks from foreign rule." Please note the "Slavs and
Czecho-Slovaks" part, lbecaUJSe thaJt tells us 'j ust how well
the Allies were informed on the sUJbjoot. Since Slovruks and
Czechs spoke different languages, occupied different territories, and never in history had been united, rbhe appelation "Ozecho-1Slorvruk,s " was real new. At that time, when the
British government was asked, in ithe Commons, ,w hethmit could indicate the territory inhabited iby "Czecho-1Slo-·
vakis," the ra nswer was "no."
The Czechs at home resented being mentioned as a nation under "foreign rule." One of their leading ipaipers, the
NARODNE I.1IiSTY, had this tto say aJbout it:
1
"It is amazing how indefatigably Masaryk endeavors to defile
the honor of the CZECH nation. The enemies have learnt that the
love of all Austrian peoples for their inherited dynasty and their
fatherland is firm and unshakable. The enemies have realized that
those who make contradictory statements abroad are liars and impostors."
In Norvem!ber, 1916, all the Czech parties in the Austrian rparliament, without a single exception, had issued a
solemn declaration, stating thrat "the basis and guaranty of
the national existence of the Czech people are the dynasty,
called to the throne centuries ago, and the indivisibly constituted Monarchy." In the declaration they demanded foderafozation. And oin December 30, 191.6, all the Czech party
leaders attended ttihe emiperor's coronation as king of Hungary as "guesrts of honor."
After the Afli.ed reply to, Wilson became !known, the
society of Czech memlbers of parliament sent the following
letter (J,a nuary 23, 1'917) to the foreign minister of AustroHtrogary:
"In view of the Alli-ed runswer to President ,W ilson in which the
liberation of the Czechs figures as a war ,a im, we reject this insinuation whiClh is based on entirely erroneous assumptions. We declare emphatically that the Czech people, as always in the past, is
convinced that it can be assured of a prosperous development only
under the Habsburg scepter and within the Habsburg Monarchy"
(Ingrim: "After Hitler Stalin?" p. 75).
The very same Czech members of parliament requested
Prime M:in.istffi' C1am....Martinic, a Czech, to arrange an audience with the emperor for them. Why? !Because :they said:
"We want to tell His Majesty that we shall always stand by
him and his successors; that our demands will always be compatible
SLOVAKIA
57
with the interests of the Habsburg dyansty and of the realm; that
we are loyal servants of the king and the country; that our complaints have never shaken our belief that after victory the claims
of the ,Czech people will find satisfaction within the framework of
the realm and under the Habsburg crown."
It is quite obvious, then, thaJt the representatirves of the
Czech people did not want separation - independence but federalization. Furthermore, Masaryk ,a nd his Council
were hiit from another quarter. At the conference of the
Sociiailist International in 1Stockho1m, June 1:917, the Czech
delegates vociferously demanded "an independent Czech
State within a federated Austria-Hungary."
Is it possible that professor Kerner, an expert on
Czecho-SloiValkia, is ignorant of what w:as going on even m
Czech lands while !Masaryk a.nd Benes were calling for the
destruction of Austria? I cannot ·believe it •a nd, therefore,
say that iKerner delilberately did not tell the truth when he
said that Mas•a ry'k's Council "had not been disavowed by the
nation at home." Masarylk :himself admits it in his work
"Svetowa RevoJuce" (pp. 1150-il.52; 253-254 ; 32,1 ).
When 'Kerneir wr1tes aJbo.ut the organimtion of the
"Czechoslovak Legions," the work a,ccomplished lby Masarylk and iBenes in ,E ngland, France, Russia allld America for
the esta;blishment of the "Ozechosloivalk Reipulblic," he completely ignores the effort put forth by Gen&al Milan R.
Stefanik, the !Slovak who, did much in France, the U.S. A.,
Italy and Russi.a for the realization of the Republic. fu the
twenty pages of this cltaJpter, Kerner mentiom; the name
of this great Slovak only once, but does not tell us a single
thing aJbo,ut the ,w ork he did so tha,t Czecho-,Slova'l da might
become a reality. If Ma,s aryk himself was not loath to give
credit to •S tefanik for his accompl.isihmen,ts, why should Kerner ibe?
Furthermore, Kerner devotes. several pages to the
"OzechoslavaJk" Legion in Siiberia - "the ,a rmy which had
fought vicitorio'll.Sly at !Kiev, Zhitamir, and Baikhmach, and
which yearned to leave Russia in peace in order to continue the conflict ,a gainst the Germans in the West." He
almost outdoes Masaryk himself on the ·" Siberian anabasis"
legend.
58
SLOVAKIA
The fact is, however, that the legion was offered a
short route home via Murmansk and Archangel whence
British sh1ps were to transport it to the battle front in
France. But the legion, afraid of German sulbmarines and
not too eager to fight, preferred ithe long way home via
Siberia to Viadfuvostok. AB a result, Masarylk's a:xmy
reached Europe long after the smoke of the war had lifted,
without haJVing contributed ,to the defeat of Germany and
Austria. The IStberian anabas:is made greait propagand a for
Masaryk's cause, as he himself atlmitted, and without it,
in fact, the "calli:!e" m1ght haive 'been lost. '.I recommend
that Kerner and other students •o f history, read pp. 81-83
of fugrim's "After Hlitler !Stalin?" - and, ibut carefully,
even Masaryik's "Svetava. Revoluce."
•
"In the ,a ims publicized as the objectives of peace, the Czechosl ovaks were promised their independence on the basis of the selfdetermination of the Czechoslovak nation. It is a fum:l.amentaJ question just what "self-deteirmi natlon of the nations" meant a.t tihat
time. It s eems most probrul>le that when it ,was first uttered it
meant the determinatio n of a n entire nation to choo.se whether it
wished to be jndependent or live under another, and not self-determination of small parts of it" (p. 62).
Here, Kerner quite naively would have us :b elieve
that he iis be.fuddled lby the meaning of "self-determ ination." Of course, he could have given credit ,to Masaryk
and especially Benes for his 1pretended quandary. I say
"pretended ," /because he himself tells us on the page following:
" In many regions the populations were thoroughly mixed in
composition . . . . As far as the Czechoslovak s were concerned, the
matter was complicated by the fact that their claims in the Czech
regions rested on historic rights, the Lands of the Bohemian Crown
(Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia), which they as a nation had created and maintained in history, rund on the rights of nationality for
the ,Slovaks in Hungary, wihere the Magyars cJ.almed 'historic rights
of the Lands of tihe Hungarian Crown" (p. 63) .
So, what is this business "the Czechoslov aks were promised their independen ce on the ,basis of the self-determ ination of the Czechoslovak nation"? !Kerner purt:s himse1f in
a ivery ludicrous situation: he admits the existence of the
Czech naition, Czech regions, etc., does not admit directly
the existence of the Slovak counterpar ts, but still insists
on having a "Orechoslovak" nation!
SLOVAKIA
69
AP, mentioned earlier, one of the aims of the Allies
was the "lilberaition of Iltalians, Rumanians, Slavs and Cze-
choslovaks from foreign r.ule." The Czechs and Slova;ks
got i'lllto the picture also as "Ozech~ova ks," and not only
as Slavs, at the persistent insistence of Dr. Edward Benes to support the fiction promoted by M'aJSaryik and himself that "Czechs and Slovaks were the same." The truth,
however, remains that the SlovaJks are an individual nation in the great family of Slovanic nations, as are the
Poles, Byelorussians , Ukrainians, Russians, C.zec'hs, Bulg,aria:ns, .S erbs, ISlO!Veni•a ns, Croatians, Macedonians, Montenegrins, a,nd Lusatia,n tSerbs, whatever Kerner and other
"historians" of his type might have to say to the contrary
notwithstandi ng.
If Kerner does not be1ieve that t:he right of self-dete:nmination applies equally to the Czechs and /Slovaks, let
him .say so outright and be done wi~h it. Kerner should
know, as we certainly lmow, that the magic formula that
druzzled. and charmed. President Wilson was "national determination," which meant that every ethnic group be
conceded the right to decide to which state it wished to
belong. More dmpo:ntrunt than what it meanit, of course,
was what it implied: the notion that the id68.l state would
be one inhabited only by one ethnic entity, one nation.
The tenth of WiliSion's "1Fo!Urteen Points" reads as follows:
''!The peoples of Austria-iHu111gary , whose place among the nations
we wish to see s·afeguaro€d and •a ssured, should be accorded the
freest opportunity of autonomous development."
What does "the peoples of Austria-Hung ary" mean
to professor Kerner? Does it mean all the peoples, except
the Slova1k people? If Masaryik used his charms to maJk:e
Wilson •b elieve the fiction that the "Czechs and the Slovaiks were the same," and so to deceive him does that
alter the .truth that the Ozechs a.nd the Slov~ are not
one people, one nation? Why should Kenner want us to
believe otheIWise?
•
"The !Peace Conference chose to give the Czechos-lovaks the
hiatoric boundaries in the Czech regions of Austri•a and ethnic bound•a rles In the Slovak districts of Hungary. Furthermore, it •a ddoo,
under cond,l tlons of autonomy, Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. It thmi created a state in Wlhlch 34 per cent of the population was non-Czech0-
60
SLOVAKIA
slovak, ,a nd this element included a German .population of over three
millimi.s, livin,g chiefly in the outer rim of Bohemia, in a state of
less than fifteen millions" (p. 63).
But this is 111ot quite the whole ,s tory. The Peace Conference decided as it did, 'becaJUOO it relied on the "expert"
information supplied iby Masaryk and Benes, !both Czechs,
who presumed to represent iboth the Czechs and also the
Slova!ks. In the state created, the non-Czech population
was in the majority, and this included some three and a
half million Germams, in a state of "less than fifteen millions" (how much less?). The Conference ga;ve the "Czechoslovaks" nothing, lbuit it did allow the boundaries for
the "new" state that was -created, as Kerner states, "on
the -g round that rune or ten million Czechoslovaks should
be favored •w ith independence oiver three million Germans"
(p. 65) - the argument Oif Masaryk and Benes! They
needed the almost three million Slovaiks of Hrung,ary to
m.aJce "nine or ten n:rlllion Czechoslovaks," but the Czechs
and the ISloivaJks, were "the same"!
•
"The Duchy of TesC'hen was ,w,hat was left of Silesia, one of the
Lands of the Bohemian Crown, after Frederiick the Great had seized
fourte en-fifteeruths of that territory in 1740. The historic rights of the
Czechs went •back to t!he fourteenth century. Before that the Duchy
had been ,Polish {p. r66) . . . It was, however, Poland's diss·a tisfaction with this decision which led her diplomacy into d.e manding a.nd
acquiring Czech Teschen on the occasion of the Conference of Mu·
nlch (October, 1938). This blow from the rear really made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to fight after she was abandoned by her
Western allies" (p. 68) .
It is ,olbvious that Kerner either laoks knowledge
about Teschen or is deli'berately attemptilllg to confuse the
readers of his "Ozechoslova:kia." Just lilke Miasaryik and
Benes, iit seems that Kerner does not want students oif
history to know the whole tmth about Ozecho-Sloivaki,a.
Furthermore, the ,allegation that Ozecho,...Slov,rukia was
"forced" to :su,r render to iHitler !Without firing a shot, because her "Western allies" had abandoned her, OT because IDngland ·a nd France asked her to, is purely fictitious.
Benes surrendered Czecho-Slovaki.a to Hitler without
the approval of parliament. The Benes Czechs knew fully
well that Czeoho-SlovaJkia could not be saved, because her
non-Czech majority was not wiling to fight for her. They
SLOVAKIA
61
chose to urrender "at the behest of their faithless friends,"
because an attempt to fight would have revealed to the
world that the Germa~lovak-Magyar~Rutib.en.ian-iPolish
majority of her population was not ready to die for a
tate that had treated them as second-rate citizens for
ome thirty years. And let us not forget that even the
Czech,s, who considered themselves t he "State-nation," did
not fire a single shot in defense of Czecho-JSlovrukia. Furthermore, it is no secret ,t hat Benes did not cultivate
friendshiip with Poland and other neigh'boring states : his
pro Soviet policy over decades of years is proof of that.
Already in 1929 Viscount D'Abernon prophesied:
"The treaty between Czecbo S lovakia and Poland is thought a
triumph of French m ilitarism . o it m a y be, but the duration w ill b e
te mpo rary . . . the Czech satellite will revert to the orbit of the
Moscow planet as soon as disturbing forces cease to operate quite
as powerfully as today."
•
"Germ an propaganda l ater s ought to spread the view that the
bou ndaries of Czeoho slovakia, a s well as t hose of P ol and, wer e
drawn by the Peace Conferene e in ignorance and that they repres e nted a failure to understand the problems of central Europe. N ot hing could be far th er from tJh e facts . The deleg ates o f the Peace
Cont rence had access to and used the best available information
and considered these problems from all possible angles" (p. 6 ).
After reviewing the events that followed World Wa.r
I Mld led to World War IiI, I believe it is safe to say that
Kerner's statement is "farther from the facts" than even
the "German propaganda" he alludes to. The fact rernains
t hat World War I not only failed to solive Europe's problems, ,b ut even ,a ccentuated them and led t o World War II.
At Paris there was a meeting of two continents which were
quite ignorant of each other. The peacemakers blundered
when they accepted interested parties as experts wit hout
having them chedked 'by the opposition. When Lloyd
George asked Benes how many Ma.gyam would fall undeT
Ozech rule, Benes replied that their number would lbe
350,000 ('D. H. Miller: "My Diary at the Conference in Paris"; in reality it was more ibhan one million. Benes, plead..,
ing fOT a "natural frontier," described a little ~oolk as a
nasvigalble river.
Repudiation of Kerner's claim may also be found in
A . J. P. Taylor's "The HaJbsbu.rg Monarchy," C. A . Ma-
62
SLOVAKIA
cartney's "Problems of the Danubiam Basin," Lloyd
George's "The Tr.urth About the Peace Treaties," J. M.
Keynes "The Economic Consequences of the Peace." Winston Churchill's "Afternnath and World Crises,." Robert fugrim's "After Hitler :Stalin?" and even T. G. Masa;ryk's
"Svet<Jva Revoluce." But Kerner himself does that quite
effecti:vely with the last three sentences - especially the
last sentence - of the ivery same par.aJgraph, ,whi.oh reads:
"Another ,s olution of the Czechoslovak problem might indeed be
sought •by some future .p eace conference, if the poignant problem of
the German nation is solved, for example, on the model of Switzerla:nd rather than that permitting a rampant totalitarian racialism.
U.nti,l then it may be said that the work of t!he Peace Conference
was a reasonable solution for its time. Common sense and Intelligence and a few minor boundary rectifications might have aecured
a durable settlement" (p. 69).
Of course, Professor Kerner, could hardly have intended it that way, but this is quite an admission from a mem.
her of the "EXPERT STAFF, Colonel House Inquiry and
American Commission to Negotiate Peace"! We know today
that Kerner was not the only "exipert" who la'o ked sufficient
"common sense and intelligence" at that time.
(More coming)
WHO SAID IT?
"In 1868 the Ozeoh initel,lectuails and the Bohemian aristocrats renewed filleir allegi1ance. . . The eighty Bohemian
a<bsentees from the Reicllsrat made a declaration of their
aims: they asked for equal na:tional rights for the Czechs in
Bohemia, and for a refornn of the electoral system; they
demanded also the unity of the lands of St. We:nceslaus and
the same independence for this "grea,t Bohemia" a;s HUlllgary
possessed. The Ozech leaders were bewitched by the Hungarian example. '1'1hey saw, quite rightly, that the Magyars
had achieved their nation'al freedom by associating it with
historic rilghts, and they supposed that the way to achieve
the national freed~m of the Czechs was to claim the historic
rights of Bohemia. They did not see that the historic rights
of Hungary were real, the historic rights of Bohemia imaginary. . . " - (A. J. P. Taylor, TH1E HABSIBURG MONA'ROHY, London, 1948; p. 142).
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Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (1/8)
Description
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P. A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp. 38-62
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Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
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June-September 1955
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continues in <a href="/items/show/176">Vol. 5, No. 4 (17), pp. 55-62</a>
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SLOVAKIA
29
THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK
Fr. Janik-Horak
(This article results from the contents of the corresponding
article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the
ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and
his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.)
Two months ago - when we had written that the
Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our
exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using
strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at
that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich
which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond
recognition.
We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work
of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it.
First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous
anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of
the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case,
which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which
killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high
ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With
the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the
exiles would lbe frightened into inaction.
Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of
Cerna,k in M<Unich would incite the German population,
and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in
general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in
particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak
opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles,
while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups.
�30
SLOVAKIA
It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together
with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated
the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and
the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia.
We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced
that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The
Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles;
the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and
Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is
its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor
Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s
in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and
which, in fact, he did ;p ublish.
The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this
case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ;
it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is
n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight;
they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say:
good riddance !
Courageously then -
Heroically Now!
Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior
on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free
Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE.
'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a
murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the
editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking
sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands
joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing
and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of
B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e
�SLOVAKIA
31
now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore,
that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most
careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight
against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us.
In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware
o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry
on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never,
however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty
meaningless phrase which we might use in America to
coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere
in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the
Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged
to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that
pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today.
If we have written courageously up to this time, then
from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of
the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know
that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the
wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are
young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do
have a positive, healthy, political program.
We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking
methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we
ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no
mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake
everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a
manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices.
We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come
when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament
still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered
by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of
merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day
1
�32
SLOVAKIA
we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH
even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day
of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country!
It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has
caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in
Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of
Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that
dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when
he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr
will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage
in their fight for the freedom and independence of the
Slova!k nation.
'.Dhe 'Munich <killing of Cernak hais cast light on several
real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front
is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the
so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is
it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~
honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob
needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front.
'!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and
stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of
American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the
mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are
being financed •b y American dollars.
Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble
people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement
that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who
stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when
RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE.
Must All Exiles Think Alike?
The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and
truthfully about conditions in exile.
Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging
every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic-
�SLOVAKIA
33
a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether
the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it
as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we
remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that
we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow?
Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of
the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor
land even though they knew practically nothing about it .
And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would
listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told
us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us
now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different
than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall
persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists
at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing
of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express
a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is
suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg
an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of
others.
1
No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee
Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~
tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes.
What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right
are they trying to force that criminal political conception
upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if
some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would
continually try to force into the administration of their
country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises,
and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not
only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing
praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss
their hands.
With the Munich murder the situation has gone so
far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our
exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe
Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians
in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not
1
�34
SLOVAKIA
interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not
interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions
of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not
a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have
been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies
and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red
Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which
has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press .
In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer
that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why?
Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible
The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual
blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney
in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the
free world from the substance of the Communist threat
which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family
and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us
Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and
immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to
10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the
end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a
light that not only shall we be understood at all why we
are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe
regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the
Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the
olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince
western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a
there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those
described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride
normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic
primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents
of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that
people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even
better than in the West; that there are dances at which
the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en-
�SLOVAKIA
36
twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial
houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~
tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea.
In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol
activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before
the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from
this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat
of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation.
Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile
At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the
support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree
Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC
one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the
OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee
will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we
see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile,
if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in
its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American
FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so
much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there
would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia,
Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years,
is beginning to go through the process of old settlers,
which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the
American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically
protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these
anti-exile sentiments.
Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady
acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their
�36
SLOVAKIA
prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about
their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk
for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best
seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation.
Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists
for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National
Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable
enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents
in Germany.
What are we to say about the threats made against
refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it
not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy
postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny
together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en,
titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where
did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who
was it that let them have them? And how come that
GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE?
Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such?
While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad
Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and
alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany
and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated?
Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face
We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be
translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the
USA with the statement that we are writing against the
Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the
:bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side
of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same
time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep
silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not
oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but
1
�SLOVAKIA
37
when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and
gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the
face.
We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the
irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak"
unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and
which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of
our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples"
democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only
an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists.
Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a
day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth
which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on
their bosoms.
Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf
Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home
telling how he became an official of the State Department.
He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When
he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined
and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl,
Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly
welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech
Radio hour.
Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our
anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not
doUar politicians.
•
•
•
Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago;
AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L.
Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.
�
SLOVAKIA
29
THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK
Fr. Janik-Horak
(This article results from the contents of the corresponding
article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the
ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and
his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.)
Two months ago - when we had written that the
Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our
exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using
strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at
that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich
which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond
recognition.
We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work
of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it.
First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous
anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of
the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case,
which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which
killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high
ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With
the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the
exiles would lbe frightened into inaction.
Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of
Cerna,k in M<Unich would incite the German population,
and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in
general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in
particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak
opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles,
while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups.
�30
SLOVAKIA
It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together
with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated
the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and
the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia.
We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced
that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The
Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles;
the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and
Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is
its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor
Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s
in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and
which, in fact, he did ;p ublish.
The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this
case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ;
it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is
n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight;
they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say:
good riddance !
Courageously then -
Heroically Now!
Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior
on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free
Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE.
'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a
murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the
editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking
sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands
joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing
and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of
B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e
�SLOVAKIA
31
now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore,
that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most
careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight
against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us.
In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware
o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry
on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never,
however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty
meaningless phrase which we might use in America to
coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere
in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the
Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged
to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that
pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today.
If we have written courageously up to this time, then
from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of
the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know
that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the
wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are
young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do
have a positive, healthy, political program.
We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking
methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we
ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no
mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake
everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a
manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices.
We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come
when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament
still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered
by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of
merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day
1
�32
SLOVAKIA
we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH
even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day
of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country!
It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has
caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in
Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of
Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that
dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when
he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr
will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage
in their fight for the freedom and independence of the
Slova!k nation.
'.Dhe 'Munich <killing of Cernak hais cast light on several
real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front
is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the
so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is
it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~
honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob
needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front.
'!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and
stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of
American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the
mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are
being financed •b y American dollars.
Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble
people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement
that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who
stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when
RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE.
Must All Exiles Think Alike?
The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and
truthfully about conditions in exile.
Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging
every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic-
�SLOVAKIA
33
a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether
the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it
as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we
remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that
we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow?
Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of
the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor
land even though they knew practically nothing about it .
And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would
listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told
us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us
now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different
than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall
persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists
at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing
of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express
a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is
suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg
an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of
others.
1
No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee
Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~
tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes.
What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right
are they trying to force that criminal political conception
upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if
some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would
continually try to force into the administration of their
country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises,
and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not
only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing
praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss
their hands.
With the Munich murder the situation has gone so
far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our
exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe
Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians
in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not
1
�34
SLOVAKIA
interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not
interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions
of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not
a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have
been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies
and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red
Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which
has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press .
In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer
that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why?
Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible
The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual
blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney
in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the
free world from the substance of the Communist threat
which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family
and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us
Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and
immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to
10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the
end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a
light that not only shall we be understood at all why we
are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe
regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the
Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the
olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince
western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a
there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those
described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride
normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic
primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents
of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that
people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even
better than in the West; that there are dances at which
the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en-
�SLOVAKIA
36
twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial
houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~
tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea.
In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol
activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before
the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from
this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat
of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation.
Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile
At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the
support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree
Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC
one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the
OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee
will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we
see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile,
if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in
its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American
FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so
much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there
would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia,
Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years,
is beginning to go through the process of old settlers,
which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the
American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically
protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these
anti-exile sentiments.
Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady
acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their
�36
SLOVAKIA
prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about
their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk
for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best
seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation.
Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists
for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National
Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable
enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents
in Germany.
What are we to say about the threats made against
refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it
not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy
postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny
together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en,
titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where
did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who
was it that let them have them? And how come that
GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE?
Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such?
While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad
Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and
alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany
and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated?
Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face
We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be
translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the
USA with the statement that we are writing against the
Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the
:bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side
of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same
time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep
silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not
oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but
1
�SLOVAKIA
37
when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and
gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the
face.
We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the
irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak"
unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and
which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of
our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples"
democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only
an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists.
Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a
day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth
which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on
their bosoms.
Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf
Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home
telling how he became an official of the State Department.
He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When
he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined
and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl,
Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly
welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech
Radio hour.
Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our
anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not
doUar politicians.
•
•
•
Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago;
AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L.
Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.
�
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Title
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
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SLOVAKIA
29
THE MURDER OF MATUS CERNAK
Fr. Janik-Horak
(This article results from the contents of the corresponding
article in ,Czech, wJJ.ich ,appeared in " BOHEMIA" (July 22, 1955), published monthly in Munich, Germany, by the rCzech Democmtic Federalists. T·h e author, its editor-in-chief, is quite outspoken about the
ruinous pro-Soviet and a'llti-'.Slovak policy of Dr. \Edward ,B enes and
his socialistic political entourage whi ch brought Moscow to CzechoSlovakia and the heart of (Europe.)
Two months ago - when we had written that the
Communists were maiking an all-out attack against our
exiles and that this would be a ,b rutaily merciless fight some of our exiles prdbably thought that we iwere using
strong but empty words. That we meant what we wrote at
that time has been proved by the explosion in !Munich
which mutilated Matthew CernaJk (Tchernah1k) ibeyond
recognition.
We do nat doubt that this brutal murder is the work
of the Prague Communists. Let us consider why they committed it and what they exipected to gain by it.
First of ·all, they wanted to liquidate the dangerous
anti-Communist, Matthew Cernak. That is the opinion of
the ipolice commission of experts assigned to the case,
which ascertained that the diabolical instrument which
killed Cernak contained one kHogram (2.2 ~bs.) of a high
ex;plosive which is not at all obtaina!ble in Germany. With
the murder of Cernak, the Reds figured the rest of the
exiles would lbe frightened into inaction.
Nen, the Prague Reds figured that the murder of
Cerna,k in M<Unich would incite the German population,
and the German authorities as well, against all exiles in
general, 1a nd against the exiles from Ozecho-lSlovakia in
particular. They almost succeeded in this, since two Germans were kiHed and 21 others wounded when Cernak
opened the bomlb~ac'kage in a Munich post-office. Premier Hogneir of Bavaria ibro1a dcast a warning to all exiles,
while the leading "foreign affairs" editor of the "Siiddeutsche Zeitung," Mr. Birnbaum, strongly urged the cessation of ,politica1 ,a ctivity of all exile groups.
30
SLOVAKIA
It is significant that Mr. Birnibaum's editorial, together
with a commentary sup,plied by Red Prague, ,w as propagated
the very next day by the Czeoh Press Bureau (CTK) and
the entire Communist press of 0zecho-Slova!kia.
We can thank the leadership of the Union of Democratic Exiles (UIDU) ithat the German public convinced
that the guilty party o,r parties must :b e sought in Red Czecho-,Slovrukia and not among the exiles in Germany. The
Union is made up of seven central organi~ations of exiles;
the fate 'M. Cerna,k was a member of its presidium, and
Vladimir Pekelsiky (owner and publisher of BOHEM[A) is
its secretary-general. Credit must also be .given to editor
Birnbaum for allowing himself to be convinced that he wa:s
in error and that in the interests of impartiality he himself offered to publish the lengthy article of the DIDU, and
which, in fact, he did ;p ublish.
The shocking murder of Cernak was supposed to silence and frighten the rest of his fellow-exiles. Even in this
case, however, we must state that the Communist murderers miscaloulated. rt is true, of course, that the murder of Cernak did strlke fear in the hearts of many exiles ;
it did not, however, frighten of.f the w,arriors. And that is
n;iost important. Cowards always crawl aiway from a fight;
they never did hel,p fight the Reds, so we might just say:
good riddance !
Courageously then -
Heroically Now!
Matthew Cerna:k was our closest Slovak felQow-warrior
on the exile fvont in Ger.many. We stood on the same political platform against Communists and ·against their assistants here in exHe an:d, therefore, even against the ruinous ideology of IDr. Edward Benes in the Council of Free
Czecho~Slovakia and in RiA!DIO FREE EUR.OPE.
'Dhat is why we say that the murder of Cernak was a
murderous attempt aimed even against us here in the
editorial offices of B0HEMtI:A. The German press, seeking
sensations, and some malicious exiles wringing their hands
joyously where nobody might see them, are even writing
and Wking about the people in .the editoriaJl offices of
B0HIElMIA who are "dedicated to death," because we a.r e
SLOVAKIA
31
now supposed to be-next. We are not surprised, therefore,
that we are _urged !by some of our friends to lbe most
careful, to t ~ r our writing and even to quit our fight
against the Reds, ,bec,ause, they say, it is in the best interests of our security that we do not incite the Communists against us.
In reply, we can only say that we are fully aware
o.f the seriousness of the times. Fighters, however, carry
on the fight Entil they either win o•r fall in combat; never,
however, do_,they flee from battle! Now, we fled into exile to fight for the freedom ,o f our nation and for the freedom of all nations. For us this has never ,b een an empty
meaningless phrase which we might use in America to
coiled dollars for a carefree, comfortable life. somewhere
in a seoure 'land !beyond the ,s ea. When the •program of the
Czech 'Democratic Federalists was ,p rodaimed, we ·p ledged
to our adherents . that we would loyally -p ersevere, and that
pledge iwe conside·r sacred even today.
If we have written courageously up to this time, then
from now on ·we shafl' write heroica:lly ! The explosion of
the iMunich murder of Cernak binds us to do so. We know
that our strength and our significance and al,s o our danger to the Communists lies in the fact that we speaik to the
wide masses of the common ipeople of our exile, that we are
young and that we are not dreamers - and that we do
have a positive, healthy, political program.
We are familiar with the bloody and bushwhacking
methods o.f the Communists. As political prisoners we
ha'V'e passed through tens of jails and riruvestigating torture-chambers. That is why we e~pect no quarters and no
mercy from them. We •also know that they undertake
everything according to plan and, therefore, that the murder of Cernak might well lbe followed by a series of further 'killings, even though they m~ght be per.petrated in a
manner different than that oif ,s ending heHish devices.
We warn the Reds, however, that the day ,shaH come
when they ,wjll know that our God of the Old Testament
still lives! There ,w ill come a day when the exiles murdered
by them shall foad baok into the homeland an anny of
merciless avengers. That day shall come. For that day
1
32
SLOVAKIA
we are strug,g ling for years, and rfor that day we shaH
even be prepared to fall, because that shall lbe the day
of a new rising of the sun over our enslaved country!
It is neces,s ary to note here that Cema!k's death has
caused joy not on~y to the initiators and per.petrators in
Red Prague, but even to his opponents in the Council of
Free Czecho-Slovakia. Certainly they. must realize that
dead Cernruk is much more dangerous to them than when
he was alive. '.Dhey know that Cerna.k's death as a martyr
will give SlovaJk patriots a new motive and added cO'llJrage
in their fight for the freedom and independence of the
Slova!k nation.
'.Dhe 'Munich <killing of Cernak hais cast light on several
real~ties. [t has demonstrated what section of the front
is most dangerous to Red Prague. That section is not the
so~oalled Council of Free Ozecho-Slova:kia, nor the "Czecho-Slovax" dirvi,sion of RiAJD]O FREE EUROOE; neither is
it the loudmouths around the dollar trough, nor the dis~
honest people in the social organizaUons who crullously rob
needy refugees. !But it is certainlly our section of the front.
'!'hat is the section that is ,b eing hit from all sides and
stands - and solidly stands - without a single dollar of
American support; nay, it is that section which must resist not only the attacks of the Communists, but even the
mad attacks of the "peoples' democrats" in exile who are
being financed •b y American dollars.
Little wonder, then, that some morally irresponsi'ble
people in the interests of RFE spread among the uninformed foreign journalists the shameless, false statement
that Matus Cernak was •a n employee of the "Ozecho-Slovak" unit of !Radio Free Europe - the same Cernak who
stood loyally at our side on the same forefronit, even when
RJF:Ei rightfully deserved sharp criticism for the propaganda sprea:d iby the "Ozecho-1Slovak" unit of RIFE.
Must All Exiles Think Alike?
The Munich murder forces us to speak openly and
truthfully about conditions in exile.
Our ipolitkal exile. is accustomed to, a.oknowledging
every generosity of the free world gra,tefu!lly and uncritic-
SLOVAKIA
33
a1ly. But the free world owes us much more. . . Whether
the West gave us anything or not, we always regarded it
as our moral duty to ibe sincere allies of the West; and we
remain true to this principle. But is it only our fault that
we are in exile, that our country is enslaved by Moscow?
Or is it not the fauiLt ,o f the Yalta and Porbsdam leaders of
the free world? They negotiated with StaJlin about oor
land even though they knew practically nothing about it .
And it is l.iikewise rtheir fault that at that time they would
listen only to Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes. They told
us to like Stalin against our will, just li:ke they are teHing us
now in exile to like Titoism, which is not a hair different
than Stalinism. We know, too, that tomorrow they shall
persecute every Titoist, even those who became Titoists
at their advice. This is nothing but imbecile uniform:rzing
of the views of the exile. Should any one in exile express
a different view, his own and sane view, immediately he is
suspected and spied upon, smeared and accused of beiillg
an enemy agent. They have no respect for the views of
others.
1
No Thanks to the Free Europe Committee
Americans in the ,F1REE ;JDUROPE COMiMI['DTEE already for years are forcing upon us the political oonc~
tion of the criminal and 1Stalin's agent, Dr. Edward Benes.
What do those men !know a:bout our nation? By ,w hat right
are they trying to force that criminal political conception
upon us? They :would ,probaJbly be very much ,sur,prised if
some foreigners, ignorant of American conditions, would
continually try to force into the administration of their
country Quislings, whOlm the ,A merican nation despises,
and the terror of the immoral "ipeoples'" democracy. Not
only that, but they even demand that the Czech exile sing
praises to them daily and with hat in hand humlbly rkiss
their hands.
With the Munich murder the situation has gone so
far that we cannot lkoop silent a.:bout it any longer. Our
exile has nothing to be grateful for to the Free Europe
Committee. Whatever it gave to the profaned politicians
in the so-oa:lled Council of Free Ozecho-Slovakia does not
1
34
SLOVAKIA
interest the anti-Communist exile at all. And rwe are not
interested if they throw out the windows of RIFE millions
of dollairs of American contributors. Out of that money not
a single cent has gone to support the anti-Oorrununist resistance,. ibut, conversely, those hard-earned dollars have
been used to divide and suppress the anti-Communist resistance and for the support of pro~·Communist tendencies
and elements, if not even outright Communist agents! Red
Prague has murdered \Matthew Cernaik in a manner which
has shaken the entire free world, as witnessed by its press .
In R:ADIO ,F,RIDE EJUROPE the ernme incident was disposed of in a few simple sentences ia.nd they would prefer
that the murder be fo.r,gotten altogether. Why?
Propaganda of RFE iis Responsible
The "Ozecho-iSlovaJk" unit of R!FE with its continual
blabbering of .primitive phrases ·aJbout the Iack of baloney
in Czecho-Slovakia completely diverts the attention of the
free world from the substance of the Communist threat
which is inherent in the moral disintegration of the family
and hum8.1Il society and never in the ~ack of meat. For us
Communism is unacceptaJble, 1b ecause it is immoral, and
immoral even if under it every citirzen would ibe entitled to
10 kilograms of meat daily. This mistaken, primitive propaganda of the "Czecho-'Slov,ak" unit of IRF1E wifil in the
end place our exile in the eyes of the West into such a
light that not only shall we be understood at all why we
are agaJinst a Communist regime, but that rwe also ,s hall ibe
regarded as cheats, adventurers and 1 iars, ,b ecause the
Prague regime, with the help of ente:r,prises such as the
olympics ·a nd others, will easily and altogether convince
western journalists and visitors that in Czecho-iSlovaki-a
there exist other economic and social conditions th·a n those
described by IR@E. It iwill convince them that autos ride
normally on the streets of Prague (a certain journalistic
primitive recently reported from Brno that the residents
of that city hruve not seen any auto fo:r six months!); that
people there are nonnaUy dressed, and in many cases even
better than in the West; that there are dances at which
the bands play western tunes; that there are cultural en-
SLOVAKIA
36
twprises,. calba.rets and night clubs, lange commercial
houses, etc., and that wirbh this our nation will ·b e disin~
tegrated internally by the most immoral Communistic sea.
In the interest of a more effective fight against Communism, it i,s 1high time that the anti-Communist exile presents a unified and decisive protest rugainst this harmfol
activity of the "Ozecho.JSlovruk" unit of RFE, which benefits the Communists in many ways, and so that before
the western public a:nd our nation it keep its distance from
this irresponsible propaganda. At the same time it is necessary to clearly and loudly point out the actual threat
of Communism and the program efforts of t he anti-Communist part of the nation.
Shady Acts of the National Socialists in Exile
At the same time we must not .r emain siilent rubout the
support of the "peoples" democrats by the American Flree
Europe Comrruttee. With this support the American F'EC
one-sidedly puts itself on record for the party of the
OLecho..slovaik National :Socialists. Now, the Committee
will have to reconcile itself with the ,f.act thrut we are going to tell the whole iworld a.lbout this situation. 'Ilhis Committee should also know that in its one-sided swpport we
see a coarse inter:vention against the health of the exile,
if it is not directly against its freedom, and ,a rude political coercion and even moral orientation of the nation in
its homeiland. [fit were not for the support of the American
FEC, today in exile there would not be even by far so
much demoralization and moral disintegration, and there
would not be by far so much disgust, bitterness and disappointments in the wide masses of exiles. [f in Australia,
Canada, the USA and elsewhere we ·are today the witnesses of how the political exile, after only several years,
is beginning to go through the process of old settlers,
which ,w ere friendly to emigrants, then rwe can thank the
American _cirdes which financiailly suppor,t and poilitically
protect the Czecho-lSlovaJk !National Socialists for these
anti-exile sentiments.
Likewise iwe can /keep silent no longer albout the shady
acts of the Ozooh National .Socialists in exile, rubout their
36
SLOVAKIA
prepared -o ffensive against the Catholic Church, about
their shameless and lbra;zen presumption that ibhey speruk
for the exiles and tile nation, and about their immoral political tactics, which might be called a science which !best
seHs itself without iregard to the interests of the nation.
Indeed, that the alliance with the Czech National !Socialists
for those several America;ns is a very ugly calling card even if they use them only because th•e Ozech National
Socialists are, according to their views, the most reliable
enemies of the Germans and, hence, also reliable agents
in Germany.
What are we to say about the threats made against
refugees in the camps who read "BOHEMIDA"? Why -is it
not allowed to sell it there? The "GESKE SWVO" - organ of the Czech National Socialists - is sent on miJitairy
postal numbers to Czechs and Slovaks in the U. S. Anny
together with sharply anti-German flyers of the RFE en,
titled "DEMOCRATIC GUIDE FOR PRAGUE"? Where
did the GESKE SLOVO get those milit.a.ry addresses? Who
was it that let them have them? And how come that
GESKE SLOVO is sent together with leaflets of RFE?
Is this a single enterprise and to be regarded as such?
While American authorities are assuring iDr. Konrad
Adenauer and the west Germans of their friendship and
alliance, members ,o f the U. S. Army in western Germany
and elsewhere are ·b eing sent inciting, anti-GeTman literature! W,h o is responsilble for this? Wihy is it tolerated?
Exiles Lick the Hand for Every Slap in the Face
We •k now with what eilithusiasm our article wiH be
translated, embellished and sent to various rplaces in the
USA with the statement that we are writing against the
Americans. So that there be no mistake albout it, we repeat, that for us it is not a question of what side of the
:bar.ricades our rplace is. We reiterate that for the freedom of tp.e nation and humanity we shali fight on the side
of the free world rto the J:ast drop of !blood. At the same
time we pvoc1aim that we are no longer willing to 'keep
silent if out of the exile is made a ;political clown,. who not
oil'ly no longer defends the. interes.ts of his own nation, but
1
SLOVAKIA
37
when commanded even I-a.ughs and cries and humlbly and
gratefully thanlks and licks the hand for every slap in the
face.
We Tepeat our call so that the democra:tic, anti-Communist exile ,u nitedly and shanply distance itself from the
irresponsilble, primitive ipropaganda of the "Ozecho,.,Slovak"
unit of ruiE, which ma.inly serves the Communists and
which tomorr.ow ,can mean the disintegration and ruin of
our exile. LikewiJSe it should keep away from the "peoples"
democratic Council .o f !Free Czecho-Slovakia, which is only
an expanded party of the Czeich National Socialists.
Let us not ibe fooled. Every period is a period of transition. Even the period during which some American circles surppOirt the ",p eoples" democrats. There will come a
day when those Americans will come to ·r ecognize the truth
which we write today and the snakes they toyed with on
their bosoms.
Let us not forget that even the Communist Adolf
Hoffmeister for two years was an official of the U. S. Office of War Information, which he ridicules today at home
telling how he became an official of the State Department.
He used to ibe acceptruble and supported in the USA. When
he came to the USA during World War IT, he was dined
and wined by the "Czecho-Slovak" countrymen, who today are wining and dining the "peoples" demoaats Zenkl,
Rirpka, Peroutlka and company. In Chicago they solemnly
welcomed him amid even let him sound off on a Ozech
Radio hour.
Let us, therefore, not ,b,e deceived. We must pr.otect our
anti-Commll!Irist exile so that it remains healthy and unyielding at all costs. ,F or this we need honest men and not
doUar politicians.
•
•
•
Recommended Books: McCARTHY AND HIS ENEMIES, by Buckley and Bozell, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago;
AFTER HI'.DLER STALIN? - by Robert Ingrim, Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee; F1ALSE FREEDOM, by Edward L.
Delaney, Sequoia University Press, Los Angeles.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Murder of Matúš Černák
Description
An account of the resource
Fr. Janík-Horák
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp. 29-37
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Janík-Horák, František
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June-September 1955
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3df390c146b8a19ed69021c960bfd41b.pdf
6b96444e10dcd12ca2c175bd4bb3614b
PDF Text
Text
22
SLOVAKIA
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .
•
•
•
MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state
�SLOVAKIA
23
or form of political organization under which they wish
to live
This principle, not applied practically in the past with
respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended.
We fully endorae the principle that the Government of
the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any
government and any state or form of political organization
which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an
alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be
followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in
flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the
Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for
the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy
of self-detezmina.tion.
3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all
forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has
no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual
and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state.
We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a
conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs<!ribe to the policy
that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare
and security of the United States of America and the rest
of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against
it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the
earth.
We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist..
ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a
myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the
godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence
�24
SLOVAKIA
means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that.
4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the
agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and
prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds,
economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us.
We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress,
under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten
of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult
task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it
was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by
a congressional committee to become acquainted with the
background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain,
the nations who always were and still are our friends, the
peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends,
because to them America has always been a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and today is just about their
last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny.
5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the
U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been
very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in
its charter, but an organization of governments, several
of which definitely are not representative of the political
will and national interests of the nations they presume to
represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those
very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the
free political systems of the world, including our own
American Way of Life.
�SLOVAKIA
25
The sad experiences with the United Nations during
the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet
Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble
aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program
of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly
and the Security Council of the United Nations.
As we see it, there is something monstrous about the
idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with
the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have
enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring
us all under their yoke.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the
entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to
demand the expulsion of all nations and governments
espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already
not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made
to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should
make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N.,
gives any aid and succor to any nation or government
which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N.
6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as
presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous
in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in
its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will
not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in
countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by
all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it
genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should
include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a
vehicle for domestic legislation.
�26
SLOVAKIA
7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the
United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not
recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States.
8. Once again we respectfully request the President
rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the
question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945,
because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also request the President and the
Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to
the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U
N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence
of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives
of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II.
We further petition the President and the Congress
of the United States to voice a strong protest against the
violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by
the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague.
9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined
to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who
promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech
and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as
members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition.
The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in
various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never
will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even
if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le
by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization
�SLOVAKIA
27
of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech
Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes,
which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all
anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power
with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their
homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet
policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal
with them accordingly.
We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes
and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This
information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech
"progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political,
cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who
fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such
people are employed by various agencies of government,
like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee
(Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States
entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon
any longer. We respectfully request the President and
Congress of the United States to give this matter their
serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of
our country.
10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be
Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in-
�28
SLOVAKIA
terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-<:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered.
The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and
the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to
the Slovak nation, be<!ause it still is the most effective
weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of
the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron
Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral
and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we
are descended from. We protested when the fundamental
rights of other nations were threatened or violated and
we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights
of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened.
As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given
rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the
Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only
by the United States and other democratic countries, but
even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human
liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the
cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or
political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for
the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the
recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today.
Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955,
with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the
Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America,
in the City of Washington, D. C.
PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President.
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary
�
22
SLOVAKIA
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .
•
•
•
MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state
�SLOVAKIA
23
or form of political organization under which they wish
to live
This principle, not applied practically in the past with
respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended.
We fully endorae the principle that the Government of
the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any
government and any state or form of political organization
which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an
alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be
followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in
flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the
Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for
the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy
of self-detezmina.tion.
3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all
forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has
no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual
and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state.
We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a
conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs<!ribe to the policy
that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare
and security of the United States of America and the rest
of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against
it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the
earth.
We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist..
ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a
myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the
godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence
�24
SLOVAKIA
means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that.
4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the
agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and
prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds,
economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us.
We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress,
under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten
of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult
task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it
was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by
a congressional committee to become acquainted with the
background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain,
the nations who always were and still are our friends, the
peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends,
because to them America has always been a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and today is just about their
last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny.
5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the
U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been
very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in
its charter, but an organization of governments, several
of which definitely are not representative of the political
will and national interests of the nations they presume to
represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those
very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the
free political systems of the world, including our own
American Way of Life.
�SLOVAKIA
25
The sad experiences with the United Nations during
the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet
Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble
aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program
of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly
and the Security Council of the United Nations.
As we see it, there is something monstrous about the
idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with
the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have
enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring
us all under their yoke.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the
entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to
demand the expulsion of all nations and governments
espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already
not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made
to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should
make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N.,
gives any aid and succor to any nation or government
which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N.
6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as
presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous
in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in
its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will
not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in
countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by
all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it
genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should
include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a
vehicle for domestic legislation.
�26
SLOVAKIA
7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the
United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not
recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States.
8. Once again we respectfully request the President
rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the
question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945,
because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also request the President and the
Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to
the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U
N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence
of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives
of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II.
We further petition the President and the Congress
of the United States to voice a strong protest against the
violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by
the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague.
9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined
to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who
promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech
and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as
members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition.
The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in
various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never
will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even
if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le
by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization
�SLOVAKIA
27
of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech
Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes,
which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all
anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power
with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their
homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet
policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal
with them accordingly.
We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes
and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This
information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech
"progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political,
cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who
fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such
people are employed by various agencies of government,
like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee
(Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States
entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon
any longer. We respectfully request the President and
Congress of the United States to give this matter their
serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of
our country.
10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be
Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in-
�28
SLOVAKIA
terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-<:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered.
The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and
the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to
the Slovak nation, be<!ause it still is the most effective
weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of
the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron
Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral
and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we
are descended from. We protested when the fundamental
rights of other nations were threatened or violated and
we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights
of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened.
As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given
rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the
Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only
by the United States and other democratic countries, but
even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human
liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the
cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or
political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for
the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the
recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today.
Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955,
with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the
Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America,
in the City of Washington, D. C.
PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President.
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
22
SLOVAKIA
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .
•
•
•
MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state
SLOVAKIA
23
or form of political organization under which they wish
to live
This principle, not applied practically in the past with
respect to the Slovruk nation, must apply without any reservaJtion even to the Slovak nation from which we are descended.
We fully endorae the principle that the Government of
the United States of America shall refuse to recognize any
government and any state or form of political organization
which has been imposed upon any nation by the force of an
alien power and we respectfully request that this policy be
followed even in the case of the Slovak nation, which is tyrannized by the Czecho-Communist regime of Prague in
flagrant violation of the fundamental principle of the
Charter of the United Nations and in utter contempt for
the fundamental principle of the American foreign policy
of self-detezmina.tion.
3. As Americans and Christians, we condemn all
forms of tyranny, every form of totalitarianism which has
no regard for the ri,g hts and liberties of the individual
and is determined to maJke individuals slaves of a political state.
We recognize godless, materialistic Communism as a
conspiracy against free humanity, as a ,p olitical and economic sy,stem which threatens mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore, we cannot snhs<!ribe to the policy
that doing business with the Savi.et Union and other Communist governments is in the best interests of the welfare
and security of the United States of America and the rest
of the free world. We have fought the plague of Communism openly and resolutely in the past and today are determined more than ever to persevere in the fight against
it until it is completely e:z,adicated from the face of the
earth.
We shall not be deceived by the "pea:ced:Uil co-exist..
ence" propagated by the Soviet Union. Peaceful co-existence with the USSR, the Communist world, is strictly a
myth and a hoax. To give it credence would be folly. To the
godless materialists of the Kremlin peaceful co-existence
24
SLOVAKIA
means full collaboration with the USSR. And collaboration with the USSR means, in the end, a brutal suppression of all freedoms and liberties and utter enslavement.
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, China, and other countries are proof of that.
4. We heartily commend all efforts of the Administration and the Congress of the United States and of the
agencies of our Government to ferret out, unmask and
prosecute all subversive elements, specifically all Communists and pro-Communi sts, who propagate class hatreds,
economic strife, chaos and anarchy, and promote the interests of the USSR which is determined to destroy us.
We appreciate especially the work of the House Committee on Communist Aggression of the 83rd Congress,
under the chairmanship of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten
of Milwaukee, Wis. The Committee had a very difficult
task to perform, but did it admirrubly well. We believe it
was the first time that a real, honest effort was made by
a congressional committee to become acquainted with the
background of the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain,
the nations who always were and still are our friends, the
peoples who with all their hearts want to be our friends,
because to them America has always been a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and today is just about their
last hope of liberation from Communist tyranny.
5. We approve of the idea of a United Nations to promote peace and prosperity in all countries as far as is humanly possible. Ten years after the establishment of the
U. N., however, we note with regret that it has not been
very effective in doing the work it set out to do. As presently constituted the U. N. is not an organization of nations united in the common purpose, so nobly expressed in
its charter, but an organization of governments, several
of which definitely are not representative of the political
will and national interests of the nations they presume to
represent, but are dedicated to the enslavement of those
very nations and, furthermore, to the destruction of the
free political systems of the world, including our own
American Way of Life.
SLOVAKIA
25
The sad experiences with the United Nations during
the past ten years have convinced us that the Soviet
Union definitely is not interested in promoting the noble
aims and purposes of the U. N. Moscow apparently accepted the U. N. only to mask and facilitate its program
of world domination; the Soviet Union is in fact promoting world revolution from within the General Assembly
and the Security Council of the United Nations.
As we see it, there is something monstrous about the
idea of associating in a pretended peace organization with
the godless mass murderers of the Kremlin, who have
enslaved one-third of the human race and vowed to bring
us all under their yoke.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States not only to oppose the
entrance of Red China to the United Nations, but also to
demand the expulsion of all nations and governments
espousing the godless philosophy of Marxistic materialism, so that the United Nations, rid of all tyrants and quislings of tyrants, might function effectively as an assembly of free men. Provisions for such expulsions, if already
not included in the Charter of the U. N., should be made
to that effect, and one of these provis,i ons definitely should
make it cause for expulsion if any member of the U. N.,
gives any aid and succor to any nation or government
which is judged guilty of aggression by the U. N.
6. We stand opposed to the Genocide Convention as
presently written, because we feel that it is dangerous
in the extreme to our Constitutional freedoms and fails in
its primary purpose - the outlawing of mass extermination of peoples by governments - and because it will
not apply to genocide as practiced by the USSR and in
countries captured by it. Genocide should be outlawed by
all nations. But genocide should be properly defined to include government approval, for then and only then is it
genocide. Furthermore, the Genocide Convention should
include "political groups" as well as national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups, and it should not be used as a
vehicle for domestic legislation.
26
SLOVAKIA
7. Because we fear that the adoption of the International Covenant on Human Rights - as proposed by the
United Nations Commission - would destroy our basic Constitutional concept of inalienable God-given liberty, we do not
recommend its adoption as a treaty by the United States.
8. Once again we respectfully request the President
rund the Congress of the United States to re-examine the
question on the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945,
because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also request the President and the
Congress of the United States to instruct our delegate to
the United Nations to ask for an investigation by the U
N. of the destruction of the Slovak State, the independence
of which was proclaimed by duly elected r/ilpresentatives
of the Slovak people on March 14, 1939, th~t is, approximately six months before the start of World" War II.
We further petition the President and the Congress
of the United States to voice a strong protest against the
violation of human rights in Slovakia, the brutal persecution of Slovak religious, cultural and politcal leaders by
the Czecho-Communis t regime of Prague.
9. We deeply resent the fact that even the present Administration of the United States Government is inclined
to recognize and favor former Czech and Slovak politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovak nations. We refer particularly to the followers of Dr. Edward Bein.es who
promoted pro-Soviet and anti-Slovak policy - the Czech
and Slovak Socialists and radical left-wingers who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until 1948 as
members of the Communist-domin ated National Front Government of Czecho-Slovakia of the Benes-Gottwald coalition.
The Czechs and their Slovak hirelings organiized in
various so-called "Czechoslovak" organizations - no matter what their political plumage - never did and never
will represent the political will of the Slovak nation, even
if they continue to presume to do so. One such organization, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," allegedly regarded as a semi-official provisional government-in-exi le
by our State Department, boasts that it is an organization
SLOVAKIA
27
of "anti-Communist, democratic" exiles from Czecho-Slovakia, but, in fact, is an organization controlled by Czech
Socialists who were prominent members of the Communistdominated National Front Government of Dr. Benes,
which collaborated closely with Moscow and outlawed all
anti-Socialistic and anti-Communistic elements in CzechoSlovakia after the war ended in 1945, when it came to power
with the blessing of Stalin and the force of the Red armies.
We, therefore, respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to recognize the members of this Council for what they really were in their
homeland - as promoters of Socialism and the pro-Soviet
policy of the Czech Socialists and Communists - and deal
with them accordingly.
We also respectfully request the President and Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoolovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information supplied by Dr. Eldward Benes
and other Czech Socialists and radical leftwingers. This
information, naturally, glorifies and favors the Czech
"progreflSives" who promoted Socialism and pro-Soviet policy, and maliciously smears and vilifies genuine political,
cultural and religious leaders of the Slovak nation who
fought Socialism and Communism all their lives. It is embarrassing to us, as it should also be to the present Administration and Congress of the United States, that such
people are employed by various agencies of government,
like the USIA (Voice of America), CIA, Library of Congress, and others, as well as by so-called "privately-sponsored" organizations, like the Free Europe Committee
(Radio Free Europe). The Benes Czechs have embarrassed and compromised the prestige of the United States
entirely too long and, therefore, should not be relied upon
any longer. We respectfully request the President and
Congress of the United States to give this matter their
serious attention, 1b ecause it does affect the security of
our country.
10. Since the Slovaks are not and do not wish to be
Czechs, and the Czeclls are ·n ot and do not want to be Slovaks, we believe that it is only just and proper in the in-
28
SLOVAKIA
terests of all concerned that this ethnic distinction be observed when any so-<:alled "Czechoslovak" problem is considered.
The Slovak League of America, together with the organization.s affiliated with it, petition the President and
the Congress of the United States not to abandon the principle of nationality, the ethnic principle, with respect to
the Slovak nation, be<!ause it still is the most effective
weapon against Communism. We urge the liberation of
the Slov8Jk nation along with other nations behind the Iron
Curtain, including the Czech nation. We recommend moral
and financial aid to the fighters for Czech liberation, freedom and independence, but we certainly cannot recommend less for the genuine representatives of the nation we
are descended from. We protested when the fundamental
rights of other nations were threatened or violated and
we certainly cannot be expected to do less when the rights
of the SlovaJk nation are violated and its national existence is threatened.
As Americans who believe in inherent, God-given
rights of nations, we believe those same rights of the
Slovak naJtion must be recognized and respected not only
by the United States and other democratic countries, but
even by the Czech nation as well. As Christians and followers of the American Way of Life, dedicated to human
liberty and the dignity of the human person which are the
cornerstones of democracy, we resolutely oppose the dominaJtion and exiploiitaiticm of one nation by another nation or
political state. We seek no special benefits or grants for
the nation we are descended from, but only plead for the
recognition of and respect for its inherent and fundamental rights, because the Slovak nation cannot voice itself freely today.
Approved and adopted this 23rd day of May, 1955,
with the unanimous consent of all the delegates to the
Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slov8Jk League of America,
in the City of Washington, D. C.
PIDLIP A. HROBAK, President.
DR. FRANCIS HRUSOVSK°£", Secretary
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Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League
Description
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Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp. 22-28
Date
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June-September 1955
-
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Text
SLOVAKIA
11
REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY
{iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue
of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)
I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley
thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from
Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from
your members throughout the country. I was, frankly,
at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was
your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am
happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you.
In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and
here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of
your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its
apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze<:h
or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters.
Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with
Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney
Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both
here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning
the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland,
Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there
can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences
behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left
there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great,
if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must
admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task.
Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have
we run into a problem.
About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a
public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the
text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time:
�12
SLOVAKIA
Dear Congressman Bentley:
You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in
mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal
balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our
staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe.
I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns
the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This
is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a
foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We
try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to
make it.
United States policy, we are informed, favors the
eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of
Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a
Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think
Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free
Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so :
It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy
- from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities.
As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by
equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000
Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total
of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records:
Ratio of
Czech
RFE New York
1. Employees full time
18
Slovak
6
Slovaks
To Czech s
33 %
�13
SLOVAKIA
2.
Freelance employed in 1954
Total
RFffi Munich
l.Employees at radio desk
Employees Production Dept.
51
31
60 %
69
37
44 %
72
30
26
13
36 1/c
40 %
39 %
39
102
Broadcasting total
26 %
26
98
1954
in
employed
2. Freelance
%
16
6
36
Munich, non-broadcasting
The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and
45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the
Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting
(common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent
and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation
in Germany.
Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story,
and something must be added to these figures:
The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to
concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present
fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the
good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks
to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end,
it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who,
speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S.
Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free
world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their
struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them
the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime.
How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and
night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and
neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those
�14
SLOV.MGA.
events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to
what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day .
They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing?
What is their present hope or fear? What is happening
to the wife and children, the church, the living standard,
the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and
worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party
at this time?
For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen
for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for
its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It
must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly
recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they
must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work.
Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of
the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what
they work for. You are aware that they have been both
criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r
them all for their belief that they must get on with the
fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist
bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is
to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free
to speak for themselves.
I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to
you.
Yours sincerely,
(s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON.
There you have the official statement of policy of the
Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question.
�SLOVAKIA
15
Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much
fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received
a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a
copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson
maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United
States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia;
it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia."
On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say:
"Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered
into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of
the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's
thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I
have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for
the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves
That is to say, that such status would be resolved by
means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a
proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom
for all.
"I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government
has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of
Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that
country may truke place. I would rather believe that the
Department has not committed itself in the future to either
the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but
that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the
people of that area should freely choose at the time they
may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice."
�16
SLOVAKIA
The reply from the Department of State dated May 2
sets forth the official position of our government in this
respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing
this also:
"In dealing with Central and IDastern European states,
their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on
the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under
free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of
any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of
the stability, security and economic viability of Central and
Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on
the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine
their own governmental and economic institutions, as well
as their relationships with each other and with the other
peoples of Europe.
"With respect to the question of the future territorial
organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will
continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State.
"The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one
state since 1918, except for the period of World War II
when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through
Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State
seek to have this government take action which may be
construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State
of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the
present Communist regime, and has come to favor the
break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State.
"'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure
along this line from continuing to deal with the historical
concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and
Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own
�SLOVAKIA
17
free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern
Europe, consequences which would exist long after that
area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status
of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards
against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it
includes national minorities."
So there you have the official views of the Free :mu.
rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards
the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all
I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more
important for you to know these official viewpoints than
to hear anythtng which I might have to say.
You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy
which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible
moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental
policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia.
However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes
what appears to me to be the correct position and that
is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples
themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their
homeland.
I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part
of the State Department and I think it is something we
all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for
the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent
and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But
there is one all-important task before us at the moment
and that is to work together in e<Very possible way for the
lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important,
should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I
say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for
�18
SLOVAKIA
an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia
must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to
which we must devote our all.
Developments are taking place today in Europe which
are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is
being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian
peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty,
they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have
a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free
Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be
for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the
Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other
enslaved peoples in that part of Europe .
And I do believe that this happy development has
come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the
Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures
engendered upon her by the free world of which this
country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now
be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to
do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on.
Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist
Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I
had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and
which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of
Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or
may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an
identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of
State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova-
�SLOVAKIA
19
kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two
weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted
and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,
of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a
rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration
and action. This is the type of pressure used against the
Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see
continued in the future.
Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between
the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those
who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further
concessions which would further abandon the enslaved
people to their fate. I personally think there will be little,
if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I
have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I
give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples
such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen
to this letter which I received from the State Department
last December:
'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the
captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a
party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it
seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence.
"Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign
policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress
in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the
realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among
the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the
�20
Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude
toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we
will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again
enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice."
In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and
the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better
than to let you know what the Communists think about
you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder
the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was
our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April
19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the
Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a
few paragraphs from this Communist document to close
my remarks this evening:
"The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants
and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight
against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged
in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as
an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is
described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants.
"The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but
also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves
in the fight against their common fascist enemy.
"At the present time, reports, both in the American
and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how
American justice and various congressional investigating
�SLOVAKIA
21
committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the
investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its
report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that
the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by
the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II.
"Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called
Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report
gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts
as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of
the United States of America base their hostile activities
against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist
emigre groups.
"'Dhe present Government of the United States quite
openly gives support to and encourages those elements,
who, as early as the period before World War II, sided
with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial
integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility
to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new
World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have
now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive
groups in the United Sates of America.
"Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in
Western Germany, in the organization of plots against
Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the
people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who
escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European
States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new
master but along the same fascist line."
So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the
work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by
your own organization and its leaders, must be effective,
must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained
outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the
�22
SLOVAKIA
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .
•
•
•
MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state
�
SLOVAKIA
11
REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY
{iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue
of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)
I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley
thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from
Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from
your members throughout the country. I was, frankly,
at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was
your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am
happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you.
In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and
here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of
your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its
apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze<:h
or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters.
Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with
Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney
Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both
here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning
the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland,
Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there
can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences
behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left
there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great,
if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must
admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task.
Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have
we run into a problem.
About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a
public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the
text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time:
�12
SLOVAKIA
Dear Congressman Bentley:
You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in
mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal
balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our
staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe.
I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns
the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This
is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a
foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We
try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to
make it.
United States policy, we are informed, favors the
eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of
Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a
Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think
Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free
Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so :
It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy
- from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities.
As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by
equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000
Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total
of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records:
Ratio of
Czech
RFE New York
1. Employees full time
18
Slovak
6
Slovaks
To Czech s
33 %
�13
SLOVAKIA
2.
Freelance employed in 1954
Total
RFffi Munich
l.Employees at radio desk
Employees Production Dept.
51
31
60 %
69
37
44 %
72
30
26
13
36 1/c
40 %
39 %
39
102
Broadcasting total
26 %
26
98
1954
in
employed
2. Freelance
%
16
6
36
Munich, non-broadcasting
The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and
45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the
Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting
(common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent
and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation
in Germany.
Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story,
and something must be added to these figures:
The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to
concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present
fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the
good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks
to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end,
it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who,
speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S.
Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free
world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their
struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them
the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime.
How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and
night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and
neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those
�14
SLOV.MGA.
events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to
what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day .
They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing?
What is their present hope or fear? What is happening
to the wife and children, the church, the living standard,
the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and
worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party
at this time?
For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen
for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for
its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It
must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly
recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they
must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work.
Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of
the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what
they work for. You are aware that they have been both
criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r
them all for their belief that they must get on with the
fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist
bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is
to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free
to speak for themselves.
I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to
you.
Yours sincerely,
(s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON.
There you have the official statement of policy of the
Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question.
�SLOVAKIA
15
Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much
fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received
a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a
copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson
maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United
States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia;
it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia."
On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say:
"Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered
into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of
the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's
thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I
have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for
the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves
That is to say, that such status would be resolved by
means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a
proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom
for all.
"I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government
has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of
Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that
country may truke place. I would rather believe that the
Department has not committed itself in the future to either
the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but
that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the
people of that area should freely choose at the time they
may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice."
�16
SLOVAKIA
The reply from the Department of State dated May 2
sets forth the official position of our government in this
respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing
this also:
"In dealing with Central and IDastern European states,
their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on
the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under
free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of
any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of
the stability, security and economic viability of Central and
Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on
the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine
their own governmental and economic institutions, as well
as their relationships with each other and with the other
peoples of Europe.
"With respect to the question of the future territorial
organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will
continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State.
"The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one
state since 1918, except for the period of World War II
when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through
Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State
seek to have this government take action which may be
construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State
of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the
present Communist regime, and has come to favor the
break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State.
"'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure
along this line from continuing to deal with the historical
concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and
Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own
�SLOVAKIA
17
free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern
Europe, consequences which would exist long after that
area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status
of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards
against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it
includes national minorities."
So there you have the official views of the Free :mu.
rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards
the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all
I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more
important for you to know these official viewpoints than
to hear anythtng which I might have to say.
You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy
which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible
moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental
policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia.
However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes
what appears to me to be the correct position and that
is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples
themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their
homeland.
I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part
of the State Department and I think it is something we
all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for
the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent
and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But
there is one all-important task before us at the moment
and that is to work together in e<Very possible way for the
lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important,
should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I
say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for
�18
SLOVAKIA
an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia
must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to
which we must devote our all.
Developments are taking place today in Europe which
are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is
being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian
peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty,
they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have
a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free
Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be
for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the
Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other
enslaved peoples in that part of Europe .
And I do believe that this happy development has
come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the
Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures
engendered upon her by the free world of which this
country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now
be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to
do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on.
Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist
Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I
had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and
which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of
Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or
may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an
identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of
State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova-
�SLOVAKIA
19
kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two
weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted
and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,
of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a
rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration
and action. This is the type of pressure used against the
Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see
continued in the future.
Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between
the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those
who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further
concessions which would further abandon the enslaved
people to their fate. I personally think there will be little,
if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I
have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I
give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples
such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen
to this letter which I received from the State Department
last December:
'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the
captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a
party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it
seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence.
"Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign
policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress
in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the
realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among
the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the
�20
Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude
toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we
will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again
enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice."
In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and
the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better
than to let you know what the Communists think about
you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder
the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was
our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April
19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the
Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a
few paragraphs from this Communist document to close
my remarks this evening:
"The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants
and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight
against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged
in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as
an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is
described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants.
"The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but
also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves
in the fight against their common fascist enemy.
"At the present time, reports, both in the American
and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how
American justice and various congressional investigating
�SLOVAKIA
21
committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the
investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its
report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that
the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by
the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II.
"Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called
Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report
gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts
as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of
the United States of America base their hostile activities
against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist
emigre groups.
"'Dhe present Government of the United States quite
openly gives support to and encourages those elements,
who, as early as the period before World War II, sided
with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial
integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility
to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new
World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have
now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive
groups in the United Sates of America.
"Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in
Western Germany, in the organization of plots against
Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the
people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who
escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European
States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new
master but along the same fascist line."
So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the
work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by
your own organization and its leaders, must be effective,
must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained
outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the
�22
SLOVAKIA
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .
•
•
•
MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state
�
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1955, Vol. 5
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<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
11
REMAR~S OF HON. ALVIN M. BENTLEY
{iBefore the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak Lea gue
of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)
I am, of course, happy to be here with Mrs. Bentley
thts evening with so many of our good Slovak friends from
Michigan and elsewhere throughout the country. I remember two years ago when I had inserted in the Congressional Record an article from the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and how many letters of protest I received from
your members throughout the country. I was, frankly,
at that time quite amazed to learn how widespread was
your organization. For many reasons, of course, I am
happy that my subsequent actions have only evoked commendation from you.
In my talks with your members, both in Michigan and
here in Washington, I have come to realize that one of
your greatest difficulties lies with the Free Europe Committee and, specifically with Radio Free Europe and its
apparent tendency to swbordinate Slovak matters to Cze<:h
or, rather, to "Czecho~lovak" matters.
Now I have had occasion in the past to deal with
Radio Free Europe and with its director, Mr. Whitney
Shepardson. I have broadcast over their facilities, both
here in the United States and in Germany. Concerning
the work they are doing in their broadcasts to Poland,
Hungary and many of the other satellites, I think there
can be little or no criticism. From my own experiences
behind the Iron Curtain and from my contacts since I left
there, I should say that Radio Free Europe has as great,
if not greater, audience than any other media of propaganda used by the free world. So, on the whole, we must
admit the RFE is performing a useful and valuable task.
Only in this matter of Czech and Slovak programs have
we run into a problem.
About two months ago, I wrote Mr. Shepardson, expressing my concern in this matter and asking him for a
public statement of policy in this respect. I have here the
text of his reply, dated April 19, and I think it is important enough to read to you at this time:
12
SLOVAKIA
Dear Congressman Bentley:
You ask in your letter of March 25 for a public statement of this Committee's policy with respect to the Slovruk question. I am glad to note that what you have in
mind, specifically, is that we arrive at as nearly an equal
balance as possible of Czech and Slovak persons on our
staff - and I presume, of air time on Radio Free Europe.
I say this because at bottom the Slovak question concerns
the future political status of the people of Slovakia. This
is, of course, something which lies wholly outside the competence of the Free Europe Committee. We are not a
foreign office, we are a political warfare organization. We
try to follow United States policy, we do not U111dertake to
make it.
United States policy, we are informed, favors the
eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of
Czechoslovak ia ; it does not favor the establishment of a
Republic of Slovakia. (As I will point out later, I think
Mr. Shepardson is mistaken in this belief). Radio Free
Europe is not obliged to reiterate this fact in its broadcasts to Czechs and Slovaks, and indeed it does not do so :
It refrains from discussing it. This means also that it refrains and indeed it should refrain, in view of U. S. policy
- from promoting Slovak separatism over its facilities.
As to Czech and Slovak personnel and air time, by
equal I take it you mean equitable, since, according to statistics as of February 1955 published by the Prague regime, the proportion of Slovaks to Czechs in Czechoslovakia was 34 percent. 2,990,000 Slovaks and 8,870,000
Czechs. As to Radio Free Europe air time. the Slovak proportion is 67 percent of the Czech ( 40 percent of the total
of 113½ hours a week). Here is a breakdown of our employment records:
Ratio of
Czech
RFE New York
1. Employees full time
18
Slovak
6
Slovaks
To Czech s
33 %
13
SLOVAKIA
2.
Freelance employed in 1954
Total
RFffi Munich
l.Employees at radio desk
Employees Production Dept.
51
31
60 %
69
37
44 %
72
30
26
13
36 1/c
40 %
39 %
39
102
Broadcasting total
26 %
26
98
1954
in
employed
2. Freelance
%
16
6
36
Munich, non-broadcasting
The total broadcasting staff includes 120 Czechs and
45 Slovaks, the latter in the ratio of 38 percent. The freelance record for 1954 is 149 Czechs and 57 Slovaks, the
Slovak ratio being again 38 percent. In non~broadcasting
(common labor, etc.) the Slovak proportion is 16 percent
and is probably a fair reflection of the escapee situation
in Germany.
Statistics by themselves never tell the whole story,
and something must be added to these figures:
The function of the Free Europe Committee is not to
concern itself with future political and territorial arrangements in Europe. Its function is to carry on the present
fight against Communism, especially behind the Iron Curtain. To carry on that fight successfully, it must have the
good will of the peoples it addresses: Therefore, it seeks
to win the approval of the people of Slovakia. To this end,
it invites into the service Slovak escapees of talent who,
speaking in their own name (not in the name of the U. S.
Government or of the American people), inform their captive fellow-countrymen of what is going on in the free
world, report evidences of American (particularly SlovakAmericrun) concern for their fate, support them in their
struggle against the Communist oppressors, instill in them
the hope of eventually regaining their freedom, and sustain their deep spirit of non-cooperation with the Communist regime.
How do our Slovak co-workers contribute to our common purposes? They listen to the Comunist radio day and
night. They read the Communist press. They interview Slovaik escapees. They watch events in Soviet Russia and
neighboring countries and estimate the impact of those
14
SLOV.MGA.
events upon Slovakia. They seek to learn and respond to
what is in the mind of the Slovak listeners this very day .
They ask themselves: What is the particular form of oppression the Slovaks are at this moment undergoing?
What is their present hope or fear? What is happening
to the wife and children, the church, the living standard,
the spiritual and cultural life of the Slovak peasant and
worker? How weak or strong are the regime and the party
at this time?
For these reasons, our Slovak staff must be chosen
for its intimate knowledge of present-day Slovakia and for
its professional competence, not its party allegiance. It
must be made u:e, so far as possible, of recent or fairly
recent escapees, men and women, who haVe had experience with life under Communism in Slovakia; but they
must at the same time be editors, writers, actors, radio producers and other professionals experienced in our work.
Our staff possesses this competence and this experience. And they are patriots, not partisans. The cause of
the people, not the cause of this or that faction is what
they work for. You are aware that they have been both
criticized and defended right inside Slov3Jk separatist circles. Some are Protestant, some are Catholic. Some are Czechoslovruk federalists, some even sepaTatists. We hono.r
them all for their belief that they must get on with the
fight against Communism and wait to cross the separatist
bridge, or federalist bridge, until they come to it, which is
to say, until the time when the Slavak people will be free
to speak for themselves.
I am sure that we have your sympathetic understanding. I am happy to think that you will interpret our position to the American Slovak League as you have interpreted theirs to us, and I send our respectful regrurds to
you.
Yours sincerely,
(s) WHITNEY S. SHEPARDSON.
There you have the official statement of policy of the
Free Europe Committee on the whole Slovak question.
SLOVAKIA
15
Now I know that many, if not all of you, would have much
fault to find with this letter. Only ten days ago I received
a ten-page letter from Phil Hrobak after I had sent him a
copy of the Shepardson letter. But let me go back and refer to the one great mistake which I think Mr. Shepardson
maikes when he speaks of the policy of our government regarding the Slovak question and when he says: "United
States policy, we are informed, favors the eventual restoration of a truly democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia;
it does not favor the establishment of a Republic of Slovakia."
On April 25, I wrote the Secretary of State and directed his attention to that sentence. I went on to say:
"Although I am aware that thi,s government never entered
into diplomatic relations with the war-time government of
the Republic of Slovakia but, on the contrary, has maintained such recognition with the Republic of Czechoslovakia ever since its inception, I nevertheless presume to request a statement of the Department's
thinking in regard to tlhis i mp or t a n t matter. I
have always been under the firm impression that this government properly considered the political status of the enslaved countries, following their liberation, to be one for
the peo•ples of those countries to determine for themselves
That is to say, that such status would be resolved by
means o.f independent self-determination consistent with a
proper regard for the rights and privileges of their neighbors and founded upon the ideas of justice and freedom
for all.
"I, therefore, hesitate to believe that this government
has committed itself to a continuation of the Republic of
Czecho,s lovakia at such a time as the liberation of that
country may truke place. I would rather believe that the
Department has not committed itself in the future to either
the idea of Czechoslovakia or of independent Slovakia but
that it would make its own decision and base its own support on whatever form of government or governments the
people of that area should freely choose at the time they
may be aible to enjoy such freedom of choice."
16
SLOVAKIA
The reply from the Department of State dated May 2
sets forth the official position of our government in this
respect and I presume you will be interested in hearing
this also:
"In dealing with Central and IDastern European states,
their territorial organization, and their national composition, the policy of the department has been predicated on
the belief that support for the principle of self-determination makes it incumbent on us to await a conclusive manifestation of the will of the people of those states under
free conditions, and to consider fully the consequences of
any action in favor o.f a new state from the standpoint of
the stability, security and economic viability of Central and
Eastern Europe generally. The focus of this policy is on
the creation of conditions under which the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe will be able freely to determine
their own governmental and economic institutions, as well
as their relationships with each other and with the other
peoples of Europe.
"With respect to the question of the future territorial
organization of Czechoslova;kia, it is the view of the department that the Czech and Slovak peoples should themselves determine under free conditions whether they will
continue to live together in a common Czechoslovak State.
"The Czechs and Slovaks have been united in one
state since 1918, except for the period of World War II
when the Czechoslovak Republic was dismembered through
Nazi aggression. Advocates of a separate Slovak State
seek to have this government take action which may be
construed 8/S an indication that the United States Government has changed its attitude toward the territorial State
of Czechoslovakia, apart from its attitude toward the
present Communist regime, and has come to favor the
break-up of that state and the creation of a separate Slovak State.
"'Dhe department believes, however, that a departure
along this line from continuing to deal with the historical
concept of a united Czechoslovakia until the Czechs and
Slovaks themselves may otherwise determine o.f their own
SLOVAKIA
17
free choice would have fateful consequences in Eastern
Europe, consequences which would exist long after that
area wins independence of Soviet domination. These consequences would involve such matters as the eventual political organization of all of Eastern Europe, the status
of each of the many ethnic groups in that area, the relations of each such group to the United States and to Germany, Russia and other European powers, and safeguards
against the territorial, political and economic fragmentation of Eastern Europe and even of Slovakia itself, since it
includes national minorities."
So there you have the official views of the Free :mu.
rope Committee and of the Department of State as regards
the Slovaik question. It may seem to some of you that all
I have been doing this evening has been to read letters instead of giving a speech, but I believed that it was more
important for you to know these official viewpoints than
to hear anythtng which I might have to say.
You, of course, have noticed the outstanding discrepancy between these two viewpoints a discrepancy
which I intend to see is reconciled at the earliest possible
moment. Mr. Shepardson declared that our governmental
policy favors the restoration of the Republic of Czechoslova:lda and not an independent Republic of Slovakia.
However, the State Department, on the other hand, ta;kes
what appears to me to be the correct position and that
is that this is a matter for the Czech and Slovak peoples
themsel'Ves to determine following the li'beration of their
homeland.
I think that is a noteworthy admission on the part
of the State Department and I think it is something we
all should bear in mind. I know how all of you long for
the day when Slovakia will again be free and independent
and I sympathize with your viewpoint in that respect. But
there is one all-important task before us at the moment
and that is to work together in e<Very possible way for the
lrberation of the enslaved peoples from the grip of Communist tyranny. No purpose, no aim, however important,
should be allowed to take precedence over this task. So I
say to you that you do well indeed to keep up the fight for
18
SLOVAKIA
an independent Slovakia but do not forget that Slovakia
must be free before she can be independent. The achie,vement of freedom from the Communists is something to
which we must devote our all.
Developments are taking place today in Europe which
are most important in the matter of considering liberation. For the first time since the war, the Iron Curtain is
being pushed eastwards with the signing of the Austrian
peace treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from
Eastern Austria. According to the terms of the treaty,
they are supposed to withdraw from Hungary and Rumania. Now not only Hungary but also Slovakia will have
a common border with freedom. Now your fellow-countrymen in Bratislava can look across the Danube into free
Austria. Think what a tremendous attraction that will be
for them and think how it will add to the difficulties of the
Czech Communist regime in trying to retain its totalitarian control. I do believe the li,b eration of Eastern Austria will have far~reaching consequences for many other
enslaved peoples in that part of Europe .
And I do believe that this happy development has
come about because of the internal difficulties faced by the
Soviet Union as well as a result of the external pressures
engendered upon her by the free world of which this
country is the leader. I trust that these pressures will now
be intensified on the Soviet Union and I certainly intend to
do my small part in seeing that the heat remains on.
Take the work of the Select Committee on Communist
Aggression, the former Kersten Committee, on which I
had the honor to serve during the 83rd Congress, and
which did so much to reveal to the free world the story of
Communist enslavement and brutality, in Slovakia and
elsewhere behind the Iron Curtain. This committee may or
may not be reactivated - I do not know. But every former member of the committee who is still in Congress four Democrats and two Republicans - has introduced an
identical resolution which would call on the Secretary of
State to have introduced in the United Nations a resolution declaring the Soviet Union to he an international aggressbr because of her takeover and occupation of Slova-
SLOVAKIA
19
kia, the Baltic States and others of the satellites. Two
weeks ago, this resolution was overwhelmingly adopted
and approved by the House Foreign Affairs Oommittee,
of which I am also a member, and we hope soon to have a
rule to bring it to the floor of the House for consideration
and action. This is the type of pressure used against the
Soviet Union in the past and which is now paying dividends - this is the type of pressure which I want to see
continued in the future.
Some people, I know, have expressed misgivings regarding the forthcoming meeting "at the summit" between
the leaders of the Big Four. With the unhappy memories
of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam in mind, there are those
who have wondered if this would be another such meeting whereby the United States might agree to further
concessions which would further abandon the enslaved
people to their fate. I personally think there will be little,
if any, value to a Big Four meeting and that is why I
have consistently opposed it. But, if it does take place, I
give you the pledge of this government, of this administration, that there will be no sell-out of the captive peoples
such as took place at similar meetings in the past. Listen
to this letter which I received from the State Department
last December:
'During the past two years this goveTnment has issued, or subscribed to, a number of public statements indicating that it is not reconciled to the present fate of the
captive peoples of Eastern Europe; that it will not be a
party to any arrangement or treaty confirming or prolonging their subjection to Soviet despotism; and that it
seeks by peaceful means conditions permitting these enslaved national groups to recover genuine freedom and independence.
"Recently in a speech reviewing United States foreign
policy before the Thirty-Third Annual 4-H Club Congress
in Chicago, the Secretary spoke of our efforts in the
realistic pursuit of peace and at the same time of our action in many ways to sustain the hope of freedom among
the captive peoples. As of particular relevance in this connection, he stated that 'The scope of conferences with the
20
Soviet government is necessarily limited by our attitude
toward the captive peoples, for the Soviets know that we
will not make ~y deal which would condone and perpetuate the captivity of men and nations.' The principles enunciated in this speech show that our objective remains unchanged, namely to work in all peaceful ways for the creation of a Europe in which the captive peoples will again
enjoy governments as well as social and economic institutions of their own free choice."
In regard to the Slovak League of America itself and
the value of the work you are doing, I can do no better
than to let you know what the Communists think about
you. We on the Kersten Committee found that the louder
the Commun~sts screamed about us the more effective was
our work, the more we were hurting them. Now last April
19 the Czech Communist foreign office in Prague delivered a note to our embassy there, a note of protest regarding many things. I inserted the text of this note in the
Congressional Record on May 10 and I want to read you a
few paragraphs from this Communist document to close
my remarks this evening:
"The report of the Kersten Committee extols the socalled Slovak State, covers up the crimes of the occupants
and their henchmen and stresses their merits in their fight
against the Soviet Union and Communism. The anti-fascist resistance of the Czechoslovak people is disparaged
in the repo.r t, the Slovak national uprising is described as
an improvised relbellion of suJbversive elements, and the
liberation of Czechoslovakia by the heroic Soviet army is
described with bitter sorrow at the defeat of Hitlerite occupants.
"The Kersten Committee reports are a gross provocation not only against all Czech and Slovak patriots, but
also against all honest and democratic Americans who, together with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and other Democratic countries, sacrificed their lirves
in the fight against their common fascist enemy.
"At the present time, reports, both in the American
and the world press, daily give the reader a picture of how
American justice and various congressional investigating
SLOVAKIA
21
committees fabricate anti-Communist testimony. As to the
investigation of the so-called Kersten Committee and its
report on Czechoslovakia, however, it is worthy of note that
the principal witnesses and experts named and quoted by
the reiport are iprimarilly notorious fascists and coNaJborators from the time of World War II.
"Thus, for instance, the section dealing with the antifascist struggle of the Slovak people is based on the testimony of the former Charge D' Affaires of the so-called
Slovak State in Madrid, Jozef Mikus, to whom the report
gives his full title, obvio1.l1Sily in order to eliminaite any doUJbts
as to his qualifications or loyalty. The official circles of
the United States of America base their hostile activities
against Czechoslovakia on the most reactionary fascist
emigre groups.
"'Dhe present Government of the United States quite
openly gives support to and encourages those elements,
who, as early as the period before World War II, sided
with Hitler in the breaking up of the unity and territorial
integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, who gave convincing proof of their political convictions by their servility
to the fascist occupants and who, speculating on a new
World War and a new occupation of Czechoslovakia, have
now placed themselves fully at the disposal of aggressive
groups in the United Sates of America.
"Similarly, the United States occupation -:mbhorities in
Western Germany, in the organization of plots against
Ozec'hoslovakia, cooperate closely with the traitors of the
people, with convicted war criminals. Thus, under the protection of the United States occupation authorities, the former minister of the so-called Slovak State in Berlin, Matus Cernak, together with a number of other traitors who
escaped from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European
States, continue in their treacherous activities under a new
master but along the same fascist line."
So there you have it. You can readily perceive that the
work of our own Kersten Committee, the work done by
your own organization and its leaders, must be effective,
must be hurting the communists to judge by their pained
outcries. You know, for a great many years we were the
22
SLOVAKIA
ones who were writing all the notes and doing all the pro·testing and that's as far as it ever got. Our notes were
snubbed and our protests were ignored. That passive attitude on the part of our government at that time was one
reason I resigned from the State Department in' disgust
five years ago. But how times have changed since then!
Isn't it with a feeling of pleasure and relief that we witness the other side writing notes and protests for a
change? Isn't it great to know that the initiative in this
cold war is really passing into our hands?
It is always a pleasure to meet with members of your
organization and it has been a great privilege for ·_ Mrs.
Bentley and me to be here this evening. Keep u,p the
good work.
Thank you very much .
•
•
•
MEMORANDUM
To the President and the Congress of the United States,
Adopted by the Delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America, May 23-24,
1955, Washington, D. C.
We, the delegates to the Thirty-Fourth Congress of
the Slovak League of America, assembled in Washington, D. C., May 23-24, 1955 - send most cordial greetings
to President Dwight D. Eisenho-w er and the members of
the Congress of the United States of America, and do
solemnly and unanimously resolve that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
principles upon which our Country was founded under
God, the American Way of Life, which has made our
America the envy of the world, and declare that the welfare and the security of the United States of America
shall continue to be our primary interest.
2. We subsor1be wihole'heartedly to the expressed printhe. fundamental principle
ciple of self-determination of American policy in Europe since the administration of
President Woodrow Wilson, which declares that all nations have the . right to determine for themselves the state
Dublin Core
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Title
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Remarks of the Hon. Alvin M. Bentley
Description
An account of the resource
Before the Thirty-Fourth Congress of the Slovak League of America in Washington, May 23, 1955)
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp. 11-22
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June-September 1955
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Text
SLOVAKIA
3
APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
By Phi1ip A . Hrobak
Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow
with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915,
he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek
was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary
priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men.
Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in
the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially
probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of
the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he
attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring
later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the
seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with
distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he
became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After
recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University
of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology
for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and
Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he
corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr.
Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to
complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth
year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of
Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh
his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail
for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland,
Ohio, several weelks Irater.
··
�4
SLOVAKIA
In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the
priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first
assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St.
Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him
pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of
Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour
asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of
the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened
patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring"
factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the
parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was
back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where
he labored successfully until his death in 1915.
In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church
on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language,
the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about
it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the
Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and
instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers
read the Holy Mass.
As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish
a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in
1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner
of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road.
IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed
so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that
same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish.
In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek
went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the
spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the
Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek
visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish
in Cleveland.
�SLOVAKIA
5
Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication
to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the
slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was
adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the
First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892);
the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak
League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund
to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized
the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found
many others, including the parish schools which were built
later.
The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the
greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The
biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the
F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the
largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world.
Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding
spirit throughout his life.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into
America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized
that much more could be acomplished by an organization
than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the
close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized
into benefit and social organizations on the local level.
Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which
would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight
such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention
at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established
the First Catholic Slovak Union.
Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth
$22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was
organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00
�6
SLOV.A,~IA
in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members;
another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in
1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members
who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many
boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of
it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them.
Furdek and his followers, the members of the First
Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial
schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of
Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford,
Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and
Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue,
Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill.
The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States
and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a
total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as
well as many non~Slovak parishes.
Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished
character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of
the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to
help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek
was loved and revered by his own people and respected
even by the enemies of his Church and nation.
Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his
people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors
tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and
haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt
seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and
�SLOVAKIA
7
his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America
and the members of the organization he founded to be up
and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly
and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at
hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and
foreign missions, etc.
At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever
mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it,
but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who
came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of
their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~
ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them
with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many
times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom
that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his
followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their
countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise.
The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in
J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike
the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare
and security of the United States of America. But it is also
interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions,
achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak
nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other
orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism.
Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations
could better their lot if they drew their strength from the
rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of
�8
SLOVAKIA
which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the
Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given
rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the
Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than
many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even
under the most adverse conditions, and generation after
generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the
Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in
America did not have to surrender their character, their
national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the
treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment
of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that
good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk
who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could
not become an unworthy citizen.
Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of
no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later
the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it
is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his
death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several
plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5
articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the
Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the
book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries),
an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of
scientists about the origin of the world and man.
The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak
parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by
Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by
both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed
in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated
the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to
�SLOVAKIA
9
love something that was unlknown to them; they could love
and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers
for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in
several generations of Slovaks in America.
Father Furdek endearvored to a<!quaint Amerioans with
Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To
win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good
name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up
to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota"
(1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians,
Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek
who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed
to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise.
Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the
trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding,
tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and
misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people.
To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared
to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was
Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of
gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not
easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might
be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be
called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing
every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger,
bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them.
Father
culties and
thoroughly,
fered what
Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem
presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he
�10
SLOVAKIA
decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic
Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept
hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the
membership and the delegates to the convention until the
proposition was approved. We know today that if it had
not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would
not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought
it was time to seriously think of building a home for the
orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je<lnota, he let
the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task
until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~
ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school
and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the
good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully.
Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his
soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news
of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements
in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing
of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes
church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father
Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over
10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior,
Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America,
the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union,
the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc
Father Furdek.
Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the
majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free
and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished
the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts
of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire
determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod"
until the end of time.
�
SLOVAKIA
3
APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
By Phi1ip A . Hrobak
Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow
with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915,
he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek
was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary
priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men.
Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in
the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially
probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of
the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he
attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring
later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the
seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with
distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he
became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After
recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University
of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology
for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and
Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he
corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr.
Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to
complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth
year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of
Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh
his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail
for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland,
Ohio, several weelks Irater.
··
�4
SLOVAKIA
In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the
priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first
assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St.
Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him
pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of
Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour
asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of
the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened
patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring"
factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the
parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was
back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where
he labored successfully until his death in 1915.
In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church
on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language,
the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about
it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the
Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and
instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers
read the Holy Mass.
As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish
a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in
1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner
of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road.
IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed
so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that
same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish.
In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek
went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the
spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the
Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek
visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish
in Cleveland.
�SLOVAKIA
5
Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication
to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the
slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was
adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the
First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892);
the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak
League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund
to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized
the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found
many others, including the parish schools which were built
later.
The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the
greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The
biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the
F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the
largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world.
Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding
spirit throughout his life.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into
America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized
that much more could be acomplished by an organization
than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the
close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized
into benefit and social organizations on the local level.
Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which
would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight
such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention
at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established
the First Catholic Slovak Union.
Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth
$22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was
organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00
�6
SLOV.A,~IA
in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members;
another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in
1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members
who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many
boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of
it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them.
Furdek and his followers, the members of the First
Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial
schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of
Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford,
Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and
Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue,
Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill.
The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States
and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a
total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as
well as many non~Slovak parishes.
Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished
character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of
the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to
help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek
was loved and revered by his own people and respected
even by the enemies of his Church and nation.
Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his
people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors
tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and
haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt
seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and
�SLOVAKIA
7
his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America
and the members of the organization he founded to be up
and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly
and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at
hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and
foreign missions, etc.
At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever
mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it,
but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who
came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of
their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~
ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them
with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many
times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom
that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his
followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their
countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise.
The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in
J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike
the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare
and security of the United States of America. But it is also
interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions,
achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak
nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other
orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism.
Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations
could better their lot if they drew their strength from the
rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of
�8
SLOVAKIA
which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the
Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given
rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the
Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than
many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even
under the most adverse conditions, and generation after
generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the
Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in
America did not have to surrender their character, their
national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the
treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment
of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that
good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk
who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could
not become an unworthy citizen.
Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of
no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later
the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it
is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his
death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several
plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5
articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the
Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the
book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries),
an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of
scientists about the origin of the world and man.
The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak
parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by
Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by
both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed
in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated
the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to
�SLOVAKIA
9
love something that was unlknown to them; they could love
and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers
for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in
several generations of Slovaks in America.
Father Furdek endearvored to a<!quaint Amerioans with
Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To
win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good
name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up
to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota"
(1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians,
Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek
who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed
to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise.
Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the
trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding,
tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and
misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people.
To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared
to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was
Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of
gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not
easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might
be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be
called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing
every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger,
bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them.
Father
culties and
thoroughly,
fered what
Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem
presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he
�10
SLOVAKIA
decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic
Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept
hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the
membership and the delegates to the convention until the
proposition was approved. We know today that if it had
not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would
not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought
it was time to seriously think of building a home for the
orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je<lnota, he let
the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task
until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~
ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school
and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the
good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully.
Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his
soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news
of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements
in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing
of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes
church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father
Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over
10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior,
Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America,
the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union,
the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc
Father Furdek.
Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the
majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free
and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished
the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts
of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire
determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod"
until the end of time.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
3
APOSTLE OF A'MErRICAN SLOVAKS
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
By Phi1ip A . Hrobak
Father Stephen Furdek was called to his eternal reward forty years ago, bwt his stature continues to grow
with the years. When Furrdek died on January 18, 1915,
he was mourned by Slovaks everywhere. Father Furdek
was, indeed, a great American, a good Slovak, an exemplary
priest of God, a true apostle of Christian charity, a successful organizer and leader of men.
Rev. Stephen Furdek was born September 2, 1856, in
the village of Trstena, Orava County, S1ovakia, materially
probably one of the poorest of the poor communities of
the land of the Tatras, which hras 'been inhabited 1zy Slovaks during the past 1500 years. It was there that Furdek completed his primary education as a boy. Then he
attended the gymnasium at Banska Bystrica, transferring
later to, the one at Nitra; and af.ter that he entered the
seminary at Nitra. Completing his studies at Nitra with
distinction, Furdek was sent to Pest University, where he
became, ill a short time later and returned to Nitra. After
recuperating, Fu.rdek taught school for a time in Straznice, Moravia, and then decided to study at the University
of Prague. It was here that he studied classical ,philology
for three years and became acquainted with Dr. Francis Bauer, rector of the seminary and, later, Cardinal and
Archbishop of the Olomouc archbishopric, with whom he
corresponded to his death. It was on the advice of Dr.
Bauer that Furdek entered the seminary at Prague to
complete his priestly studies. But he did not quite complete those there, because as a theologian in his fourth
year he answered the call of Bishop Richard Gilmour of
Cleveland, Ohio, for priests who could spook and understand Slovak and other SloV'anic languages. Parting wi:tlh
his family and acquaintances in Trstena, Furdek set sail
for America in March, 1882, and arrived in Cleveland,
Ohio, several weelks Irater.
··
4
SLOVAKIA
In Cleveland, Furdek completed his studies for the
priesthood and was ordained priest July 1, 1882. His first
assignment was a chaplaincy at the Czech parish of St.
Wenceslaus. In .Aipril, 1883, Bishop Gilmour appointed him
pastor of the newly..founded congregation of Ourr Lady of
Lourdes in the East 55th and Broadway section of Cleveland. However, at the end of May, 1883, Bishop Gilmour
asked F1ather Furdek to take over the administration of
the St. Procopius parish on the West Side, where a disturbance had occurred. Father furdek acquiesced, listened
patiently to arguments proferred by the various ''warring"
factions, reconciled and set them straight and made the
parish a going concern. By February, 1884, Furdek was
back at his old post of Our Lady of Lorurdes parish, where
he labored successfully until his death in 1915.
In the meantime, quite a number of Slorvrukis had settled in the downtown Wood.land-Scorvill-Commercial Avenue section of Cleveland; they attended St. Joseph's church
on 23rd and Woodland Arvenue. Since the Franciscan Fathers there did not know Slovak or any related language,
the Slov~s begged F'ather Furdek to do something about
it. And he did. With the permission of the Bishop and the
Franciscans, F'ather Furdek made his appearance regularly at one of the Masses at St. Joseph's to preach and
instruct in Slov,aik, while one of the Franci,sca.n Fathers
read the Holy Mass.
As the number of Slovaik immigrants in Cleveland increased, they asked Father Furdek to help them esta;blish
a parish "of our own" - a Slovak parish. This he did in
1888, when a lot, 180 by 180 feet, was bought at the corner
of Corwin and Holton Avenues, just below Woodhill Road.
IDven the Magyars of the Buckeye Road area contributed
so that a wooden church was constructed on the site that
same year. That was the start of St. Ladislaus parish.
In 1890, at the request of his Bishop, Father Furdek
went to Europe to seeGc out priests who would serve the
spiritual needs of Slovaks, Slovenes and Croatians of the
Cleveland diocese. After completing his mission, Furdek
visited Lourdes and Rome and then returned to his parish
in Cleveland.
SLOVAKIA
5
Father Furdek'.s entire life was a life of dedication
to God and his fellowmen. EJarly in life he adopted the
slogan "Za Boha a narod" (For God and nation) and adhered to it strictly throughout his life. The motto was
adopted by the organizations which Furdek founded: the
First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States of America (1890); the First Caitholic Slovak Ladies Union (1892);
the Slovak Institute (Slovenska Matica - 1893); the Slovak
League of America (1907); the National Fund, the Fund
to Preserve our National Heritage. F'u.rdek also organized
the St. Ladislaus parish in Cleveland and helped to found
many others, including the parish schools which were built
later.
The First Catholic Slovak Union is undoubtedly the
greatest achievement of Father Furdek's fruitful life. The
biography of Furdek is substantially the history of the
F'irst Catholic Slovak Union. Today this organization is the
largest fraternal benefit society of Slovaks in the world.
Furdek not only organized it, but was also its guiding
spirit throughout his life.
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Slovruks from the Tatra country were literally pouring into
America to better their economic lot and escape the political oppression of alien rulers at home. Furdek realized
that much more could be acomplished by an organization
than by an individual. He also knew that it was only natural for men to band together in a common cause. At the
close of the nineteenth century, Slovak immigrants in various cities of the United States had already organized
into benefit and social organizations on the local level.
Furdek put hi:s sights on a national organization, which
would do so much more "for God and nation." And Furdek's dream was realized when representatives of eight
such Slovak societies answered his call for a convention
at Cleveland, Ohio, September 4, 1890, and established
the First Catholic Slovak Union.
Today the First Catholic Slovruk Union is worth
$22,000,000.00; over 200,000 Slovaks joined it since it was
organized; the orgainization paid out some $40,000,000.00
6
SLOV.A,~IA
in death benefits to widows and or,phans of its members;
another $5,000,000.00 in charity to individuals and institutions; and the Jednota Home for orphans, -opened in
1914, hras taken care of some 2,000 children of its members
who lost one or both of their parents. In addition, the organization has paid for the high school education of many
boys and girls who otherwise might have been deprived of
it, because relatives could not afford to give it to them.
Furdek and his followers, the members of the First
Catholic Slovak Union, also ·played a major role in establishing some 300 Catholic •Slovak parishes, 150 parochial
schools, several high schools; also St. Andrew's A:bbey of
Slovruk Benedictines, Cleveland, Ohio, the Slovruk Franciscan Fathers of Clifton, N. J., P1ttsburgh, Pa., and Valparaiso, Ind., the Order of Sisters of Sts. Cyril and 'Methodius, Danville, Pa., the Slovak Dominican Sisters, Oxford,
Mich., the Slovak Vincentian Sisters of Perrysville, Pa., and
Bedford, Ohio, the Slovak Franciscan Sisters of Bellevue,
Pa., Lacon, Ill., Bethlehem, Pa., and the Slovruk Btmedictine Sisters, Tinley Park, Ill.
The First Catholic Slov~k Union of the United States
and Canada has some 1100 subordinate branches with a
total membership of 98,000. There are branches of the organization at practically every Catholic SlovaJk parish, as
well as many non~Slovak parishes.
Father Stephen Furdek was a man of U!Illblemished
character, deep c01nvictions, and keen foresigiht; a man of
the highest princtples, intelligent, kind, patient, just, understanding, ever ready to forgive and advise, quick to
help and comfort the unfortunate. That is why Furdek
was loved and revered by his own people and respected
even by the enemies of his Church and nation.
Thoroughly familiar with the virtues and failings of his
people, Father Furdek did everything in his power to improve their material and spiritual -c ondition. All his labors
tended to uplift his Slovak countrymen. His heart and
haJnds were in practically every national and religious undertaking of the Slovaks in America. His only oomrplaitnt
seemed to be that he could not do enough for his God and
SLOVAKIA
7
his people. Not only did he rouse the Slovaks of America
and the members of the organization he founded to be up
and doing, but he himself led the way, working selflessly
and tirelessly, and supporting generously the cause at
hand, whether it be a new church, a newly created foundation, a new school, the Holy Father, the domestic and
foreign missions, etc.
At the same time, however, Father Furdek was ever
mindful of the sad plight of the Slovaks beneath the Tatras, the land of his fathers . Not only was he aware of it,
but also decided to do something rubout it. He constantly appealed to the sons Ml.d daughters of the Slovak nation who
came to the shores of free America not to be ashamed of
their Slovak origin, but to proudly proclaim it. He appr~
ciated the blessings of freedom and wished to share them
with his less fortunate brethren in Slovakia. How many
times did Furdek sigh and pray "Lord, that our Slovak people over there might once enjoy the blessings of freedom
that are mine in America!" And Father Furdek and his
followers did much to alleviate the oppression of their
countrymen at home Mld inspired many others to do likewise.
The Slovak League of America, founded by Furdek in
J 907, Cleveland, Ohio, is aJso a going concern today. Unlike
the Jednota, the Slovaik League of Amerioa is not a fraternal insurance organi'zation, but a cultural and civic organizatioo of Americans of Slovruk desceint. Being an AmericMl institution it is primarily interested in promoting the welfare
and security of the United States of America. But it is also
interested in creating a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovaik nation, its histery, culture, traditions,
achievements, and its long, hard struggle for freedom and independence. As a truly American organization it is resolutely opposed to the domination and exploitation of t:he Slovak
nation by any other nation or political state. Like the other
orgamzations founded by Furdek, the Slovruk League consistently repudiates Ml.d condemns Marxist communism.
Father Furde'k believed that individuals . and nations
could better their lot if they drew their strength from the
rich, vital fountains of mO'ral forees, the foundation of
8
SLOVAKIA
which are faith, religion and spiritual traditions. The circumstances that prevailed in Slovakia did not allow the
Slovruks to prosper materially. As a nation they were humbled and alien rulers repudiated their inherent, God-given
rights to freedom and independence. But spiritually, the
Slovak nation never was poor but, in fact, wealthier than
many other larger nations which were free and independent. The Slo'Vaks preserved their Christian character even
under the most adverse conditions, and generation after
generation preserved the individualistic traditions of the
Slovak s,pirit. Father Furdek knew that the Slovaks in
America did not have to surrender their character, their
national traditions, but could in fact even develop the spiritual heritage of their forefathers and thus with the
treasures of their own spirit contribute to the enrichment
of Americam life. Father Furdek always contended that
good Slovaks made good American citizens, that a Slovruk
who remained loyal to God and his own nation simply could
not become an unworthy citizen.
Father Stephen Furdek was also a writer and poet of
no mean a;bility. In 1891, he began publishing the newspaper "Jednota" (The Union) weekly, and fi'Ve years later
the annual "Kalendar Jednota" or Jednota Almanac as it
is called. Both are still being published by the First Catholic Slovak Union. Father Furdek not only ecli,ted these ,pu:blication.s, but also contributed heavily to them until his
death in 1915. He found time, too, to write for several
plllblications in Sloivakia. His was a very popular style; hL5
articles, stories, anecdotes and poems were relished 'by the
Slovruks of America amd Europe. In 1910, he pub1'ished the
book "S'Vet a jeho zahady" (The World and its Mysteries),
an apologetic wurk repudiating the atheistic theories of
scientists about the origin of the world and man.
The importance vf hruving a school in every ,S lovak
parish was highly appreciated and strongly advocated by
Father Furdelk. It could be used to great advantage by
both the young and the old. The latter could be instructed
in English, and the former in SlO'Vak. Furdek aippreciated
the fact that children especially .:ould not be expected to
SLOVAKIA
9
love something that was unlknown to them; they could love
and a,ppreciate only wha.t they had an opportunity to become acquainted with. His Slovruk grammar and readers
for children did much to preserve the Slovak 1-anguage in
several generations of Slovaks in America.
Father Furdek endearvored to a<!quaint Amerioans with
Slovakia and the Slov,a ks, and the latter wi~ America. To
win recogmtion for his people and preserve their good
name was one of the principle aims of Father FurdeJk. Up
to the time that Furdek began to pwblish his "Jedinota"
(1891), the Slova,ks were referred to as "Hungarians,
Huns, Sla,vish people, Slavonians, Slavs" - in a word, almost anything but what they really were. It was Furdek
who insisted on the appellation •~sLOVAKS" and appealed
to the readers of the J ednota in particU!lar to do likewise.
Father Furdek enjoyed universal popul,a rity and the
trust of his people. He was a man of great understanding,
tact and diplomacy. Furdek settled many arguments and
misunderstandings to the satisfaction of all parties COIIlcerned. An apostle of ,peace and tolerance, Furdek endeavored to a.void whatever might ca.use dissension and misunderstanding a,mong his people.
To those who did not know him well, Furdek appeared
to be cool, reserved and difficult to appl'Oach. That was
Furdek O!Il the outside. Inside, however, beat a heart of
gold, in fiact, Father Furdek was all heart. Furdek was not
easily irritated, possessing surpr,i sing self-contro'I. even under the most trying circumstances. Hleated debates might
be carried O!Il in his presence when, finally, he would be
called upon to settle the a:vgument in question. Furdek always spoke little, 1but said very much, carefully weighing
every word. He spoke softly, without any show of anger,
bitterness or aggravation; he was fair and objectirve towards friend and foe alike in private as well as public relations with them.
Father
culties and
thoroughly,
fered what
Furdek was not easily discouraged by diffidisappointmoots. He studied every problem
presented his views intelligently and then ofhe thought was the best soJution. When he
10
SLOVAKIA
decided it was in the best interests of the F,iz,st Oaitholic
Slovak Union to change to the reserve system, he kept
hammering away at it, appealing and ~laining to the
membership and the delegates to the convention until the
proposition was approved. We know today that if it had
not been, the First CathoUc Slovak Union most liikely would
not be in existence today. When Father Furdek thought
it was time to seriously think of building a home for the
orphaned children of the memlbers of the Je<lnota, he let
the membership know rubout it and set himself to the task
until the Jednota Home in Middletown, Pa., became a r~
ality in 1914. He also dreamed of building a high school
and a uniiversity on the Jednota Home property, and if the
good Lord had spared Furdek another decade, he undoubtedly would ha,ve promoted even these worthy objects successfully.
Ailing for several years, Father Furdek ga,ve up his
soul to its Maiker at 4 :40 p. m., January 18, 1915. The news
of his death spread liike fire throughout Slovaik settlements
in America; Slov~ks everywhere, Catholics aind non..Catholics alike, were deeply touched and mourned the passing
of the greatest Slovaik in America. After the solemn Requiem chanted by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor O'Reilly, Ohancellor of the Diocese of Cleveland, in our Lady of Lourdes
church, January 20, 1915, the earthly remains of Father
Furdek were laid to rest in ,t he CalV'ary Cemetery. Over
10,000 people, including Bishop J. M. Koudelka of Superior,
Wisconsin, 65 priests from Slovaik parishes of America,
the Supreme Officers of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union,
the Slovak League of America and other Slovak organizations, and many civic leaders, attended the last rites foc
Father Furdek.
Father Stephen Furdek, worthy son of the land of the
majestic Tatras and adopted son of the land of the free
and the home of the brave, fought the good fight, finished
the course, and kept the faith. He shall live in the 'hearts
of the Slovaks forever. Guided by his noble spirit they aire
determined to carry on the good fight ''Za Boha a na:rod"
until the end of time.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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The Rev. Stephen Furdek
Description
An account of the resource
Philip A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16), June-September 1955
pp. 3-10
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June-September 1955
LCNAF
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54815f0a3b47f0a4352806044a567894
PDF Text
Text
IN TID!-1. ISSUE:
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley
Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League
The Murder of Matus Cernak
Professor
Kerner's
"CZECHOSLOVAKIA":
History or Propaganda ?
The Significance of Small Nations
Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage
WHO SAID IT?: 62-96
*
*
*
Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Published by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�\
:
\' I
SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica,
a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent.
rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA
is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding
and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation
and its long struggle for fl'eedom and
.i.J ulependence.
As Ame1·i cam,, members of the
Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all
natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given
1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence.
!J.'hey al'e tledi<·ated to the cause of the
Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom
and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to
oppose the plague ot Communism and
all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems.
Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1·
yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
l3ox ·+50
Middletown, Pa.
-------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A.
i EDN OT A:
PR ES S
M iddletown, P a.
�SLOVAKIA
Published quarterly by the Slovak
VOL. V
League of America
JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955
NO. 2-3 (15-16 )
TEN YEARS AGO . ...
I
the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt
and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate
mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So•
tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith.
Jiu and his heroic armies. T<he out foundation. "
"joyous, historic" event was cele·
At t he same time Monsignor Jan
orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo·
of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be·
again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a
socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling
t he Slovak National Council - him :
" All
Czecho-Slovaks
are
Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's
and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera.
ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten .....
tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army
lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will
told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight
sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this
ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting
a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms."
cialiistic policy and philosophy,
Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas
whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political
ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in
As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not
Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze•
cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with
claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled
joy:
"Presov
aga in
I
I
i
"triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib.
Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze.
serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain
"our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red
our Slav liberators, the Great Army."
Powers, to Providence for putting
Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from
of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said :
fi n, and giving us Benes."
"Do not allow yourselves to be
A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty
director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union ,
vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and
government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In
the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet
�2
SLOVAKIA
Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich
Union will do." Later, after -b eing
welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front
SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald
Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a
member of the so-called Council of
free."
Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The
vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our
grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and
that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance
her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological
friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems
from political and geographical
Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our
das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of
joying freedom in tJhe USA, told
Slavic unity."
A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK
1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I
The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases
who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza,
of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union.
Jleved that collaboration between
Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia
who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly
Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed
that
ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds
government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of
Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet
Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed·
could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why
Czecho-Slovak-Soviet
Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible
in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak
as the leading editorial on July 18,
nations? And w·hy should they
1945.
Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State
minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of
to serve the FR>EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA,
Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee
a mass meeting in Most in 1945:
.
"We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of
those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union."
trenched in these institutions?
�
IN TID!-1. ISSUE:
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley
Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League
The Murder of Matus Cernak
Professor
Kerner's
"CZECHOSLOVAKIA":
History or Propaganda ?
The Significance of Small Nations
Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage
WHO SAID IT?: 62-96
*
*
*
Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Published by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�\
:
\' I
SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica,
a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent.
rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA
is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding
and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation
and its long struggle for fl'eedom and
.i.J ulependence.
As Ame1·i cam,, members of the
Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all
natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given
1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence.
!J.'hey al'e tledi<·ated to the cause of the
Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom
and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to
oppose the plague ot Communism and
all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems.
Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1·
yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
l3ox ·+50
Middletown, Pa.
-------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A.
i EDN OT A:
PR ES S
M iddletown, P a.
�SLOVAKIA
Published quarterly by the Slovak
VOL. V
League of America
JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955
NO. 2-3 (15-16 )
TEN YEARS AGO . ...
I
the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt
and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate
mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So•
tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith.
Jiu and his heroic armies. T<he out foundation. "
"joyous, historic" event was cele·
At t he same time Monsignor Jan
orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo·
of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be·
again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a
socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling
t he Slovak National Council - him :
" All
Czecho-Slovaks
are
Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's
and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera.
ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten .....
tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army
lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will
told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight
sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this
ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting
a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms."
cialiistic policy and philosophy,
Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas
whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political
ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in
As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not
Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze•
cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with
claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled
joy:
"Presov
aga in
I
I
i
"triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib.
Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze.
serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain
"our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red
our Slav liberators, the Great Army."
Powers, to Providence for putting
Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from
of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said :
fi n, and giving us Benes."
"Do not allow yourselves to be
A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty
director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union ,
vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and
government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In
the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet
�2
SLOVAKIA
Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich
Union will do." Later, after -b eing
welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front
SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald
Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a
member of the so-called Council of
free."
Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The
vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our
grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and
that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance
her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological
friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems
from political and geographical
Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our
das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of
joying freedom in tJhe USA, told
Slavic unity."
A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK
1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I
The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases
who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza,
of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union.
Jleved that collaboration between
Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia
who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly
Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed
that
ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds
government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of
Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet
Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed·
could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why
Czecho-Slovak-Soviet
Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible
in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak
as the leading editorial on July 18,
nations? And w·hy should they
1945.
Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State
minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of
to serve the FR>EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA,
Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee
a mass meeting in Most in 1945:
.
"We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of
those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union."
trenched in these institutions?
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
IN TID!-1. ISSUE:
THE REV. STEPHEN FURDEK
Remarks of the Hon . Alvin M. Bentley
Memorandum of the 34th Congress of the Slovak League
The Murder of Matus Cernak
Professor
Kerner's
"CZECHOSLOVAKIA":
History or Propaganda ?
The Significance of Small Nations
Czech Social Democrats and Red Espionage
WHO SAID IT?: 62-96
*
*
*
Edited and compi led by
PHILIP A. HROBAK
Published by
THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA
\
:
\' I
SLO \ .AKlA ~s. 1mblishetl pei·iodically by the Slo,·ak League of .Arnel'ica,
a cu]hll'al and ciYit fedel'ation of Ame1·icans of SloYak: descent.
rl'he chief purpose of SLOYAKlA
is to 1J1·omote a bettel' w1derntanding
and aJJlJreciation o} the Slontk nation
and its long struggle for fl'eedom and
.i.J ulependence.
As Ame1·i cam,, members of the
Slontk League of Ame1·ica finnly beh eYe that the Slovak nation, just as all
natiorn,, has an i_n hel'ent and God-given
1·ight to freedom and .i.J1dependence.
!J.'hey al'e tledi<·ated to the cause of the
Amel'ican \Yay of life, Slovak freedom
and \\'Ol'lcl peaee arnl are detennined to
oppose the plague ot Communism and
all other totalih\_i-1ai1 lJOlitical systems.
Subscription to SloYakia $LOO pe1·
yea1· in the U. N. .A. - $2.00 elsewhere.
Send subscriptions to:
SLOVAKIA
l3ox ·+50
Middletown, Pa.
-------~------------------------Printed in the U . S. A.
i EDN OT A:
PR ES S
M iddletown, P a.
SLOVAKIA
Published quarterly by the Slovak
VOL. V
League of America
JUNE-SEPTEMBER, 1955
NO. 2-3 (15-16 )
TEN YEARS AGO . ...
I
the Benes and Gottwald Czechs published report a bout the attempt
and the Lettrjch Slovak "de• of the Soviet Union to i:ncorporate
mocrats" celebrated the "libera• 1 Sub-Carpathian H.ussila into the So•
tion" of Czecho-Slovak ia by Sta- v'iet Ukmine "was absolutely w ith.
Jiu and his heroic armies. T<he out foundation. "
"joyous, historic" event was cele·
At t he same time Monsignor Jan
orated for months. By the ,g1,ace Sramek, leaoer of the Czech Peo·
of Stalin, Benes became president pie's Party and a member of Be·
again; the Czech communists and nes's London government, sent a
socialists ruled in Prague; and telegram to Marshal Stalin, telling
t he Slovak National Council - him :
" All
Czecho-Slovaks
are
Lettrich's newborn "demoC'rats" filled with joy. The Soviet Union 's
and Schmidke's Slovak commun· limitless sacrifices for our libera.
ists reigned supreme in Bra• tion will never be forgotten .....
tislava. The people of the Czech Your gesture, naming Red Army
lands .really were ,hap,py, we were units after Kosice and Presov, will
told, but the Slovak nation was perpetuate the m e mory of the fight
sorrowful and fearful of the fu· against the common enemy, this
ture . Benes and 'h is Czechs had being the foundation of lasting
a1ways promoted pro·SOV'iet, SO· brotherhood in arms."
cialiistic policy and philosophy,
Dr. Juraj Slavik, Slovak Judas
whereas the S~ovaks had c onsi~t- and member of Benes's political
ently and persistently opposed it. entourage, who as ambassador in
As early as February 14, 1945, Washington somehow could not
Jan Masaryk, broadcasting to Cze· I recognize known Reds in the Cze•
cha-Slovakia from London, pro· cho-Slovak embassy, bubbled with
claimed the Crimea Conference ·a unbridled
joy:
"Presov
aga in
I
I
i
"triumph of allied statesmanship." breathes a free life. Kosice is fib.
Czecho-Slovakia, he said, 'has no erated.. . . Slovakia and the Cze.
serious international µrob l ems and cho-Slovak Republic shall remain
"our lasting gratit,ude is due to eternally grateful to th e Red
our Slav liberators, the Great Army."
Powers, to Providence for putting
Before leaving Britain, Dr. Edmankind's d estiny in the hands ward Benes, broadcasting from
of Churchill , Roosevelt, and Sta- London to Czecho-Slovakia, said :
fi n, and giving us Benes."
"Do not allow yourselves to be
A month earlier, Dr. Jan Papa- frightened by the Goebbels bolshenek, minister plenipotentiary and vik bogey ..... We have a treaty
director of the information ser· of alliance with the Soviet Union ,
vice in New York of Benes's which we rate very highly and
government-in-exile in London, told which we will always fulfill In
the NEW YORK P OST that t-he spirit and letter, Just as the Soviet
2
SLOVAKIA
Dr. Fedor Hodza - a Lettrich
Union will do." Later, after -b eing
welcomed in Moscow, Benes said: "de•m ocrat," member of the com"The road to Iiberated Czecho- munist-dominated National Front
SloVTakia leads through Moscow. government of the Benes-Gottwald
Soon the whole of Europe shall be coalition, but now in the USA, a
member of the so-called Council of
free."
Dr. Hubert Ripka, member of Free Czecho-Slo vak-ia and the A£Bene/i's London government, told sembly of Captive European Naa fa!'ffivell press conference in tions, as well as of the InternaLondon that he did not consider t'.onal Pea-s ant Union - said bethe Western .A:lhles' apprehensions fore the provis'ional National Aschat his country mi,ght become a sembly in Prague, in 1945: "The
vassal of the Soviet Un·i on were Sov,i et Union is our ally and our
grounded. He said: "it is natural friend, and we are its ally and
that Czecho-Slovakia should seek friends. Our friendship and alliance
her security primarily in the is not based only on ideological
friendship with the Soviet Union." ties. It is something more. It stems
from political and geographical
Dr. Joseph Lettrfoh, Slovak Jureality, from the depth of our
das and Red collaborator now enhearts and from the living idea of
joying freedom in tJhe USA, told
Slavic unity."
A. I. Goldberg of the NEW YORK
1:11MiES that "Russia has kept al I
The Benes Czechs (e:enkl, tR.ipthe terms of the occupation treaty ka, Majer, Has·a l, Taborsky, Heivery fairly." The s·ame Lettrich dirich, etc.) and Slovak Judases
who praised Stalin, the Red Army (•L ettri,ch, Papanek, Slavik, Hodza,
of "libemtion," and the g,reat So- Kocvara, Mudry, Kvetko, etc.) beviet Union.
Jleved that collaboration between
Dr. Vlado Clementis, Slovak Red the UISSR and CzeC'ho-Slov,a kia
who was a member of Lettrich's \W1S not only ,f easihle, but highly
Slovak National Council ·a nd Be- desirable. They •believed
that
ne/i's communist-dominated Prague peaceful coexistence with the Reds
government, broadcast over the was possible without the loss of
Pl'ague l'adio on June 13, 1945, freedoms and rights. They proabout the "conditions of Czecho- moted the disastrous pro-Soviet
Slovak seourity." Of course, there and anti-Slovak policy of Dr. Ed·
could be no security wit:Jhout the ward Benes to the bitter end. Why
Czecho-Slovak-Soviet
Treaty of should they not ,b e considered re1!943. His address was published sponsible for the present terrible
in the NrIDW YOR.KiSKY DIDNN1K plight of the Czech -a nd Slovak
as the leading editorial on July 18,
nations? And w·hy should they
1945.
Dr. Jaroslav Stransky, Benes's presently be favored by our State
minister now in the USA and glad Department, various agencies of
to serve the FR>EE IDUROPE COM- U. S. Government (USIA, CIA,
Mil'DTEE (Radio Free Europe), told j etc.), the Free Europe Committee
a mass meeting in Most in 1945:
.
"We shall be eternally grateful to (1Rad10 Free Europe), ·and some of
those who helped us, above all to our universities? Or must we beo-ur great Slav brother, the So- lieve that similar forces a.re enviet Union."
trenched in these institutions?
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 2-3 (15-16)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
June-September 1955
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/73211fb74e35c4af309a97a7ffc1c7b8.pdf
31d167ba8598a1ec4055158275c90fba
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.)
•
John J . Sirotnak
610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
Honorar y Presillen1
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1943 W. 4Sth Street
Chi cago n. Illinoi s
Dr. Julius Janci
215 East ' Mason Street
Owoss o, Mich.
President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek
Georgian Cour t Co ll ege
Vice-Pres ident
Lak e wood, N. J .
Jacob Kocis
A DVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Sll eet
Mic hae l J . Vargovich
Ha mmond , Ind .
Nat iona l President
First Catholi c Slovak Un ion
\'ice-Pr e s ident
of U. S. A.
Ju Iia K rajcovic
1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan
National President
Re cording Secretary
First Catholic Slovak
Francis H rusovsky
Ladies Union
2900 East Bo ul evard
Frank Sobus
Cle veland 4, Olli:>
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secr e tary-Tre asurer
Milan V. Blazek
Stephen J. Tkach
4205 W. Cull erton Street
National Presid ent
Chicago 23, Ill.
Penna. Slovak U ni on
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies P e nnsylvania
Slovak Union
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
Sl O Montooth Street
PittRhurgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J .
John Rozboril
National President
S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica)
JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
BRATST VO
SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleveland , Ohio
Scrnn ton , P a.
Wilk es-Barre, Pa.
SL OV ENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland , Ohio
ZORNICKA
Wilke.s -Barre, Pa.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Pass ai c, N . J.
SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa .
OSADNE HLASY
Chic,a go, Ill.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
�Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built
in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 .
•
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.)
•
John J . Sirotnak
610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
Honorar y Presillen1
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1943 W. 4Sth Street
Chi cago n. Illinoi s
Dr. Julius Janci
215 East ' Mason Street
Owoss o, Mich.
President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek
Georgian Cour t Co ll ege
Vice-Pres ident
Lak e wood, N. J .
Jacob Kocis
A DVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Sll eet
Mic hae l J . Vargovich
Ha mmond , Ind .
Nat iona l President
First Catholi c Slovak Un ion
\'ice-Pr e s ident
of U. S. A.
Ju Iia K rajcovic
1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan
National President
Re cording Secretary
First Catholic Slovak
Francis H rusovsky
Ladies Union
2900 East Bo ul evard
Frank Sobus
Cle veland 4, Olli:>
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secr e tary-Tre asurer
Milan V. Blazek
Stephen J. Tkach
4205 W. Cull erton Street
National Presid ent
Chicago 23, Ill.
Penna. Slovak U ni on
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies P e nnsylvania
Slovak Union
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
Sl O Montooth Street
PittRhurgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J .
John Rozboril
National President
S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica)
JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
BRATST VO
SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleveland , Ohio
Scrnn ton , P a.
Wilk es-Barre, Pa.
SL OV ENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland , Ohio
ZORNICKA
Wilke.s -Barre, Pa.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Pass ai c, N . J.
SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa .
OSADNE HLASY
Chic,a go, Ill.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
�Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built
in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 .
•
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Officers of the Slovak League of America
(O rganiz ed 1907 in C leveland . Ohio.)
•
John J . Sirotnak
610-612 Li:lcoln Trust Bl dg.
Scranton 3, Pa.
Honorar y Presillen1
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1943 W. 4Sth Street
Chi cago n. Illinoi s
Dr. Julius Janci
215 East ' Mason Street
Owoss o, Mich.
President
Philip A. Hrobak
P. O. Dux 150. i\l idd letuwn. Pa. St e phani e 0. H usek
Georgian Cour t Co ll ege
Vice-Pres ident
Lak e wood, N. J .
Jacob Kocis
A DVISORY COUNCIL
1547 - 167th Sll eet
Mic hae l J . Vargovich
Ha mmond , Ind .
Nat iona l President
First Catholi c Slovak Un ion
\'ice-Pr e s ident
of U. S. A.
Ju Iia K rajcovic
1/i.J W. 18th SL. Chicago 8, m. Helen Kocan
National President
Re cording Secretary
First Catholic Slovak
Francis H rusovsky
Ladies Union
2900 East Bo ul evard
Frank Sobus
Cle veland 4, Olli:>
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secr e tary-Tre asurer
Milan V. Blazek
Stephen J. Tkach
4205 W. Cull erton Street
National Presid ent
Chicago 23, Ill.
Penna. Slovak U ni on
Gabriela E. Vavrek
National President
Ladies P e nnsylvania
Slovak Union
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Paul P. Jamriska
Sl O Montooth Street
PittRhurgh 10, Pa.
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St .. Passaic, N. J .
John Rozboril
National President
S lovak Cath o li c Cfldet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affil ia ted with th e S lovak Lea gue of Amer ica)
JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
BRATST VO
SLOVENSKA OBRANA ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Cleveland , Ohio
Scrnn ton , P a.
Wilk es-Barre, Pa.
SL OV ENSKE NOVINY
Cleveland , Ohio
ZORNICKA
Wilke.s -Barre, Pa.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
Pass ai c, N . J.
SVORNOST
Whitaker, Pa .
OSADNE HLASY
Chic,a go, Ill.
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
Ruins of the S!pis Castle from the western side, Spis County, Slovakia. The fortress, built
in the 13th century, was destroyed by fire in 1780 .
•
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14)
Description
An account of the resource
includes photo of ruins of Spiš Castle
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1955
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/efa6f46e44b94f6f5c82ce212e023eec.pdf
dcb6d3cffabaa2213aae768b7623cc98
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
Published
VOL. V
quarterly by the
Slovak
League of
MARCH 1955
America
NO . 1 (14)
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA
is told on the following pa,ges by
witnesses called upon to testify
by the Select Committee on Com•
mu.nist Aiggression of the House
of Representatives, headed by the
Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil·
waukee, Wis.
Michael Galayda is an .American
citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was
there W1,d saw Communism at
work a mong his people w'ho had
persdstenUy ,and consistently fought
the Red plague for over a hundred
years. H e makes his home in
Hazleton, Pa.
Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the
terror and horror of Red rule in
Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name.
Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America
in 1950; he is assistant editor of
the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic
Slovak Union, and a1so chairman
of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k
National Council Abroad.
Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law
1 and politics and was very active
' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which
invaded his native Slovakia.
Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer,
became the director of the Press
Bureau of the Slovak League of
America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon
after his arrival in America several years ago.
Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in
West Germany, was a Sergeant of
the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Jur Detviansky was an active
officer of the Sloviak Army before
he Hed to the West.
Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor
and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia,
is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits
"HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From
Rome), Italy.
Rev.
Stephen
Nahalka,
S.T.D.,
ecclesiastical writer and former
personal secretary to Bishop John
Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese,
1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was
sentenced to 24 years 1n prison
1by the Reds lives in Rome.
Italy.
Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the
JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of
America since 19'50, is a native
AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio,
in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs
for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak
has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for
government. His
articles
and
pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the
maohinations of the Benes Czechs
(Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for
the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the
men of the Kremlin - +and the
Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. ·
�SLOVAKIA
Communist Aggression Against Slovakia
(The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of
the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to
ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries
of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest
attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those
who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others
who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts
because of the pro-Soviet -poli<:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech
Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after
World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact
sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast
masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant
nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia
with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of
the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.).
FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8
SLOVAKIA
!Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on
the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with
the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western
Slaivs.
The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the
beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization
was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this
period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself
lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country.
FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and
Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of
the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church
organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It
was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries
�SLOVAKIA
3
from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of
the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance.
In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a
battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and
Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century,
she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized
under the Arpad dynasty.
In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth
century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda
of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in
that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings
were celebrated in BratisJava.
The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the
nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary
and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace
it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual
rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy.
In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising
against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor
crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They
did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated
monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never
satisfied.
h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle
7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament
of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of
"Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree
of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the
Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act.
�4
SLOVAKIA
In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom,
except for some autonomous bodies.
1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania
and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national
rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the
kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was
not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in
the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary.
1
World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State
Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was
greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire.
Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater
autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of
nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further
stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage
for the peace settlements.
Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders
established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G.
Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe
and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement
and support.
Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's
separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the
Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state,
as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish
Republic.
Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into
contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed
with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement,
and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at
1
1
1
�5
SLOVAKIA
the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa
should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have
complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should
be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent.
1
A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and
Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated
by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on
the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions
in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the
Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers.
1
In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the
people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg
Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe
and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce,
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army
waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany.
A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up
in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de
jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18,
1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected
the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer
accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of
peace .. ."
On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian
Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the
estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body
composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918,
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
6
and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of
Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed
the separation of Slo.va:lci<a from the Kiingdom of Hungary
and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected
T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the
first ,caJbinet.
However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement
developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of
government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon
a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved.
In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state,
for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst
the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia.
Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak
delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to
Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague
at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April
1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's
Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and
reestabllished in December 19'18.
1
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
ConstitutJional Structure
Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until.
February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied
from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence.
The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the
�SLOVAKIA
7
preamble of the Constitution of the United States.
The main body of the Consbitution provided for a
popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both
houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary.
Parties and Politics
The politics of the period may ibe divided into four
phases:
1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19)
Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech
political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on
which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this
major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been
enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a
split on partisan lines followed.
2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20)
The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water
power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into
Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia.
3. The agrarian era (1922-35)
This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability
under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed
the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout
this period.
4. The crisis ( 1935-38)
This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the
Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem
of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic.
The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the
period betiween the two World Wars formed the following
groups:
National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never
beoame very ,powenfu:l.
�8
SLOVAKIA
Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist
Party and the Slovak Pe>ipulist Party, respectiively, this
group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life.
The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its
strongholds, especially in Slovakia.
Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the
subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both
rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network
of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its
broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support.
National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the
lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more
influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate.
Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social
democratic parties of other European countries, had more
influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though
outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction .
Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party
was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though
equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe,
the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World
War.
Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Agrarian reform
iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing
the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore,
was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak
Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter
com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a
fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who
needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula-
�SLOVAKIA
9
tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances.
Economic development
While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost
covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was
far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former
Austro..lHJungarian Empire.
'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods,
were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a
view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea
countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers
of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great
Britain.
Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a
sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it
was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the
early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and
exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries
to weather the crisis.
Education and social progress
The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The
new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional
free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools.
The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the
field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor
had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies,
and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either
provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was
made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives.
The Religious Situation
The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment
of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun-
�SLOVAKIA
:iO
try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild.
A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of
the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As
a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an
independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its
meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse
circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself,
therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence.
In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic,
the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas
G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith.
1
Internal Problems
'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to
become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the
one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation
of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain,
asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the
Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the
local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain.
'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both
the internal and international point of rview. The Czech
statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente,
1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France,
1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke
the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed
�11
SLOVAKIA
that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference
to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll
branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs.
Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe
decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only
58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most
important questions such a;s the relation betlween state
and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority.
Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl
domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the
same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity.
From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to
remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech
part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy
of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole
industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent,
while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper
importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that
Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent
of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic.
From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and
county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to
Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech
pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia.
All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has
1
1
�12
SLOVAKIA
been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's
Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the
strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of
the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic
asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in
the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this
party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform
in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main
points:
!Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government.
As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the
Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as
natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding
finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth
the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament
in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet
of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment.
Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without
validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in
the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak
aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament.
A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali>zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May
8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this
document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by
article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have
had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive.
The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters
whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon
it. Laws enacted by the <Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the
1
�SLOVAKIA
13
President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for
Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal
was never discussed in the Parliament.
Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew
H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small
traditionailist <Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia,
stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of >the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic."
Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the
Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating,
however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the
Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later
before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the
Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the
Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic.
This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation
of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for
a better economic amd social <poll.icy in the German areas
suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague
did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in
Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the
'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the
same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German
P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party
in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant.
T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more
Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia.
�14
SLOVAKIA
PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for
its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the
federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk
People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government.
It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the
Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty.
Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis
of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went
to Germany.
This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As
a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no
share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary
her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an
agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for
the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout
Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day
after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of
SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a
dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of
constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice
and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed
,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso.
1
November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von
Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670
inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This
included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia
saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international
po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna
decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions
and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l
spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the
formation of a common party !known henceforth as the
Party of National Unity.
This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the
�15
SLOVAKIA
Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-<Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine
(,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech
officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and
the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the
common <budget.
FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS
Beforre Munich
The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy
was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by
the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive
system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy.
A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status
quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little
Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on
vanquished Austda and Hungary.
Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the
League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the
negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union
into the League.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's
foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two
ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The
NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per
cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission.
1
Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the <leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands
which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with
the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action.
De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and
�16
SLOVAKIA
Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should
cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When
Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must
ae<!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their
country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler.
1
After Munich
After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to
the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the
country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and
experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the
country's only hope of sur:vival.
The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was
given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration
was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted.
The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became
even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played
within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak
about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg
documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this
situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible,
direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors.
On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed
the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial
law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation
of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and
Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c
demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia.
Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph
�SLOVAKIA
17
Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment
was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to
which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then
suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the
declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr.
Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence.
President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a
protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced
the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich."
German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague
(March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the
"Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via."
Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead.
The Establishment of the Slovak Republic
Even though the Slovak state was largely the result
of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom
and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment.
After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German
orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her
armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the <Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line
in foreign policy.
Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were
later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand,
Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939,
�18
SLOVAKIA
SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine.
The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some
aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the
Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered
the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature.
The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only
ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October
1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state,
and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar.
The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise
between the past and the present, between an old tradition
and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the
se'Lf-q>reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation.
The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with
two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union.
Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau
had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic
was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or
Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In
fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did
not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers.
1
World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia
Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere
not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were
exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight
for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame
of freedom fHalrering.
After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun-
�SLOVAKIA
19
try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and
London, which became the cenrters of their political activities.
Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration
of a free Czecho-iSlovakia.
The committee was recognized first as the provisional
and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and
the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich
agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's
original frontiein; were guaranteed.
While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international
position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist
leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's <international .p osition would
be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory
and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at
bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country.
Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w
where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty
of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet
Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet
Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of
the war as an ally.
No. such treaty having been <:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in
Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation.
During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the
edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The
state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla<:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties
would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire-
�20
SLOVAKIA
,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a
"government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts"
would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These
principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication
of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy
were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in
Czecho-1Slovakia.
In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and
coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating
effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination,
with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the
absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany.
These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to
work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and
for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and
the Slovak Government.
:FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA,
AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA.
Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the
teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le?
Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people.
Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was
going on; is that correct?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going
on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ?
Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es.
Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail?
Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me
to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an
American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik
Army."
�SLOVAKIA
21
!Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right.
MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were
put in jail?
Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946.
Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Why?
Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against
communism.
Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism?
Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed.
'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did
you try to get a Un~ted States passport?
Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me
and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the
United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we
decided to leave and join the American Army.
Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in
Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport
finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home.
Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont?
Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way
from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did.
Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you
are taiking the train to 'Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time
what happened.
Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
1
1
�22
SLOVAKIA
Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way
of Budapest and Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake.
They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and
in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed
the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some
screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I
know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one
soldier and we can't move.
Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up?
Mr. Gailay<la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour.
Mr. Boll!in. One hour.
Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved
of his valualbles, jewelry, money?
Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally
reached .Prague ?
Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I
said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to
join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get
your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home.
Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia?
Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start
speruking agafast communism.
Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ;
you made some speeches against communism?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. ls that correct?
Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout
theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them?
Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say
something.
iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a
Mr. Galayda. No.
complaint?
Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&t ed ?
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
23
Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia.
Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear
in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight.
Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia?
Mr. Ga:layda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to
M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain?
Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there?
Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for
this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and
I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years,
and I know. They iaire no good in this world.
Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do
you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United
States who may feel that communism is a good system of
government?
Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that
is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have,
freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f
what they have.
Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the
Communists?
iMr. Galayda. No.
Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press?
Mr. Galayda. No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly?
Mr. Galayda . No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No.
visi'o n as we do !ill America here.?
Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit?
Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight.
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY
MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that
correct?
Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct.
Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen
at that time?
�2-l
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this
country.
Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root?
Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes.
Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to
Slova·k ia at that time?
Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was
reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to
visit him and see him.
Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before
the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd?
Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing
t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much.
Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good
in ,Slovakia; is that correct?
Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were.
Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as
Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r
then.
Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe
Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes.
press...
Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . .
Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly
Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes.
iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years.
Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was.
sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia?
Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in
contact with the Commun.ists?
Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated,
they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist
bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people.
1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944?
Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes.
lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout.
�SLOVAKIA
25
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were
liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising?
Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right.
Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if
necessary?
!Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the
same time.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things
you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising?
Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the
OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n
old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of
the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for
them and buried them.
Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here.
We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean
that the . . .
Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run.
Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run?
Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot
them from the back.
iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie
they were trying to get away from them?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that?
Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were
shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms.
Mir. Bonin. They were without arms?
Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people.
Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the
baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two
larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father?
1
1
�26
SLOVAKIA
,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons.
Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were
tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe?
MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved?
MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them
there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and
during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the
cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are
Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel.
sti1l buried.
'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied
Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in
jail your1self?
1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days.
Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why?
Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They
wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife
went to the authorities <a!Ild they let me free after 14 days.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
,r elease?
~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal
Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes.
knowledge?
Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours?
Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community?
•M r. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Priests?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. McTigue. Nuns?
of different rel,i gious faiths?
people
And
lMcTigu.e.
Mr.
Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes.
MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get
back to the United States?
�SLOVAKIA
27
Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came
to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as
soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the
United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there
for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver.
Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some
Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes.
·
property; didn't you?
Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter
you left? .
Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My
wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to
do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa.
The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that
they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one
country to. another?
Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty
to the Government.
(Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954).
a
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY
iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946
to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is
(Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct.
Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you
had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is
Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes.
thaJt correct?
Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had
the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did
you have with the Communists?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad.
Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in
--any way so that you would give your property ;to them?
Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to
this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government.
Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to
�28
SLOVAKIA
the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is
!Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct?
MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still
there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your
friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I'
close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated
in any way by the Communists?
!Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or
massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there
was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in
one truck rund took them away.
Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they
shot?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists
and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists.
MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In
other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs.
Smre~ovsky. Yes.
va:kia since 1945 . . .
Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right.
come Communists?
Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?.
Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and
live again like decent people.
MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the
Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to
prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
them?
Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary
public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and
princilples under the domination of the Russian system?
Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right.
Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being
sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain?
Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
�SLOVAKIA
29
MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in
order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them?
1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia
in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr.
Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of
what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that
you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia?
Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly.
(WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00
Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the
present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa.
Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed?
Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly,
Jednota.
Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were
born in Slovakia, is that correct.
Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true.
Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia.
Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is
that coTrect?
[)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir.
Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my
understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had
the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in
1944; is that correct?
Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine?
Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right.
Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there?
Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in
July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there
four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves
of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were
�30
SLOVAKIA
murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us
by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between
1939 and 1941.
I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed
to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved
twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and
with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven
in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;>edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and
women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They
said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their
relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941,
after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people
of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists
were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the
wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in
~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands,
sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the
night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives
and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told
me their relatives were deported in the night. The people
knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot.
Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed
Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred.
iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia?
Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four
days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women,
and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass
grarves.
iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew
about?
Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a.
Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves
disc01Vered later on; is that correct?
Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I
wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l
saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what
�SLOVAKIA
:n
I saJW at these mass graves.
Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we
hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we
haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the
reoord, but not have it read at this time?
Dr. Paulco. All right.
Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord.
Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make
this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe
us the highlights of it as of thJis moment?
Dr. PaUlc<>. All right.
Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files.
Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we
had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia
murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we
hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in
connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses
descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am
sure you recall thait testimony.
Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated
entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia.
Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect?
Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing
that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted
in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then
in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against
the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of
Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at
this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti-
�32
SLOVAKIA
zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and
the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This
so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in
194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And
this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943,
this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal
Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate
with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a
mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from
my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen,
were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling
against the Communists. He wrote several books againist
communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was
shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch.
1
Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot?
Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia.
!Mr. McTigue. About '50,000?
Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000.
Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year?
Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months.
Mr. McTigue. Three months?
Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but
after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia,
and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several
thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the
NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and
to the mines in Dombas.
Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally
end?
�33
SLOVAKIA
Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in
September 1944.
Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with
Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct?
Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true.
Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him
and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch?
Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in
Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was
the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into
being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the
side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian
ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically
every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army,
and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern
Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates
practicaly from every village and every town from eastern
Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak
Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the
whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by
the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke
after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch
was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign.
He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak
question to the International Tribunal.
Mr. Bonin. Tribunal?
Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to
change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia.
That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv?
Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the
Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr.
1
�34
SLOVAKIA
Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central
Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld
War Iil.
Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were
applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in
motion?
Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet
agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself
a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the
Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall,
that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght
him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by
the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947.
Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was
the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian
Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in
the spiritual and politic8il world?
Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct.
Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll.
Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for
a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean
countries to be in political life; isn't that correct?
Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit.
Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to
engBlge in political lifo . . .
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their
clerical life; isn't that coreivct?
Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir
Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass
there practically every Sunday.
'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you
escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country?
Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees
from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary,
�SLOVAKIA
35
from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets,
I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I
hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western
World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of
my relatives came through the border just several months
ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he
writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron
Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they
are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United
States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks,
like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia,
Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they
like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to
be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a
great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the
United States.
Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945.
Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country?
Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950.
Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n.
Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with
reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that
after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in
1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which
there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and
depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they
weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ;
they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and
the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with
reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by
the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those.
Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these
�SLOVAKIA
36
people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the
Soviet agents.
,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding.
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that.
I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons
Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired,
is that OOlITect..
Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an
atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a?
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
!Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that
cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt?
Dr. Pauico. That is correct.
Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst
tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to
them?
Dr. Pauco. Yes
Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait
same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have
come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is <the fhist time,
I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually
dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate
the trouble.
Dr. Pauc·o. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct?
Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes.
Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there?
iDr. Pallico. Yes.
iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t
were dTopped in?
Dr. PauJco. Yes.
Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United
States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they
are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes,
to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place .
Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue.
Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the
1
�SLOVAKIA
37
United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention
of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is
that correct?
Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt.
Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je<lnota?
Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct
Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe
that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people
have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the
Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force
and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless
as they possibly can.
Dr. Paiu100. That is correct.
Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to
thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made
as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia.
Dr. Pauco. Thank you.
Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would
like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco.
Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr.
Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and
they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign
nation?
- Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir.
Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing
more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted
through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- ·
termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type
of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and
thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania,
Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to
goveTn themselves; is that correct.
Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct.
MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for
your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity
1
�SLOVAKIA
38
presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to
the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free
world. Thank you ve,r y much.
Dr. P,aulco. Thank you.
Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·.
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova>lcia, did
you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which
the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the
1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people?
Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital
of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on
April 4.
Mr. Feighan. I see.
Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the
whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three
months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by
the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends ,
of the methods which I mentioned before.
Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o
see it and observe .iit?
Dr. Pmrco. No, no.
Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco
Or. Paulco. You are wekome.
Mr. Bonin. Thank you <very much.
(Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA
IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War
Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was.
Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground
movemerut in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who
started it.
iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ?
Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944.
tr?
�SLOVAKIA
39
:Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this
underground moivement?
Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation
is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity
of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger
of communism. They studied communism and decided to
combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or
not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World
War II.
The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the
field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions.
The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations
at the !beginning w&e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir
activities in the political field.
Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement?
Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field.
The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation
are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed
which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party.
So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting
strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had
no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population.
Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles
and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist
Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled
by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else
but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control
aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party.
Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un-
�40
SLOVAKIA
derground in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so.
Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your
members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground
movement from without ?
Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we
had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We
,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion,
informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;,
iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to
ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or
any member here might ask in that regard, you just use
yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly
anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure.
Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission.
Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.?
Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost
fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for
the United States.
·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited
States in 1950?
Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were
you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'(
Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent
abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition
was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from
Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I
was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by
1
1
�41
SLOVAKIA
the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry
of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is
mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet.
Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945.
Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did.
Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry
during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you
were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct?
Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of
the leaders outside.
MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in
Slova,kiia?
Dr. Mii kula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us
here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava?
Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia.
Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this.
Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst
the Repl]blic."
iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi<s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4."
And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a
Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year?
Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947.
Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations
2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say,
70 or 80 times?
[)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that.
Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity?
Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes
Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense?
Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely.
1
1
1
�42
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing
here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it
seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice
a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you?
Dr. Mikula. That i:s me.
Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
is t:Jhiat rig1ht?
Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel.
Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities
of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit?
Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that
we tahlced albout.
Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance
or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the
people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their
weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently,
sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans.
Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were
the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist
Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over
the counwy.
So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We
pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB
pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we
started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station.
It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it
existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we
tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the
worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there.
JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in
ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery
police.
�SLOVAKIA
43
Mr. McTigue. Communis t police?
Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes.
Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say?
Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I
will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March
4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard.
The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards :
il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports
of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is
the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid
fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false
infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R.
Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis
order?
Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover
was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after
t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war
started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary
to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary.
What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the
people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy
came people from Slova:kiia.
There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in
one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good
faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia.
'Dhe movements of the population are very serious
thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how
long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and
so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle.
Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order?
Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further:
Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard
to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station.
�44
SLOVAKIA
Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the
public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the
order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post
offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by
the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was
said. If they find something against the regime they wt
accorcmng to regufations.
Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in
traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to
have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower
units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if
somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to
be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest
police station.
This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers
of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to
Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to
Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions.
They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says:
To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat
the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against
the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the
other members of the unit.
I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits
and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to
the oommittee . . .
Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized.
Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the
oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in
SwvaJkia ,a t the present time?
Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just
say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the
will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That
is a general rea:son
�SLOVAKIA
45
Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or
with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents
that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve.
Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the
heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today?
Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout
80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but
not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am.
acti:ve part to fight oommundsm.
Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why?
Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm
they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or
cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason.
!Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a
hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy
whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most
vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce.
Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the
Communist taikeover; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries?
Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½
million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but
in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are
pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people.
Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over,
aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken
out of theiir normal life.
Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions.
Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
.
Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945.
Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume.
Dr. Mitkula. Yes.
�46
SLOVAKIA
Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how
have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities
of the underground since that time?
Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact
through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945
our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children.
Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four
and one was ,s ix.
Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained?
Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but
I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949.
Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout
two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue?
Dr. Milrula. Yes.
!Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has
been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct?
Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I
a'In receiving informia,tion, but later.
Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite,
would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae?
DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the
same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in
S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a
little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is
a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the
people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing
for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides
that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and
rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat.
Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are
about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit
·stronger?
Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration
camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes
and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo-
�SLOVAKIA
47
ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere,
the same procedure.
Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union?
Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18
villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion.
Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or
does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does,
what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble
this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any?
Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase
the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there
will be a cha1I1ge.
iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a.
Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely
necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we
are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we
have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems.
Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination?
Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should
not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have
proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people
the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i<s po<l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90
per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait
we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is
cutting otff the will to resist.
iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan?
MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel
thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that
the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national
determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so
desiire?
·
Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the
popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important
�48
SLOVAKIA
things that they need; some kind of good will that we have
a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem.
MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that
we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be
he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free
w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese
caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope,
ilS that right?
Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant
things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl
a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they
are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret
communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge
to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs.
Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the
Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries?
Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic
se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the
Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals,
a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists.
The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must
be directed against those opportunists, because they are
afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re
readty to betray todlay and every day.
Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have
gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee?
Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome.
Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for
Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work
Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes.
with your family?
Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal
of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that
I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in
Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very
great extent.
!Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954).
ance here today. 1
�SLOVAKIA
49
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK
Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and
happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America.
:Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United
States and Canada.
·
Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg
of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people
to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways
in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should
do to combat this new kind of enemy.
Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are
a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of
America?
Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout
300,000.
!Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of
.America?
Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses?
Mr. McTigue. Yes.
1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of
Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907.
'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan,
that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I
sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith
the statement?
· Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered.
!Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first
express my deep appreciation to this committee for the
opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the
dread detail of Communist aggression.
I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I
know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know
the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends,
�50
SLOVAKIA
peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends
because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their
last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee
and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a
difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well.
Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp
liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot
and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the
business, the duty, of every American to take part in it;
every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because
it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own
America.
I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my
statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ
with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is
in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation.
The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about
Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure
responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and
Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc
the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble.
("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak
League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official
011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County
Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue
[Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is
not repeated here.)
Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of
Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the
sellout to Moscow; is that correct?
Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir.
Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1
�SLOVAKIA
51
Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with
Communists?
Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely.
Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence?
Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to
lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget
what communism is, and just let them get strong enough
until they can take all of us.
Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we
can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive?
How can we most help them at a time like this?
Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything
to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime
they have.
~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified
here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among
the ,people of SlovaJkia?
Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with
the people directly and indirectly right through the war,
and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today.
Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective
system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with
what is going on over there today; is that correct?
Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl>ova~ia and then we get it.
Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little
bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia
and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second
World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic,
what exactly was the relationship at that time between
Slovakia and Germany?
�52
SLOVAKIA
Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited
by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy
Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it.
Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example,
that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany?
Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that
they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token
division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men
by classes; they never had many men in the field.
Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the
UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor
when the Germans declared war?
Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business.
We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia
declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our
own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United
States.
iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time?
Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find
that out from our own United States Goveirnment because
that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is
absolutely no record of it.
Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was
exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic
policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany?
Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean,
running the country of Slovakia itself.
Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at
thait time?
Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any
other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide
with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside
of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of
�SLOVAKIA
53
the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the
wax, were good.
Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There
was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms
that you normally would expect?
Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the
problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the
two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's
Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus
Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran
Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one
accoro.
Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944,
when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from
that time Slovakia lost its. independence?
Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides.
They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by
the partisans on the other end.
Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation
did the Tiso government continue in po,w er?
Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso
tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a
national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak
gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia
themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at
Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25;
the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children
included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks
for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against
a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans.
Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist
activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The
leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not
have popular support.
�54
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when?
Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945.
Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany?
Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria.
Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured
with the American troops?
Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a
copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State
Department, and, of course, the Army Department.
Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of
the Slovak Goivernment?
Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our
effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to
Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I
say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald
coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison.
Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals?
Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague.
Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today
under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any
form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely
unified government?
Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the
Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the
Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true.
The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not
safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary
general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek,
a Czech.
Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to
appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat?
Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any-
�SLOVAKIA
55
thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for
separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty.
Mr. Bentley. Who?
Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record.
They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there
are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free
and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport.
Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you
know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would
simply have states' rights.
The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect
their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much
later.
Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine,
when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned,
what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that?
Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct.
Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement
and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am
sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l
think at this time it is
quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and
have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case
of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely
for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists.
Mr. Hrobak. That is correct.
Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard.
Mr. Hrobak. Correct.
iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the
Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that
Mr. Hrobak Yes.
too.
Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi-
�56
SLOVAKIA
sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s.
Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct.
Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records
show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows
a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because
he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several
yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country.
Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia.
Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge
of that, too.
Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have
made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks,
patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the
regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-.
crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is
"Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras).
The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's
men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that
was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these,
The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then
on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in
Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another
booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by
Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946.
Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946
and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s
in BraUshwa.
In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you
can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they
have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed
from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10,
�57
SLOVAKIA
1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other
Slova!k p8{!)ers.
Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated
Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin.
The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on
the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward
Benes."
Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication?
Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of
the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and
Canada.
And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League
of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak.
(Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954).
1
STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS
Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated
Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava.
During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now,
as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to
have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on
Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own
knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were
utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant
force in tha,t country.
Introduction
Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history.
�58
SLOVAKIA
After losing her political independe nce in the ninth
century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for
eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did
not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within
the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was
ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural
and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very
naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally
providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves
of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power
structure .
On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the
Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called
Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal
union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of
Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the
preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made
any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly
centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called
revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by
the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first
Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak
national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y
conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs
wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their
predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense
provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after
World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal
protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as
a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the
"
�SLOVAKIA
69
people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation
foisted upon the Sl01Vak people."
For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle
of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders
argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both
parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk
state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the
Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with
France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of
Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet
Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion
on this pomt at any time.
The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the
primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the
Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly
brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous
Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f
E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration
of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This
was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and
other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with
the alternative of the partition of her territory among
Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct
German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939,
thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for
independence.
During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily
resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found
refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal
was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this
goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army
and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of
my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo-
�SLOVAKIA
60
lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important
point :
All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the
fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression
has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics
were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted
in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which
Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union
by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II.
As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a
German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia
was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire:
To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end
of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from
German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster
which would put an end to the Slovak national state.
Because of this difference in psychological attitude,
Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement
of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program
had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow.
1
A. The Blueprint for Sovietization
After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the
Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in
post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain
pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of
the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity
of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in
Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories
agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests,"
�SLOVAKIA
61
says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided,
after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and
friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other,
after the war, all possilble economic help."
No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United
States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia
toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations.
The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus
for those who had been aspiring to political power within
the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In
this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers
of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this
party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to
Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around
10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted
for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938.
The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its
common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of
Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time
of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia.
Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the
apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was
perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and
created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name
of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement,
as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all
political, legislative, military, and governmental executive
power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the
,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati<ves
shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over."
The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas
Agreement were laid down in another document, the first
three articles of which read as follows :
�62
SLOVAKIA
"(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs,
as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite
their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be
their common government organized on the principle of
equality.
"(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states
and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh
we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of
all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular.
"(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct
its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should
therefore, lean on the Soviet Union."
It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit
to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle
agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in
Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in
Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following
passage (pp. 408-409) :
''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the
way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed
the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) ,
which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of
insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole
revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.''
- wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ."
1
"Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on
to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great
Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of
right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not
willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De-
�SLOVAKIA
63
cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of
fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue."
In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched
on the problem of the National Front Government: "It
will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental
parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to
pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national
front ." (pp. 409-410).
On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization
of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties,
and organization of the National Front Government as it
emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to
become a "people's" democrwcy.
Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the
Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24
percent of the population, became the future leading force
of Slwakia.
B. The August 1944 Insurrection
Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in
Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser,
had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents
into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the
German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs,
and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators.
More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin,
Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army,
and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an
agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future
partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions
�64
SLOVAKIA
from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be
the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his
sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec
County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2
Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet
rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing.
Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of
Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander
Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real
Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second
lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar
camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet
agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent
to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of
the activity of the different groups.
In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after
hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people
of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of
a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would
receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just
reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of
(1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26.
( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29.
�SLOVAKIA
66
August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were
able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots
who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22,
1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On
Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries."
The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on
Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the
U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a
military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary
government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A
civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks
were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks
had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising,
and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this
country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and
their opportunity was not long in arising.
On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train
stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the
Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of
the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko,
refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the
Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng
from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was
then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner
on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his
aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day.
ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland
of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into
Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the
�66
SLOVAKIA
partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that
the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[>rising whioh was announced on August
29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General
Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the
political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo ..
crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin
Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v
Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible
to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General
Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to
escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and
disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by
the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the
Reich from ,w hich they were never to return.
Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was
quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months,
tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &ama. It is evident
that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952.
As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been
the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev.
With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~
tioned him as follows:
Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in
Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian?
Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under
the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska
Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their
activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and
of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3
(3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013.
�SLOVAKIA
67
Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia.
This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle
against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on
the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the
insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that
Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country.
C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia
What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the
Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the
historical facts. During World War II, though subject to
a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia
was a relatively free country. During five years, until the
insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for
political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava
was able to master all the difficulties of the war period
during these years. Then the Red army came.
I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family
which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would
say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of
mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The
house in question, which was located on a hill, was then
chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that
the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary.
After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the
Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a
good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were
sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of
�68
SLOVAKJA
the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on
the dining-room ta>ble and began checking on our identity.
Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms
and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded
to examine these things in detail and chose for himself
whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather
suitcase, etc.
We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red
army had entered the house and began in turn to forage
through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go
into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these
three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed
because she had been violated. After this visit by offi ..
cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk,
successively entered bhe house, each one having held us,
that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their
own way, until 2 :30 a. m.
In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around
200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women
had to go to the hospital for examination.
During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets,
around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by
po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while
various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned.
D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945
On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes
followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the
easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third
Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets,
through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign
government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which,
except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had
been loyal to the Slova>k State - all of this without any
plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats",
who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in
the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state
will in Slovaikia.
�SuOVA.KIA
69
According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political
life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely,
the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1,
plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out
of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia.
Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which
had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the
uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in
strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being
Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others.
Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political
re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~
Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system
exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political
aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of
the Communists increased, in comparison with the year
1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet
"Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this
50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected
by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional
,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while
the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence
of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the
outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat
of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of
the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment
for Slo:vaikia.
MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was
progressing in every field of Government activity: In the
field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the
Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry
by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and
this without any consultation with the nation - mines,
1
�70
SLOVAKIA
100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production,
80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72
percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47
percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent;
clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent;
wood industry, 8 percent.
By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working
people fell within the field of private industry.
ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34,
dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated
the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation.
By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of
May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice
were created: Oommunit,y and <list.riot "people's courts"
and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these
courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two
factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with
Germany.
The political character of this distorted justice was
determined by three circumstances :
1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55
Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the
the
of
memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two
political ,parties in power.
2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle
nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide
upon cases which were not punishable according to the
Penal Code.
3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility.
4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided
for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive
Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate-
�SLOVAKIA
71
gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps:
a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts";
b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and
order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic
life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it;
c. Those who· do not work;
d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them
within the framework of laibor duty.
'5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting
his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t.
6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the
confiscation of the ded'endant's property.
It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought
to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and
"unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their
indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury
in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation.
This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal
revenge.
By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from
thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly,
and other human rights were likewise a;bolished.
E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia
All these measures were aimed at the weakening of
traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading
personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko,
Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should
remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with
the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the
great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided
�SLOVAK.IA
72
to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s.
Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have
been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all
the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon
the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This
loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on.
In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three
deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against
" . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists
of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37
plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw
their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23
deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies).
The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided.
There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia.
Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the
Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further
limitatio!Ils on the politi>Cal preirogative s of his own party.
1
After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the
Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947,
to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the
triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party
itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1;
the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat
fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of
the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have
been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia.
�SI.IOVAKIA
73
Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the
way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946
and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec<h area) was
finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate
its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and
National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the
National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp.
Conclusion
As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat
that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the
events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I
must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The
Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954),
contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of
Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in
Slovrukia.
(Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954).
fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK
Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r .
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is
that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total
number of seven times?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.?
Father Botek. Yes.
�74
SLOVAKIA
Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949?
Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950.
Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944.
kia, Father?
Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout
the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and
1946 following the Communist occupation.
Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all
church-Operated school,s.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the
tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church?
Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic
Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic
press.
Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in
Father Botek. Yes.
religion, is tihat right, Father?
Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics
in Slo;vakia?
Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic.
Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia?
F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two
political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party
and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that
would be able to defend their rights by democratic method.
Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between
the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father?
Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and
clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics
could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to
use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their
1
�SLOVAKIA
75
pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the
creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end
of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~
cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian
Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then
inco:riporated into the so-called
Kosice agreement concluded in 1945.
The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and
support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they
woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they
joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests
for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph
Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y
his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The
bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing
prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were
also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in
those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this
order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for
the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party.
He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist
Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to
the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this
committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they
trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the
bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during
the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some
cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which
was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was
also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were
aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally
indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~
cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary
schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us..
ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1
�76
SLOVAKIA
tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner
for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party,
Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however,
became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they
also, on their part, tried to win su>ppo•r t of the Catholic
population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we
Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that
we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side.
There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement
with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the
negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement
of a final decision. They made indications that they might
be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but
a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the
Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became
apparent that no agreement could be reached with the
Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we
concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of
SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on
their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the
Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another
party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which
they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there
were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't
be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid
votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes
received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes
were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they
were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white
ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections,
and the Communists and the representative s of the Free-
�77
SLOVAKIA
dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party
under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started
,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party.
We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we
r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics
were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we<re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic
party which would .not admit religious freedom and they
were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in
favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary
to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for
them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a
statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true
which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that
party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party
and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif
the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking
them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and
receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found
out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests
of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed
to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic
group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the
Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the
Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or
guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would
also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1
�78
SLOVAKIA
ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises
and in arguments with the Communists they always
yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to
take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in
order to defend their rights.
Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman
of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve
the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats
and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner
HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and
neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the
Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to
find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this
commission, representative s of the Communist Party were
Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the
Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of
the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to
be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed
schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the
Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of
property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no
results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished
the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association
of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000.
Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was
liquidated and you were arrested?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you
were arrested, Fathoc?
Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received
�SLOVAKIA
instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all
acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action.
However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and
therefore any acttvities developed by this organization
oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted.
The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action
Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was
collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and
that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances
happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended
by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to
omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were
anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c
Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix
in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists
didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht
Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared
that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau
had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e
sent to a room where they were searched while, in the
meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were
searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from
8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally
the employees of the bureau were released to their homes,
and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also
was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau
was investigated by the police.
On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame
to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was
just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the
policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also
1
�80
SLOVAKlA
the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station
at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess
that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I
engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime
in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst
me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional
court's prison where they held me for another five months
pending investigation. At the end of these five months,
my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as
the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were
released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked
for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I
knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this
to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven
months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred
to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the
Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action,
which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so
that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my
term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was
released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after
a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists.
Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father?
F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were
preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local
Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with
me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with
my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated
he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me
and on the other hand, if another .person would be given
�SLOVAKIA
81
the same instructions, this other person could do harm
to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this
par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called
on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at
the district national committee for some discussion. I
was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that
people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even
after they had served their terms imposed by the courts.
However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes
between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when
the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests
fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where
such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered.
TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national
committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and
on the same day the police arrived and took me to a
forced-labor camp at Nova:ky
My parishioners protested against my arrest; however,
they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by
arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was
to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my
experiences which I had at that time when I was held at
the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked
how they became involved in underground activities and
how it happened that they were arrested since there were
always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most
of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated
that there was always a Communist spy planted by the
Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground
activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police.
�82
SLOVAKIA
I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e
all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any
underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to
develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually
start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them
to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested.
In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to
win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore,
they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They
coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-<:aJled representaUves of the
Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this
meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts,
stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and
discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were
mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play
any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists
eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of
the Catholic Action.
The Communists declared that since the Vatican was
against the people and since the bishops supported the
v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch
only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs
concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but
all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this
Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized
that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore,
they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a
memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at
which this Communist Catholic Action was founded.
Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They
convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at
wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon
to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops,
�SLOVAKIA
83
however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See
declared every person who would sign this memorandum as
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.
Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp
in 1950; is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were
you sent to a hospital?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something
about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the
hospital?
Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested
all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because
there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals.
These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries.
That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants.
They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in
their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The
Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in
the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a
university without any previous education, which was
otheIWise required from university students. This was the
same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short
preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of
these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the
Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals.
MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father?
Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951.
Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out
of SlQIVakia?
Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe.
At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However,
�84
SLOVAKIA
this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second
time, at which time we were only four escapees and we
succeeded in crossing the border.
,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time
is in Rome; is that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism
is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might
like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their
efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion
in SlovaJkia.
Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist
instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion
of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these
instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the
second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the
separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests.
IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question.
Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own
personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the
Communists?
Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the
first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in
Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican
were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See.
However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective.
to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and
to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of
communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced
a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike
care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the
�SLOVAKIA
86
clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops,
and admitted only those whom they considered harmless;
but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were
monitored.
Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods
and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the
pupils with the, theory of Marxism?
Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the
very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this
girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way
of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine.
Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the
other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let
the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and
girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat
this Communist march toward worrld revolution?
Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have
had great successes in educating the very young people
in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology
implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents
to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact;
that if communism is given enough time, that these youths
will become completely communistic and the Communist
strength will be increased.
Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make
the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God?
Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children,
for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is
our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and
�86
SLOVAK IA
"Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor,
Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man."
Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia?
Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not
well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack
of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were
poor.
Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given
any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were
a member of the clergy?
Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I
never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations,
and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten,
so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This,
may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of
Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also
had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should
give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to.
IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any
agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper
it is written on?
Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions
with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists
never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy
which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss.
Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y
haive covered very well your experien ces back over the
years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only
question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the
populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say?
�SLOVAKIA
87
Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent.
Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free
Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you
come from?
F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa ..
milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of
America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard
from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of
those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia.
Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in
Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia.
Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a
very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and
13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints.
Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan
Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian
population.
Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the
straight news given on those programs?
Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice
of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well,
turn it off because the news is over and they are now
going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic
and we do not want any Oze<!h Republic."
Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are
doing some good behind the Iron Curtain?
Father Botek They certainly are of great use and
great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater
if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also
adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian
popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling.
Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are
they j&mmed by the Soviets?
�88
SLOVAKIA
Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but
on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the
transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the
radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one.
Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why
there has been some resentment to the broadcasts?
F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are
almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States,
who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the
United States, these programs do not bring any reports on
the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in
the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities
of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak
people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order
to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in
the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also
beams SlO'Vakian programs.
Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within
Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic
development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in
a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that
the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the
opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic?
Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945,
not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the
S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However,
Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the
Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy,
self-rule.
Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing?
Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was
�SLOVAKIA
89
opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government.
Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there
is only one way.
Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent
discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in
1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When
the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944,
they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people
with promises of an independent Slovakian State but
within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists,
however, was disapproved by Moscow.
Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit
of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak
people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S.
S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but
in su!bstance it would be socialistic?
Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but
President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made
also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic.
Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting
in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951?
Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic
action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an
anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't
celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the
third year any more.
Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of
ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding
the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our
overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
1
�90
SLOVAKIA
TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA
(The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.)
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is
Father Nahalka. Yes.
that correct?
Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia?
Father N ahalka. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia?
Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was
ordained in Rome.
Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia,
is that correct?
!Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in
Slovakia.
Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct?
Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946
to 1949.
Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called,
Father Nrahalka. Yes.
in Slovakia?
Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place?
Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the
uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this
town was occupied by Communist guerillas.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what
the guerillas did in that town?
Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the
town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the
Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the
men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even
though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80
innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a
nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut
�SLOVAKIA
91
stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off
his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the
uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm
the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread
the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic,
Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and
that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise.
Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a
political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch
over the bishop's activiities?
FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke
down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into
every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar
into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old
at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in
the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all
visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the
bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the
files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom
those files.
Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home,
for example, wired ?
Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the
rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s
present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the
Communists placed microphones in the conference room
for the bishop's conferences.
Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k
in 1949?
Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the
'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary.
Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists,
Father?
1
Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and
held in imprisonment until January 1946.
1
�92
SLOVAKIA
,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father?
-Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953.
Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago.
Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia?
FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was
very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run
opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and
we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area
in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad
to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the
border.
Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was
testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and
Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the
broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge
on th-at?
Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with
the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during
this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign
broadcasts.
Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia?
Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen
to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re
different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily
jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen
to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free
Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed
to the political part of the program of those broad~asts
mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not
state the entire Communist case in Slovakia.
Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist?
Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire
anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist
attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs,
�93
SLOVAKIA
the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact
that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~
ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda.
'.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are
people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists
and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the
time when the transmitters were still in operation, people
in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called
the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs
broadoost by Radio Vatican.
IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast
by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any
good - I mean, against the Communists?
Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects
in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their
news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still
more efficient if they adjusted their political programs
also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA
Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es.
iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913
at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct?
Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of
SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security,
is that correct?
Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir.
Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to
1951, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. That is right.
1
�94
SLOVAKIA
Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security
completely controlled by the Communists,?
Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under
Communist control.
Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau
of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under
Communist control, isn't that correct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as
a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the
Communists got control, is that corerct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over.
Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security
was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time
to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house
searches, and so forth and so on?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders.
Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made?
Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the
orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League?
Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic
Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated
because the Communists considered this organization a
swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3
supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America.
iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close
supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in
Slovakia?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders.
Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they?
iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such
orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as
secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only
u:pon special order by telephone.
!Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed
�SLOVAKIA
95
you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were
they plain-clothes men?
Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed
police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me.
Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did
you m0lke,?
Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on
whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests.
Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that
there was any political significance to what a priest
had to say?
Mr. Dobrotka. I <know I sulbmitted annual reports to
this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent
of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests
to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the
priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised
by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political
speeches within their sermons.
Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is
reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and
peasants and the PQpulace in general?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to
observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground
acti<vities.
Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal
Security?
Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I
was active there were approximately three cases of arrests
of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the
area under my jurisdiction.
Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting
to your superiors that the priests were only talking to
God, is that correct?
�96
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for
their arrest.
Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from
SlorvaJkia?
Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951.
Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of
Slorvalcia?
Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in
escaping.
Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor
Service unit at Bad Kreuznach?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kersten. Any questions?
Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the
Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name?
Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my
headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie,
which was under the Minister of Interior.
Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938?
Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state.
Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist
Party at that time in 1938?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the
gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any
political parties.
Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed
your duties of reporting on priesrts?
Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the
time when the Catholic Action was started.
Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist
Party at that time ?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir.
Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB
in order to protect their own existence were forced to file
an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party.
Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to
become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time?
�SLOVAKIA
97
Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but
your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in
February 1948.
Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March
1948?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic
and I attended Mass every Sunday.
Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948?
Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from
that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the
local priest, local teacher and local government officer
were suspicious, because these persons were considered as
reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set
on us by the Communist Party.
Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole
world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for
world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind
the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to
belie:ve in God?
Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe.
Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have
a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that
we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as
possilble.
Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions.
(The witness was excused.)
(,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY
Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows:
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919,
�98
SLOVAKIA
in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct?
_Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics
in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct?
Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct.
Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir.
,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office
by the Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. Why?
Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person.
Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something
about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the
Communists, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik
and in English.
Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set?
Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the
Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment,
this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas
to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would
be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to
join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the
farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end
also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken
away from the farmers and transferred to industrial
pul'p()ses.
Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the
Communists, is that correct?
,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to
meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other
�SWVAKIA
99
in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e
to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were
arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas.
~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you
know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some
of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas?
Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the
most significant of them was that which occurred at
Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard
delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed
this action of despair because he stated that since they
took aiway from him everything they should take away
also his family.
Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West?
Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951.
Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of
the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is
that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been
receiving here aH you expected?
Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here
meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the
slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and
I am impatient to return to my home country.
Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with
the progress of OUI' fight against communism.
Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel
that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the
people of the other captive nations that are in the free
world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those
countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is
that right?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better.
Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young
main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms,
�100
S!LOVAIHA
would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I
can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I
can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men
would use such an oipportunity.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you.
The witness was. excused.
(Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings,
the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream
"murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For
the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear
technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary
25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the
Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak
witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous."
It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not
call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story
would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas
Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should
have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and
1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k
initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes
Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former
members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to
"sing"!
�
SLOVAKIA
Published
VOL. V
quarterly by the
Slovak
League of
MARCH 1955
America
NO . 1 (14)
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA
is told on the following pa,ges by
witnesses called upon to testify
by the Select Committee on Com•
mu.nist Aiggression of the House
of Representatives, headed by the
Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil·
waukee, Wis.
Michael Galayda is an .American
citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was
there W1,d saw Communism at
work a mong his people w'ho had
persdstenUy ,and consistently fought
the Red plague for over a hundred
years. H e makes his home in
Hazleton, Pa.
Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the
terror and horror of Red rule in
Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name.
Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America
in 1950; he is assistant editor of
the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic
Slovak Union, and a1so chairman
of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k
National Council Abroad.
Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law
1 and politics and was very active
' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which
invaded his native Slovakia.
Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer,
became the director of the Press
Bureau of the Slovak League of
America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon
after his arrival in America several years ago.
Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in
West Germany, was a Sergeant of
the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Jur Detviansky was an active
officer of the Sloviak Army before
he Hed to the West.
Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor
and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia,
is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits
"HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From
Rome), Italy.
Rev.
Stephen
Nahalka,
S.T.D.,
ecclesiastical writer and former
personal secretary to Bishop John
Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese,
1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was
sentenced to 24 years 1n prison
1by the Reds lives in Rome.
Italy.
Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the
JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of
America since 19'50, is a native
AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio,
in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs
for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak
has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for
government. His
articles
and
pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the
maohinations of the Benes Czechs
(Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for
the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the
men of the Kremlin - +and the
Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. ·
�SLOVAKIA
Communist Aggression Against Slovakia
(The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of
the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to
ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries
of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest
attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those
who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others
who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts
because of the pro-Soviet -poli<:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech
Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after
World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact
sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast
masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant
nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia
with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of
the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.).
FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8
SLOVAKIA
!Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on
the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with
the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western
Slaivs.
The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the
beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization
was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this
period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself
lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country.
FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and
Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of
the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church
organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It
was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries
�SLOVAKIA
3
from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of
the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance.
In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a
battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and
Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century,
she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized
under the Arpad dynasty.
In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth
century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda
of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in
that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings
were celebrated in BratisJava.
The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the
nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary
and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace
it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual
rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy.
In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising
against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor
crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They
did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated
monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never
satisfied.
h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle
7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament
of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of
"Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree
of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the
Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act.
�4
SLOVAKIA
In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom,
except for some autonomous bodies.
1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania
and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national
rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the
kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was
not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in
the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary.
1
World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State
Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was
greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire.
Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater
autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of
nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further
stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage
for the peace settlements.
Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders
established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G.
Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe
and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement
and support.
Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's
separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the
Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state,
as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish
Republic.
Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into
contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed
with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement,
and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at
1
1
1
�5
SLOVAKIA
the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa
should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have
complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should
be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent.
1
A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and
Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated
by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on
the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions
in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the
Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers.
1
In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the
people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg
Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe
and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce,
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army
waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany.
A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up
in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de
jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18,
1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected
the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer
accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of
peace .. ."
On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian
Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the
estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body
composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918,
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
6
and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of
Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed
the separation of Slo.va:lci<a from the Kiingdom of Hungary
and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected
T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the
first ,caJbinet.
However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement
developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of
government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon
a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved.
In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state,
for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst
the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia.
Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak
delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to
Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague
at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April
1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's
Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and
reestabllished in December 19'18.
1
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
ConstitutJional Structure
Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until.
February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied
from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence.
The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the
�SLOVAKIA
7
preamble of the Constitution of the United States.
The main body of the Consbitution provided for a
popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both
houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary.
Parties and Politics
The politics of the period may ibe divided into four
phases:
1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19)
Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech
political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on
which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this
major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been
enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a
split on partisan lines followed.
2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20)
The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water
power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into
Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia.
3. The agrarian era (1922-35)
This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability
under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed
the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout
this period.
4. The crisis ( 1935-38)
This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the
Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem
of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic.
The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the
period betiween the two World Wars formed the following
groups:
National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never
beoame very ,powenfu:l.
�8
SLOVAKIA
Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist
Party and the Slovak Pe>ipulist Party, respectiively, this
group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life.
The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its
strongholds, especially in Slovakia.
Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the
subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both
rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network
of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its
broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support.
National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the
lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more
influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate.
Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social
democratic parties of other European countries, had more
influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though
outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction .
Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party
was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though
equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe,
the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World
War.
Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Agrarian reform
iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing
the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore,
was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak
Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter
com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a
fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who
needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula-
�SLOVAKIA
9
tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances.
Economic development
While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost
covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was
far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former
Austro..lHJungarian Empire.
'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods,
were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a
view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea
countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers
of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great
Britain.
Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a
sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it
was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the
early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and
exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries
to weather the crisis.
Education and social progress
The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The
new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional
free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools.
The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the
field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor
had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies,
and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either
provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was
made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives.
The Religious Situation
The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment
of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun-
�SLOVAKIA
:iO
try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild.
A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of
the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As
a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an
independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its
meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse
circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself,
therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence.
In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic,
the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas
G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith.
1
Internal Problems
'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to
become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the
one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation
of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain,
asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the
Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the
local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain.
'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both
the internal and international point of rview. The Czech
statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente,
1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France,
1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke
the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed
�11
SLOVAKIA
that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference
to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll
branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs.
Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe
decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only
58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most
important questions such a;s the relation betlween state
and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority.
Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl
domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the
same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity.
From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to
remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech
part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy
of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole
industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent,
while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper
importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that
Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent
of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic.
From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and
county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to
Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech
pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia.
All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has
1
1
�12
SLOVAKIA
been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's
Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the
strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of
the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic
asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in
the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this
party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform
in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main
points:
!Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government.
As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the
Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as
natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding
finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth
the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament
in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet
of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment.
Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without
validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in
the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak
aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament.
A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali>zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May
8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this
document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by
article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have
had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive.
The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters
whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon
it. Laws enacted by the <Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the
1
�SLOVAKIA
13
President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for
Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal
was never discussed in the Parliament.
Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew
H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small
traditionailist <Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia,
stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of >the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic."
Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the
Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating,
however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the
Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later
before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the
Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the
Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic.
This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation
of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for
a better economic amd social <poll.icy in the German areas
suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague
did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in
Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the
'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the
same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German
P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party
in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant.
T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more
Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia.
�14
SLOVAKIA
PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for
its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the
federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk
People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government.
It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the
Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty.
Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis
of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went
to Germany.
This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As
a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no
share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary
her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an
agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for
the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout
Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day
after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of
SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a
dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of
constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice
and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed
,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso.
1
November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von
Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670
inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This
included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia
saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international
po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna
decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions
and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l
spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the
formation of a common party !known henceforth as the
Party of National Unity.
This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the
�15
SLOVAKIA
Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-<Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine
(,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech
officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and
the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the
common <budget.
FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS
Beforre Munich
The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy
was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by
the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive
system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy.
A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status
quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little
Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on
vanquished Austda and Hungary.
Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the
League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the
negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union
into the League.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's
foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two
ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The
NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per
cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission.
1
Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the <leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands
which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with
the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action.
De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and
�16
SLOVAKIA
Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should
cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When
Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must
ae<!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their
country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler.
1
After Munich
After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to
the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the
country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and
experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the
country's only hope of sur:vival.
The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was
given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration
was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted.
The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became
even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played
within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak
about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg
documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this
situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible,
direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors.
On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed
the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial
law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation
of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and
Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c
demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia.
Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph
�SLOVAKIA
17
Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment
was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to
which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then
suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the
declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr.
Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence.
President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a
protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced
the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich."
German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague
(March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the
"Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via."
Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead.
The Establishment of the Slovak Republic
Even though the Slovak state was largely the result
of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom
and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment.
After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German
orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her
armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the <Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line
in foreign policy.
Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were
later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand,
Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939,
�18
SLOVAKIA
SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine.
The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some
aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the
Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered
the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature.
The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only
ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October
1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state,
and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar.
The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise
between the past and the present, between an old tradition
and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the
se'Lf-q>reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation.
The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with
two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union.
Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau
had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic
was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or
Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In
fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did
not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers.
1
World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia
Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere
not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were
exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight
for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame
of freedom fHalrering.
After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun-
�SLOVAKIA
19
try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and
London, which became the cenrters of their political activities.
Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration
of a free Czecho-iSlovakia.
The committee was recognized first as the provisional
and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and
the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich
agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's
original frontiein; were guaranteed.
While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international
position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist
leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's <international .p osition would
be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory
and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at
bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country.
Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w
where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty
of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet
Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet
Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of
the war as an ally.
No. such treaty having been <:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in
Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation.
During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the
edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The
state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla<:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties
would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire-
�20
SLOVAKIA
,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a
"government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts"
would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These
principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication
of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy
were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in
Czecho-1Slovakia.
In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and
coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating
effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination,
with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the
absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany.
These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to
work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and
for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and
the Slovak Government.
:FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA,
AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA.
Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the
teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le?
Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people.
Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was
going on; is that correct?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going
on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ?
Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es.
Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail?
Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me
to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an
American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik
Army."
�SLOVAKIA
21
!Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right.
MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were
put in jail?
Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946.
Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Why?
Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against
communism.
Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism?
Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed.
'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did
you try to get a Un~ted States passport?
Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me
and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the
United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we
decided to leave and join the American Army.
Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in
Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport
finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home.
Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont?
Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way
from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did.
Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you
are taiking the train to 'Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time
what happened.
Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
1
1
�22
SLOVAKIA
Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way
of Budapest and Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake.
They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and
in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed
the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some
screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I
know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one
soldier and we can't move.
Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up?
Mr. Gailay<la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour.
Mr. Boll!in. One hour.
Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved
of his valualbles, jewelry, money?
Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally
reached .Prague ?
Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I
said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to
join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get
your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home.
Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia?
Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start
speruking agafast communism.
Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ;
you made some speeches against communism?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. ls that correct?
Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout
theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them?
Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say
something.
iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a
Mr. Galayda. No.
complaint?
Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&t ed ?
1
1
�SLOVAKIA
23
Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia.
Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear
in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight.
Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia?
Mr. Ga:layda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to
M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain?
Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there?
Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for
this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and
I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years,
and I know. They iaire no good in this world.
Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do
you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United
States who may feel that communism is a good system of
government?
Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that
is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have,
freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f
what they have.
Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the
Communists?
iMr. Galayda. No.
Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press?
Mr. Galayda. No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly?
Mr. Galayda . No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No.
visi'o n as we do !ill America here.?
Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit?
Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight.
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY
MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that
correct?
Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct.
Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen
at that time?
�2-l
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this
country.
Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root?
Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes.
Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to
Slova·k ia at that time?
Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was
reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to
visit him and see him.
Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before
the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd?
Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing
t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much.
Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good
in ,Slovakia; is that correct?
Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were.
Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as
Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r
then.
Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe
Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes.
press...
Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . .
Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly
Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes.
iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years.
Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was.
sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia?
Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in
contact with the Commun.ists?
Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated,
they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist
bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people.
1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944?
Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes.
lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout.
�SLOVAKIA
25
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were
liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising?
Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right.
Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if
necessary?
!Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the
same time.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things
you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising?
Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the
OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n
old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of
the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for
them and buried them.
Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here.
We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean
that the . . .
Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run.
Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run?
Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot
them from the back.
iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie
they were trying to get away from them?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that?
Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were
shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms.
Mir. Bonin. They were without arms?
Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people.
Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the
baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two
larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father?
1
1
�26
SLOVAKIA
,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons.
Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were
tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe?
MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved?
MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them
there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and
during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the
cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are
Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel.
sti1l buried.
'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied
Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in
jail your1self?
1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days.
Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why?
Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They
wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife
went to the authorities <a!Ild they let me free after 14 days.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
,r elease?
~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal
Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes.
knowledge?
Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours?
Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community?
•M r. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Priests?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. McTigue. Nuns?
of different rel,i gious faiths?
people
And
lMcTigu.e.
Mr.
Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes.
MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get
back to the United States?
�SLOVAKIA
27
Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came
to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as
soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the
United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there
for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver.
Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some
Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes.
·
property; didn't you?
Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter
you left? .
Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My
wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to
do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa.
The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that
they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one
country to. another?
Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty
to the Government.
(Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954).
a
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY
iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946
to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is
(Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct.
Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you
had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is
Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes.
thaJt correct?
Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had
the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did
you have with the Communists?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad.
Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in
--any way so that you would give your property ;to them?
Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to
this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government.
Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to
�28
SLOVAKIA
the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is
!Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct?
MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still
there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your
friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I'
close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated
in any way by the Communists?
!Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or
massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there
was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in
one truck rund took them away.
Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they
shot?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists
and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists.
MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In
other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs.
Smre~ovsky. Yes.
va:kia since 1945 . . .
Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right.
come Communists?
Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?.
Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and
live again like decent people.
MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the
Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to
prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
them?
Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary
public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and
princilples under the domination of the Russian system?
Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right.
Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being
sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain?
Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
�SLOVAKIA
29
MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in
order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them?
1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia
in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr.
Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of
what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that
you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia?
Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly.
(WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00
Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the
present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa.
Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed?
Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly,
Jednota.
Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were
born in Slovakia, is that correct.
Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true.
Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia.
Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is
that coTrect?
[)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir.
Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my
understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had
the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in
1944; is that correct?
Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine?
Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right.
Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there?
Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in
July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there
four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves
of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were
�30
SLOVAKIA
murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us
by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between
1939 and 1941.
I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed
to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved
twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and
with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven
in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;>edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and
women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They
said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their
relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941,
after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people
of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists
were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the
wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in
~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands,
sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the
night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives
and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told
me their relatives were deported in the night. The people
knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot.
Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed
Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred.
iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia?
Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four
days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women,
and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass
grarves.
iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew
about?
Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a.
Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves
disc01Vered later on; is that correct?
Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I
wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l
saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what
�SLOVAKIA
:n
I saJW at these mass graves.
Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we
hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we
haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the
reoord, but not have it read at this time?
Dr. Paulco. All right.
Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord.
Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make
this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe
us the highlights of it as of thJis moment?
Dr. PaUlc<>. All right.
Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files.
Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we
had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia
murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we
hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in
connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses
descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am
sure you recall thait testimony.
Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated
entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia.
Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect?
Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing
that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted
in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then
in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against
the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of
Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at
this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti-
�32
SLOVAKIA
zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and
the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This
so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in
194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And
this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943,
this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal
Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate
with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a
mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from
my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen,
were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling
against the Communists. He wrote several books againist
communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was
shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch.
1
Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot?
Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia.
!Mr. McTigue. About '50,000?
Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000.
Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year?
Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months.
Mr. McTigue. Three months?
Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but
after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia,
and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several
thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the
NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and
to the mines in Dombas.
Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally
end?
�33
SLOVAKIA
Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in
September 1944.
Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with
Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct?
Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true.
Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him
and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch?
Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in
Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was
the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into
being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the
side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian
ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically
every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army,
and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern
Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates
practicaly from every village and every town from eastern
Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak
Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the
whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by
the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke
after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch
was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign.
He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak
question to the International Tribunal.
Mr. Bonin. Tribunal?
Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to
change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia.
That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv?
Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the
Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr.
1
�34
SLOVAKIA
Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central
Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld
War Iil.
Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were
applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in
motion?
Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet
agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself
a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the
Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall,
that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght
him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by
the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947.
Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was
the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian
Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in
the spiritual and politic8il world?
Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct.
Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll.
Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for
a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean
countries to be in political life; isn't that correct?
Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit.
Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to
engBlge in political lifo . . .
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their
clerical life; isn't that coreivct?
Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir
Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass
there practically every Sunday.
'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you
escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country?
Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees
from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary,
�SLOVAKIA
35
from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets,
I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I
hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western
World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of
my relatives came through the border just several months
ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he
writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron
Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they
are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United
States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks,
like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia,
Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they
like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to
be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a
great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the
United States.
Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945.
Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country?
Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950.
Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n.
Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with
reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that
after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in
1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which
there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and
depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they
weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ;
they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and
the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with
reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by
the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those.
Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these
�SLOVAKIA
36
people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the
Soviet agents.
,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding.
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that.
I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons
Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired,
is that OOlITect..
Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an
atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a?
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
!Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that
cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt?
Dr. Pauico. That is correct.
Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst
tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to
them?
Dr. Pauco. Yes
Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait
same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have
come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is <the fhist time,
I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually
dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate
the trouble.
Dr. Pauc·o. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct?
Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes.
Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there?
iDr. Pallico. Yes.
iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t
were dTopped in?
Dr. PauJco. Yes.
Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United
States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they
are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes,
to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place .
Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue.
Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the
1
�SLOVAKIA
37
United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention
of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is
that correct?
Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt.
Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je<lnota?
Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct
Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe
that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people
have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the
Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force
and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless
as they possibly can.
Dr. Paiu100. That is correct.
Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to
thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made
as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia.
Dr. Pauco. Thank you.
Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would
like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco.
Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr.
Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and
they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign
nation?
- Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir.
Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing
more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted
through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- ·
termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type
of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and
thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania,
Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to
goveTn themselves; is that correct.
Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct.
MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for
your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity
1
�SLOVAKIA
38
presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to
the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free
world. Thank you ve,r y much.
Dr. P,aulco. Thank you.
Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·.
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova>lcia, did
you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which
the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the
1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people?
Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital
of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on
April 4.
Mr. Feighan. I see.
Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the
whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three
months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by
the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends ,
of the methods which I mentioned before.
Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o
see it and observe .iit?
Dr. Pmrco. No, no.
Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco
Or. Paulco. You are wekome.
Mr. Bonin. Thank you <very much.
(Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA
IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War
Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was.
Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground
movemerut in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who
started it.
iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ?
Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944.
tr?
�SLOVAKIA
39
:Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this
underground moivement?
Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation
is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity
of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger
of communism. They studied communism and decided to
combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or
not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World
War II.
The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the
field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions.
The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations
at the !beginning w&e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir
activities in the political field.
Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement?
Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field.
The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation
are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed
which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party.
So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting
strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had
no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population.
Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles
and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist
Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled
by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else
but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control
aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party.
Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un-
�40
SLOVAKIA
derground in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so.
Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your
members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground
movement from without ?
Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we
had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We
,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion,
informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;,
iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to
ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or
any member here might ask in that regard, you just use
yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly
anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure.
Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission.
Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.?
Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost
fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for
the United States.
·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited
States in 1950?
Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were
you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'(
Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent
abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition
was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from
Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I
was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by
1
1
�41
SLOVAKIA
the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry
of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is
mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet.
Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945.
Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did.
Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry
during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you
were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct?
Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of
the leaders outside.
MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in
Slova,kiia?
Dr. Mii kula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us
here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava?
Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia.
Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this.
Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst
the Repl]blic."
iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi<s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4."
And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a
Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year?
Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947.
Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations
2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say,
70 or 80 times?
[)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that.
Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity?
Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes
Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense?
Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely.
1
1
1
�42
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing
here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it
seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice
a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you?
Dr. Mikula. That i:s me.
Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
is t:Jhiat rig1ht?
Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel.
Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities
of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit?
Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that
we tahlced albout.
Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance
or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the
people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their
weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently,
sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans.
Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were
the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist
Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over
the counwy.
So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We
pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB
pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we
started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station.
It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it
existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we
tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the
worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there.
JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in
ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery
police.
�SLOVAKIA
43
Mr. McTigue. Communis t police?
Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes.
Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say?
Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I
will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March
4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard.
The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards :
il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports
of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is
the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid
fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false
infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R.
Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis
order?
Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover
was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after
t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war
started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary
to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary.
What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the
people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy
came people from Slova:kiia.
There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in
one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good
faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia.
'Dhe movements of the population are very serious
thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how
long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and
so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle.
Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order?
Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further:
Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard
to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station.
�44
SLOVAKIA
Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the
public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the
order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post
offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by
the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was
said. If they find something against the regime they wt
accorcmng to regufations.
Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in
traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to
have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower
units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if
somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to
be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest
police station.
This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers
of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to
Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to
Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions.
They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says:
To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat
the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against
the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the
other members of the unit.
I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits
and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to
the oommittee . . .
Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized.
Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the
oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in
SwvaJkia ,a t the present time?
Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just
say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the
will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That
is a general rea:son
�SLOVAKIA
45
Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or
with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents
that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve.
Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the
heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today?
Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout
80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but
not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am.
acti:ve part to fight oommundsm.
Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why?
Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm
they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or
cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason.
!Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a
hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy
whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most
vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce.
Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the
Communist taikeover; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries?
Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½
million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but
in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are
pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people.
Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over,
aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken
out of theiir normal life.
Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions.
Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
.
Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945.
Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume.
Dr. Mitkula. Yes.
�46
SLOVAKIA
Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how
have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities
of the underground since that time?
Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact
through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945
our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children.
Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four
and one was ,s ix.
Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained?
Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but
I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949.
Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout
two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue?
Dr. Milrula. Yes.
!Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has
been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct?
Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I
a'In receiving informia,tion, but later.
Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite,
would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae?
DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the
same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in
S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a
little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is
a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the
people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing
for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides
that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and
rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat.
Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are
about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit
·stronger?
Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration
camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes
and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo-
�SLOVAKIA
47
ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere,
the same procedure.
Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union?
Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18
villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion.
Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or
does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does,
what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble
this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any?
Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase
the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there
will be a cha1I1ge.
iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a.
Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely
necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we
are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we
have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems.
Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination?
Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should
not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have
proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people
the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i<s po<l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90
per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait
we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is
cutting otff the will to resist.
iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan?
MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel
thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that
the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national
determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so
desiire?
·
Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the
popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important
�48
SLOVAKIA
things that they need; some kind of good will that we have
a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem.
MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that
we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be
he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free
w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese
caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope,
ilS that right?
Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant
things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl
a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they
are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret
communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge
to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs.
Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the
Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries?
Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic
se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the
Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals,
a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists.
The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must
be directed against those opportunists, because they are
afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re
readty to betray todlay and every day.
Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have
gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee?
Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome.
Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for
Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work
Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes.
with your family?
Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal
of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that
I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in
Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very
great extent.
!Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954).
ance here today. 1
�SLOVAKIA
49
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK
Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and
happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America.
:Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United
States and Canada.
·
Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg
of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people
to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways
in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should
do to combat this new kind of enemy.
Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are
a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of
America?
Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout
300,000.
!Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of
.America?
Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses?
Mr. McTigue. Yes.
1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of
Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907.
'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan,
that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I
sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith
the statement?
· Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered.
!Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first
express my deep appreciation to this committee for the
opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the
dread detail of Communist aggression.
I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I
know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know
the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends,
�50
SLOVAKIA
peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends
because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their
last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee
and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a
difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well.
Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp
liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot
and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the
business, the duty, of every American to take part in it;
every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because
it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own
America.
I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my
statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ
with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is
in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation.
The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about
Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure
responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and
Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc
the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble.
("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak
League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official
011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County
Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue
[Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is
not repeated here.)
Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of
Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the
sellout to Moscow; is that correct?
Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir.
Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1
�SLOVAKIA
51
Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with
Communists?
Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely.
Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence?
Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to
lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget
what communism is, and just let them get strong enough
until they can take all of us.
Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we
can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive?
How can we most help them at a time like this?
Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything
to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime
they have.
~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified
here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among
the ,people of SlovaJkia?
Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with
the people directly and indirectly right through the war,
and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today.
Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective
system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with
what is going on over there today; is that correct?
Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl>ova~ia and then we get it.
Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little
bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia
and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second
World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic,
what exactly was the relationship at that time between
Slovakia and Germany?
�52
SLOVAKIA
Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited
by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy
Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it.
Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example,
that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany?
Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that
they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token
division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men
by classes; they never had many men in the field.
Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the
UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor
when the Germans declared war?
Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business.
We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia
declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our
own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United
States.
iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time?
Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find
that out from our own United States Goveirnment because
that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is
absolutely no record of it.
Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was
exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic
policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany?
Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean,
running the country of Slovakia itself.
Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at
thait time?
Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any
other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide
with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside
of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of
�SLOVAKIA
53
the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the
wax, were good.
Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There
was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms
that you normally would expect?
Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the
problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the
two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's
Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus
Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran
Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one
accoro.
Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944,
when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from
that time Slovakia lost its. independence?
Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides.
They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by
the partisans on the other end.
Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation
did the Tiso government continue in po,w er?
Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso
tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a
national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak
gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia
themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at
Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25;
the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children
included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks
for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against
a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans.
Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist
activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The
leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not
have popular support.
�54
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when?
Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945.
Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany?
Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria.
Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured
with the American troops?
Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a
copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State
Department, and, of course, the Army Department.
Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of
the Slovak Goivernment?
Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our
effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to
Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I
say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald
coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison.
Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals?
Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague.
Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today
under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any
form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely
unified government?
Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the
Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the
Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true.
The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not
safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary
general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek,
a Czech.
Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to
appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat?
Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any-
�SLOVAKIA
55
thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for
separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty.
Mr. Bentley. Who?
Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record.
They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there
are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free
and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport.
Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you
know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would
simply have states' rights.
The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect
their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much
later.
Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine,
when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned,
what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that?
Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct.
Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement
and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am
sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l
think at this time it is
quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and
have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case
of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely
for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists.
Mr. Hrobak. That is correct.
Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard.
Mr. Hrobak. Correct.
iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the
Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that
Mr. Hrobak Yes.
too.
Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi-
�56
SLOVAKIA
sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s.
Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct.
Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records
show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows
a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because
he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several
yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country.
Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia.
Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge
of that, too.
Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have
made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks,
patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the
regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-.
crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is
"Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras).
The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's
men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that
was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these,
The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then
on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in
Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another
booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by
Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946.
Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946
and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s
in BraUshwa.
In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you
can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they
have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed
from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10,
�57
SLOVAKIA
1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other
Slova!k p8{!)ers.
Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated
Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin.
The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on
the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward
Benes."
Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication?
Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of
the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and
Canada.
And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League
of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak.
(Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954).
1
STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS
Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated
Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava.
During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now,
as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to
have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on
Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own
knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were
utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant
force in tha,t country.
Introduction
Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history.
�58
SLOVAKIA
After losing her political independe nce in the ninth
century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for
eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did
not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within
the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was
ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural
and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very
naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally
providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves
of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power
structure .
On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the
Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called
Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal
union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of
Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the
preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made
any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly
centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called
revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by
the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first
Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak
national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y
conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs
wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their
predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense
provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after
World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal
protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as
a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the
"
�SLOVAKIA
69
people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation
foisted upon the Sl01Vak people."
For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle
of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders
argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both
parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk
state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the
Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with
France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of
Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet
Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion
on this pomt at any time.
The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the
primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the
Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly
brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous
Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f
E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration
of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This
was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and
other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with
the alternative of the partition of her territory among
Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct
German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939,
thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for
independence.
During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily
resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found
refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal
was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this
goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army
and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of
my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo-
�SLOVAKIA
60
lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important
point :
All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the
fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression
has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics
were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted
in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which
Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union
by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II.
As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a
German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia
was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire:
To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end
of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from
German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster
which would put an end to the Slovak national state.
Because of this difference in psychological attitude,
Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement
of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program
had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow.
1
A. The Blueprint for Sovietization
After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the
Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in
post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain
pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of
the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity
of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in
Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories
agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests,"
�SLOVAKIA
61
says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided,
after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and
friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other,
after the war, all possilble economic help."
No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United
States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia
toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations.
The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus
for those who had been aspiring to political power within
the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In
this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers
of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this
party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to
Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around
10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted
for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938.
The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its
common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of
Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time
of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia.
Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the
apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was
perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and
created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name
of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement,
as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all
political, legislative, military, and governmental executive
power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the
,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati<ves
shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over."
The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas
Agreement were laid down in another document, the first
three articles of which read as follows :
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SLOVAKIA
"(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs,
as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite
their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be
their common government organized on the principle of
equality.
"(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states
and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh
we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of
all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular.
"(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct
its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should
therefore, lean on the Soviet Union."
It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit
to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle
agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in
Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in
Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following
passage (pp. 408-409) :
''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the
way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed
the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) ,
which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of
insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole
revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.''
- wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ."
1
"Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on
to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great
Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of
right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not
willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De-
�SLOVAKIA
63
cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of
fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue."
In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched
on the problem of the National Front Government: "It
will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental
parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to
pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national
front ." (pp. 409-410).
On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization
of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties,
and organization of the National Front Government as it
emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to
become a "people's" democrwcy.
Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the
Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24
percent of the population, became the future leading force
of Slwakia.
B. The August 1944 Insurrection
Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in
Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser,
had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents
into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the
German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs,
and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators.
More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin,
Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army,
and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an
agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future
partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions
�64
SLOVAKIA
from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be
the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his
sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec
County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2
Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet
rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing.
Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of
Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander
Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real
Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second
lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar
camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet
agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent
to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of
the activity of the different groups.
In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after
hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people
of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of
a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would
receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just
reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of
(1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26.
( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29.
�SLOVAKIA
66
August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were
able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots
who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22,
1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On
Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries."
The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on
Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the
U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a
military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary
government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A
civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks
were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks
had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising,
and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this
country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and
their opportunity was not long in arising.
On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train
stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the
Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of
the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko,
refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the
Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng
from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was
then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner
on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his
aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day.
ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland
of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into
Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the
�66
SLOVAKIA
partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that
the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[>rising whioh was announced on August
29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General
Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the
political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo ..
crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin
Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v
Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible
to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General
Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to
escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and
disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by
the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the
Reich from ,w hich they were never to return.
Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was
quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months,
tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &ama. It is evident
that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952.
As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been
the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev.
With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~
tioned him as follows:
Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in
Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian?
Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under
the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska
Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their
activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and
of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3
(3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013.
�SLOVAKIA
67
Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia.
This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle
against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on
the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the
insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that
Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country.
C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia
What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the
Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the
historical facts. During World War II, though subject to
a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia
was a relatively free country. During five years, until the
insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for
political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava
was able to master all the difficulties of the war period
during these years. Then the Red army came.
I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family
which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would
say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of
mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The
house in question, which was located on a hill, was then
chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that
the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary.
After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the
Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a
good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were
sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of
�68
SLOVAKJA
the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on
the dining-room ta>ble and began checking on our identity.
Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms
and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded
to examine these things in detail and chose for himself
whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather
suitcase, etc.
We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red
army had entered the house and began in turn to forage
through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go
into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these
three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed
because she had been violated. After this visit by offi ..
cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk,
successively entered bhe house, each one having held us,
that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their
own way, until 2 :30 a. m.
In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around
200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women
had to go to the hospital for examination.
During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets,
around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by
po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while
various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned.
D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945
On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes
followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the
easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third
Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets,
through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign
government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which,
except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had
been loyal to the Slova>k State - all of this without any
plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats",
who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in
the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state
will in Slovaikia.
�SuOVA.KIA
69
According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political
life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely,
the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1,
plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out
of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia.
Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which
had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the
uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in
strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being
Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others.
Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political
re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~
Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system
exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political
aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of
the Communists increased, in comparison with the year
1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet
"Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this
50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected
by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional
,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while
the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence
of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the
outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat
of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of
the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment
for Slo:vaikia.
MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was
progressing in every field of Government activity: In the
field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the
Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry
by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and
this without any consultation with the nation - mines,
1
�70
SLOVAKIA
100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production,
80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72
percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47
percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent;
clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent;
wood industry, 8 percent.
By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working
people fell within the field of private industry.
ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34,
dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated
the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation.
By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of
May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice
were created: Oommunit,y and <list.riot "people's courts"
and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these
courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two
factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with
Germany.
The political character of this distorted justice was
determined by three circumstances :
1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55
Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the
the
of
memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two
political ,parties in power.
2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle
nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide
upon cases which were not punishable according to the
Penal Code.
3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility.
4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided
for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive
Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate-
�SLOVAKIA
71
gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps:
a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts";
b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and
order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic
life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it;
c. Those who· do not work;
d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them
within the framework of laibor duty.
'5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting
his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t.
6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the
confiscation of the ded'endant's property.
It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought
to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and
"unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their
indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury
in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation.
This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal
revenge.
By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from
thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly,
and other human rights were likewise a;bolished.
E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia
All these measures were aimed at the weakening of
traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading
personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko,
Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should
remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with
the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the
great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided
�SLOVAK.IA
72
to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s.
Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have
been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all
the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon
the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This
loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on.
In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three
deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against
" . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists
of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37
plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw
their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23
deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies).
The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided.
There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia.
Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the
Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further
limitatio!Ils on the politi>Cal preirogative s of his own party.
1
After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the
Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947,
to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the
triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party
itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1;
the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat
fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of
the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have
been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia.
�SI.IOVAKIA
73
Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the
way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946
and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec<h area) was
finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate
its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and
National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the
National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp.
Conclusion
As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat
that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the
events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I
must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The
Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954),
contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of
Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in
Slovrukia.
(Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954).
fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK
Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r .
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is
that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total
number of seven times?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.?
Father Botek. Yes.
�74
SLOVAKIA
Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949?
Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950.
Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944.
kia, Father?
Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout
the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and
1946 following the Communist occupation.
Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all
church-Operated school,s.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the
tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church?
Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic
Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic
press.
Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in
Father Botek. Yes.
religion, is tihat right, Father?
Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics
in Slo;vakia?
Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic.
Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia?
F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two
political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party
and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that
would be able to defend their rights by democratic method.
Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between
the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father?
Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and
clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics
could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to
use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their
1
�SLOVAKIA
75
pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the
creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end
of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~
cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian
Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then
inco:riporated into the so-called
Kosice agreement concluded in 1945.
The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and
support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they
woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they
joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests
for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph
Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y
his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The
bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing
prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were
also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in
those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this
order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for
the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party.
He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist
Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to
the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this
committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they
trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the
bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during
the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some
cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which
was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was
also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were
aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally
indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~
cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary
schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us..
ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1
�76
SLOVAKIA
tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner
for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party,
Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however,
became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they
also, on their part, tried to win su>ppo•r t of the Catholic
population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we
Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that
we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side.
There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement
with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the
negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement
of a final decision. They made indications that they might
be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but
a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the
Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became
apparent that no agreement could be reached with the
Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we
concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of
SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on
their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the
Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another
party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which
they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there
were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't
be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid
votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes
received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes
were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they
were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white
ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections,
and the Communists and the representative s of the Free-
�77
SLOVAKIA
dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party
under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started
,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party.
We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we
r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics
were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we<re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic
party which would .not admit religious freedom and they
were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in
favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary
to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for
them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a
statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true
which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that
party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party
and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif
the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking
them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and
receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found
out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests
of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed
to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic
group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the
Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the
Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or
guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would
also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1
�78
SLOVAKIA
ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises
and in arguments with the Communists they always
yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to
take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in
order to defend their rights.
Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman
of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve
the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats
and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner
HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and
neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the
Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to
find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this
commission, representative s of the Communist Party were
Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the
Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of
the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to
be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed
schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the
Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of
property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no
results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished
the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association
of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000.
Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was
liquidated and you were arrested?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you
were arrested, Fathoc?
Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received
�SLOVAKIA
instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all
acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action.
However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and
therefore any acttvities developed by this organization
oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted.
The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action
Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was
collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and
that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances
happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended
by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to
omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were
anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c
Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix
in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists
didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht
Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared
that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau
had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e
sent to a room where they were searched while, in the
meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were
searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from
8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally
the employees of the bureau were released to their homes,
and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also
was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau
was investigated by the police.
On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame
to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was
just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the
policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also
1
�80
SLOVAKlA
the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station
at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess
that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I
engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime
in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst
me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional
court's prison where they held me for another five months
pending investigation. At the end of these five months,
my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as
the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were
released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked
for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I
knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this
to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven
months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred
to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the
Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action,
which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so
that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my
term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was
released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after
a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists.
Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father?
F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were
preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local
Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with
me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with
my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated
he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me
and on the other hand, if another .person would be given
�SLOVAKIA
81
the same instructions, this other person could do harm
to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this
par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called
on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at
the district national committee for some discussion. I
was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that
people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even
after they had served their terms imposed by the courts.
However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes
between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when
the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests
fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where
such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered.
TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national
committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and
on the same day the police arrived and took me to a
forced-labor camp at Nova:ky
My parishioners protested against my arrest; however,
they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by
arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was
to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my
experiences which I had at that time when I was held at
the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked
how they became involved in underground activities and
how it happened that they were arrested since there were
always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most
of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated
that there was always a Communist spy planted by the
Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground
activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police.
�82
SLOVAKIA
I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e
all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any
underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to
develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually
start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them
to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested.
In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to
win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore,
they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They
coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-<:aJled representaUves of the
Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this
meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts,
stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and
discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were
mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play
any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists
eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of
the Catholic Action.
The Communists declared that since the Vatican was
against the people and since the bishops supported the
v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch
only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs
concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but
all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this
Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized
that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore,
they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a
memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at
which this Communist Catholic Action was founded.
Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They
convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at
wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon
to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops,
�SLOVAKIA
83
however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See
declared every person who would sign this memorandum as
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.
Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp
in 1950; is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were
you sent to a hospital?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something
about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the
hospital?
Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested
all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because
there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals.
These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries.
That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants.
They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in
their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The
Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in
the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a
university without any previous education, which was
otheIWise required from university students. This was the
same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short
preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of
these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the
Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals.
MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father?
Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951.
Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out
of SlQIVakia?
Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe.
At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However,
�84
SLOVAKIA
this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second
time, at which time we were only four escapees and we
succeeded in crossing the border.
,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time
is in Rome; is that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism
is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might
like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their
efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion
in SlovaJkia.
Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist
instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion
of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these
instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the
second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the
separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests.
IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question.
Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own
personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the
Communists?
Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the
first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in
Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican
were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See.
However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective.
to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and
to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of
communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced
a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike
care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the
�SLOVAKIA
86
clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops,
and admitted only those whom they considered harmless;
but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were
monitored.
Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods
and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the
pupils with the, theory of Marxism?
Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the
very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this
girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way
of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine.
Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the
other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let
the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and
girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat
this Communist march toward worrld revolution?
Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have
had great successes in educating the very young people
in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology
implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents
to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact;
that if communism is given enough time, that these youths
will become completely communistic and the Communist
strength will be increased.
Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make
the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God?
Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children,
for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is
our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and
�86
SLOVAK IA
"Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor,
Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man."
Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia?
Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not
well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack
of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were
poor.
Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given
any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were
a member of the clergy?
Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I
never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations,
and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten,
so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This,
may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of
Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also
had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should
give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to.
IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any
agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper
it is written on?
Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions
with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists
never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy
which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss.
Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y
haive covered very well your experien ces back over the
years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only
question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the
populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say?
�SLOVAKIA
87
Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent.
Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free
Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you
come from?
F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa ..
milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of
America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard
from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of
those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia.
Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in
Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia.
Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a
very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and
13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints.
Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan
Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian
population.
Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the
straight news given on those programs?
Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice
of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well,
turn it off because the news is over and they are now
going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic
and we do not want any Oze<!h Republic."
Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are
doing some good behind the Iron Curtain?
Father Botek They certainly are of great use and
great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater
if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also
adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian
popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling.
Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are
they j&mmed by the Soviets?
�88
SLOVAKIA
Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but
on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the
transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the
radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one.
Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why
there has been some resentment to the broadcasts?
F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are
almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States,
who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the
United States, these programs do not bring any reports on
the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in
the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities
of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak
people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order
to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in
the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also
beams SlO'Vakian programs.
Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within
Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic
development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in
a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that
the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the
opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic?
Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945,
not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the
S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However,
Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the
Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy,
self-rule.
Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing?
Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was
�SLOVAKIA
89
opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government.
Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there
is only one way.
Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent
discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in
1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When
the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944,
they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people
with promises of an independent Slovakian State but
within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists,
however, was disapproved by Moscow.
Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit
of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak
people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S.
S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but
in su!bstance it would be socialistic?
Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but
President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made
also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic.
Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting
in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951?
Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic
action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an
anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't
celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the
third year any more.
Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of
ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding
the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our
overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
1
�90
SLOVAKIA
TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA
(The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.)
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is
Father Nahalka. Yes.
that correct?
Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia?
Father N ahalka. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia?
Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was
ordained in Rome.
Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia,
is that correct?
!Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in
Slovakia.
Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct?
Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946
to 1949.
Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called,
Father Nrahalka. Yes.
in Slovakia?
Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place?
Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the
uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this
town was occupied by Communist guerillas.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what
the guerillas did in that town?
Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the
town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the
Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the
men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even
though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80
innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a
nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut
�SLOVAKIA
91
stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off
his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the
uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm
the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread
the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic,
Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and
that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise.
Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a
political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch
over the bishop's activiities?
FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke
down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into
every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar
into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old
at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in
the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all
visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the
bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the
files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom
those files.
Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home,
for example, wired ?
Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the
rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s
present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the
Communists placed microphones in the conference room
for the bishop's conferences.
Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k
in 1949?
Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the
'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary.
Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists,
Father?
1
Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and
held in imprisonment until January 1946.
1
�92
SLOVAKIA
,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father?
-Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953.
Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago.
Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia?
FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was
very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run
opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and
we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area
in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad
to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the
border.
Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was
testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and
Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the
broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge
on th-at?
Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with
the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during
this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign
broadcasts.
Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia?
Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen
to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re
different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily
jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen
to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free
Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed
to the political part of the program of those broad~asts
mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not
state the entire Communist case in Slovakia.
Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist?
Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire
anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist
attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs,
�93
SLOVAKIA
the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact
that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~
ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda.
'.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are
people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists
and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the
time when the transmitters were still in operation, people
in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called
the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs
broadoost by Radio Vatican.
IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast
by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any
good - I mean, against the Communists?
Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects
in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their
news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still
more efficient if they adjusted their political programs
also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA
Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es.
iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913
at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct?
Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of
SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security,
is that correct?
Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir.
Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to
1951, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. That is right.
1
�94
SLOVAKIA
Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security
completely controlled by the Communists,?
Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under
Communist control.
Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau
of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under
Communist control, isn't that correct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as
a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the
Communists got control, is that corerct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over.
Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security
was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time
to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house
searches, and so forth and so on?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders.
Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made?
Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the
orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League?
Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic
Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated
because the Communists considered this organization a
swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3
supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America.
iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close
supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in
Slovakia?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders.
Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they?
iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such
orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as
secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only
u:pon special order by telephone.
!Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed
�SLOVAKIA
95
you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were
they plain-clothes men?
Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed
police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me.
Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did
you m0lke,?
Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on
whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests.
Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that
there was any political significance to what a priest
had to say?
Mr. Dobrotka. I <know I sulbmitted annual reports to
this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent
of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests
to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the
priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised
by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political
speeches within their sermons.
Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is
reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and
peasants and the PQpulace in general?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to
observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground
acti<vities.
Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal
Security?
Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I
was active there were approximately three cases of arrests
of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the
area under my jurisdiction.
Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting
to your superiors that the priests were only talking to
God, is that correct?
�96
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for
their arrest.
Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from
SlorvaJkia?
Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951.
Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of
Slorvalcia?
Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in
escaping.
Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor
Service unit at Bad Kreuznach?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kersten. Any questions?
Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the
Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name?
Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my
headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie,
which was under the Minister of Interior.
Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938?
Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state.
Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist
Party at that time in 1938?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the
gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any
political parties.
Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed
your duties of reporting on priesrts?
Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the
time when the Catholic Action was started.
Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist
Party at that time ?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir.
Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB
in order to protect their own existence were forced to file
an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party.
Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to
become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time?
�SLOVAKIA
97
Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but
your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in
February 1948.
Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March
1948?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic
and I attended Mass every Sunday.
Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948?
Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from
that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the
local priest, local teacher and local government officer
were suspicious, because these persons were considered as
reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set
on us by the Communist Party.
Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole
world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for
world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind
the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to
belie:ve in God?
Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe.
Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have
a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that
we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as
possilble.
Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions.
(The witness was excused.)
(,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY
Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows:
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919,
�98
SLOVAKIA
in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct?
_Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics
in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct?
Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct.
Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir.
,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office
by the Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. Why?
Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person.
Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something
about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the
Communists, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik
and in English.
Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set?
Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the
Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment,
this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas
to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would
be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to
join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the
farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end
also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken
away from the farmers and transferred to industrial
pul'p()ses.
Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the
Communists, is that correct?
,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to
meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other
�SWVAKIA
99
in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e
to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were
arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas.
~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you
know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some
of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas?
Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the
most significant of them was that which occurred at
Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard
delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed
this action of despair because he stated that since they
took aiway from him everything they should take away
also his family.
Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West?
Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951.
Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of
the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is
that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been
receiving here aH you expected?
Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here
meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the
slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and
I am impatient to return to my home country.
Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with
the progress of OUI' fight against communism.
Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel
that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the
people of the other captive nations that are in the free
world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those
countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is
that right?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better.
Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young
main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms,
�100
S!LOVAIHA
would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I
can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I
can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men
would use such an oipportunity.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you.
The witness was. excused.
(Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings,
the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream
"murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For
the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear
technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary
25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the
Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak
witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous."
It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not
call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story
would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas
Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should
have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and
1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k
initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes
Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former
members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to
"sing"!
�
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1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
Date
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1955
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SLOVAKIA
Published
VOL. V
quarterly by the
Slovak
League of
MARCH 1955
America
NO . 1 (14)
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED SLOVAKIA
is told on the following pa,ges by
witnesses called upon to testify
by the Select Committee on Com•
mu.nist Aiggression of the House
of Representatives, headed by the
Hon. Ch:a.J'lles J . Kersten of Mil·
waukee, Wis.
Michael Galayda is an .American
citzen who experienced Communist terror in Slovakia. He was
there W1,d saw Communism at
work a mong his people w'ho had
persdstenUy ,and consistently fought
the Red plague for over a hundred
years. H e makes his home in
Hazleton, Pa.
Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovsky, American citizens, also witnessed the
terror and horror of Red rule in
Slovakia ,f irst hand. They have relatives and many friends in S1ovakia and, hen.ce are using an assumed name.
Dr. Joseph Pauco, news.paperman and writer, c ame to America
in 1950; he is assistant editor of
the .TIIDDNOTA (Union), the official organ of the First Catholic
Slovak Union, and a1so chairman
of the U. S. Bran,ch of the Slov,a k
National Council Abroad.
Dr. Joseph Mikula studied law
1 and politics and was very active
' in student circ'les of Slovakia ,before he Jlled the Red terror which
invaded his native Slovakia.
Dr. Joseph Mikus, foraner Slovak dilplomat, lawyer and writer,
became the director of the Press
Bureau of the Slovak League of
America, Wash!lngton, D. C., soon
after his arrival in America several years ago.
Jan Dobrotka, now an exile in
West Germany, was a Sergeant of
the Department of National Security in Bratislava, Slovakia.
Jur Detviansky was an active
officer of the Sloviak Army before
he Hed to the West.
Rev. Anton Botek, S.T.D., editor
and former director of the Catholic Center in Bratd•slava, S-Jovakia,
is in charge of the S lovak Catholic Action in Exiile; he edits
"HLASY Z RiMA," (Voices From
Rome), Italy.
Rev.
Stephen
Nahalka,
S.T.D.,
ecclesiastical writer and former
personal secretary to Bishop John
Vojtassak of t'he Spis Diocese,
1Slovaki,a - who, by the way, was
sentenced to 24 years 1n prison
1by the Reds lives in Rome.
Italy.
Philip A. Hrobak, editor of the
JEDNl()TA since 1938 and president of t'he Slovak League of
America since 19'50, is a native
AmerLcan, born in Cleveland, Ohio,
in 1904. Active in Slovak aff.airs
for the past 35 years,, Mr. Hrobak
has devoted much time to the study of Czecho-Slovakda and Slovakia and the people responsible for
government. His
articles
and
pampb:lets in Engilish have contributed greatly to expose "Czechoslo,v ak" pseudo-democracy, the
maohinations of the Benes Czechs
(Socialists) and Lettri.ch "detnocrats", the people responsible for
the betrayal of the Slova;ks to the
men of the Kremlin - +and the
Reds and Socialists aictJ!ve In Slovak circles in Amertlca. ·
SLOVAKIA
Communist Aggression Against Slovakia
(The Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, EJighty-Third Congress, 1954, under the ch·a irmans•h lp of
the HonoraJble Oharles J. Kersten, did quite a. remarkable jdb to
ascertain how the !Communists seized pO'wer in the various countries
of IDurope. I believe it is the first time in our history that an honest
attempt was made to understand the 'background of the -peoples behind the Iron Curtain. 1Slovak representatives were among those
who gave testimony of Communist a,ggression in S-tovakia, which differed in so.me respects from th.at in other countries. From the testimony of various witnesses who were heard, and the many others
who sent in their statements fl'Qm various countries, it is quite eviden,t that 1Slovrukia fell an easy prey to Moscow iand the C-Ommunlsts
because of the pro-Soviet -poli<:y of Dr. Edward ,B enes and the Czech
Socialists, who ruled in Czecho-Siovakia with the Communists after
World War ]I. Slovakia, traditionally anti-Communist, was jn fact
sold out by the National Front ,Government of Prague. The vast
masses of the Slovak population ,had no ,c•hoice; their wiH meant
nothin,g to Benes and tib.e Prague regime, whJ.ch took over Slovakia
with the help of Soviet bayonets, disregardin,g the pollti-cal wHl of
the peOII)le completely. Excerpts from the testimony of Slovak witnesses, l'\Vlhic,h are contained on these pages, definitely prove that. P.A. H.).
FROM THE SPECIAL REPORT NO. 8
SLOVAKIA
!Slovaki,a is situated between the Carpathian Mountains on the north and the Danube and the Tisa Rivers on
the south. The in!hrubitants are !known as Slov,aks and with
the !Poles a111d the Ozechs, belong to the group of western
Slaivs.
The political history of the ·S lov,a!ks goes back to the
beginnmg of the ninth century when ChmsUan civilization
was introduced into their territoTy, and it was during this
period that tlhe ruler, H;astisfav, 84~70, made himself
lmown by an intensiive ChTistiianmation of the country.
FoJilowing hls ti,nvitation, two brothers, Saints Cyril and
Methodius, who henceforth were to b.ecome the rupostles of
the Slaivs, came in 863 from Byoo.ntium to Great Moravia. B y their activities, they laid the foundations for church
organizaibions, the Slav liturgy, a'.Jiphrubet, •a nd literature. It
was in this way that the rwork of the two missionaries
SLOVAKIA
3
from Byzruntrl:l.l!Ill brought ,t he western Slavs into the fold of
the Catholic OhuTch, an historical event of paramount ipolitic,al and oulturral importance.
In the tenth century, ,Slovakia ,b ecame for a time a
battlefie'ld in the struggles .among the SlaVIS, Magyars, and
Germans, and at the fbegiillnmg of the eleventh century,
she became a part of the kingdom of Hungary, organized
under the Arpad dynasty.
In the fifteenth and at the !beginning of the si~teenth
century the internal prOiblems of Hungary reached a certain degree of consolidation. The invasions of •c entral Europe by the 'Dmks in tJhe ,s ixteenth and seventeenth ceinturies, however, reduced Hungary to the area of the Slovalda
of today and political and cultural liife was concentrated in
that area. For a long time sessions of the Hungarian Pa•r liament were held •a nd coronations of the Hungarian llings
were celebrated in BratisJava.
The end o,f the eighteenth and the first half of the
nineteenth centuries mark the /beginning of the Slovak national renaissance. At this time, the nationa1ities tin central Emope we,r e about to abrundon Latin as the literary
and spoken language of the cu!tiivated claS'S and to replace
it by their own national language. Consequently, a spiritual
rebirth stirred up national aspirations among the different peoples of the !Hapsburg monarchy.
In 1848, the Slov,a,ks -organiized a military uprising
against the centralism of 'BudaJpeSt and: helped 1:Jhe Emperor
crush the Kossuth rebellion against the Hapsburgs. They
did it with the hope that Slovrukia wocld ibe finally acknowledged as an autonomous land within a federated
monaTohy, ibut thedr hopes in this respect were never
satisfied.
h1 the "Memorand'll!IIl of the Slovak Nation" of Jl.l'lle
7, 1861, a Slovak National Assemlbly, asked the Parliament
of Hungary to create an rarl!ministiratirve unit from the oounties imlhaJbited lby tlhe iSloviaJc population under the name of
"Slovak region." It was to ,b e ,provjdedJ with such a degree
of poaitical and oultural autonomy which would be compatible wiith the prniciiple of u.mty of the monarchy. But the
Hungarian Parlioonent failed to act.
4
SLOVAKIA
In 1868 the Nationality Act was passed in the /Pairliament of Hunga:ry .b y which Magyar was proclaimed. the official language of the ,s tate administration in the kingdom,
except for some autonomous bodies.
1n 1895, the Serbs, the Rwmanians from Transylvania
and the Slovaks convOlked a congress of nationalities in Budapest in which they claimed ,respect for their national
rights and asked once more for a federative reform of the
kingdom on the ,p rinciple of equality. Such a reform was
not carried out. As a ,c onsequence the non.,Magy,ar nationa!lities lost, during the First World War, their interest in
the continued existence ()ff the dual monarchy oif AustriaHu.ngary.
1
World War I and Formation of the Czecho-Slovak State
Dwring World War [ the ,s pirit of nationalism was
greatly stimulated within the Alustro-Hungari:ain Empire.
Thi•s spirit was reflected iby increasing demands for greater
autonomy or ouwi:ght independence ,f or the clifforent nations within that empire. The advocacy of the principle of
nationa:l self-tdeter-mination by President Wilson further
stimulated these iaJS!)iratiOill,s. and dlid much to set the stage
for the peace settlements.
Dur:i.ng the course of the war Czech political leaders
established a secret committee wh~ch directed the ,a ctivities of Ozech nationalists at home and abroad. Thomas G.
Masaryk, as the leader of this movement, toured Europe
and the United 'States Wlhere h e recei.:ved encouragement
and support.
Meanwhile a movement ,a rose among the ·l arge number oif Americans of Slovaik descent promoting Slovak!ia's
separation from Hungary. Th.Tee different solutions of the
Slovaik prob1em were oovi,saged: Slovakia as a new state,
as ia partner orf a Czecho-Slovruk Federation •o r a·s a territory forming a pollitircal union with the prospectirve Polish
Republic.
Finally, the SloivaJk -League of Amerioa entered into
contact with the Amemcans of Czech descent and signed
with their organilzations, in 191 5, t;he Cleveland agreement,
and in 1918 the Pittsburgh Parct, 'both of which aim·e d at
1
1
1
5
SLOVAKIA
the creation of a Czecho-.Slova1k federal state. In these doouments the Slov,aik organi•z ation stipulated that Slovakfa
should 'be an equal mem1ber iwitJh the Czech lands ·a nd have
complete legislative, executive, judiciary and cultural autonomy in strictly national matters, while matters of common interest, such as foreign affairs and defense, should
be within the competence '()!f a common parlitailllent.
1
A tangi!ble proof of the aspi-rabions of 1:Jhe Ozec:h and
Slo:vruk peoples toiward foll mdependence iwas demonstrated
by the thousands of thei:r soldiers who had swrendeired on
the 'Various fronts. They formed the Czecho-Slovak Legions
in Russia, France, amd Ita1y and fought on the side of the
Al[ied and Associated \P,o wers.
1
In order to convince ·W estern statesmen that the concept of national states 1was, ~n concern with the iwill of the
people a Congress otf !Peop1es Oppressed ·b y the Hrups'burg
Monarchy was commenced in Apilil 191'8 at Rome. This congress did much to mfl,uence the th,i nking in western Europe
and in the United States. ln the summer of 1918, F'ra.nce,
Great Britain, the United States, and Italy offici,all,y recognized the Czecho-1Slovak National Council as a defacto gOIVerrunent and the Gzecho-lSlwak forces as an Allied army
waging regu~ar warfare agarl.nst kustria-Hungary and Germany.
A Ozeoho-4Slwak IPro:visionrul Government •w as set up
in Paris with Masaryik as President and was recogn.iized de
jure by the Aflied and Associated Powers. It issued the Declaration of Czecho..SlovaJk Independence on October 18,
1918, in Paris. On the saime day President Wilson rejected
the Austrian ,proiposa:l for the organi zation of Austria-Hungary on a federa l !b asis iby reiplyiing that !he could no longer
accept •~ere autonomy of these peoples as a basis of
peace .. ."
On Octolber 28, 1918, the Ozecho-Slo,yak Nationial Colllllcil in !P:mgue proclaimed the deiposibion of the Austrian
Emperor as so,yereign of the Czech and Slcxvak lands and the
estrublishment of a free and united Republic ,of Ozecho-4SlovavaJda. The ,SiovaJk National Counchl, a revolutionary 'body
composed of Slovak patriots, convened on October 30, 1918,
1
1
SLOVAKIA
6
and ,pwb1isihed a document known •a s the Dec1aration of
Turcia.nsky rSv. Martlin. In. this document they proclaimed
the separation of Slo.va:lci<a from the Kiingdom of Hungary
and their intention to form with the Ozech lands a CzeohoSlOWlik .state. On November 14, 1918, this decision was ratified 1~ the Crecho--iSlvoruk National Assembly which elected
T. G. 1M as•aryik as President of the Republic and set up the
first ,caJbinet.
However, it was not long !b efore serious dlisagreement
developed between the Ozechs and ISlovaJks on the form of
government for the new state. The Ozeohs farvored a Czecho~Sl01Vak ,centralist state whHe the Sllo,vaiks ins.i:sted upon
a Czecho~SlQl\llaJk feder.ation ~n whioo the identity and individrua:lity of each nation would ibe •recognized and preserved.
In the opinion of !Slovak leadJers the Ozecho,..slovak state,
for all practical purposes, was to become a Czech ,s tate, enlarged 'by Slovakia ra nd :sulb-Oaripathlian Ruthenia. This situation resulted .in the !Slovaks taking a firm ,position a,g ainst
the centralist form of government. Monsignor Andrew Hilinka, a great patriotic [eader from the time of pre~a:r HrUlllgar.y, went dandestine1y in !September 1919 to Pairis in order to present S1ova;kia's cause before the Peace Conference, ,a dvocating an international guaranty fo·r the selfgovernment of the ,Slovruk nation withi:n OzechoJSlova!kia.
Denounced to the •French authorities !by the Ozecho,.;Slovak
delegation as a Hapsburg spy, he was foTced to return to
Slovaikia without any result. Toniprisoned 1by order of Prague
at Mirov, Mara'Via, Hlinka was to stay tJhere until April
1920, when he was elected deputy of the 'Slovak People's
Party, founded iby him under the Hungarian regime and
reestabllished in December 19'18.
1
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
ConstitutJional Structure
Althowg,h the !basic ,constitution was not adopted until.
February 1920, its .gener.al principles had been B!pplied
from the very •b eginning of Cze.cho-Slovaik independence.
The philosophy underlying this fundamental law is expressed in the preamble, whfoh is striikingly similar to the
SLOVAKIA
7
preamble of the Constitution of the United States.
The main body of the Consbitution provided for a
popularly elected Parliament, a President selected by both
houses of Parliament and an independent judiciary.
Parties and Politics
The politics of the period may ibe divided into four
phases:
1. Nationalistic phase (1918-19)
Following the proclamation of independence, ,a ll Czech
political parties agreed on the fundamental principles on
which the new state ,w as to be bui1t. Having reaohed this
major consensus and the necessary leg,islation having been
enacted, the coalition had accomplished its task and a
split on partisan lines followed.
2. Swing toward Social Democraicy (1919-20)
The period of Socia.dist rule in the Czecho-Slovruk Republic did not accom;plish too many changes in the country's economy although the r,a,iUwa,ys, mines, and water
power were socialiized. The division of the 1Soci:alists into
Socialist amd Communist ranks ended the brief era of Socialist eJQ!)erimentation in Czooho-Slovrukia.
3. The agrarian era (1922-35)
This was a period of Telative ·parliamentary stability
under the leadershiip of the Agrarian Party, which managed
the government along m.iddile-of~the-road policies. A satisfactory coalition government was maintained throughout
this period.
4. The crisis ( 1935-38)
This period iwas the touchstone of the solidity of the
Czecho-1Slovruk state. Confronted with the serious iproblem
of the Sudeten Germain poipuil.ation, Czecho-6lovakia betrayed no signs, of political panic.
The .principal political ,parties in Ozecho-Slovrukia in the
period betiween the two World Wars formed the following
groups:
National 'Democrats. - This party, conservative and intensely nationalist, drew its princi'pa:l support from businessmen, the professions, and hi,gher cirvil servants. It never
beoame very ,powenfu:l.
8
SLOVAKIA
Populists. - Under the name of the Czech Populist
Party and the Slovak Pe>ipulist Party, respectiively, this
group endeavored to bring CathoiJ.ic ideas into plllblic life.
The Sllllall faruners and workers in rural districts were its
strongholds, especially in Slovakia.
Agrarians. - This poJitica-1 groUJp, the largest in the
subsequent parliaments, was solidly entrenched in both
rural aind town districts by means 0£ a widespread network
of cooperat:1ve, economic, and mtlturnJl organimtions. Its
broaid economic and so.cia'l program att•r acted wide support.
National Socialists. - Thi1s non-Marxian Socialist Party may ibie described as a "radicai national party of the
lower middle class and of the wonkers." It had rather more
influence than its moderate numerical strength would indii;cate.
Social Democrats. - This, party, resembling the social
democratic parties of other European countries, had more
influence during the first two years of bhe Republic. Though
outwardly united it was, however, undermined by dissension within its own ranks, whicih finally resulted in the expu1lsion of the Communist faction .
Communists. - The Ozecho-Sloivaik Commll!Ilist Party
was created in 1920 as a result of the e~ulsion of Communist elements from the 'Social Democratic Party. Though
equia:lly subversive and aggressiive as elsewhere in Europe,
the Ozecho-iSlovaJk Communists never secured a la:rge foll-owing during the two decades before the Second World
War.
Economic, Social and Cultural Development
Agrarian reform
iRediistribu:tion of land was an urgent iprOlblem facing
the IIlew government and a Land Reform Act, therefore,
was one of the first measures passed ,b y the Czecho-Slovak
Parliament. This ,a ct entitled the state to truke over, •a,fter
com;pensation, all ,1and :from the great estates in excess of a
fixed maximum and to permit land purcha,se by those who
needed it most. The agr,ariam. refomi program substantially improved the material conditions of the rural popula-
SLOVAKIA
9
tion aml averted the diam.ger of ,agrarian disturbances.
Economic development
While Czecho-1Slovruk agricl.l!ltura:l resources almost
covered domestic req,uiTements, indrustrial prodUJCtion was
far in excess of the needs of the home market since Ozecho-1Slovakia had been the industrial center of the former
Austro..lHJungarian Empire.
'Since the Danulbiian countries, originally Czooho-Slovakia'•s principal foreign ma,r ket fOT manufadured goods,
were increasing the tempo of their industria;lization with a
view to :restricting tihe import orf industrial µvoducts, Ozecho..JSlovruk foreign trade was olbJiiged to look for new outlets. These were found ma,i nly in those western and oversea
countries which were Czecho-1SloV1aJkia's .principal suppliers
of •r aw materials, especially the United States and Great
Britain.
Economically aJnd fin!andalil.y Czecho-Slorvaikia was a
sound state in central Europe. As an exporting country it
was severely hlt by the wodd economic depression of the
early thirties, hut, lby timely adtj:ustments to new price and
exchange levels, it was one orf the first Eiurropean countries
to weather the crisis.
Education and social progress
The cl.l!ltmrra1 level orf the Czechs was hlgh and their passion fOT education was prQIVeribial in central Eur.ope. The
new R.ep'Ulblic fostered educaition by establishing additional
free schools •a nd by, improving the existing ,schools.
The Ozecho-1Slorva,k :S tate a,lso forged ahead in the
field of social impmve:ment. All groU!ps and interests pos,sessed the rig:ht of organi,z ation ,a nd thus organized lalbor
had its trade unio,n s, farmers their cooperative societies,
and white--coUar worker,s and businessmen their associations. Health a,nd other types of ,social insurance were either
provided for or encouraged iby the State and pro¥i:sion was
made for State assistance to hoursing and cooperatives.
The Religious Situation
The re1igious .situation created after the esmblishment
of the Repu'blic in 19'18 must, like many other of the coun-
SLOVAKIA
:iO
try's developments, ibe rvieiwed against its historical backgrou!Ild.
A strong Czech groUJp of modernist, nationalistic Roman clergy insisted on radicall reforms, such as the use of
the vernacuiliar in the lituvgy ,and the abolition of compulsory celibacy, Wlhich the Roman Curia could not accept. As
a result, this group seceded from Rome and esta:blished an
independent "Ozecho-1S1ovak Church" ,w hioh originally numbered aJbout one million adherents, lbut ,w hich lost half its
meimlbership by 1939, so that Roman Catholics still comprised 80 •p er cent of the popul,a tion. In spite of adverse
circu:mstl8Jnces, the Roman Cathoilic ChUTch adjusted itself,
therefore, to the new millieu and recovered much for its former influence.
In the political and cultural life of the new Repwblic,
the Protestant element played a role far beyond its numerical strength. Many ,prominent political leaders, Thomas
G. Masaryk among them, 1be'longed to the Protestant faith.
1
Internal Problems
'J.'lhe OOIIlstituition of 1920, in }airge measure disiregarding the ethnographic realities of Czecho-Slovakia, was to
become a bone of contention 1b ,etween the Czechs on the
one side, and 1:Jhe. 1Slova:k,s, Ger.mans, Mag,yar:s, and Ruthenians on the other. The Slovaks demanded the incorporation
of the main clauses of the Pittsburgh Pa-ct into the Constitution. The Ruthemans, whose autonomy within CzechoSlovakia had ,b een granted by the Treaty of St. Germain,
asked that this international obligation be respected 'by the
Prague Government. The Ge:rana:ns ,and the Magyars solicited oulturaJ rig,hts and adnninistr,a,ti,ve autonomy on the
local level, as granted iby the same Treaty of St. Germain.
'Dhis psychological split among the ,populatiOIIl of OzechoSlova1ki,a wea:kened consideriaJbly the new state from both
the internal and international point of rview. The Czech
statesmen tried to iremedy this situation by creating a system of international treaties such as the Little Entente,
1920, the Pact of Alliance and FriendsihiJp with France,
1924, and a similar pact with the Soviet Union, 1935. Uke
the Austro-Hunga1rian staite'Smen in 1867, Benes believed
11
SLOVAKIA
that the transformation of Czech~Slova!kia into a federation of three memlbers, the Czech lands, 1Slov,a kia, and Subcarpaitlliian iRuthenia, would weaken the international position of the centralized state, I)a)rticularly with reference
to HW11gary and Germany. Consequently, in the field of internal ,administraJtio,n he developed a system, in which aJll
branches of Gove:rnment in Slov.a:kia and Sulbca rpathiian Ruthenia ,w ere reserved iprimari1y to 1:Jhe Czec,hs.
Politicall'Y, al·l problems of these bwo lands we.re to ibe
decided in the Pa:-ag,ue Parliament, where !Slovakia had only
58 and Ruthenia 9 deputies out of 300. Thus, even the most
important questions such a;s the relation betlween state
and church, official language, system of schools, the economy, were to be decided ib;y the Ozech parliamentarian majority.
Ai3 to the cutural aspect, secondary schodls in Slovakia as wel[ ,as the Bratislava Universirty lbecaJm.e an officiaJl
domain of Ozech ,professors, teacihing the UJnitarian concept of a "Czechoslovak" nation m ithe ethnic sense. On October 1, 1938, there were 523 Czech and 345 Sloviaik instructors teaching in the secondary schools of Slovaikia. At the
same time, there were 66 Czech and only 24 Slov~k professors in the Bratisl,a,va Uruversity.
From the standpoint of the economy Slovakia was to
remain a predominantly agrarian land, while the Czech
part of the Repulblic was highly induskialized. This policy
of two dif,ferent measures is shown by the share of Slovakia and Ruthenia ~n the industrial production of the RepU!blic. The participation of these two lands in the whole
industry, !between 1934 and 1937, was only 8.5 per cent,
while 91.5 iper cent went to the Czec,h lands. The proper
importance of these figures is stressed by the fact, that
Slwakia constituted 23 per cent and Rutheinia 5.5 per cent
of the total popuJation of the Re1pulblic.
From the adlministratifve ,p oint of view, the district and
county offices in Slo,vakia and iRuthenia were mostly direcited iby Czech off,iciais who were directly responsible to
Prague ,as were the police. In 1938 there were 120,926 Czech
pwb1ic offici,a ls in 'Slovakia.
All these aspects created in Ozecho-Slovakia what has
1
1
12
SLOVAKIA
been knoiWn as the "Sll.ova;k problem." The Slovak People's
Party which, in 1925 had 23 deputies, became not only the
strongest single party in Slav,aJkia, lbut a majority party of
the Slovak people (not counting minorities and the Comm1.1!11ists) endorsed 1:Jhe federative reform of the Republic
asking for the accomplishment of stipulations contained in
the ,PittslblllI'gh Pact. A:s early as Jianuary 25, 1922, this
party presented its fiTst project for c01I1stituti01I1al reform
in Czecho-Slovakia. The prog,ram hatl the following main
points:
!Slovakia to be granted her own Diet and Government.
As common affairs would ,b e considered: The President, the
Army, Foreign Affairs, and Communications. The Sloviak Diet to harve exolU1Sive competence in such matters as
natiOIIlal eduoaJtion, denominations, justice, commerce, agriculture, publric works, social welifare, and corresponding
finances. The executive ;power in Slov-rukia, as iregards b.oth
the laws which wound be :voted by the Central Parliament
in Prague and those which would be enacted. lby the Diet
of Bratis:larva, would belong to the Slovruk Gorvernment.
Laws voted ,by ithe Central Parliament would lbe without
validity in .Slovakia if rejected by a two-.thirds majority in
the •Sll.ovak Diet. This proposal would have satisfied !Slovak
aspirations, but it was 111ever put on the agenda o;f Parliament.
A second proposed reform concerning the decentirali>zation of the state administration was presented to the Czecho4S1avruk Parliiament by the 1Slovak People's 1Party, May
8, 1930. More modest in -i ts scope than the first one, this
document claimed for -Slovakia the same constitutional position which had 1b een gr8.lllted ihwt never carried out by
article 3 of the constitwtion relating to Sub.carpathian Ruthenia. According to this proposal, IS1ovakta should have
had her own 'Diet as a national legislative ,b ody and a governor as chief of the land executiive.
The iDiet would have lbeen competent to enact laws concerning [anguage, education, religion, municipal, and district administration and justice as well as other matters
whioh the laws of the Central ,Parliament would comer wpon
it. Laws enacted by the <Diet of Slovakia and .si:gned by the
1
SLOVAKIA
13
President of the Republic would ibe promulgated, under sigruature of the gavemor, in a sipecial col1ection of laiws for
Slova:kia. Although presented in due form, this proposal
was never discussed in the Parliament.
Octdber 16, 1932, the Slovak People's Party of Andrew
H!linika and the Slova!k National Party of M. Ra;zus (a small
traditionailist <Protestant party) having joined in an agreement a;b,out the necessity of autonomy for Slovakia,
stressed their detemnination to pursue the fight for Slovakia's national rights, "even ,t houg,h it may ,bring the disintegration of >the Ozecho..,Slov,a;k Republic."
Fol1.owing the resignation of T. G. Masaryk as President of the Repulblic, E. Benes became 1a candidate in Deceimber 19315 for that office. After some consultations, the
Slovak People's Party end!orsed his election, stiipwlating,
however, that a ,pol,icy of national equality between the
Czechs and the 1Slava:kis should ibe inaugrnrated by the President aind a law concerning 'Slovak~a's autonomy ,be promulgated in one year. Nevertheless, it was two years later
before the Prague Government was ready to, consider the
Sl()IVruk prdblem and this ooourred in connection wit!h the
Sudeto·- German claims for nation,a,1 rights within the Republic.
This nationality group had been integrated into CzechoSlovakia in spite of their protest. -Since the very foTlffiation
of Czecho,..,Sl'ovakia, the German minority had been soliciting a form of cultural autonomy in the schools, local administration, and in the courts. Later on they asked for
a better economic amd social <poll.icy in the German areas
suffering from unemployment. For a long time, Prague
did not lristen to such :voices. But with Hitler's accession in
Gennany, the Sudeto-Germans recei;ved the !backing of the
'I1hl1rd Reich. Consequent11 theiT claims increased at the
same time as their courage. In 1935 the ,Sudeto-German
P,a rty, with 44 deputies, lbeoame the second ,g reatest party
in the Repuiblic. The (P,raigue Goverll!!Ilent, not willing to ~ppear as acting under foreign pressure, remained reluctant.
T.he stiffer the Czecho..jSlovak Government 1becaime, the more
Hitler determined to annihilate Czecho ... Slovakia.
14
SLOVAKIA
PairalJel to this evolution was Sfovrukia's struggle for
its own rrights. JU/Ile 5, 1938, a third projed concerning the
federalization of the Repulblic was pU!blished lby the SlovaJk
People's Party, a!lld presented to the Central Government.
It was only one week !before the, Munich Conference, 1Septem'be:r 22, 1'938, that E . Benes sent a counteriproject to the
Praesidium of the Sllovaik ,People's Barty.
Shortly after, the conflict :betiween Prague and: the Sudeto-Ge:rrmans was resolrved in Munich, where, on the basis
of Lord Rundman's rrecommendation, the Sudetenl:and went
to Germany.
This decision created for ISlovaikia a new situation. As
a consequence of a policy in whioh she had praotically no
share, Sllovrukia was ,a lso to surrender in favor Olf ifllUJilgary
her Southern !boundary ·zone, ,s ettled mostly ,b y Magyar population. This was a psychdlo,gical blow which brought an
agreement among all Slova!k ,political parties, except for
the Communist, Social-Democrat and minority parties, rubout
Slovakia's autonomy. Thus on October 6, 1938, one day
after the resignation of ,E . Benes, six ipolitica,,l parties of
SlovaJkia, representing 36 out of 58 deputies, puiblished a
dedarration in which they agreed that the third project of
constitutional reform shO'llld be immediat~ly put in practice
and l8Jil autonomous gorverrnment for Slovakia 1b e appointed
,u nder the chairmanship of iDr. Joseph Tiso.
1
November 2, 1938, lby the ar,bi,tration of Ciano and Von
Ribbentrop in Vienna, 10,309 .s quare kilometers with ·853,670
inhafbitants were to .b,e ceded by :Slovakia to Hungary. This
included 503,980 'Magyars and 272,145 Slovaks. ISfovakia
saw that she was becoming a viotim of an international
po1itica1 game ,w ithout aniy faJllJlt of her own. The Vienna
decision proved the futility of the fomner party dirvisions
and produced ra n integrating effect upon the Slo:va;k politica:l
spectrum. Parties which had signed rt.he Declaration of Zilina on October 6, agreed on NovembeT 10, 1938, on the
formation of a common party !known henceforth as the
Party of National Unity.
This political evolution in 1Slovrukia was f:inal:ly sanctioned by the Ozech and Slovak representatives irn the
15
SLOVAKIA
Prague Parliament on No-vemlber 19, 193'8. Then, by a constitutionall ,amendiment, Ozecho-Slovrukia became a federation of Bohemi!a-<Maravfa, !Slovakia and! Oa:rpathian Ukraine
(,Ruthenia). Burt the relations between Prague and the Slova:k Government remained tenJSe, because of 9,000 Czech
officia1s who 1Were removed lby the Slovak Goivernment, and
the share of Slovakia in the income and expense, orf the
common <budget.
FOREIGN ,R ELATIONS
Beforre Munich
The principal aim of Ozecho-Slovakia's foreign policy
was the preserivation of the status quo as estaJblished by
the 19~9 peace settlements, and the estaJblishment of friend-ly relations with all her neighlbors through ,a n exten1Sive
system of adequate agreements. Eduard Benes, Minister of
Foreign Affairs until 11936 and 1ater 1P resident of the Repulblic, was the girniding sipiirit of this policy.
A solid :f oundation for rthe, presewation .o f the status
quo in cenibral Europe was laid !by the CTeation of the Little
Entente formed by Ozecho-Sfoivakia, Yugos1a;vfa and Rumania, and three victorious Danulbian states bordering on
vanquished Austda and Hungary.
Ozecho-1Slovalda was ·a n enthusiastic supporter of the
League of Nations and colktJborated ,w holeiheartedly in the
negotiations which brought Germany and the ,Soiviet Union
into the League.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, Ozecho-iSlovakia's
foreign relations entered into a critical phase and two
ye31rs of vi,r,uJent Nazi pro,paganda among the Sudeten Germans !bore frwt in the results of the 1935 elections. The
NaJZi..sponsored :Sudetendeutsche IPartei poiiled over 62 per
cent of the total Ge1riman vote and c01Wed the smaller German parties .i nto submission.
1
Later .on, acting on instructioillS from iBer,Hn, the <leaders od: the Sudeten German movement put fomvard demands
which no Czecho-S1,orva'k 1g overnment •c ould a·c cept and, with
the anne:,ration of Austria, the srtage was set for final action.
De.seprately anxious to avert a new war, France and
16
SLOVAKIA
Great Britain proposed to Czecho-Slovakia that she should
cede to Germany all areas with a German majority. When
Ozecho--srtovakia demwred, she was informed that she must
ae<!ept the proposal or bear the conisequences alone. The result was tihat the Czechs gave in and at Munich their
country was di vided on the lines dictated by Hitler.
1
After Munich
After MU1J1ioh, Czecho-.Slova:kia tried to adjust itself to
the new situation. President Benes resigned and left the
country. He was succeeded 1b y Emil Hacha, an eldeI1ly and
experienced jurist with no politioa1 affiliations, who believed that close cooperation with the Third Reich was the
country's only hope of sur:vival.
The tra,nsition to Hitler's New Order was swift. Obnoxious parties were dissolived and the Government was
given wide power,s to govern by decree. The ,administration
was purged, the 1press put under rigorous control and antiSemitic measures were ena,cted.
The situation in central Europe after Mlliilloh became
even more confused. Germany began to remind the Bohemian puibLic of the role the Kingdom of Bohemia had played
within the Holy Roman Empire. !Hungary started to speak
about her histor,i,cal boundaries and the necessity of a common frontier with Poland. According to the Nuremberg
documents, Hitler 1at that time. had already decided to destroy Czecho-Slovakia. But there was apparently no definite decision o.n S1ova:kia as to wihether to place it under German OCOU1pation or to ha;ve it occU1pied by Hungary. In this
situation, the Slovak GOIVernment had only one preoccupation: to preserve what unity had remained of Sloviakia after the Vienna a11bitration and to avoid:, as far as possible,
direct domination lby a:ny of her neighbors.
On Ma11ch 10, 1969, the Prague Government dismissed
the government of Dr. Joseph Tiso and proclaimed martial
law in 'Slovakia. The Slova!k people considered this a violation
of agreements that had /been si,gned ~tween Prague and
Bratislaiva and incorporated into the Constitution. Puibl~c
demonstrations spread throll!g.hout 'Slova:kia.
Invited to a consultation by Hitler in Berlin, Dr. Joseph
SLOVAKIA
17
Tiso, the dismissed chairman of the Slov,ak Gooernment
was shown a telegram by Von Ribbentrop, according to
which HUIIlgary iwas ready to occupy Slova,kia. Hlitler then
suggested that this eventuality may be prevented by the
declaration of 1Slovakia's independence. Consequently, Dr.
Tiso returned to Bratisl,aiva where, om March 14, 1939, following his report, the IS'lovak Diet proclaimed independence.
President Hacha was then summoned to Berlin and presented with an ultimatum aiming at the i.mJpos.ition of a
protectorate upon Bohemia-Moravia. Forced into submission, the Presiderut ,s igned ,a declruration by w1hich he "ip1aced
the destiny of the Czech people and country with confidence in the 'hands of the Fuehrer of the German Reich."
German troo1ps marched into Bohemia and from Prague
(March 16) Hitler issued the proclamation establishing the
"Protectorate of Bohemia-Mora'Via."
Thereafter, Hungary annexed Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Czecho-SlovaJkia was dead.
The Establishment of the Slovak Republic
Even though the Slovak state was largely the result
of a tense international situation, it nevertheless co.rresponded to· the aspirations of the Slovak ~ple for freedom
and the principle of self-determination a,nd seltf-1govern.ment.
After Munich, central EUTotpe became a part of the German
orbit. Therefore, in oroer to. d.~scourage Hungary in her
armed attack launched against Eastern Slovakia, the Slovak Government concluded •w ith Germany a treaty of protection, March 23, 1939, by which the <Reich assured the existence of Sloiva;kia without destroying its .national pe,r sonality. In exchange, S1ova:kia ha,d to, follow the German line
in foreign policy.
Altogether, 2:l states. reoogniiized the international .i ndividuality of Slovaikia. Besides the countries which were
later to become members of the Axis, S~ovaikia was recognized by the Holy See, the -Soviet Union, iSpain, 1Switzedand,
Sweden, Grea,t Britain (de facto) , France (de facto), Liberia, Costa Rica, and Ecuador.
According to the constitution voted on July 21, 1939,
18
SLOVAKIA
SlovaJkiia became a Repulblic with a Parliament of 80 members and a Government of nine.
The constitution contained princi!pleis, which in some
aspects combined features of the liberal staite, the Christian democracy, and the authoritarian state,. In the beginning all poweT of the 'Slova:k Reipu'blic was vested in the
Parliiamenrt !but later on, in 19·41, after Slovakia had entered
the war against the S'Oviet Union, the executive was to prevail over the legislature.
The numlber of political parties was reduced. The Communist and the :Social il)emocrat pa·r ties, representing only
ten deputies, had been 1s uppressed as suJbversive, in October
1938. Six other parties merged mto the Slov,ak Unity Party, the baokibone of the ipolitcal system of the SLovak state,
and tlhere were two minority parties: German and Magyar.
The SlOIVaJk state was far froon being a perfect democracy in the trarlitional sense. R reflected a compromise
between the past and the present, between an old tradition
and a temporarily determined political dynamism in Central Europe. lBut, in ,general, it was an expression of the
se'Lf-q>reservation instinct of the 1SlO'Vak nation.
The Sloviruk Government, in 1941, joined Gernnany, with
two armored dirvisions, in :the war against the Soviet Union.
Although on [)ecemlber 1:2, 1941, the Slovak Press Bureau
had pulb'lished an anno'UIIlcement that the ISlovia;k Repulblic
was in a state of war with the United !States and Great Britain, neither the President nO'r the tS lovak Pa:rliament or
Government ever made such a decision or declaration. In
fact, the Sl01Vruk forces, during the Second World War, did
not engage in comlbat against any of the Western Powers.
1
World War B and the Restoration of Czecho-Slovakia
Czechs in the protectorate of Bohemia-Morawa ,w ere
not directly iDJVolved in the •S econd World War. They were
exempt from militaJry service hut had to work for the German war machine. Though their contribution in the fight
for freedom was not Sipectacular, thousands of Czech patriots ipaid with their live'S for their efforts to 1keep the flame
of freedom fHalrering.
After Munich, many Czechs and SlovaJks left the coun-
SLOVAKIA
19
try and established themsel,ves talbroad, mostly in Paris and
London, which became the cenrters of their political activities.
Headed by Eduaxd Benes, these emigres set urp a National Committee to taJke up the struggle for the restoration
of a free Czecho-iSlovakia.
The committee was recognized first as the provisional
and eventwall.'y as the regulaT Government of Czecho-Sloviakia, by Great Britain and, later, iby the United !S tates and
the Soviet Union. Czecho-'Sl01Vaikia was thus given the status of an allied state under foreign ocoupation. The Munich
agreement was declared null and void and Czecho-.Slova.kia's
original frontiein; were guaranteed.
While the C!zecho-.Slovak GQI\Ternment-ii.n-exile was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the international
position of the Republic, the Czecho-Sfovak Communist
leaders in Moscow were com1pleting their plan for immediately seizing power after the li/beration. Moscow knew precisely what Ozecho-Slovalkia's <international .p osition would
be once the Red army was stationed within the ter.ritory
and was concerned on:ly with tadica:l movements aimed at
bringing ahout a speedy sovietfomtion of the country.
Toward the end of 1943, E. Benes went to Mosco.w
where, on Decembe:r 12, 1943, he signed with Stalin a treaty
of alliance, friendship, and mutual help between the Soviet
Union and Czecho-Slovakia. tBy this treaty, the ·S oviet
Uruon was to approach Ozecho-1Slova1kia after the end of
the war as an ally.
No. such treaty having been <:oncluded. with the Western Powers, the influence of Moscow on the future of emergent Ozecho-Slovakia became predominant. In Soviet tactics, this treaty was to create a favora!ble atmosphere in
Bohemia-lMo:ravia fm: tbe idea of a Soviet ·l iberation.
During his visit in Moscow, E. Benes came to a,n agreement with K. Gottwald, the ex,iled chief of the Czech Communist Party, aJbouit the main prindples upon which the
edifice of the future Ozecho-,Slovakia wouJd rely: (1) The
state admin.stration 'wouJld be repla<:ed by "natio,n_aa committees" (IS01Viet.s); (2) the .fOI1II1er right-of--center parties
would 1b e eliiminaited; (3) the non-Communist parties in ire-
20
SLOVAKIA
,s tored Ozecho ..Slovak,ia would form ,w ith the Communists a
"government of National 1F ront"; (4) "people's courts"
would lbe established to eliminate all war criminals. These
principles with an extensive inter,pretation and -aipplication
of ipoints (2) and ( 4) and the nationali2ation of indiustcy
were to, lay the fou:ndaitions for a "People's !Democracy" in
Czecho-1Slovakia.
In Slov:alkia, the treaty of friendship , mutual help, and
coJ1aboration with the Soviet Union iProduced a stimulating
effect upon the Commun1st .and Social Democrat undergroUIIlds and also on a group of lilberals whose imaigiination,
with respect to central Europe, was tempted more lb y the
absent Soviet Union than 'by the present Germany.
These ,groll!ps met secretly on Christmas 1943 in Bratislava and signed what is known as the "ChristJmas agreement." In this declaration they reaffirmed their will to
work for the restoration of "Ozecho·-IS1ov•a kia," for a Illarrow collalboration with the iSov.ieit Union in the field of foreign policy, for the estaiblishment of political justice and
for the continuation oif resistance against the Germans and
the Slovak Government.
:FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GALAYDA,
AMERICAN CITIZEN FROM HAZLETON, PA.
Mr. McTigue. The Russians deported to Russia the
teachers and iwell-educated ,peoip le?
Mr. G alayda. Yes, t eachers and educated people.
Mr. McTigue. And you were in Slova:kia while this was
going on; is that correct?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. :McTigue. Now, while these deportations were going
on did you then endeavor to get a visa o.ut ·o f the country ?
Mr. GaJayda. I :tried a couple of times but it was impossible at that time. I was put in ja•il two tim es.
Mr. tM cTigue. Who puit you in jail?
Mr . Galayda. The Ozecho-Sloivak Army. They asked me
to fight ,a gainst the Germans. I ref,u:sed. I said, "I am an
American citizen and I refuse to serve in the Czec,ho..,Slovaik
Army."
SLOVAKIA
21
!Mr. (McTigue. 1S0, you were put in jail because. you refused to serve?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, thaJt's right.
MT. !MoTigue. Now, when was t1he second time you were
put in jail?
Mr. Galayda. Wel1, the second time was in 1946.
Mr. Mc'Digue. iBy the Communists?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Why?
Mr. Galayda. Well, because I was campaigning against
communism.
Mr. McT,i gue. You were making taiks against communism?
Mir. Ga1ayda. Yes, I made ,a couple speeches in the villages against communi sm. That is why I was jailed.
'M r. iMcTigue. Noiw, in 1'94fi, at the end of the war, did
you try to get a Un~ted States passport?
Mir. Galayda. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTiig ue To return to the United States?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. [n 1945, when the war was 0 1ver, me
and my brothers decided to Oeaive, because at that time the
United States was ,stil'l fighting with the Japanese. So we
decided to leave and join the American Army.
Mr. iMcTigue. iDecided to come home?
Mr. Galayda. Yes. We went to the American cons,ul in
Prague. He refused. He saiid, "You have to get your passport
finst, then you can join American Army." So ,J came home.
Mir. McTigue. How did you go about gettiing your passpont?
Mr. Galadya. Well, we went to Hungary. On the way
from Budapest to Bratislava - weH, i will tell you something 3:borut the !Russian s-oldd.ers, what they did.
Mr. McTigue. Yes, I wish you woiuld. This is while you
are taiking the train to 'Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda Yes. 'l never am going to forget that time
what happened.
Mr. McTigue. You are on the train now?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Is this what you are describing?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
1
1
22
SLOVAKIA
Mir. McTigue. And you rure en route to Prague lby way
of Budapest and Bratislava?
Mr. Galayda. The Russians pulled the emergency brake.
They had guns; they took the money frOirn .the ipoople, and
in every coach was one soldier. He had a gun. They robbed
the people. They ta!ke everything. Then I heard some
screaming, a girl, a couple of giTls started screaming. I
know that. I remember that. And I don't know what happened because 1I didn't see because in every coach was one
soldier and we can't move.
Mr. McTigue. And they -to ok the girls off the tra,i n ?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. How long did they hold the train up?
Mr. Gailay<la. Oh, Irt was, I think, at least one hour.
Mr. Boll!in. One hour.
Mr. :Mc'I'igue. And everybody on the train ·w as relieved
of his valualbles, jewelry, money?
Mr. Galaiyda. They took everything.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what !hia:ppened when you finally
reached .Prague ?
Mr. Galayda. Well, when I reached the Prague, liike I
said, I went to the American consul. I itold hd.m I ,wanted to
join the American Army. H~ said, "!No. You have to get
your Arnevican ,p assport first." So then I came home.
Mr. McTigue. You came home to Slovakia?
Mr. Galadya. Yes. I came baok home. Then I start
speruking agafast communism.
Mr. Mc'lligue. You started writing against communism ;
you made some speeches against communism?
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Galayda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. ls that correct?
Mr. Bonin. Now, did any,body ma!ke any complaint rubout
theiir activities, itaking this property aJway from them?
Mr. Ga1ayd:a. No, 'alt that time it rwaiS impossible to say
something.
iMr. Bonin. You had nobody to turn to to even make a
Mr. Galayda. No.
complaint?
Mr. Bonin. If you did ma!ke a compla int you would probably ·b e arre&t ed ?
1
1
SLOVAKIA
23
Mr. Galayda. Then yOl\l are sent ito Russia.
Mr. Bonin. In other wocds, tllere was a c0111Stant fear
in the minds of the peoiple that they would go to a concentration camp?
Mr. Galayda. Yes, that's tight.
Mrr. Bonin. Into 'Si-ber-ia?
Mr. Ga:layda. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Which, of course, is nothing ito .p leasant to
M1ybody living ·b ehind the Iron Curtain?
Mr. Gafayda. No, I don't think so.
Mr. Bonin. You were very happy to get ou:t of there?
Mr. Galayda. Yes,. The Communist Party is no good for
this world; a!bsoI1U1telly no good. Becaiuse ,I was over there -and
I lb.ave experience: ,I lived in Czecho-lS1ovakia for 20 years,
and I know. They iaire no good in this world.
Mr. Bonin. They are no good for this world. Well, do
you have any moos-a ge to tell ,to the people of the United
States who may feel that communism is a good system of
government?
Mr. Galayda. Well, there is one thing I can say, and that
is the American ,p eople should be proud of what they have,
freedom of speech and everything They should ibe ,p roud o.f
what they have.
Mr. Bomn. ls, it-here any freedom of religion under the
Communists?
iMr. Galayda. No.
Mir. Bonoin. Is there Mly freedom iof the press?
Mr. Galayda. No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom of assembly?
Mr. Galayda . No.
Mr. Bonin. Is there any freedom to use radio and teleMr. Galayda. No.
visi'o n as we do !ill America here.?
Mr. Bonin. [t i,s a ,pretty lblack picture, this lirving behind t.he Iron Curtain; isn't iit?
Mir. Galayda. That's ~ight.
(Wilkes-Barre, Pa., ISeptemiber 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MR. SMREKOVSKY
MT. McTigue. You came to this country in 1928; is that
correct?
Mr. Smrekiovsky. 1928 is correct.
Mr. MoTigue. And did you become a:n American citizen
at that time?
2-l
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir, after being five years in this
country.
Mr. McTi!gue. I under,stand that you returned to Slovakfa in 1939; is that cor.root?
Mr. 1Smrekovgky_ 1939; yes.
Mr. !l\foTigue. What iwas the purpose for returning to
Slova·k ia at that time?
Mr. Smrekovsky. To. visit my father because he was
reaching 90 rund wrote me that he was i'll; so I wanted to
visit him and see him.
Mr. Mc'figue. Now, did you return to Slovakia before
the 'Outlbreak oif wa;r between Germa;ny a.ind Polamd?
Mr. 1Sm.rekovsky. Yes. We had a little difficll'l,ty crossing
t:he ·Polish boroer, lbut ,that didn't amount to much.
Mr . .McTigiue. Noiw, at thait time, conditions were good
in ,Slovakia; is that correct?
Mr. Smreko'V'sky. Yes, they were.
Mr. Mc'figue. There wasn't any difficulty as far as
Mr. ,S mrekovs,k y. We didn't .know anything about wa:r
then.
Mr. McTigue. There was ,c omplete fu-eedom of ithe
Mr. ISm.rekovsky. Yes.
press...
Mr. McTigue. Freedom of ireligion . . .
Mr. 1Smerkovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And freedom of assembly
Mr. Smerkov:sky. Yes.
iMr. iMcTigue. Hoiw long did you stay in 1Slovakia?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. 1Seven years.
Mr. McTigue. Then you were there at the time the Rus1M r. !Smrekov.s ky. Ye·s, I was.
sians C'aime into 1Slovaikia?
Mrr. Mc'figue. What - or, w:hen did you first come .in
contact with the Commun.ists?
Mr. Smrekovsky. After the German Army was defeated,
they started to drop parachutists to organize Communist
bands to pers.e cute and rob middle class and decent people.
1M r. Mc'.Dig,ue. Noiw, did this haJppen in 1944?
Mr. IS mrekovs.ky. Yes.
lMr. Mcrrigue. And thls i1s the Communist-inspir ed uprising that you are talk,i ng a:bout.
SLOVAKIA
25
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. McTi,g ue And in the community where you were
liviing rthey had parachuted agents into the community to organi1ze Communist bands in order to continue the uprising?
Mr. Smreko,v,s ky. That's right.
Mr. McTi'gue. And bring it to a successful conclusion, if
necessary?
!Mr. ISmrekovsky. Yes, and spread commurnsm at the
same time.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. Now, can you teH us some of the things
you wit:ne.ssed, yourself, during the course of this Communist-inspired uprising?
Mr. Smrekovsky. I remember a family cruptured by the
OommUIIllists. There were five memlbers in the fami'ly, a twoyear-old giirl, there was another bigger girl, a son-in-laiw, a,n
old man, and his wife. They were dragged to the edge of
the forest and shot from ithe back. Then they dug a hole for
them and buried them.
Mr. Bonin. Mr. Counsel, I just want to interrupt here.
We hea.ird testimony .b efore from different witnesses when stating that ithey were shot in the back, do you mean
that the . . .
Mr. Smrekoivsky. They start •t o run.
Mr. Bonin. They ,s tarted to run?
Mr. Smrekovsky. They started to run and they shot
them from the back.
iMr. Bonin. And they shot tlhem firom the bru~k whiie
they were trying to get away from them?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Now, they were agents of the Russian Government - that were doing that?
Mr. Smrekovs:ky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. .A!nd were they armed, these people that were
shot, or were they with01Ut a,r,ms?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. They were without arms.
Mir. Bonin. They were without arms?
Mr. '.Smrekovsky. Without arr-ms, innocent people.
Mr. Bonin. But, nevertheless, they were all .s hot in the
baC'k, the one two years of a,ge, four years of age, the two
larger ones, the son-in...,Jaw, and the father?
1
1
26
SLOVAKIA
,M r. Smrekovsky. And the mother, too. Five persons.
Mr. Bonin. Five persons? Now, you say that they were
tossed in •a mass grave; is that correct?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. Bonin. They were a:11 placed in the same g:raJVe?
MT. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. Was there any re1iigious burirul service involrved?
MT. Smrekovsky. No, sir. No, sir. They just buried them
there like any criminals. It ha:ppened around Oot:ctber, and
during tJhe winter they dug them out and :p ut them in the
cemetery, in the corner of the cemetery, where they are
Mr. Bonin. Continue Mr. Counsel.
sti1l buried.
'Mr. IMcTiigue. Now, after the Communists had occuipied
Slovwkia, did there come a time when you were put in
jail your1self?
1Mr. Smreikovsky. Yes. r:r was there 14 days.
Mr. Mcfl'igue. Why?
Mir. 1Smrekovsky. Of course, they had no reason. They
wanted to get rid of the middle-class people. My ·brother-4nlaw and a friend of mine were an-ested. Finally, my wife
went to the authorities <a!Ild they let me free after 14 days.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to your brother-in~law?
Mr. 1Smrekovsky. Well, he was jailed also, hut they released him.
Mr. Mc'I'igue. But there were others whom they didn't
Mr. Smrekovsky. Yes.
,r elease?
~fr. lMc'l'igue. You know that of your own personal
Mr. 'Sm~kOIV'sky. Yes.
knowledge?
Mr. Mc'.Digue. They were friends of yours?
Mr. 'Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Leading people in the community?
•M r. Smrekovsky. Yes.
Mr. Smrekov,s ky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Priests?
Mr. Smrekovsky. That's right.
Mr. McTigue. Nuns?
of different rel,i gious faiths?
people
And
lMcTigu.e.
Mr.
Mr. SmTekovsky. Yes.
MT McTigue.·· Now, when did you and how did you get
back to the United States?
SLOVAKIA
27
Mr. SmrekoV!Siky. As soon as the American constcl came
to Prague, I a,pplied for visa to the United States, and as
soon as my transportation was ready I lef.t and came to the
United States, first of Octolber 1946. I left my we there
for three years until I could bring her 'O'Ver.
Mr. iMcTigue. Now, at the time you le.flt you awned some
Mr. Smrelwvsky. Yes.
·
property; didn't you?
Mr. iMcTigue. What lhaippened to that iproperty af.ter
you left? .
Mr. Smrekovsky. Well, that was a1l confiscated. My
wife had to sign a statement tha,t it's gi;ven to ,the Govem.ment. And every'body ,w ho wamts to come to America had to
do that. Otherwise she would't get a !Visa.
The Chairman. That is a method of highway robbery that
they hold against somebody that wants to migraJte from one
country to. another?
Mr. S'mrekovsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bonin. They compel them to transfer their i)roperty
to the Government.
(Wil:kes-iBarre, Pa., September 30, 1954).
a
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF MRS. SMREKOVSKY
iMr. McTigue. When yoUJr husband left Slova!kia in 1946
to come to the Untted States, he left you in Slovakia; is
(Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct.
Mr. iMcTigue. And at the time he left you in 1946 you
had under yourr care the property which you both owned; is
Mrs. :SmrekoV'Slky. Yes.
thaJt correct?
Mr. McTigue. rNow, when your husband left and you had
the ipropeirty under your management, what experience did
you have with the Communists?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Very ibad.
Mr. McTigue. Did they make efforts to frig,hten you in
--any way so that you would give your property ;to them?
Mrs. Sinreko1Vsky. ThaJt was the only hope to come to
this country, unless if agreed that the property is transferred to the Government.
Mr. McTigue. So until you signed over your property to
28
SLOVAKIA
the Government you 'had no chance of leaving Slovakia; is
!Mrs. 1Smrekovsky. Yes.
that correct?
MT. iMcTigue. iln it.he meantime, while you were still
there, in 1946 and b,efore you left the country, were your
friends mistreated by the Comrnurusts? Were any of yoll'I'
close friends that you harve personal ikno,w ledge of mistreated
in any way by the Communists?
!Mrs. Smrekorvsky. In my hometown there were shot or
massacred four 1people while I was wiith my ,p arents - there
was a senator, a notary public, a mayo.r , and a foo-ester. DuTing the night, in theilr ntght clothes, they loaded them UJp in
one truck rund took them away.
Mr. McTigue. What was their crime? Why were they
shot?
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Because they were not Communists
and they never a:gireed with the Comml.llilists.
MT. Bonin. Oongressman Feighan. Just a minute. In
other words, even though the Communists ,have been in Slo1Mrs.
Smre~ovsky. Yes.
va:kia since 1945 . . .
Mir. Bonin. StiM your relatives ·a nd friends have not beMrs. Smrekovsky. Right.
come Communists?
Mr. Bonin. They still belie·v e in ,t he religion and the freedom of religion that they had before?.
Mrs. Smrekovsky. And they hope they wihl be £.reed and
live again like decent people.
MT. Bonin. In other words, regardless of how long the
Communists may dominate Slorvrukia, there is still that desire for freedom on theiiT prurt and to live as they used to
prior to the Communist regime that has been imposed upon
Mrs. Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
them?
Mr. Bonin. Now, I understand that t:hese four influential 1poople, a senator, a mayor, a t:imiber man and a notary
public, were also shot because rthey failed to accept communism and to lead the people through Communist doctrines and
princilples under the domination of the Russian system?
Mrs. Smrekorvsky. Right.
Mr. Bottin. That is the type of freedom thaJt is being
sold to the ,people behind the lTOn Currtain?
Mrs. -Smrekovsky. Yes, sir.
SLOVAKIA
29
MT. Bonin. Force, threats, violence, and intimidation, in
order to constantly keep them in fear of whait is apt to happen to them?
1M rs. Smrekovsky. Exactly.
Mr. Bonin. Now, your wifo came out of Czecho-iSliovrukia
in 1'9 49; ts thart: correct?
Mr. IS mrekovsky. Yes, sirr.
Mr. !Bonin. And the principal reason ,w hy you aTe testifying under an assumed name is lbecaUJSe you are fearrful of
what might haJppen to your relaUves and ,t he friends. that
you ,s till 1haJVe in 1s1ova~ia?
Mr. Srnrekovsky. Exactly.
(WiJJkes-iBarre, Pa., ,September 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH PAU00
Mr. McTigue. 1Mr. Pall'co, where are you living at the
present ,t ime? - - - Dr. Pauco. ln Middletown, Pa.
Mr. McTigue. H ow are yiou employed?
Dr. Pa:ll!co. I am assistant editor of the Slova.k weekly,
Jednota.
Mr. McTigue. Mir. !PauJco, I understand that you were
born in Slovakia, is that correct.
Dr. PaU!co. Yes; that is true.
Mr. ,M cTigue. What part of Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. In ceilltraJl Slovakia.
Mr. McTigue. Central ISlovaJkia. And it's my understanding that you spent most of your adult life as a journalist; is
that coTrect?
[)r. ,Pawc'O. Yes; that is correct, sir.
Mr. McTi:gue. W1hiile yiou were in Slova!kia, it is also my
understanding that in yiour capacity as -a journa:list, you had
the occasion to witness the Communist~in,s;pired uprising in
1944; is that correct?
Dr. Pa'Ulco. Yes, that's true.
Mr. Mc'lligue. And were, you also present at the uncovering of the mass graves at Vinnitsia in the Ukraine?
Dr. Pauico. Yes; that's right.
Mr. McTigue . . How d!id you happen to be there?
Dr. 1Pau'co. I was a member of a journalist expedition in
July 1943 It wa:s an e~pedition of all journalists firom cen.trrul Europe. I came to Vmnitsia in July 1943 and I wais there
four days. In those four days I saw five ,o.r six maSIS grarves
of the Ukrainian people and some Polish people, who were
30
SLOVAKIA
murdered by the ,Soviets. An eX!planation was girven to us
by the Geamam.. dootors that these people were shot between
1939 and 1941.
I spoke with the local people, Ukrainia:n and Polish people, some dozens of these people, because we were allowed
to spealk to those people - a,t the mass graves there in Vinnitsia, in the town of Vinnitsia. For example, I was shaved
twice in a local lba'.l'bershop, and I spoke to these men and
with some. other people ,i n Vinnitsi,a. A concert was gurven
in t'he town of Vinnitsia in honor of ,t he journaliSll:s' e,q;>edition, and after this concert, I spoke with several men and
women, and all these Ukrairuian people trul'ked to me. They
said what I saiw there in mass graJVes is true, and that their
relaitirves were shot by the Soviets between 1939 and 1941,
after the occupation of west Uikra,inia in 1939. Some people
of Ukrainian nationality known as strong anti-Communists
were deported in the Illight. And late,r , at the begmning of the
wa:r !between 1Sovieit Russia and Germany, deporta:tion was in
~eat masses. Nob,ody ,w as sure that hls, relatives, hrusbands,
sons, or some other of the family, wilhl not be shot in the
night. I have in my memory six ox seven cases of the wives
and daughters of the shot fathers and brothers, who told
me their relatives were deported in the night. The people
knew nothing. Their husbands and fathers were sent to Siberia or probably shot.
Mir. McTigu:e. How many people were killed
Dr. Pauco. Several 'hundred.
iMr. McTigue. At Vinnitsia?
Dr. Pau'co. 1Severrul hundred. I was at the graves four
days and I spoke with several dozens of Ukrainian women,
and, I learned, several ·hundred were buried in these mass
grarves.
iMr. McTigue. In these mass grarves that you knew
about?
Dr. ·P auco. Yes; in Vinniitsi.a.
Mr. McTigue. Yes. But there were other mass graves
disc01Vered later on; is that correct?
Dr. Pau'CO. I heard about it. I know a;bout Katyn, but I
wasn't there. ,I was in Vinnitsia and I can state only what l
saw at these mass graves. I have here a statement of what
SLOVAKIA
:n
I saJW at these mass graves.
Mr. McTigue. iMay I suggest, Mir. Chairman, since we
hawe other testimony that we want to develop, and since we
haJVe other witnesses, t:ha.t we admit this statement into the
reoord, but not have it read at this time?
Dr. Paulco. All right.
Mr. ,McTig;ue. IMaJke it a ,p art of the reoord.
Mr. !Bo:nin. Woll!ld you have any objection if we make
this staitement a part of the record at this time and you g;ilVe
us the highlights of it as of thJis moment?
Dr. PaUlc<>. All right.
Mr. Bonin. Without oibjootion, we will take the statement and place it in the committee files.
Mr. iMcTigue. You may recall, Mr. Chairman, tllait we
had testimony at our hearings in Munich on the Vinnd.tsia
murders very much ,a long the same 1ines Mr. Paruoo is testifying. This testimony that he has given today on the subject of the Vin.nlitsi.ai massacre eertainlly corroibo,rates wha,t we
hea.Td from many ,wiit:nesses in Munich. You aJlso recall in
connection with that testimony that one of ibhe witnesses
descri1bed the finding of hundreds of bod!ies of Vinnitsi:a \'i,ctims under the floor of a d'ance hall in one of the amusement •pariks iw:hen these mass graves were investig;ated. iI am
sure you recall thait testimony.
Mr. Bonin. Yes. I distinctly recall that, a'lld this corroborates the faot tJhat these mass graves and the mass kfiling of citizens of Vinnirtsia was deli;b erate and ,pe~trated
entirely by ,t he Communist regime in Russia.
Now, I understand, Mr. Pauioo., that you have some addition.al testimony suipplementing what 1happene:d in V!innitsia aind what took ,p lace in 'Slov,aikia; is that C()lrrect?
Dr. PaU!co. Yes. I woltld iiJke to say thiat the same thing
that h~ppened in Vinnitsia in 1939-41 happened in Slovakia in lr944. The Sovli.ets' s~hool oif prurtisans were parachuted
in the s,prmg of 1'94'4 in the mou:nrtains of Slorvaki1a, and then
in August 1'9414 they orga.ruzed a so-calil ed uprising against
the SlovaJk Government a'lld shot hundredlS and thousands of
Slovaks of anti..Communist feeling. Im Slova1ci(a, we had at
this time, 1944, several mass graves of innocent Slovak ciiti-
32
SLOVAKIA
zens, Slova.ik ainti-Oommunist patriots. The Communist part~,s ans ,w ere 1pariachUJted, as I mentioned, by the Soviets, and
the partisans were also furnh,,hed Soviiet ammunition. This
so-called upris,i ng in 1Slov-akia started with prepairations in
194'3. Some so.-,called underground politicians made an 8.'greement with the Communist leader, Karol Schmidke. And
this Karol ;Schmidke saiid in 1946 that this action in 1943,
this preparation of the uprising, was the merit o;f the illegal
Communist Party. All the people who declined to collaborate
with the Communist ieaders in 1944 were shot. Thiiis happened in central 1Slova.ikia because central Slovakia is a
mountainous land. Then the German armies came to S1ova-kia and :Slorvak ter:nitory was a battlefield. After this Communist uprising in ,Slovrukia, I heard f.rom my friends, from
my relatives in ISJ.ovakria thrut many innocent ,p eople, farmers, ,w orkei,s, priests, ,s ome ipriesits, ,s ome congressmen,
were shot by the Communists. I recall a congressman, a Catholic priest Anthony Salat. He was of very strnnig feeling
against the Communists. He wrote several books againist
communism and, iin the first week of the uprising, he was
shot. In 1Slw8!kia were liquidated about forty to fifty thousand :S lovaks in this Communist putsch.
1
Mr. IMc'Digue. T1hey were shot?
Dr. Pauco. They were shot 1b y the Soviets, b,y the Soviets' paritisan,s and by the collaborators in Slovakia.
!Mr. McTigue. About '50,000?
Dr. Paufo. Yes, aJbout '50,000.
Mr. McTigue. 1In the period of one year?
Dr. Pauco. In the period of three months.
Mr. McTigue. Three months?
Dr. Pauco. The purtsch was defeated in two months, but
after there were some battles in the mountains in Slovakia,
and in December the Red Army ,c ame to Slovalkia. Several
thousand Slo.vaJks fr,om eas,t ern Sl01viakia were sent by the
NK_,V il) to Russia, to Siberia and concentration camps. and
to the mines in Dombas.
Mr. IMcTigue. Norw, when and how did ,t he uprising finally
end?
33
SLOVAKIA
Dr. Pauco. The German Army came into Slovakia in
September 1944.
Mr. McTigue. Now, you had a close relationship with
Monsignor Tiso; isn't that correct?
Dr. Pauco. 'f.hat's true.
Ylr. McTigue. Now, will you tell the committee who Monsignor Tiso is and briefly explain your relationship with him
and your discussion with h~m afte,r the putsch?
Dr. Pauco. I was editor-in-chief of the greatest daily in
Slovakia, the "Slovak." This daily was the organ ,o f Monsignor Tiso. Joseph Tiso was the first Slovak President. He was
the legal President of the SlovaJk Republic, which came into
being on March 14, 1939. The ,Slovaik Republic had diplomatic relations with 27 naJtions, of them 17 or 18 were on the
side of the western allies. Monsignor Tiso was a Christian
ruler - after a thousand years, the first Slovak irll'ler and I had the opportunity to spea:k with him practically
every week . I reca:11 thrut on August 20, 1944, I was in Presov at a meeting called by the Government, by the army,
and by the Slovak People's Party. At that time, in eastern
Slovrukia the situation was very critica•l and the delegates
practicaly from every village and every town from eastern
Slovakda told the Government and government representatirves of Bratislava, tha:t something wliitl hruppen if the Slovak
Army and Slovak police do not interlere. Pradically the
whole of eastern Slovakia was, parachuted at this ,t ime by
the So;yiets, the Soviet parti,sans and Soviet a;genrts. I spoke
after this meeting with Dr. Tiso, and ag,ain when the pUJtsch
was liquidated. Dr. Tiso at this time was ready to resign.
He hoped that some Slovak politician would take the Slovak
question to the International Tribunal.
Mr. Bonin. Tribunal?
Dr. Pauco . Tribunal, yes, because he would iiike to
change the regime, but to preserve independent Slovakia.
That was the goal of Monsignor Dr. Tiso.
Mr. McTigue. What happened to Monsignor Tiso eventuallv?
Dr. Pauco. Monsignor Tiso was hanged, executed by the
Communist nation:i.l court, April 18, 1947, in Bratislava. Dr.
1
34
SLOVAKIA
Tiso wa.s the first among the Catholic prelrates in central
Europe who were executed by the Communists afte,r Warld
War Iil.
Mr McTigue. The usual phony charges, I suppose, were
applied, and the usurul phony court procedures were set in
motion?
Dr. Pauco. Just becallise he had anti-Communist feelings; I know, 'Il!Ot from Dr. Ttso, but from his personal secretary who its living now i n Caniada, seiveral times, Soviet
agents were ready to assuire to Slova.ks and Dr. Tiso himself
a seperate Slovak-,Soviet Repulblic if Dr. Tiso will go wtth the
Soviets, and Dr. Tiso refused. Tiso said one time, I recall,
that tf his own brother were a Communist, he would fii.ght
him. And I am SJure that i·s why Dr. Tiso wa:s executed by
the Commtmists' so-called nahonal court in April 1947.
Mr. Fetghain When you state that Monsirgnor Tiso was
the first of the clergymen to he executed by the Russian
Communists, you mean the first outstanding figure, both in
the spiritual and politic8il world?
Dr. Pll!uico. Yes, sn-. That's correct.
Mr. Feiigihain. That's 1a ll.
Mir. Bonin. W-ell, Mr. Pauco, it is nothing uncommon for
a priest or a member of the clergy in central EUI'Opean
countries to be in political life; isn't that correct?
Dr. Paooo . Yes, that's ri.ghit.
Mr. Bonin. And, therefore, they would be permitted to
engBlge in political lifo . . .
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
MT. Bonin. Bllit they took a leave od' absence from their
clerical life; isn't that coreivct?
Dr. Pauco. No, that was not so in S1ovakiia. Monsignoir
Tiso, as Prresident of the Slovak RepU!blic, was the adm~nistrator of his own parish in Bano:vce, rund sang Holy Mass
there practically every Sunday.
'Mr. McTigue. Tell me, Mr. P8iuoo., how and why did you
escaipe from Slo1Va!kia arnd come to this country?
Dr. Praulco. After what I ,s aw in Vinnitsia, then in Slovakia , and what I hearo from many hundreds orf escll!pees
from Ukrainia, from Poland, from Russia, from Hu'Il!gary,
SLOVAKIA
35
from Ruman:i:a ., from Lithiuani:a, about ·p ractices of 1S01Viets,
I could not stay in rS1()1VlaJk:J,a, because I hated communism ; I
hated oolsiheiv:ism, and I hoped to live in the free Western
World. I am happy that 1 am here in this free ,a nd democratic couliltTy. I haive my relatives over there, ,a nd one of
my relatives came through the border just several months
ago to Austriia. He. ~s: now in the American Zone, and he
writes to me. thlat Oill!r ;p eople over there behind the Iron
Curtain have friends. here in the United States, and they
are praying every d·a y that the Gorvernmen t of the United
States wHl win the battle against communism . ,A nd Slorvaks,
like IPoles, the Uikrairuans , the Baltic nations, or Rum•a nia,
Hung,ary, the Czechs:, Croatians,, :Serbians, and so on, they
like to be free like you are here in this country; they like to
be independen t, and, maybe, wiH sometime be ruinified in a
great European federation li,k e yoru are here urnfied in the
United States.
Mr. M:c~•g ue. When di:d you say you left Slovakia?
Dr. Pauco. It wa:s in Apr.ii 1945.
Mr. McTigue. And when did you arrive in this country?
Dr. 'P auco. WoUT years aglO, in Apri[ 1950.
Mr. McTigue. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bonin. Mir. Feiglha:n.
Mr. Feighan. Mr. Pau!co, we have heard testimony with
reference to the Vinnitsia massacres ,w hich stated' to us that
after the Commllllllists were diriiven out of the Ukm.i.ne in
1943 and the Naizis came in, they opened up graves of which
there were 38, each of them the same length, and widlhh, and
depth, that they conWned ov:er 10,000 rpeople they
weiI'en't aill U!kirruinians; some were IPoJes, and of other nationalities ; 'that the people there were of various status ;
they were, :farmers, armsan;s, wovkers, ,a nd rinteilleotUJals, and
the testimony th1at we rnceived also. indicated, at iJ.east with
reference to those particulaT graves, that tlhey were done by
the So;viet Russ,i ans durJng the years 1937 and 1938, but I assume that they did many othera besides those.
Dr. Pa:uco. I spoke ,t o the 1people of Vinniitsia, these
SLOVAKIA
36
people, Ukramiians and Poles, were all liquidated tb y the
Soviet agents.
,MT. Feighan. Yes. That ~s my understanding.
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. The testimony that we had shows that.
I 1have no further que,s1t1:ons
Mr. Bonin. WeH, Mr. Pa.'Ulco, you stated that this alleged uprising in Slovakiia was clearly Communist inspired,
is that OOlITect..
Mr. Pauco. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. BODJin. They created dissension and they created an
atmospheTe Olf revolt within Slova:ki:a?
Dr. Pauoo. Yes.
!Mr. !Bonin. And a.gents had been sent in there, is that
cor,rec.t, to irritate and agitate this revolt?
Dr. Pauico. That is correct.
Mr. iBonin. And by thait means using the Commurnst
tecfunique to wipe out the ,people that were undesiralble to
them?
Dr. Pauco. Yes
Mr. !Bonin. Of coU1I1Se, iwe lhruve had testimony where thait
same identicaJl truing was used in- other countries that have
come under the domi'Il'ation of the Russians throughout different parts of Ea;sitern EuTope, lbut this is <the fhist time,
I beli'e!V'e, that we had testimony that they were aotually
dvopped in by pamchute to iITitate and agitaite rund crnate
the trouble.
Dr. Pauc·o. Yes.
Mr. Bonin. But, in the meantime, they !had some agitators in there already; iis tlhat correct?
Dr. Pauico. Oh, yes.
Mr. Bonin. And they had le:6twingers ,i n there?
iDr. Pallico. Yes.
iMr. !Bonin. Who were ready to follow the agents tha:t
were dTopped in?
Dr. PauJco. Yes.
Mir. !Bonin. In other words, isome people in the United
States fool that there are not many Communistls, lb ut they
are aliways :ready, willing w:hen the o.p portune time cOllnes,
to seize that opportunity to overthrow the existing governmenrt: in any partioular place .
Dr. Pauco. Thait's wue.
Mr. Bondn. Now, of course, since you have lbeen in the
1
SLOVAKIA
37
United States, you have been trying to. bring to the attention
of the people of the free world this Commwnist threat; is
that correct?
Dr. P,a uco. Yes, that is oorredt.
Mrr. Bonin. And in each instance where you haive an opportUillity, and I understand that you are still a newspaperman and a joornalist, you bring these facts to .t he attention of the people that Tead your newspaper, the Je<lnota?
Dr. fuuco. Yes, that's correct
Mr. Boniin. This isn't tJhe fiiirst part, of Eastern Europe
that we have heard of where forty to f,i fty thousand people
have boon slaughtered.; O'Ilce a;gain demonstrating that the
Communist regime holds power only because 1t UJSeS force
and threats and intimidation to keep the people ias helpless
as they possibly can.
Dr. Paiu100. That is correct.
Mr. Bonin. WeH, on behalf of the committee.. I 'Wish to
thank yow for your splendid staJte:rnent tlhat you haive made
as a part of thii:s ree-0,r d and for the reswme orf yo'lllI' experiences in Ozecho-Siovakia and in .Slov•a kia.
Dr. Pauco. Thank you.
Mr. Boiruin. Mr. Feighan has another question 'h e would
like to as!k you, Mr. Pauco.
Mr. Fei,ghan. Do you not feel that it is correct, Mr.
Pautco, that the people of 1Slo;v;akia are imbued with the nationali-stic -spirit, a love of God and a love of colUllltry, and
they just seek the right of self-deteTmination as ~ sovereign
nation?
- Dr. Pauco. That is co,r rect, Slir.
Mr Bonin. In other words, they are asking nothing
more than some of the principles: that have been em.mcia:ted
through long yea.rs, that each people have the right to de- ·
termine the kmd o.f government they wish to have, the type
of leaders they wish to have, and to conooct their Lives and
thei,r g01Vernment in theiT own nationialistic spirit and attitude. The people orf R!Umania, Hung,a ry, Po•land, Lithuania,
Latvia, EJSltooila, ruid o:their nations ha,v e the same desire to
goveTn themselves; is that correct.
Dr. Pauico. Yes; iliat iis correct.
MT. Bomn. Welil., I 'Wliish to thank you ,v ery much for
your testimony, and we sincerely hope thait the opportunity
1
SLOVAKIA
38
presents itself to defeat thls Communist threat, not only to
the Ewopean natio111S., burt: also to the peoples of the free
world. Thank you ve,r y much.
Dr. P,aulco. Thank you.
Mr. Feiighan. Waiit a minute, Mr. Pauco·.
Dr. Pauco. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. During your experience in Slova>lcia, did
you haive an opportunity to witness the manner by which
the Russian Commlln!isbs tried to break up the culture, the
1,anguage, the customs, and the religion of the Slovak people?
Dr. Pauco. I lived in Bratislava. Bvatislava is the capital
of Sllo;v,rukdoa, and is on fille west border of Slovrukia. The Soviets came from the east. The whole of Slov-akJa was occupied on April 7 or 8, ,a nd I escaped from Bratis lav,a on
April 4.
Mr. Feighan. I see.
Dr. Paulco. I wasn't there after the Soviets occupied the
whole of Slov.alk,i a, ·b ut I was in Braitiosla:va during three
months thait the eastern part of Sl()!Va:kia was occupied by
the !Soviets, and I heard from my relatives, from my f11iends ,
of the methods which I mentioned before.
Mr. !Feighan. Yes; but you were noi there yourself t o
see it and observe .iit?
Dr. Pmrco. No, no.
Mr. Feigihan. Well thank you, Mr. Pauco
Or. Paulco. You are wekome.
Mr. Bonin. Thank you <very much.
(Wil'kes-,Barre, Pa. , September 30, 1954).
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JOSEPH l\1IKULA
IMr. iMcTigue. Were you in Sl'OVlaJkia during World War
Dr. Miku1a. Yes, I was.
Mr. iMcTigue. Were you a pairt of the underground
movemerut in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikul,a. Yes, sir. We started the underground movement at the end of World War II. I was one of those who
started it.
iMr. Mc'Digue. When did it start ?
Dr. Mi1kula. It was in 1944.
tr?
SLOVAKIA
39
:Mir. McTigue. What caused you amd others to form this
underground moivement?
Dr. Mikula. I will read a short statement in this connection. The inception of the anti-Communist arganirlation
is attrilbutafule to the iintellectuals wlho foresaw the necessity
of truking preventive measures aga,inst the imminent d001ger
of communism. They studied communism and decided to
combat it, ~cause tlhey had no false illusions of whether or
not the Communists wOIU!ld Telax their demands after World
War II.
The first communistic pressur~ was expected in the
field of religion. Conseqiue.ntly, the preparations were directed for the defense of re!l,i gious freed.om and the preservation of religious life in the event of intensive persecutions.
The second fi.eld was the po[iltical field. Ourr ca1cuJations
at the !beginning w&e wrong. They didn't staTt at the beginning in religiious _peil'Sooution, but it:Jhey concentrated an theliir
activities in the political field.
Mr. Kersten. Have you finished with your s1:Jatement?
Dir. Mikul,a. No; very briefly about this polii!tical field.
The most essential elements in tlhe polritical life of the nation
are political parties. The Communists knew it, and acted accordingly. They were verry cautious. that no par.ty existed
which by attracting the sympathy of a majority of the _population wouild endanger t'he position of the Commumst Party.
So, the parties which airose after the war with the petrmisSlion of the Communusts were incapable of eiffecting
strong anti-Communist oipposition, because, first, theiy had
no roots, no tradition, a;mong the population.
Second, part of their leadeffi, were either tools of Communists ior opportunists who, /because of l,a ck of principles
and courage, completely sulbmitted to the Communist pressure, and third, throug;h the assistance of the ColIIlm.unist
Party, they were s'h ackJed - aM other parties were shackled
by the coordinating comrruttee of all the parrties, the socalled National Front. This Nationa'l Front was nothing else
but a machine in the ih ands of the Communists to control
aU o,pposiition against the Communist Party.
Mr. Mc'l'igue. Were you the recognized leader of the un-
40
SLOVAKIA
derground in Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula I woll!ldn't say so.
Mr McTig;ue. Were you one of ,t he leaders?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. !Did you ar.ronge to have some of your
members sent abroad in order to assist in the underground
movement from without ?
Dr. Mtkula. I thin:k I can state it quite openly. Our program was to prepa1re things, firs,t, at home, and, second, we
had some people out aibroad. I mean, out of ,the count.Ty. We
,s end them out of the country ,a nd directed the situ.aitiion,
informed them, they ind'ormed us. The illlformatiion we receirved we direoted to ,proper aut'horitie;,
iMr. Keirsiten. Now, just at this ipoint - we want to
ma:ke sure that you understand ,p erfectly clearly, Mr. Mikula. We know, of course, that you did operate in the underground in Slovakia, and there are undou!btedly a number of things that you would not wish to spea;k a.'bout specifiicaHy and openly. 1S0 that any question the oounseil or
any member here might ask in that regard, you just use
yom own judgment. We don':t want you to disclose pU!blicly
anything t hat would in any way endanger the ipresent situation there, a:nd that is what you 'ha,,ve in mind, Mr. Counsel, I am sure.
Mr McTigue. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. [Mikula. Yes. I 'Wl3.'Ilted to ask yo u for this permission.
Mr. Mc'Tugue. How long were you a part of the undergroU1I1d in Slovakia.?
Dr. Miikwla. I was wor,king directly in the field almost
fiiive years to the. end ,o f 1'949. 1Iin Feb:rua.ry 11950 I left for
the United States.
·Mr. McTigue. And did you emigrate to the Uniited
States in 1950?
Dr. Milkula. Yes, I did.
Mr. McTigue. Now, when you left 1S1ova.ki.a in 1949, were
you furced to !leave your wife b e hind'(
Dr. Mikula. No, I was one of tho se who was sent
abroad when the Communists took over and legia.l opposition
was ailimost iimpossilble in ,the country. So, I went out from
Slova:kfa in 1945, and I was wonk,i ng outside of Sfoviakia.. I
was worlcing abroad. I have here a little bo~ldet edited by
1
1
41
SLOVAKIA
the Ministry of l!nterior in .Prague; the head of the Ministry
of Interior was a well-iknown Oommunist •o y the name of Nosek. It was edited and published by the Ministry of Interior, 5,000 issues were distrilbuted over here. My name is
mentioned aJbout 70 or 80 times in this booklet.
Mr. Kersten. Just .so we get th•a t clearly, as I understand it, you ~eift Sloivaikia in 1945.
Dr. Mikuia. Yes, I did.
Mr. Kersten. And you were outside the country?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. !But while you were outside the coll!Ilitry
during the fullowmg yerurs up 'll'Iltil -about 1949 or 1950, you
were woriking in t'hiis movement, is that correct?
Mr. '.Mhlm~ia. I was in steady contact, and I was one of
the leaders outside.
MT. Kersten. Of the lllillderground freedom m01vement in
Slova,kiia?
Dr. Mii kula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And this :book ,t hat you have ha,nded us
here is a booldet put out by the Communists in Bratislava?
Dr. Miikula. 1:rl ·P rague. The Ministry of InteriOT, Czecho-Slovakia.
Mr. [Kersten. Maylbe we 1had better mark this.
Dr. Milrula. The title of .the book is "Conspiracy Agaiinst
the Repl]blic."
iMT•. Kersten. Would you mark thi<s "Milwaukee Exhibit 4."
And you have stated rthat this Milwaukee Exhibit 4 is a
Communist ,pubH1cation ipulblished in what year?
Dr. Miiktl'l.a:. ffit was printed Noivemlber 1947.
Mr. Kersten. And it contains rtJhe accounts of operations
2.gainst the Communist g01Vernmen t; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. And you are named in here, as you say,
70 or 80 times?
[)r. Mii:ku1 a !Something liike that.
Mr. Kersten. In rw1hat crupacity?
Dr. Miikuila. Someitiiimes as ibhe leadeT of the underground, sometimes as an American agenrt, sometimes
Mr. Kerstein. Always in a derogatory sense?
Dr. M~kuJ1a. Absolutely.
1
1
1
42
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Kersten. I notice on 1:Jhe first page of the printing
here - one of the first rpages - it is aotually page 7,, but it
seems to be the start "Of the body of t'he article - I notice
a name - Joseph rMi!kufa. Is that you?
Dr. Mikula. That i:s me.
Mr. Kersten. Then you are named frequently therearfter;
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
is t:Jhiat rig1ht?
Mr. Kersten. Proceed, Mr. Coltl7lsel.
Mr. McTigue. I w,ant to •ask you two questions. Dr. Mikula. Wi'fil you briefly tell uis something about the ac'tiivities
of the ll!Ilderground, and secondly, were these actiivities effectiive, in y;our j,udg,menit?
Mr. iKersten. Keeping in mind tJhe safety maitters that
we tahlced albout.
Dr. Miikua,a. As I mentioned before, the legaiJ. resistance
or Jega!l oppositilion againJSt communism was foiling. So, the
people 1wirt:Jh ra nti-Oommunist tendencies lost faith m their
weaik and oppo:rbuni,stic party leaders, and consequently,
sought -0ther mea.lilS wiherelby they might prevenit the Communists from ·aocompl:iishing their ,plans.
Now, the diTect answer to your question, "Wihat were
the actiivities ?" Fiirst, to do e,verythiing that would undermine the Coimmu!nist IP .arty, and the ends of tfue Oommunist
Party. We knew that they will try to Sovietize, to taike over
the counwy.
So, we rpuibliiished leaflets. We published booklets. We
pu'b1is,ihed pe;riodiools. IDverytilimg was hllegal and underground. That w.as at 'the b~imling. Laiter on, when it wiIB
pretty hrurd to distrilbute mimeographed leaflets or publications - because they were against the Communists - we
started an illegal triansimi-titer - a shortwaive radio station.
It is not necessairy to teH where and how it was, but it
existed and rit worked very effectively. Then, later on, we
tried to collect all possible rnformaitiorn from political, economical, military, oullJtu,r,a-1 life; get it out and mfomi the
worild 1aJbout the si•tUJatiion over there.
JUJst to show you how it was done, here are some photostatic copies of the orders issued by the commander in
ohlef of the nati'Onal security guard. It was a gend:armery
police.
SLOVAKIA
43
Mr. McTigue. Communis t police?
Dr. Milrula. CommUIIlist, yes.
Mr. McTiguei. What did the ·o rder say?
Dr. Mikula. They are different o:rders. For example, I
will just ~ k of the first one. lt i,s dated Bratislava, March
4, 1947, firom the head{l_uall'lters of Nationail !S ecurity Guiard.
The orders to the lower units of National Security Guards :
il order that ,s pecial attention be paid to tJhe transports
of Volhyi.ruia Ozechs cOIInli.ng from tihe U. S. S. R. - thait is
the Soviet Union - they have already settled on the territory of Slovrukia. They have to lbe constantly watched arid
fO!Nowed, because they are spreadling internationr uUy false
infurmation a:bOUJt iour eastern ally, the U. S. S. R.
Mr. !McTigue. Wha:t people is he talking rubout in tlhis
order?
Dr. !M.ikiula. One of the tactics of Commt.Lll!ist takeover
was tramsplanta tion; movements of the people. Right after
t'he war we had a HUJngarian minority in 1Slcwakia and a SlovaJki,a n minoniity in iH ungary. Now , right aft.er the war
started the transportru tion orf these minorities frQiffi HUI11gary
to Slovwkia, a,:nd from 1S1ova!kfa. to Hungary.
What happened to Slovakia? From H1.1!11.g,acy came the
people who couldn't sipealk any word of Sloviak. To Hungacy
came people from Slova:kiia.
There were Ozeohs iwho Hived about 200 or 300 years in
one province of [Russia calllled Vo1hynia. Just to show good
faith tor something like bha.t, the Sowet moved those Volhynia: Czechs to Ozeciho-Slovaikia.
'Dhe movements of the population are very serious
thinigs, because they !bring insecurity. Noibody knows how
long he stays in his ()IWll house., in his 01W11 neighlborllood, and
so insecure people are aliways much easier for the CommUilasts to handle.
Mr. McTigue. That is the grnup to whiioh he has reference in the order?
Dr. Mikula. That is tihe explanation . So further:
Specifically , I ask the units of Nationa,] Soourity Guard
to watch the tI"ansports corning in and the transient transports orf V oohyniia Czec:hs going through the railroad station.
44
SLOVAKIA
Those Czechs wouldn't come !into any contact with the
public. I mea.n witJh the popu1ati10n. Then you hiwe here the
order to maintain ~ continuous oontro1l on ail calls in post
offices and telephone-Office excihanges. This was done by
the ipol!ice. They ccmtr.ol all calls ·c oming in and W:hait was
said. If they find something against the regime they wt
accorcmng to regufations.
Thls here is concerning the control of the pop.wlation in
traiins. Everyone - they sa,y here, "Everyone is Slllpposed to
have this ridentificaitioo. card1." So, the units of SiNB - lower
units - are ordered lh:ere to control the population, and if
somebody hasn't his idenitificatlion card, he ris supposed to
be arrested am.cl brougiht ilil for investigation to the nearest
police station.
This order ooncerns the former gendarmes orr mem!bers
of the National Security Guard poiice who were deported to
Russia, were coniiined there, and later on brought 1b ack to
Slovakia. Same of them were put in the!ir fonner positions.
They were ·agaiin rcinsitated a:s gendarmes, but the order says:
To the Ministry ()If Interior came the information t:Jhat
the behavior ()If these returned former memlbers of gendarme is not satisfactory. They taJlk very sharply against
the !S oviets iand are doring that even in the company of the
other members of the unit.
I order you to follow those memlbers in your d±sbr.icits
and remind them that for bad talk aibout the brother nation, Russia, they can be ,p unished and arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Now, what you haNe been de.scmbing to
the oommittee . . .
Dr. Mikll!la. These •a re just the examples of how information was oolle_c ted and brought out and utilized.
Mr. McTigue. Now, do you know, or oan you tell the
oommittee whether there is an wnderground operating in
SwvaJkia ,a t the present time?
Dr. Miilmla. l am posritive there is. First, I would just
say from the general point of vtl.ew, so long as the Comm'Ulilists are unaJble to change human nait'UT'e, there wiU [be the
will. to 1be free. It means there will be the will to rresist. That
is a general rea:son
SLOVAKIA
45
Second, the best proof ,i s that you still read in the papers how much troulble they haJVe in .t his or that group or
with this group, and so on. These are the 1best documents
that the :resistance is not only aJlii.ve, but is acti1Ve.
Mr. iMcTigue. Do you fool thaJt the underground is the
heart of the resistance, the core of the resisltance, in Slovaki,a today?
Dr. Mhlrul'a. I would say so. I would dare say that albout
80 or 90 per cent of the population is anti-Communist, but
not aU of these 80 o:r 90 per cent are willing to ta!ke am.
acti:ve part to fight oommundsm.
Mr. iMcrrigiue. Why?
Dr. (Mlikula. Because of the advances of oommumsm
they are very cautious ito. d:o nothing which could provoke or
cailll for Communist reprisals This is one reason.
!Second, urSU1ally the people WOII'king activei1y and directly are, in my opinion, heroes, and not everyone cam. be a
hero. So, from thds group, from this 80 per cent, we can sruy
whaJt is in tlhe underground is the most ii.miporllant and most
vaJLuiaJble co,re of passive and ,a ctive resistam.ce.
Mr. McTigue. You were in Slov,rukia at the time of the
Communist taikeover; is that correct?
Dr. Mikula. Yes.
Mr. IMc'Digue. Were there wholesaile arrests and deportations in Slovakia. as there were in the other C-Ollll!tries?
Dr. Milkllll,a. Slovakia. is a small counrtry of 31bou,t 3½
million poipuilation. So the figures. are not so enormous, but
in relatio1I1, in proportion to ,t he whole popll'laition, they are
pretty big They deported in :t'he fi.rst month aifteir the occupa1tion of Slovakia rubout 38,000 people.
Besides this, in tlhe !first half year, when they took over,
aibout 133,000 people were put in ja,i1s, in camps, amd taken
out of theiir normal life.
Mr.' Mcrrigue. [ ha;ve M further questions.
Mir. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
.
Mr. Be1I1tley. When did you leave Slovakia?
Dr. Mikula. I lefit Slovalci.a in 1945.
Mr. Bentley. That was just the beginni.DJg of the antiCornmi.mist resistance then,, I presume.
Dr. Mitkula. Yes.
46
SLOVAKIA
Mir. Bentley. ilfaJVe you mamta.ined contacits, or how
have yiou gotten yml'I' worrunaJtion regarding the activities
of the underground since that time?
Dr. MikU!la. As I Wld you, we haJVe steady contact
through couriers. I wi!ll j!U'st mention one thing: In 1945
our coUJriers hrougiht over my wife with two little children.
Mr. Chai:run:an rememJbers those l.ititle children. One w:as four
and one was ,s ix.
Mr. Bentley. How l01ng was co111tact of this kind maintained?
Dr. Miikulia. ,J t.hinik that contac.t is stiH mamtarlned, but
I could rta1k 3111d testify ,t o the end of 1'949.
Mr. Bentley. Until the end of 1949, which was a,bout
two years after the coup d'etat in Pra,gue?
Dr. Milrula. Yes.
!Mr. Bentley. And srunce .that time, your ilmowledge has
been 01JJ.ly fTom information, not direct; rum I correct?
Dr. Miku]a. lit is secondary. Before I reccived mormatron diirecil,y. I was ll'S'lllally the first who received it. Now I
a'In receiving informia,tion, but later.
Mr. Bentley. How dloes the situation in Slovakia compare wi;th that of otfuer countries in the Soviet satellite,
would YOIU say? Iis it -b etter or worae?
DT. MikU!la. I thiinlk .t he condifti,ons a;re generaHy the
same in all the coU!Iltries. As for the resistance, maybe in
S'lovakira, the resistance is a little bit stronger and maybe a
little bit more success:fluil, 1becall!se, as you iknow, Slovakia is
a country orf farnners, a country of mountainee:ris, ·a nd the
people i1I1: Slovaiki'a are deeply reliigtlous. T.he hardest thing
for the Communists to break ~re the farmers and /besides
that, to remove Teligion from the sow of the rpeoiple and
rep}ace it by Leninism is not so easy. You know .t hat.
Mr. Bentley. So you would say that the cond!itiOIIl!S are
about the same, but -the resistance itJhere is a little bit
·stronger?
Dr. Mikula. Yes. The same. The same concentration
camps, liaJbor orumps, the same tendency to create Kollkhozes
and co[lectiive farms, the same tendency to brealk any possible resistance, and if there dsn't any hope, arrest the peo-
SLOVAKIA
47
ple, seind them ,t o uranii.ium mines; tJhe same everywhere,
the same procedure.
Mr. Bentley. Am ,I correct in believing that part of Slovakiia has been incorporiated in the 'Soviet Union?
Dr. Mi:kula. A very small eastern part. Abowt 15 or 18
villages of S1ova1-da were inconporated inito the Soviet Ull!ion.
Mr. Bentley. '.Dhe fiact that this resi,s tance dioes exist or
does not exist in 'SlrovaJkia to the extent you say it does,
what, in your opinio!Il, can lbe done most effectiively to eniruble
this resistance to continue ,and maintain itself. Whrut encouragement or assistrunce can be givan, if any?
Dr. 1M:iikuil.a. I would state .it in ·one way: To increase
the hopes of ipeople lh'ling over there that soonetime there
will be a cha1I1ge.
iMr. Bentley. We ,a:re ta:lking specificailly of SLovaik:i!a.
Dr. M:ikula. Spooiffioa.My, for 1Slovakia, it is absolutely
necessary to reassure a;gaiin and again those people tlhat we
are not forgetting them, we are not •giviing them up, and we
have unde.rstaind!i!Il!g for their specific prolblems.
Mr. Bentley. Including the right 'O'f self-determination?
Dr. iMitkullia. '.Dhia.t is w!hat I walllted to say. We should
not stick to the owtmoded, ourtlived st'I'luctures. '.Dhey have
proved to be un:successfol, and rwe should give to the people
the right to be free and to have therr OIWIIl: government, ·a ccording to their own c1hooce. That is one o.f the most important t'hd.ngs. Then th'i<s po<l.tnt: The people are, I wou!l.d say, 90
per cent 'llillited in Slovalk:ta. .Anyrt;hin,g whioh .poi.nrt:s o.wt thait
we are forgetting them, rwe are not undersibanding them, is
cutting otff the will to resist.
iMr. Bentley. Thank you very much. Thiat i'S a:11, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Kersten. Congressman Feighan?
MT. Feighan. Dr. 'Mikula, as I understand it, you feel
thrut the people of 1SIOV1akia should be ,giiven assurances that
the free ,w orld would sirnpport their desire for seiltf national
determiniation of thei:r own identity as a nation if they so
desiire?
·
Dr. Miikula. Wihen you are talking generally albout the
popu1ation of Slovakia, that is one of the most important
48
SLOVAKIA
things that they need; some kind of good will that we have
a.!11 understanding oif thei'l' problem.
MT. Feighan. Then if ,w e ,w ould tell the whole world that
we stand by the principle upon which our Naition was founded, thiat is, the ri!ght of self-determi:ri:ati-cm, that would be
he'l!pful to them. 'In other words, Mr. Mikula, if the free
w0irld shO'Uld gi,ve the Communists a free hand !in t!hese
caiptiive nations,, this would cause those people to lose hope,
ilS that right?
Dr. iM:ikuil:a. Absolutely. One of the most •i mportant
things is to show those people :tlhait we are really l!Iliform.etl
a'boUJt their plight, a.Jbout tlhe conditions under ,w hich they
are 11ivimg, that rwe hacve actually access to the most secret
communistic conspiracies. 'We shouJ.d convey t:his knowledge
to the masses. That is one of the moot imlportant th,i ngs.
Mr. Kersten. Does thrat hellp to sha:ke and lessen the
Communist ipawer in 'Uhose countries?
Dr. iMikul1a. It is •curttin.g off the arrogamt communistic
se!lf-corufiderice, amd when we ta.Jke such a cut through the
Communist Party, we see there are just a few intellectuals,
a group of fanatics, and a great nuim ber of opportunists.
The greatest ipart of them a.Te oppoiitun:ists. Activities must
be directed against those opportunists, because they are
afmid. They betrayed, first, second, thoird time. They a.re
readty to betray todlay and every day.
Mr. Kersten. ~irst o;f iaU, let me ask you this: YO!U have
gone to Detroit from iMHrwaUJkee?
Dr. M~kula. Yes. MHiwaiUJkee is my ,h ome.
Mr. Ker,s ten. You li:ved 1here several years and ~eft for
Detroit a short whlle ago wlhere you now live and :work
Dr. MikuiJ.a. Yes.
with your family?
Mr. Kersten. Dr. MikU'la, you iha,ve given us a great deal
of valuable inlfoirmation, rparticula:rly the knowledge that
I know you ha'V'e, of the existence of the undeiig,round in
Slocvakii a, resi,s tance, opposition, which our evidence indicates exists in all the other cOUIIltries likewise to a very
great extent.
!Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Dr. ~u!la, for yOUT aippear~Milwaukee, Wis., October 22, 1954).
ance here today. 1
SLOVAKIA
49
FROM THE TESTIMONY OF PHILIP A. HROBAK
Mir. Kersten. I want to say we are rvery honored and
happy to haive you here with us, Mr. Hrobak, as the president of the Slovak League of America.
:Mr. Hrobak. And tihe editor of the Jednota, the official organ of the First Catholic SlovaJk Union of the United
States and Canada.
·
Mr. Kersten. I notice through several years of knowledge of your activities that you have keen understa:ndmg
of whaJt it means for a nation or a country or a people
to be occupied lby the Communists and some of the ways
in whioh they fight and some of the thinigs that we should
do to combat this new kind of enemy.
Mr. iMcTigue. How many memlb:ers, Mr. Hro'bak, are
a:ssociated or affiliated with the Slo:vak League of
America?
Mr. Hroba:k. The SloviaJk League .o f America, rubout
300,000.
!Mr. Mo'Dig,ue. What, ibriefly, is the Slovak League of
.America?
Mr. Hrobaik. The pur:poses?
Mr. McTigue. Yes.
1Mr. HTdbak. A cirvic and culturial origarnzation of
Americans of Slov,a;k descent. It was organized in Oleveland in 1907.
'Mr. Mc'lligue. It is mry understanding, MT. Chaimnan,
that !Mr. HrdbaJk has a statement which he wiSlhes to present to the committee, and if there is no objection, may I
sugigest that the witness be permitted to proceed wiith
the statement?
· Mr. Kersten. Without objection, it is so ordered.
!Mr. Hrdbalk. If you permit me, I would like to first
express my deep appreciation to this committee for the
opportunity given me to present the Slovruk chaipter in the
dread detail of Communist aggression.
I believe it is for the first time, at least as far as I
know, that ,a real, honest effort is :being miade to know
the background olf the many peoples behind the Iron Curtain, nations who always were and still are our friends,
50
SLOVAKIA
peoiples who with all their hearts want to be our friends
because to them America has always lbee:n a living symbol
of freedom and independence, and now is just aJbout their
last hope of sa1vation from Red tyranny. I harve the greatest respect for the hono-raJble gentlemen on this committee
and its chairman, Charles Kersten. The coonmittee has a
difficult taslk, b,ut it is doing that task admiraJbliy well.
Helping the nations behind the Ixon Curtain to helrp
liberate themselves from the curse of communism cannot
and must not become ipOlitically a partisan a:flf1air. It is the
business, the duty, of every American to take part in it;
every Almerican must see it in that perspectirve, because
it is, after all, in the interest of the security of our own
America.
I would li!ke to e~press one point ,b efore I read my
statement, and that is that the SlovaJks have no quarreJ
with the Czech nation as such. The Czech nation today is
in the same Red fix as the SlovaJk nation.
The Sfovak•s, however, cannot remain silent about
Czech .p olitical leaders who were in a very large measure
responsible for the present terrilble plight of the Ozech and
Slovak nations over there, and who made it possilble foc
the Communists to seize power in Czecho-Slova!kia practically without any troUJble.
("How the Communists Seized Power in SlovaJkia" the statement by P. A. Hrobaik, president of the Slovak
League of America and Editor of the "J ednota," official
011gan of the First CathoHc Slorvak Union, •b efore the Kersten Committee on Communist Aggr(}SSion, in the County
Court House, Milwaukee, Wis., Friday afternoon, October 22, 1954 - was .pulblished in full in the iprevious issue
[Septemlber.,Decemlber 19541 of SLOVAKIA and, hence,, is
not repeated here.)
Mr. iMcTi,gue. 1I take it from your statement, Mrr. Hrobaik, that you consider the National Socialistic Party of
Czecho-,Slovalda a:s the one which was responsible for the
sellout to Moscow; is that correct?
Mr. HrrobaJk. I do, sir.
Mr. McTigue. Do you consider that the case of Czecho1
SLOVAKIA
51
Slovakia is a practical or typical example of what happens to a nation that attemipts to coo,peirate or coexist with
Communists?
Mr. Hroba:k. Definitely.
Mr. McTigue. What do you think of the present Kremlin campaign to sell the nati0'11s of the free world on peaceful coexistence?
Mr. Hrohak. That is the Kremilin's way of trying to
lull us to sleep; forget our problems, our troubles; forget
what communism is, and just let them get strong enough
until they can take all of us.
Mr. McTigue. In your opinion, what do you think we
can do to keeip the ho,pes of the people of Slovakia alive?
How can we most help them at a time like this?
Mr. Hrolba!k. We must let them know that we a;re behind them; that we have not forgotten them; that .Americans stiH believe in the principles uip on which their country was founded, in the principle of freedom and independence ; and let them know that we shall do everything
to help them he1p themselves to overthrow the regime
they have.
~fir. McTigue. You agree with Mr. Mikula, who testified
here earlier today, that the resistance is still strong among
the ,people of SlovaJkia?
Mr. Hrabaik. It certainly is. We have had cootact with
the people directly and indirectly right through the war,
and we still get letters from people, who come from Slovakia today.
Mr. McT-fgue. You are able to maintain an effective
system of communicati10n with the Slovakian people with
what is going on over there today; is that correct?
Mr. Hrobalk. indirectly. Certain people get the info;rmation from persons in Sl>ova~ia and then we get it.
Mr. Kersten. Mr. Bentley?
Mr. Bentley. Mr. HrobaJk, I want to go 1b aclt a little
bit before the period of Communist domanation of Slovakia
and look at the situation there !b:rfofly during the Second
World War. When SlO'V'aJkia was an independent reipulblic,
what exactly was the relationship at that time between
Slovakia and Germany?
52
SLOVAKIA
Mr. HrOlbalk. Foveign policy was undoulbtedlly dictaited
by Germmy, /but the domestic policy was not, until the uprising of 1944, when the German Aiimy came in to occupy
Sloval~ia. Then bhe Slova.ks were in for it.
Mr. Bentley. -Would you say that the fad, for example,
that Slovalkia had troops on the Russian f.vont was a voluntary action or wa:s that dd.otated b:y Genmany?
Mr. Hvdbalk. I think it was both. I think th13Jt the Germans expected it, and the Slovaks, to make it aippear that
they aire really taking the business seriously, s.e nt a token
division there. The Slovaks had a way of exchanging men
by classes; they never had many men in the field.
Mr. Bentley. Did -Slov:akia take any action toward the
UTrited States at the time or shortlly after Pearl Harbor
when the Germans declared war?
Mr. Hrobaac. No; we tried to ascertain thait business.
We found out that some ,p erson, I believe it was the German radlio in Vienrna, d'id ma.Ike a statement that Slovakia
declared warr, but as far as- we could find out from our
own State Department and War Department, there is absolUJtely no formal declaration of war aga:inst the United
States.
iMr. Bentley. Never was at any time?
Mr. Hlrolbruk. Never was at any time. We couldn't find
that out from our own United States Goveirnment because
that point interested us rvery much, and so far there is
absolutely no record of it.
Mr. Bentley. Now, you say there was a distinction between the foreign policy of the Slov,a k Repulbl:ic which was
exercised and the domesti'c .poHicy. You mean -t he domestic
policy of the Slovak Repulblic was independent of Gennany?
Mr. HrobaJk. Yes; just about all independent; I mean,
running the country of Slovakia itself.
Mr. Bentley. Was there any form of oppression at
thait time?
Mr. Hrobaik. There was no oppression of religion or any
other thing. Some laiws. were enacted that ha;d to coincide
with some of the laiws that · the Germans had, but oUJtside
of that, the economic conditions - even Mr. Sr0ib31r, one of
SLOVAKIA
53
the most intimate foiends of Benes had to admit after the
wax, were good.
Mr. Kersten. You say there was no oppression. There
was freedom of religion and the other political freedoms
that you normally would expect?
Mr. HrOlb.ak. None. Some claim that there was ,political swppression in Sl01Va!kia, but they don't explain the
problem correctly. The fact is that the ISlovaik parties, the
two only genuine !Slovak parties, are the Hlinka People's
Barty sometimes called the Catholic Party, and the Razus
Slwalk National Party, whi·c h was considered the Lutheran
Parby. Now these worked for the same program with one
accoro.
Mr. Bent-ley. Following the wprising of August 1944,
when the German mHitary came in to ,p ut it down, from
that time Slovakia lost its. independence?
Mr. Hrrolbak Yes. The Slovaks got it from both sides.
They were murdered by the occupation troops a.ind then by
the partisans on the other end.
Mr. Bentley. After the German military occupation
did the Tiso government continue in po,w er?
Mr. HrdbaJk. They continued. in ,power until 1945. Tiso
tried to explain away as best he coui'd that it was not a
national uprising; that the Slovruk Army and the Slovak
gendarmerie couild ta.Ike care olf the troubles in Slova:kia
themselves. The Germans firral,l y did not believe the Slovaks rufter General Otto's military mission was stopped at
Turciansky :S vaty Martin. I believe it was on August 25;
the group of aJbout 25 or 30 people, women and children
included, were taken off the train and put up in barracks
for the night. The neoct morning ~l were lined up against
a wall and mowed down with machine guns by the prurtisans.
Then there were other murders, sabotage, terrorrist
activities, which all came too soon, even for Benes's liberation movement which he had allegedly organized. The
leader of that movement was supposed to be General Golian. The uiprising was Communist-in spired and did not
have popular support.
54
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Bentley. The Rm!ssian military OCCUipation of Slovalkia took place about when?
Mr. HrQbak. Albout Easter Sunday, 1945.
Mr. Bentley. And at that time the Slovak Government escaped to Germany?
Mr. Hlrobak. The Slovak Government went to Austria.
Mr. Bentley. And I believe they were finally captured
with the American troops?
Mr. Hrobak They were not captured. They surrendered to General Walker's army at that time. We had a
copy of the surrender papers and we gave it to, our State
Department, and, of course, the Army Department.
Mr. Bentley. And what happened to the members of
the Slovak Goivernment?
Mr. Hrohak. Well, unfortunately, even despite all our
effovts in America to preivent their being handed over to
Benes and his governrrnent in London, unfortunately, I
say, our pleas availed us nothing, and Tiso's Slovak Government was gi'Ven up to Benes and the Benes.Gottwald
coalition government. Tiso, after being tried by a "people's" court, was hanged on April 18, 1947, while members of the Slovak Govenunent were sentenced to prison.
Mr. Bentley. They were tried as war criminals?
Mr. Hrabaik. Yes, "war criminals," according to Prague.
Mr. Bentley. What is the sit'lllation in Slovakia today
under the Commrunist government of Prague? Is there any
form of committee for Slo;vaikia or is there a completely
unified government?
Mr. Hrobaik. Prague is still trying to tell us that the
Slovaiks themselves govern the.ir part of the state and the
Czechs govern their part, and so on, but that is not true.
The Czech Red centralized government in Prague is running the whole show. Even Slovak Communists are not
safe; Clementis is gone, so are others, and the secretary
general of the Slovak Communist Party is Karel Bacilek,
a Czech.
Mr. Bentley. You say the Communists are trying to
appeal to Slovak nationa1ism somewhat?
Mr. Hrobak. They did. Today it doesn't mean any-
SLOVAKIA
55
thing. They are done for. In fact, 1S lovak Reds were for
separation in 1926, long ibefore Hlinka's pa,r ty.
Mr. Bentley. Who?
Mr. Hrdba.lk. The Communists. It is a matter of record.
They knew what the people wanted. They figtN"ed that there
are no people in any country who, do not desire to be free
and independent and they used that to gain their SUipport.
Hlinka's Party fought for autonomy; in the beginning, you
know, it wanted to haive a federation where SlovaJk,i a would
simply have states' rights.
The fight was simply for states' rights, as we understand them here in the States. The Slovaks wanted to elect
their own governor, their own judges, their school di,rectors, and so on. They were not for separatism until much
later.
Mr. Bentley. Mr. Hrobak, you were here, I imagine,
when Dr. Milkiu.la was testifying, and he said it was his belief that so far as the people of Slovakia are concerned,
what they really wanted was the right to self-determination. Do, you concur in that?
Mr. HroibaJk. That is correct.
Mr. Bentley. Thanik you ivery much. Your statement
and your testimony has contributed to the hearings, I am
sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1Mr. Kersten. Mr. Hrolbak, l
think at this time it is
quite clear from the records of recent history that the attempts of the Benes government to collaborate with and
have coexistence with the Soviet Union is a classic case
of what it means to make this attempt. I meant merely
for that government to put itsel1' in a position to be swallowed wp by the COll'Il.Illunists.
Mr. Hrobak. That is correct.
Mr. Kersten. It is a classic case in that regard.
Mr. Hrobak. Correct.
iMr. Kersten. And I believe one of the ministers of the
Benes government in London, Dr. Stransky, thought that
Mr. Hrobak Yes.
too.
Mr. Kersten. And that, along with other similar epi-
56
SLOVAKIA
sod.es, certainly proves that there is no such thing as peaceful coexistence with the Communist s.
Mr. HTolbaik. That is correct.
Mr. Ker.sten. Well, I want to than!k you. The records
show if it doesn't already that Congressm an Bentley knows
a great deal about this situation in Ea:stern Europe because
he was an American diplomat in Hungary for several
yeairs, and he knows firsthand sOime of the real maichinations of the Communist s when they truke aver a country.
Mr. Bentley. I was ailso in Slova-kia.
Mr. Kersten. I am sure he has firstha:nd knowledge
of that, too.
Mr. HrolbaJk. Mr. Chairman, -t he statement that I have
made is based not only on what we haive from Slovaks,
patriotic Slovaks, 'but it iis also based O!t1 the 'book that the
regime put out in 1946, that is by the Lettrich "Demo-.
crats" arid the Husak Communist s; the name of it is
"Natl Tatrou sa Blyska" - (Lightning over the Tatras).
The booik has contr~butio ns from both sides, MT. Lettrich's
men and the Husaik men. And, of coocse, on the book that
was already introduced, there were only 5,000 of these,
The Conspiracy .Aigainst the Republic, which was introd uced as testimony by Dr. Mikula. That is my oopy. Then
on a boolk that was published here in America by the Communists called "Parti:zani na Slovensku" - (Partisans in
Slovakia), published in Chicago. And, I believe, another
booklet called "Verni ostruli," (They Remained Faithful). This book dealt with the uprising; it was written by
Deso Benau, ,w ho was editor of the New Yonksky Dennik (The New York Daily), in 1946.
Mr. Benau wa:s editor of that paper from 1942 to 1946
and tod!ay is doing an admiraJble job for the Communist s
in BraUshwa.
In this pamphlet - I will leaNe you this copy - you
can see the organizatio ns that are affiliated with us The SlovaJk League of America -- and the me:rrubers they
have. - I might add here that our papers were outlaiwed
from Ozecho-Slovakia by the Communist s on October 10,
57
SLOVAKIA
1946 - that is this paper, the Jednota. and three other
Slova!k p8{!)ers.
Now, as you see here in this particular paper dated
Decemlber 13, 1944, we didn't wait until 1948 to tell America that Benes sold out the Czechs and Slova!ks to Stalin.
The big headline in that Decemlber 13, 1944, issue right on
the front page reads: "Sl()IVakia soJd out by Dr. Ed/ward
Benes."
Mr. Mc'Digue. What is that .pu!blication?
Mr. Hro!b.ruk. This is the Jednota, the official organ of
the First Catholic Slovak Union of the United States and
Canada.
And my statement is further ·b ased on the information contained in the booklet "The Rise and Fall of the Democratic Party in Slovakia," which was written by Constantine Cu1en, a new:spruperman from Slova;kia now residing in Canada, and ipu!blished in Slovaik by the Slovaik League
of America. I have translated it into English and the committee is welcome to it any time.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you, Mr. Hrobak.
(Milwaukee, Wis., Octo'ber 22, 1954).
1
STATEMENT BY DR. JOSEPH A. MIKUS
Fram 1944 until my escape from Soviet-dominated
Czecho-Slovakra, i:n March, 1948, I resided in Bratislava.
During this period I was three times imprisoned by the National Front Government: in 1945, 1946, and 1947. Now,
as a Slovalk refugee in the United States, I am glad to
have the opportunity of exposing to the Committee on
Communist A!ggression the tactics which, to miy own
knowledge and ibased on my personal experience, were
utilized 'b y the Communists in Slovakia to establish themselves first as a politca.-1 party and finally as a dominant
force in tha,t country.
Introduction
Before entering upon a discussion of the subject: proper, I would like to outline in general terms what has until now been the main trend in Slovakia's political history.
58
SLOVAKIA
After losing her political independe nce in the ninth
century, Slovakia existed for a thousand years under for
eign dominatio n. Desrpite this fact, the Sl01Va!k nation did
not lose its ethnograp hic and cultural individua lity. Within
the nraime~o rik of the Austro-H ungarian Empire, it was
ruble to survive all the ;pressure of the Magyar cultural
and political centralism whioh seriously menaced its very
naJtional existence in the 19th century. World War I finally
providied an opportun ity for the 1SlovaJks to rid themsel'Ves
of the restrictin g grip of this ancient and obsolete power
structure .
On May 30, 1918, at the close of World War I, the
Slovak League of America signed together with the organilzatio ns of .Amemcans of Czech descent the so-called
Pittsburg h Agreeme nt, aimed at creating a dualist federal
union of the Czechs and Slov,atk,s which a little later entered the world communi ty of nations under the name of
Ozecho-!Slio:vakia. Although provision s guarantee ing the
preservat ion of the Slovak national and po1itical individuality were, according to the principle of self-deter mination, the essential condition of this solution, the Ozech political leaders, T. G. Masaryik and E. Benes, never made
any real attempt to fulfill their pledges. Instead of a federal union providing for a reasonaib le degree of self-gover nment for the Slovaks, and in utter disregard of the political will of the Slo1V.:\k people, Prague organized a strongly
centralize d state. On !February 29, 1920, the first so-called
revolutio nary parliame nt Oif Oze:cho..JSlovakia, ~inted !by
the Prague revolutio nary governme nt, voted for the first
Czecho-lSlovak Constitut ion which suibmerge d the Slovak
national individua lity through the device of a speciousl y
conceirved "Ozecho-!Slorvaik" nation, wherein the Czechs
wouid always lbe assured of their majority status and their
predomin ance. Not being a minority group in the sense
provided for under internatio nal treaties signed after
World War I, Slovakia ·r emained without any internatio nal
protection . Contrary to the famous definition of democracy by Abraham Lincoln, the regime a:rfuitrarily established by Prague in Slo:vaJkia could be described not as
a governme nt of the people, by the people, for the
"
SLOVAKIA
69
people," 'but rather as "the g,overnment of the Ozech bureaucracy by the concept of the 'Czecho..:Slovak' nation
foisted upon the Sl01Vak people."
For 20 years SlovaJkia sought to· haive the principle
of equality between the Czechs and the Slovalks inco:r.porated into the constitution. The Slo,vak political leaders
argued that the Pittsburgh Agreement was of international relevance and that it should 'be respected by both
parties in the very interest of the joint Czecho-Slovalk
state. Prague, conrfident of the support implicit in the
Little Entente (1920), thie Mutual Defense Treaty with
France (1924), and, last but not least, the 'Dreaty of
Friendship and Mutual Aid concluded with the Soviet
Union (1935), felt strong enough to refuse any discU1ssion
on this pomt at any time.
The Munich Oonference of Septemlber 28, 1938, the
primary sig.niificance of which was the coUaipse of the
Ozecho~SlovaJk sysltem · of military a,lliances, inevitaJbly
brouight the nationality problem of the heterogeneous
Ozecho-Slovak State into the foreground. By the policy o;f
E. Benes, and in accordance with the Vienna arbitration
of Von R~bentro,p and Ciano on Novemb,er 2, 1938, SlOIVakia, lost over 10,000 square kilometers of territory to Hungary; an a·rea which included 853,000 inhabitants. This
was a national catastrophe. Ha,ving experienced this and
other deceptions,, and !being confronted in MaTch 193,9 with
the alternative of the partition of her territory among
Germany, Hung,a ry, and Poland, or of falling under direct
German administration, Slovakia voted on March 14, 1939,
thrnugh her legitimately constituted Diet in Bratislava, for
independence.
During World War II -E. Benes, who had voluntarily
resigned his oflice of President of Czecho-Slovakia, found
refuge as a ,pri'Vl8.te indilvidual in ,London. His basic goal
was to reestrublish Czecho"'Slo,valkia and, in spite of the oppositi'on. of the SlOIValk people, he was able to achieve this
goal ,b y relying essentially on the help of the Red army
and a grourp of domestic colla!borato~s. lirl the main body of
my statement I will explain the ;principal facts of this evo-
SLOVAKIA
60
lution, but I would first of all li!ke to stress one important
point :
All 'Slovaiks in the free world greatly ruppreciate the
fact that the House Committee on Oommunist Aggression
has paid particul ar attention to the tactics• which communism aipplied in Slovaikia. As a matter of fact, these tactics
were very difforenit 'from - for exMn1ple - those adopted
in the Czech area. This fine distinction - an a,rt in which
Moscow h•a s aliways been a master - resllilted from the clifference of attitude demonstrated toward the Sovieit Union
by the population of Slova:kia at the end of World Wa:r II.
As is kno,wn, during World War IT the Czech lands were a
German protectorate. At that time and until 1944, Slovaikia
was a relatively fTee state, imbued with only one desire:
To reaffirm her status as a national state after the end
of the war. Whereas the populaition of Bohemia and Moravia loolked fonwa:rd with high hO!pe to its liberation from
German domination 1by the Soviets, that of Slovakia considered the approach of the Soviet Army as a dista:ster
which would put an end to the Slovak national state.
Because of this difference in psychological attitude,
Moscow decided from the•outset on a policy of appeasement
of the Czechs and on a prog,r am designed to smash the resistance of the Slova:ks. A detailed ,plan for this program
had ibeen elalborated, with the Kremlin's blessing, by E. Benes and K. Gottwald, who as early as 1943 were in Moscow.
1
A. The Blueprint for Sovietization
After the Teheran Conference, which toolk place Novemlber 28 - December 1, 1943, it b,ecame clear that the
Soviet Union would inevitaJbly play an important role in
post-war Europe . This conference gave substantial encouragement to the hopes of the Communists and certain
pro.-Soviet non~ommunists in Slovakia. Immediately thereafter, on December 12, 1943, Dr. Edward Benes, as chief of
the Czecho-Slova:k: Government-rn-exile, signed the Treaity
of F'riends·hip, Mutual Aid and Col1ia/boration ,w ith Stalin in
Moscow. In article 4 of this treaty the two· signafories
agreed upon close political and economic cooperaition. "Talking into consideration their respective peaceful interests,"
SLOVAKIA
61
says the treaty, "the high contracting parties have decided,
after the restoration of peace, to estaiblish a close and
friendly collaboration . . ." They will develop to the maximum their economic relations and will grant each other,
after the war, all possilble economic help."
No such treaty haw.ing been signed with the United
States, Great Britain, or France, this international a:greement predetermined the orientation of Ozecho~SlovaJkia
toward Moscow in the post-iwar European scheme of politica:l relations.
The Benes-Stalin treaty served as a strong stimulus
for those who had been aspiring to political power within
the framework of Soviet influence in central Europe. In
this category were included, among others, fOTmer memJbers
of the Slova:k Communist P,arty. In the 1935 elections, this
party had gained six sea:ts of the 58 corresponding to
Slo;vaikia in the Pmgue Pa:rliament. Consequently, around
10 per cent of the total ,p opulation of the country had voted
for this party, which the Government of the Sl01Vak Republic had suppressed as a subversive group in 1938.
The non-Communist growp, smaller and weaker in its
common punpose, was composed mostly of descendants of
Czech exiles who in the seventeenth century, at the time
of the Count er Refiormation, had settled in Slovakia.
Both of these factions, equally willing to back " ... the
apocaly,ptical horse from the E}ast" (as communism was
perfervidly described lby one of the factional leaders, r..udovit Sensel ), met secretly on Christmas Day, 1943, and
created a joint r evolutionary organization under the name
of the Slovak National Council. The goal of this movement,
as estaJblished under article 2 of the respective secret document, was: " . . . to ta:ke over, at the expedient time, all
political, legislative, military, and governmental executive
power in Slova:kia and to use it according to the will of the
,people until such time as their freely elected reipresentati<ves
shall themsel,ves ibe ruble to take it over."
The b.asic political tenets of the so-called Christmas
Agreement were laid down in another document, the first
three articles of which read as follows :
62
SLOVAKIA
"(1) It is our desire that the Slovaks and the Czechs,
as the two most closely related Slav nations, shall unite
their destinies in a Czecho-Slovalk Republic which will be
their common government organized on the principle of
equality.
"(2) We desire close collaboration with all Slav states
and peoples, particularly with the Soviet Union, in whioh
we see a protecting shield for the free life and welfare of
all small nations in general, and of the Slav nations in particular.
"(3) The future Czecho..Slovak Republic shall conduct
its foreign policy in the spirit of these .principles and should
therefore, lean on the Soviet Union."
It is appropriate to mention here that, during his visit
to Moscow in Deceimib er 1943, E. Benes had in principle
agreed with K. Gottwald to set up a So'Viet ty;pe of internal administration in Cze.cho-Slovakia after its reestablishment as a dualist union ; to eliminate all traditional conservative political parties in the Ozech area, as well as in
Slovakia; and to esta:bli,s h the regime of a so-called National Front Government. In his Memoirs, published in
Prague in 1947, E . Benes recognized this in the following
passage (pp. 408-409) :
''Thereafter Gottwald e,opressed his opinion a'bout the
way in which this revolution should be prepared. He stressed
the necessity of forming national committees (i.e., So¥iets) ,
which would not only constitute the revolutionary cells of
insurrection, but would even se:rve as embryos for the whole
revolutionary political administration, I was not apposed.''
- wrote Benes - "to this opinion . . ."
1
"Then Deputy Gottwald," continued Benes, "went on
to consider the question of the structure of political parties after the revolution in Czecho-Slovakia. He was certain of a great Te1volutionary shift to the leift, of a great
Socialist majority, rund of a great defeat of our block of
right-of-center parties as it existed before the war: agrarians, national democrats, and artisans . . . As to the admission of the Agrarian Party, our Communists were not
willing to commit themselves in any specific way in De-
SLOVAKIA
63
cember 1943. For all of us the merciless liquidation of
fasoism was without any distinction the basic and obvious issue."
In the same discussion., Benes and Gottwald touched
on the problem of the National Front Government: "It
will be necessary," ~ote Benes, "for the governmental
parties to form a unified national front after the Uberation, to form a common reivolutionary program, and to
pledge themselves to put it jointly into practiice. I then expressed my agreement with the plan concerning a national
front ." (pp. 409-410).
On the basis of these three principles,: Sovietization
of administTati'ons, elimination of the conservative parties,
and organization of the National Front Government as it
emerged in 194'5, Cze'cho-1Siovakia was inevitrubly fated to
become a "people's" democrwcy.
Wihat was the practical result for SlorvaJkia of the
Benes-Gottwald agreement? The Communist and the nonCommunist pro~Soviet group conspiring a.gain.st the Slovak Repulblic, although not representing more than 24
percent of the population, became the future leading force
of Slwakia.
B. The August 1944 Insurrection
Since early 1944 the Soviet partisan headqll!arters in
Kiev, with Rudo1ph Slanslky as i.ts main political adviser,
had 1been pouring Red ,p arachutists and Communist agents
into the mountains of central Slovakia, far behind the
German frontlines. Through contacts with many Communists and non-Communist symjpathizers, Sfova'ks, Czeehs,
and fornigners in various cities and villages of the country, these agents maI11a,g ed to create a network of informants and future collruborators.
More recent documents reveal that as early as Fehrua·r y 7, 1944. Proif. Viladimir Jershov of Russian· origin,
Gregorij Soloshenko, second lieutenant of the Red army,
and William Zingor, a Slo~-ak Communist, came to an
agreement in Tureiansky Sv. Martin that " . . . all future
partisan activities in Slovakia would follow instructions
64
SLOVAKIA
from Mos:cow."l It was also agreed that 2ingor would be
the chief of the Slova:k partisans, with Soloshenko as his
sulbstitute. These self-appointments were later " . . . recognized by partisan headquarters in Kiev, and the Turiec
County group was integrated into the general Soviet partisan system. By this act the partisan movement in Turiec assumed the character of a militaTy organ~tion." 2
Moreover, in the summer of 1944 the following Sol\Tiet
rugents were, a.mong many others, actiive in Slovakia: Ing.
Nicolai Avenaria, as liaison officer in Myjawa; Jmfa Nikolaiev, a graduate of the Leningrad Naival Academy, as distrilbutor of arnns; Ing. Dimitrij Venero:vsky am.d Ivan Platonovich, active in preparing the partisan or.ganization of
Liptov County. In Turiec, whioh was the center of the So·viet partisan activities, I·v:an Stepanol\Tich and Alexander
Fjodorovich Krajushkin were actively operating. The real
Soviet partisan camp was organized in the Kantorska Valle~, near Sklabina. It was commanded by a second lieutenant of the Red Army, Ilvan VySOIC!ldj. Nikola Sur:kov, second
lieutenant of the Red army, was in command of a similar
camp near Priekopa. The most effective of these Soviet
agents was Alexei Velichko, captain oif the Soviet paratroopers, who, in fact, ibecame the chief of all partisan actil\Tity in Central Slovakia. Even General Osmolov was sent
to SlovaJda for a period of time to assure coordination of
the activity of the different groups.
In the meantime, on August 1, 1944, Gen. Bar Komorovs:ki, in command of the Polis:h underground army, ordered a general insurrection in Wa.rsa.w. H e did this after
hea.iring an a;ppeal of _Radio Moscow encouraging the people
of Warsaiw to carry out a ·general uprising. "The hour of
a·ction has already arriived," declared Moscow. Bor Komor-ovski was consequently firmly conivinced that he would
receive eiffoctiive aid from the Red army, which had just
reached the gates of the Praga sulbwr.b, 10 miles from Warsaw. But the e~pected hel.p neyer came. In his telegram of
(1) Cont ributions to the H istory of th e Slo vak Nationa:l Insurrection (In Slovalk ) , Turcians ky Sv. M.arrt in , 1947, p . 26.
( 2 ) IbM.. , p. 29.
SLOVAKIA
66
August 16, 1944, to Prime Minister Churchill, Stalin dissociated himself from the "Wa1rsaiw venture." And so under the very eyes of the Red .army, the German units were
able to carry out their m8Sllicre of those Polish patTiots
who to Strulin (,according to his telegram of August 22,
1944, to Churchill) were but "a groU!p of criminals." On
Octdber 2 the uiprising collapsed 1because Stalin was unwilling to help "the Polish reactionaries."
The Waraaw insurrection seemed to ha:ve no effect on
Slovalkia. This was a ibloiw to Soviet expectations. To the
U. S. S. R., Sl~i,a, in the summer of 1944 was, from a
military viewpoint, an eID1Pty tera'itory with a "reactionary
government and nationalist populations," with some "deviated Communists" and some opporturustic non-Communist elements looking hopefully to Benes in London. A
civH W8JI' in Ozecho~Sloiwukia wouild haive been immensely helpful to the political aim!s of Moscow. But patriotic Slovaks
were too wise to begin an internal struggle. Three weeks
had passed siI11Ce the beginning of the Warsaw U!prising,
and still no rea.c,tion in Slovakia. In order to purge this
country of its "reactionary" elements before the impending occupat:rion, Moscow needed German military intervention there. ft was up to the Soviet aigen.ts to provoke it and
their opportunity was not long in arising.
On August 24, 1944, a spec,ial German military train
stopped in Tureiansky Sv. Martin, some miles from the
Soviet partisan headquarters illl ,Sklabina. The chief of
the railway station, in collusion with Captain Velichko,
refused to let it leaive. G€aleral Otto, former chielf olf the
Gernnan milimry mission in Rumania and now retwrmng
from Bucharest to .Berlin with his suite of 28 ;persons, was
then oonducted to the military barracik,s, held a prisoner
on instructions from Velichko, and together with all his
aides was killed by a unit of revolting soldiers the fohlawirtg day.
ThereUJPOn Hitler, infuriated with a Slovaik Government which was "unalble to 'k eep oroer in the hinterland
of the German lines," decided to send General Hloeffle into
Slovakia with an army of six di,visions to arunihrilate the
66
SLOVAKIA
partisan movement. It was as a result of this decision that
the political and military leaders of the pro-Soviet conspiracy started the U[>rising whioh was announced on August
29, by Radio Banslka Bystrica. Within two months General
Hoeffle crushed this Sorviet-inspired venture. Although the
political chiefs of the insurrection, such as the "Demo ..
crats" Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, iMatej Josiko, Martin
Kvetko, Samuel Bellus, etc., and the Commum,s ts Gusta,v
Husak, Laco Novomesky, Karol Schmidke, etc., were aible
to escrupe, its military chiefs, General Viest and General
Golian, were not so fortunate. As they were attempting to
escrupe by plane, the latter was burned by their angry and
disillusioned soldiers. Both of them were then captured by
the Germans and ta:ken to a concentration camip in the
Reich from ,w hich they were never to return.
Wihile alll of this was going on, the Soviet Army was
quietly resting on the north side of the Carpathian Mountams where it had been stationed for ove,r four months,
tranquilly ruwaiting the last act in this &ama. It is evident
that the U!prising was only a trrup set b.y the Soviet partisans to ensnare the ". . . Sl~ak reactionary and opportunist elements." This pur,pose of the insurrection was revealed during the trial against Slansky in Prague in 1952.
As has already been mentioned, the former secretary general of the Comm.1N1ist Party of Ozeoho-1Slovakia had been
the main ctivil adviser for the 1944 insurrection in Kiev.
With respect to this function the state prosecutor ques~
tioned him as follows:
Prosecutor: Why did th.e Anglo-iAmerican agent (general) P1ka show an interest in placing the partisan units in
Slovakia under the command of (General) Golian?
Slanslky: He sought to place all partisan units under
the command of the reactionary General Golian at Banska
Bys:trica so as to faciJ.itate Golian's supervision of their
activities. Pika tried, in the interest of the imperialists and
of the London Government of Dr. Benes, to reduce the influence of the par1Usa.n.s as far as possdible.3
(3) Marcel Peju: Hier et Aujourd1hui: Le sens du proces Slansky II. Les Temps Modernes. P.ari,s, June 1953, p. 2013.
SLOVAKIA
67
Thus Slansky revealed many years later what the Soviets really thought of the leading non-Communist personalities in the 1944 insurrection in Slovaikia.
This event is a great national tragedy. Whereas during the thref' years of her participation in the struggle
against bolshevism, Slovakia lost only 2,500 soldiers on
the eastern front, she lost around 30,000 persons in the insurrection in the short space of two months. Unlike the
insurrection of Warsaw, that of Banska Bystrica has nothing to do with Slovak ~triotism. It is quite clear that
Slovak patriots would have never organized an insurrection the purpose of which was to reestablish foreign external and internal control in their country.
C. The "Liberation" of Slovakia
What is known as the liberation of Slovakia by the
Soviets is in fact a misnomer and a grave distortion of the
historical facts. During World War II, though subject to
a certain international supervision by Germany, Slovalkia
was a relatively free country. During five years, until the
insurrection of Banska Bystrica, no one was executed for
political reasons . The Slovak Government in Bratislava
was able to master all the difficulties of the war period
during these years. Then the Red army came.
I waited for the Soviet "liberation" with a family
which lived on the outskirts of a small town, S., in western Slovakia. They had a nice, or as the Communists would
say, a '~bourgeois" home here. On the morning of a day of
mid-April 1945, the Soviet Army entered the town. The
house in question, which was located on a hill, was then
chosen as headquarters for the Soviet commanding generral in that sector of the front. During the two days that
the general stayed in the house, the conduct of the Russians was exemplary.
After the general and his staff had left, we congratulated ourselves on our not too bad experience with the
Soviet Army and prepared to cel~brate this event with a
good family dinner that evening. At p. m., just as we were
sitting down to table, a first lieutenant and a sergeant of
68
SLOVAKJA
the Red army entered the house. The latter put his gun on
the dining-room ta>ble and began checking on our identity.
Meanwhile the officer began to inspect the house "looking for hidden German spies." In the course of this inspection he found our ,p ersonal effects in Oiile of the bedrooms
and ·b rought them into the dining room. He then proceeded
to examine these things in detail and chose for himself
whatever happened to please him: A watch, a leather
suitcase, etc.
We then saw that a second lieutenant of the Red
army had entered the house and began in turn to forage
through it. After a while he ordered a young lady to go
into the kitchen to give him a glass of water. When these
three left, after 9 :30 p. m., the lady in question colJapsed
because she had been violated. After this visit by offi ..
cers, two other groups of soldiers, many of them drunk,
successively entered bhe house, each one having held us,
that is, four men and three ladies, under terror in their
own way, until 2 :30 a. m.
In the city of Bratislava, which numbered around
200,000 inhabitants, more than 4,000 dishonored women
had to go to the hospital for examination.
During the "liberation" of SlovaJkia by the Soviets,
around 20,000 Slovaks, mostly intellectuals, were sent by
po1itical commissarias into la;bor camps of Russia, while
various tens of thousands of inhaJbitants were imprisoned.
D. Political Evolution Aft.er 1945
On April 5, 1945, the government of Dr. E. Benes
followed the advancing Red army from Moscow into the
easVSlovaikian city of Kosice and estaJblished the Third
Czecho-iSlova!k Republic in the shadow of Soviet bayonets,
through the so-called Kosice declaration. Thus a foreign
government was imposed upon the Slovaik people which,
except for two small :factions of political opportunists, had
been loyal to the Slova>k State - all of this without any
plebiscite. The Communists and pro-Soviet "Democrats",
who had already rendered a great service to Moscow in
the 1944 uprising, became the ex cutors of the n w state
will in Slovaikia.
SuOVA.KIA
69
According to. the Benes-Gotlbwald agreement of December 1943 in Mos'coiw, they eliminated from the political
life of Slovrukia all other former political ,parties, namely,
the Slovak People's Party, the Agrarian Party, the Slovak National Party, and the Artisans Party. These parties }:lad received in the 1935 elections 19 plus 112, plus 1,
plus 1, or a total of 33 seats in the Prague Parliament out
of the grand total of 58 seats corresponding to Slovalkia.
Not countiing the Magyar and the German minorities which
had then elected 11 deputies and did not take part in the
uprising, the two pro-Soviet factions cor,r esiponded in
strengbh to only 1'4 deputies of the pre~war Slova,k representation in the Prague Parliament, six of them being
Communists, four Social Democrats, and four others.
Now, after haiving assured the mo!Ilopoly of political
re,presentation for themselves, the Communist and pro~
Soviet "Democrat" fa.c tions agreed upon a spo.ils system
exipressed in the form of a 50-50 share in the political
aJff~irs of Slovakia. In this way the political irufl:uence of
the Communists increased, in comparison with the year
1935, from 10 to 50 percent, and that of the pro...Soviet
"Democrntic" faction from 13 to 50 percent. Afthough this
50--50 relation 'between the two factions was corrected
by the elections of May 26, 1946, in favor of the "Democrats" who, 'becauS€ of the exdusion of other traditional
,parties, gained 62 .p ercent of all voters in SlovaJkia, while
the Communists got only 30 percent, the actual influence
of the Communist Party did not diminish at all. From the
outset the Communists had taken oiver the Commissariat
of Interior, including the Police; o;f EducatiOIIl; and of Industry, together with other key ,p ositions in the administration Oif Slovakia. They also retained the chairmanship of
the Board of Commissioners, i.e., the regional g01vernment
for Slo:vaikia.
MeaI11Whhle the Sovietizaition of Czecho~Slovaikia was
progressing in every field of Government activity: In the
field of industry, President Benes, ever olbedient to the
Communi,s ts, nationalized the main branches of industry
by Decrees Nos. 100, 102 and 103 of October 28, 1945, and
this without any consultation with the nation - mines,
1
70
SLOVAKIA
100 percent; steel industry, 100 percent; sugar production,
80 percent; electricity, 73 percent; chemical industry, 72
percent; metallurgy, 68.5 percent; glass industry, 65 percent; leather, 53.5 percent; gas, 50 percent; textiles, 47
percent; ceramics, 46.5 percent; pruper industry, 4'5.5 percent; distilleries, 31.5 percent; breweries, 27.5 percent;
clothing, 25 percent; mills, 14 percent; food, 9 percent;
wood industry, 8 percent.
By these acts the IIlum!ber of wor.kers in the nationalized sector ,b ecame 570,000, whereas only 430,000 working
people fell within the field of private industry.
ln the field of education all the schools were nationalized by decree of the Slovalk National Council (No. 34,
dated May 16, 1945). Decree No. 47 of 1945 comiscated
the property of pri:viate schools, without compensation.
By decree of the Slovak National Council • (No. 33 of
May 15, 1945) the following institubions of political justice
were created: Oommunit,y and <list.riot "people's courts"
and a national court in Bratislava. The legal task of these
courts was to judge war criminals, but their political pmpose was to get rid of the -p olitical adversaries of the two
factions in power, under the pretext of collaboration with
Germany.
The political character of this distorted justice was
determined by three circumstances :
1. According to article 42 of Executive Decree No. 55
Board of Commissioner s, dated June 5, 1945, the
the
of
memlbers of these courts were to be ruppoinrted by the two
political ,parties in power.
2. These courts, disregarding the classiical principle
nulla poena, sine lege, were made component to decide
upon cases which were not punishable according to the
Penal Code.
3. This legislation introduced the principle of collective guilt and collective :responsilbility.
4. Art.i.cle 5 of Decree No. 33 of May 15, 194!5, provided
for labor camps, which were estaJblished through Executive
Decree No. 105 of August 23, 1945. According to the provisions of article 2 of this last decree, the following cate-
SLOVAKIA
71
gories of persons were to be sent to lrubor camps:
a. Those sentenced by the "ipeople's courts";
b. Tho,s e whose activities were a threat to "the people's demoeratic regime," public security, puib1ic peace and
order, rpulblic nutrition and the reconstruction o:f economic
life; or those who were enemies of the state or conspirators against it;
c. Those who· do not work;
d. Those who declined to do the work assigned to them
within the framework of laibor duty.
'5. No plea was admissible agaiinst the act of indictment; the defendant did not have a free choice in selecting
his defender; no ·a ppeal was granted to a sentenced de. fendaJI11t.
6. Sentences to imprisonment usually involved the
confiscation of the ded'endant's property.
It 4, ruppropriate to add here tha,t before being .brought
to· trial the "traitors," "Fasci.Sits," "collaJborationists," and
"unreliable persons" were entirely at the memy of their
indictor~. There was no impartial court, as the grand jury
in America, to examine into the basis of an accusation.
This was an era of arlbitrary indictments and personal
revenge.
By its decree No. 5,1 of May 2, 1945, the Sloivaik Natiooal Council dissolved in Slorvakia all assodations, except for those few which were eixipressly exempted from
thls general ,p rovision. Freedom of the press, of assembly,
and other human rights were likewise a;bolished.
E. The "Coup de Force" of November 1947 in Slovakia
All these measures were aimed at the weakening of
traditional political forces and the estaiblishmenrt of an exclusively Communist power. For a long time the leading
personalities of the Sloivak Democratic Party, such as Joseph Lettrich, Jan Ursiny, Matej Josko, Martin Kvetko,
Stephen Koovara, etc., did not know whether they should
remain loyal to their "gentleman's agreement" of 1945 with
the Communists or follow the anti-Communist line orf the
great ma;j.ority of the Slwak people. Finally they decided
SLOVAK.IA
72
to remain loyal to their agreements with the Communist s.
Instead of getting .r id of the Oommunist s, as would have
been normal for a party which had won 62 percent of all
the votes of SlovaJkia, the "Democrat s" did not alb.andon
the principle of the National Front G01Vernment. This
loyalty was to prove their fatal undoing later on.
In Selptemlber 1947, under the pretext of having disc01Vexed a conspiracy a,gainst the governmen t in the Democratic Party, the Communist s decided to liqUJidate this party. Jan Kempny, Milos iBugar, and Joseph St8!sko., three
deputies of the Catholic wing of this party, were imprisoned, as well as a,bout 2,000 other Slova\k patriots. Thereafter the Communist s organized demonstrat ions against
" . . . the reactionari es hidden within the Democratic Party." In this violent dispute between the two political parties in Slo vaJkia, the Ozech-1Soci alist block - i.e., the Communists, the Social Democrats , and the National Socialists
of Benes - representin g togeither 18'5 deputies (93 plus 37
plus 55) out of the 300 in the Prague Parliament , threw
their weight on the side of the Slovak Communis ts (23
deputies) and against the Democratic Party (43 deputies).
The Czech Catholics ( 44 deputies) remained undecided.
There was only one honora,ble way to prevent the constant intewenUo n of Prague in the internal affairs of Slova!kia, name ly, to proclaim the inde pendence of Slovakia.
Instead of doing that, Joseph Lettrich, chaimnan of :the
Slovaik Demooratic Party, gave his consent to further
limitatio!Ils on the politi>Cal preirogative s of his own party.
1
After a visit of Klement Gottwald to Bratislava, the
Democratic Party was relegated on Novemlber 18, 1947,
to a minority status in the regional governmen t of Slova1kia. Out of 15 seats there, it retained only 7, while the
triumphant Communist bloc got 8: The Communist Party
itself (including the chairman), 5; the Wreedom Party, 1;
the Social Democratic La,bor Pairty, 1; and the last seat
fell to General M~kttlas Ferjencik, "the neutral Oommis,s ioner of the Interior," playing in fact into the hands of
the Communist s. Such a hll!IIliliating change would have
been impossi!ble without a Czech coup de force in SloV3Jkia.
SI.IOVAKIA
73
Having thus eliminated the greatest obstacle from the
way of their ambition for exclusive power, the Czech Marxist rbloc (includ!ing 56 percent of aU Czech voters of 1946
and 130 deputies (93 Communists and 37 Social Democrats) out of 23,1 corresponding to the Ozec<h area) was
finally able, on February 25, 1948, to, peacefully consolidate
its position and, by eliminating the Czech Catholics and
National Socialists, to pass over from the priniciple od' the
National Front Gorvernment to a sheer Communist dictatorshilp.
Conclusion
As a conolusion to this statement, I wish to repeat
that I welcome this. opportunity of finally putting the
events which took place in Ozecho-iSlovia'k ia between 19451948 in the pro.per historical light. It is with regret that I
must state. that neither of the two congressional documents dealing with the Communist subjtu gation of CzechoSlovakia - i.e., House Document No. 154, part I, on The
Coup de Force in Prague, pulblished in 1,9 49 by the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and DoCIU!Illent No. 70, pa,rt 4, on internal tensions in Ozecho-,Slovalkia, recently pulblished by
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate (July 1954),
contain aipproprfate facts and analyses of the acts of
Commun.ist aggression committed during that period in
Slovrukia.
(Wa,s hington, D. C., December 3, 1954).
fflE TESTIMONY OF FATHER ANTON BOTEK
Mr. Kersten. 'Dhe hearings will come to orde•r .
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Anton Botelk, is
that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were fOl'!Illerly director of Catholic Action in Slo:vahla, is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTi:gue. fa it true you were in prison a total
number of seven times?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Imprisoned by the Communists.?
Father Botek. Yes.
74
SLOVAKIA
Mr. iMcTigue. From 1945 to 1949?
Father Botek. No, from 1949 till 1950.
Mr. McTigue. When did the Communists occupy SlovaFather Botek. In 1944.
kia, Father?
Mr. McTigue. Norw, Father, tell us something a!bout
the f,i ght to !keep the Catholic schools open in 1945 and
1946 following the Communist occupation.
Father Botek. As early as 1944, during the 1944 CommUJili.st uprising in SlovaJkia, the so-,ca,lled Slovakian National Council was concerned with the abolition of all
church-Operated school,s.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aJbout the
tactics of the Communists used to destroy the organizations of the church?
Father Botek. At first they rubolished all Catholic
Church operated schools; then they disbanded all Catholic associations, and fina:lly they sll!ppressed the Catholic
press.
Mr. McTigue. Slo:v akia is predominantly Catholic in
Father Botek. Yes.
religion, is tihat right, Father?
Mr. McTigue. What are the percentages of Catholics
in Slo;vakia?
Father Botek. Eighty-two ,p ercent are Catholic.
Mr. McTigue. Is there anything you can tell us, Father, rubout the so-called elections in 1946 in Slovaikia?
F1a:ther Bote:k. As early as 1944, there were only two
political .p arties admitted; that is, the Communist Party
and the so-.c alled Slovaikiian Democratic Party. .The Slovakian Democratic Party denied any political party that
would be able to defend their rights by democratic method.
Mr. MoTigue. Wasn't there some agreement between
the Slova1kian bishops amd the Democratic Party, Father?
Father Botek. Since there was no political representation of Slovakian Catholics, the Sloviakian bishops and
clergy tried to find means by which Slovitkian Catholics
could exipress their political will. This was necessary especially since the Communasts were anxious to win the sympathies of the Slovakian people. The Communists tried to
use, especially, the Sloivakian Nation's. feelings for their
1
SLOVAKIA
75
pu~ses and they suggested to the SlovaJkian people the
creation of an independent SlovaJkian State after the end
of World War II. This, howerver, wasn't approved by Mos~
cow. Therefore, the Commurusts tried to achieve a selfrule for ISlovaJkia within the frame of the Czecho...Slovakian
Re,pulblic and they finally succeeded in it; this was then
inco:riporated into the so-called
Kosice agreement concluded in 1945.
The Communists also tried to win the sympathy and
support of SlovaJkian Oathol.ics, promising the former members of the CathoJic Slova;kian People's Party tha;t they
woU!ldn't be punished for their wrur-time activities if they
joined the Communist Party. They also wanted some priests
for their policies; for instance, a certain priest, Joseph
Straka, who was previously suspended from his office b,y
his bishop because of irregularities in administration. The
bishOipS foribade Catholic priests to make any canvassing
prior to the 1946 elections and the Catholic priests were
also fonbidden to be candidates for any political party in
those elections. Father Straka, however, disobeyed this
order of the Catholic bishops and made .propaganda for
the Communist Party in winning Catholics for that party.
He promised Slovakian Catholics that the Com1rm.11n.ist
Party would guarantee complete religious freedom to CathoJics and he issued also several ~itten statements to
the peoiple, one of which I am in position to furnish to this
committee. The Slovafidan people, however, didn't let themselves be misled by the Communist propa;ganda and they
trusted the bishops because they knew their a;ttitude toward the Communists was the only correct one, since the
bishops warned them agaiinst the Communists even during
the time Oif Worlld War fil. Therefore, we tried to find some
cooperation with the Democrati:c Party of Slovakia, which
was not at least Communist, even tho.ugh this party was
also coresponsilble for the fact that the Communists were
aJble to penetrate SloiV'a!kia. The Catholics were es'peci'ally
indignant aigainst the Democratic Barty of Slova1cia ~
cause they rug-reed to the confiscation of 1,800 elementary
schools and 80 schools of higher grade which were prevfo:us..
ly operated by the Catholic Church, because this conifisca1
76
SLOVAKIA
tion took place. i,n 19'115, at the time when the commissioner
for education was the chairman of the Democratic Party,
Dr. Joseph Lettriich, T.he so-called "Democrats," however,
became aware of the great pressure, and the great activities developed by the Communists and therefore they
also, on their part, tried to win su>ppo•r t of the Catholic
population of SlovaJkia for themseJves. At tha,t time we
Catholics still conducted negotiations with both the Communists and the Democratic Pa·:rity since we still hoip ed that
we would be aJble to achieve from the Communists the admission of a Catholic Party to be on the other side.
There were also preparations made for an ag,r eement
with the Democratic Party. The Communists, during the
negotia.tions, always applied the tactics of postponement
of a final decision. They made indications that they might
be inclined ·to admit, if not an ex,plicity Catholic party but
a P'arty which would at least, to some extent, aP\peal to the
Catholic population of Slovaikia. However, it soon became
apparent that no agreement could be reached with the
Communists. Therefore, on the 30th of March, 1946, we
concluded an agreement with the Democratic Party of
SlovaJkia. In this agreement, the Democratic Party of SlovaJkia pledged itself to admit Catholics as candidates on
their list of candidates in the 1946 elections. When the
Communists realized this they qtlliokly allowed another
party, which was called the Freedom Pa,rty and of which
they claimed this was a Catholic party. In this party there
were several good Catholics, even such persons who previously part-icilpated in the negotiations with the Democratic Party, but the chief leaders of that party couldn't
be trusted. The Communists also made propaganda or encouraged voters to cast inrvalid votes beca:UJSe they calculated that Slovakians who• disrug,reed both with the Communist and Democratk Pa!r ty would prefer to cast invalid
votes which then would diminish the percentage of votes
received by the Democratic Party. These irnvalid votes
were. generally referred to as "white ballots" because they
were plain slips ()If ,paper. This oppovtunity to use these white
ballots was voted in the Parliament prim· to the elections,
and the Communists and the representative s of the Free-
77
SLOVAKIA
dom Party were in favor of this policy. Then it became ob.viou:s thalt the Fireedom Party was merely a pwppet party
under control orf the Communist s. We therefore started
,pmpagand a among the Catholics to vote for the Democratic Party.
We couldn't deve1orp this propaganda publicly, hut we
r equested Slovakian bishops to issue a statement to the Slovalkian voters. In this statement orf the bishops, Caltholics
were called upon to vote according to their Christian conscience; they we<re forihidden to vote for an undemocra tic
party which would .not admit religious freedom and they
were called upon to vote for the party wh~,ch would guarantee demncratic freedom. This statement clearly indicated thalt SlovaJkiam. CathoUcs were foiibidden to vote in
favor of the Communist Party but it still was necessary
to instruct the Slovakian Catholics that it ,w asn't good for
them to vote for the Freedom Party either. Therefore, a
statement was included in this aipipeal by the bi shops stating that it was not true; that the rumors were not true
which stated that the Slovakian bishops joined the Freedom Party and that they were inclined to vote for that
party. Those :mimors we.re spread by the Communis t Party
and hy the Freedom Party. Copies of this proclamati on oif
the bishops were sent to all iparish priests; it was also published in the Catholic press and we had couriers talking
them personally to each priest. As a result of this campaign, the Democratic Party won in the 1946 elections and
receiived 61 ½ percent of all votes cast. HO!Wever, we found
out that the Democratic Party didn't de.fend the interests
of the Slovakian Catholics and that this ,p arty even failed
to defend its own memlbers of Parliament who were Catholics. The Oomnmniirst-controlled Commissio n of the Interior in SlovaJkia had arrested the leaders of the Catholic
group within the Pairliame.nrt who were members of the
Democratic Party. In the a,greement reruohed between the
Catholic representati v,es and the representat ives of the
Democratic Party, the Democratic Pat-ty pledged itself, or
guaranteed to, Catholics that the schools would be returned to. the Catholiircs ag·a:in and that the press would
also be allowed, as well as Catholic organrzatio ns. How1
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SLOVAKIA
ever, the Democratic Party failed to honor these promises
and in arguments with the Communists they always
yielded to the Communist demands in order to avoid personal troubles with them. Therefore, Catholics decided to
take up direct negotiations with the Government itself in
order to defend their rights.
Bishop Jantausch persona1ly called on the chairman
of the Board of Commissioner s in Slovakia trying to achieve
the fulfillment of the promises given by the Democrats
and the guarantees for the democratic rights of Catholics. However, he failed to achieive any results. I accompanied him on his visits to the Communist Commissioner
HusaJk, and the Communist Commissioner Viktory, and
neither of these two ever agreed to any concessions to the
Catholics. Then a commission was. introduced which was to
find a solution of all ,pr01blems of the Catholics. In this
commission, representative s of the Communist Party were
Husak and Novomesky, and the representative s of the
Demooratic Party were Filo and Frastacky. On the part of
the Catholics, the representative s were Bishop Lazik, Cannon Cvincek, Carnogursky, and myself. The pro!blems to
be solved were the reesta!blishme nt of church-Operat ed
schools, a free Catholic press, admission of Catholic organizations, discontinuatio n of inhuman deportations of the
Germans and Hungarians from Slovakia, confiscation of
property and cancellation of work on Sundays. This commission convened only twice in the winter of 1947, but no
results were achieved. In 1945 the Communists abolished
the following Catholic organizations : Organization of Catholic women, with a memlbership of 100,000; the Organization of Catholic Men, with 30,000, and the Association
of Catholic Youth, with a membership of 50,000.
Mr. MoTigue. In 1948, is it true that the central office of Catholic Action, of which you were director, was
liquidated and you were arrested?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. What were you charged with when you
were arrested, Fathoc?
Father Botek. The Central Catholic Bureau received
SLOVAKIA
instructions from the Catholic bishops to taJke over all
acti,v ities previously carried out by the Catholic Action.
However, we were aware of the fad that all organrizations didn't haive a legal background, a legal footing, and
therefore any acttvities developed by this organization
oould be stopped by the Communists any time they wanted.
The activitie.g of the Central Bureau, the Catholic Action
Bureaiu, were carried on with a great risk. I knew I was
collSltantly shadowed by one or two secret policemen and
that offic:ially all persons who entered the offices of our orgaruza.tions were super.vised by the· Communists. Instances
happened that visitors at or1.1r office were then apprehended
by these policemen, searched, beaten Uip , and adivised to
omit further visits to our bureau. Therefore, we were
anx,ious to keep our activities in the field of the Cathohl.c
Action strictly within the limits of religion a,nd not to mix
in any political aspects. Nevertheless, the Communists
didn't permit our activities and on December 7, 1948, eigiht
Communist po1icemen inivaded our bureau and declared
that our organization was disbanded and that the 'b,ureau
had to be closed dQIWiJl. The employees at the bureau we.r e
sent to a room where they were searched while, in the
meantime, in the ibwreau itself, all documents were
searched by the Communist police. This search la,s ted from
8 o'clook in the morning until evening hours, but finally
the employees of the bureau were released to their homes,
and I was t aiken by the police to my apartment which also
was searched by the police. The office rooms of the bureau were then sealed by the Communist police. 1:'he Communists then entered the office rooms of the Catholic bureau twice more and also, I, myself, was twice investigated by the pol,ice. Likewise, my assistant at the bureau
was investigated by the police.
On the 29th of January 1949, three policemen oame
to my apartment at 6 :30 o'clock in the · morning and intended to ta ke me to. the police station. At that time I was
just saying my daily Mass and I was notified that the
policemen were waiting for me. I could escrupe, but I decided aga,inst this, because I suspected that I would discredit, by esca,ping, the Central Catholic Bureau and also
1
80
SLOVAKlA
the Slovakian bishops. I was taken to the police station
at Bra:tislav and held for seven days U1I1der very poor conditions. The iinrvestigators tried to force me to confess
that I had connections with the Western Powers, that I
engaged in espionage activities, and that I develO!I)ed subversive activities against the Peoiple's Democratic regime
in Ozecho-iSlO!Vak.ia. They didn't have any evidence a,gainst
me and, therefore, the]' tr8.lllsferred me to the regional
court's prison where they held me for another five months
pending investigation. At the end of these five months,
my foI1IDer assistant at the Catholic Bureau, as well as
the expert for pastoral activities in the border areas, were
released and I was put on trial. Since they couldn't produce any evidence in support of the charges that I wo:riked
for foreign powers and that I engaged in espionage activities, they forced a student to testif,y against me, that I
knew of his espionage activities and failed to reiport this
to the police. For this offense I was sentenced to seven
months' imprisonment. On July 7, 1'949, I was transferred
to the Leopoldov penitentiary b.eca:use, at the time the
Communists organized their so-called CathoHc Action,
which was controlled by them, many Catholics who supported the genuine Catholic Action were imprisoned, so
that the prisons were crowded. I served the rest of my
term at LeO!poldov and on the 28th of August 1949 I was
released. I was in poor health as a result of my imprisonment and, therefore, I had to go to a hosip ital, but after
a month I myself requested to ibe assigned to a small parish so as to disappear from the eyes od' the Communists.
Mr. McTigue. Was this in 1950, Father?
F,8 /ther Botek. 1949. While at this small parish, we were
preparing an ecdesiastical sermon and at this time a local
Communist called on me and requested me, pleaded with
me, that I shouldn't launch any attacks against Communists in my sermon, bec3/Use he stated he was charged with
my suI1veillance and was to report everything on me, including that whicih I told in my sermons, and he stated
he was a Catholic, too, and was the father of eight children he couldn't refuse this Communist order to spy on me
and on the other hand, if another .person would be given
SLOVAKIA
81
the same instructions, this other person could do harm
to me. When I was approximatel,y two months at this
par,ish, the local chairman of the Communist Party called
on me and notified me that I was swpposed to report at
the district national committee for some discussion. I
was afraid, however, that this was just a triok and that
people were previously sentenced on charges of underground activities and were sent to forced-.JaJb.or camps even
after they had served their terms imposed by the courts.
However, the Communists are very cautious while proceeding against Catholic priests since the parishioners defended their ,priest$ against arrest and there were clashes
between the population and the Communist police who a,r rived to arrest Catholic priests, especially at the time when
the Communists started their own sponsored Catholic Action. There.fore, they endeavored to lure our parish priests
fronn their parishes and to arrest them at a place where
such resistance by local parishioners couldn't be offered.
TherefoiI'e, I decided not to report at the district national
committee and await my arrest at the parish office, and
on the same day the police arrived and took me to a
forced-labor camp at Nova:ky
My parishioners protested against my arrest; however,
they didn't put up any ·physical resistance since they already experienced that such resistance was followed by
arrests of hundreds of innocent people and that it still was
to no avail because the pTiests were always eventuaUy arrested. I could tell you about conditions there, albout my
experiences which I had at that time when I was held at
the Bmtisl8'va County jail. At that time there were members at least of ten underground groups held at that prison. When I had an opportunity to talik to them, I asked
how they became involved in underground activities and
how it happened that they were arrested since there were
always rubout 50 persons from each group arrested. Most
of these for.mer members of the undengr.ound groups stated
that there was always a Communist spy planted by the
Communists within their organizations, and that this Communist spy even encouraged them to develop underground
activ:ities which he then reported to the Communist police.
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SLOVAKIA
I realized that the Communists had put under sur:veill~e
all people whom they suspected might engage in underground activ-ities and if they failed to find anything, any
underground actiivities, they encouraged such people to
develop such activities, and be.fore a group could actually
start its undeirground activities, the spy denounced them
to the police and the memJbers of the group were arrested.
In 1,9 49, the Communists realized that they were U!Ilaible to
win the Catholic bishops for their puriposes; therefore,
they decided to organize their o,w n Catholic Action. They
coTI1Vened a meeting of the so-<:aJled representaUves of the
Catholic Church in Prague on June 10, 1949. To this
meeting they invited several priests under false pretexts,
stating that this was to he a conference to negotiate and
discuss church pro1b lems. In addition, there were also several Catholic laymen invited to this meeting, who were
mostly mem!bers of the Communist Party but didn't play
any decisive role in the Catholic life, and the Communists
eventually declared this meeting as the new leadership of
the Catholic Action.
The Communists declared that since the Vatican was
against the people and since the bishops supported the
v ,a tican in this policy, they intended to leave to the Ohu:rch
only the spiritual care and admit only the kind of questions and morals that the Pope could rule in .the affairs
concerning the Catholic morals a:nd the· Catholic faith; but
all other religious· questions would be taken care of by this
Catholic Action. This evidently was an attempt by the Communists to seize control over the administration of the Catholic Church in Czecho-Slovakia. However, they real.ized
that they didn't haNe the sU1pport of the people. Therefore,
they initiated an aotion of signatures which were to be rutta,c hed by the entire population of C!zecho-Sloivakia, to a
memorandUllll issued by the rubove-mentioned meeting at
which this Communist Catholic Action was founded.
Branches of the Communist Party organization were entrusted with the carrying out of this signature action. They
convened meetings in towns and in viUages, and also at
wo:rikiplaces. at which the present people were called uipon
to put their signatu:re on the memorandum. The bishops,
SLOVAKIA
83
however, condemned this Catholic Action, and the Holy See
declared every person who would sign this memorandum as
excommunicated from the Catholic Church.
Mr. McTigue. Father, you were in a forced labor camp
in 1950; is that correct?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Did you get sick at that time and were
you sent to a hospital?
Father Botelk. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us very briefly something
about how the Communists treated the Sister,s at the
hospital?
Father Botek. A Communist order previously arrested
all nuns those who were nurses at hospitals because
there was a great laclk of trained nurses at the hospitals.
These nuns, however, who were left as nurses at the hospitals, were e~posed to various Communist chicaneries.
That was done by Communist functionaries at the hospital, by Communist doctors, and men, and assistants.
They were called upon to renounce their mernlbership in
their religious orders and to become civilian nurses. The
Communists tried to Lure · the younger nuns with a promise that if they agreed to renounce their membership in
the religious order, tihey would be permitted to go to a
university without any previous education, which was
otheIWise required from university students. This was the
same pattern as was rupplied in the case of young Communist woI'kers who also were admitted to university studies without adequate education and just attend a short
preparatory course. Except for a few exceptions, most of
these nuns refused the Communist demands and so the
Communists started to remove the nun nur,ses from hospitals.
MT. McTigue. When did you learve Slovrukia, Father?
Father Botek. On the 26th of June 1951.
Mir. McT,~giue. Did you have any trouble in getting out
of SlQIVakia?
Father Botek. I made a previous attempt to escrupe.
At that time we were a group of 22 escapees. However,
84
SLOVAKIA
this escrupe mdn't succeed and. so I had to try it a second
time, at which time we were only four escapees and we
succeeded in crossing the border.
,M r. McTigue. Your present assignment at this time
is in Rome; is that correct, Father?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Busby. Father Botek, we know that communism
is opposed to all religions, but I think the comm~ttee might
like t-0 know how successful the Communists were in their
efforts to infiltrate and to destroy the Catholic religion
in SlovaJkia.
Father Botek. Previously, when I still was at the Central Catholic Bureau, we intercepted a secret Communist
instruction in continuing a Commumst plian for destruc,tion
of the Church and for its seizure and control. Under these
instructions, the indirvidual phases were to be the following: At first the ibishops of the Catholic Church in Czecho-,Slova:kia were to be separated from the Vatican; the
second step was to be. that the bishops were t-0 be discredited in the eyes of the priests, as well as of the laymen Catholics, and finally, the last phase was to be the
separation of the Catholic laymen from their priests.
IMr. Busbey. Now, that leads ri,ght up to my question.
Up until the time you left Slovakia, and from yOIUI' own
personal olbservation, h ow successful was this plan of the
Communists?
Father Botek. They succeeded in accomplishing the
first oibjective; that is, to separate the Catholic Church in
Czecho'"'Slorvrukia from the Vatican. They expelled the Annuncias from the Vatican to Ozech0-Slovakia so that contacts of Ozecho-iSl01Vakian authorities with the Vatican
were interrupted. Nevertheless, the Catholics in OzechoSlovaJkia remained faithful to the Vatican, to the Holy See.
However, they failed in achieving their second olbjective.
to make the Catholic bishops bend to their demands and
to have them - to maJke them tools in the propagation of
communism in Slovakia. Therefore, the Communists ,pliaced
a commissary to each episcoipal office who was to taike
care that the bjsho,ps didn't have any contacts with the
SLOVAKIA
86
clergy and with the congregation. These Communist commissars controlled the in- and out-going mail; they controlled the visitors who intended to call on the bishops,
and admitted only those whom they considered harmless;
but even the talks of such visitors with the bishops were
monitored.
Mr. Busbey. Father, can you tell us aJbout the methods
and technics used by the Communists to indoctrinate the
pupils with the, theory of Marxism?
Father Botek. The Communists innoculated the Marxist ideology and way of thin'king to the pupils from the
very first grade of elementary school. When I was in hiding with a family who had an 8-year-old daughter, I overheard her tal!ks with her parents and I heard that this
girl was thinking in Communist terms and that her way
of thinking was completely inJfiluenced by the Communist doctrine.
Mr. Busbey. Father, do you agree with some of the
other witnesses we have heard, in the belief that if something isn't done in the immediate future and that if we let
the Communists ikeep on educating the real young boys and
girls, it will be more difficult, as time goes on, to defeat
this Communist march toward worrld revolution?
Father Botek. lt is a fact that the Communists have
had great successes in educating the very young people
in their ideology and the parents are almost unable to influence or to counteract against this Communist ideology
implanted inrto the chlldren because these children are instructed to report at school any attempts ,b y their parents
to dissuade them :13rom communism. Therefore, it is a fact;
that if communism is given enough time, that these youths
will become completely communistic and the Communist
strength will be increased.
Mr. Busbey. Can you give the committee any illustrations of the technics used by the Communists to make
the children believe in Stalin before he died, instead of God?
Father Botek. Yes, I saw the mrugazines for children,
for school-children, containing slogans such as "Stalin is
our sun; everything we haive, we've got from Stalin," and
86
SLOVAK IA
"Stalin is ouT benefac tor, Stalin is our greatest benefac tor,
Stalin is the greatest man, Stalin is the most beautifu l man."
Mr. Busbey. Father, are you qualified to. tell the committee how the Commu nists rocploited the economy of Slovakia?
Father Botek. In these economi c aspects, I am not
well versed; I only Olbse,r:ved thait there was a general lack
of all consum er goods and that the living conditio ns were
poor.
Mr. Busbey. WhiJe you were in prison, were you given
any consider ation at all because of the fact that you were
a member of the clergy?
Father Botek. This ,prdbaJbly was the case 'b ecause I
never was maltreat ed, never was beaten at interrog ations,
and I observe d that many fello•w prisoner s were beaten,
so that I prolbaibly enjoyed preferen tial treatme nt. This,
may!be, was due to the faot that there was still a trace of
Catholic faith in my investig ators so that they were reluctant to rai,se their hands aigainst me as a priest. I also
had the followin g experien ce. While I was in ,prison, a prison guard caime to me and asked me whether he should
give his signatur e to the Commu nist Ac~ion Manifes to.
IMT. Busbey. My final question ; do you lbelieve tha,t any
agreeme nt made with the Commu nists is worth the paper
it is written on?
Father Botek. From my e~perience, I had negotiat ions
with the Commu nists, I can sta:te thait the Commu nists
never honor their word thait they gave in such negotiations, and this is in accorda nce with their general policy
which goes that everyth ing is good that promote s the Communist cause, and therefor e I am convinced thait any negotiatio ns or any agreeme nts reached with the Communists are worthle ss.
Mr. Madden . Father Botek, you in your testimon y
haive covered very well your experien ces back over the
years with the Commu nist Party in Slovakia and the only
question I would like to ask is what percenta ge of the
populati on of Sloviahla today are Commun ists, true Communists at heart; what percent age: 5 percent; 10 percent; 20 ; or what would you say?
SLOVAKIA
87
Father Botclc. I thin!k that the percentage doesn't exceed 10 ,p ercent.
Mr. No71blad. Is the Voice of America or Radio Free
Europe listened to by many of the people in the area you
come from?
F1ather Botclc. While I was in hiding with several fa ..
milies in Slovakia, we frequently listened to the Voice of
America and Free EuTope programs. However, I heard
from these ipeople many objections against the spirit of
those programs beamed to Ozecho-.S1ovaJkia.
Mr. Nor.blad. What were the dbjoctions, generally, in
Slovakia? I am refemnig to the conditions in Slovakia.
Father Botek. The objections were mainly of a national and religious nature. The Slavaikian peqple are a
very religious people. They are 82 percent Catholics and
13 pereent Protestants, who also are active Protestaints.
Therefore, programs promoting ideas of a reformer, Jan
Huss, or the religious ideas of Masaryk and the other socalled free thinlkers, are not appeaJ.ing to the Sl01Vakian
population.
Ma-. Noy,blad. Do they believe the world news, the
straight news given on those programs?
Father Botek. Well, the Slovallcian people listen eagerly to the news broadcasts by the Voice of America. However, once OT twice I .w itnessed the following incident. Slovakian listeners who listened to the program of the Voice
of America, said, after the news was over, just said, "Well,
turn it off because the news is over and they are now
going to stam their propaganda for the Czech Republic
and we do not want any Oze<!h Republic."
Mr. Norblad. Do you feel that the radio broadoasts are
doing some good behind the Iron Curtain?
Father Botek They certainly are of great use and
great efficiency but this efficiency would still be greater
if the rest of the pro.grams, except for the news, was also
adjusted to those two major feelings of the Slovakian
popufation, the religious feelin:g and the national feeling.
Mr. No:rlblad. Do you get the programs clearly or are
they j&mmed by the Soviets?
88
SLOVAKIA
Father Botek. The programs are being jammed but
on la11ger radio sets they still can be received and if the
transmission is jammed on one wave, on one b,and of the
radio,, it may ,be still tuned in on another one.
Mr. Feighan. There is, is there not, a very strict feeling of healthy nationalism within Slovakia?
Father Botek. Yes.
Mr. Feighan. And that of course. is the reason why
there has been some resentment to the broadcasts?
F1ather Botek. Yes. I also heard comments by listeners to the Radio Free Europe, and Voice of America programs to ·the effect that in spite of the fact that there are
almost one million SlO'Vitk immigrants in the United States,
who ha.ve their own homes there and national life in the
United States, these programs do not bring any reports on
the activities developed by these Slovak organi~atrons in
the United States; they only bring reports. of aotivities
of organi•z ations which are not sympathetic to the Slovak
people and, therefore, the Slova!kian population, in order
to learn of the activities of the Slov:ak organizations in
the United States, tune in on Radio Rome, which also
beams SlO'Vakian programs.
Mr. Feighan. Well, it is a pity that the pe-o:ple within
Slovak,ia are not acquainted with the tremendous contribution of the Slovakian immigrants to the culture and ciivic
development of our cotmtry. l!"'ather, would y;ou relate. in
a U.ttle more detail, if you are familiar with the fact that
the Communists in 1948, I believe, offered Slovakia the
opportunity to ·b ecome a Slovak S01Viet Republic?
Fiather Botek. That was actually in 1944 and 1945,
not in 1948. At that time this policy was promoted by the
S]pvaikian Communists, Husak and Novomesky. However,
Moscow disapproved. of this policy and, therefore, the
Slovakian Communists had to put up with Czecho-Slovakia, within which SlO'V•a!kia was to have broad autonomy,
self-rule.
Mr. Feighan. Was it no,t the Slo¥ak Government that refused rather than Moscow's refusing?
Father Botek. Naturally the Slovak Government was
SLOVAKIA
89
opposed to this idea since it was a Catholic Government.
Mr. Feighan. Well, you've got it both ways; now there
is only one way.
Flather Botek. I would like to explain this apparent
discrepancy. This was due to the fact that there was in
1944, there was a Sl,QIV'a)ldan Govemment of an independent Slovakian State which to some extent - whose sovereignty was to some extent restricted by Germans. When
the Communists started their wprising, in August 1944,
they tried to arouse the sympathies of the SlOIVa:k people
with promises of an independent Slovakian State but
within the framework of the S01Viet Socialist Repulblic. Rusruk and N ovomesky were leading organizers of the wprising in 1944. This policy of the Slovakian Communists,
however, was disapproved by Moscow.
Mr. Feighan. Is it not true thait because of the spirit
of healthy nationalism within Slovrukia that the Slovak
people would not accept the offer to be a part of the U. S.
S. R., ~a,use they knew that such a so-.called independence of Slo,vaikia would be national in structme only, but
in su!bstance it would be socialistic?
Father Botek This is possible. This is possilble, but
President Booes, who was at Moscow at that time, persuaded the Moscow leaders to drop that idea; and he made
also great concessions to the Russia,ns so that they considered it more profitruble for them to hruve a CzechoSlovak Republic rather than a small Slovakian Repulblic.
Mr. Feighan. F'ather, did thi s Communist Catholic Action still function between that time of its first meeting
in June 1949 until you left in Jll!Ile of 1951?
Father Botek. This Communist- sponsored Catholic
action prorved to be a complete failure. They still held an
anniversary meeting the following year but they didn't
celebra,te the foundation of thls Catholic Action in the
third year any more.
Mr. Kersten. I hope you understand, Father, that all of
ourr questions are asked in the spirit of inquiry regarding
the Communist aggression upon Slovakia. That is our
overall purpose, and thank you, Father, for the testimony.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
1
90
SLOVAKIA
TESTIMONY OF FATHER STEFAN NAHALKA
(The witness wa:s sworn. The same interipreter was utilized as for the previous witness.)
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Father Stefan N ahal!ka, is
Father Nahalka. Yes.
that correct?
Mr. McTigue. Were you born in Slovakia?
Father N ahalka. Yes.
Mir. McTigue. Were you ordained a priest in Slov,aJkia?
Father N ahalka. I studiied theology in Rome, so I was
ordained in Rome.
Mir. McTigue. And assigned to parish duties in Slovakia,
is that correct?
!Father Naha1ka. Since 1943, I was a'SSigned to duty in
Slovakia.
Mr. MicTigue. And at one time, Father, you were secretary to Bishop Vojtassa!k, is that correct?
Father Naha1ka. Yes, I was in that capacity from 1946
to 1949.
Mr. McTigue. Do you recall the uprising, so-called,
Father Nrahalka. Yes.
in Slovakia?
Mr. McTigue. When did the t11prising taike place?
Flather NahaLka. At the place in which I resided, the
uprising started on the 26th of August 1944, when this
town was occupied by Communist guerillas.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something aborut what
the guerillas did in that town?
Father Nrahalka. At that time I was chruplain at the
town of Ruio:miberoik and during the firist days of the
Communist uprising, the relbels forced the popll!lation, the
men in tha;t town, forcibly to join the rebel army even
though they were completely disiruterested and even opposed to the uprising. They also committed grave atroci~ies. In a valley called Podsucha, they murdered over 80
innocent people and buried them in a mass grave. In a
nea'Iiby village, the partisans mwdered without any connection with the military, a Catholic priest named Martin:ko. In the Lupca valley, the Communist guerillas tortured to death there a Catholic priest named Seda; they cut
SLOVAKIA
91
stri!Ps of hi,s skin from his back and finally even cut off
his genitals. Since the population was not in favor of the
uprising, the rebels used this deceptive propa,ganda to wm
the sympathles of the popul ation. To this end they spread
the rumor,s that the president of the Slovakian R~Ulbl,ic,
Dr. Tiso, was arrested and de1p orted by the Germans and
that, therefore, Slovrukia should arise.
Mr. McTigue. Father, in 1949, did each b:i,shop have a
political commissar assigned to him so that he could watch
over the bishop's activiities?
FaJther Naha1ka. In 1949, when the negotia,tions between the Communists and the Slovakian bishops broke
down, the Communists placed Communist commissars into
every ibishop's oftfice and they also placed one commissar
into Bishop Vojtassa:k's oft:Eice, who was a young Communist, ,a former tailor. He was approximately 24 years old
at that time, and t'here was aJil'Other Co:mmun,ist placed in
the main entrance to the ,b ishop's office who chooked on all
visitors at the bishop's office. The. commissar opened: the
bishop's mail, in- and out...going, and overheard all conversations the bishop had with his visitors and also acoompanied him on ,a ll his trips,. He also seized control O'Ver the
files of the bishop's office and he tooik out items firom
those files.
Mr. McTigue. Were the rooms in the hishoip's home,
for example, wired ?
Father N ahallm. There were no microphones in the
rooms of the bishoip's office because the commissar wa,s
present at all conversations, ibut I know orf a case. when the
Communists placed microphones in the conference room
for the bishop's conferences.
Mr. McTi,g ue. Were you secretary to Bishop Vojtassa.k
in 1949?
Father Nahalika. Well, I was secretary to Bishop Vojta:ssaik until January 1'949 and afterwards I lived in the
'Vicinity of the bish0tp's residence, in the priest's seminary.
Mr. McTigue. Were you arrested by the Communists,
Father?
1
Fruther N ahalika. I was arrested in December 1945 and
held in imprisonment until January 1946.
1
92
SLOVAKIA
,Mr. McTigue. When did you leaive Slovakia, Father?
-Father Nahalk,a. llll May 1953.
Mr. McTigue. That is a little more than a year ago.
Did you hawe any difficulty in getting out of Slovakia?
FaJther Nahiallk,a. Well, the crossing of the bo,rder was
very difficult. At first we had to wait fo~ 14 days for run
opportunity, for a favnrruble time to cross the border and
we had to ~ very cautious while crossing to a :border area
in which the border g,u ards are authorized to fire at anybody whom they see, without warning and finally we h,ad
to cut through the barbed wire fences directly on the
border.
Mr. Madden. Father Nahallka, when Father Boteik was
testifying, he mentioned something regarding certain broadcasts thaJt were cormng over the Voice of . Arrnerioa and
Radio Wree Europe; do you know anything regarding the
broadcasts th·a t come 01Ver? Do you have any knowldge
on th-at?
Father Nahallka. I was in hiding f.or two years with
the viarious people from almost all social striafa and during
this time I had ample opportUillity to 1isten to foreign
broadcasts.
Mr. Madden. Oou:ld you tell us regarding your knowledge of the hmadcasts that come into, Slovaikia?
Father Nruha.1':ma. The people in Slovakia eaigerly listen
to democriaitic broadcasts. However, the preferences a.re
different and also the foreign broadcasts axe hOON'ily
jammed by the Communists. The people in Slovakia listen
to news broadcasts in the Slovak language by Riadio Free
Europe, Voice of America and also BBC in London; however, they disaigree on many aspects in the poJ.i;tical comments broadcast from these stations. They are opposed
to the political part of the program of those broad~asts
mainly beca'll'Se they realize that such programs do not
state the entire Communist case in Slovakia.
Mr. Madden. You mean anti-Communist?
Father Nahalka. Are not efficient enough to inspire
anti.Communist feelinig or to keep up the ainti-Communist
attitude of the population. This opposition to the programs,
93
SLOVAKIA
the poJitical programs of those stations is due to the fact
that they do not appeal to the national and religious fee~
ings of the Slovakians and a.iso from the ideological viewpoint, there are some oibjections, since they are sometimes very much alike with the Communist propaganda.
'.Dhey teJl people who know, in these broadcasts, there are
people who formerly collaiborated with the Communists
and they are now talking aib,out anti-Communists. For instance, the reports of the so~called Slovia,kian national uprising was a very, very - was a great mistake. At the
time when the transmitters were still in operation, people
in Slovakia eagerly listened to an illegal transmitter called
the Wlhite Legion transmitter and the people in Slo;vakia also :5requently listened to the religious programs
broadoost by Radio Vatican.
IMr. Madden. Do yoo think the programs broadcast
by the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe do any
good - I mean, against the Communists?
Father Nahalka. These broadcasts have their effects
in the line of anti-communism, but especially thr01Ugh their
news which they broadlcast. However, they could be still
more efficient if they adjusted their political programs
also to the needs and desires of the Slovak population.
(Munich, Germany, June 26, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JAN DOBROTKA
Mr. McTigue. You are a Slovak, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. ¥ es.
iMr. McTigue. And you were 'bom on OctOlber 20, 1913
at Dechtice, Slovakia, is that correct?
Mr. Dolbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. During the Communist occupation of
SlovaJkia you were a master sergeant in the SiN.B, socalled, which is known as the Bureau of Internal Security,
is that correct?
Mr. Dob:mtka. Yes, sir.
Mr. McTigue. And you were a uniformed master sergeant in the Buireau of Internal Security from 1947 to
1951, is that correct?
Mr. Dobrotka. That is right.
1
94
SLOVAKIA
Mr. McTigue. Was the Bureau of Internal Security
completely controlled by the Communists,?
Mr. DobTOtka. As of 194'8 it was completely under
Communist control.
Mr. M'CTigue. But you were a member of the Bureau
of Internal Security prior to the time that it was under
Communist control, isn't that correct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Yes.
Mr. McTigue. And you were required to stay on as
a member of the Bureau of Internal Security after the
Communists got control, is that corerct?
Mr. Ddbrotka. Well, I was automatically taken over.
Mr. McTigiue. After the Bureau of Internal Security
was taiken over by the Communists, did you from time
to time receive orders to arrest priests, to make house
searches, and so forth and so on?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, I received such orders.
Mr. McTigue. Were there many of such arrests made?
Mr. Dobrotka. Many wealthy farmers were arrested.
Mr. McTigue. Can you tell us something about the
orders that were given to suppress and liquidate the Slovak Democratic Party members and the Slovak League?
Mr. Dobrotka. As of 1948 memlbers of the Democratic
Party were removed from all leadmg positioos in the administraJtion. The Slovak League was completely liquidated
because the Communists considered this organization a
swbversive and reactionary organizati'on, because it wa3
supporteq by the Slovak Leagiue of America.
iMr. McTigue. Did you ever rec{:ive orde~s to give close
supervision to the activity of certain parish priests in
Slovakia?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I recei,v ed such orders.
Mr. McTigue. What kind of orders were they?
iMr. Dobrotka. We received such orders through channels from the government down to our posts and such
orders arrived in sealed envelopes and were classified as
secret, and we were instructed to open these eI1JVeloipes only
u:pon special order by telephone.
!Mr. McTigue. Who were the men that actually handed
SLOVAKIA
95
you the orders, were they uniformed Soviet police or were
they plain-clothes men?
Mr. Dolbrotka. These were members of the uniformed
police. They were my immedia,te superiors and they related these orders to me.
Mr. McTigue. Iif you were instructed under sealed orders to report on certain priests, what kind of reports did
you m0lke,?
Mr. Dobrotka. Under these orders we were to Sllipervise the sernnons of priests and to report periodically on
whether there were any political aspects in those sermons by priests.
Mr. McTigue. Did you ever report, for example, that
there was any political significance to what a priest
had to say?
Mr. Dobrotka. I <know I sulbmitted annual reports to
this effect, and I can state approximately 60 to 70 percent
of the memlbers of the SNB did not reporit any priests
to their superiors. This was also due to the fact that the
priests were aware of the fact that they were Slllpervised
by the police and, therefore, they avoided any political
speeches within their sermons.
Mr. MoTigue. Did the same kind of procedure, that is
reporting on their activities, apply to businessmen and
peasants and the PQpulace in general?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; we received such orders to supervise the activities of the entire population, especially to
observe whether the former mem!bers of the partially liquidated Democratic Party developed any underground
acti<vities.
Mr. McTigue. Were many priests arrested and interned at the time you were in the Bureau of Internal
Security?
Mr. Ddbratka. From the entire district in which I
was active there were approximately three cases of arrests
of priests, however, not a single priest was arrested in the
area under my jurisdiction.
Mr. McTigue. Tha,t is because you kept reporting
to your superiors that the priests were only talking to
God, is that correct?
96
SLOVAKIA
Mr. Ddbrotka. That is right; there was no reason for
their arrest.
Mr. McTigue. When did you manage to esca,pe from
SlorvaJkia?
Mr. Dobrotka. On Deoomlber 3, 1951.
Mr. McTigue. Did yiou haive any troUJble in getting out of
Slorvalcia?
Mr. Dobrotka. No; I did not have any tro'Ulble in
escaping.
Mr. McTigue. You are now a member of the Labor
Service unit at Bad Kreuznach?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kersten. Any questions?
Mr. Busbey. When did you ·become a mem!ber of the
Bureau of Internal Security? Is that the correct name?
Mr. Dobrotka. In 1938. At that time the name of my
headquarterrs was Provincial Command of Gendarmerie,
which was under the Minister of Interior.
Mr. Buskey. That was in 1938?
Mr. DOlbrotlra. Yes, in 1938, at which time Slovakia became an independent state.
Mr. Busbey. Were you a memlber of the Communist
Party at that time in 1938?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir ; at that time memibers of the
gendarmerie were fonbidden to become memlbers of any
political parties.
Mr. Busbey. In what year was, it that you assumed
your duties of reporting on priesrts?
Mr. Dabrotka. That was after February 1948, at the
time when the Catholic Action was started.
Mr. Busbey. You were a member of the Communist
Party at that time ?
Mr. Dobrotka. No, sir.
Mr. Busbey. Were you ever a memlber of the Communist Party?
Mr. Dobrotka. In March 1948 all members orf the SNB
in order to protect their own existence were forced to file
an application fur mem'bership in the COIIDmunist Party.
Mr. BUS1bey. In order to saive your life, you had to
become a member of the Communi'St Party at that time?
SLOVAKIA
97
Inter:preter. He became a memiber in March 1M8, but
your previous quesltion was whether he was a member in
February 1948.
Mr. Busbey. Did you attend church prior to March
1948?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes; I did. I am a practical Catholic
and I attended Mass every Sunday.
Mr. Bustbey. And how rubout after March 1948?
Mr. Do!brotka. After March 1948 I continued attending Mass regularly, however, we were aware that from
that time on we were under supervision by the Communists, particularly all our contacts with priests, with the
local priest, local teacher and local government officer
were suspicious, because these persons were considered as
reactionary, and our activities and connections with the people were supervised by Communists spies which were set
on us by the Communist Party.
Mr. Busbey. Would you agree with me that the greatest bulrwark ag,ainst communism, and the hope of the whole
world for e:venrual elimination of communism and for
world peace, is the fact that the people, not only behind
the Iron Curtain, 'b ut all over the world, will continue to
belie:ve in God?
Mr. DO!brotka. This I 'believe.
Mr. Buslbey. In other words, as long as the people have
a deep-seated, strong belief in God, we can be sure that
we will eventually eradicate communism from the earth?
Mr. Dobrotka. Yes. May this ha,ppen as soon as
possilble.
Mr. Bus•bey. Thank you. No further questions.
(The witness was excused.)
(,Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
THE TESTIMONY OF JUR DETVIANSKY
Mr. Det'Vianslky was called a:nd duly sworn and testified through the Slo,vak interpreter as follows:
Mr. McTigue. Your name is Jur Detviansky?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTigue And you were born on September 6, 1919,
98
SLOVAKIA
in Slovakia in the village of Ladomila, is that correct?
_Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. You were a recorder of vital statistics
in the town of Deitv:a until August 1950, is that correct?
Mr. DetvfanSlky. That is correct.
Mr. McTigue. This is the time, of course,, that Slovakia was under the Communist domination or occupation?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
iMr. McTigue. Later you were an administrative officer at Zvolen until Septemlber 1951, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir.
,M r. McTi,gue. Were you discharged from this office
by the Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. McTig,ue. Why?
Mr. Detviansiky. As a politically unreliable person.
Mr. McTigue. In your ,p osition you know something
about the quotas which were set for the farmers lby the
Communists, is that correct?
Mr. Detviansiky. Yes.
Mr. Kersten. Will you speaJk a little louder in Slovaik
and in English.
Mr. McTigue. How were these quotas set?
Mr. Detrviansky. The quotas were estalbJished for individual farmers in the presence of a representative of the
Communist Party. The •p rinci:p le for this establishment,
this prescrilbing of quotas, was· to prescribe those quotas
to wealthy farmers in such a manner that nothing would
be left for their own needs. This policy was aimed at desiroying the independenec of farmers and forcing them to
join the farmers' cooperative wh[ch would make them the
farmers dependent on the Communists. To the same end
also several other measures were taken by the Communists, such as, for instance, that all laJbor force was taken
away from the farmers and transferred to industrial
pul'p()ses.
Mr. McTigue. So it was impossible for these farmers, big and small, to meet the quotas imposed by the
Communists, is that correct?
,M r. Detvianslky. At first the farmers managed to
meet the delivery quotas because they helped each other
SWVAKIA
99
in tendmg the soil. But later this task became imposs~b'l.e
to fttlfill and famJ.ers rubandoned. their farms and/ or were
arrested for not ful£illing their deliivery quotas.
~- McTigue. Can you give any examples which you
know of from your own personal knowledge, of how some
of the peasants on small farims reacted to the quotas?
Mr. Debviansky. There were several instances, but the
most significant of them was that which occurred at
Detva-lKostolna. It was on: Decemiber 5, 1951, when a farmer named Jan Ba/bic from despair because of the hard
delivery quotas prescriibed to him 1knifed his three children, 1, 3 and 5 years old. His wife and two older children succeeded in escaping his desperate aJCt. He committed
this action of despair because he stated that since they
took aiway from him everything they should take away
also his family.
Mr. McTigue. When did you escape to the West?
Mr. Detviansky. In Decemlber 1951.
Mr. McTigrue. And you are now a caiptain in one of
the Labor Service COIJ:Il!pany units at Kaiserslautern , is
that correct?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes.
Mr. No:rlblad. Is the treatment which you harve been
receiving here aH you expected?
Mr. Detvfansky. Well, the treatment l received here
meets my expectations, however, I am dissatisfied with the
slow progress of the struggle rugainst the Communists and
I am impatient to return to my home country.
Mr. Norblad. Many of us are quite dissatisfied with
the progress of OUI' fight against communism.
Mr. Kersten. In other words I understrund you feel
that the men, the young men of Slovakia as well as the
people of the other captive nations that are in the free
world would like to try to help the people ibaok in those
countries and your country to regain their fireedom, is
that right?
Mr. Detviansky. Yes, sir, the sooner the better.
Mr. Kersten. And you likewise feel that the young
main back behind the Iron Curtain, even those under arms,
100
S!LOVAIHA
would if they have the Oipportunity help get rid of Communists?
Mr. Detviansky. As far as Slovakia is concerned, I
can srtaite that since I was previously an active army officer and knew the mentality of the Sl01Vakian soldiers, I
can state that 90 percent orf the Slova,kian young men
would use such an oipportunity.
Mr. Kersten. Thank you.
The witness was. excused.
(Munich, Germany, June 29, 1954).
When the Kersten Committee pwblished its findings,
the Benes Czechs (Socialists), the Slovak renegades the Lettrich "democrats" - and the Reds began to scream
"murder!" That, of course, is quite understandaJble. For
the ladk of positive al'gument, they resort to the smear
technique, the usua,l line of the Reds. "CAS" (TIME) the official propaganda sheet of the Lettrich "we-got-6'2 %of-the,JSlovak-vote-in-1946" democrats, who actively collaborated with the Reds and Moscow from 1943 to Fe!bruary
25, 1948 - in its issue of February 1, 195:5, attaciked the
Kersten Committee and the testimony of most of the Slovak
witnesses, laJbeling the report "scandalous."
It is unfortunate that the Keraten Committee did not
call wpon the Lettrioh "democrats" to testify; the story
would have been more complete. At least Dr. Joseph Lettrich, "leader" of the Slovak "democrats," and Gen. Nicholas
Ferjencik, "non-!I)artisan" head of Lettrich's gestapo, should
have ,b een given the opportunity to confess that the "democrats" did .conclude agreements with the Reds in 1943 and
1945 to collaJborate closely on all issues. The Kersten Committee did a good job in the time allotted to it. The wol1k
initiated: should !be completed. Albove all else, leading Benes
Czechs (Socialists) and Lettrich "democrats" - former
members of the Communist-d ominated National Front government of Prague - should be girven the opportunity to
"sing"!
Dublin Core
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Title
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How the Communists Seized Slovakia (special issue)
Description
An account of the resource
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives<br /><ol><li>From the Special Report No. 8</li>
<li>Michael Galayda</li>
<li>Mr. and Mrs. Smrekovský</li>
<li>Dr. Joseph Paučo</li>
<li>Dr. Joseph Mikula</li>
<li>Philip A. Hrobák</li>
<li>Dr. Joseph A. Mikuš</li>
<li>Father Anton Botek</li>
<li>Father Stephen Náhalka</li>
<li>Ján Dobrotka</li>
<li>Jur Detviansky</li>
<li>Reaction of Beneš Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-Slovak Reds</li>
</ol>
Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14), March 1955<br />pp. 1-100
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1955
specialissue
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/289e982e1ea11932791357752174d95c.pdf
40d13f557c6a9506f09893826987ea60
PDF Text
Text
MARCH 1955
VOL. V
NO . 1 ( 14)
o,~:o STAT E
U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~
t
_; :L\UG 16 J960
LIBRAR'V
IN THIS ISSUE:
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on
Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives
1.
From the Special Report No . 8
2.
Michael Galayda
3.
Mr. and
4.
Dr. Joseph Pauco
Mr!l. Smrekovsky
5.
Dr. Joseph Mikula
6.
Philip A. Hrobak
7.
.Dr. Joseph A. Mikus
8.
Father Anton
9.
Father Stephen Nahalka
Botek
10.
Jan Dobrotka
11.
J ur
12.
Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-
Detviansky
Slovak Reds
*
•
Edited and compiled by
PHILIP - A. HROBAK
Published by
THE S LOVAK
LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�I'
SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote
a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and
i.nd ependence.
As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[
America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just
as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right
to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli<'atecl
to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose
the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian
political systems.
Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in
the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere.
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
MiclcIJetown , Pa.
CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently
in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich,
"The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e
the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s
shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s
in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT
own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept
as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not
true that these states have e v er corresponded to ,"
instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2.
line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e."
We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid
t h em in the future.
P,r inted in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa.
�
MARCH 1955
VOL. V
NO . 1 ( 14)
o,~:o STAT E
U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~
t
_; :L\UG 16 J960
LIBRAR'V
IN THIS ISSUE:
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on
Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives
1.
From the Special Report No . 8
2.
Michael Galayda
3.
Mr. and
4.
Dr. Joseph Pauco
Mr!l. Smrekovsky
5.
Dr. Joseph Mikula
6.
Philip A. Hrobak
7.
.Dr. Joseph A. Mikus
8.
Father Anton
9.
Father Stephen Nahalka
Botek
10.
Jan Dobrotka
11.
J ur
12.
Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-
Detviansky
Slovak Reds
*
•
Edited and compiled by
PHILIP - A. HROBAK
Published by
THE S LOVAK
LEAGUE OF AMERICA
�I'
SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote
a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and
i.nd ependence.
As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[
America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just
as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right
to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli<'atecl
to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose
the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian
political systems.
Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in
the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere.
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
MiclcIJetown , Pa.
CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently
in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich,
"The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e
the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s
shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s
in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT
own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept
as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not
true that these states have e v er corresponded to ,"
instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2.
line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e."
We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid
t h em in the future.
P,r inted in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1955, Vol. 5
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 14), March 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 2-3 (No. 15-16), June-September 1955.</li>
<li>Issue 4 (No. 17), December 1955.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1955
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
MARCH 1955
VOL. V
NO . 1 ( 14)
o,~:o STAT E
U ~1 sl qr=-,~. J; T~
t
_; :L\UG 16 J960
LIBRAR'V
IN THIS ISSUE:
HOW THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED S1LOVAKIA
From the testimony of witnesses before the Select Committee on
Communist Aggression of the House of Representatives
1.
From the Special Report No . 8
2.
Michael Galayda
3.
Mr. and
4.
Dr. Joseph Pauco
Mr!l. Smrekovsky
5.
Dr. Joseph Mikula
6.
Philip A. Hrobak
7.
.Dr. Joseph A. Mikus
8.
Father Anton
9.
Father Stephen Nahalka
Botek
10.
Jan Dobrotka
11.
J ur
12.
Reaction of Benes Czechs, Lettrich "Democrats" and Czecho-
Detviansky
Slovak Reds
*
•
Edited and compiled by
PHILIP - A. HROBAK
Published by
THE S LOVAK
LEAGUE OF AMERICA
I'
SLOVAKIA is prnblish d periodically by the Slovak Leaigue of Ameri ca, a cultural and civi c federation of Americans of Slovak descent.
The chief purpose of SLOV A_KIA is to promote
a better und,entanding and appreciation of the S lovak natio n and its long s truggl e for freedom and
i.nd ependence.
As Americans, memb er of the Slovak League o[
America firm ly believe that the Slovak nation, just
as all n,ations, has an inherent and God-given right
to freedom and inde,pend e nce. They are decli<'atecl
to the cause of the Am erican way nf life, Slovak freedom and world peace, ::rnd are determ ·ned to oppose
the plague of Co=unism and all other totalitarian
political systems.
Subscri•ption to SLOVAK IA is $1.00 per year in
the U. S. A. - $2 .00 elsewhere.
SLOVAKIA
Box 150
MiclcIJetown , Pa.
CORREC'l'ION - ln the pTevious issue of SLOVAKIA several mistakes were made inadvertently
in the ,a rticle written by Dr. George W. Cesarich,
"The Apo,s tles o.f Bogus Federa lism ." Please mak e
the foll01wing cor,rection s : p,g. 68, first three lin,e,s
shoul d r ead: "the, sufferings o,f subjugated nation s
in the artificial .states which th e Croats an.cl the S lovak,s definitely an,d finall y r efus e to accept as theiT
own", instead of " ... definitely anrl finally do ac cept
as their own;" p,g. 69 , par 3, lin e -1, to read "is not
true that these states have e v er corresponded to ,"
instead of "nev e r corres-ponded to;" pg. 73, par. 2.
line 2, " unc onceivable" should read "i ncon ceivabl e."
We regret the errors in printing and hope to avoid
t h em in the future.
P,r inted in the U. S. A.
JEDNOTA PRESS
Middletown , Pa.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (14)
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
March 1955
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/24e8fa8553d5868a5dbd5d6161ae2ee5.pdf
87c33b9236be42a4365e2bb736ebe2da
PDF Text
Text
Officers of the Slovak League of America
1
(Orwanized 1907 in Cleveland, Oh:io
•
Honorary President
Frances L. Mizenko
37 56 Lee R oad
Cleveland 28, Ohio
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1!143 W. 48th Street
Chica.go 9, lllinois
Stephen J . Tkach
173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
President
Philip
A.
Hrobak
P . 0 . Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Andrew J. Hamrock
61 Woodland Avenue
Camp bell, Ohio
Vice-President
Jacob Koci&
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J. Vargovich
1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
National President
First Catholic Slovak Union
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
Helen Kocan
1648 W . 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Constantine Culen
2900 East Boulevard
Clevaland 4, Ohio
Paul Fallat
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secreta.ry-Treasurer
Stephen J. Tkach
Milan V. Blazek
National President
Penna. Slovak Union
4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Anna Sotak
ational President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozboril
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .
ational President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKE
NOVINY
ZORNICKA
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Ill.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
SVORNOST
Pa.ssaic, N . J.
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa..
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
�GAN'S.ER LIBRARY
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
MfLLERSVILLE, PA. 17551
�
Officers of the Slovak League of America
1
(Orwanized 1907 in Cleveland, Oh:io
•
Honorary President
Frances L. Mizenko
37 56 Lee R oad
Cleveland 28, Ohio
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1!143 W. 48th Street
Chica.go 9, lllinois
Stephen J . Tkach
173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
President
Philip
A.
Hrobak
P . 0 . Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Andrew J. Hamrock
61 Woodland Avenue
Camp bell, Ohio
Vice-President
Jacob Koci&
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J. Vargovich
1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
National President
First Catholic Slovak Union
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
Helen Kocan
1648 W . 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Constantine Culen
2900 East Boulevard
Clevaland 4, Ohio
Paul Fallat
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secreta.ry-Treasurer
Stephen J. Tkach
Milan V. Blazek
National President
Penna. Slovak Union
4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Anna Sotak
ational President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozboril
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .
ational President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKE
NOVINY
ZORNICKA
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Ill.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
SVORNOST
Pa.ssaic, N . J.
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa..
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
�GAN'S.ER LIBRARY
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
MfLLERSVILLE, PA. 17551
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1956
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
Officers of the Slovak League of America
1
(Orwanized 1907 in Cleveland, Oh:io
•
Honorary President
Frances L. Mizenko
37 56 Lee R oad
Cleveland 28, Ohio
Dr. Peter P. H letko
1!143 W. 48th Street
Chica.go 9, lllinois
Stephen J . Tkach
173 N. Main Street
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.
President
Philip
A.
Hrobak
P . 0 . Box 150, Middletown, Pa.
Andrew J. Hamrock
61 Woodland Avenue
Camp bell, Ohio
Vice-President
Jacob Koci&
ADVISORY COUNCIL
Michael J. Vargovich
1547 -- 167th Street
Hammond, Ind.
National President
First Catholic Slovak Union
Vice-President
Julia Krajcovic
Helen Kocan
1648 W . 18th St., Chicago 8, Ill.
National President
First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Union
Recording Secretary
Constantine Culen
2900 East Boulevard
Clevaland 4, Ohio
Paul Fallat
National President
Slovak Catholic Sokol
Secreta.ry-Treasurer
Stephen J. Tkach
Milan V. Blazek
National President
Penna. Slovak Union
4922 S. Leclaire Avenue
Chicago 38, Ill.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Anna Sotak
ational President
Ladies Pennsylvania
Slovak Union
Paul P. Jamriska
810 Montooth Street
Pittsburgh 10, Pa.
John Rozboril
Joseph Prusa
205 Madison St., Passaic, N. J .
ational President
Slovak Catholic Cadet Union
SLOVAK NEWSPAPERS
( Affiliated with the Slovak League of America)
JEDNOTA
SLOVENSKA OBRANA
ZENSKA JEDNOTA
Middletown, Pa.
Scranton, Pa.
Cleveland, Ohio
BRATSTVO
SLOVENSKE
NOVINY
ZORNICKA
Cleveland, Ohio
Chicago, Ill.
KATOLiCKY SOKOL
SVORNOST
Pa.ssaic, N . J.
Whitaker, Pa.
OSADNE HLASY
Chicago, Ill.
Wilkes-Barre, Pa..
SLOVAK V AMERIKE
Whiting, Ind.
GAN'S.ER LIBRARY
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
MfLLERSVILLE, PA. 17551
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21)
Description
An account of the resource
includes photo of ruins of Spiš Castle
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/91b571fed5874142104665abf50bd5f2.pdf
90f8ab1d1e391715a4d6c875d90c1db7
PDF Text
Text
88
SLOVAKIA
Kerner's "Czechoslov~kia" (Cont'd.)
IDSTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
"With the formation of the Czecho,Slovak State, the Germans
refused to accept the new situation and to cooperate with the new
government at Prague" (p. 177) .
But the fact is that even though they were forced to
accept the situation, on various occasions the Sudetenlanders
showed their willingness to cooperate with Prague, but the
Czechs were not disposed to cooperate. "The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority,
naturally resented the new setup," Roucek tells us, which
is true, but the entire blame for the bad blood between the
Czechs and the Germans, could hardly be placed on the latter,
as Roucek would have us do. Masaryk and Benes and their
followers were responsible for what happened in and to
Czecho-Slovakia, because they practically ran the whole
show.
"But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included
in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the
Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All
history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations
demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken
the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central
Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia d6lsired to be united with the new
Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by the
Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German
Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria•
Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally
with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and
parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian
Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands." - (p. 178).
Roucek's tendency is obvious: the Czechs had a claim,
but the Germans did not. Bohemia, we know, was an independent kingdom until 1526; the Germans were no less a part
of it than were the Czechs. Roucek, however, tells us that
the territories settled by the Germans "were connected solely
as part and parcel of the "CZECH" State and not the BOHEMIAN Crown lands. What Benes and Masaryk submitted
to the Peace Conference to back their "claims" to the his-
�SLOVAKIA
89
toric frontiers of Bohemia is one thing, but the truth is something else. Roucek apparently preferred not to deal with
the latter. For his edification, I quote Robert Ingrim, eminent
journalist and author, who says that:
_ . . before Huss's reformation, Bohemia had been the scene of
the most felicitous Czech-German cooperation. Of this, Prague, one of
the most magnificent cities in Europe, is still a living witness. It must
be added that in those dark times, when people had not yet learned to
regard another language as a symptom of inferiority, no one spoke of
Czechs or 'G ermans. They were just Bohemians. This explains why no
two other races have more similarity than Czechs and Sudeten Germans. There was perpetual intermarriage and it became, in the towns,
purely accidental whether a family considered itself German or Czech.
The race which profited most by this close community were the Czechs
because the Germans had an older and more highly developed culture
and could draw from the great receptacle of the Germanies. The Czechs
as part and parcel of the Holy Roman Empire became entirely different
from Slavic peoples outside." ("After Hitler Stalin?" - 1946 - Bruce
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.; pp. 54-55) .
It is significant that Roucek did not include the works
of such eminent historians as C. A. Macartney and A. J. P.
Taylor, which shed much light on Bohemia and the Habsburg
Empire. Macartney, for example, says that Bohemia did
"become a member of the German Reich," whereas Roucek
claims that "the areas settled by the Germans were never,
of themselves, component parts of the German Reich," which
is a tricky way of putting it, to say the least. iHow many
students and teachers of history, using Kerner's "Czechoslovakia," noticed or paid any attention to Roucek's "of themselves," and if some did, what did they make of it? What
real claim did Masaryk and Benes have to the 3,231,688
Germans of Bohemia, the figure mentioned by Roucek (.p.
178)?
Furthermore, according to Roucek:
"The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the
game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany
in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks
and the 75,0'00,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in
Czecho-Slovakia, or the frontiers of that Repu'blic, or of the destiny
of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders.
It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire"
(p. 182).
Now this may have been the desire of Hitler after he
came to power. But why should Roucek consider the Sudete
�90
SLOVAKIA
problem only from this angle? The situation in 1938 may
have been ~s described, but what the Sudeten Germans themselves had to say about their treatment at the hands of the
Czechs from 1918 to 1938 is not at all worth mentioning
by Roucek. Furthermore, the debate certainly did not concern "11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks," as Roucek would have us
believe. The Slovaks had nothing to do with it; foreign policy
was dominated by Benes and the Czechs.
The Slovaks, we know, had their own arguments with
the Czechs. The Czechs under Masaryk and Benes were on
one side, while the non-Czech nationalities - the majority
of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - were on the opposite
side. The demands of these non-Czech nations may have
been, as Roucek says, "incompatible with the fundamental
principles of democracy as understood and practiced in
Czecho-Slovakia," nevertheless they were not incompatible
with natural rights and the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in genuinely democratic
countries.
The simple truth is that the Czechs, especially the
Masaryk-Bene s Czechs, did not learn the lesson of AustriaHungary. They followed Masaryk and Benes blindly, ruling
high and mighty over the non-Czech nations, in the fashion
of Stalin and Hitler.
" The problem of nationalism played no part In Slovak ia up to the
end of the eighteenth cen t ury because the official language of Hungary
was Latin" (p. 183) .
Following this line of reasoning, then, nationalism played
no part in any country, at any time, whenever the official
language of a country was any other than that of the inhabitants. Does professor Roucek really believe that? Writing about the period of Joseph II, when "Bohemian politics
of the nineteenth century received their first rehearsal," A.
J. P. Taylor says in his "The Habsburg Monarchy":
Even In Bohemia the Imperial nobility, which had been Imported
by the Habsburgs, cloaked their hostility to social reform In a display
of Bohemian patriotism , and in the ante-rooms of the >Habsburgi the!
descendants of German, ,Scottish, or Spanish adventurers ostentatiously
exchanged a few words of CZECH which they had laboriously learnt
from their stable-boys" (pp. 19-20).
�SLOVAKIA
91
This relates to the time that Roucek writes about (Joseph
died in 1790). What then was the official language of Bohemia, or of the Habsburg Empire up to the end of the eighteenth century?
"The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and
certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the
fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there
was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodza, a member of the R epublican Party
and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938" (p. 184).
If the Slovaks were not considered "as a minority" by
Prague, what were they considered? An equal partner, a
colony, a branch of the Czech nation? What does Roucek's
"attestation" prove? What were CZECH parties doing in
Slovakia? Does not Roucek know that the Slovaks selected
by Masaryk and Benes for cabinet or other posts did not
represent the will of the vast masses of the Slovak people?
We remember that Judas was one of the apostles, too. Masaryk and Benes could hardly make the new-born Republic
appear "Czecho-Slovak" without including several Slovaks
in their cabinets. But those Slovaks knew that they had to
serve the interests of Masaryk and Benes, the interests of the
Czechs, if · they wanted to keep their posts. Every one of
them repudiated the right of their own nation to freedom
and political independence, nay, even autonomy (states'
rights). What kind of Slovaks were they, if not "Judas"
Slovaks? Dr. Milan Hod.fa was a smart politician; he knew
what was best for Milan Hod.fa. He served Masaryk and Benes
well for decades, but, in the end, was made the scapegoat
of Munich, being discarded by Benes, as were so many
other Slovaks and Czechs who got out of line with the policies of Masaryk and Benes. (Pergler, Stfibrny, Beran, Osusky, etc.).
"The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their
expression, however, in the Slovak Populist Party of Father Andrej
Hlinka, wt-lose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the
Civil War" (p. 184) .
Roucek, however, omitted to mention that Hlinka was
joined in "the autonomist tendencies" by the Lutheran minister and poet, Martin Razus, Slovak patriot and head of
�92
SLOVAKIA
the Slovak National Party. Biased historians propagate the
idea that only the Slovak Catholics fought for autonomy
(states' rights) :in Slovakia.
What does Mr. Roucek mean when he says that Hlinka's
policies "can be underst.ood best when we recall the demands
for stat.es' rights in the United Stat.es which culminated in
the Civil War"? In the first place, does it make sense to
compare the relationship between the individual 48 States
to the United States and the relationship of Slovakia to
Czecho-Slovakia? Demands by how many states and for
what states' rights culminated in the Civil War? Do not the
States comprising the United States have their rights defined and secured by the Constitution of the U. S. A.? What
states' rights did Slovakia have guaranteed and secured by
the Czecho-Slovak Constitution of Masaryk and Benes, which,
in fact , even denied the existence of the Slovak nation? Or
is it possible that Mr. Roucek wants us to believe that
Hlinka's .policies advocated slavery? It is quite obvious that
Roucek did not know Hlinka and his policies!
"The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated politically for
one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized,
Influenced by German and Western thought and technical development.
The Slovaks, on the contrary, r emained agriculturists and under a
Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally
Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during
their national struggle against the Catholic tHabsburgs had earned
the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being irreligious" (pp.
184-185).
Roucek and other pro-Czech historians like to dwell on
the theme that the Czechs and Slovaks were "separated politically for one thousand years," but somehow always forget
to tell when and under what conditions the Czechs and
Slovaks were ever united politically or otherwise. They also
favor the theme that the Czechs were "largely industrialized,"
while the Slovaks "remained agriculturists," but never have
an explanation for the fact that Slovakia was more industrialized under the Magyars of Hungary than it was under Masaryk and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. The tendency is only too
obvious!
The Czechs, it is true, did not fare badly under the Germans (Austria); the Slovaks suffered incomparably greater
�SLOVAKIA
93
political and economic oppression under the Magyars of
Hungary. The culture of the Slovaks, however, was not
"Magyar (that is, Eastern)," as Roucek maintains. The
Slovaks evidently knew the Czechs better than Roucek did.
Many Czechs were undoubtedly "nominally Roman Catholics," hut many times many mOTe became so-called "progressive" Roman Catholics, having succumbed to the influence of Huss, Palacky, Rieger, Havlicek, Masaryk and
Benes. The Slovaks did not consider the Czechs "irreligious"
because they fought against the "Catholic Ha:bsburgs," but
rather because they repudiated the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church and deeply insulted the religious feelings of
the Slovak people by destroying religious monuments, removing crucifixes from classrooms, etc., soon after Masaryk
and Benes took over the reins of the Czecho-Slova k State.
Roucek may not like to admit it, nevertheless the possibility does exist that the Slovaks could have regarded the
Czechs as "irreligious" also for denying the existence of the
Slovak nation and its inherent and God-given right to freedom and political independence. Or is it possible that Roucek
believes that recognition of and respect for the natural
rights of nations does not come under the title of religion?
"Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high,
the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low In
1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from
the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of
them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too
matter-of-fact, methods . . . When, during the eourse of time, Slovaks
became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of
whom had married and settled down" (p. 185).
By what standards or statistics professor Roucek was
influenced, I do not know, but I honestly believe that his
statement regarding the literacy of the Slovaks in 1919 is
highly exaggerated. How low is very low? What were the
"well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fac t, methods" of
Czech intellectuals which antagonized the Slovaks? Is it not
significant that Roucek has no sympathy for the many
Slovaks who, during the course of time, did become available, got married and had children, but could hardly settle
down in their own homeland, because the jobs they had been
trained for were taken by Czechs? R. W. Seton-Watson , the
�94
SLOVAKIA
Czech propagandi st, admits much more in his "The New
Slovakia" (Fr. Borovy, Prague; 1924) ; I heartily recommend
it to Roucek and to all readers of Kerner's "Czechoslo vakia."
The fact is that Prague sent about 110,000 Czechs to Slovakia
to do jobs which the Slovaks themselves could have done
erusily and effectively.
Roucek asks "what was the Pittsburgh Agreement ?"
and then answers the typical Masaryk-B enes way, using
Ivan Derer's (the Judas Slovak) "The Unity of the Czechs
and Slovaks" (Prague, 1938) and Benes's "Central European
Observer" (Dec. 16, 1938) as his "catechism s"! It is evident
that Roucek never even saw a copy of the original, because
he dates the Pittsburgh Agreement June 30, 1918, instead of
May 30, 1918, the same mistake made by other Czech propagandists, including T. G. Masaryk (Svet.ova Revoluce, p.
262) and professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University
of Colorado, author of "Czechoslovakia in European mstory" (Princeton University Press, 1953) and editor of the
"Journal of Central European Affairs." Roucek does not
produce the full text of the Pittsburgh Agreement , but simply states:
"These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk,
agreed that Slovakia should 'have her own administrativ e system, her
own diet and her own courts, (and that) the Slovak
the official language in the schools, In the public
affairs generally'. Actually the points in agreement
ried out - except the one stipulating the setting up
kia."
language should be
offices and public
were virtually carof a diet for Slova-
Roucek, however, does not tell the whole story about
the Pittsburgh Agreement . By presenting only the Czech
side and omitting the Slovak side of it, he proves himself
partial and prejudiced. Without the support of the Slovaks,
T. G. Masaryk knew that his proposed "Czecho-Sl ovakia"
was doomed. There was no way of contacting the Slovaks
at home (in Hungary at that time), hence he came to the
United States to seek the support of Americans of Slovak
descent; also the support of Americans of Czech descent,
since the Czechs at home did not react favorably to Masaryk's
plan to destroy Austria-Hu ngary and to establish CzechoSlovakia.
The weightiest objection to Masaryk's plan was that
�SLOVAKIA
95
about six and a half million Czechs would hardly make a
.state fit to live, even if they were allowed to swallow three
and a half million Germans in order to obtain the historical
frontiers of the Bohemian kingdom. To meet this argument,
Robert Ing,rirn tells us ("After Hitler Stalin" - ip. 80):
"Masaryk invented the fiction that the Czechs and Slovaks were the
same, that is Czecho-Slovaks, thus claiming a large part of Hungary for
his new state. As this discovery failed to impress the Allies, he enlisted
the support of the Americans of Slovakian descent. Disliking the Magyars, who . . . had not given them a fair deal, they favored the idea
of separating Slovakia from Hungary. But sufficiently history conscious,
they rejected emphatically the theory of the Czecho-Slovak race."
Americans of Slovak descent did not put much trust in
Masaryk's oral pronouncements and promises. They remembered that the Magyars had made quite a few promises to
the Slovaks and never kept them. When Masaryk came to
America to gain the support of the citizens of Slovak descent,
the latter insisted on a written guaranree that Slovakia would
enjoy full autonomy (states' rights) within the proposed
Czecho-Slovakian republic. The result was the Pittsburgh
Agreement or Convention which Masaryk drafted and signed
during a meeting of representatives of Slovak and Czech
organizations at Pittsburgh, Pa., May 30, 1918. Masaryk,
however, repudiated it soon after he and Benes took over
the reins of the Czecho-Slovak State. To refute Slovakia's
claim for autonomy, Masaryk wrote in 1925:
"It (the Pittsburgh Convention) was concluded in order to appease
a small Slovak fraction which was dreaming of God knows what sort
of independence for Slovakia ... I signed the agreement unhesitatingly
because it was a local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks between themselves'' (SVETOV.A REVOLUCE, p . 262).
To attain a "Czecho-Slovak" majority in the proposed
Czecho-Slovak Republic T. G. Masaryk did not hesitate to
resort to• falsehood and dishonesty. How else can we explain
his preposterous statement that the Pittsburgh Agreement
was only a "local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks
between themselves"!
What need did .Amerkan Crechs and Slovaks have for
such an agreement? And if Masaryk actually did think it was
only a "local agreement" between Americans, why did he,
a foreigner, even consider drafting and signing it? iHe con-
�96
SLOVAKIA
eluded the agreement, he says, "in order to appease a small
SWVAK fraction which was dreaming of God knows what
sort of independence for Slovakia," but the fact is that the
Slovaks at that Pittsburgh meeting represented an overwhelming majority of organized Slovaks in America. And
what sort of independence for Slovakia could they possibly
be dreaming of when Masaryk himself told them that CzechoSlovakia would be modeled after the United States or Switzerland?
In 1918, T. G. Masaryk presented the Pittsburgh Convention to President Woodrow Wilson as a solemn treaty
between the Slovaks and the Czechs to induce him to grant
official recognition to the Czech and Slovak union and its
provisional government. Wilson would hardly have been
charmed by Masaryk to destroy Austria if Masaryk had described the Pittsburgh convention, in 1918, in the disparaging
terms he set in the record in 1925. The "great" Masaryk,
who so persistently insisted on the truth in all things, obviously lied to President Wilson and the Slovaks!
By saying that "actually the points in agreement were
virtually carried out - except the one stipulating the setting
up of a diet for Slovakia," professor Roucek admits that he
does not know what went on in Czecho-Slovakia and, hence,
is hardly qualified to write with authority about that country, and especially the Slovak portion of it. The fact is that
the Masaryk and Benes regimes were deaf to the just demand
of the Slovaks that the Pittsburgh Convention be honored
by the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and, hence,
both were responsible for the consequences. The relations
between the Czechs and the Slovaks were actually worse
in 1938 than they were in 1918.
(More Coming)
• • •
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�
88
SLOVAKIA
Kerner's "Czechoslov~kia" (Cont'd.)
IDSTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
"With the formation of the Czecho,Slovak State, the Germans
refused to accept the new situation and to cooperate with the new
government at Prague" (p. 177) .
But the fact is that even though they were forced to
accept the situation, on various occasions the Sudetenlanders
showed their willingness to cooperate with Prague, but the
Czechs were not disposed to cooperate. "The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority,
naturally resented the new setup," Roucek tells us, which
is true, but the entire blame for the bad blood between the
Czechs and the Germans, could hardly be placed on the latter,
as Roucek would have us do. Masaryk and Benes and their
followers were responsible for what happened in and to
Czecho-Slovakia, because they practically ran the whole
show.
"But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included
in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the
Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All
history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations
demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken
the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central
Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia d6lsired to be united with the new
Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by the
Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German
Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria•
Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally
with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and
parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian
Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands." - (p. 178).
Roucek's tendency is obvious: the Czechs had a claim,
but the Germans did not. Bohemia, we know, was an independent kingdom until 1526; the Germans were no less a part
of it than were the Czechs. Roucek, however, tells us that
the territories settled by the Germans "were connected solely
as part and parcel of the "CZECH" State and not the BOHEMIAN Crown lands. What Benes and Masaryk submitted
to the Peace Conference to back their "claims" to the his-
�SLOVAKIA
89
toric frontiers of Bohemia is one thing, but the truth is something else. Roucek apparently preferred not to deal with
the latter. For his edification, I quote Robert Ingrim, eminent
journalist and author, who says that:
_ . . before Huss's reformation, Bohemia had been the scene of
the most felicitous Czech-German cooperation. Of this, Prague, one of
the most magnificent cities in Europe, is still a living witness. It must
be added that in those dark times, when people had not yet learned to
regard another language as a symptom of inferiority, no one spoke of
Czechs or 'G ermans. They were just Bohemians. This explains why no
two other races have more similarity than Czechs and Sudeten Germans. There was perpetual intermarriage and it became, in the towns,
purely accidental whether a family considered itself German or Czech.
The race which profited most by this close community were the Czechs
because the Germans had an older and more highly developed culture
and could draw from the great receptacle of the Germanies. The Czechs
as part and parcel of the Holy Roman Empire became entirely different
from Slavic peoples outside." ("After Hitler Stalin?" - 1946 - Bruce
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.; pp. 54-55) .
It is significant that Roucek did not include the works
of such eminent historians as C. A. Macartney and A. J. P.
Taylor, which shed much light on Bohemia and the Habsburg
Empire. Macartney, for example, says that Bohemia did
"become a member of the German Reich," whereas Roucek
claims that "the areas settled by the Germans were never,
of themselves, component parts of the German Reich," which
is a tricky way of putting it, to say the least. iHow many
students and teachers of history, using Kerner's "Czechoslovakia," noticed or paid any attention to Roucek's "of themselves," and if some did, what did they make of it? What
real claim did Masaryk and Benes have to the 3,231,688
Germans of Bohemia, the figure mentioned by Roucek (.p.
178)?
Furthermore, according to Roucek:
"The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the
game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany
in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks
and the 75,0'00,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in
Czecho-Slovakia, or the frontiers of that Repu'blic, or of the destiny
of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders.
It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire"
(p. 182).
Now this may have been the desire of Hitler after he
came to power. But why should Roucek consider the Sudete
�90
SLOVAKIA
problem only from this angle? The situation in 1938 may
have been ~s described, but what the Sudeten Germans themselves had to say about their treatment at the hands of the
Czechs from 1918 to 1938 is not at all worth mentioning
by Roucek. Furthermore, the debate certainly did not concern "11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks," as Roucek would have us
believe. The Slovaks had nothing to do with it; foreign policy
was dominated by Benes and the Czechs.
The Slovaks, we know, had their own arguments with
the Czechs. The Czechs under Masaryk and Benes were on
one side, while the non-Czech nationalities - the majority
of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - were on the opposite
side. The demands of these non-Czech nations may have
been, as Roucek says, "incompatible with the fundamental
principles of democracy as understood and practiced in
Czecho-Slovakia," nevertheless they were not incompatible
with natural rights and the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in genuinely democratic
countries.
The simple truth is that the Czechs, especially the
Masaryk-Bene s Czechs, did not learn the lesson of AustriaHungary. They followed Masaryk and Benes blindly, ruling
high and mighty over the non-Czech nations, in the fashion
of Stalin and Hitler.
" The problem of nationalism played no part In Slovak ia up to the
end of the eighteenth cen t ury because the official language of Hungary
was Latin" (p. 183) .
Following this line of reasoning, then, nationalism played
no part in any country, at any time, whenever the official
language of a country was any other than that of the inhabitants. Does professor Roucek really believe that? Writing about the period of Joseph II, when "Bohemian politics
of the nineteenth century received their first rehearsal," A.
J. P. Taylor says in his "The Habsburg Monarchy":
Even In Bohemia the Imperial nobility, which had been Imported
by the Habsburgs, cloaked their hostility to social reform In a display
of Bohemian patriotism , and in the ante-rooms of the >Habsburgi the!
descendants of German, ,Scottish, or Spanish adventurers ostentatiously
exchanged a few words of CZECH which they had laboriously learnt
from their stable-boys" (pp. 19-20).
�SLOVAKIA
91
This relates to the time that Roucek writes about (Joseph
died in 1790). What then was the official language of Bohemia, or of the Habsburg Empire up to the end of the eighteenth century?
"The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and
certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the
fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there
was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodza, a member of the R epublican Party
and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938" (p. 184).
If the Slovaks were not considered "as a minority" by
Prague, what were they considered? An equal partner, a
colony, a branch of the Czech nation? What does Roucek's
"attestation" prove? What were CZECH parties doing in
Slovakia? Does not Roucek know that the Slovaks selected
by Masaryk and Benes for cabinet or other posts did not
represent the will of the vast masses of the Slovak people?
We remember that Judas was one of the apostles, too. Masaryk and Benes could hardly make the new-born Republic
appear "Czecho-Slovak" without including several Slovaks
in their cabinets. But those Slovaks knew that they had to
serve the interests of Masaryk and Benes, the interests of the
Czechs, if · they wanted to keep their posts. Every one of
them repudiated the right of their own nation to freedom
and political independence, nay, even autonomy (states'
rights). What kind of Slovaks were they, if not "Judas"
Slovaks? Dr. Milan Hod.fa was a smart politician; he knew
what was best for Milan Hod.fa. He served Masaryk and Benes
well for decades, but, in the end, was made the scapegoat
of Munich, being discarded by Benes, as were so many
other Slovaks and Czechs who got out of line with the policies of Masaryk and Benes. (Pergler, Stfibrny, Beran, Osusky, etc.).
"The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their
expression, however, in the Slovak Populist Party of Father Andrej
Hlinka, wt-lose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the
Civil War" (p. 184) .
Roucek, however, omitted to mention that Hlinka was
joined in "the autonomist tendencies" by the Lutheran minister and poet, Martin Razus, Slovak patriot and head of
�92
SLOVAKIA
the Slovak National Party. Biased historians propagate the
idea that only the Slovak Catholics fought for autonomy
(states' rights) :in Slovakia.
What does Mr. Roucek mean when he says that Hlinka's
policies "can be underst.ood best when we recall the demands
for stat.es' rights in the United Stat.es which culminated in
the Civil War"? In the first place, does it make sense to
compare the relationship between the individual 48 States
to the United States and the relationship of Slovakia to
Czecho-Slovakia? Demands by how many states and for
what states' rights culminated in the Civil War? Do not the
States comprising the United States have their rights defined and secured by the Constitution of the U. S. A.? What
states' rights did Slovakia have guaranteed and secured by
the Czecho-Slovak Constitution of Masaryk and Benes, which,
in fact , even denied the existence of the Slovak nation? Or
is it possible that Mr. Roucek wants us to believe that
Hlinka's .policies advocated slavery? It is quite obvious that
Roucek did not know Hlinka and his policies!
"The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated politically for
one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized,
Influenced by German and Western thought and technical development.
The Slovaks, on the contrary, r emained agriculturists and under a
Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally
Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during
their national struggle against the Catholic tHabsburgs had earned
the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being irreligious" (pp.
184-185).
Roucek and other pro-Czech historians like to dwell on
the theme that the Czechs and Slovaks were "separated politically for one thousand years," but somehow always forget
to tell when and under what conditions the Czechs and
Slovaks were ever united politically or otherwise. They also
favor the theme that the Czechs were "largely industrialized,"
while the Slovaks "remained agriculturists," but never have
an explanation for the fact that Slovakia was more industrialized under the Magyars of Hungary than it was under Masaryk and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. The tendency is only too
obvious!
The Czechs, it is true, did not fare badly under the Germans (Austria); the Slovaks suffered incomparably greater
�SLOVAKIA
93
political and economic oppression under the Magyars of
Hungary. The culture of the Slovaks, however, was not
"Magyar (that is, Eastern)," as Roucek maintains. The
Slovaks evidently knew the Czechs better than Roucek did.
Many Czechs were undoubtedly "nominally Roman Catholics," hut many times many mOTe became so-called "progressive" Roman Catholics, having succumbed to the influence of Huss, Palacky, Rieger, Havlicek, Masaryk and
Benes. The Slovaks did not consider the Czechs "irreligious"
because they fought against the "Catholic Ha:bsburgs," but
rather because they repudiated the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church and deeply insulted the religious feelings of
the Slovak people by destroying religious monuments, removing crucifixes from classrooms, etc., soon after Masaryk
and Benes took over the reins of the Czecho-Slova k State.
Roucek may not like to admit it, nevertheless the possibility does exist that the Slovaks could have regarded the
Czechs as "irreligious" also for denying the existence of the
Slovak nation and its inherent and God-given right to freedom and political independence. Or is it possible that Roucek
believes that recognition of and respect for the natural
rights of nations does not come under the title of religion?
"Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high,
the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low In
1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from
the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of
them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too
matter-of-fact, methods . . . When, during the eourse of time, Slovaks
became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of
whom had married and settled down" (p. 185).
By what standards or statistics professor Roucek was
influenced, I do not know, but I honestly believe that his
statement regarding the literacy of the Slovaks in 1919 is
highly exaggerated. How low is very low? What were the
"well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fac t, methods" of
Czech intellectuals which antagonized the Slovaks? Is it not
significant that Roucek has no sympathy for the many
Slovaks who, during the course of time, did become available, got married and had children, but could hardly settle
down in their own homeland, because the jobs they had been
trained for were taken by Czechs? R. W. Seton-Watson , the
�94
SLOVAKIA
Czech propagandi st, admits much more in his "The New
Slovakia" (Fr. Borovy, Prague; 1924) ; I heartily recommend
it to Roucek and to all readers of Kerner's "Czechoslo vakia."
The fact is that Prague sent about 110,000 Czechs to Slovakia
to do jobs which the Slovaks themselves could have done
erusily and effectively.
Roucek asks "what was the Pittsburgh Agreement ?"
and then answers the typical Masaryk-B enes way, using
Ivan Derer's (the Judas Slovak) "The Unity of the Czechs
and Slovaks" (Prague, 1938) and Benes's "Central European
Observer" (Dec. 16, 1938) as his "catechism s"! It is evident
that Roucek never even saw a copy of the original, because
he dates the Pittsburgh Agreement June 30, 1918, instead of
May 30, 1918, the same mistake made by other Czech propagandists, including T. G. Masaryk (Svet.ova Revoluce, p.
262) and professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University
of Colorado, author of "Czechoslovakia in European mstory" (Princeton University Press, 1953) and editor of the
"Journal of Central European Affairs." Roucek does not
produce the full text of the Pittsburgh Agreement , but simply states:
"These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk,
agreed that Slovakia should 'have her own administrativ e system, her
own diet and her own courts, (and that) the Slovak
the official language in the schools, In the public
affairs generally'. Actually the points in agreement
ried out - except the one stipulating the setting up
kia."
language should be
offices and public
were virtually carof a diet for Slova-
Roucek, however, does not tell the whole story about
the Pittsburgh Agreement . By presenting only the Czech
side and omitting the Slovak side of it, he proves himself
partial and prejudiced. Without the support of the Slovaks,
T. G. Masaryk knew that his proposed "Czecho-Sl ovakia"
was doomed. There was no way of contacting the Slovaks
at home (in Hungary at that time), hence he came to the
United States to seek the support of Americans of Slovak
descent; also the support of Americans of Czech descent,
since the Czechs at home did not react favorably to Masaryk's
plan to destroy Austria-Hu ngary and to establish CzechoSlovakia.
The weightiest objection to Masaryk's plan was that
�SLOVAKIA
95
about six and a half million Czechs would hardly make a
.state fit to live, even if they were allowed to swallow three
and a half million Germans in order to obtain the historical
frontiers of the Bohemian kingdom. To meet this argument,
Robert Ing,rirn tells us ("After Hitler Stalin" - ip. 80):
"Masaryk invented the fiction that the Czechs and Slovaks were the
same, that is Czecho-Slovaks, thus claiming a large part of Hungary for
his new state. As this discovery failed to impress the Allies, he enlisted
the support of the Americans of Slovakian descent. Disliking the Magyars, who . . . had not given them a fair deal, they favored the idea
of separating Slovakia from Hungary. But sufficiently history conscious,
they rejected emphatically the theory of the Czecho-Slovak race."
Americans of Slovak descent did not put much trust in
Masaryk's oral pronouncements and promises. They remembered that the Magyars had made quite a few promises to
the Slovaks and never kept them. When Masaryk came to
America to gain the support of the citizens of Slovak descent,
the latter insisted on a written guaranree that Slovakia would
enjoy full autonomy (states' rights) within the proposed
Czecho-Slovakian republic. The result was the Pittsburgh
Agreement or Convention which Masaryk drafted and signed
during a meeting of representatives of Slovak and Czech
organizations at Pittsburgh, Pa., May 30, 1918. Masaryk,
however, repudiated it soon after he and Benes took over
the reins of the Czecho-Slovak State. To refute Slovakia's
claim for autonomy, Masaryk wrote in 1925:
"It (the Pittsburgh Convention) was concluded in order to appease
a small Slovak fraction which was dreaming of God knows what sort
of independence for Slovakia ... I signed the agreement unhesitatingly
because it was a local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks between themselves'' (SVETOV.A REVOLUCE, p . 262).
To attain a "Czecho-Slovak" majority in the proposed
Czecho-Slovak Republic T. G. Masaryk did not hesitate to
resort to• falsehood and dishonesty. How else can we explain
his preposterous statement that the Pittsburgh Agreement
was only a "local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks
between themselves"!
What need did .Amerkan Crechs and Slovaks have for
such an agreement? And if Masaryk actually did think it was
only a "local agreement" between Americans, why did he,
a foreigner, even consider drafting and signing it? iHe con-
�96
SLOVAKIA
eluded the agreement, he says, "in order to appease a small
SWVAK fraction which was dreaming of God knows what
sort of independence for Slovakia," but the fact is that the
Slovaks at that Pittsburgh meeting represented an overwhelming majority of organized Slovaks in America. And
what sort of independence for Slovakia could they possibly
be dreaming of when Masaryk himself told them that CzechoSlovakia would be modeled after the United States or Switzerland?
In 1918, T. G. Masaryk presented the Pittsburgh Convention to President Woodrow Wilson as a solemn treaty
between the Slovaks and the Czechs to induce him to grant
official recognition to the Czech and Slovak union and its
provisional government. Wilson would hardly have been
charmed by Masaryk to destroy Austria if Masaryk had described the Pittsburgh convention, in 1918, in the disparaging
terms he set in the record in 1925. The "great" Masaryk,
who so persistently insisted on the truth in all things, obviously lied to President Wilson and the Slovaks!
By saying that "actually the points in agreement were
virtually carried out - except the one stipulating the setting
up of a diet for Slovakia," professor Roucek admits that he
does not know what went on in Czecho-Slovakia and, hence,
is hardly qualified to write with authority about that country, and especially the Slovak portion of it. The fact is that
the Masaryk and Benes regimes were deaf to the just demand
of the Slovaks that the Pittsburgh Convention be honored
by the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and, hence,
both were responsible for the consequences. The relations
between the Czechs and the Slovaks were actually worse
in 1938 than they were in 1918.
(More Coming)
• • •
He1p expose the political monstrosity that was CzechoSlov;aJkia by getting the SLOV'AK NEWSLEITER to as
many Americans as possible. Renew youT subscriptions
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1956
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88
SLOVAKIA
Kerner's "Czechoslov~kia" (Cont'd.)
IDSTORY OR PROPAGANDA?
P.A. HROBAK
"With the formation of the Czecho,Slovak State, the Germans
refused to accept the new situation and to cooperate with the new
government at Prague" (p. 177) .
But the fact is that even though they were forced to
accept the situation, on various occasions the Sudetenlanders
showed their willingness to cooperate with Prague, but the
Czechs were not disposed to cooperate. "The Germans, reduced from the position of dominance to that of a minority,
naturally resented the new setup," Roucek tells us, which
is true, but the entire blame for the bad blood between the
Czechs and the Germans, could hardly be placed on the latter,
as Roucek would have us do. Masaryk and Benes and their
followers were responsible for what happened in and to
Czecho-Slovakia, because they practically ran the whole
show.
"But why did the Czechs ask that this hostile element be included
in their state? In the memorandum which the Czechs submitted to the
Peace Conference, they claimed the historic frontiers of Bohemia. All
history showed, they argued, and economic and strategic considerations
demanded, that the historic Lands of the Bohemian Crown should remain a single unit. The exclusion of the Sudete areas would have broken
the virtually indissoluble geographical and economic ties with central
Bohemia. The Germans of Bohemia d6lsired to be united with the new
Austrian Republic and not with the Reich. The areas settled by the
Germans were never, of themselves, component parts of the German
Reich nor were they independent elements in the former Austria•
Hungary. So far as these territories were connected constitutionally
with the Holy Roman Empire, they were connected solely as part and
parcel of the Czech State, consisting of the Lands of the Bohemian
Crown, and only as an entity with those Lands." - (p. 178).
Roucek's tendency is obvious: the Czechs had a claim,
but the Germans did not. Bohemia, we know, was an independent kingdom until 1526; the Germans were no less a part
of it than were the Czechs. Roucek, however, tells us that
the territories settled by the Germans "were connected solely
as part and parcel of the "CZECH" State and not the BOHEMIAN Crown lands. What Benes and Masaryk submitted
to the Peace Conference to back their "claims" to the his-
SLOVAKIA
89
toric frontiers of Bohemia is one thing, but the truth is something else. Roucek apparently preferred not to deal with
the latter. For his edification, I quote Robert Ingrim, eminent
journalist and author, who says that:
_ . . before Huss's reformation, Bohemia had been the scene of
the most felicitous Czech-German cooperation. Of this, Prague, one of
the most magnificent cities in Europe, is still a living witness. It must
be added that in those dark times, when people had not yet learned to
regard another language as a symptom of inferiority, no one spoke of
Czechs or 'G ermans. They were just Bohemians. This explains why no
two other races have more similarity than Czechs and Sudeten Germans. There was perpetual intermarriage and it became, in the towns,
purely accidental whether a family considered itself German or Czech.
The race which profited most by this close community were the Czechs
because the Germans had an older and more highly developed culture
and could draw from the great receptacle of the Germanies. The Czechs
as part and parcel of the Holy Roman Empire became entirely different
from Slavic peoples outside." ("After Hitler Stalin?" - 1946 - Bruce
Publishing Company, Milwaukee, Wis.; pp. 54-55) .
It is significant that Roucek did not include the works
of such eminent historians as C. A. Macartney and A. J. P.
Taylor, which shed much light on Bohemia and the Habsburg
Empire. Macartney, for example, says that Bohemia did
"become a member of the German Reich," whereas Roucek
claims that "the areas settled by the Germans were never,
of themselves, component parts of the German Reich," which
is a tricky way of putting it, to say the least. iHow many
students and teachers of history, using Kerner's "Czechoslovakia," noticed or paid any attention to Roucek's "of themselves," and if some did, what did they make of it? What
real claim did Masaryk and Benes have to the 3,231,688
Germans of Bohemia, the figure mentioned by Roucek (.p.
178)?
Furthermore, according to Roucek:
"The whole problem of the Sudete Germans was a counter in the
game of power politics and a part of the larger problem of Germany
in Europe. It was not a debate between the 11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks
and the 75,0'00,000 Germans concerning the treatment of Germans in
Czecho-Slovakia, or the frontiers of that Repu'blic, or of the destiny
of the national fragments which remained outside the German borders.
It was a question of the desire of Germany to establish a new empire"
(p. 182).
Now this may have been the desire of Hitler after he
came to power. But why should Roucek consider the Sudete
90
SLOVAKIA
problem only from this angle? The situation in 1938 may
have been ~s described, but what the Sudeten Germans themselves had to say about their treatment at the hands of the
Czechs from 1918 to 1938 is not at all worth mentioning
by Roucek. Furthermore, the debate certainly did not concern "11,000,000 Czecho-Slovaks," as Roucek would have us
believe. The Slovaks had nothing to do with it; foreign policy
was dominated by Benes and the Czechs.
The Slovaks, we know, had their own arguments with
the Czechs. The Czechs under Masaryk and Benes were on
one side, while the non-Czech nationalities - the majority
of the population of Czecho-Slovakia - were on the opposite
side. The demands of these non-Czech nations may have
been, as Roucek says, "incompatible with the fundamental
principles of democracy as understood and practiced in
Czecho-Slovakia," nevertheless they were not incompatible
with natural rights and the fundamental principles of democracy as understood and practiced in genuinely democratic
countries.
The simple truth is that the Czechs, especially the
Masaryk-Bene s Czechs, did not learn the lesson of AustriaHungary. They followed Masaryk and Benes blindly, ruling
high and mighty over the non-Czech nations, in the fashion
of Stalin and Hitler.
" The problem of nationalism played no part In Slovak ia up to the
end of the eighteenth cen t ury because the official language of Hungary
was Latin" (p. 183) .
Following this line of reasoning, then, nationalism played
no part in any country, at any time, whenever the official
language of a country was any other than that of the inhabitants. Does professor Roucek really believe that? Writing about the period of Joseph II, when "Bohemian politics
of the nineteenth century received their first rehearsal," A.
J. P. Taylor says in his "The Habsburg Monarchy":
Even In Bohemia the Imperial nobility, which had been Imported
by the Habsburgs, cloaked their hostility to social reform In a display
of Bohemian patriotism , and in the ante-rooms of the >Habsburgi the!
descendants of German, ,Scottish, or Spanish adventurers ostentatiously
exchanged a few words of CZECH which they had laboriously learnt
from their stable-boys" (pp. 19-20).
SLOVAKIA
91
This relates to the time that Roucek writes about (Joseph
died in 1790). What then was the official language of Bohemia, or of the Habsburg Empire up to the end of the eighteenth century?
"The Slovaks were not considered as a minority by Prague, and
certainly not by the Slovaks themselves. This is attested to by the
fact that the Czech parties had their adherents in Slovakia, that there
was no discrimination against the inclusion of Slovaks in various cabinets, and that Dr. Milan Hodza, a member of the R epublican Party
and a Slovak, headed the cabinets from 1935 to 1938" (p. 184).
If the Slovaks were not considered "as a minority" by
Prague, what were they considered? An equal partner, a
colony, a branch of the Czech nation? What does Roucek's
"attestation" prove? What were CZECH parties doing in
Slovakia? Does not Roucek know that the Slovaks selected
by Masaryk and Benes for cabinet or other posts did not
represent the will of the vast masses of the Slovak people?
We remember that Judas was one of the apostles, too. Masaryk and Benes could hardly make the new-born Republic
appear "Czecho-Slovak" without including several Slovaks
in their cabinets. But those Slovaks knew that they had to
serve the interests of Masaryk and Benes, the interests of the
Czechs, if · they wanted to keep their posts. Every one of
them repudiated the right of their own nation to freedom
and political independence, nay, even autonomy (states'
rights). What kind of Slovaks were they, if not "Judas"
Slovaks? Dr. Milan Hod.fa was a smart politician; he knew
what was best for Milan Hod.fa. He served Masaryk and Benes
well for decades, but, in the end, was made the scapegoat
of Munich, being discarded by Benes, as were so many
other Slovaks and Czechs who got out of line with the policies of Masaryk and Benes. (Pergler, Stfibrny, Beran, Osusky, etc.).
"The autonomist tendencies of the Catholic Slovaks found their
expression, however, in the Slovak Populist Party of Father Andrej
Hlinka, wt-lose policies can be understood best when we recall the demands for states' rights in the United States which culminated in the
Civil War" (p. 184) .
Roucek, however, omitted to mention that Hlinka was
joined in "the autonomist tendencies" by the Lutheran minister and poet, Martin Razus, Slovak patriot and head of
92
SLOVAKIA
the Slovak National Party. Biased historians propagate the
idea that only the Slovak Catholics fought for autonomy
(states' rights) :in Slovakia.
What does Mr. Roucek mean when he says that Hlinka's
policies "can be underst.ood best when we recall the demands
for stat.es' rights in the United Stat.es which culminated in
the Civil War"? In the first place, does it make sense to
compare the relationship between the individual 48 States
to the United States and the relationship of Slovakia to
Czecho-Slovakia? Demands by how many states and for
what states' rights culminated in the Civil War? Do not the
States comprising the United States have their rights defined and secured by the Constitution of the U. S. A.? What
states' rights did Slovakia have guaranteed and secured by
the Czecho-Slovak Constitution of Masaryk and Benes, which,
in fact , even denied the existence of the Slovak nation? Or
is it possible that Mr. Roucek wants us to believe that
Hlinka's .policies advocated slavery? It is quite obvious that
Roucek did not know Hlinka and his policies!
"The Czechs and the Slovaks had been separated politically for
one thousand years. The former had become very largely industrialized,
Influenced by German and Western thought and technical development.
The Slovaks, on the contrary, r emained agriculturists and under a
Magyar (that is, Eastern) type of culture. The Czechs were nominally
Roman Catholics, and those who opposed Roman Catholicism during
their national struggle against the Catholic tHabsburgs had earned
the reputation in the eyes of devout Slovaks of being irreligious" (pp.
184-185).
Roucek and other pro-Czech historians like to dwell on
the theme that the Czechs and Slovaks were "separated politically for one thousand years," but somehow always forget
to tell when and under what conditions the Czechs and
Slovaks were ever united politically or otherwise. They also
favor the theme that the Czechs were "largely industrialized,"
while the Slovaks "remained agriculturists," but never have
an explanation for the fact that Slovakia was more industrialized under the Magyars of Hungary than it was under Masaryk and Benes of Czecho-Slovakia. The tendency is only too
obvious!
The Czechs, it is true, did not fare badly under the Germans (Austria); the Slovaks suffered incomparably greater
SLOVAKIA
93
political and economic oppression under the Magyars of
Hungary. The culture of the Slovaks, however, was not
"Magyar (that is, Eastern)," as Roucek maintains. The
Slovaks evidently knew the Czechs better than Roucek did.
Many Czechs were undoubtedly "nominally Roman Catholics," hut many times many mOTe became so-called "progressive" Roman Catholics, having succumbed to the influence of Huss, Palacky, Rieger, Havlicek, Masaryk and
Benes. The Slovaks did not consider the Czechs "irreligious"
because they fought against the "Catholic Ha:bsburgs," but
rather because they repudiated the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church and deeply insulted the religious feelings of
the Slovak people by destroying religious monuments, removing crucifixes from classrooms, etc., soon after Masaryk
and Benes took over the reins of the Czecho-Slova k State.
Roucek may not like to admit it, nevertheless the possibility does exist that the Slovaks could have regarded the
Czechs as "irreligious" also for denying the existence of the
Slovak nation and its inherent and God-given right to freedom and political independence. Or is it possible that Roucek
believes that recognition of and respect for the natural
rights of nations does not come under the title of religion?
"Whereas the standard of literacy among the Czechs was high,
the percentage of Slovaks who could read and write was very low In
1919. For that reason, many officials, teachers, and intellectuals from
the Czech regions had to be sent to Slovakia in 1918-1919, and many of
them antagonized the Slovaks with their well-intentioned, but often too
matter-of-fact, methods . . . When, during the eourse of time, Slovaks
became available, it was not easy to dismiss the Czechs, many of
whom had married and settled down" (p. 185).
By what standards or statistics professor Roucek was
influenced, I do not know, but I honestly believe that his
statement regarding the literacy of the Slovaks in 1919 is
highly exaggerated. How low is very low? What were the
"well-intentioned, but often too matter-of-fac t, methods" of
Czech intellectuals which antagonized the Slovaks? Is it not
significant that Roucek has no sympathy for the many
Slovaks who, during the course of time, did become available, got married and had children, but could hardly settle
down in their own homeland, because the jobs they had been
trained for were taken by Czechs? R. W. Seton-Watson , the
94
SLOVAKIA
Czech propagandi st, admits much more in his "The New
Slovakia" (Fr. Borovy, Prague; 1924) ; I heartily recommend
it to Roucek and to all readers of Kerner's "Czechoslo vakia."
The fact is that Prague sent about 110,000 Czechs to Slovakia
to do jobs which the Slovaks themselves could have done
erusily and effectively.
Roucek asks "what was the Pittsburgh Agreement ?"
and then answers the typical Masaryk-B enes way, using
Ivan Derer's (the Judas Slovak) "The Unity of the Czechs
and Slovaks" (Prague, 1938) and Benes's "Central European
Observer" (Dec. 16, 1938) as his "catechism s"! It is evident
that Roucek never even saw a copy of the original, because
he dates the Pittsburgh Agreement June 30, 1918, instead of
May 30, 1918, the same mistake made by other Czech propagandists, including T. G. Masaryk (Svet.ova Revoluce, p.
262) and professor S. Harrison Thomson of the University
of Colorado, author of "Czechoslovakia in European mstory" (Princeton University Press, 1953) and editor of the
"Journal of Central European Affairs." Roucek does not
produce the full text of the Pittsburgh Agreement , but simply states:
"These American Czechs and Slovaks, together with Dr. Masaryk,
agreed that Slovakia should 'have her own administrativ e system, her
own diet and her own courts, (and that) the Slovak
the official language in the schools, In the public
affairs generally'. Actually the points in agreement
ried out - except the one stipulating the setting up
kia."
language should be
offices and public
were virtually carof a diet for Slova-
Roucek, however, does not tell the whole story about
the Pittsburgh Agreement . By presenting only the Czech
side and omitting the Slovak side of it, he proves himself
partial and prejudiced. Without the support of the Slovaks,
T. G. Masaryk knew that his proposed "Czecho-Sl ovakia"
was doomed. There was no way of contacting the Slovaks
at home (in Hungary at that time), hence he came to the
United States to seek the support of Americans of Slovak
descent; also the support of Americans of Czech descent,
since the Czechs at home did not react favorably to Masaryk's
plan to destroy Austria-Hu ngary and to establish CzechoSlovakia.
The weightiest objection to Masaryk's plan was that
SLOVAKIA
95
about six and a half million Czechs would hardly make a
.state fit to live, even if they were allowed to swallow three
and a half million Germans in order to obtain the historical
frontiers of the Bohemian kingdom. To meet this argument,
Robert Ing,rirn tells us ("After Hitler Stalin" - ip. 80):
"Masaryk invented the fiction that the Czechs and Slovaks were the
same, that is Czecho-Slovaks, thus claiming a large part of Hungary for
his new state. As this discovery failed to impress the Allies, he enlisted
the support of the Americans of Slovakian descent. Disliking the Magyars, who . . . had not given them a fair deal, they favored the idea
of separating Slovakia from Hungary. But sufficiently history conscious,
they rejected emphatically the theory of the Czecho-Slovak race."
Americans of Slovak descent did not put much trust in
Masaryk's oral pronouncements and promises. They remembered that the Magyars had made quite a few promises to
the Slovaks and never kept them. When Masaryk came to
America to gain the support of the citizens of Slovak descent,
the latter insisted on a written guaranree that Slovakia would
enjoy full autonomy (states' rights) within the proposed
Czecho-Slovakian republic. The result was the Pittsburgh
Agreement or Convention which Masaryk drafted and signed
during a meeting of representatives of Slovak and Czech
organizations at Pittsburgh, Pa., May 30, 1918. Masaryk,
however, repudiated it soon after he and Benes took over
the reins of the Czecho-Slovak State. To refute Slovakia's
claim for autonomy, Masaryk wrote in 1925:
"It (the Pittsburgh Convention) was concluded in order to appease
a small Slovak fraction which was dreaming of God knows what sort
of independence for Slovakia ... I signed the agreement unhesitatingly
because it was a local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks between themselves'' (SVETOV.A REVOLUCE, p . 262).
To attain a "Czecho-Slovak" majority in the proposed
Czecho-Slovak Republic T. G. Masaryk did not hesitate to
resort to• falsehood and dishonesty. How else can we explain
his preposterous statement that the Pittsburgh Agreement
was only a "local agreement of American Czechs and Slovaks
between themselves"!
What need did .Amerkan Crechs and Slovaks have for
such an agreement? And if Masaryk actually did think it was
only a "local agreement" between Americans, why did he,
a foreigner, even consider drafting and signing it? iHe con-
96
SLOVAKIA
eluded the agreement, he says, "in order to appease a small
SWVAK fraction which was dreaming of God knows what
sort of independence for Slovakia," but the fact is that the
Slovaks at that Pittsburgh meeting represented an overwhelming majority of organized Slovaks in America. And
what sort of independence for Slovakia could they possibly
be dreaming of when Masaryk himself told them that CzechoSlovakia would be modeled after the United States or Switzerland?
In 1918, T. G. Masaryk presented the Pittsburgh Convention to President Woodrow Wilson as a solemn treaty
between the Slovaks and the Czechs to induce him to grant
official recognition to the Czech and Slovak union and its
provisional government. Wilson would hardly have been
charmed by Masaryk to destroy Austria if Masaryk had described the Pittsburgh convention, in 1918, in the disparaging
terms he set in the record in 1925. The "great" Masaryk,
who so persistently insisted on the truth in all things, obviously lied to President Wilson and the Slovaks!
By saying that "actually the points in agreement were
virtually carried out - except the one stipulating the setting
up of a diet for Slovakia," professor Roucek admits that he
does not know what went on in Czecho-Slovakia and, hence,
is hardly qualified to write with authority about that country, and especially the Slovak portion of it. The fact is that
the Masaryk and Benes regimes were deaf to the just demand
of the Slovaks that the Pittsburgh Convention be honored
by the Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and, hence,
both were responsible for the consequences. The relations
between the Czechs and the Slovaks were actually worse
in 1938 than they were in 1918.
(More Coming)
• • •
He1p expose the political monstrosity that was CzechoSlov;aJkia by getting the SLOV'AK NEWSLEITER to as
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Professor Kerner's "CZECHOSLOVAKIA": History or Propaganda? (5/8)
Description
An account of the resource
P. A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 88-96
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
Relation
A related resource
continued from <a href="/items/show/213">Vol. 6, No. 2 (19), pp. 61-64</a><br />continues in <a href="/items/show/251">Vol. 7, No. 1 (22), pp. 59-64</a>
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9843ecdca4096265cc4fb2022a13eb49.pdf
42ff8cdfb2154da3f2bfedd6c328972b
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
86
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ>resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-
�86
SLOVAKIA
ty of Done; in the fifteenth it belonged to Pankrac of Lip-.
:tovsky Svaty Miku:las and then to Peter KiomO'.rovsky. The
county administratorrs resided there. In 1433 Starohrad
W<3JS taken by the Czech Hussites who came from Bohemia
to ra.vage and plunder Slovaikia. King Mathias took the
castle from Komorovsky and had it completely destroyed
in 1474. Little remains of the ruins today, but Starohrad
lives on in many legends.
The 'brook called Sestrca separates the fortress of
Sielnica, with its historical Starohrad, from the mighty
cliff of 2ipov; with the .passage of years it cut a narrow
but deep valley. People say that when King Mathias besieged Starohrad, his army encamped Oiil 2ipov, cannonaded :Starohrad with such foTce that the walls giwe in. One
of the cannon balls, the story goes, flew all the way to
Sielnica, and since that time the inhab,itants of Sielnica
claim the entire cliff as, their property, even though they
a.re separated from it by three communit>ie~.
People of the community of St. Ann also have pre~
served a legend 8Jbout Starohrad. They say that Starohrad
was at one time besieged by unknown enemies, who were
as numerous as flies, so that one could not even see a
blade of grass on the slope beneath the castle.. Try as they
might, however, they could not ta;ke the castle. That is, at
least, not until love ,prompted treason. People say that the
daughter of Starohrad's owner fell in love with one of the
lrnights of the besieging army and one .night threw him the
keys to the main gate. And that is the way the enemy was
able to get in:to fue courtyard of the castle.
The Joni of the castie, however, as is always the C8Jse
in such legends, was ,prepared for su~h an eventuality. He
and hi!S family escruped through an underground passage.
It was only after they were '3afe from the enemy that the
lord learned that the castle was betrayed by his own daughter. Thereupon he flew into a great rage and cursed her.
And a father's curse is never without effect. The unfor...
tunate girl wandered about the ruins of Starohrad for
seven years, longingly awaiting her liberation. The people
of the vicinity, however, would have nothing to do with her
and ke;pt their distance from her. Well, ,i t so happened that
�SLOVAKIA
87
a certain shepherd finally did get UJP enough courage to
talk to, the cursed girl.
She begged him to help her and liberate her from the
infinite sufferings. The shepheTd promised that he would
come to the same spot the very next day and when she ap,peairs in :the form of a pig, he would snatch the golden
1keys
from her snout. She ,i n turn ;promised him to reveal
the spot on rS'tarohrad where her father had concealed a
great treasure when he was attacked by the enemy, which
would be his ~eward.
'l'he $hepherd did as he had promised. He came to
the spot, but when a pig did maJke its aippearance, fear overcame him and he began to shake all over. The pig was so
ugly that he .took to flight. The pig, however, ran after
him. ln terror the shepherd shouted: "Would to God that
you wouid vanish!" Right then and there the apparition
sto[Pped and said "Now you did it; you cursed me even
more." And with that the girl did ,v anish, leaving not a
single trace behind herself.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Let me be allowed to point to the example given by
Dr. H. Ripka ... It was no accident that he was entrusted
with the leadership of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that
he was entrusted with the care of our foreign press and radio, that he was entrusted to negotiate an agreement of our
alliamce with the Soviet Union, that he was the head of
practically ail negotiation s by which the foundation was
placed for the greatest success of our national revolution,
the transfer of Germans from our lands. And neither was it
an accident, but it emanated from the stand of our brethren,
that it was a National Socialist who was unanimous ly
elected as president of the State Council of our parliament
abroad, that a National Socialist was the Chairman of the
British-Cze choslovak Friendship Society, that a National
Socialist was the Chairman of the Society to cultivate cultural and economical contacts with the USSR." - (J. Firt,
a Benes Czech, in the SVOBODN E SLOVO, 3-2-47).
�
SLOVAKIA
86
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ>resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-
�86
SLOVAKIA
ty of Done; in the fifteenth it belonged to Pankrac of Lip-.
:tovsky Svaty Miku:las and then to Peter KiomO'.rovsky. The
county administratorrs resided there. In 1433 Starohrad
W<3JS taken by the Czech Hussites who came from Bohemia
to ra.vage and plunder Slovaikia. King Mathias took the
castle from Komorovsky and had it completely destroyed
in 1474. Little remains of the ruins today, but Starohrad
lives on in many legends.
The 'brook called Sestrca separates the fortress of
Sielnica, with its historical Starohrad, from the mighty
cliff of 2ipov; with the .passage of years it cut a narrow
but deep valley. People say that when King Mathias besieged Starohrad, his army encamped Oiil 2ipov, cannonaded :Starohrad with such foTce that the walls giwe in. One
of the cannon balls, the story goes, flew all the way to
Sielnica, and since that time the inhab,itants of Sielnica
claim the entire cliff as, their property, even though they
a.re separated from it by three communit>ie~.
People of the community of St. Ann also have pre~
served a legend 8Jbout Starohrad. They say that Starohrad
was at one time besieged by unknown enemies, who were
as numerous as flies, so that one could not even see a
blade of grass on the slope beneath the castle.. Try as they
might, however, they could not ta;ke the castle. That is, at
least, not until love ,prompted treason. People say that the
daughter of Starohrad's owner fell in love with one of the
lrnights of the besieging army and one .night threw him the
keys to the main gate. And that is the way the enemy was
able to get in:to fue courtyard of the castle.
The Joni of the castie, however, as is always the C8Jse
in such legends, was ,prepared for su~h an eventuality. He
and hi!S family escruped through an underground passage.
It was only after they were '3afe from the enemy that the
lord learned that the castle was betrayed by his own daughter. Thereupon he flew into a great rage and cursed her.
And a father's curse is never without effect. The unfor...
tunate girl wandered about the ruins of Starohrad for
seven years, longingly awaiting her liberation. The people
of the vicinity, however, would have nothing to do with her
and ke;pt their distance from her. Well, ,i t so happened that
�SLOVAKIA
87
a certain shepherd finally did get UJP enough courage to
talk to, the cursed girl.
She begged him to help her and liberate her from the
infinite sufferings. The shepheTd promised that he would
come to the same spot the very next day and when she ap,peairs in :the form of a pig, he would snatch the golden
1keys
from her snout. She ,i n turn ;promised him to reveal
the spot on rS'tarohrad where her father had concealed a
great treasure when he was attacked by the enemy, which
would be his ~eward.
'l'he $hepherd did as he had promised. He came to
the spot, but when a pig did maJke its aippearance, fear overcame him and he began to shake all over. The pig was so
ugly that he .took to flight. The pig, however, ran after
him. ln terror the shepherd shouted: "Would to God that
you wouid vanish!" Right then and there the apparition
sto[Pped and said "Now you did it; you cursed me even
more." And with that the girl did ,v anish, leaving not a
single trace behind herself.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Let me be allowed to point to the example given by
Dr. H. Ripka ... It was no accident that he was entrusted
with the leadership of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that
he was entrusted with the care of our foreign press and radio, that he was entrusted to negotiate an agreement of our
alliamce with the Soviet Union, that he was the head of
practically ail negotiation s by which the foundation was
placed for the greatest success of our national revolution,
the transfer of Germans from our lands. And neither was it
an accident, but it emanated from the stand of our brethren,
that it was a National Socialist who was unanimous ly
elected as president of the State Council of our parliament
abroad, that a National Socialist was the Chairman of the
British-Cze choslovak Friendship Society, that a National
Socialist was the Chairman of the Society to cultivate cultural and economical contacts with the USSR." - (J. Firt,
a Benes Czech, in the SVOBODN E SLOVO, 3-2-47).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1956
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
86
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ>resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-
86
SLOVAKIA
ty of Done; in the fifteenth it belonged to Pankrac of Lip-.
:tovsky Svaty Miku:las and then to Peter KiomO'.rovsky. The
county administratorrs resided there. In 1433 Starohrad
W<3JS taken by the Czech Hussites who came from Bohemia
to ra.vage and plunder Slovaikia. King Mathias took the
castle from Komorovsky and had it completely destroyed
in 1474. Little remains of the ruins today, but Starohrad
lives on in many legends.
The 'brook called Sestrca separates the fortress of
Sielnica, with its historical Starohrad, from the mighty
cliff of 2ipov; with the .passage of years it cut a narrow
but deep valley. People say that when King Mathias besieged Starohrad, his army encamped Oiil 2ipov, cannonaded :Starohrad with such foTce that the walls giwe in. One
of the cannon balls, the story goes, flew all the way to
Sielnica, and since that time the inhab,itants of Sielnica
claim the entire cliff as, their property, even though they
a.re separated from it by three communit>ie~.
People of the community of St. Ann also have pre~
served a legend 8Jbout Starohrad. They say that Starohrad
was at one time besieged by unknown enemies, who were
as numerous as flies, so that one could not even see a
blade of grass on the slope beneath the castle.. Try as they
might, however, they could not ta;ke the castle. That is, at
least, not until love ,prompted treason. People say that the
daughter of Starohrad's owner fell in love with one of the
lrnights of the besieging army and one .night threw him the
keys to the main gate. And that is the way the enemy was
able to get in:to fue courtyard of the castle.
The Joni of the castie, however, as is always the C8Jse
in such legends, was ,prepared for su~h an eventuality. He
and hi!S family escruped through an underground passage.
It was only after they were '3afe from the enemy that the
lord learned that the castle was betrayed by his own daughter. Thereupon he flew into a great rage and cursed her.
And a father's curse is never without effect. The unfor...
tunate girl wandered about the ruins of Starohrad for
seven years, longingly awaiting her liberation. The people
of the vicinity, however, would have nothing to do with her
and ke;pt their distance from her. Well, ,i t so happened that
SLOVAKIA
87
a certain shepherd finally did get UJP enough courage to
talk to, the cursed girl.
She begged him to help her and liberate her from the
infinite sufferings. The shepheTd promised that he would
come to the same spot the very next day and when she ap,peairs in :the form of a pig, he would snatch the golden
1keys
from her snout. She ,i n turn ;promised him to reveal
the spot on rS'tarohrad where her father had concealed a
great treasure when he was attacked by the enemy, which
would be his ~eward.
'l'he $hepherd did as he had promised. He came to
the spot, but when a pig did maJke its aippearance, fear overcame him and he began to shake all over. The pig was so
ugly that he .took to flight. The pig, however, ran after
him. ln terror the shepherd shouted: "Would to God that
you wouid vanish!" Right then and there the apparition
sto[Pped and said "Now you did it; you cursed me even
more." And with that the girl did ,v anish, leaving not a
single trace behind herself.
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"Let me be allowed to point to the example given by
Dr. H. Ripka ... It was no accident that he was entrusted
with the leadership of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that
he was entrusted with the care of our foreign press and radio, that he was entrusted to negotiate an agreement of our
alliamce with the Soviet Union, that he was the head of
practically ail negotiation s by which the foundation was
placed for the greatest success of our national revolution,
the transfer of Germans from our lands. And neither was it
an accident, but it emanated from the stand of our brethren,
that it was a National Socialist who was unanimous ly
elected as president of the State Council of our parliament
abroad, that a National Socialist was the Chairman of the
British-Cze choslovak Friendship Society, that a National
Socialist was the Chairman of the Society to cultivate cultural and economical contacts with the USSR." - (J. Firt,
a Benes Czech, in the SVOBODN E SLOVO, 3-2-47).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Castles of Slovakia: Starohrad (The Old Castle) of Liptov
Description
An account of the resource
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 85-87
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
castles
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8c8271043711a370d1b4805931454a70.pdf
6e7755d23ce59000907d2f5a4f0ddd75
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
83
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)
• • •
1856 -
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -
1956
P.A. HROBAK
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs
�84
SLOVAKIA
(Yugoslavs) ; this, of course, was disproved by the studies of ,S kultety and Pastrnek. iin his last work, relating
to the Slovak language and other Slovanic languages,
Czambel systematically dealt with Slovak dialects, beginning with the eastern. He had intended to• add several volumes to show the relationship between the other Slovamic
languages and the Slavak - to the preparation of which
he had devoted years of study - but, unfortunately, illhealth and death overtook Czambel ,b efore he could com-.
plete the planned monumental philological work.
Because Samuel Czam:bel was employed as an official
in a Magyar ministry, and because he had written a ibrochure in Magyar (1902) - even though in favor of the
Slova!k language - he was accused by some writers of being a Magyarcme. The truth is, however, that those write:rs were more influenced by the fact that Czambel ref1Used
to accept the "Czecho-Slo!Vak" theory a!bout the "unity"
of the !Slovaks and Czechs than they were by his Magyar
brochure.
In regard to that Magyar brochure, Dr. Jo8e[)h Skul-i
tety, the grand old defender of :Slovruk history, philology
and culture, had this to say in the "'Slovenske Pohl'ady"
(1923):
"We saw no reason why we should write against this
iMagyar brochure. Were we supposed to write agairnst its
author because he wanted to. have a dean, ,g enuine Slovruk language? Or because he wanted to a.iid it wherever it
needed it? That here 'in politics' he goes a bit too far, well,
that is his business; Dr. Czambel al,w ays stood out so indiividually that we have no right to concern ourselves
a-bout him."
Objective observers will not deny that Czamlbel did
serve the Slova;k caJUSe; he did not serve -Magyarism or Ma...
gyarization as a jobholder in the Ma:gyar ministry, or with
his linguistic theory and his patriotic Slovak verses. In
spirit Czambel was Sloivak, even thoogh he did study in
Vienna and P;r ague·. But a Slovak intellectual could not
easily get the kind of work he ,prepared for in Hungary.
Czambel's father, as a Justice of the Peace in Sloven.ska
tU1pCa, was an acquaintance of Bela Griinwald, who w~
�SLOVAKIA
86
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ>resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-
�
SLOVAKIA
83
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)
• • •
1856 -
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -
1956
P.A. HROBAK
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs
�84
SLOVAKIA
(Yugoslavs) ; this, of course, was disproved by the studies of ,S kultety and Pastrnek. iin his last work, relating
to the Slovak language and other Slovanic languages,
Czambel systematically dealt with Slovak dialects, beginning with the eastern. He had intended to• add several volumes to show the relationship between the other Slovamic
languages and the Slavak - to the preparation of which
he had devoted years of study - but, unfortunately, illhealth and death overtook Czambel ,b efore he could com-.
plete the planned monumental philological work.
Because Samuel Czam:bel was employed as an official
in a Magyar ministry, and because he had written a ibrochure in Magyar (1902) - even though in favor of the
Slova!k language - he was accused by some writers of being a Magyarcme. The truth is, however, that those write:rs were more influenced by the fact that Czambel ref1Used
to accept the "Czecho-Slo!Vak" theory a!bout the "unity"
of the !Slovaks and Czechs than they were by his Magyar
brochure.
In regard to that Magyar brochure, Dr. Jo8e[)h Skul-i
tety, the grand old defender of :Slovruk history, philology
and culture, had this to say in the "'Slovenske Pohl'ady"
(1923):
"We saw no reason why we should write against this
iMagyar brochure. Were we supposed to write agairnst its
author because he wanted to. have a dean, ,g enuine Slovruk language? Or because he wanted to a.iid it wherever it
needed it? That here 'in politics' he goes a bit too far, well,
that is his business; Dr. Czambel al,w ays stood out so indiividually that we have no right to concern ourselves
a-bout him."
Objective observers will not deny that Czamlbel did
serve the Slova;k caJUSe; he did not serve -Magyarism or Ma...
gyarization as a jobholder in the Ma:gyar ministry, or with
his linguistic theory and his patriotic Slovak verses. In
spirit Czambel was Sloivak, even thoogh he did study in
Vienna and P;r ague·. But a Slovak intellectual could not
easily get the kind of work he ,prepared for in Hungary.
Czambel's father, as a Justice of the Peace in Sloven.ska
tU1pCa, was an acquaintance of Bela Griinwald, who w~
�SLOVAKIA
86
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ>resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-
�
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1956
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SLOVAKIA
83
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)
• • •
1856 -
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -
1956
P.A. HROBAK
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs
84
SLOVAKIA
(Yugoslavs) ; this, of course, was disproved by the studies of ,S kultety and Pastrnek. iin his last work, relating
to the Slovak language and other Slovanic languages,
Czambel systematically dealt with Slovak dialects, beginning with the eastern. He had intended to• add several volumes to show the relationship between the other Slovamic
languages and the Slavak - to the preparation of which
he had devoted years of study - but, unfortunately, illhealth and death overtook Czambel ,b efore he could com-.
plete the planned monumental philological work.
Because Samuel Czam:bel was employed as an official
in a Magyar ministry, and because he had written a ibrochure in Magyar (1902) - even though in favor of the
Slova!k language - he was accused by some writers of being a Magyarcme. The truth is, however, that those write:rs were more influenced by the fact that Czambel ref1Used
to accept the "Czecho-Slo!Vak" theory a!bout the "unity"
of the !Slovaks and Czechs than they were by his Magyar
brochure.
In regard to that Magyar brochure, Dr. Jo8e[)h Skul-i
tety, the grand old defender of :Slovruk history, philology
and culture, had this to say in the "'Slovenske Pohl'ady"
(1923):
"We saw no reason why we should write against this
iMagyar brochure. Were we supposed to write agairnst its
author because he wanted to. have a dean, ,g enuine Slovruk language? Or because he wanted to a.iid it wherever it
needed it? That here 'in politics' he goes a bit too far, well,
that is his business; Dr. Czambel al,w ays stood out so indiividually that we have no right to concern ourselves
a-bout him."
Objective observers will not deny that Czamlbel did
serve the Slova;k caJUSe; he did not serve -Magyarism or Ma...
gyarization as a jobholder in the Ma:gyar ministry, or with
his linguistic theory and his patriotic Slovak verses. In
spirit Czambel was Sloivak, even thoogh he did study in
Vienna and P;r ague·. But a Slovak intellectual could not
easily get the kind of work he ,prepared for in Hungary.
Czambel's father, as a Justice of the Peace in Sloven.ska
tU1pCa, was an acquaintance of Bela Griinwald, who w~
SLOVAKIA
86
first the Vice-Commissa;r of Zvolen County and then a mem..
ber of the Hungarian Diet. It was Grunwald who placed
young Czambel in the press bureau of the Premier at Budin. And Gri.inwald, we know, ,w as for some 25 years the
greatest oppressor of the Slovaks in Hungary. We can imagine then what it meant to a young Slo;va!k ;patriot to hawe
his protection. Because of that, however, young CZiambel
did not become a Magyarone, but devoted himself to the
study of his people and their language.
In 1890, Czambel was persuaded to write for the "Slo-.
venske Pohl'ady" (Slovak Review); of course, holding a
job under the Magyars, he could not write under his own
name. When he published his book, "Slovaci a ich rec" in
1903, iJ>resenting t'he theory that the Slovaks were a Yu"'
goslav tribe, Czambel was severely criticized by the "Na:rodne Noviny" and the "Slovenske Pohl'ady," which proved
mm wrong and condemned him. Informed ,p ersons, however,
knew t'hat Czambel proposed the Yugoslav theory not because of convictions, lbut rather as a matter of tactics: it
was only thus that he could keep his state job.
:S amuel Czambel definitely proved that man does ,n ot
live by lbreoo alone. Suspected as a Magyarone by some of
his own people, and as a Pan-Slarv by the Magyars, Samuel
Czambel nevertheless rendered a g,reat service to his people by his literary efforts. His grammar of the Slovak lan-.
guage is, still the best, according to Slovak philologists .
•
•
CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA
STAROHRAD (THE OLD CASTLE) OF LIPTOV
The village of Liptovska Tepla in Slovakia lies east of
the ,city of Ruzomlberok. Not far from the village we find
the mineral springs called Lucky. Traveling by train from
Ruizomberok to Lucky we see the mighty roC'ky cliffs of
the Sielinica fortress, which is almost as high as Sitno. On
these rocky cliffs can still. be seen the remnants of the on~e
mighty Old Castle (Starohroo). It is accessi1b le from the
valley of Sestrca; at one time it served as a guard for the
highway that led from Liptov to Ora:va.
'In the fourteenth century Starohrad wa:s the proper-
Dublin Core
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Title
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1856 - Dr. Samuel Czambel - 1956
Description
An account of the resource
P. A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 83-85
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
LCNAF
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https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ab896c8bdc403e834ef271b0733764e8.pdf
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63
SLOVAKIA
The History of Slovakia:
By PHILIP A . HROBAiK
SLOVENSKO -
SLOVAKIA -
SLOVAKLAND
The territory occupied by the Slovak people for the
past 1500 years is known as Slovakia. It is situated in the
very heart of Europe. Present-day Slovakia has an area of
49,015 square kilometers (approximately 19,000 sq. miles)
and a population of 4,000,000. There were times when the
borders of Slovakia extended beyond their present limits
and times when the land of the Slovaks had no definite
borders at all.
In ancient times the Slovaks occupied even the western
bank of the Morava river and the north bank of the Tisa
(Theiss) river. Though the area and the borders of Slovakia changed at various times, its topography - the land
and its waterways - did not.
Slovakia is bound on the north by the Carpathian
Mountains and on the south by the blue Danube and the
upper arm of the Tisa river. Into these two streams empty
all the rivers of Slovakia that have their origin in the foothills of the King's Plateau (Krafova Hofa) - the natural
center of Slovakia: those that run off to the southwest
empty into the Danube, while those that course to the
southwest pour into the Tisa, forming deep valleys and
broad basins between the ,i ndividual mountain :zones that
fill out the largest part of the territory of Slovakia.
This territory is divided into three parts: 1. western
Slovakia which drains into the Danube tributaries; 2. eastern Slovakia that drains into the tributaries of the Tisa;
3. the mountainous country of central Slovakia.
The geographical picture of Slovakia is extremely
varied, because high mountain ranges alternate with deep
valleys which, in places, spread out into basins. Fertile
plains stretch out from the foothills of the mountains.
Slovakia is situated in the very center of Europe
where the north-eastern spurs of the Alps near the central
Danube touch upon the mountainous arch of the Carpa-
�64
SLOVAKIA
thians which is the main watershed of central Europe.
From this watershed the streams of central Europe run
into several seas. In olden times the course of these
streams determined the course of roads along which nations migrated and business and culture flowed. We find
Slovakia at the juction of these roads which cross the
Caripathian Mountains kom the north and the south.
Two roads were especially significant in deciding the
fate of Slovakia and the Slovak nation. One coursed along
the Danube and connected the western oountTies of Europe
with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate this
road intersected with the other important highway which
started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the
Danube, proceeded to the north against the current of the
Morava river and went to the coast of the Baltic Sea.
Slovakia, according to archeological researches, was
well inhabited as early as 5000 B. C., but we do not know
the race or the names of the peoples who inhabited the
land. Traces of the Neolithic Man, who used stone weapons
in hunting the mammoth and the huge cave bear, have
been found. The scientific investigator will find much material on the prehistoric period in the museum of Bratislava
and Turciansky Svaty Martin.
About the year 2000 B.C. begins the Bronze Age with
its burial urns, and clay and stone remains, found on the
sites of ancient settlements in Slovakland. During the ensuing Iron Age, we find traces of the Illyrians in the west,
of the Thracians in the east. The latter came into contact
with the Scythians in the valley of the Tisa river.
Several nations of various origins and culture lived in
Slovakia just before the dawn of the Christian era. According to ancient Greek and Roman writers, the land of
the Slovaiks was inhabited by the Gauls and the Celts at
that time. In the fourth century B. C., we note traces of
the more advanced Gallic culture from the discoveries of
golden ornaments and coins, imitations of those issued by
Philip III of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great.
At Bratislava coins of the Roman Republic, dating from
the first century B. C., have been found. A Greek map of
the Slovak territory, dating back to the third century,
�SLOVAKIA
65
shows many Slovanic names for mountains and rivers,
The fertile plains of south-eastern Slovakia were occupied by the Boii, a Gallic tri'be, and in the mountainous
parts of central Slovakia lived the Kotin (Gothine) tribe
which worked the ore of the Iron Mountains. The Osi settled in the neighborhood of the Kotins, while the Korkonti
- tribes of southern origin - occupied the northwestern
part of Slovakia.
In the first half of the last century before Christ the
Dacians came to Slovakia from the east and overpowered
the Gallic Boii. But in the first quarter of the first century
after Christ, the Dacians were forced to migrate to the
north into the mountains, because they were iha:rd pressed
by the J azygi who had come from the Black Sea to take
over the land on the left side of the Danube.
During the reign of Tiberius, two Germanic tribes settled in the territory of the Slovaks, the Quadi and the
Marcomanni, who frequently raided the Roman proi\Tince
of Pannonia on the other side of the Danube. Vannius, the
bellicose king of the Quadi, built military fortresses along
the V ah river and extended his power to the Turiec a:nd
Kysuca rivers.
About twenty years after Christ, when a large part of
the territory of Slovakia was occupied by the Quadi, the
Romans were consolidating their might near the Danube.
The Franks and the Romans began to wage war for the
control of the territory of Slovakia, a struggle that lasted
several centuries.
South of the Danube the Romans organized the province of Pannonia, east of which was the province of Dacia.
To conquer the whole Danube basin to the Carpathians, the
Romans built military strongholds along the south bank of
the Danube. Such fortresses were established at Vindobona
(Vienna), Carnanthum (Hainburg), Brigetium (Komarno)
and at Aquincum (Budapest). To defend and to secure the
frontier along the Danube against incursions of barbaric
tribes, the Romans sent detachments across the river to
established military stations on the northern bank, on the
territory of Slovakia. From excacations we know that Ro-
�66
SLOVAK.IA
man troops were stationed at Devin, Stupava, Bratislava
and opposite Komarno at li.
The Romans bested the Quadi in battle. Their king
Vannius ruled over the territory of Slovakia by the grace
of the Roman Emperor. Of course, the Quadi resented this.
After Vannius' death the aggressive Quadi challenged the
power of the Romans on the Danube and the Roman Emperors had to defend their rule with large armies. Along
the Vah river the Roman troops penetrated as far as Trencin. Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus defeated the Quadi in 179 A. D. after several bloody skirmishes on Slovak territory, as is commemorate d by inscription on a roc'k at Trencin: "In memory of the IVictory of the
Emperor's army that encamped at Laugaricio, 855 soldiers
of the II. Legion. Made by Constantine, commander of the
II. auxiliary Legion." This army was stationed at Laugaritio, a Roman settlement near Trencin, which has since
disappeared.
During these skirmishes with the Quadi, probably
about 173 A. D., the Roman army in Slovakia found itself
threatened by a scarcity of water. In the army that fought
against the Germans somewhere along the Hron river,
there were several Christians who had come from Asia
Minor. These Christian soldiers - the first Christians on
Slovak territory - prayed for raiin and their prayers were
answered. The Roman army was saved. This incident is immortalized on the Arch of Triumph of Emperor Marcus
Aurelius in Rome.
The Quadi, 1b eaten repeatedly by the Romans, never
·gwve up trying to drive the Romans out of Slovakia. Emperor Constantine LI defeated them in 258 A.ID. and Emperor
Valentian, the last Roman emperor who cowd claim sovereignty over the territory of Slovakia, repeated the pel'for:mance in 3·74. Upon the latter's death in 376, the great Mig;ra~
tion of Nations begain.. Shortly thereafter the Romans
ipulled thek gax.risoDJS out of Slo-y;aJk ia and let the Quadi
take over. The Quadi, however, were evicted from the territory by the Huns in the first half of the fifth century.
The Huns in turn were displaced by the Heruli, who held
the territory until about 491 when the Lombards defeated
�SLOVAKIA
87
them, occupied their lands and held them until about 526,
when they crossed the Danube into Pannonia.
Slovrukia, however, did not remain even under the Huns
for long. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire,
the Germans migrated from Slovakia to the south. The
Marcomanni, weakened by the wars with the Romans and
forced by the hordes of Attila to join his army, were wiped
out in the battle of Cha.Ions (Catalaunian Fields) in 451.
There is as yet no definite proof, even though it may be
safely assumed, that the Slovaks and related Slovanic tribes
came into Slovakia in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni. The historian J ordannes, writing
in the sixth century, said that all the Hungarian plain was
inhabited by Slovanic people (the Slavs).
AFTIDR THE ADVENT OF THE SLOVAKS
The Slovaks came to their present territory from the
East, probably from India. At the time Frankish tribes
fought the Roman Legions over the territory of Slovakia,
the Slovanic peoples occupied the land that stretched to the
north of the Carpathians and to the east of the river Vistula. It was a marshy and unfertile land. In time the growing Slovanic families were forced to emigrate to neighboring territories.
The Slovanic peoples who migrated to the west and
occupied the territory to the Elbe and Saal rivers are called
We,stern Slavs; they are the Poles, the SlOJVaks and! the
Czechs; those that occwpied the territory between t'he Elbe
and Oder rivers and the country along the coast of the
Baltic Sea are known as the Lusatian Serbs (northern Germany) and the Kashubes (near the Baltic Sea); today their
numbers are few. The Slovanic peoples, who migrated from
their ancient land to the south and occupied the Balkan
peninsula, are called the Southern Slavs: the Slovenes,
Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. A large part of the Slovanic peoples migrated to the east and occupied the plains
of eastern Europe. They are the Eastern Slavs: the White
Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Great
Russians.
As the great Slovanic family disintegrated, separate
�68
SLOVAKIA
Slovanic nations developed with the centuries, each with
its dictinct culture, language, customs and traditions.
The Slovaks, like other Slovanic peoples, originally
were hunters. After a time they took to bee culture and
animal husbandry, especially sheep raising. From their
neighbors they learned to cultivate the soil. The men folk
hunted and herded sheep, while .the women and the slaves
did the farm work. The only trades known to them were
pottery making and blacksmithing. In business transactions
they exchanged products or paid in cloth; money was not
known as a means of barter. The Slovaks lived in simple
huts made of poles driven into the ground, around which
were wound branches and twigs which were then covered
with mud.
Several families, originating from a common forefather, formed a clan ("rod"). The head of the clan was the
oldest member; he was in charge of the common property
of the clan. A Slovanic settlement, inhabited by several related families, i.e. a clan, was called a village ("dedina"
from "dedo"-grandfather). The village was the common
heritage ("dedicstvo") of the whole clan. Several related
clans made up a tribe ("kmeii"), the leader of which was
the tribal chief, called a priest ("kiiaz") or prince ("knieza). When several such related tribes lived in one territory
for a long time a Slovanic state evolved and a Slovanic
nation was born.
SLOVAK CHARACTERISTICS
The Slovanic peoples had many good and bad characteristics. They loved songs and entertainment. Not possessing great wealth, they lived frugally. They were goodhearted and hospitable, but suffered discipline with difficulty.
They did not know how to obey, hence there was no harmony among them. They did not seek a battle, but when
they had to defend themselves they fought heroically and
also knew how to be cruel. All these characterictics of the
Slovanic nature can be found in the Slovanic nations even
at the ,p resent time.
The historian Procopius (562) said that the Slavs were
rather tall, hardy, blond-haired people and honesty was one
�SlJOVAK.I.A
69
of their marked characteristics. Theophylactus recorded an
interesting commentary on the Slavs. He said: "In 590
three men were captured by the Greeks in Thrace; the men
carried musical instruments instead of weapons. When
Caesar M:auricus asked who they ,w ere, the men answered:
'We are Slavs; we love music; we play the guitar and violin
and sing.' Mauricus was overcome by their simplicity. Af..,
ter feasting them he had a guard escort them to their
lands."
The German historian Herder had this to say about
the Slavs: "They loved farming; they had herds and implements and a home industry ; with the products of their
land and their industry they carried on a useful business.
They built cities and in places occupied themselves with
mining; they knew how to melt and mold metals. The Slavs
prepared salt, made cloth, brewed beer, grafted trees, and
lived according to their manner a happy, musical life.''
The Slovaks of old had names for implements, furniture, grains, fruit trees, trades and animals. They had their
own words for: plow, iron, cloth, needle, pliers, wheel,
wagon, seal, ring, blacksmith, spoon, clothier, butcher,
cape, jeweler.
As a musical people they had many folk songs. In
number and variety of content they are second to those
of no other nation.
SLOVAK MYTHOLOGY
There are very few reliable records of the religion of
ancient Slovanic peoples. We know that they believed in a
Supreme Being and in immortality. The Slovaks called the
Supreme Being "Praboh" :_ the God of all gods. They had
a White God - the God of all good, and a Black God - the
God of evil and death. Many lesser gods, belonging to both
the white and black groups, also existed for the ancient
Slovaks and other Slovanic peoples.
"ZIVENA" was the godess of life, and "MORENA"
the godess of death. Brooks and streams housed nymphs,
and fairies inhabited the woods and forests. "LADA" was
the godess of beauty, while "URODA" was the godess of
the fields and crops. ' ~PfilRUIN" (P.AJROM" ) , the God of
thunder, was held in great respect.
�70
SLOVAKIA
The ancient Slovaks worshipped and invoked their gods
in sacred groves. They offered sacrifices of grain and animals to images of wood and stone through their priests.
The White Priests (BieJok:iiazi) served and invoked the
White Gods. The White Priests were most important men
of the tribe; they presided at all councils and trials and
their judgments and decisions were final. The Black Priests
- the magicians and sorcerers - were believed to possess
powers of tmnsforming peraons into animals and inanimate
objects.
The Slovaks, like most of the other Slovanic peoples
of ancient times, cremated or buried their dead. Food,
weapons, wine and jewelry were usually placed in the
graves of the dead. Ashes of the dead were placed in urns
of clay and then buried. Mounds of clay and stone were
built over burial places; the greater the mound, the more
important the person or persons buried there. Several such
mounds were found and excavated in Slovakia (at Skalica,
Brezolupy, Boooivce, Kras:iiany near 2ilina and at Cepcin in
Turiec). One of the most extensive burial grounds was uncovered at Devinska Nova Ves.
Some of the customs and practices of the ancient pagan Slovaks have survived the centuries and are still observed in many quaint villages of Slovakia today. Many of
the pagan practices, however, disappeared with the advent
of Christianity.
As the Slovanic peoples abandoned their ancient lands
and began to colonize central and eastern Europe - after
the Germanic Heruli and Lombards withdrew from the territory of Slovakia in the sixth ·century and the Slovaks
came in - the savage nation of the Avars tore into the
Danube basin, overran the whole territory, and pushed
deeply into the Frankish kingdom in the west. During the
next hundred years the whole region seethed in turmoil.
The Avars were wild nomads of Turko-Tartarian origin
who rode their horses rough-shod over the countries of
their neighbors and subjugated them. They settled in Pannonia, where they built military camps which were protected by huge, circular mounds of earth and stone and
wooden fences. The Slovaks withdrew from this territory
�SLOVAKIA
71
and settled north of the Danube . Part of the Slovak tribes
lived in the mounta ins; they were govern ed by their own
princes .
The Slovan ic peoples along the Danube had to serve
the Avars and were forced to go with them on their rampages into neighb oring territor ies. The A vars looted the
Germa n lands in the west and Constan tinoiple (Cari•h rad)
and Salonik a in the east. Natura lly, the Slovan ic peoples
wanted tQ throw off the yoke of the Aivars and waited for
the opportu ne momen t to rebel. That time came in 624,
when Samo, a Franki sh mercha nt, succeed ed in uniting the
Slovani c peoples and led them in battle agains t the savage
A;vars. Sa.mo defeate d the Arv,a xs rund founde d the first SlovaJllic state ,near the central Danube . Encour aged by the
victory over the A vars, Samo led the Slovan ic peoples
agains t the German ic Franks . Samo again was victorio us;
his Slovani c army defeate d the Franks under Dagob ert in
a three-d ay battle near the Vogast e castle in 631. Becaus e
the Slovak s were settled north of the Danub e and the Slovenians south of it, Samo's empire stretch ed over these
territor ies. The Slovani c peoples within these territor ies
were called by the commo n name of Sloven es (Slovie ni).
The main fortres s of this Slovani c empire was situate d in
Slovak ia at the conflue nce of the Morava and Danube rivers. Samo's empire , howeve r, disinte grated soon after his
death (658). Wheth er it was the ,k ingdom of the Slova!ks
alone is questio nable, but the fact remain s that the territory of Slovak ia formed the core of it.
ilfu-edegar's "Chron icles" ;record that a ~trong westem Slovan ic empire existed already in the seventh century ,
strong enough to, resist the pressu re of the Avars and the
rule of Dagob ert. Fredeg ar wrote quite plainly that Samo
came along when the Slovam c tribes of the area were successful ly rebellin g aga~t the rule of the A vars. His "Chro.nioles" form the basis of most theorie s in ;regard to the
ethnica l composiition of Samo's Empire , its territor ial extent
and the site of its princip al city or strongh old. In recent
yeara Slova!k, Polish, and Czech scholar s of Slavist ics agreed
that Samo's strongh old, the center of his empire , was at De...
vin, at ,t he conflue nce of the Morav a and Danll!be rivers.
�SLOVAK.IA
72
Professor Oettinger, well-knOIWll historian and archeologis t
of Vienna, however, .prefers to Tegard Vienna as the center
of Samo's Empire. In his book "Das Warden Wiens" (19M),
he tells that he .bases his conclusion especially on the findings resulting from the discovery of the ancient Berghof
Castle in Vienna, the remains of which can ibe traced ;to
Samo's time. The Ava.rs, a nomadic people, could not build
such a g,reat citadel of stone. Presenting a whole series of
philological airguments to baclk his theory, professor Oettinger states that tt is self-eviden t that SlovaJks and ,p ossibly
other Slwanic peoples lived in the aJrea of Vienna iaJIJ.d far to
the west along the Danube territory during Samo's time.
While the Slovanic peoples were resisting the A vars
heroically, a strong Frankish empire was being built in the
west. The power of this empire, whose borders in the eighth
century extended from the Pyrenees to the Sumava River,
became consolidate d especially during the reign of Charles
the Great (Charlemag ne), who ruled from 768 to 814, and
united all the Germanic tribes, subjugated the Bavarians
and the Saxons in the east, and came into contact with the
most westerly tribes of the Slovans. In 799 the armies of
Charlemag ne defeated the Arvars, who lateT were aJbso;z1bed
by the Slovanic inhabitants of the Danube countries.
But the great empire of Charlemag ne, who became
Emperor in 800, had another weapon besides its strong
army for its aggression s into the neighborin g countries of
the east. That weapon was Christianit y, which in the
Franldsh empire had spread and become so strong that already during the reign of Charlemag ne the way was prepared for it to reach the Danubian Slovans who were settled along the eastern borders of the Frankish empire.
To safegururd the eastern f:rontier of his empiire, Charlemagne placed heavy military garrisons along bordering
countries. Such territories were called "Marks" and were
managed by so-called "Markgrav es." In a short time it became evident that the military garriso!IlS of such Marks
were not only for defense, but also for advance into the
neighboring Slovanic countries. Contempor aneously new
bishoprics and monasterie s were built along these bordering countries which strengthen ed the Christian faith and
1
�SIJOVAKIA
73
propagated Christian culture. It was thus that Christianity
came to the neighboring Slovanic nations.
Slovakia already in the very beginning of the ninth
century came into immediate contact with the military and
cultural might of the Frankish empire. The Slovak nation
crossed the threshhold of its national and cultural history.
~RiINCiE PRJ.BINA
The Slovanic tribes, which settled on the northern
bank of the Danube, on ,b oth sides of the 1Mora,va river, weTe
called Moravians. Philologis~, historians, a,nd aroheologists
have a.miply demonstrated that whatever had b,een mentioned
in old historical documents aibout the MoraJVian.s referred
in £act to the ancestors of the Slovaks, the Slovans (ISla<vS)
who already in the first half of the ninth century were the
inhaJbitants of the territory on both sides of the MoTava
river.
in anoient d0<:uments we find the name "Slovenica"
used interchangeably with ' 1Moravia" and "Magna Moravia"
to designate the territory on both sides of the Morava riveT.
A document of King Loruis from the year 861 also, calls that
area "Slovenica." In western (Latin) sources, the inhabit..,
ants of that territory were called ''Moravians" and "the
Slarvs of Moravia" (Slavi; Sclavi; Sch1avi; Sc,l a,v i Marahenses; Marehenses; Maravi; Mairavani; Moravi; Maraibi; MarahaJvi; Sclavini; Selavi Margenses) to distinguish them from
the Slorvans (Slavs) who had occupied other territories (Behemi; Sclavi Boehemia; Boemie; Beheimi; Boemani ; Boo-.
manici; Behemani; Bohemani; Bulgari; Vulgari; ChTobati;
BeJochrobati; .Kosari; Czechi; Poloni; ,Russi; etc.). In eastern sources, however, the inhabitants of the same territory
were called "Slovenes" ('Slovieni; Sloveni), while their land
wa:s rreferred to as "Slovak Land" and "Moravia" (.Slovenska
zemlja; Morava). It is significant that af.ter the fall olf Great
Moravia, her inhabitants were referred to by their a,ndent
name: Slavi; ,Sclavi; Slovieni; Sloveni - older forms of the
term Slovak, which began to appear onyl after the fifteenth centUTY.
From reliable sources we learn that about the year
830,. there ruled in Slovakia a prince named Pribina, who
resided in Nitra. The name Pribina and Nitra are very dear
�74
SLOVAKIA
to ,t he hearts of all .Slovaks, because Prilbina is the name
of the first Slovak ruler ever mentioned by history, and
Nitra is the name of the first Slovak castle which became
the cradle of Slovak national history. Pribina reigned in
Nitra and his principality extended over the territory of
the fertile basin of the Nitra river. The sovereignty of the
Prince of Nitra was acknowledged by other Slovak principalities that extended along the Hron river country, the
banks of the Vah and other Slovak lands. Under the rule
of Prince Pribina belonged the Slovaik principalities that lay
to the east of the Small Carpathians.
The same sources tell us that Archbishop Adalram of
Salzburg blessed a church on Pribina's land in Nitra. This
consecration is proof that the Christianity spread by the
German priests among the Slovaks already had taken firm
root. Pribina's church in Nitra is the first Christian church
on the territory of the western Slovans. While other Slovanic peoples in the eastern half of Europe still lived far
off from western-European Christian culture and wandered
in the darkness of paganism, the Slovak nation already in
the beginning of the ninth century was counted among the
Christian, the cultured nations of Europe.
At the time of the consecration of the Nitra church,
in 833, Pribina himself was not yet a Christian. But the
circumstance that Pribina allowed the Christian faith to be
preached to his nation proves that the first Slovak ruler,
even though he probably could not grasp the significance
of Christian doctrine, nevertheless understood the political
and cultural significance of Christianity on the SlovanoGermanic border. Pribina, a wise and prudent ruler, knew
that a small nation at this dangerous crossroad could defend itself against its stronger neighbors only when it was
equal to them culturally.
Not long afterwards, however, cruel calamity befell the
ruler of Nitra. Prince Mojmir, who had united the Slovak
tribes in the western part of the Slovak territory under his
rule and who probably resided at Devin, drove Pribina out
of Nitra and occupied his domain. Out of this union of
.Mojmirs country with Pribina's, there arose on the north
bank of the Danube a state that united all the Slovak
�SLOVAKIA
75
tribes. The state, thus established about the year 830, was
called Great Moravia (VeFka Morava) or the Great Moravian Empire (Vefkomoravska risa).
Pribina, with his son Kocef and a retinue of Slovak
magnates, sought refuge in the neighboring Mark to the
east, near the Danube. Markgrave Ratbod presented Pribina to King Louis the German. The latter had Pribina in:structed in the Christian faith and baptized in St. Martin's
,c hurch in the city of Treisma (probably the present city of
Sankt Polten in Germany). For a time Pribina and his
group lived in the court of Markgrave Ratbod, but when
the latter refused to aid him against Mojmir, he went to
the Bulgars. However, he did not tarry there for long
either, because soon after we find him seeking the aid of
Ratimar, the Croatian Prince. At that time (about 838),
Ratimar was not on good terms with Ratbod, so Pribina
had to take refuge with Count Salach of Corutania. The
latter succeeded in reconciling Pribina with Ratbod.
In exile Pribina convinced himself that he could not
regain his lost domain and return to Nitra. He became reconciled with his fate and sought to gain the favor of King
Louis the German. The latter entrusted to Pribina the new
principality beyond the Danube, the country of Pannonia
near Blatno. In 847 he became the independent ruler of this
principality and built a formidable citadel there that was
called Blatnohrad (Moosburg). After his baptism, Pribina
became a zealous Christian and sought to convert all his
subjects to Christianity. He invited German missionaries
into his domain, built churches, endowed monasteries and
often welcomed the archbishop of Salzburg at his court.
In his work, Pribina had a zealous helper in the person of
his son Kocel'. When Pribina died in 861 under mysterious
circumstances, Kocel' inherited his principality. The Slovak
nation, immediately with its first appearance on the stage
of European history, entered the services of Christian culture. The Slovaks are the oldest nation on the central
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe
to have its own independent state. It is well to note that
the Slovak State from its very inception was ,a Christian
State.
�76
SLOVAKIA
CHAPTER TWO
'DHiE GREAT M!ORA~ EJMPI'RE
The studies of historians, philologists, and -archeolo~
gists clearly indicate that the Great Moravian Empire was
not the empire of the ''Great Moravians," but the land of
the ancietn Slov•a k s who had settled on both sides of the
'Morava river. The Great Moravian IDmpire, then, was in reality a Great Slova!k Empire, if we are to call the territory
by the name of the peole who had occupied it from the dawn
of history. These studies refute the hypothesis of the Czech
and non-Czech philologists, ethnogr~phers, and historians,
who claim that "Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia, MMoraviia,
and Nor.them Hung•a ry (SlovaJkia) fornied a single group
with a common langua,ge."
Furthermore, these studies tell us that at first there
were two estates or rprinciipalities in that area: the one
called "Mol'ova" was around the Morava up to the Vah with
its capital city at Devin, while the other called "Nitra" the capital city of which bore the i,;ame name - was around
the Nitra river. When Mojmir, the ruler of Moravia, conquered Pribina, the ruler of Nitra, German chronicles 'began
to call his empire "Magna Mora'Via," whk'h meant the annexation of the NitJ:ra principality to that of Mor8JVia.
We afso leiarn from these studies that the ancestors of
the Czechs had settled in the land of the Boii (Boehemi,a;
Behemia; Bohemia) just ltbout at the same time that the
Slovaks occupied the territory of the Morava river. Moj!mir,
Rastislav, and Sviitopllllk built the empire of the Slova!ks,
while Hostivit and Borivoj built .the state of the Czechs.
The Annales Fra,ncofuldenses tell us that "Sviitoplwk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule by force." Later
the Czechs (Slavs of Bohemia) even joined the Germans to
wage war agaJnst the Great Moravian EmpiTe.
When Mojmir, some time in the year 836, drove Pribina out of Nitra and united the territory inhabited by
Slovak trib,es into a larger unit, there arose on the northern
bank of the Danube an empire which the Byzantine em1
�SLOVAKIA
77
peror, Constantine Po.rphyrogennetos, in his work "About
the Management of a State" (950), calls Great Moravia.
Mojmir's empire stretched over the territory of present
Slovakia and Moravia and was, after Samo's empire, the
second Slovanic state near the Danube on the German-Slovanic border.
Just as Samo's Empire, so even the Great Mora'Vlian
Empire had its origin at the same historic crossroad, because it was here that the greatest danger threatened the
Slovanic peoples and they had to unite in defense of their
freedom a,nd independence. While Samo's empire , arose because the Slovans along the Danube wanted to protect
themselves against the enemies from the east, Great Moravia was established under pressure of danger from the
west.
Mojmir, like Pribina, tried to live in peace with the
neighboring Germans, because he knew that war with them
could only end disastrously for the Slovaks. Mojmir was
already a Christian, so the missionary activity of the German priests on the territory of Great Moravia went on nuhampered. We must remember that Great Moravia at that
time did not have any definite borders, because the borders
of states of the Middle Ages never were defined strictly.
The area of Great Moravia changed because the successors
of Mojmir did undertake expeditions into neighboring countries, defeated them in battle and annexed them to the
empire.
Louis the German did not relish the idea of a great,
united Slovanic empire as a neighbor. In 846 he unseated
Mojmir and replaced him with Rastislav. The latter simu~
lated friendship for Louis, but knew well that the independence of his country was constantly threatened by the
Germans. The independence of Great Moravia was threatened not only by German armies, but also by the missionary activity of the German priests, who had begun to look
upon the territory as a part of the German empire. In
about 860 Rastislav sent a special messenger to Pope Nicholas I in Rome with a request for missionaries who had
a command of the Slovanic tongues. The Pope, however,
answered he was sorry that he could not help Rastislav,
�78
SLOVAKIA
because at that time there were no such priests in Rome.
After due deliberation with his advisers, Rastislav decided to send a special mission to .Constantinople, to .E mperor Michael ill. Rastislav's request, as presented to the
Emperor, read: "Since our people has cast off paganism
and follows the Christian law, we do not have such a teacher, who might explain the true Christian Faith to us in our
own tongue, so that even other parties, witnessing this,
might become like unto us. So send us, Emperor, such a
bishop and teacher, because your country is everywhere
recognized for its good laws."
Just about that time the German empire found strong
allies in the Bulgarians, who bordered with Great Moravia
at the Tisa river and lived in enmity with the Byzantine
emperor. Michael did not have to deliberate long with his
counsellors. He wanted Rastislav as an ally against the
German-Bulgarian alliance and, hence, decided to aid the
ruler of Great Moravia in his quest for missionaries who
could speak the language of Rastislav's people. Up to this
time the land of the Slovaks was subject to the influence
of western culture only. Now it was to make contacts with
the Christian culture of the European east.
SLOVAK .APOSTLES: CYRIL .AND METHODLUS
Em;peror Michael of Constantinople decided to send
Constantine (Cyril), the philosopher and linguist, and his
brother Methodius, who was versed in the art of government, to preach the Gospel to the people of Rastislav. Constantine had distinguished himself in apostolic work before,
at first alone and later with his brother Methodius. As
natives of Salonica (Thessalonica) they were suited for the
mission: they new the language of Rastislav's people, the
forefathers of the Slovaks. The Emperor, having summoned them, told the brothers: "You are from Salonica, and
all Salonicans speak pUTe Slovanic."
Upon learning that Rastislav's people did not have their
own script, the task of inventing one fell to the lot of Constantine. Legend has it that the alphabet worked out by
Constantine (Cyril) had been revealed to him by God. It
was quite an achievement. Constantine started with Greek
�SLOVAKIA
79
characters, but Slovanic sounds of the ninth century varied
greatly with the Greek, therefore signs and characters had
to be created to designate them. The alphabet that resulted
is known as "Cyrillic."
After due preparation for their new mission, the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius set out for the
country of Rastislav. They arrived in Rastislav's empire
in 863 and began preaching the Word of God in the language of the people. Soon ,a fter the translation of the
Scriptl.ll'es and liturgical 1b ooks was completed and present...
ed to Rastislav's court at Devin. Naturally the saintly brothers gained many admirers and disciples. These catechists
went among their people and aided Constantine and Methodius in their missionary work. Up to the time of the Slovak
apostles, only three languages were considered feasible for
ecclesiastic life, the Holy Scriptures and the Church liturgy: Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The latter two were used
extensively-the Greek in the Byzantine (eastern) Church
and Latin in the Roman (western) Church. Due to the efforts of Constantine and Methodius, the language of the
Slovaks (early Slovanic) became the third language to be
used in Church liturgy.
The work of Constantine and Methodius in Rastislav's
empire was blessed with success. The saintly brothers united the people of Rastislav spiritually and. also contributed
handsomely to the material welfare of the Great Moravian
Empire. Their disciples later spread the Gospel to other
neighboring Slovanic nations (Czechs, Serbs, Russians) in
a language that was for the most part understandable to
all Slo-\'anic nations.
The German clergy of Salzburg viewed the work of
Constantine and Methodius with envy and accused the brothers of introdllJlcing dangerous innovations into the liturgy
of the Church. A protest against their activities was lodged
in Rome, and the brothers were summoned by Pope Nicholas (858-867) to vindicate themselves.
Constantine and Methodius set out for Rome in 867.
Their journey led them through Lake Blatno (Balaton),
the residence of Prince Kocer, Pribina's son. Kocer received
the brothers with great joy and examined their liturgical
�80
SLOVAKIA
books in the Slovanic script with great interest. Leaving
Kocer, Constantine and Methodius passed through Corinthia to Venice on the Adriatic Sea. At Venice they successfully defended their use of the language of Rastislav's people in the liturgy of the Church, while the ecclesiastics
there had to concede defeat in the debate.
While Constantine and Methodius made their way to
Rome, Pope Nicholas died. Four days later his successor,
Adriam ]I (867--872), was elected head of the ChuTch.
The saintly brothers were given a cordial reception by the
Pope, and, after convincing a synod of bishops that they
were not guilty of introducing any dangerous innovations
into the liturgy of the Church, their activities were accorded Adrian's approval. The Holy Father accepted the liturgical books in ;the Slov,anic language, blessed them on the aUar
of the church of St. Mary Major, and celebrated the Divine
Liturgy over them himself. The Pope then proceeded to
consecrate Constantine and Methodius as bishops. A number of their disciples (Clement, Gorazd, Angelar, Sava and
Naum) were ordained to the priesthood by the bishops Formosus and Gaundenrich.
Shortly thereafter Constantine became seriously ill and
retired to a monastery. There he joined the religious community, taking the name of Cyril. He died February 14,
869, and his earthly remains were buried on the right side
of the high altar of the church of St. Clement in Rome.
After the death of Saint Cyril, the entire burden of
spreading the Gospel and teaching of Christ rested on the
shoulders of his brother. Methodius returned as archbishop
and papal legate fully authorized to organize the Church
in the land of Rastislav. Archbishop Methodius became the
head of Slovanic Christendom. Besides receiving the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Methodius carried letters from the
Pope for Rastislav of Great Moravia, Svatopluk of Nitra
and Kocef of Blatnohrad Castle (Moosburg), the three Slovak princes, which stated that the Pope permitted the use
of Slovanic liturgy with the reservation that the epistle
and ,gospel always be read in Latin before being read in
the vernacular (Slovanic). The archdiocese of Methodius
extended over Great Moravia and beyond the Danube over
�SLOVAKIA
81
Pannonia, uniting the lands governed by Slovak rulers. But
as Methodius was returing to continue his apostolic work
among the people of Rastislav, a new ruler was taking
over the throne of Great Moravia.
KING S,V ATOPDUCK
While Methodius was in Rome, the Germans continued
to harass Rastislav. In 869 King Louis the German declared
war against the neighboring Slovanic peoples and invaded
their lands with his armies headed by his three sons. Prince
Louis attacked the Lusatian Serbs, Charles went after Rastislav, and Carloman tore into the territory that was ruled
by Rastislav's nephew, Svatopluk of Nitra. The German
armies plundered and pillaged the Great Moravian Empire.
But Rastislav's stronghold, the mighty Devin, proved impregnable and Rastislav's empire retained its independence.
The following year, however, Rastislav was betrayed
by his own kinsman, his nephew Svatopluk, regent of Nitra.
Success in battle had turned Svatopluk's head. The Germans played up to Svatopluk and promised to help him
gain the throne of Great Moravia. Svatopluk decided to
betray his uncle and vowed loyalty to Carloman. Rastislav,
however, learned of the plot and became furious. Having
vowed to punish his traitorous nephew, he ordered his men
to do away with Svatopluk at a banquet, but their attempt
to take and kill him failed. Soon thereafter Rastislav led
his army against Svatopluk. In the ensuing battle, Rastislav was defeated. Worse than that, he was captured and
handed over to the Germans. Carloman sent Rastislav
bound in chains to Bavaria where King Louis the German
imprisoned him and had his eyes ,gouged out. Rastislav
died later as a prisoner of the Germans.
With Rastislav's defeat the Great Moravian Empire
passed completely into the hands of the German crown.
The Germans also seized Archbishop Methodius, who had
returned from Rome, and imprisoned him. The Bavarian
bishops, who regarded Methodius as a foreign intruder,
made claims to the territories of the Slovanic peoples along
the Danube and dealt with Methodius so inhumanely that
Svatopluk himself intervened in his behalf. When Carlo-
�82
SLOVAKIA
man took possession of Rastislav's country and seized his
royal treasures, he entrusted the rule of the ravaged country to Svatopluk.
Svatopluk soon proved himself a strong ruler. As a
soldier he excelled in ruthless courage. The Germans began
to distrust him, because they feared he would build an empire so strong as to imperil their country. Louis the German decided to put Svatopluk out of the way. In 871 the
Germans succeeded in taking Svatopluk and imprisoned
him. Some of his castles were taken over by the German
Markgraves. Svatopluk denied the charge of Carloman that
he plotted against the German crown, but that did not help
him. When the Slovaks learned what had happened to their
ruler, they elected Slavomir to take his place and rebelled
against the Germans.
Slavomir was supported by the whole country. A terrilble war followed. The Germans suffered heaivy losses.
Devin proved impregnable to their attacks. In the meantime, the wily Svatopluk was plotting to even matters with
the Germans who had tricked him. While in prison he repented his betrayal of Rastislav and vowed to even the
score with his German captors.
Svatopluk begged Carloman to release him so that he
might subdue the Slovaks under Slavomir. Carloman was
reluctant at first, but finally gave in to Svatopluk's pleadings. Accompanyin g a large German army, Sviitopluk soon
found himself below the mighty fortress of Devin. While
the German army encamped quietly below the citadel, Svatopluk set out with a small detachment of men to the castle
to persuade Slavomir to surrender without a battle. Once
inside the castle, Svatopluk disclosed his plan to Slavomir.
Assuming command of the Slovak army, Svatopluk tore
out of the courtyard and attacked the Germans with such
sa;vagery that only few were able to esc•a;pe alirve. Carloman's army was caught unawares and crushed.
Svatopluk knew that the Germans would come after
him sooner or later. He looked around for allies. That same
year (871), he married the sister of Borivoj, ruler of the
Bohemian fand, and formed an alliance with' him. Svatopluk
pressed the offensive against the Germans and was quite
�SLOVAKIA
83
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)
• • •
1856 -
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -
1956
P.A. HROBAK
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs
�
63
SLOVAKIA
The History of Slovakia:
By PHILIP A . HROBAiK
SLOVENSKO -
SLOVAKIA -
SLOVAKLAND
The territory occupied by the Slovak people for the
past 1500 years is known as Slovakia. It is situated in the
very heart of Europe. Present-day Slovakia has an area of
49,015 square kilometers (approximately 19,000 sq. miles)
and a population of 4,000,000. There were times when the
borders of Slovakia extended beyond their present limits
and times when the land of the Slovaks had no definite
borders at all.
In ancient times the Slovaks occupied even the western
bank of the Morava river and the north bank of the Tisa
(Theiss) river. Though the area and the borders of Slovakia changed at various times, its topography - the land
and its waterways - did not.
Slovakia is bound on the north by the Carpathian
Mountains and on the south by the blue Danube and the
upper arm of the Tisa river. Into these two streams empty
all the rivers of Slovakia that have their origin in the foothills of the King's Plateau (Krafova Hofa) - the natural
center of Slovakia: those that run off to the southwest
empty into the Danube, while those that course to the
southwest pour into the Tisa, forming deep valleys and
broad basins between the ,i ndividual mountain :zones that
fill out the largest part of the territory of Slovakia.
This territory is divided into three parts: 1. western
Slovakia which drains into the Danube tributaries; 2. eastern Slovakia that drains into the tributaries of the Tisa;
3. the mountainous country of central Slovakia.
The geographical picture of Slovakia is extremely
varied, because high mountain ranges alternate with deep
valleys which, in places, spread out into basins. Fertile
plains stretch out from the foothills of the mountains.
Slovakia is situated in the very center of Europe
where the north-eastern spurs of the Alps near the central
Danube touch upon the mountainous arch of the Carpa-
�64
SLOVAKIA
thians which is the main watershed of central Europe.
From this watershed the streams of central Europe run
into several seas. In olden times the course of these
streams determined the course of roads along which nations migrated and business and culture flowed. We find
Slovakia at the juction of these roads which cross the
Caripathian Mountains kom the north and the south.
Two roads were especially significant in deciding the
fate of Slovakia and the Slovak nation. One coursed along
the Danube and connected the western oountTies of Europe
with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate this
road intersected with the other important highway which
started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the
Danube, proceeded to the north against the current of the
Morava river and went to the coast of the Baltic Sea.
Slovakia, according to archeological researches, was
well inhabited as early as 5000 B. C., but we do not know
the race or the names of the peoples who inhabited the
land. Traces of the Neolithic Man, who used stone weapons
in hunting the mammoth and the huge cave bear, have
been found. The scientific investigator will find much material on the prehistoric period in the museum of Bratislava
and Turciansky Svaty Martin.
About the year 2000 B.C. begins the Bronze Age with
its burial urns, and clay and stone remains, found on the
sites of ancient settlements in Slovakland. During the ensuing Iron Age, we find traces of the Illyrians in the west,
of the Thracians in the east. The latter came into contact
with the Scythians in the valley of the Tisa river.
Several nations of various origins and culture lived in
Slovakia just before the dawn of the Christian era. According to ancient Greek and Roman writers, the land of
the Slovaiks was inhabited by the Gauls and the Celts at
that time. In the fourth century B. C., we note traces of
the more advanced Gallic culture from the discoveries of
golden ornaments and coins, imitations of those issued by
Philip III of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great.
At Bratislava coins of the Roman Republic, dating from
the first century B. C., have been found. A Greek map of
the Slovak territory, dating back to the third century,
�SLOVAKIA
65
shows many Slovanic names for mountains and rivers,
The fertile plains of south-eastern Slovakia were occupied by the Boii, a Gallic tri'be, and in the mountainous
parts of central Slovakia lived the Kotin (Gothine) tribe
which worked the ore of the Iron Mountains. The Osi settled in the neighborhood of the Kotins, while the Korkonti
- tribes of southern origin - occupied the northwestern
part of Slovakia.
In the first half of the last century before Christ the
Dacians came to Slovakia from the east and overpowered
the Gallic Boii. But in the first quarter of the first century
after Christ, the Dacians were forced to migrate to the
north into the mountains, because they were iha:rd pressed
by the J azygi who had come from the Black Sea to take
over the land on the left side of the Danube.
During the reign of Tiberius, two Germanic tribes settled in the territory of the Slovaks, the Quadi and the
Marcomanni, who frequently raided the Roman proi\Tince
of Pannonia on the other side of the Danube. Vannius, the
bellicose king of the Quadi, built military fortresses along
the V ah river and extended his power to the Turiec a:nd
Kysuca rivers.
About twenty years after Christ, when a large part of
the territory of Slovakia was occupied by the Quadi, the
Romans were consolidating their might near the Danube.
The Franks and the Romans began to wage war for the
control of the territory of Slovakia, a struggle that lasted
several centuries.
South of the Danube the Romans organized the province of Pannonia, east of which was the province of Dacia.
To conquer the whole Danube basin to the Carpathians, the
Romans built military strongholds along the south bank of
the Danube. Such fortresses were established at Vindobona
(Vienna), Carnanthum (Hainburg), Brigetium (Komarno)
and at Aquincum (Budapest). To defend and to secure the
frontier along the Danube against incursions of barbaric
tribes, the Romans sent detachments across the river to
established military stations on the northern bank, on the
territory of Slovakia. From excacations we know that Ro-
�66
SLOVAK.IA
man troops were stationed at Devin, Stupava, Bratislava
and opposite Komarno at li.
The Romans bested the Quadi in battle. Their king
Vannius ruled over the territory of Slovakia by the grace
of the Roman Emperor. Of course, the Quadi resented this.
After Vannius' death the aggressive Quadi challenged the
power of the Romans on the Danube and the Roman Emperors had to defend their rule with large armies. Along
the Vah river the Roman troops penetrated as far as Trencin. Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus defeated the Quadi in 179 A. D. after several bloody skirmishes on Slovak territory, as is commemorate d by inscription on a roc'k at Trencin: "In memory of the IVictory of the
Emperor's army that encamped at Laugaricio, 855 soldiers
of the II. Legion. Made by Constantine, commander of the
II. auxiliary Legion." This army was stationed at Laugaritio, a Roman settlement near Trencin, which has since
disappeared.
During these skirmishes with the Quadi, probably
about 173 A. D., the Roman army in Slovakia found itself
threatened by a scarcity of water. In the army that fought
against the Germans somewhere along the Hron river,
there were several Christians who had come from Asia
Minor. These Christian soldiers - the first Christians on
Slovak territory - prayed for raiin and their prayers were
answered. The Roman army was saved. This incident is immortalized on the Arch of Triumph of Emperor Marcus
Aurelius in Rome.
The Quadi, 1b eaten repeatedly by the Romans, never
·gwve up trying to drive the Romans out of Slovakia. Emperor Constantine LI defeated them in 258 A.ID. and Emperor
Valentian, the last Roman emperor who cowd claim sovereignty over the territory of Slovakia, repeated the pel'for:mance in 3·74. Upon the latter's death in 376, the great Mig;ra~
tion of Nations begain.. Shortly thereafter the Romans
ipulled thek gax.risoDJS out of Slo-y;aJk ia and let the Quadi
take over. The Quadi, however, were evicted from the territory by the Huns in the first half of the fifth century.
The Huns in turn were displaced by the Heruli, who held
the territory until about 491 when the Lombards defeated
�SLOVAKIA
87
them, occupied their lands and held them until about 526,
when they crossed the Danube into Pannonia.
Slovrukia, however, did not remain even under the Huns
for long. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire,
the Germans migrated from Slovakia to the south. The
Marcomanni, weakened by the wars with the Romans and
forced by the hordes of Attila to join his army, were wiped
out in the battle of Cha.Ions (Catalaunian Fields) in 451.
There is as yet no definite proof, even though it may be
safely assumed, that the Slovaks and related Slovanic tribes
came into Slovakia in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni. The historian J ordannes, writing
in the sixth century, said that all the Hungarian plain was
inhabited by Slovanic people (the Slavs).
AFTIDR THE ADVENT OF THE SLOVAKS
The Slovaks came to their present territory from the
East, probably from India. At the time Frankish tribes
fought the Roman Legions over the territory of Slovakia,
the Slovanic peoples occupied the land that stretched to the
north of the Carpathians and to the east of the river Vistula. It was a marshy and unfertile land. In time the growing Slovanic families were forced to emigrate to neighboring territories.
The Slovanic peoples who migrated to the west and
occupied the territory to the Elbe and Saal rivers are called
We,stern Slavs; they are the Poles, the SlOJVaks and! the
Czechs; those that occwpied the territory between t'he Elbe
and Oder rivers and the country along the coast of the
Baltic Sea are known as the Lusatian Serbs (northern Germany) and the Kashubes (near the Baltic Sea); today their
numbers are few. The Slovanic peoples, who migrated from
their ancient land to the south and occupied the Balkan
peninsula, are called the Southern Slavs: the Slovenes,
Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. A large part of the Slovanic peoples migrated to the east and occupied the plains
of eastern Europe. They are the Eastern Slavs: the White
Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Great
Russians.
As the great Slovanic family disintegrated, separate
�68
SLOVAKIA
Slovanic nations developed with the centuries, each with
its dictinct culture, language, customs and traditions.
The Slovaks, like other Slovanic peoples, originally
were hunters. After a time they took to bee culture and
animal husbandry, especially sheep raising. From their
neighbors they learned to cultivate the soil. The men folk
hunted and herded sheep, while .the women and the slaves
did the farm work. The only trades known to them were
pottery making and blacksmithing. In business transactions
they exchanged products or paid in cloth; money was not
known as a means of barter. The Slovaks lived in simple
huts made of poles driven into the ground, around which
were wound branches and twigs which were then covered
with mud.
Several families, originating from a common forefather, formed a clan ("rod"). The head of the clan was the
oldest member; he was in charge of the common property
of the clan. A Slovanic settlement, inhabited by several related families, i.e. a clan, was called a village ("dedina"
from "dedo"-grandfather). The village was the common
heritage ("dedicstvo") of the whole clan. Several related
clans made up a tribe ("kmeii"), the leader of which was
the tribal chief, called a priest ("kiiaz") or prince ("knieza). When several such related tribes lived in one territory
for a long time a Slovanic state evolved and a Slovanic
nation was born.
SLOVAK CHARACTERISTICS
The Slovanic peoples had many good and bad characteristics. They loved songs and entertainment. Not possessing great wealth, they lived frugally. They were goodhearted and hospitable, but suffered discipline with difficulty.
They did not know how to obey, hence there was no harmony among them. They did not seek a battle, but when
they had to defend themselves they fought heroically and
also knew how to be cruel. All these characterictics of the
Slovanic nature can be found in the Slovanic nations even
at the ,p resent time.
The historian Procopius (562) said that the Slavs were
rather tall, hardy, blond-haired people and honesty was one
�SlJOVAK.I.A
69
of their marked characteristics. Theophylactus recorded an
interesting commentary on the Slavs. He said: "In 590
three men were captured by the Greeks in Thrace; the men
carried musical instruments instead of weapons. When
Caesar M:auricus asked who they ,w ere, the men answered:
'We are Slavs; we love music; we play the guitar and violin
and sing.' Mauricus was overcome by their simplicity. Af..,
ter feasting them he had a guard escort them to their
lands."
The German historian Herder had this to say about
the Slavs: "They loved farming; they had herds and implements and a home industry ; with the products of their
land and their industry they carried on a useful business.
They built cities and in places occupied themselves with
mining; they knew how to melt and mold metals. The Slavs
prepared salt, made cloth, brewed beer, grafted trees, and
lived according to their manner a happy, musical life.''
The Slovaks of old had names for implements, furniture, grains, fruit trees, trades and animals. They had their
own words for: plow, iron, cloth, needle, pliers, wheel,
wagon, seal, ring, blacksmith, spoon, clothier, butcher,
cape, jeweler.
As a musical people they had many folk songs. In
number and variety of content they are second to those
of no other nation.
SLOVAK MYTHOLOGY
There are very few reliable records of the religion of
ancient Slovanic peoples. We know that they believed in a
Supreme Being and in immortality. The Slovaks called the
Supreme Being "Praboh" :_ the God of all gods. They had
a White God - the God of all good, and a Black God - the
God of evil and death. Many lesser gods, belonging to both
the white and black groups, also existed for the ancient
Slovaks and other Slovanic peoples.
"ZIVENA" was the godess of life, and "MORENA"
the godess of death. Brooks and streams housed nymphs,
and fairies inhabited the woods and forests. "LADA" was
the godess of beauty, while "URODA" was the godess of
the fields and crops. ' ~PfilRUIN" (P.AJROM" ) , the God of
thunder, was held in great respect.
�70
SLOVAKIA
The ancient Slovaks worshipped and invoked their gods
in sacred groves. They offered sacrifices of grain and animals to images of wood and stone through their priests.
The White Priests (BieJok:iiazi) served and invoked the
White Gods. The White Priests were most important men
of the tribe; they presided at all councils and trials and
their judgments and decisions were final. The Black Priests
- the magicians and sorcerers - were believed to possess
powers of tmnsforming peraons into animals and inanimate
objects.
The Slovaks, like most of the other Slovanic peoples
of ancient times, cremated or buried their dead. Food,
weapons, wine and jewelry were usually placed in the
graves of the dead. Ashes of the dead were placed in urns
of clay and then buried. Mounds of clay and stone were
built over burial places; the greater the mound, the more
important the person or persons buried there. Several such
mounds were found and excavated in Slovakia (at Skalica,
Brezolupy, Boooivce, Kras:iiany near 2ilina and at Cepcin in
Turiec). One of the most extensive burial grounds was uncovered at Devinska Nova Ves.
Some of the customs and practices of the ancient pagan Slovaks have survived the centuries and are still observed in many quaint villages of Slovakia today. Many of
the pagan practices, however, disappeared with the advent
of Christianity.
As the Slovanic peoples abandoned their ancient lands
and began to colonize central and eastern Europe - after
the Germanic Heruli and Lombards withdrew from the territory of Slovakia in the sixth ·century and the Slovaks
came in - the savage nation of the Avars tore into the
Danube basin, overran the whole territory, and pushed
deeply into the Frankish kingdom in the west. During the
next hundred years the whole region seethed in turmoil.
The Avars were wild nomads of Turko-Tartarian origin
who rode their horses rough-shod over the countries of
their neighbors and subjugated them. They settled in Pannonia, where they built military camps which were protected by huge, circular mounds of earth and stone and
wooden fences. The Slovaks withdrew from this territory
�SLOVAKIA
71
and settled north of the Danube . Part of the Slovak tribes
lived in the mounta ins; they were govern ed by their own
princes .
The Slovan ic peoples along the Danube had to serve
the Avars and were forced to go with them on their rampages into neighb oring territor ies. The A vars looted the
Germa n lands in the west and Constan tinoiple (Cari•h rad)
and Salonik a in the east. Natura lly, the Slovan ic peoples
wanted tQ throw off the yoke of the Aivars and waited for
the opportu ne momen t to rebel. That time came in 624,
when Samo, a Franki sh mercha nt, succeed ed in uniting the
Slovani c peoples and led them in battle agains t the savage
A;vars. Sa.mo defeate d the Arv,a xs rund founde d the first SlovaJllic state ,near the central Danube . Encour aged by the
victory over the A vars, Samo led the Slovan ic peoples
agains t the German ic Franks . Samo again was victorio us;
his Slovani c army defeate d the Franks under Dagob ert in
a three-d ay battle near the Vogast e castle in 631. Becaus e
the Slovak s were settled north of the Danub e and the Slovenians south of it, Samo's empire stretch ed over these
territor ies. The Slovani c peoples within these territor ies
were called by the commo n name of Sloven es (Slovie ni).
The main fortres s of this Slovani c empire was situate d in
Slovak ia at the conflue nce of the Morava and Danube rivers. Samo's empire , howeve r, disinte grated soon after his
death (658). Wheth er it was the ,k ingdom of the Slova!ks
alone is questio nable, but the fact remain s that the territory of Slovak ia formed the core of it.
ilfu-edegar's "Chron icles" ;record that a ~trong westem Slovan ic empire existed already in the seventh century ,
strong enough to, resist the pressu re of the Avars and the
rule of Dagob ert. Fredeg ar wrote quite plainly that Samo
came along when the Slovam c tribes of the area were successful ly rebellin g aga~t the rule of the A vars. His "Chro.nioles" form the basis of most theorie s in ;regard to the
ethnica l composiition of Samo's Empire , its territor ial extent
and the site of its princip al city or strongh old. In recent
yeara Slova!k, Polish, and Czech scholar s of Slavist ics agreed
that Samo's strongh old, the center of his empire , was at De...
vin, at ,t he conflue nce of the Morav a and Danll!be rivers.
�SLOVAK.IA
72
Professor Oettinger, well-knOIWll historian and archeologis t
of Vienna, however, .prefers to Tegard Vienna as the center
of Samo's Empire. In his book "Das Warden Wiens" (19M),
he tells that he .bases his conclusion especially on the findings resulting from the discovery of the ancient Berghof
Castle in Vienna, the remains of which can ibe traced ;to
Samo's time. The Ava.rs, a nomadic people, could not build
such a g,reat citadel of stone. Presenting a whole series of
philological airguments to baclk his theory, professor Oettinger states that tt is self-eviden t that SlovaJks and ,p ossibly
other Slwanic peoples lived in the aJrea of Vienna iaJIJ.d far to
the west along the Danube territory during Samo's time.
While the Slovanic peoples were resisting the A vars
heroically, a strong Frankish empire was being built in the
west. The power of this empire, whose borders in the eighth
century extended from the Pyrenees to the Sumava River,
became consolidate d especially during the reign of Charles
the Great (Charlemag ne), who ruled from 768 to 814, and
united all the Germanic tribes, subjugated the Bavarians
and the Saxons in the east, and came into contact with the
most westerly tribes of the Slovans. In 799 the armies of
Charlemag ne defeated the Arvars, who lateT were aJbso;z1bed
by the Slovanic inhabitants of the Danube countries.
But the great empire of Charlemag ne, who became
Emperor in 800, had another weapon besides its strong
army for its aggression s into the neighborin g countries of
the east. That weapon was Christianit y, which in the
Franldsh empire had spread and become so strong that already during the reign of Charlemag ne the way was prepared for it to reach the Danubian Slovans who were settled along the eastern borders of the Frankish empire.
To safegururd the eastern f:rontier of his empiire, Charlemagne placed heavy military garrisons along bordering
countries. Such territories were called "Marks" and were
managed by so-called "Markgrav es." In a short time it became evident that the military garriso!IlS of such Marks
were not only for defense, but also for advance into the
neighboring Slovanic countries. Contempor aneously new
bishoprics and monasterie s were built along these bordering countries which strengthen ed the Christian faith and
1
�SIJOVAKIA
73
propagated Christian culture. It was thus that Christianity
came to the neighboring Slovanic nations.
Slovakia already in the very beginning of the ninth
century came into immediate contact with the military and
cultural might of the Frankish empire. The Slovak nation
crossed the threshhold of its national and cultural history.
~RiINCiE PRJ.BINA
The Slovanic tribes, which settled on the northern
bank of the Danube, on ,b oth sides of the 1Mora,va river, weTe
called Moravians. Philologis~, historians, a,nd aroheologists
have a.miply demonstrated that whatever had b,een mentioned
in old historical documents aibout the MoraJVian.s referred
in £act to the ancestors of the Slovaks, the Slovans (ISla<vS)
who already in the first half of the ninth century were the
inhaJbitants of the territory on both sides of the MoTava
river.
in anoient d0<:uments we find the name "Slovenica"
used interchangeably with ' 1Moravia" and "Magna Moravia"
to designate the territory on both sides of the Morava riveT.
A document of King Loruis from the year 861 also, calls that
area "Slovenica." In western (Latin) sources, the inhabit..,
ants of that territory were called ''Moravians" and "the
Slarvs of Moravia" (Slavi; Sclavi; Sch1avi; Sc,l a,v i Marahenses; Marehenses; Maravi; Mairavani; Moravi; Maraibi; MarahaJvi; Sclavini; Selavi Margenses) to distinguish them from
the Slorvans (Slavs) who had occupied other territories (Behemi; Sclavi Boehemia; Boemie; Beheimi; Boemani ; Boo-.
manici; Behemani; Bohemani; Bulgari; Vulgari; ChTobati;
BeJochrobati; .Kosari; Czechi; Poloni; ,Russi; etc.). In eastern sources, however, the inhabitants of the same territory
were called "Slovenes" ('Slovieni; Sloveni), while their land
wa:s rreferred to as "Slovak Land" and "Moravia" (.Slovenska
zemlja; Morava). It is significant that af.ter the fall olf Great
Moravia, her inhabitants were referred to by their a,ndent
name: Slavi; ,Sclavi; Slovieni; Sloveni - older forms of the
term Slovak, which began to appear onyl after the fifteenth centUTY.
From reliable sources we learn that about the year
830,. there ruled in Slovakia a prince named Pribina, who
resided in Nitra. The name Pribina and Nitra are very dear
�74
SLOVAKIA
to ,t he hearts of all .Slovaks, because Prilbina is the name
of the first Slovak ruler ever mentioned by history, and
Nitra is the name of the first Slovak castle which became
the cradle of Slovak national history. Pribina reigned in
Nitra and his principality extended over the territory of
the fertile basin of the Nitra river. The sovereignty of the
Prince of Nitra was acknowledged by other Slovak principalities that extended along the Hron river country, the
banks of the Vah and other Slovak lands. Under the rule
of Prince Pribina belonged the Slovaik principalities that lay
to the east of the Small Carpathians.
The same sources tell us that Archbishop Adalram of
Salzburg blessed a church on Pribina's land in Nitra. This
consecration is proof that the Christianity spread by the
German priests among the Slovaks already had taken firm
root. Pribina's church in Nitra is the first Christian church
on the territory of the western Slovans. While other Slovanic peoples in the eastern half of Europe still lived far
off from western-European Christian culture and wandered
in the darkness of paganism, the Slovak nation already in
the beginning of the ninth century was counted among the
Christian, the cultured nations of Europe.
At the time of the consecration of the Nitra church,
in 833, Pribina himself was not yet a Christian. But the
circumstance that Pribina allowed the Christian faith to be
preached to his nation proves that the first Slovak ruler,
even though he probably could not grasp the significance
of Christian doctrine, nevertheless understood the political
and cultural significance of Christianity on the SlovanoGermanic border. Pribina, a wise and prudent ruler, knew
that a small nation at this dangerous crossroad could defend itself against its stronger neighbors only when it was
equal to them culturally.
Not long afterwards, however, cruel calamity befell the
ruler of Nitra. Prince Mojmir, who had united the Slovak
tribes in the western part of the Slovak territory under his
rule and who probably resided at Devin, drove Pribina out
of Nitra and occupied his domain. Out of this union of
.Mojmirs country with Pribina's, there arose on the north
bank of the Danube a state that united all the Slovak
�SLOVAKIA
75
tribes. The state, thus established about the year 830, was
called Great Moravia (VeFka Morava) or the Great Moravian Empire (Vefkomoravska risa).
Pribina, with his son Kocef and a retinue of Slovak
magnates, sought refuge in the neighboring Mark to the
east, near the Danube. Markgrave Ratbod presented Pribina to King Louis the German. The latter had Pribina in:structed in the Christian faith and baptized in St. Martin's
,c hurch in the city of Treisma (probably the present city of
Sankt Polten in Germany). For a time Pribina and his
group lived in the court of Markgrave Ratbod, but when
the latter refused to aid him against Mojmir, he went to
the Bulgars. However, he did not tarry there for long
either, because soon after we find him seeking the aid of
Ratimar, the Croatian Prince. At that time (about 838),
Ratimar was not on good terms with Ratbod, so Pribina
had to take refuge with Count Salach of Corutania. The
latter succeeded in reconciling Pribina with Ratbod.
In exile Pribina convinced himself that he could not
regain his lost domain and return to Nitra. He became reconciled with his fate and sought to gain the favor of King
Louis the German. The latter entrusted to Pribina the new
principality beyond the Danube, the country of Pannonia
near Blatno. In 847 he became the independent ruler of this
principality and built a formidable citadel there that was
called Blatnohrad (Moosburg). After his baptism, Pribina
became a zealous Christian and sought to convert all his
subjects to Christianity. He invited German missionaries
into his domain, built churches, endowed monasteries and
often welcomed the archbishop of Salzburg at his court.
In his work, Pribina had a zealous helper in the person of
his son Kocel'. When Pribina died in 861 under mysterious
circumstances, Kocel' inherited his principality. The Slovak
nation, immediately with its first appearance on the stage
of European history, entered the services of Christian culture. The Slovaks are the oldest nation on the central
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe
to have its own independent state. It is well to note that
the Slovak State from its very inception was ,a Christian
State.
�76
SLOVAKIA
CHAPTER TWO
'DHiE GREAT M!ORA~ EJMPI'RE
The studies of historians, philologists, and -archeolo~
gists clearly indicate that the Great Moravian Empire was
not the empire of the ''Great Moravians," but the land of
the ancietn Slov•a k s who had settled on both sides of the
'Morava river. The Great Moravian IDmpire, then, was in reality a Great Slova!k Empire, if we are to call the territory
by the name of the peole who had occupied it from the dawn
of history. These studies refute the hypothesis of the Czech
and non-Czech philologists, ethnogr~phers, and historians,
who claim that "Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia, MMoraviia,
and Nor.them Hung•a ry (SlovaJkia) fornied a single group
with a common langua,ge."
Furthermore, these studies tell us that at first there
were two estates or rprinciipalities in that area: the one
called "Mol'ova" was around the Morava up to the Vah with
its capital city at Devin, while the other called "Nitra" the capital city of which bore the i,;ame name - was around
the Nitra river. When Mojmir, the ruler of Moravia, conquered Pribina, the ruler of Nitra, German chronicles 'began
to call his empire "Magna Mora'Via," whk'h meant the annexation of the NitJ:ra principality to that of Mor8JVia.
We afso leiarn from these studies that the ancestors of
the Czechs had settled in the land of the Boii (Boehemi,a;
Behemia; Bohemia) just ltbout at the same time that the
Slovaks occupied the territory of the Morava river. Moj!mir,
Rastislav, and Sviitopllllk built the empire of the Slova!ks,
while Hostivit and Borivoj built .the state of the Czechs.
The Annales Fra,ncofuldenses tell us that "Sviitoplwk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule by force." Later
the Czechs (Slavs of Bohemia) even joined the Germans to
wage war agaJnst the Great Moravian EmpiTe.
When Mojmir, some time in the year 836, drove Pribina out of Nitra and united the territory inhabited by
Slovak trib,es into a larger unit, there arose on the northern
bank of the Danube an empire which the Byzantine em1
�SLOVAKIA
77
peror, Constantine Po.rphyrogennetos, in his work "About
the Management of a State" (950), calls Great Moravia.
Mojmir's empire stretched over the territory of present
Slovakia and Moravia and was, after Samo's empire, the
second Slovanic state near the Danube on the German-Slovanic border.
Just as Samo's Empire, so even the Great Mora'Vlian
Empire had its origin at the same historic crossroad, because it was here that the greatest danger threatened the
Slovanic peoples and they had to unite in defense of their
freedom a,nd independence. While Samo's empire , arose because the Slovans along the Danube wanted to protect
themselves against the enemies from the east, Great Moravia was established under pressure of danger from the
west.
Mojmir, like Pribina, tried to live in peace with the
neighboring Germans, because he knew that war with them
could only end disastrously for the Slovaks. Mojmir was
already a Christian, so the missionary activity of the German priests on the territory of Great Moravia went on nuhampered. We must remember that Great Moravia at that
time did not have any definite borders, because the borders
of states of the Middle Ages never were defined strictly.
The area of Great Moravia changed because the successors
of Mojmir did undertake expeditions into neighboring countries, defeated them in battle and annexed them to the
empire.
Louis the German did not relish the idea of a great,
united Slovanic empire as a neighbor. In 846 he unseated
Mojmir and replaced him with Rastislav. The latter simu~
lated friendship for Louis, but knew well that the independence of his country was constantly threatened by the
Germans. The independence of Great Moravia was threatened not only by German armies, but also by the missionary activity of the German priests, who had begun to look
upon the territory as a part of the German empire. In
about 860 Rastislav sent a special messenger to Pope Nicholas I in Rome with a request for missionaries who had
a command of the Slovanic tongues. The Pope, however,
answered he was sorry that he could not help Rastislav,
�78
SLOVAKIA
because at that time there were no such priests in Rome.
After due deliberation with his advisers, Rastislav decided to send a special mission to .Constantinople, to .E mperor Michael ill. Rastislav's request, as presented to the
Emperor, read: "Since our people has cast off paganism
and follows the Christian law, we do not have such a teacher, who might explain the true Christian Faith to us in our
own tongue, so that even other parties, witnessing this,
might become like unto us. So send us, Emperor, such a
bishop and teacher, because your country is everywhere
recognized for its good laws."
Just about that time the German empire found strong
allies in the Bulgarians, who bordered with Great Moravia
at the Tisa river and lived in enmity with the Byzantine
emperor. Michael did not have to deliberate long with his
counsellors. He wanted Rastislav as an ally against the
German-Bulgarian alliance and, hence, decided to aid the
ruler of Great Moravia in his quest for missionaries who
could speak the language of Rastislav's people. Up to this
time the land of the Slovaks was subject to the influence
of western culture only. Now it was to make contacts with
the Christian culture of the European east.
SLOVAK .APOSTLES: CYRIL .AND METHODLUS
Em;peror Michael of Constantinople decided to send
Constantine (Cyril), the philosopher and linguist, and his
brother Methodius, who was versed in the art of government, to preach the Gospel to the people of Rastislav. Constantine had distinguished himself in apostolic work before,
at first alone and later with his brother Methodius. As
natives of Salonica (Thessalonica) they were suited for the
mission: they new the language of Rastislav's people, the
forefathers of the Slovaks. The Emperor, having summoned them, told the brothers: "You are from Salonica, and
all Salonicans speak pUTe Slovanic."
Upon learning that Rastislav's people did not have their
own script, the task of inventing one fell to the lot of Constantine. Legend has it that the alphabet worked out by
Constantine (Cyril) had been revealed to him by God. It
was quite an achievement. Constantine started with Greek
�SLOVAKIA
79
characters, but Slovanic sounds of the ninth century varied
greatly with the Greek, therefore signs and characters had
to be created to designate them. The alphabet that resulted
is known as "Cyrillic."
After due preparation for their new mission, the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius set out for the
country of Rastislav. They arrived in Rastislav's empire
in 863 and began preaching the Word of God in the language of the people. Soon ,a fter the translation of the
Scriptl.ll'es and liturgical 1b ooks was completed and present...
ed to Rastislav's court at Devin. Naturally the saintly brothers gained many admirers and disciples. These catechists
went among their people and aided Constantine and Methodius in their missionary work. Up to the time of the Slovak
apostles, only three languages were considered feasible for
ecclesiastic life, the Holy Scriptures and the Church liturgy: Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The latter two were used
extensively-the Greek in the Byzantine (eastern) Church
and Latin in the Roman (western) Church. Due to the efforts of Constantine and Methodius, the language of the
Slovaks (early Slovanic) became the third language to be
used in Church liturgy.
The work of Constantine and Methodius in Rastislav's
empire was blessed with success. The saintly brothers united the people of Rastislav spiritually and. also contributed
handsomely to the material welfare of the Great Moravian
Empire. Their disciples later spread the Gospel to other
neighboring Slovanic nations (Czechs, Serbs, Russians) in
a language that was for the most part understandable to
all Slo-\'anic nations.
The German clergy of Salzburg viewed the work of
Constantine and Methodius with envy and accused the brothers of introdllJlcing dangerous innovations into the liturgy
of the Church. A protest against their activities was lodged
in Rome, and the brothers were summoned by Pope Nicholas (858-867) to vindicate themselves.
Constantine and Methodius set out for Rome in 867.
Their journey led them through Lake Blatno (Balaton),
the residence of Prince Kocer, Pribina's son. Kocer received
the brothers with great joy and examined their liturgical
�80
SLOVAKIA
books in the Slovanic script with great interest. Leaving
Kocer, Constantine and Methodius passed through Corinthia to Venice on the Adriatic Sea. At Venice they successfully defended their use of the language of Rastislav's people in the liturgy of the Church, while the ecclesiastics
there had to concede defeat in the debate.
While Constantine and Methodius made their way to
Rome, Pope Nicholas died. Four days later his successor,
Adriam ]I (867--872), was elected head of the ChuTch.
The saintly brothers were given a cordial reception by the
Pope, and, after convincing a synod of bishops that they
were not guilty of introducing any dangerous innovations
into the liturgy of the Church, their activities were accorded Adrian's approval. The Holy Father accepted the liturgical books in ;the Slov,anic language, blessed them on the aUar
of the church of St. Mary Major, and celebrated the Divine
Liturgy over them himself. The Pope then proceeded to
consecrate Constantine and Methodius as bishops. A number of their disciples (Clement, Gorazd, Angelar, Sava and
Naum) were ordained to the priesthood by the bishops Formosus and Gaundenrich.
Shortly thereafter Constantine became seriously ill and
retired to a monastery. There he joined the religious community, taking the name of Cyril. He died February 14,
869, and his earthly remains were buried on the right side
of the high altar of the church of St. Clement in Rome.
After the death of Saint Cyril, the entire burden of
spreading the Gospel and teaching of Christ rested on the
shoulders of his brother. Methodius returned as archbishop
and papal legate fully authorized to organize the Church
in the land of Rastislav. Archbishop Methodius became the
head of Slovanic Christendom. Besides receiving the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Methodius carried letters from the
Pope for Rastislav of Great Moravia, Svatopluk of Nitra
and Kocef of Blatnohrad Castle (Moosburg), the three Slovak princes, which stated that the Pope permitted the use
of Slovanic liturgy with the reservation that the epistle
and ,gospel always be read in Latin before being read in
the vernacular (Slovanic). The archdiocese of Methodius
extended over Great Moravia and beyond the Danube over
�SLOVAKIA
81
Pannonia, uniting the lands governed by Slovak rulers. But
as Methodius was returing to continue his apostolic work
among the people of Rastislav, a new ruler was taking
over the throne of Great Moravia.
KING S,V ATOPDUCK
While Methodius was in Rome, the Germans continued
to harass Rastislav. In 869 King Louis the German declared
war against the neighboring Slovanic peoples and invaded
their lands with his armies headed by his three sons. Prince
Louis attacked the Lusatian Serbs, Charles went after Rastislav, and Carloman tore into the territory that was ruled
by Rastislav's nephew, Svatopluk of Nitra. The German
armies plundered and pillaged the Great Moravian Empire.
But Rastislav's stronghold, the mighty Devin, proved impregnable and Rastislav's empire retained its independence.
The following year, however, Rastislav was betrayed
by his own kinsman, his nephew Svatopluk, regent of Nitra.
Success in battle had turned Svatopluk's head. The Germans played up to Svatopluk and promised to help him
gain the throne of Great Moravia. Svatopluk decided to
betray his uncle and vowed loyalty to Carloman. Rastislav,
however, learned of the plot and became furious. Having
vowed to punish his traitorous nephew, he ordered his men
to do away with Svatopluk at a banquet, but their attempt
to take and kill him failed. Soon thereafter Rastislav led
his army against Svatopluk. In the ensuing battle, Rastislav was defeated. Worse than that, he was captured and
handed over to the Germans. Carloman sent Rastislav
bound in chains to Bavaria where King Louis the German
imprisoned him and had his eyes ,gouged out. Rastislav
died later as a prisoner of the Germans.
With Rastislav's defeat the Great Moravian Empire
passed completely into the hands of the German crown.
The Germans also seized Archbishop Methodius, who had
returned from Rome, and imprisoned him. The Bavarian
bishops, who regarded Methodius as a foreign intruder,
made claims to the territories of the Slovanic peoples along
the Danube and dealt with Methodius so inhumanely that
Svatopluk himself intervened in his behalf. When Carlo-
�82
SLOVAKIA
man took possession of Rastislav's country and seized his
royal treasures, he entrusted the rule of the ravaged country to Svatopluk.
Svatopluk soon proved himself a strong ruler. As a
soldier he excelled in ruthless courage. The Germans began
to distrust him, because they feared he would build an empire so strong as to imperil their country. Louis the German decided to put Svatopluk out of the way. In 871 the
Germans succeeded in taking Svatopluk and imprisoned
him. Some of his castles were taken over by the German
Markgraves. Svatopluk denied the charge of Carloman that
he plotted against the German crown, but that did not help
him. When the Slovaks learned what had happened to their
ruler, they elected Slavomir to take his place and rebelled
against the Germans.
Slavomir was supported by the whole country. A terrilble war followed. The Germans suffered heaivy losses.
Devin proved impregnable to their attacks. In the meantime, the wily Svatopluk was plotting to even matters with
the Germans who had tricked him. While in prison he repented his betrayal of Rastislav and vowed to even the
score with his German captors.
Svatopluk begged Carloman to release him so that he
might subdue the Slovaks under Slavomir. Carloman was
reluctant at first, but finally gave in to Svatopluk's pleadings. Accompanyin g a large German army, Sviitopluk soon
found himself below the mighty fortress of Devin. While
the German army encamped quietly below the citadel, Svatopluk set out with a small detachment of men to the castle
to persuade Slavomir to surrender without a battle. Once
inside the castle, Svatopluk disclosed his plan to Slavomir.
Assuming command of the Slovak army, Svatopluk tore
out of the courtyard and attacked the Germans with such
sa;vagery that only few were able to esc•a;pe alirve. Carloman's army was caught unawares and crushed.
Svatopluk knew that the Germans would come after
him sooner or later. He looked around for allies. That same
year (871), he married the sister of Borivoj, ruler of the
Bohemian fand, and formed an alliance with' him. Svatopluk
pressed the offensive against the Germans and was quite
�SLOVAKIA
83
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)
• • •
1856 -
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -
1956
P.A. HROBAK
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs
�
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1956
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63
SLOVAKIA
The History of Slovakia:
By PHILIP A . HROBAiK
SLOVENSKO -
SLOVAKIA -
SLOVAKLAND
The territory occupied by the Slovak people for the
past 1500 years is known as Slovakia. It is situated in the
very heart of Europe. Present-day Slovakia has an area of
49,015 square kilometers (approximately 19,000 sq. miles)
and a population of 4,000,000. There were times when the
borders of Slovakia extended beyond their present limits
and times when the land of the Slovaks had no definite
borders at all.
In ancient times the Slovaks occupied even the western
bank of the Morava river and the north bank of the Tisa
(Theiss) river. Though the area and the borders of Slovakia changed at various times, its topography - the land
and its waterways - did not.
Slovakia is bound on the north by the Carpathian
Mountains and on the south by the blue Danube and the
upper arm of the Tisa river. Into these two streams empty
all the rivers of Slovakia that have their origin in the foothills of the King's Plateau (Krafova Hofa) - the natural
center of Slovakia: those that run off to the southwest
empty into the Danube, while those that course to the
southwest pour into the Tisa, forming deep valleys and
broad basins between the ,i ndividual mountain :zones that
fill out the largest part of the territory of Slovakia.
This territory is divided into three parts: 1. western
Slovakia which drains into the Danube tributaries; 2. eastern Slovakia that drains into the tributaries of the Tisa;
3. the mountainous country of central Slovakia.
The geographical picture of Slovakia is extremely
varied, because high mountain ranges alternate with deep
valleys which, in places, spread out into basins. Fertile
plains stretch out from the foothills of the mountains.
Slovakia is situated in the very center of Europe
where the north-eastern spurs of the Alps near the central
Danube touch upon the mountainous arch of the Carpa-
64
SLOVAKIA
thians which is the main watershed of central Europe.
From this watershed the streams of central Europe run
into several seas. In olden times the course of these
streams determined the course of roads along which nations migrated and business and culture flowed. We find
Slovakia at the juction of these roads which cross the
Caripathian Mountains kom the north and the south.
Two roads were especially significant in deciding the
fate of Slovakia and the Slovak nation. One coursed along
the Danube and connected the western oountTies of Europe
with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate this
road intersected with the other important highway which
started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the
Danube, proceeded to the north against the current of the
Morava river and went to the coast of the Baltic Sea.
Slovakia, according to archeological researches, was
well inhabited as early as 5000 B. C., but we do not know
the race or the names of the peoples who inhabited the
land. Traces of the Neolithic Man, who used stone weapons
in hunting the mammoth and the huge cave bear, have
been found. The scientific investigator will find much material on the prehistoric period in the museum of Bratislava
and Turciansky Svaty Martin.
About the year 2000 B.C. begins the Bronze Age with
its burial urns, and clay and stone remains, found on the
sites of ancient settlements in Slovakland. During the ensuing Iron Age, we find traces of the Illyrians in the west,
of the Thracians in the east. The latter came into contact
with the Scythians in the valley of the Tisa river.
Several nations of various origins and culture lived in
Slovakia just before the dawn of the Christian era. According to ancient Greek and Roman writers, the land of
the Slovaiks was inhabited by the Gauls and the Celts at
that time. In the fourth century B. C., we note traces of
the more advanced Gallic culture from the discoveries of
golden ornaments and coins, imitations of those issued by
Philip III of Macedonia and his son, Alexander the Great.
At Bratislava coins of the Roman Republic, dating from
the first century B. C., have been found. A Greek map of
the Slovak territory, dating back to the third century,
SLOVAKIA
65
shows many Slovanic names for mountains and rivers,
The fertile plains of south-eastern Slovakia were occupied by the Boii, a Gallic tri'be, and in the mountainous
parts of central Slovakia lived the Kotin (Gothine) tribe
which worked the ore of the Iron Mountains. The Osi settled in the neighborhood of the Kotins, while the Korkonti
- tribes of southern origin - occupied the northwestern
part of Slovakia.
In the first half of the last century before Christ the
Dacians came to Slovakia from the east and overpowered
the Gallic Boii. But in the first quarter of the first century
after Christ, the Dacians were forced to migrate to the
north into the mountains, because they were iha:rd pressed
by the J azygi who had come from the Black Sea to take
over the land on the left side of the Danube.
During the reign of Tiberius, two Germanic tribes settled in the territory of the Slovaks, the Quadi and the
Marcomanni, who frequently raided the Roman proi\Tince
of Pannonia on the other side of the Danube. Vannius, the
bellicose king of the Quadi, built military fortresses along
the V ah river and extended his power to the Turiec a:nd
Kysuca rivers.
About twenty years after Christ, when a large part of
the territory of Slovakia was occupied by the Quadi, the
Romans were consolidating their might near the Danube.
The Franks and the Romans began to wage war for the
control of the territory of Slovakia, a struggle that lasted
several centuries.
South of the Danube the Romans organized the province of Pannonia, east of which was the province of Dacia.
To conquer the whole Danube basin to the Carpathians, the
Romans built military strongholds along the south bank of
the Danube. Such fortresses were established at Vindobona
(Vienna), Carnanthum (Hainburg), Brigetium (Komarno)
and at Aquincum (Budapest). To defend and to secure the
frontier along the Danube against incursions of barbaric
tribes, the Romans sent detachments across the river to
established military stations on the northern bank, on the
territory of Slovakia. From excacations we know that Ro-
66
SLOVAK.IA
man troops were stationed at Devin, Stupava, Bratislava
and opposite Komarno at li.
The Romans bested the Quadi in battle. Their king
Vannius ruled over the territory of Slovakia by the grace
of the Roman Emperor. Of course, the Quadi resented this.
After Vannius' death the aggressive Quadi challenged the
power of the Romans on the Danube and the Roman Emperors had to defend their rule with large armies. Along
the Vah river the Roman troops penetrated as far as Trencin. Emperor Marcus Aurelius and his son Commodus defeated the Quadi in 179 A. D. after several bloody skirmishes on Slovak territory, as is commemorate d by inscription on a roc'k at Trencin: "In memory of the IVictory of the
Emperor's army that encamped at Laugaricio, 855 soldiers
of the II. Legion. Made by Constantine, commander of the
II. auxiliary Legion." This army was stationed at Laugaritio, a Roman settlement near Trencin, which has since
disappeared.
During these skirmishes with the Quadi, probably
about 173 A. D., the Roman army in Slovakia found itself
threatened by a scarcity of water. In the army that fought
against the Germans somewhere along the Hron river,
there were several Christians who had come from Asia
Minor. These Christian soldiers - the first Christians on
Slovak territory - prayed for raiin and their prayers were
answered. The Roman army was saved. This incident is immortalized on the Arch of Triumph of Emperor Marcus
Aurelius in Rome.
The Quadi, 1b eaten repeatedly by the Romans, never
·gwve up trying to drive the Romans out of Slovakia. Emperor Constantine LI defeated them in 258 A.ID. and Emperor
Valentian, the last Roman emperor who cowd claim sovereignty over the territory of Slovakia, repeated the pel'for:mance in 3·74. Upon the latter's death in 376, the great Mig;ra~
tion of Nations begain.. Shortly thereafter the Romans
ipulled thek gax.risoDJS out of Slo-y;aJk ia and let the Quadi
take over. The Quadi, however, were evicted from the territory by the Huns in the first half of the fifth century.
The Huns in turn were displaced by the Heruli, who held
the territory until about 491 when the Lombards defeated
SLOVAKIA
87
them, occupied their lands and held them until about 526,
when they crossed the Danube into Pannonia.
Slovrukia, however, did not remain even under the Huns
for long. After the disintegration of the Roman Empire,
the Germans migrated from Slovakia to the south. The
Marcomanni, weakened by the wars with the Romans and
forced by the hordes of Attila to join his army, were wiped
out in the battle of Cha.Ions (Catalaunian Fields) in 451.
There is as yet no definite proof, even though it may be
safely assumed, that the Slovaks and related Slovanic tribes
came into Slovakia in increasing numbers after the extinction of the Marcomanni. The historian J ordannes, writing
in the sixth century, said that all the Hungarian plain was
inhabited by Slovanic people (the Slavs).
AFTIDR THE ADVENT OF THE SLOVAKS
The Slovaks came to their present territory from the
East, probably from India. At the time Frankish tribes
fought the Roman Legions over the territory of Slovakia,
the Slovanic peoples occupied the land that stretched to the
north of the Carpathians and to the east of the river Vistula. It was a marshy and unfertile land. In time the growing Slovanic families were forced to emigrate to neighboring territories.
The Slovanic peoples who migrated to the west and
occupied the territory to the Elbe and Saal rivers are called
We,stern Slavs; they are the Poles, the SlOJVaks and! the
Czechs; those that occwpied the territory between t'he Elbe
and Oder rivers and the country along the coast of the
Baltic Sea are known as the Lusatian Serbs (northern Germany) and the Kashubes (near the Baltic Sea); today their
numbers are few. The Slovanic peoples, who migrated from
their ancient land to the south and occupied the Balkan
peninsula, are called the Southern Slavs: the Slovenes,
Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. A large part of the Slovanic peoples migrated to the east and occupied the plains
of eastern Europe. They are the Eastern Slavs: the White
Russians, the Little Russians (Ukrainians) and the Great
Russians.
As the great Slovanic family disintegrated, separate
68
SLOVAKIA
Slovanic nations developed with the centuries, each with
its dictinct culture, language, customs and traditions.
The Slovaks, like other Slovanic peoples, originally
were hunters. After a time they took to bee culture and
animal husbandry, especially sheep raising. From their
neighbors they learned to cultivate the soil. The men folk
hunted and herded sheep, while .the women and the slaves
did the farm work. The only trades known to them were
pottery making and blacksmithing. In business transactions
they exchanged products or paid in cloth; money was not
known as a means of barter. The Slovaks lived in simple
huts made of poles driven into the ground, around which
were wound branches and twigs which were then covered
with mud.
Several families, originating from a common forefather, formed a clan ("rod"). The head of the clan was the
oldest member; he was in charge of the common property
of the clan. A Slovanic settlement, inhabited by several related families, i.e. a clan, was called a village ("dedina"
from "dedo"-grandfather). The village was the common
heritage ("dedicstvo") of the whole clan. Several related
clans made up a tribe ("kmeii"), the leader of which was
the tribal chief, called a priest ("kiiaz") or prince ("knieza). When several such related tribes lived in one territory
for a long time a Slovanic state evolved and a Slovanic
nation was born.
SLOVAK CHARACTERISTICS
The Slovanic peoples had many good and bad characteristics. They loved songs and entertainment. Not possessing great wealth, they lived frugally. They were goodhearted and hospitable, but suffered discipline with difficulty.
They did not know how to obey, hence there was no harmony among them. They did not seek a battle, but when
they had to defend themselves they fought heroically and
also knew how to be cruel. All these characterictics of the
Slovanic nature can be found in the Slovanic nations even
at the ,p resent time.
The historian Procopius (562) said that the Slavs were
rather tall, hardy, blond-haired people and honesty was one
SlJOVAK.I.A
69
of their marked characteristics. Theophylactus recorded an
interesting commentary on the Slavs. He said: "In 590
three men were captured by the Greeks in Thrace; the men
carried musical instruments instead of weapons. When
Caesar M:auricus asked who they ,w ere, the men answered:
'We are Slavs; we love music; we play the guitar and violin
and sing.' Mauricus was overcome by their simplicity. Af..,
ter feasting them he had a guard escort them to their
lands."
The German historian Herder had this to say about
the Slavs: "They loved farming; they had herds and implements and a home industry ; with the products of their
land and their industry they carried on a useful business.
They built cities and in places occupied themselves with
mining; they knew how to melt and mold metals. The Slavs
prepared salt, made cloth, brewed beer, grafted trees, and
lived according to their manner a happy, musical life.''
The Slovaks of old had names for implements, furniture, grains, fruit trees, trades and animals. They had their
own words for: plow, iron, cloth, needle, pliers, wheel,
wagon, seal, ring, blacksmith, spoon, clothier, butcher,
cape, jeweler.
As a musical people they had many folk songs. In
number and variety of content they are second to those
of no other nation.
SLOVAK MYTHOLOGY
There are very few reliable records of the religion of
ancient Slovanic peoples. We know that they believed in a
Supreme Being and in immortality. The Slovaks called the
Supreme Being "Praboh" :_ the God of all gods. They had
a White God - the God of all good, and a Black God - the
God of evil and death. Many lesser gods, belonging to both
the white and black groups, also existed for the ancient
Slovaks and other Slovanic peoples.
"ZIVENA" was the godess of life, and "MORENA"
the godess of death. Brooks and streams housed nymphs,
and fairies inhabited the woods and forests. "LADA" was
the godess of beauty, while "URODA" was the godess of
the fields and crops. ' ~PfilRUIN" (P.AJROM" ) , the God of
thunder, was held in great respect.
70
SLOVAKIA
The ancient Slovaks worshipped and invoked their gods
in sacred groves. They offered sacrifices of grain and animals to images of wood and stone through their priests.
The White Priests (BieJok:iiazi) served and invoked the
White Gods. The White Priests were most important men
of the tribe; they presided at all councils and trials and
their judgments and decisions were final. The Black Priests
- the magicians and sorcerers - were believed to possess
powers of tmnsforming peraons into animals and inanimate
objects.
The Slovaks, like most of the other Slovanic peoples
of ancient times, cremated or buried their dead. Food,
weapons, wine and jewelry were usually placed in the
graves of the dead. Ashes of the dead were placed in urns
of clay and then buried. Mounds of clay and stone were
built over burial places; the greater the mound, the more
important the person or persons buried there. Several such
mounds were found and excavated in Slovakia (at Skalica,
Brezolupy, Boooivce, Kras:iiany near 2ilina and at Cepcin in
Turiec). One of the most extensive burial grounds was uncovered at Devinska Nova Ves.
Some of the customs and practices of the ancient pagan Slovaks have survived the centuries and are still observed in many quaint villages of Slovakia today. Many of
the pagan practices, however, disappeared with the advent
of Christianity.
As the Slovanic peoples abandoned their ancient lands
and began to colonize central and eastern Europe - after
the Germanic Heruli and Lombards withdrew from the territory of Slovakia in the sixth ·century and the Slovaks
came in - the savage nation of the Avars tore into the
Danube basin, overran the whole territory, and pushed
deeply into the Frankish kingdom in the west. During the
next hundred years the whole region seethed in turmoil.
The Avars were wild nomads of Turko-Tartarian origin
who rode their horses rough-shod over the countries of
their neighbors and subjugated them. They settled in Pannonia, where they built military camps which were protected by huge, circular mounds of earth and stone and
wooden fences. The Slovaks withdrew from this territory
SLOVAKIA
71
and settled north of the Danube . Part of the Slovak tribes
lived in the mounta ins; they were govern ed by their own
princes .
The Slovan ic peoples along the Danube had to serve
the Avars and were forced to go with them on their rampages into neighb oring territor ies. The A vars looted the
Germa n lands in the west and Constan tinoiple (Cari•h rad)
and Salonik a in the east. Natura lly, the Slovan ic peoples
wanted tQ throw off the yoke of the Aivars and waited for
the opportu ne momen t to rebel. That time came in 624,
when Samo, a Franki sh mercha nt, succeed ed in uniting the
Slovani c peoples and led them in battle agains t the savage
A;vars. Sa.mo defeate d the Arv,a xs rund founde d the first SlovaJllic state ,near the central Danube . Encour aged by the
victory over the A vars, Samo led the Slovan ic peoples
agains t the German ic Franks . Samo again was victorio us;
his Slovani c army defeate d the Franks under Dagob ert in
a three-d ay battle near the Vogast e castle in 631. Becaus e
the Slovak s were settled north of the Danub e and the Slovenians south of it, Samo's empire stretch ed over these
territor ies. The Slovani c peoples within these territor ies
were called by the commo n name of Sloven es (Slovie ni).
The main fortres s of this Slovani c empire was situate d in
Slovak ia at the conflue nce of the Morava and Danube rivers. Samo's empire , howeve r, disinte grated soon after his
death (658). Wheth er it was the ,k ingdom of the Slova!ks
alone is questio nable, but the fact remain s that the territory of Slovak ia formed the core of it.
ilfu-edegar's "Chron icles" ;record that a ~trong westem Slovan ic empire existed already in the seventh century ,
strong enough to, resist the pressu re of the Avars and the
rule of Dagob ert. Fredeg ar wrote quite plainly that Samo
came along when the Slovam c tribes of the area were successful ly rebellin g aga~t the rule of the A vars. His "Chro.nioles" form the basis of most theorie s in ;regard to the
ethnica l composiition of Samo's Empire , its territor ial extent
and the site of its princip al city or strongh old. In recent
yeara Slova!k, Polish, and Czech scholar s of Slavist ics agreed
that Samo's strongh old, the center of his empire , was at De...
vin, at ,t he conflue nce of the Morav a and Danll!be rivers.
SLOVAK.IA
72
Professor Oettinger, well-knOIWll historian and archeologis t
of Vienna, however, .prefers to Tegard Vienna as the center
of Samo's Empire. In his book "Das Warden Wiens" (19M),
he tells that he .bases his conclusion especially on the findings resulting from the discovery of the ancient Berghof
Castle in Vienna, the remains of which can ibe traced ;to
Samo's time. The Ava.rs, a nomadic people, could not build
such a g,reat citadel of stone. Presenting a whole series of
philological airguments to baclk his theory, professor Oettinger states that tt is self-eviden t that SlovaJks and ,p ossibly
other Slwanic peoples lived in the aJrea of Vienna iaJIJ.d far to
the west along the Danube territory during Samo's time.
While the Slovanic peoples were resisting the A vars
heroically, a strong Frankish empire was being built in the
west. The power of this empire, whose borders in the eighth
century extended from the Pyrenees to the Sumava River,
became consolidate d especially during the reign of Charles
the Great (Charlemag ne), who ruled from 768 to 814, and
united all the Germanic tribes, subjugated the Bavarians
and the Saxons in the east, and came into contact with the
most westerly tribes of the Slovans. In 799 the armies of
Charlemag ne defeated the Arvars, who lateT were aJbso;z1bed
by the Slovanic inhabitants of the Danube countries.
But the great empire of Charlemag ne, who became
Emperor in 800, had another weapon besides its strong
army for its aggression s into the neighborin g countries of
the east. That weapon was Christianit y, which in the
Franldsh empire had spread and become so strong that already during the reign of Charlemag ne the way was prepared for it to reach the Danubian Slovans who were settled along the eastern borders of the Frankish empire.
To safegururd the eastern f:rontier of his empiire, Charlemagne placed heavy military garrisons along bordering
countries. Such territories were called "Marks" and were
managed by so-called "Markgrav es." In a short time it became evident that the military garriso!IlS of such Marks
were not only for defense, but also for advance into the
neighboring Slovanic countries. Contempor aneously new
bishoprics and monasterie s were built along these bordering countries which strengthen ed the Christian faith and
1
SIJOVAKIA
73
propagated Christian culture. It was thus that Christianity
came to the neighboring Slovanic nations.
Slovakia already in the very beginning of the ninth
century came into immediate contact with the military and
cultural might of the Frankish empire. The Slovak nation
crossed the threshhold of its national and cultural history.
~RiINCiE PRJ.BINA
The Slovanic tribes, which settled on the northern
bank of the Danube, on ,b oth sides of the 1Mora,va river, weTe
called Moravians. Philologis~, historians, a,nd aroheologists
have a.miply demonstrated that whatever had b,een mentioned
in old historical documents aibout the MoraJVian.s referred
in £act to the ancestors of the Slovaks, the Slovans (ISla<vS)
who already in the first half of the ninth century were the
inhaJbitants of the territory on both sides of the MoTava
river.
in anoient d0<:uments we find the name "Slovenica"
used interchangeably with ' 1Moravia" and "Magna Moravia"
to designate the territory on both sides of the Morava riveT.
A document of King Loruis from the year 861 also, calls that
area "Slovenica." In western (Latin) sources, the inhabit..,
ants of that territory were called ''Moravians" and "the
Slarvs of Moravia" (Slavi; Sclavi; Sch1avi; Sc,l a,v i Marahenses; Marehenses; Maravi; Mairavani; Moravi; Maraibi; MarahaJvi; Sclavini; Selavi Margenses) to distinguish them from
the Slorvans (Slavs) who had occupied other territories (Behemi; Sclavi Boehemia; Boemie; Beheimi; Boemani ; Boo-.
manici; Behemani; Bohemani; Bulgari; Vulgari; ChTobati;
BeJochrobati; .Kosari; Czechi; Poloni; ,Russi; etc.). In eastern sources, however, the inhabitants of the same territory
were called "Slovenes" ('Slovieni; Sloveni), while their land
wa:s rreferred to as "Slovak Land" and "Moravia" (.Slovenska
zemlja; Morava). It is significant that af.ter the fall olf Great
Moravia, her inhabitants were referred to by their a,ndent
name: Slavi; ,Sclavi; Slovieni; Sloveni - older forms of the
term Slovak, which began to appear onyl after the fifteenth centUTY.
From reliable sources we learn that about the year
830,. there ruled in Slovakia a prince named Pribina, who
resided in Nitra. The name Pribina and Nitra are very dear
74
SLOVAKIA
to ,t he hearts of all .Slovaks, because Prilbina is the name
of the first Slovak ruler ever mentioned by history, and
Nitra is the name of the first Slovak castle which became
the cradle of Slovak national history. Pribina reigned in
Nitra and his principality extended over the territory of
the fertile basin of the Nitra river. The sovereignty of the
Prince of Nitra was acknowledged by other Slovak principalities that extended along the Hron river country, the
banks of the Vah and other Slovak lands. Under the rule
of Prince Pribina belonged the Slovaik principalities that lay
to the east of the Small Carpathians.
The same sources tell us that Archbishop Adalram of
Salzburg blessed a church on Pribina's land in Nitra. This
consecration is proof that the Christianity spread by the
German priests among the Slovaks already had taken firm
root. Pribina's church in Nitra is the first Christian church
on the territory of the western Slovans. While other Slovanic peoples in the eastern half of Europe still lived far
off from western-European Christian culture and wandered
in the darkness of paganism, the Slovak nation already in
the beginning of the ninth century was counted among the
Christian, the cultured nations of Europe.
At the time of the consecration of the Nitra church,
in 833, Pribina himself was not yet a Christian. But the
circumstance that Pribina allowed the Christian faith to be
preached to his nation proves that the first Slovak ruler,
even though he probably could not grasp the significance
of Christian doctrine, nevertheless understood the political
and cultural significance of Christianity on the SlovanoGermanic border. Pribina, a wise and prudent ruler, knew
that a small nation at this dangerous crossroad could defend itself against its stronger neighbors only when it was
equal to them culturally.
Not long afterwards, however, cruel calamity befell the
ruler of Nitra. Prince Mojmir, who had united the Slovak
tribes in the western part of the Slovak territory under his
rule and who probably resided at Devin, drove Pribina out
of Nitra and occupied his domain. Out of this union of
.Mojmirs country with Pribina's, there arose on the north
bank of the Danube a state that united all the Slovak
SLOVAKIA
75
tribes. The state, thus established about the year 830, was
called Great Moravia (VeFka Morava) or the Great Moravian Empire (Vefkomoravska risa).
Pribina, with his son Kocef and a retinue of Slovak
magnates, sought refuge in the neighboring Mark to the
east, near the Danube. Markgrave Ratbod presented Pribina to King Louis the German. The latter had Pribina in:structed in the Christian faith and baptized in St. Martin's
,c hurch in the city of Treisma (probably the present city of
Sankt Polten in Germany). For a time Pribina and his
group lived in the court of Markgrave Ratbod, but when
the latter refused to aid him against Mojmir, he went to
the Bulgars. However, he did not tarry there for long
either, because soon after we find him seeking the aid of
Ratimar, the Croatian Prince. At that time (about 838),
Ratimar was not on good terms with Ratbod, so Pribina
had to take refuge with Count Salach of Corutania. The
latter succeeded in reconciling Pribina with Ratbod.
In exile Pribina convinced himself that he could not
regain his lost domain and return to Nitra. He became reconciled with his fate and sought to gain the favor of King
Louis the German. The latter entrusted to Pribina the new
principality beyond the Danube, the country of Pannonia
near Blatno. In 847 he became the independent ruler of this
principality and built a formidable citadel there that was
called Blatnohrad (Moosburg). After his baptism, Pribina
became a zealous Christian and sought to convert all his
subjects to Christianity. He invited German missionaries
into his domain, built churches, endowed monasteries and
often welcomed the archbishop of Salzburg at his court.
In his work, Pribina had a zealous helper in the person of
his son Kocel'. When Pribina died in 861 under mysterious
circumstances, Kocel' inherited his principality. The Slovak
nation, immediately with its first appearance on the stage
of European history, entered the services of Christian culture. The Slovaks are the oldest nation on the central
Danube and they were the first nation in Central Europe
to have its own independent state. It is well to note that
the Slovak State from its very inception was ,a Christian
State.
76
SLOVAKIA
CHAPTER TWO
'DHiE GREAT M!ORA~ EJMPI'RE
The studies of historians, philologists, and -archeolo~
gists clearly indicate that the Great Moravian Empire was
not the empire of the ''Great Moravians," but the land of
the ancietn Slov•a k s who had settled on both sides of the
'Morava river. The Great Moravian IDmpire, then, was in reality a Great Slova!k Empire, if we are to call the territory
by the name of the peole who had occupied it from the dawn
of history. These studies refute the hypothesis of the Czech
and non-Czech philologists, ethnogr~phers, and historians,
who claim that "Czechs and Slovaks of Bohemia, MMoraviia,
and Nor.them Hung•a ry (SlovaJkia) fornied a single group
with a common langua,ge."
Furthermore, these studies tell us that at first there
were two estates or rprinciipalities in that area: the one
called "Mol'ova" was around the Morava up to the Vah with
its capital city at Devin, while the other called "Nitra" the capital city of which bore the i,;ame name - was around
the Nitra river. When Mojmir, the ruler of Moravia, conquered Pribina, the ruler of Nitra, German chronicles 'began
to call his empire "Magna Mora'Via," whk'h meant the annexation of the NitJ:ra principality to that of Mor8JVia.
We afso leiarn from these studies that the ancestors of
the Czechs had settled in the land of the Boii (Boehemi,a;
Behemia; Bohemia) just ltbout at the same time that the
Slovaks occupied the territory of the Morava river. Moj!mir,
Rastislav, and Sviitopllllk built the empire of the Slova!ks,
while Hostivit and Borivoj built .the state of the Czechs.
The Annales Fra,ncofuldenses tell us that "Sviitoplwk extricated the Czech tribes from Frankish rule by force." Later
the Czechs (Slavs of Bohemia) even joined the Germans to
wage war agaJnst the Great Moravian EmpiTe.
When Mojmir, some time in the year 836, drove Pribina out of Nitra and united the territory inhabited by
Slovak trib,es into a larger unit, there arose on the northern
bank of the Danube an empire which the Byzantine em1
SLOVAKIA
77
peror, Constantine Po.rphyrogennetos, in his work "About
the Management of a State" (950), calls Great Moravia.
Mojmir's empire stretched over the territory of present
Slovakia and Moravia and was, after Samo's empire, the
second Slovanic state near the Danube on the German-Slovanic border.
Just as Samo's Empire, so even the Great Mora'Vlian
Empire had its origin at the same historic crossroad, because it was here that the greatest danger threatened the
Slovanic peoples and they had to unite in defense of their
freedom a,nd independence. While Samo's empire , arose because the Slovans along the Danube wanted to protect
themselves against the enemies from the east, Great Moravia was established under pressure of danger from the
west.
Mojmir, like Pribina, tried to live in peace with the
neighboring Germans, because he knew that war with them
could only end disastrously for the Slovaks. Mojmir was
already a Christian, so the missionary activity of the German priests on the territory of Great Moravia went on nuhampered. We must remember that Great Moravia at that
time did not have any definite borders, because the borders
of states of the Middle Ages never were defined strictly.
The area of Great Moravia changed because the successors
of Mojmir did undertake expeditions into neighboring countries, defeated them in battle and annexed them to the
empire.
Louis the German did not relish the idea of a great,
united Slovanic empire as a neighbor. In 846 he unseated
Mojmir and replaced him with Rastislav. The latter simu~
lated friendship for Louis, but knew well that the independence of his country was constantly threatened by the
Germans. The independence of Great Moravia was threatened not only by German armies, but also by the missionary activity of the German priests, who had begun to look
upon the territory as a part of the German empire. In
about 860 Rastislav sent a special messenger to Pope Nicholas I in Rome with a request for missionaries who had
a command of the Slovanic tongues. The Pope, however,
answered he was sorry that he could not help Rastislav,
78
SLOVAKIA
because at that time there were no such priests in Rome.
After due deliberation with his advisers, Rastislav decided to send a special mission to .Constantinople, to .E mperor Michael ill. Rastislav's request, as presented to the
Emperor, read: "Since our people has cast off paganism
and follows the Christian law, we do not have such a teacher, who might explain the true Christian Faith to us in our
own tongue, so that even other parties, witnessing this,
might become like unto us. So send us, Emperor, such a
bishop and teacher, because your country is everywhere
recognized for its good laws."
Just about that time the German empire found strong
allies in the Bulgarians, who bordered with Great Moravia
at the Tisa river and lived in enmity with the Byzantine
emperor. Michael did not have to deliberate long with his
counsellors. He wanted Rastislav as an ally against the
German-Bulgarian alliance and, hence, decided to aid the
ruler of Great Moravia in his quest for missionaries who
could speak the language of Rastislav's people. Up to this
time the land of the Slovaks was subject to the influence
of western culture only. Now it was to make contacts with
the Christian culture of the European east.
SLOVAK .APOSTLES: CYRIL .AND METHODLUS
Em;peror Michael of Constantinople decided to send
Constantine (Cyril), the philosopher and linguist, and his
brother Methodius, who was versed in the art of government, to preach the Gospel to the people of Rastislav. Constantine had distinguished himself in apostolic work before,
at first alone and later with his brother Methodius. As
natives of Salonica (Thessalonica) they were suited for the
mission: they new the language of Rastislav's people, the
forefathers of the Slovaks. The Emperor, having summoned them, told the brothers: "You are from Salonica, and
all Salonicans speak pUTe Slovanic."
Upon learning that Rastislav's people did not have their
own script, the task of inventing one fell to the lot of Constantine. Legend has it that the alphabet worked out by
Constantine (Cyril) had been revealed to him by God. It
was quite an achievement. Constantine started with Greek
SLOVAKIA
79
characters, but Slovanic sounds of the ninth century varied
greatly with the Greek, therefore signs and characters had
to be created to designate them. The alphabet that resulted
is known as "Cyrillic."
After due preparation for their new mission, the brothers Constantine (Cyril) and Methodius set out for the
country of Rastislav. They arrived in Rastislav's empire
in 863 and began preaching the Word of God in the language of the people. Soon ,a fter the translation of the
Scriptl.ll'es and liturgical 1b ooks was completed and present...
ed to Rastislav's court at Devin. Naturally the saintly brothers gained many admirers and disciples. These catechists
went among their people and aided Constantine and Methodius in their missionary work. Up to the time of the Slovak
apostles, only three languages were considered feasible for
ecclesiastic life, the Holy Scriptures and the Church liturgy: Hebrew, Latin and Greek. The latter two were used
extensively-the Greek in the Byzantine (eastern) Church
and Latin in the Roman (western) Church. Due to the efforts of Constantine and Methodius, the language of the
Slovaks (early Slovanic) became the third language to be
used in Church liturgy.
The work of Constantine and Methodius in Rastislav's
empire was blessed with success. The saintly brothers united the people of Rastislav spiritually and. also contributed
handsomely to the material welfare of the Great Moravian
Empire. Their disciples later spread the Gospel to other
neighboring Slovanic nations (Czechs, Serbs, Russians) in
a language that was for the most part understandable to
all Slo-\'anic nations.
The German clergy of Salzburg viewed the work of
Constantine and Methodius with envy and accused the brothers of introdllJlcing dangerous innovations into the liturgy
of the Church. A protest against their activities was lodged
in Rome, and the brothers were summoned by Pope Nicholas (858-867) to vindicate themselves.
Constantine and Methodius set out for Rome in 867.
Their journey led them through Lake Blatno (Balaton),
the residence of Prince Kocer, Pribina's son. Kocer received
the brothers with great joy and examined their liturgical
80
SLOVAKIA
books in the Slovanic script with great interest. Leaving
Kocer, Constantine and Methodius passed through Corinthia to Venice on the Adriatic Sea. At Venice they successfully defended their use of the language of Rastislav's people in the liturgy of the Church, while the ecclesiastics
there had to concede defeat in the debate.
While Constantine and Methodius made their way to
Rome, Pope Nicholas died. Four days later his successor,
Adriam ]I (867--872), was elected head of the ChuTch.
The saintly brothers were given a cordial reception by the
Pope, and, after convincing a synod of bishops that they
were not guilty of introducing any dangerous innovations
into the liturgy of the Church, their activities were accorded Adrian's approval. The Holy Father accepted the liturgical books in ;the Slov,anic language, blessed them on the aUar
of the church of St. Mary Major, and celebrated the Divine
Liturgy over them himself. The Pope then proceeded to
consecrate Constantine and Methodius as bishops. A number of their disciples (Clement, Gorazd, Angelar, Sava and
Naum) were ordained to the priesthood by the bishops Formosus and Gaundenrich.
Shortly thereafter Constantine became seriously ill and
retired to a monastery. There he joined the religious community, taking the name of Cyril. He died February 14,
869, and his earthly remains were buried on the right side
of the high altar of the church of St. Clement in Rome.
After the death of Saint Cyril, the entire burden of
spreading the Gospel and teaching of Christ rested on the
shoulders of his brother. Methodius returned as archbishop
and papal legate fully authorized to organize the Church
in the land of Rastislav. Archbishop Methodius became the
head of Slovanic Christendom. Besides receiving the highest ecclesiastical dignity, Methodius carried letters from the
Pope for Rastislav of Great Moravia, Svatopluk of Nitra
and Kocef of Blatnohrad Castle (Moosburg), the three Slovak princes, which stated that the Pope permitted the use
of Slovanic liturgy with the reservation that the epistle
and ,gospel always be read in Latin before being read in
the vernacular (Slovanic). The archdiocese of Methodius
extended over Great Moravia and beyond the Danube over
SLOVAKIA
81
Pannonia, uniting the lands governed by Slovak rulers. But
as Methodius was returing to continue his apostolic work
among the people of Rastislav, a new ruler was taking
over the throne of Great Moravia.
KING S,V ATOPDUCK
While Methodius was in Rome, the Germans continued
to harass Rastislav. In 869 King Louis the German declared
war against the neighboring Slovanic peoples and invaded
their lands with his armies headed by his three sons. Prince
Louis attacked the Lusatian Serbs, Charles went after Rastislav, and Carloman tore into the territory that was ruled
by Rastislav's nephew, Svatopluk of Nitra. The German
armies plundered and pillaged the Great Moravian Empire.
But Rastislav's stronghold, the mighty Devin, proved impregnable and Rastislav's empire retained its independence.
The following year, however, Rastislav was betrayed
by his own kinsman, his nephew Svatopluk, regent of Nitra.
Success in battle had turned Svatopluk's head. The Germans played up to Svatopluk and promised to help him
gain the throne of Great Moravia. Svatopluk decided to
betray his uncle and vowed loyalty to Carloman. Rastislav,
however, learned of the plot and became furious. Having
vowed to punish his traitorous nephew, he ordered his men
to do away with Svatopluk at a banquet, but their attempt
to take and kill him failed. Soon thereafter Rastislav led
his army against Svatopluk. In the ensuing battle, Rastislav was defeated. Worse than that, he was captured and
handed over to the Germans. Carloman sent Rastislav
bound in chains to Bavaria where King Louis the German
imprisoned him and had his eyes ,gouged out. Rastislav
died later as a prisoner of the Germans.
With Rastislav's defeat the Great Moravian Empire
passed completely into the hands of the German crown.
The Germans also seized Archbishop Methodius, who had
returned from Rome, and imprisoned him. The Bavarian
bishops, who regarded Methodius as a foreign intruder,
made claims to the territories of the Slovanic peoples along
the Danube and dealt with Methodius so inhumanely that
Svatopluk himself intervened in his behalf. When Carlo-
82
SLOVAKIA
man took possession of Rastislav's country and seized his
royal treasures, he entrusted the rule of the ravaged country to Svatopluk.
Svatopluk soon proved himself a strong ruler. As a
soldier he excelled in ruthless courage. The Germans began
to distrust him, because they feared he would build an empire so strong as to imperil their country. Louis the German decided to put Svatopluk out of the way. In 871 the
Germans succeeded in taking Svatopluk and imprisoned
him. Some of his castles were taken over by the German
Markgraves. Svatopluk denied the charge of Carloman that
he plotted against the German crown, but that did not help
him. When the Slovaks learned what had happened to their
ruler, they elected Slavomir to take his place and rebelled
against the Germans.
Slavomir was supported by the whole country. A terrilble war followed. The Germans suffered heaivy losses.
Devin proved impregnable to their attacks. In the meantime, the wily Svatopluk was plotting to even matters with
the Germans who had tricked him. While in prison he repented his betrayal of Rastislav and vowed to even the
score with his German captors.
Svatopluk begged Carloman to release him so that he
might subdue the Slovaks under Slavomir. Carloman was
reluctant at first, but finally gave in to Svatopluk's pleadings. Accompanyin g a large German army, Sviitopluk soon
found himself below the mighty fortress of Devin. While
the German army encamped quietly below the citadel, Svatopluk set out with a small detachment of men to the castle
to persuade Slavomir to surrender without a battle. Once
inside the castle, Svatopluk disclosed his plan to Slavomir.
Assuming command of the Slovak army, Svatopluk tore
out of the courtyard and attacked the Germans with such
sa;vagery that only few were able to esc•a;pe alirve. Carloman's army was caught unawares and crushed.
Svatopluk knew that the Germans would come after
him sooner or later. He looked around for allies. That same
year (871), he married the sister of Borivoj, ruler of the
Bohemian fand, and formed an alliance with' him. Svatopluk
pressed the offensive against the Germans and was quite
SLOVAKIA
83
successful. In 873 he defeated Carloman decisively. Carloman asked his father Louis for help to fight the Slovaks.
When aid was not forthcoming, Carloman decided to seek
a truce with Svatopluk. He signed a pact with Svatopluk
at Forsheim in 874 and recognized the independence of the
Great Moravian Empire. Svatopluk had reached the pinnacle of his ambitions: he was sole ruler of the Great Moravian Empire, with its crupital at Devin near Bratislava.
(Continued)
• • •
1856 -
DR. SAMUEL CZAMBEL -
1956
P.A. HROBAK
T.he year 1956 marks not only the centennial of the
dea:th o:f the great Slovak fighter for freedom and democracy, Dr. Louis Sti1r, ,b ut it is a}so the centennial of the
birth of the eminent SlovaJk philologist, Samuel Czam:bel.
Czambel was born September 1, 1856, in the town of
Slovenska Eupca, Zvolen County, 1Slova;kia. The ~tudy of
his native Slovak language attracted him early in his life
and he devoted much of his adult Hfe to it. He died in Buda.pest, December 18, 1909.
In 1887, Czam'bel wrote his Contrioutions to the History of the Slovak Language (''Prispevlky k dejinam jazy.ka slovenskeho") ; he followed this with his Slovak Orthography ("Slovensky praivopis") in 1890; A Manual of
the Literary Slovak Language ("Rukovaf spisovnej reci
slovenskej") in 1902; The Slovaks and Their Language
("Slovaci a kh rec") in 1903; 8Jlld The Slovak Language
and its Place in the Family of Slovanic Languages ("Slo-.
venska rec a jej miesto v rodine slovenskych jazykov"),
624 pp., in 1906. Of course, Czambel contributed many
other articles on Slovak subjects to Slovak newspapers,
periodical reviiews and magazines.
Czambel's "Rukovae (Slovak Grammar), revised and
modified several times since its first edition by the late
Dr. Joseph SkU!ltety, is a ,s tandard work with ,p hilologists,
grammarians, and students of Slovak. In his "Slovaoi a ich
rec," Czambel promoted the theory that the SlovaJks were
every closely related to the Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs
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Title
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The History of Slovakia (1/9)
Description
An account of the resource
Philip A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 63-83
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An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
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A related resource
continues in <a href="https://slovakia.omeka.net/items/show/252">Vol. 7, No. 1 (22), pp. 53-59</a>
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SLOVAKIA
59
WHY DID BENES RESIGN IN 1938?
P. A. Hrobak
This quest.ion still. puzzles many people. Benes hlmself,
both in his letter to the government and in !his speech to the
people in paTting, 1lol'd Why he had Tesigned, but he told it
in such a way :that it is not fully clear to the average person. To say it simply a:nd briefJy: Benes resigned beca1USe
the policy of which he himself had been the chief exponent and representative for twenty years had proved faulty;
it went bankrupt and he could, therefore, no longer remain at the head Ol:f the State.
He himself told it in !this manner:
"I 'had played so great a role in this deve1opment of
events that I had to contemplate seTiously what my duty
should be under ,c hanged ciircumstances. . . . I came into
office under entirely different circumstances; and iI must
reckon this adtuality. Circumstances have changed so completely, that I feel my remaining in office might create an
obstacle in the new ci;z-cumstances with which our State
is now coping . . . This is mainly so, as it concerns the international situation with a view towards :t:Jhe speedy
(In a
building up of cooperation with om neighbors" letter to Premier GeneTal Syirovy).
"I have reached my decision of my own free will and
in accordance with my person:al conviction after conswltation with <politi~al and constibuitional circles and with a
number of other leading persons. . . In these ciiroomstances
I think it is advisable that the new developments and the
new European coliaboration should not be disturbed from
our side through the faot that the personal position of
its leading 1representative rupparently 0onstitutes an obstacle to tihls development. I was elected to my present
position at a time s:ubstamJtially different from 1Jhe pres(,Farewell Broadcast, Oct. 5, 1938: MEMOIRS,
ent." 1954, pp. 292-293).
What these words of Benes actwail.ly meant wiU, perhaps, be best e.xiplained by a few quotations from Czech
periodicals of 1938:
�60
SLOVAKIA
"Orf necessity our. :uuture pr0igram ,c ontains good re'lations with Ge:ranany - a program which we could have
adopted long ago, iif ilt were not for the 'oavalierislh' Western Poweir,s which threatened to brook off theiir allialil.ce
with us m suiCh an event" - Stanislav Yester, "Lidove
Noviny, Oct. 5).
'~Venlkov" called fOT lnew, friendlly conltacits with
,n eighbodng states, and a;sked for "awaJkening from dreams
into reality .a nd the acceptance of a program which will be
ours."
"We do not know what wihl come next in :@urope. We
do know, however, that nea,r us iis a power with which
our state 0annot a,1low itself to come irnto dispute. Long
enough already have we played for othern the role of a
genda;rme who keeps Genmany in check: when the crucial
moment came, we fownd ourseLves deseTted - alone. . .
Well, good. If the woTild is to be governed not by j,u stice,
bwt by force, the:n our place is with those who harve the
greater strength and are more d ecisive. N ot!hing else remains for us. We <look for unity with Germany . .. And let
us become, liike Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, one of G€rmamy's }a,rge 1proviiders and buyers, amd let uis refuse to
enter into a ,c ombination of any kind, in which we would
become part .o f an anti-Genm~ front. We are now thinking onily of O'lN'.selves and 'let UIS be loyal only to ourselves"
-- ("Lidove Noviny," Oct. 5).
"We have aJ.ready 'had more than enaugh ·orf t'he wailing sympathy of the western states 'towaJrdsi that courageous little n:a tion.' . . . We call beyond our bo,rdecrs:
Put am end to your unwelcome manifestations oif sympathy towards Czecho-Slovakia. We are finally realizing what
om standing in Cenrtrrul Emrope is, and we shaU guide OIUTselves 1acoordingly, whether you J[ke it or not. Ouir nation
hears its defeat and hum..hliation not onily with pain, but
wi11h great pride. We had /been betting on t'he wrong horse,
a,nd we know how to take the necessaJry consequences.''
- ("Lidove Listy," OcJt. '5 ).
We see that one after the other they admit to the
fault of Czecho-Slovakia's twenty-year foreign policy. But
�SLOVAKIA
61
who wa,s i,t that determined the trend of :Czecho-Slavakia's
foreign policy for :twenty yearn? Of coUJrse, it rwa;s Benes!
It was Benes who made Czecho~SlovaJkia whoHy dependent upon the ,l ove of France and, England, and it was Benes
who did not permit Czecho-Slova:kia to attempt to make
friends with Germany, as Bulga~ia and Yiugo,s[avia had
done. It wa:s Bernes who made of CzecJho-Slov,aJkia a French
gendarme to stand guard over Germany; and it was Benes who did not know how to ,rouse himself frrom a d<re3Jlll.
and open his eyes to the reality that France and England
did not know how to derul with Germany. It was Benes
who ohstiinately held Czecho-Slovaikia in that runti-German
front. Jt was IBenes who !bet on the wrong horse. And finally, it was Benes who paid no heed to the warnings coming frolffi the Slovak awtonomisrt ,camp (P.opul1ists and Nati,onalists), but also from Czech soUTces (Kramaf and
otJhers) : that tJhe fore~gn po1ky of Czecho-Slovwkia was
dangerous. and against her interests .
Under such circumstances, when his h1wndering foreign poHcy contribulted in no smal,l measure to what had
happened, Benes co'lllld do nothing else but resign. Of
course, his apologists may say that Benes meant well,
that he did not wish the State ill, but he was too trusting,
since he depended upon the alliance with France; and, perh1a ps, he was not foresi,g hted enough, 1siince he did not see
long ago,, in s,pite orf numerous and repeated warnings,
which way the European wind was blowing.
People noticed it in Yugoslavia, they noticed it in
Bulgaria, they noticed it in Ro:umamia and they noticed it
a lso in P.Oiland - aJnd they went with the wind. Benes did
not notice it; he went ,a gainst the wind. And when he did
begin to notice that things were going bad, he committed
the cardinal error of not turning ,a bout quickly, hut against
the wiind even more and cond uded a military pact
with Soviet Rlu!ssia! 'J.1hat was the red cloth ,b efore the al,r e~dy hl'ritated dictators, Hitleir and iMus,s,o1ini. And ffingland, Whffil it came to deciding for or against war, was
fiHed with fear that, if there should be a war, Central
�62
SLOVAKIA
EUTope would be O'Ver-run by Stalin's red army, which nobody, perhaps, omtld ever drive Ol,!t of it.
When Benes departed, there left with him twenty
years of faulty Czecho-Slovak foreign poticy. As we see
from qu'Otations above, it has already been admitted also
by those who approved of his policy and supported it. And
with Benes there rulso departed twenty years of faulty internall policy, for let us not forget that Benes was one of
the most leadmg exiponents of "Czechoslovruk" national
unity and 1:he greatest opponent of Slovak autonomy. The
Czechs also noticed thi,s fault of internal policy, lbut did
not profit by it am.y more than T. G. Masaryk and Benes
did by the ,l esson of Austr10-<Hl\l!Ilgary. Perhaps it was too
late to do anything about the malignant cancer which had
been planted in the political life of Czecho-Slova.kia, which,
liike Austro-Hungary, ihad ,b ecome a prison to non-Czech
nations. T. G. ,M.asarylk and Dr. Edward Benes had founded
Ozecho~Slovakia on a [ie, bwlt it on more lies and inequities, but still Joudly proclaimed on every occasion that
the "truth prevaiJs" ! Well, truth did prevail, despite the
hypocrisy of the Czech founders of the Repuiblic.
Benes resigned the presidency a.nd fled the country
during its f,i rst great crisis, because he was a coward. He
did wrong 13.iild he knew it. H1s people knew it, too. He
capitulated to Hlitler, ,a ccepting .Muruch without even consuJlting the iparliament of CzeC'ho-Slovrukia. Ha:d he not
:fled, who knows butt that iBenes might have been tried
for treason and hung in 1938 by his own people?
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"New Ozecho..Slovakia will be a Slav state which, while
having good relations with the great western democracies,
will politically, economically, militarily and ou1turn1ly lean
without any resel"Vations on the victorious ibuliwruik olf Slav
peoples, the USSR, and cooperate with the Sl8JV and democratic states of Poland and the Yugoslav federation of
states." - Laco Novomesky, d~puty-chairman of the Slovaik
National Council.,. headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, OWI Bll!lletin, May 26, 1945.
�
SLOVAKIA
59
WHY DID BENES RESIGN IN 1938?
P. A. Hrobak
This quest.ion still. puzzles many people. Benes hlmself,
both in his letter to the government and in !his speech to the
people in paTting, 1lol'd Why he had Tesigned, but he told it
in such a way :that it is not fully clear to the average person. To say it simply a:nd briefJy: Benes resigned beca1USe
the policy of which he himself had been the chief exponent and representative for twenty years had proved faulty;
it went bankrupt and he could, therefore, no longer remain at the head Ol:f the State.
He himself told it in !this manner:
"I 'had played so great a role in this deve1opment of
events that I had to contemplate seTiously what my duty
should be under ,c hanged ciircumstances. . . . I came into
office under entirely different circumstances; and iI must
reckon this adtuality. Circumstances have changed so completely, that I feel my remaining in office might create an
obstacle in the new ci;z-cumstances with which our State
is now coping . . . This is mainly so, as it concerns the international situation with a view towards :t:Jhe speedy
(In a
building up of cooperation with om neighbors" letter to Premier GeneTal Syirovy).
"I have reached my decision of my own free will and
in accordance with my person:al conviction after conswltation with <politi~al and constibuitional circles and with a
number of other leading persons. . . In these ciiroomstances
I think it is advisable that the new developments and the
new European coliaboration should not be disturbed from
our side through the faot that the personal position of
its leading 1representative rupparently 0onstitutes an obstacle to tihls development. I was elected to my present
position at a time s:ubstamJtially different from 1Jhe pres(,Farewell Broadcast, Oct. 5, 1938: MEMOIRS,
ent." 1954, pp. 292-293).
What these words of Benes actwail.ly meant wiU, perhaps, be best e.xiplained by a few quotations from Czech
periodicals of 1938:
�60
SLOVAKIA
"Orf necessity our. :uuture pr0igram ,c ontains good re'lations with Ge:ranany - a program which we could have
adopted long ago, iif ilt were not for the 'oavalierislh' Western Poweir,s which threatened to brook off theiir allialil.ce
with us m suiCh an event" - Stanislav Yester, "Lidove
Noviny, Oct. 5).
'~Venlkov" called fOT lnew, friendlly conltacits with
,n eighbodng states, and a;sked for "awaJkening from dreams
into reality .a nd the acceptance of a program which will be
ours."
"We do not know what wihl come next in :@urope. We
do know, however, that nea,r us iis a power with which
our state 0annot a,1low itself to come irnto dispute. Long
enough already have we played for othern the role of a
genda;rme who keeps Genmany in check: when the crucial
moment came, we fownd ourseLves deseTted - alone. . .
Well, good. If the woTild is to be governed not by j,u stice,
bwt by force, the:n our place is with those who harve the
greater strength and are more d ecisive. N ot!hing else remains for us. We <look for unity with Germany . .. And let
us become, liike Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, one of G€rmamy's }a,rge 1proviiders and buyers, amd let uis refuse to
enter into a ,c ombination of any kind, in which we would
become part .o f an anti-Genm~ front. We are now thinking onily of O'lN'.selves and 'let UIS be loyal only to ourselves"
-- ("Lidove Noviny," Oct. 5).
"We have aJ.ready 'had more than enaugh ·orf t'he wailing sympathy of the western states 'towaJrdsi that courageous little n:a tion.' . . . We call beyond our bo,rdecrs:
Put am end to your unwelcome manifestations oif sympathy towards Czecho-Slovakia. We are finally realizing what
om standing in Cenrtrrul Emrope is, and we shaU guide OIUTselves 1acoordingly, whether you J[ke it or not. Ouir nation
hears its defeat and hum..hliation not onily with pain, but
wi11h great pride. We had /been betting on t'he wrong horse,
a,nd we know how to take the necessaJry consequences.''
- ("Lidove Listy," OcJt. '5 ).
We see that one after the other they admit to the
fault of Czecho-Slovakia's twenty-year foreign policy. But
�SLOVAKIA
61
who wa,s i,t that determined the trend of :Czecho-Slavakia's
foreign policy for :twenty yearn? Of coUJrse, it rwa;s Benes!
It was Benes who made Czecho~SlovaJkia whoHy dependent upon the ,l ove of France and, England, and it was Benes
who did not permit Czecho-Slova:kia to attempt to make
friends with Germany, as Bulga~ia and Yiugo,s[avia had
done. It wa:s Bernes who made of CzecJho-Slov,aJkia a French
gendarme to stand guard over Germany; and it was Benes who did not know how to ,rouse himself frrom a d<re3Jlll.
and open his eyes to the reality that France and England
did not know how to derul with Germany. It was Benes
who ohstiinately held Czecho-Slovaikia in that runti-German
front. Jt was IBenes who !bet on the wrong horse. And finally, it was Benes who paid no heed to the warnings coming frolffi the Slovak awtonomisrt ,camp (P.opul1ists and Nati,onalists), but also from Czech soUTces (Kramaf and
otJhers) : that tJhe fore~gn po1ky of Czecho-Slovwkia was
dangerous. and against her interests .
Under such circumstances, when his h1wndering foreign poHcy contribulted in no smal,l measure to what had
happened, Benes co'lllld do nothing else but resign. Of
course, his apologists may say that Benes meant well,
that he did not wish the State ill, but he was too trusting,
since he depended upon the alliance with France; and, perh1a ps, he was not foresi,g hted enough, 1siince he did not see
long ago,, in s,pite orf numerous and repeated warnings,
which way the European wind was blowing.
People noticed it in Yugoslavia, they noticed it in
Bulgaria, they noticed it in Ro:umamia and they noticed it
a lso in P.Oiland - aJnd they went with the wind. Benes did
not notice it; he went ,a gainst the wind. And when he did
begin to notice that things were going bad, he committed
the cardinal error of not turning ,a bout quickly, hut against
the wiind even more and cond uded a military pact
with Soviet Rlu!ssia! 'J.1hat was the red cloth ,b efore the al,r e~dy hl'ritated dictators, Hitleir and iMus,s,o1ini. And ffingland, Whffil it came to deciding for or against war, was
fiHed with fear that, if there should be a war, Central
�62
SLOVAKIA
EUTope would be O'Ver-run by Stalin's red army, which nobody, perhaps, omtld ever drive Ol,!t of it.
When Benes departed, there left with him twenty
years of faulty Czecho-Slovak foreign poticy. As we see
from qu'Otations above, it has already been admitted also
by those who approved of his policy and supported it. And
with Benes there rulso departed twenty years of faulty internall policy, for let us not forget that Benes was one of
the most leadmg exiponents of "Czechoslovruk" national
unity and 1:he greatest opponent of Slovak autonomy. The
Czechs also noticed thi,s fault of internal policy, lbut did
not profit by it am.y more than T. G. Masaryk and Benes
did by the ,l esson of Austr10-<Hl\l!Ilgary. Perhaps it was too
late to do anything about the malignant cancer which had
been planted in the political life of Czecho-Slova.kia, which,
liike Austro-Hungary, ihad ,b ecome a prison to non-Czech
nations. T. G. ,M.asarylk and Dr. Edward Benes had founded
Ozecho~Slovakia on a [ie, bwlt it on more lies and inequities, but still Joudly proclaimed on every occasion that
the "truth prevaiJs" ! Well, truth did prevail, despite the
hypocrisy of the Czech founders of the Repuiblic.
Benes resigned the presidency a.nd fled the country
during its f,i rst great crisis, because he was a coward. He
did wrong 13.iild he knew it. H1s people knew it, too. He
capitulated to Hlitler, ,a ccepting .Muruch without even consuJlting the iparliament of CzeC'ho-Slovrukia. Ha:d he not
:fled, who knows butt that iBenes might have been tried
for treason and hung in 1938 by his own people?
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"New Ozecho..Slovakia will be a Slav state which, while
having good relations with the great western democracies,
will politically, economically, militarily and ou1turn1ly lean
without any resel"Vations on the victorious ibuliwruik olf Slav
peoples, the USSR, and cooperate with the Sl8JV and democratic states of Poland and the Yugoslav federation of
states." - Laco Novomesky, d~puty-chairman of the Slovaik
National Council.,. headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, OWI Bll!lletin, May 26, 1945.
�
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1956
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SLOVAKIA
59
WHY DID BENES RESIGN IN 1938?
P. A. Hrobak
This quest.ion still. puzzles many people. Benes hlmself,
both in his letter to the government and in !his speech to the
people in paTting, 1lol'd Why he had Tesigned, but he told it
in such a way :that it is not fully clear to the average person. To say it simply a:nd briefJy: Benes resigned beca1USe
the policy of which he himself had been the chief exponent and representative for twenty years had proved faulty;
it went bankrupt and he could, therefore, no longer remain at the head Ol:f the State.
He himself told it in !this manner:
"I 'had played so great a role in this deve1opment of
events that I had to contemplate seTiously what my duty
should be under ,c hanged ciircumstances. . . . I came into
office under entirely different circumstances; and iI must
reckon this adtuality. Circumstances have changed so completely, that I feel my remaining in office might create an
obstacle in the new ci;z-cumstances with which our State
is now coping . . . This is mainly so, as it concerns the international situation with a view towards :t:Jhe speedy
(In a
building up of cooperation with om neighbors" letter to Premier GeneTal Syirovy).
"I have reached my decision of my own free will and
in accordance with my person:al conviction after conswltation with <politi~al and constibuitional circles and with a
number of other leading persons. . . In these ciiroomstances
I think it is advisable that the new developments and the
new European coliaboration should not be disturbed from
our side through the faot that the personal position of
its leading 1representative rupparently 0onstitutes an obstacle to tihls development. I was elected to my present
position at a time s:ubstamJtially different from 1Jhe pres(,Farewell Broadcast, Oct. 5, 1938: MEMOIRS,
ent." 1954, pp. 292-293).
What these words of Benes actwail.ly meant wiU, perhaps, be best e.xiplained by a few quotations from Czech
periodicals of 1938:
60
SLOVAKIA
"Orf necessity our. :uuture pr0igram ,c ontains good re'lations with Ge:ranany - a program which we could have
adopted long ago, iif ilt were not for the 'oavalierislh' Western Poweir,s which threatened to brook off theiir allialil.ce
with us m suiCh an event" - Stanislav Yester, "Lidove
Noviny, Oct. 5).
'~Venlkov" called fOT lnew, friendlly conltacits with
,n eighbodng states, and a;sked for "awaJkening from dreams
into reality .a nd the acceptance of a program which will be
ours."
"We do not know what wihl come next in :@urope. We
do know, however, that nea,r us iis a power with which
our state 0annot a,1low itself to come irnto dispute. Long
enough already have we played for othern the role of a
genda;rme who keeps Genmany in check: when the crucial
moment came, we fownd ourseLves deseTted - alone. . .
Well, good. If the woTild is to be governed not by j,u stice,
bwt by force, the:n our place is with those who harve the
greater strength and are more d ecisive. N ot!hing else remains for us. We <look for unity with Germany . .. And let
us become, liike Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, one of G€rmamy's }a,rge 1proviiders and buyers, amd let uis refuse to
enter into a ,c ombination of any kind, in which we would
become part .o f an anti-Genm~ front. We are now thinking onily of O'lN'.selves and 'let UIS be loyal only to ourselves"
-- ("Lidove Noviny," Oct. 5).
"We have aJ.ready 'had more than enaugh ·orf t'he wailing sympathy of the western states 'towaJrdsi that courageous little n:a tion.' . . . We call beyond our bo,rdecrs:
Put am end to your unwelcome manifestations oif sympathy towards Czecho-Slovakia. We are finally realizing what
om standing in Cenrtrrul Emrope is, and we shaU guide OIUTselves 1acoordingly, whether you J[ke it or not. Ouir nation
hears its defeat and hum..hliation not onily with pain, but
wi11h great pride. We had /been betting on t'he wrong horse,
a,nd we know how to take the necessaJry consequences.''
- ("Lidove Listy," OcJt. '5 ).
We see that one after the other they admit to the
fault of Czecho-Slovakia's twenty-year foreign policy. But
SLOVAKIA
61
who wa,s i,t that determined the trend of :Czecho-Slavakia's
foreign policy for :twenty yearn? Of coUJrse, it rwa;s Benes!
It was Benes who made Czecho~SlovaJkia whoHy dependent upon the ,l ove of France and, England, and it was Benes
who did not permit Czecho-Slova:kia to attempt to make
friends with Germany, as Bulga~ia and Yiugo,s[avia had
done. It wa:s Bernes who made of CzecJho-Slov,aJkia a French
gendarme to stand guard over Germany; and it was Benes who did not know how to ,rouse himself frrom a d<re3Jlll.
and open his eyes to the reality that France and England
did not know how to derul with Germany. It was Benes
who ohstiinately held Czecho-Slovaikia in that runti-German
front. Jt was IBenes who !bet on the wrong horse. And finally, it was Benes who paid no heed to the warnings coming frolffi the Slovak awtonomisrt ,camp (P.opul1ists and Nati,onalists), but also from Czech soUTces (Kramaf and
otJhers) : that tJhe fore~gn po1ky of Czecho-Slovwkia was
dangerous. and against her interests .
Under such circumstances, when his h1wndering foreign poHcy contribulted in no smal,l measure to what had
happened, Benes co'lllld do nothing else but resign. Of
course, his apologists may say that Benes meant well,
that he did not wish the State ill, but he was too trusting,
since he depended upon the alliance with France; and, perh1a ps, he was not foresi,g hted enough, 1siince he did not see
long ago,, in s,pite orf numerous and repeated warnings,
which way the European wind was blowing.
People noticed it in Yugoslavia, they noticed it in
Bulgaria, they noticed it in Ro:umamia and they noticed it
a lso in P.Oiland - aJnd they went with the wind. Benes did
not notice it; he went ,a gainst the wind. And when he did
begin to notice that things were going bad, he committed
the cardinal error of not turning ,a bout quickly, hut against
the wiind even more and cond uded a military pact
with Soviet Rlu!ssia! 'J.1hat was the red cloth ,b efore the al,r e~dy hl'ritated dictators, Hitleir and iMus,s,o1ini. And ffingland, Whffil it came to deciding for or against war, was
fiHed with fear that, if there should be a war, Central
62
SLOVAKIA
EUTope would be O'Ver-run by Stalin's red army, which nobody, perhaps, omtld ever drive Ol,!t of it.
When Benes departed, there left with him twenty
years of faulty Czecho-Slovak foreign poticy. As we see
from qu'Otations above, it has already been admitted also
by those who approved of his policy and supported it. And
with Benes there rulso departed twenty years of faulty internall policy, for let us not forget that Benes was one of
the most leadmg exiponents of "Czechoslovruk" national
unity and 1:he greatest opponent of Slovak autonomy. The
Czechs also noticed thi,s fault of internal policy, lbut did
not profit by it am.y more than T. G. Masaryk and Benes
did by the ,l esson of Austr10-<Hl\l!Ilgary. Perhaps it was too
late to do anything about the malignant cancer which had
been planted in the political life of Czecho-Slova.kia, which,
liike Austro-Hungary, ihad ,b ecome a prison to non-Czech
nations. T. G. ,M.asarylk and Dr. Edward Benes had founded
Ozecho~Slovakia on a [ie, bwlt it on more lies and inequities, but still Joudly proclaimed on every occasion that
the "truth prevaiJs" ! Well, truth did prevail, despite the
hypocrisy of the Czech founders of the Repuiblic.
Benes resigned the presidency a.nd fled the country
during its f,i rst great crisis, because he was a coward. He
did wrong 13.iild he knew it. H1s people knew it, too. He
capitulated to Hlitler, ,a ccepting .Muruch without even consuJlting the iparliament of CzeC'ho-Slovrukia. Ha:d he not
:fled, who knows butt that iBenes might have been tried
for treason and hung in 1938 by his own people?
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"New Ozecho..Slovakia will be a Slav state which, while
having good relations with the great western democracies,
will politically, economically, militarily and ou1turn1ly lean
without any resel"Vations on the victorious ibuliwruik olf Slav
peoples, the USSR, and cooperate with the Sl8JV and democratic states of Poland and the Yugoslav federation of
states." - Laco Novomesky, d~puty-chairman of the Slovaik
National Council.,. headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, OWI Bll!lletin, May 26, 1945.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Why Did Beneš Resign in 1938?
Description
An account of the resource
P. A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 59-62
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
LCNAF
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9a7adf1953bea91834c5a3604aeb702c.pdf
55c170d2339f65a95a5a3f4dad2edc07
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
55
MEMORANDUM
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF TID~
UNITED STATES FROM THE PITTSBURGH-JOHNSTOWN, PA. REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SLOVAK BAND HALL,
JOHNSTOWN, PA., NOVEMBER 3, 1956
Assembled in the Slovak Band Hall, in the interest of
the welfare and security of our America and the rest of the
free world, we solemnly declare that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of
Independence and of the basic law of our country, the Constitution of the United States of America.
2. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form orf totalitarian political system. We recognize the godless philosophy of materialistic communism as the greatest conspiracy against free humanity, as a political system which
threatens all of mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore
we cannot subscribe to the policy that doing business with
the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests
of the welfare and security of the United States and the
rest of the free world.
We commend our Government for its efforts to resist
and to resolutely count~ract the aggressive policies of Soviet imperialism with all the spiritual and material forces at
our command and heartily endorse all actions of our Government to expose, demobilize, and outlaw the evil forces
of brutal godless Communism in our country - the forces
that are dedicated to our destruction.
3. We strongly denounce the intervention of the Soviet
Union in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary, as
well as other countries of Europe and Asia. We express our
deepest sympathy with the peoples of Hungary and Poland
and urge our Government to denounce in the strongest
terms the massacre of these liberty-loving and liberty-seeking peoples, immediately initiating all steps that may be
taken by our Government to end the brutal treatment and
repression of the Polish and Hungarian nations.
�56
SLOVAKIA
4. We oppose the admission of Red China into the
United Nations. We fully endorse the principle that our
Government shall refuse to recogmze every form of government and political formation which is imposed on any
nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully
request that this policy be followed even in the case of the
nation we are descended from, the Slovak nation, which is
tyrannized by the Czecho-Comm unist regime of Prague
in flagrant violation of the political will of the Slovak
people and of the fundamental principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the basic
principle of the American foreign policy of self-determina tion.
Once again, we respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question of the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also respectfully request our President to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask
for an investigation by the U. N. of the destruction of the
Slovak State in 1945, the independence of which was pro_
claimed by the duly elected representative s of the Slovak
people on March 14, 1939, and eventually reco,g nized by
twenty-seven countries.
5. We deeply resent the fact that our Government is
inclined to recognize and favor former Slovak and Czech
politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the
present terrible plight of the Slovaks and the Czechs. We
refer particularly to the politicians who promoted the proSoviet and anti-Slovak policies of the late Dr. Edward Benes - the Czech Socialists and Judas Slovaks, now organized in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia,·,
who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until
1948 as members of the Communist-do minated National
Front Government of the Benes-Gottwa ld coalition.
We respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoslovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information and actions of Dr. Edward Benes
�SLOVAKIA
57
and other Czech Socialists. It is embarrassing to us, as it
also should be to our Government, that the members of
Benes's pro-Soviet political clique are employed by various
departments and agencies of our Government. They have
compromised the good name of the United States entirely
too long and, therefore, should no longer enjoy our trust
and favor.
The Slovak League of America, with the organizations
affiliated with it, has expressed itself in the past more
than once on the subject of U. S. policy in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, and especially in regard to the Slovak nation, but little or nothing has been done to correct the situation. Representing the vast majority of organized Americans of Slovak descent, the Slovak League of America feels
that it has the right and the obligation to speak for them
in matters of general and particular concern, both domestic and foreign. As loyal Americans, we are not, we trust.
overly presumptuous in assuming that we merit at least
the same measure of consideration and trust from our Government as the bankrupt, pro-Soviet political entourage of
Dr. Edward Benes, which suddenly became "anti-Communist and democratic" after February, 1948. when the
Communists, with their collaboration, seized all power in
Czecho-Slovakia.
6. We stand opposed to the concept that the power
and size of the federal government of the United States
should be increased to the detriment of the powers of the
individual States of the Union. We, therefore, respectfully
request the adoption of the recommendations of the Hoover
Commission as speedily as possible.
7. Furthermore, we respectfully request the President
and the Congress of the United States to promote legislation to decrease federal taxes, particularly the income tax
and withholding tax laws during the next session of Congress, because we belie'Ve this can be done without endangering the welfare and security of our country.
8. Finally, we recommend the President of the United
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his stand on the crisis
in the Middle East to oppose and condemn all aggressors
and violators of others natural rights
�58
SLOVAKIA
Adopted unanimously this third day of November
1956, by the Conference of the Pittsburgh-Johnstown,
Pa. Region of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band
Hall, Johnstown, Pa.
For the Conference :
PHILIP A. HROBAK. President
Slovak League of America.
ELIZABETH ANDREJKO, Chairlady
of Conference and president of Johnstown Assembly S. L. A.
MICHAEL BERES, Chairman
Pittsburgh District S. L. A.
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?
"Never in his,tory was Russia so mighty, illever were
the forces of socia1isrrn so colossally foi,ged together. This
is a new historical epoch. N e,v ertheless some pecxple think
in a stiClk-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet been possible
to convince everyone cxf the necessity for the orverthrow of
crupitalism." - (Ferdinand Peroutka, a Benes Czech, in his
book TAK NEBO TAK, 1947, pg. 8).
• • •
"The gossip that the Democratic Party is not fur cooperation with the Soviet Union is wtroI11g. rt is clear to
every Slovak, regardless oif his polftica'1 and religio;us beliefs,
that the existence of the Czechoslovak Reipulblic is 100 per
cent dependent on the e~stence and the .p ower cxf our
strongest Slavic ally. This a1lli.ance cannot be regarded as a
matter of onJ.y feeHng graciorus for erverything the Soviet
Union has done for us. It is, a matter oif rationa:1 thinking
and of our unaJteraJble foreign policy." - (Dr. Joseph Let.
trich, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee cxf the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," NOV:E PRUDY, No.
28-29, 1947, pg. 658).
• • •
"Let us declare war against the fear oif Bolshevism and
forbid at the same time, the for.mation of any anti-COlln-
(Va;olav Majer, PRAVO
mlIDist f:ront whatsoever." LIDU, officirul organ orf the O;ech Sooi!al Demooratic Party,
Novemlber 25, 1947)
�
SLOVAKIA
55
MEMORANDUM
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF TID~
UNITED STATES FROM THE PITTSBURGH-JOHNSTOWN, PA. REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SLOVAK BAND HALL,
JOHNSTOWN, PA., NOVEMBER 3, 1956
Assembled in the Slovak Band Hall, in the interest of
the welfare and security of our America and the rest of the
free world, we solemnly declare that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of
Independence and of the basic law of our country, the Constitution of the United States of America.
2. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form orf totalitarian political system. We recognize the godless philosophy of materialistic communism as the greatest conspiracy against free humanity, as a political system which
threatens all of mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore
we cannot subscribe to the policy that doing business with
the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests
of the welfare and security of the United States and the
rest of the free world.
We commend our Government for its efforts to resist
and to resolutely count~ract the aggressive policies of Soviet imperialism with all the spiritual and material forces at
our command and heartily endorse all actions of our Government to expose, demobilize, and outlaw the evil forces
of brutal godless Communism in our country - the forces
that are dedicated to our destruction.
3. We strongly denounce the intervention of the Soviet
Union in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary, as
well as other countries of Europe and Asia. We express our
deepest sympathy with the peoples of Hungary and Poland
and urge our Government to denounce in the strongest
terms the massacre of these liberty-loving and liberty-seeking peoples, immediately initiating all steps that may be
taken by our Government to end the brutal treatment and
repression of the Polish and Hungarian nations.
�56
SLOVAKIA
4. We oppose the admission of Red China into the
United Nations. We fully endorse the principle that our
Government shall refuse to recogmze every form of government and political formation which is imposed on any
nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully
request that this policy be followed even in the case of the
nation we are descended from, the Slovak nation, which is
tyrannized by the Czecho-Comm unist regime of Prague
in flagrant violation of the political will of the Slovak
people and of the fundamental principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the basic
principle of the American foreign policy of self-determina tion.
Once again, we respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question of the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also respectfully request our President to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask
for an investigation by the U. N. of the destruction of the
Slovak State in 1945, the independence of which was pro_
claimed by the duly elected representative s of the Slovak
people on March 14, 1939, and eventually reco,g nized by
twenty-seven countries.
5. We deeply resent the fact that our Government is
inclined to recognize and favor former Slovak and Czech
politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the
present terrible plight of the Slovaks and the Czechs. We
refer particularly to the politicians who promoted the proSoviet and anti-Slovak policies of the late Dr. Edward Benes - the Czech Socialists and Judas Slovaks, now organized in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia,·,
who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until
1948 as members of the Communist-do minated National
Front Government of the Benes-Gottwa ld coalition.
We respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoslovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information and actions of Dr. Edward Benes
�SLOVAKIA
57
and other Czech Socialists. It is embarrassing to us, as it
also should be to our Government, that the members of
Benes's pro-Soviet political clique are employed by various
departments and agencies of our Government. They have
compromised the good name of the United States entirely
too long and, therefore, should no longer enjoy our trust
and favor.
The Slovak League of America, with the organizations
affiliated with it, has expressed itself in the past more
than once on the subject of U. S. policy in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, and especially in regard to the Slovak nation, but little or nothing has been done to correct the situation. Representing the vast majority of organized Americans of Slovak descent, the Slovak League of America feels
that it has the right and the obligation to speak for them
in matters of general and particular concern, both domestic and foreign. As loyal Americans, we are not, we trust.
overly presumptuous in assuming that we merit at least
the same measure of consideration and trust from our Government as the bankrupt, pro-Soviet political entourage of
Dr. Edward Benes, which suddenly became "anti-Communist and democratic" after February, 1948. when the
Communists, with their collaboration, seized all power in
Czecho-Slovakia.
6. We stand opposed to the concept that the power
and size of the federal government of the United States
should be increased to the detriment of the powers of the
individual States of the Union. We, therefore, respectfully
request the adoption of the recommendations of the Hoover
Commission as speedily as possible.
7. Furthermore, we respectfully request the President
and the Congress of the United States to promote legislation to decrease federal taxes, particularly the income tax
and withholding tax laws during the next session of Congress, because we belie'Ve this can be done without endangering the welfare and security of our country.
8. Finally, we recommend the President of the United
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his stand on the crisis
in the Middle East to oppose and condemn all aggressors
and violators of others natural rights
�58
SLOVAKIA
Adopted unanimously this third day of November
1956, by the Conference of the Pittsburgh-Johnstown,
Pa. Region of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band
Hall, Johnstown, Pa.
For the Conference :
PHILIP A. HROBAK. President
Slovak League of America.
ELIZABETH ANDREJKO, Chairlady
of Conference and president of Johnstown Assembly S. L. A.
MICHAEL BERES, Chairman
Pittsburgh District S. L. A.
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?
"Never in his,tory was Russia so mighty, illever were
the forces of socia1isrrn so colossally foi,ged together. This
is a new historical epoch. N e,v ertheless some pecxple think
in a stiClk-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet been possible
to convince everyone cxf the necessity for the orverthrow of
crupitalism." - (Ferdinand Peroutka, a Benes Czech, in his
book TAK NEBO TAK, 1947, pg. 8).
• • •
"The gossip that the Democratic Party is not fur cooperation with the Soviet Union is wtroI11g. rt is clear to
every Slovak, regardless oif his polftica'1 and religio;us beliefs,
that the existence of the Czechoslovak Reipulblic is 100 per
cent dependent on the e~stence and the .p ower cxf our
strongest Slavic ally. This a1lli.ance cannot be regarded as a
matter of onJ.y feeHng graciorus for erverything the Soviet
Union has done for us. It is, a matter oif rationa:1 thinking
and of our unaJteraJble foreign policy." - (Dr. Joseph Let.
trich, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee cxf the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," NOV:E PRUDY, No.
28-29, 1947, pg. 658).
• • •
"Let us declare war against the fear oif Bolshevism and
forbid at the same time, the for.mation of any anti-COlln-
(Va;olav Majer, PRAVO
mlIDist f:ront whatsoever." LIDU, officirul organ orf the O;ech Sooi!al Demooratic Party,
Novemlber 25, 1947)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1956
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
SLOVAKIA
55
MEMORANDUM
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS OF TID~
UNITED STATES FROM THE PITTSBURGH-JOHNSTOWN, PA. REGIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA, SLOVAK BAND HALL,
JOHNSTOWN, PA., NOVEMBER 3, 1956
Assembled in the Slovak Band Hall, in the interest of
the welfare and security of our America and the rest of the
free world, we solemnly declare that:
1. We rededicate ourselves to the preservation of the
basic principles set forth in the American Declaration of
Independence and of the basic law of our country, the Constitution of the United States of America.
2. We condemn all forms of tyranny, every form orf totalitarian political system. We recognize the godless philosophy of materialistic communism as the greatest conspiracy against free humanity, as a political system which
threatens all of mankind with utter enslavement. Therefore
we cannot subscribe to the policy that doing business with
the Soviet Union and its satellites is in the best interests
of the welfare and security of the United States and the
rest of the free world.
We commend our Government for its efforts to resist
and to resolutely count~ract the aggressive policies of Soviet imperialism with all the spiritual and material forces at
our command and heartily endorse all actions of our Government to expose, demobilize, and outlaw the evil forces
of brutal godless Communism in our country - the forces
that are dedicated to our destruction.
3. We strongly denounce the intervention of the Soviet
Union in the internal affairs of Poland and Hungary, as
well as other countries of Europe and Asia. We express our
deepest sympathy with the peoples of Hungary and Poland
and urge our Government to denounce in the strongest
terms the massacre of these liberty-loving and liberty-seeking peoples, immediately initiating all steps that may be
taken by our Government to end the brutal treatment and
repression of the Polish and Hungarian nations.
56
SLOVAKIA
4. We oppose the admission of Red China into the
United Nations. We fully endorse the principle that our
Government shall refuse to recogmze every form of government and political formation which is imposed on any
nation by the force of an alien power and we respectfully
request that this policy be followed even in the case of the
nation we are descended from, the Slovak nation, which is
tyrannized by the Czecho-Comm unist regime of Prague
in flagrant violation of the political will of the Slovak
people and of the fundamental principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and in utter contempt for the basic
principle of the American foreign policy of self-determina tion.
Once again, we respectfully request the President and
the Congress of the United States to re-examine the question of the destruction of the Slovak Republic in 1945, because we are certain that the political will of the Slovak
nation was violated. We also respectfully request our President to instruct our delegate to the United Nations to ask
for an investigation by the U. N. of the destruction of the
Slovak State in 1945, the independence of which was pro_
claimed by the duly elected representative s of the Slovak
people on March 14, 1939, and eventually reco,g nized by
twenty-seven countries.
5. We deeply resent the fact that our Government is
inclined to recognize and favor former Slovak and Czech
politicians who are in a large measure responsible for the
present terrible plight of the Slovaks and the Czechs. We
refer particularly to the politicians who promoted the proSoviet and anti-Slovak policies of the late Dr. Edward Benes - the Czech Socialists and Judas Slovaks, now organized in the so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia,·,
who collaborated with Moscow and the Communists until
1948 as members of the Communist-do minated National
Front Government of the Benes-Gottwa ld coalition.
We respectfully request the President and the Congress of the United States to re-examine the so-called
"Czechoslovak" policy of our Government, which is still
based on the information and actions of Dr. Edward Benes
SLOVAKIA
57
and other Czech Socialists. It is embarrassing to us, as it
also should be to our Government, that the members of
Benes's pro-Soviet political clique are employed by various
departments and agencies of our Government. They have
compromised the good name of the United States entirely
too long and, therefore, should no longer enjoy our trust
and favor.
The Slovak League of America, with the organizations
affiliated with it, has expressed itself in the past more
than once on the subject of U. S. policy in regard to Czecho-Slovakia, and especially in regard to the Slovak nation, but little or nothing has been done to correct the situation. Representing the vast majority of organized Americans of Slovak descent, the Slovak League of America feels
that it has the right and the obligation to speak for them
in matters of general and particular concern, both domestic and foreign. As loyal Americans, we are not, we trust.
overly presumptuous in assuming that we merit at least
the same measure of consideration and trust from our Government as the bankrupt, pro-Soviet political entourage of
Dr. Edward Benes, which suddenly became "anti-Communist and democratic" after February, 1948. when the
Communists, with their collaboration, seized all power in
Czecho-Slovakia.
6. We stand opposed to the concept that the power
and size of the federal government of the United States
should be increased to the detriment of the powers of the
individual States of the Union. We, therefore, respectfully
request the adoption of the recommendations of the Hoover
Commission as speedily as possible.
7. Furthermore, we respectfully request the President
and the Congress of the United States to promote legislation to decrease federal taxes, particularly the income tax
and withholding tax laws during the next session of Congress, because we belie'Ve this can be done without endangering the welfare and security of our country.
8. Finally, we recommend the President of the United
States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, for his stand on the crisis
in the Middle East to oppose and condemn all aggressors
and violators of others natural rights
58
SLOVAKIA
Adopted unanimously this third day of November
1956, by the Conference of the Pittsburgh-Johnstown,
Pa. Region of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band
Hall, Johnstown, Pa.
For the Conference :
PHILIP A. HROBAK. President
Slovak League of America.
ELIZABETH ANDREJKO, Chairlady
of Conference and president of Johnstown Assembly S. L. A.
MICHAEL BERES, Chairman
Pittsburgh District S. L. A.
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?
"Never in his,tory was Russia so mighty, illever were
the forces of socia1isrrn so colossally foi,ged together. This
is a new historical epoch. N e,v ertheless some pecxple think
in a stiClk-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet been possible
to convince everyone cxf the necessity for the orverthrow of
crupitalism." - (Ferdinand Peroutka, a Benes Czech, in his
book TAK NEBO TAK, 1947, pg. 8).
• • •
"The gossip that the Democratic Party is not fur cooperation with the Soviet Union is wtroI11g. rt is clear to
every Slovak, regardless oif his polftica'1 and religio;us beliefs,
that the existence of the Czechoslovak Reipulblic is 100 per
cent dependent on the e~stence and the .p ower cxf our
strongest Slavic ally. This a1lli.ance cannot be regarded as a
matter of onJ.y feeHng graciorus for erverything the Soviet
Union has done for us. It is, a matter oif rationa:1 thinking
and of our unaJteraJble foreign policy." - (Dr. Joseph Let.
trich, Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee cxf the
"Council of Free Czechoslovakia," NOV:E PRUDY, No.
28-29, 1947, pg. 658).
• • •
"Let us declare war against the fear oif Bolshevism and
forbid at the same time, the for.mation of any anti-COlln-
(Va;olav Majer, PRAVO
mlIDist f:ront whatsoever." LIDU, officirul organ orf the O;ech Sooi!al Demooratic Party,
Novemlber 25, 1947)
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Memorandum
Description
An account of the resource
Memorandum to the President and the Congress of the United States from the Pittsburgh-Johnstown, Pa. Regional Conference of the Slovak League of America, Slovak Band Hall, Johnstown, Pa., November 3, 1956
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 55-58
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
September-December 1956
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d558bf486130113f31bb768332df1b00.pdf
9eda05cb64a925f0729ab0352dd02569
PDF Text
Text
SLOVAKIA
MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA
Joseph A. Mikus
An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv<akia, put the following questions
to me recently:
1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the
Slovaks?
2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa.
nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak
State?
3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament
vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920?
4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at..,
tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia?
'5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik
Peop~e's Party?
6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and
Protestantism in Slovakia?
7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program?
1
Since these questions are asked morn frequently by
persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia
of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following
article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this
regard.
Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the
Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the
Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord.
ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars
were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim,
the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the
Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo.
gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when
sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his
life than in the choice between two ponds that he would
prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and
ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were
motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their
national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con-
�46
SLOVAKIA
eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League
of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the
other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as
the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect.
The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8,
arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh
Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia.
Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was
by far a much more important document in the moderp.
history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- ,
ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts ..
burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations
to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot
be considered separately from morals and politics. It is
indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained
by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted ..
ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh
Agreement.
Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document,
but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a
million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which
had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money
from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes
would have remained somewhere in France as obscure
journalists or poor college-iteachers.
In any deal none of the two contracting parties has
the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of
America were American citizens and, consequently, did not
have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not
honest. When he signe<l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa..
ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a
pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers.
He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should,
then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa-
�SLOVAKIA
47
tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors?
What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik
in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of
Czecho-Slovakia?
It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration
of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished
on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk
in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe.
His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who
was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have
even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak
nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But
there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the
Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural
absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs.
In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave
an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska
mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview,
,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) ,
reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement:
"Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic
character. There is no question about that and on this point
- as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1)
That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation,
contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and
Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the
following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen
will henceforth ignore at their peril."
1
fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920
The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says :
"Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the
Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and
Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the
�48
SLOVAKIA
problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the
Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920.
This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very
simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of
T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to
Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary
Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called
Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they?
Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the
"·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks,
the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such
was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle.
At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under
mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down ,
from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery
as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had
been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his
courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference
in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights
before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated
Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague
was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia.
Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at
the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament
reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in
their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia.
Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is
far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a
"due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech
nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism .
�SLOVAKIA
49
After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera.
tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the
Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The
Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to
disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money
in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press
by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:;
terrorized the population during the electoral campaign
as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo
men were killed iby the police during a political gathering.
Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to
escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech
"liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party
of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party."
Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning
of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak
People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats
23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 .
In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr.
Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament:
"We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as
a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved
in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other
non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im.
prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from
expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2)
It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on
Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni.
fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
�50
SLOVAKIA
fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia,
and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the
electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion
of 750,000, had only 9.
The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak
People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in
Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and
killed two peasants. (3)
All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights.
That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can
mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's
Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born
Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond
the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom.
Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism
The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the
Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic,
awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks.
In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23
deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of
course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities
Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state.
While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served
rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither
�SLOVAKIA
51
was it possible to recognize any right of decision about
Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who,
preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against
any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from
among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc.
Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of
1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German
and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the
22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a
majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and
19'29.
Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's
Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always
sought to vilify this party by different accusations and
denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed
against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones"
into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations
were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at
Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational
background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted.
When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the
"Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in
1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a
deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was
accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been
paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced
to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that
in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy,
regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's
consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State.
What connections are there 'between Catholicism and
autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some
82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con-
�52
SLOVAKIA
structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina,
i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European
country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which
now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It
happened that after the White Mountain debacle many
Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though
afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language,
they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech
origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832),
a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech
religious emigration in Slovrukia:
"When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs
for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these
emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups
among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to
return easily from there back tio their native country in
order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to
visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT,
to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back
to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought
settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they
. found security under tlie protection of big landowners in
the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura,
etc" C4l
This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan
Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George
Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich,
Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus.
It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and
cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of
Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky,
�SLOVAKIA
53
Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of
them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages
of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak
people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality.
One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in
Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious
nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks,
however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes
they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be
qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they
were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the
last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world
that the human rights of racial and religious minorities
should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political
evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they
had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American
Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA
had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony.
Conclusion
The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an
effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger
nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way
to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring
about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they
are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national
rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism.
�54
SLOVAKIA
This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of
~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent
to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist
Party in order to break the resistance of the population
aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir
Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike
Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over
cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of
State Seourity.
For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world
could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert
Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to
collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their
prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe.
(1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955.
(2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament,
Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144.
(3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165.
(4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka
pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948
there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want
of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional
Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes
their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained
president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front,
led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt
is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr.
Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are
united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech
"BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).
�
SLOVAKIA
MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA
Joseph A. Mikus
An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv<akia, put the following questions
to me recently:
1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the
Slovaks?
2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa.
nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak
State?
3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament
vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920?
4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at..,
tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia?
'5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik
Peop~e's Party?
6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and
Protestantism in Slovakia?
7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program?
1
Since these questions are asked morn frequently by
persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia
of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following
article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this
regard.
Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the
Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the
Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord.
ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars
were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim,
the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the
Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo.
gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when
sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his
life than in the choice between two ponds that he would
prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and
ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were
motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their
national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con-
�46
SLOVAKIA
eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League
of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the
other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as
the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect.
The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8,
arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh
Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia.
Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was
by far a much more important document in the moderp.
history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- ,
ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts ..
burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations
to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot
be considered separately from morals and politics. It is
indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained
by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted ..
ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh
Agreement.
Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document,
but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a
million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which
had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money
from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes
would have remained somewhere in France as obscure
journalists or poor college-iteachers.
In any deal none of the two contracting parties has
the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of
America were American citizens and, consequently, did not
have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not
honest. When he signe<l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa..
ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a
pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers.
He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should,
then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa-
�SLOVAKIA
47
tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors?
What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik
in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of
Czecho-Slovakia?
It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration
of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished
on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk
in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe.
His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who
was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have
even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak
nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But
there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the
Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural
absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs.
In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave
an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska
mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview,
,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) ,
reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement:
"Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic
character. There is no question about that and on this point
- as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1)
That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation,
contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and
Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the
following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen
will henceforth ignore at their peril."
1
fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920
The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says :
"Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the
Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and
Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the
�48
SLOVAKIA
problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the
Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920.
This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very
simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of
T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to
Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary
Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called
Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they?
Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the
"·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks,
the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such
was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle.
At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under
mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down ,
from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery
as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had
been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his
courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference
in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights
before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated
Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague
was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia.
Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at
the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament
reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in
their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia.
Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is
far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a
"due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech
nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism .
�SLOVAKIA
49
After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera.
tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the
Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The
Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to
disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money
in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press
by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:;
terrorized the population during the electoral campaign
as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo
men were killed iby the police during a political gathering.
Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to
escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech
"liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party
of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party."
Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning
of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak
People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats
23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 .
In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr.
Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament:
"We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as
a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved
in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other
non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im.
prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from
expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2)
It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on
Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni.
fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
�50
SLOVAKIA
fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia,
and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the
electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion
of 750,000, had only 9.
The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak
People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in
Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and
killed two peasants. (3)
All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights.
That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can
mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's
Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born
Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond
the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom.
Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism
The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the
Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic,
awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks.
In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23
deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of
course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities
Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state.
While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served
rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither
�SLOVAKIA
51
was it possible to recognize any right of decision about
Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who,
preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against
any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from
among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc.
Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of
1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German
and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the
22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a
majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and
19'29.
Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's
Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always
sought to vilify this party by different accusations and
denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed
against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones"
into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations
were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at
Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational
background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted.
When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the
"Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in
1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a
deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was
accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been
paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced
to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that
in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy,
regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's
consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State.
What connections are there 'between Catholicism and
autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some
82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con-
�52
SLOVAKIA
structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina,
i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European
country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which
now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It
happened that after the White Mountain debacle many
Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though
afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language,
they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech
origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832),
a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech
religious emigration in Slovrukia:
"When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs
for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these
emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups
among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to
return easily from there back tio their native country in
order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to
visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT,
to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back
to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought
settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they
. found security under tlie protection of big landowners in
the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura,
etc" C4l
This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan
Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George
Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich,
Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus.
It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and
cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of
Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky,
�SLOVAKIA
53
Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of
them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages
of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak
people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality.
One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in
Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious
nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks,
however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes
they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be
qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they
were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the
last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world
that the human rights of racial and religious minorities
should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political
evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they
had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American
Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA
had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony.
Conclusion
The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an
effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger
nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way
to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring
about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they
are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national
rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism.
�54
SLOVAKIA
This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of
~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent
to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist
Party in order to break the resistance of the population
aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir
Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike
Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over
cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of
State Seourity.
For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world
could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert
Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to
collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their
prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe.
(1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955.
(2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament,
Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144.
(3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165.
(4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka
pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948
there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want
of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional
Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes
their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained
president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front,
led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt
is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr.
Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are
united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech
"BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).
�
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1956
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SLOVAKIA
MASARYK'S DEMOCRACY ANH SLOVAKIA
Joseph A. Mikus
An American newspaperman, desiring to know the details about Czecho-.Slorv<akia, put the following questions
to me recently:
1. What does the Pittsburgh Agreement mean to the
Slovaks?
2. What might have been the opinion of M. R. Stefa.
nik albout the status of Slovakia within the Czecho-Slovak
State?
3. Did the Slovak deputies in the Prague Parliament
vote for the Constitution of Czecho~Slovaki'a in 1920?
4. Is it true that the autonomist movement never at..,
tained a majority among the voters of Slovakia?
'5. How strong were the "Magya:rones" in the Slovaik
Peop~e's Party?
6. What is the political significance of Catholicism and
Protestantism in Slovakia?
7. What is the present Slorvruk pohtical program?
1
Since these questions are asked morn frequently by
persons interested in the truth a!bout the Czecho~lovakia
of T. G. Masaryik and Dr. Edward Benes, the following
article, I hope, will greatly help to, clear up matters in this
regard.
Before 1918, S~orvakia was an integral part of the
Kingdom of Hungary. For almost a hundred years the
Slova!ks we,r e for a federative reform of Hungary, accord.
ing to the principles of nationalities. Since the Magyars
were shortsighted and did not consent to any such refo:rim,
the Slovruks decided, during the first World War, with the
Czechs on a Czecho-Slovak federation. I.f there is, any lo.
gic in the effort of a man who tries to save himself when
sinking in a pond, it is rather in hi,s will to preserve his
life than in the choice between two ponds that he would
prefer to drown in. The SlovaJks, abandoning Hung,ary and
ag;reeing to the formation orf a Czecho-SllOv•a k State, were
motivated by the idea of preserving and deive1oping their
national individuality. The Pittsburgh Agreement - con-
46
SLOVAKIA
eluded between the representatives of the Slovak League
of America, on the one side, and the Czech National Alliance and the Federation of the Czech Catholics, on the
other, and signed on May 30, 1918, by T. G. Masaryk as
the representative of the Czecho-Slov,a k National Council - contains precise stipulations in this respect.
The Czecho-Slovak problem, .as developed after HH8,
arose from the subsequent repudiation ,of the PittS1burgh
Agreement 'by Masaryk, as President of Czecho..,Slovakia.
Masaryk did this despite the fact _giat this agreement was
by far a much more important document in the moderp.
history of Czechs and Slovaks ,t han any other one, includ- ,
ing tlie "Czecho-Sfovak" Oonstltubon of 1920. The Pitts ..
burgh Agreement assured moral and political foundations
to the prospective state of Czeeho..,Slovakia. Law cannot
be considered separately from morals and politics. It is
indeed only a formal expression of co-ordination attained
by certain social forces toward a higher end. Undoubted ..
ly, those forces manifested themselves in the Pittsburgh
Agreement.
Masaryk denied the "legal" validity of this document,
but he could not deny it!he fact of having received about a
million dollars from the Sl()JVaJk League of America, which
had been given hlm to finance the activity of the CzechoSlovak National Counicil in Barrs. Without this money
from Americans of Slovak descent, Masaryk and Benes
would have remained somewhere in France as obscure
journalists or poor college-iteachers.
In any deal none of the two contracting parties has
the right arbitrarily to pick up advantages and repudiate o'b'ligatioIIB. Something like that would be doubledealing. To say that the members of the Slovruk League of
America were American citizens and, consequently, did not
have the right to pledge themselves for Slovakia is not
honest. When he signe<l. the Pittsburgh Agreement, Masa..
ryk was a ,political rnfugee acting in contradiction with a
pro-Hapsburig declaration of the Union of Czech writers.
He himself had no delegation from anybody. But the Slovaks have never said that he was an :impostor. Why should,
then, his indirect affirmation 1be accepted that the signa-
SLOVAKIA
47
tories of the Pittsburgh Agreement on behalf of the Slovak League were nothing else than impostors?
What might have been the attitude of M. R. Stefanik
in regard to the politica;l structure and organization of
Czecho-Slovakia?
It is ,k nown that Stefanik did not sign the Declaration
of Independence of the Czecho-Slovak Nation, as pUlblished
on Octoiber 18, 1918, by Benes in Paris ,and T. G. Masaryk
in Washingiton. At that time Stefanik was outside Europe.
His name was therefore simply written down by Benes who
was pre-supposing Stefanik's consent. Stefanik might have
even admitted the western legal concept of a Czecho-Slovak
nation coo.sis-ting of citizens of various ethnic origins. But
there are sources proving that his concept of unity of the
Czecho-Slovak State did not imply the political and cultural
absoI'ption of the Slovaks by the Czechs.
In 1917, on a trip in the United Stafos, Stefanik gave
an inte1wiew to the purbli-sher of the magazine "Slovenska
mladez" (Slava,k Youth), ·Pittsburgh, Pa. 'l'his interview,
,published in this magazine on November 15, 1917 (No. 7) ,
reproduced the following passage from Stefanik's sta,tement:
"Slovakia has to maintain her cultural and linguistic
character. There is no question about that and on this point
- as well as on the question of autonomy of Slovakia, Moravia, Silesia and Bohemia - there is a complete agreement." (1)
That was in fact a realistic evaluaition of the situation,
contrasting the wishful thinking theories of Masaryk and
Bein.es, and even of such Sloivaiks as Hodza, Derer and Srobar. In 1918, Woodrow Wilson .pronounced in Congress the
following significant words : "Self-determination· is not a
mere phrase. It is an imperative principle which statesmen
will henceforth ignore at their peril."
1
fflE "Czechoslovak" Constitution of 1920
The last paragraph of the Pittsburgh Agreement says :
"Detailed regulations, concerning the establishment of the
Czecho-Slovak State, are left to the liberated Czechs and
Slovaks and their legal representatives." This places the
48
SLOVAKIA
problem of the legal representation orf S'lovakia in the
Constituent Assembly of Czecho--Slo,yakia in 1918-1920.
This serious problem, h10wever, was, resolved in a very
simple way. The :s elf-ruppointed revolutionary government of
T. G. Masaryk and E. Benes, after ha'Ving returned to
Brague in triumph mrn Paris, appointed a "Revolutionary
Oonistitiuent Parliament of CzechoslO'Vakia." In such a parliament the "deputies" for Slovakia formed the so~called
Slovaik C'lub which at the beginning of 1920 had 54 members. Who were they?
Twelve orf those "Slovak" deputies were Czechs, including Mr. Benes and AJfoe Masaryk, the daughter of the
"·P resident~Libe,r ator." And of the remaining 42 ,Slovaks,
the.re were only 8 autonomist!s . Of course, it would be difficult to find an objective ikey to these figures. But such
was the will of the Praigue Oa;srtle.
At the ,same time Stefanik died in a plane crash under
mysterious circumstances. 1n fact, he was shot down ,
from the sky of Bratislava by a Czech anti ..aircraft battery
as he was returning home from 'I taly. Andrej HTiinka had
been in the Mirov prison since October, 1919, after his
courageous but unsuccessful trip ,t o the Peace Oonference
in Paris, where he tried to defend Slovaili:ia',s .political rights
before the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated
Powers. Slovakia was occupied hy Czech legions and Prague
was threatening the Slova:k People's Party with dis,s o,lution. Strong censorship of the press and a rigid police control of the Slovak P eople's Party gatherings were exeircised by the Prague-imposed Czech authorities in Slov,a kia.
Under terrific pressure, the six Slovak "autonomist" deputies could do nothing but vote for the Constitution, establishing the new State of the Czechs and Slovaks, but at
the same time they delivered a statement in the Parliament
reassuring the Slovruk -public that they would not cease in
their str.uggle for the complete autonomy of Slovakia.
Thus, the "Czechoslorv,a:k" centralistic Constitution is
far from being a result of what in An1erica is known as a
"due democratic process." It was a victory of narrow Czech
nationalism OlVer b,road-minded Slo•v ak federalism .
SLOVAKIA
49
After this triumph, Prague proceeded to the first elections in Czecho-Slovakia ! When one takes into considera.
tion the conditions under which those elections were organized in Slovakia, there is no su:ripris-e in the fact that the
Slovak People's Party wa:s then placed in minority. The
Czechs opened a full sca:le campaign for their various political 1parties, including the Oommunis.Unfilt,rated SodalDemocratic one. By new catchwords, they attempted to
disorientate Slovak eleeito:ris. Prague spent a lot of money
in this "divide et impera" campaign, controlled the press
by a draconian censorship, and Czech .police and soldier:;
terrorized the population during the electoral campaign
as well as on the day of the elections. In Rumanova, itwo
men were killed iby the police during a political gathering.
Fearful of the official Czech terrorism and trying to
escape a concentrated attack f:mm the side of the Czech
"liberal" parties, Dr. Joseph Buday, who during the imprisonment of Hlin'ka had been the policymlliker of the Slovak People's Party, agreed with the Czech People's Party
of Msgr . J. Sramek to go into elections with hi:s ipar.ty under the common name of the "Czecho-SlovaJk People's Party."
Slovak electors, however, did not understand the meaning
of such an electoral coalition and, therefore, the Slovak
People's Party got only 12 deputi-es, the So.cial Democrats
23, the Agrarians 12, other smaller parties 10 .
In his commentary on the e1ections of April 1920, Dr.
Ferdinand Juriga, on June 10, 1920, speaking for the Slovak People's Party, declared in the Prague Parliament:
"We do not regard the elections of April 18--20 as
a free expression of the Slo•v a;t people. There were involved
in them non-Slovaik soldiers, non-Slo,vak officials, and other
non-Slovak factors. A terrifying censorship, arbitrary im.
prisonment of our people and leaders ,prevent this act from
expressing the free will of our popuilation." (2)
It is significant to note how Czech "democracy" interpreted the principle of equality of citizens by the Law on
Elections. While the Constitution introduced a rigid uni.
fied centralistic system for the whole Republic, the number of vot@ANS~sUBRAA\he election of one deputy was
MILLERSVILLE STATE COLLEGE
50
SLOVAKIA
fixed at 43,840 in the Czech }ands, at 53,384 in Slovakia,
and at 78,538 in Suhcarpath ian Ruthenia. iin this way the
electoral district of Prague, with around one million population, had 45 deputies in. the first Czecho-Slo vak Parliament, while Subcarpaith ian Rutherua, with a popuilaJtion
of 750,000, had only 9.
The poltitical terrorism exerted against the SlO'Vak
People's Party did not cease after the election:s. On October 10, 1920, while this .p arty held a political gathering in
Namestovo , Czech soldiers shot into the assembly and
killed two peasants. (3)
All this h·a ppened under a Constitutio n which guaranteed, for the consUII11ption of Western scholars, "Czechoslovwk" citizens and all modern human and political rights.
That the Slovak People's Party of Hlinka did nevertheless vote for the election of Masaryk as president can
mean only one thing: the political leadership of Hlinka's
Party held a higher view of the interests of the newly-born
Czecho.-!Slovak State than Mr. Edward Benes, the narrowminded Czech nationaJist, whose political views on Central Europe had, up to that time, never ex.tended beyond
the frontiers of the former Bohemian Kingdom.
Slovakia's Reaction to Prague Centralism: Autonomism
The Czech policy, aiming at the disintegrat ion of the
Slovalk national individuali ty w1thin the new Repu'blic,
awakened the self~preser vation instincts of the Slovaks.
In the elections of 1925, the Slovak People's !Party gained 23
deputies. Since that year until the very end of Czecho~Slovakia that ,party remained not only the relatively ~trongest party in Slovakia, but it managed to rally to its program the absolute majority of the Slovak voters. Here, of
course, nobody could consider as Slovak voters the members of the Magyar and German minorities, and the members of the Communis t ;party, because for these minorities
Czecho·-1Slovakia was a foreign state.
While a good part of the Magyar intelligents ia served
rather the cause of HU!Ilgarian ir,r edenta and Magyar peasants in Slovakia sO!ld their votes for certain economic advantages to the "Czechoslo vak" Agrarian Party. Neither
SLOVAKIA
51
was it possible to recognize any right of decision about
Slovakia's political destinies to the Communists, who,
preaching a World Proletarian State, were thereby against
any national criterion in politics. Moreover, the Communist Party in Slovakia recruited its voters mostly from
among the minority groups: Magyars, Czechs, Jews, etc.
Thus, taking into considera.tion the electoral returns of
1925, from 58 deputies corresponding to Slovakia, 17 deputies were discounted as non-Slovaik: 10 Magyars, 1 German
and 6 Communists. Out of the remaining 41 deputies, the
22 corresponding to the Slov,a k People's Party is, in fact, a
majority. The same can be said about the political structure of Sl01Vakia's 'Population in the elections of 1925 and
19'29.
Because of the attractive force the Slovaik People's
Party exerted upon the Slova,k population, Prague always
sought to vilify this party by different accusations and
denigrations. One of frequent accusations was that directed
against Andrej Hlinka for having admitted "Magyarones"
into the leading positions of the party. Such allegations
were mostly connected with the name and activity of Vojtech Tuka. This former professor of International Law at
Pees University in Hunga ry had a Hungarian educational
background, but his Slova;k origin has never been doubted.
When Czech authorities refused Tuka as professor for the
"Czechoslavak" Komensky University in Bratislava, in
1920, he became a collaborator of Hlinka and, later, a
deputy of the Slovaik People's Party. In 1929, Tuka was
accused for high treason and on the basis of false testimonies brought against him b,y witnesses who had been
paid by the Czech secret ipolice, he had been sentenced
to 15 years in jail. It must not be focgotten, however, that
in the decisive years, i e., 1938 and 1939, when M. Horthy,
regent of Hungary, did everything possible to get Hitler's
consent to occupy Slovakia, Tuka was one of t'he most ardent promoters of a free Slovak State.
What connections are there 'between Catholicism and
autonomism in Slova:kia? Catholicism is the religion of some
82 percent of t'he entire population; it is the original religion of the country. The first Catholic church was con-
52
SLOVAKIA
structed in Slovakia in 833. in Nitra, by Prince Pribiina,
i.e., decades earlier than in any other Central European
country. in contradistinction to that, Protestantism, which
now represents about 14 percent of the population in Slovakia, is a Crech and German ideological importation. It
happened that after the White Mountain debacle many
Czech P11otestants settled in Slovakia and, even though
afrter a certain time they adopted the Slovaik language,
they did not rid themselves of the nostalgia for their Czech
origin and their Czech cultural ,b ackground. It is not without interest to quote what BohuJS'lav Tablic (1769-1832),
a prominent Slovak Pr01testant, wrote about that Czech
religious emigration in Slovrukia:
"When in 1620. after that fatal battle on White Mountain, it had come to a large emigration among the Czechs
for religious reasons, more than thirty thousands of these
emigrants, Czechs and Moravians. found refuge in Hitmgary and Poland. They settled in scattered farming groups
among the Slovaks in Nitra county in view of being able to
return easily from there back tio their native country in
order to take care of their derelinquislhed belongings or to
visit their friends, or, the storm of persecution once oveT,
to be able to simply return home witih their whole furnishings. !However, when .t hey lost the ho,pe of returning back
to their fatherland and having in the meantime bought
settlements, lands, and pastures, and other lands, they
. found security under tlie protection of big landowners in
the settlements of Myjava, Vrbo'Ve, Lubina, Stara Tura,
etc" C4l
This is the historical ex,planation of the "Czechoslovak" orientation of many Slovak Protestants, such as Milan
Hodza, Method Bella, Milan Ivanka, Ivan Derer, George
Slavik, Stephen Osusky, John P.apanek, Joseph Lettrich,
Stephen Kocvara, Martin Krvebko, Fedor Hodfa and Samuel Bellus.
It must be stated, however, that not all Slovak Protestants have been or are orientated toward political and
cultural "Czechoslovakism." We can mention the name of
Louis Stur, Charles Kuzmany, Svetozar Hurban Vajan.sky,
SLOVAKIA
53
Joseph S!kultety, Martin Razus, Emil Stodola, etc., all of
them Slovak Pmtestants who h'ave written brilliant pages
of Slovak national ,h istory. In reminiscences of the Sl()JVak
people they enjo,y the same consideration as any ,g reat Catholic personality.
One reality must be partioularly .stressed in this respect: differences between Catholics and Protestants in
Slovakia have never been of a dogmaiiical or religious
nature. They have their proper explanations in the different origin and cultural background orf the Slov8ik Protestants. The great majority of the Slova:k population thinks,
however, that the Protestant minority did not rightly understand their role in their adoptive country. Sometimes
they dosely approac,h ed the attitude that may easily be
qua:lified as a "double loyalty" and at other times they
were openly active like a sort orf Czech cultural, and in the
last 50 years even Czech political fifth column in Slovakia. There is a general agreement in the democratic world
that the human rights of racial and religious minorities
should be ,protected. But it would be far from po1itical wisdom, if a religious minority. against the general political
evolution of their adoptive country, tried to politically substitute themselves, for the nation whose hosipi.Jtality they
had accepted. One ca:n imagine the reaction of American
Protestllints and Jews, if the Catholic minority in the USA
had sought to convert America into an Irish, Roman, Italian, Spanish or Polish colony.
Conclusion
The Slovak proiblem is what it has always been: an
effort to get rid of the domination of all smaller or bigger
nei,g hbors: Magyars, Czechs, Germans, Russians. Federali'z ation of Europe is necessary, because that is the way
to eliminate feudaHsm in international relations and bring
about democracy there. The SlovaJks are disposed to sacrifice certain of their rights in favor of a European Federation, such as foreign ,policy, defense, economy, but they
are not disposed to sacrifice their fundamental national
rights or their individuality in fiavor of a Central Euro1pean foreign nationalism.
54
SLOVAKIA
This is in substa:nce the reason why the Slovaks in Slovakia are refusing to recognize the political leadership of
~arel Bacilek, a Czech Communist. This man has been sent
to SlO'Vlakia as Acting Secretary General of the Communist
Party in order to break the resistance of the population
aigainst Prague and Communism. Having hanged Vladimir
Clementis and impri,s oned other Slova;k "deviationists," iiike
Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky, etc., Prag,ue took over
cont:t1ol of SlovaJkia by a man who had been ·M inister of
State Seourity.
For the same reason the Slovaks in the free world
could never recognize the leadership of some Benes-inspired old Pan-Czech politicians, like Peter Zenkl, Hubert
Ripka, and others. But the Slovaks woufd be delighted to
collaborate as equals with the Czechs who adopt as their
prog_ram the equa:lity of peoples within a Federated Europe.
(1) Quoted in "Juhoamericky Slovak," Buenos Aires, May, 1955.
(2) K. Sidor: T.he Slovaks on the floor of the Prague Parliament,
Bratislav,a, 1943, Vol. 1, 'P- 144.
(3) 1bidem: pp. Hi3-165.
(4) Quoted in: "Hlasove o potfebe jednoty sp!sovneho jazyka
pro Cechy, Moravany, a Slova.ky," Praha, 184-6, p. 102 .
•
•
•
WHO SAID IT?
"I't is am inconltesitialble fact that from 1946 to 1948
there was no demom-a1ey in Czecho-S1avaJki1a. Aflter February 25, 1948, when t'he Communists were no more in want
of the semr:ices of their feJ.il.ow-traveler,s from other NaJtional
Front parties, they reruliized wiith the fuH aid of Dr. Benes
their famous February "coup d'etat" (Dr. Benes remained
president till June 1948). Orre part of the Natioml Front,
led by Clemenlt Gotrbw.a:ld, remained in the country, where ilt
is strn terrom:ng oUT naJ!Jion. Another part, led by Dr.
Zenilcl, went into exiiJ..e, where tt wa'S o r ~ in tlhe sooalled "Council of Flree Ozeohoslova:kia." Both parts are
united by the same "governhlent-program of Kiosice." Today Red Prague a:s well a:s the Council olf Free Ozechoslovalcia are sbill folioweTs of tlhia t program." ('.I1he Czech
"BOHEMIA," Nov. 1952).
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Masaryk's Democracy and Slovakia
Description
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Joseph A. Mikuš
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 45-54
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Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005
Date
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September-December 1956
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Text
40
SLOVAKIA
BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
John B. Fox
The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe
Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the
greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe
Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned.
Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared.
Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the
world, especially Europe, was quite limited.
We set about with known American assiduousness to
tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order
to present real leadership we must know our allies, we
commenced to accumulate information about the various
nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In
pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations
in this country.
Though we have made tremendous progress in the
above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as
some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started
the job.
To state a case where our Administration, mostly due
to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true
picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia.
The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948
was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During
those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as
the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to
the West and gain admission to the League of Nations.
Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are
in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as
consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc .
1
�SLOVAKIA
il
It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's
political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not
repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from
a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own
Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in
selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications
statements expressing his stand on major political issues in
chronoilogical order from 1914~1944.
The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes
in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the
date when they were made:
1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . .
1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . .
H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been
taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed.
In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events ....
.AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our
powe r . . . .
1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today
generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European
public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia.
Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong
moral position.
1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic,
democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our
relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our
whole policy.
The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change.
1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as
-possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and
Europe.
This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to
our national independence.
I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do
not worry about our fate.
�42
SLOVAKIA
1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de
jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of
normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . .
1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a
second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . .
1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would
take up her position in Europe . . . .
1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag.
gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente.
1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate
the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The
policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is
proceeding along normal lines. . . .
1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of
all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia.
1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal
affairs.
A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the
last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was
already late, became involved in its c ollective defense.
1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know
that . . . .
1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts
would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead
to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences.
Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . .
1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us.
And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which
Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe.
Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany,
we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old
friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed
before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941,
a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition
of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our
relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there
is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before
Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the
war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union
will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat
confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be
an equil!b,rium of forces . . . .
�SLOVAKIA
43
In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . .
The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system
of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the
conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration.
1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians .
They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace.
Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental
and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een
settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . .
-Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union,
I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I
have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest
of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly
of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of
the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the
natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I
strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . .
1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached
between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete
and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this
very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that
the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together.
Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached
to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was
not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly
humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather
the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other,
are still recognized in some circles.
Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted
asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes
went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze.
cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United
Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia,
which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars,
was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to
the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might
retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia.
It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World
�44
SLOVAKIA
Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire
police power throughout the country was in Communist
hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to
play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents
did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and
anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes.
Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their
long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any
further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter
took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February,
19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by
jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article
summed up the situation with the comment that "such is
the fate of collaborators "
Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how
the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when
they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty
years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast
over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_
slaivement oif their country!
Today the whole democratic world is suffering from
what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped
bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and
Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark
Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them.
"
• • •
(JUTche.k
$3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50
(the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50.
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"
�
40
SLOVAKIA
BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
John B. Fox
The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe
Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the
greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe
Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned.
Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared.
Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the
world, especially Europe, was quite limited.
We set about with known American assiduousness to
tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order
to present real leadership we must know our allies, we
commenced to accumulate information about the various
nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In
pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations
in this country.
Though we have made tremendous progress in the
above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as
some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started
the job.
To state a case where our Administration, mostly due
to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true
picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia.
The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948
was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During
those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as
the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to
the West and gain admission to the League of Nations.
Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are
in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as
consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc .
1
�SLOVAKIA
il
It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's
political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not
repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from
a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own
Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in
selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications
statements expressing his stand on major political issues in
chronoilogical order from 1914~1944.
The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes
in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the
date when they were made:
1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . .
1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . .
H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been
taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed.
In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events ....
.AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our
powe r . . . .
1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today
generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European
public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia.
Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong
moral position.
1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic,
democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our
relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our
whole policy.
The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change.
1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as
-possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and
Europe.
This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to
our national independence.
I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do
not worry about our fate.
�42
SLOVAKIA
1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de
jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of
normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . .
1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a
second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . .
1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would
take up her position in Europe . . . .
1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag.
gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente.
1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate
the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The
policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is
proceeding along normal lines. . . .
1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of
all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia.
1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal
affairs.
A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the
last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was
already late, became involved in its c ollective defense.
1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know
that . . . .
1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts
would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead
to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences.
Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . .
1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us.
And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which
Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe.
Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany,
we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old
friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed
before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941,
a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition
of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our
relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there
is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before
Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the
war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union
will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat
confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be
an equil!b,rium of forces . . . .
�SLOVAKIA
43
In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . .
The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system
of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the
conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration.
1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians .
They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace.
Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental
and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een
settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . .
-Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union,
I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I
have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest
of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly
of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of
the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the
natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I
strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . .
1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached
between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete
and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this
very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that
the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together.
Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached
to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was
not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly
humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather
the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other,
are still recognized in some circles.
Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted
asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes
went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze.
cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United
Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia,
which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars,
was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to
the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might
retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia.
It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World
�44
SLOVAKIA
Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire
police power throughout the country was in Communist
hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to
play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents
did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and
anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes.
Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their
long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any
further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter
took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February,
19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by
jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article
summed up the situation with the comment that "such is
the fate of collaborators "
Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how
the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when
they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty
years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast
over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_
slaivement oif their country!
Today the whole democratic world is suffering from
what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped
bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and
Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark
Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them.
"
• • •
(JUTche.k
$3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50
(the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50.
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"
�
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
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The Slovak League of America
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1956
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40
SLOVAKIA
BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF
CZECHO-SWVAKIA
John B. Fox
The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe
Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the
greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe
Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned.
Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared.
Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the
world, especially Europe, was quite limited.
We set about with known American assiduousness to
tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order
to present real leadership we must know our allies, we
commenced to accumulate information about the various
nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In
pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations
in this country.
Though we have made tremendous progress in the
above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as
some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started
the job.
To state a case where our Administration, mostly due
to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true
picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia.
The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948
was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During
those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as
the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to
the West and gain admission to the League of Nations.
Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are
in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as
consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on
Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc .
1
SLOVAKIA
il
It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's
political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not
repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from
a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own
Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in
selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications
statements expressing his stand on major political issues in
chronoilogical order from 1914~1944.
The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes
in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the
date when they were made:
1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . .
1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . .
H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been
taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed.
In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events ....
.AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our
powe r . . . .
1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today
generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European
public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia.
Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong
moral position.
1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic,
democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our
relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our
whole policy.
The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change.
1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as
-possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and
Europe.
This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to
our national independence.
I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do
not worry about our fate.
42
SLOVAKIA
1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de
jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of
normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . .
1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a
second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . .
1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would
take up her position in Europe . . . .
1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag.
gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente.
1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate
the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The
policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is
proceeding along normal lines. . . .
1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of
all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia.
1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal
affairs.
A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the
last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was
already late, became involved in its c ollective defense.
1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know
that . . . .
1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts
would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead
to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences.
Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . .
1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us.
And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which
Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe.
Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany,
we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old
friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed
before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941,
a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition
of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our
relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there
is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before
Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the
war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union
will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat
confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be
an equil!b,rium of forces . . . .
SLOVAKIA
43
In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . .
The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system
of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the
conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration.
1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians .
They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace.
Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental
and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een
settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . .
-Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union,
I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I
have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest
of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly
of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of
the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the
natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I
strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . .
1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached
between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete
and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this
very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that
the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together.
Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached
to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was
not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly
humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather
the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other,
are still recognized in some circles.
Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted
asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes
went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze.
cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United
Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia,
which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars,
was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to
the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might
retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia.
It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World
44
SLOVAKIA
Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire
police power throughout the country was in Communist
hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to
play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents
did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and
anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes.
Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their
long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any
further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter
took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February,
19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by
jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article
summed up the situation with the comment that "such is
the fate of collaborators "
Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how
the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when
they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty
years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast
over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_
slaivement oif their country!
Today the whole democratic world is suffering from
what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped
bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and
Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark
Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them.
"
• • •
(JUTche.k
$3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50
(the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00;
"SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50.
REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"
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Title
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Beneš and the Communization of Czecho-Slovakia
Description
An account of the resource
John B. Fox
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 40-44
Creator
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Fox, John B.
Date
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September-December 1956
name
-
https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/dc25c9bbc01e9f568ce99331ce6c2f36.pdf
8f902d800812ac58bbf18f3f3c29e691
PDF Text
Text
34
SLOVAKIA
STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
P.A. Hrobak
John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets,
had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty
Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group
sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune
of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew :
to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names
as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak
students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics,
Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur.
These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of
Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of
the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as
an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth
of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures.
Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on
the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked
the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se.
riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk
"SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who
later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and
Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among
the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds.
Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into
a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and
therefore we must travel the thorny road of life!
That young man was Louis Shir.
Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural
manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in
Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent
�SLOVAKIA
36
Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with
a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles,
excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home
of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it
was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men.
Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to
awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite
of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in
Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One
evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he
was from Beckov and two years younger than himself;
but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason
avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a
talk with him. The young man later admitted that what
Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for
several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group.
That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters.
Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked
others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of
}()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future.
Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation,
unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without
selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to
the task of providing them.
Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained
for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_
tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without
them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful,
foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation
by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit-
�36
SLOVAKIA
erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the
face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and
democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own
,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of
Europe.
The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not
only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing."
lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural
and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep
on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies,
newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing
more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not
seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur
told his people.
The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis
Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with
reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through
a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar
history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the
renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be
difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man
who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated.
But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the
patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth.
From the forties of the last century down to our
times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur.
Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of
Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of
EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics
become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son
that Slovakia gave to mankind.
Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into
the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring
only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur
�SLOVAKIA
37
give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights
of the subjugated and oppressed.
In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two
Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were
inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess,
there was a great difference between them. One entered
the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained
loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_
ond Stur.
Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free
royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send
their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could
only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal
city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li
the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not
particular people
"We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament.
"But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom,"
continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free.
dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little.
If our towns had more freedom, even our people would
have never fallen into such thraildom."
Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this
Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion:
"That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d
goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com.
munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and
taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time
I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly."
It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom.
Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came
together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly:
"Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned
the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand
1
�38
SLOVAKIA
of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the
way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed
and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of
fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in
the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne
with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others
and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country
as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind
challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple
of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being.
When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power
of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated
from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club
of the -lords."
Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of
course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry
for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did
this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position.
Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against
the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while
Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave
had inundated Hungary.
The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love
for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in
the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved
and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be
p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished
sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation.
Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently
depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a
more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and
mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny"
prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho>Ttcomi:ngs
and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials
would be just as actual today as they were in his time.
�SLOVAKIA
39
No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent
rights of the Slovak naition.
Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it
not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the
entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of
individual persons and even though individuals harm us,
the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:;
·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL
ately abandoned the cause itself. . . "
Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting
for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s
freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even
today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations.
To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and
Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of
all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed
and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's:
"Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!"
StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the
independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years
ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation
ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination.
Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of
the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and
Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_
alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and
the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on!
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?
"The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation
can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter
future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).
�
34
SLOVAKIA
STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
P.A. Hrobak
John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets,
had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty
Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group
sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune
of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew :
to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names
as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak
students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics,
Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur.
These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of
Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of
the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as
an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth
of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures.
Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on
the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked
the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se.
riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk
"SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who
later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and
Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among
the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds.
Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into
a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and
therefore we must travel the thorny road of life!
That young man was Louis Shir.
Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural
manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in
Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent
�SLOVAKIA
36
Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with
a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles,
excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home
of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it
was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men.
Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to
awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite
of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in
Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One
evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he
was from Beckov and two years younger than himself;
but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason
avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a
talk with him. The young man later admitted that what
Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for
several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group.
That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters.
Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked
others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of
}()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future.
Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation,
unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without
selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to
the task of providing them.
Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained
for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_
tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without
them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful,
foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation
by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit-
�36
SLOVAKIA
erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the
face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and
democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own
,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of
Europe.
The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not
only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing."
lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural
and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep
on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies,
newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing
more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not
seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur
told his people.
The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis
Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with
reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through
a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar
history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the
renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be
difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man
who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated.
But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the
patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth.
From the forties of the last century down to our
times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur.
Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of
Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of
EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics
become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son
that Slovakia gave to mankind.
Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into
the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring
only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur
�SLOVAKIA
37
give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights
of the subjugated and oppressed.
In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two
Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were
inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess,
there was a great difference between them. One entered
the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained
loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_
ond Stur.
Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free
royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send
their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could
only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal
city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li
the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not
particular people
"We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament.
"But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom,"
continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free.
dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little.
If our towns had more freedom, even our people would
have never fallen into such thraildom."
Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this
Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion:
"That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d
goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com.
munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and
taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time
I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly."
It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom.
Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came
together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly:
"Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned
the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand
1
�38
SLOVAKIA
of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the
way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed
and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of
fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in
the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne
with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others
and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country
as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind
challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple
of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being.
When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power
of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated
from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club
of the -lords."
Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of
course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry
for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did
this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position.
Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against
the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while
Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave
had inundated Hungary.
The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love
for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in
the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved
and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be
p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished
sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation.
Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently
depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a
more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and
mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny"
prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho>Ttcomi:ngs
and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials
would be just as actual today as they were in his time.
�SLOVAKIA
39
No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent
rights of the Slovak naition.
Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it
not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the
entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of
individual persons and even though individuals harm us,
the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:;
·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL
ately abandoned the cause itself. . . "
Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting
for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s
freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even
today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations.
To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and
Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of
all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed
and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's:
"Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!"
StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the
independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years
ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation
ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination.
Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of
the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and
Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_
alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and
the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on!
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?
"The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation
can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter
future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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1956, Vol. 6
Description
An account of the resource
<ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li>
<li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li>
</ul>
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
The Slovak League of America
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1956
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
34
SLOVAKIA
STUR AND THE SLOVAK INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
P.A. Hrobak
John Kollar and John Holly, eminent Slorvak poets,
had sung their great songs, when a group of some fifty
Slovak youngsters assembled on the ruins of Devin the unmariked ruins which spoke so eloquently of the glorious past of the ancestors of the Slovak nation. The group
sang "Devin, mily Devin" (Devin, deair Devin) to the tune
of "N1tra, mila Nitra" and had themselves baptized anew :
to their Christian names, they added new Slovanic names
as a symbol that they were being born to a new life dedicated wholly to the service of their nation. The Slovak
students were inspired by Kollar',s sonnets, HoUy's epics,
Mickiewicz's Ode to Youth, and by the magnetic personali,t y of Louis Stur.
These Slovak young peotple carried the new era of
Slovak history on their shoulders. This was the youth of
the capital of SlovaJkia, Bratislava. Since the time of Matthew Bel, the Bratislava Lyceum enjoyed great fame as
an educational institution and, hence, attracted the youth
of Slovakia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century
something new was introduced at the Lyceum : an institute o,f the Slovak and Czech languages and literaitures.
Kollar was there in 1816 and exerci,s ed great influence on
the students. One evening in 1818 two young men walked
the road to Devin, discussing national matters quite se.
riously. One was Safarik, who late,r wrote the great wocrk
"SloivaJnic antiquities," and the other was Palacky, who
later became a great Czech historian. Although Kollar and
Saifarik left Bratislava, the sparks of their ardor fell among
the youthful scholars and smouldered in their minds.
Then some OIIle came among them to fan the embers into
a flame and to unite them in one service, as he so aptly expressed it: we ha,v e entered the service of the spirit - and
therefore we must travel the thorny road of life!
That young man was Louis Shir.
Stur entered the "service of the spirit" in a natural
manner, without extraordinary crises. He was born in
Zay-iUhrovec in 1815; his father was a teacher and ardent
SLOVAKIA
36
Slovak; his mother, too, was a loyal Slovak, graced with
a quiet, pleasant disposition; and his older brother, Charles,
excelled as a writer of Slovak poetry. In short, the home
of Stur was truly Slovak. Wlhile in Raab, Stur was greatly influenced by Professor Pee; and in Bratislava (1829) it
was his fortune to fall in with congenial SlQlV'ak young men.
Stur admired his elders, especially the youthful Chalupka, who had contributed much with their writings to
awaken the Slovaks nationally. Stur became the favorite
of the eminent Schroer and Palkovic, who recognized in
Stur the quahfica!Jions for leadership. Stur's dynMnic personality attracted Slovak youth to the Slovak cause. One
evening Stur met a young man on the street; he knew he
was from Beckov and two years younger than himself;
but he also .knew ,that this young man for some reason
avoided Slovruk company. After greeting him, Stur had a
talk with him. The young man later admitted that what
Stur had said to him on that occasion kept him awake for
several nights and made him resolve to, join Stu.r's group.
That young man was Joseph M. Hurban, who later became one of the great men of Slovak letters.
Stur did not persuade others with any special, expert arguments; he persuaded them with his entire personality. Stur was a dynamo of action; what he asked
others to do, he did himself; his entire life was a labor of
}()IVe for his people. The Slovaks, his people, needed scholars Who would dig iinto the past to build for the future.
Stur knew that the Slovaks were doomed as a nation,
unless they were awakened nationally, and thrut without
selfless terucher,s this wrus impossible. He set himself to
the task of providing them.
Julius Botto, Sl()IVa!k historian, said that "Stur trained
for the Slo1Vak nation' energetic, selfless men, genllline na_
tional heroes " Stur and his followers prepared the Slovak nation for the difficult times ahead. Indeed, without
them the Slovalks might now be a forgotten nation, a nation suppressed and beaten into oblivion by a powerful,
foreign and hostile ruler. Stur united the Slovak nation
by establishing the central dialect of Slovakia as the lit-
36
SLOVAKIA
erary medium and thus made the Slovaks stronger in the
face of the enemy. He was a genuine Slovaik patriot and
democrat; he fought n:o t only for the rights of his own
,people, but also for the rights of all subjugated nations of
Europe.
The national life of the Slovruks ,in the past was not
only a passive bewailment, a life of hapless "do nothing."
lit was filled with positive wor.k, creating higher cultural
and 1political values. Slovaks should remember this and ikeep
on preaching it in their schools, boo.k s, public assemblies,
newspapeirs, and everywhere. Perhaps we need no.thing
more than a large portion of national pride. Let us not
seek the source of our Slovak national life in foreign gardens when we have it at home, that is what Louis Stur
told his people.
The Magyars once unveiled a gigantic statue of Louis
Kossuth before the Hungarian (Magyar) Parliament with
reaI occidental pomposity. The Slovaks who went through
a Magyar school, or have any knowledge of Magyar history and literatwre, know the kind of superman Magyar
history and lite rature made of our Slo·v ak countryman, the
renegade Kossuth. To the Magyars Kossuth is a most brilliant historic ,phenomenon, a man whose equal it would be
difficult to find in all Europe, nay, in all the world. Kossuth is depicted as a fighter o.f freedom , as the first man
who raised his voice for the liberation of the subjugated.
But the fact remains, nevertheless, that Louis Stur, the
patriotic Slovalk , did more in this regard than did Kossuth.
From the forties of the last century down to our
times, Slovak national life lived in the spirit of Louis Stur.
Yet it so happened that the merits of this great man of
Slovak history were little acknowledged by writers of
EUJropean history. Once Stu.r's magnificent characteristics
become known, the world wil.l come ' to know the great son
that Slovakia gave to mankind.
Today, Louis Stu.r's 1personality cannot be hewed into
the narrow frameworik of Slorvaikia. His influence and significance was broader. In Bratislava, Stur did not bring
only the Slovaks together; among his enthusiastic disciples were also the Croatians and Serbs What did Stur
SLOVAKIA
37
give to mankind? He devoted his entire life for the rights
of the subjugated and oppressed.
In the memorable iBratislava parliament of 1847, two
Slovak countrymen met in a battle of words. Both were
inteliligent, educated and f~ery speakers. NevertheLess,
there was a great difference between them. One entered
the services of Ma:gyarization, while the other remained
loyal to his Slovak nation. The first was Kossuth, the sec_
ond Stur.
Kossuth represented the County of Pesf, Stur the free
royal city of Zvolen. Free royal cities had the right to send
their repres€1Iltatives to the Assembly, but these could
only speak and not vote. As a delegate of a free royal
city, Stur represented the privileged laildowner's class Li
the Ass,embly. But eiven this matter did not ma:ke a renegade of him, because he served ideas and ideals and not
particular people
"We want freedom," Stur said in that Parliament.
"But it is saiid that there is plenty of freedom in our homeland; yes, not only ,plenty, but even too much freedom,"
continued Stur, "but only the landow:ner's .b rand of free.
dom, and of the real, human freedom there is very little.
If our towns had more freedom, even our people would
have never fallen into such thraildom."
Kossuth replied to Stur. But, lo and behold, what this
Magyar idol and champion of freedom said on that occasion:
"That cannot be helped; that is the way the wor1d
goes. It is fate that the one who stands lower in the com.
munity is suppressed and must bear the burden and
taxes; on the other hand, the one who comes along in civic life receives rights and stands in honor. At this time
I am opposed to granting towns a vote in our Assembly."
It was thus that Kossuth "defended" freedom.
Stur, however, would not be silenced. When he came
together with Kossuth in December, he said in the Hungarian Assembly:
"Recently, when I wa:s present here and mentioned
the sorrowful plight of the wretched taxpayers, the worthy deputy from Pesf Oounty, Mr. Kossuth, saw the hand
1
38
SLOVAKIA
of fate in the o,ppression of the people and said that is the
way the world goes when the lower class is suppre.s sed
and the higher class receives more ri,g hts. I see no ha,nd of
fate in the matter, beoouse then the staitus of the oppressed could never be corrected. We demand freedom in
the country and to allow urbarial jobs which are not in Hne
with freedom. Does such a peirson, who works for others
and instead of being rewarded is despised, have a fatherland, will such a ipe~on become attached to his country
as he would to his mother? The sacred cause of mankind
challenges us so that once we would express the iprinci,ple
of the Hberation of people and honestly bring it into being.
When this redemption is accomplished, the judicial power
of the landowner and the county gentry must cease, because freedom would not be served if a people liberated
from the robot would continue to .remai:n under the club
of the -lords."
Behold the difference between Stur and Kossuth. Of
course, some months later even Kossuth took up Stur's cry
for the liJberation of al.l the people of Hlungary. But he did
this not out of internal conviction, but because circumstamces had forced him to take such a benev:olent ,position.
Stur fought for the rights of the subjugated even against
the will of those who had sent him .to the Assembly, while
Kossuth fought for them only after a revolutionairy wave
had inundated Hungary.
The fundamental trai,t of Stur's ideals was his love
for freedom. If Stur had done nothing else but fought in
the iBratislruva Assembly for the rights of the enslaved
and subjugated, even then he would have deserved to be
p'laced by the Slovak nation amo.ng its most distinguished
sons But he meant more than that to the Slovak nation.
Stur was not a naive romantic, as he is frequently
depicted. No one since his time ha;s yet come wp with a
more reaHstic program. Stuir- did not flatter faults and
mistrukes; his articles in the "Slovenske N a:rodne Noviny"
prove that he fought fearlessly ag,ai,n st the sho>Ttcomi:ngs
and delinquencies o.f his people. His leading editorials
would be just as actual today as they were in his time.
SLOVAKIA
39
No:t only in the defense of the 1purity of the Slova:k language, but .in defense of the recognition of the inherent
rights of the Slovak naition.
Stur's "let us not abandon our,selves, Slovak countrymen" is just as timely today as .it was in 184!5. And is it
not just as timely .to stress that "higher is the cause of the
entire nation, higher is the cause of the whole than that of
individual persons and even though individuals harm us,
the cause itself does ,n ot do so . But with us thus far it ha..c:;
·b een so that individuals offended iby our people immedL
ately abandoned the cause itself. . . "
Today ou~ mighty America with her Allies is fighting
for the freedom of al,l enslaved and oppressed nations. Th:s
freedom mu:st not miss the Slovak nation. The Slovaks even
today, rus during the times of Stur, have inherent and Godgiiven rights to complete freedom as do all other nations.
To fight for the freedom of all nations, including the Slovak naition, is the obligation not only of the Slovaks and
Americans of Slovak descen_t, but also the obligation of
all ,l overs of truth and freedom. Indeed, the Slovak,s existed
and shall continue to exist, if they only remember Stur's:
"Let us not abandon ourselves, Slova1k countrymen!"
StUJI"'s schoo-1 of thought built the foundation for the
independence movement of Slovakia over a hundred years
ago - and the Slovaks are building upon this foundation
ever since, and will keep on building until they attain complete freedom from al,l foreign and hostile domination.
Just as Stur repudiated a:nd condemned the hegemony of
the Magyars and the materialistic ,p hHosophy of Marx and
Engels, so the Slovaks today stand solidly agaim,t materi_
alistic Communism and all forms of totalitarianiSim and
the hegemony of the Czechs. The sipirit of Stur lives on!
•
• •
WHO SAID IT?
"The Dernocrati,c Prunty knows ithat the Sloivak nation
can be aSS1Ured of a haippier, more secure and a brighter
future oru,y by wo'Iilcing together with the Oommunist Prurty." - (Dr. Joseph Lettrich, Vfce-Ohainman of the Executive Comm,i ttee of the "Council of Free Ozechoslovakia,"
CA!S, Bratisfa,v;a, F~ary 1, 1946).
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Štúr and the Slovak Independence Movement
Description
An account of the resource
P. A. Hrobak
Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956
pp. 34-39
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Hrobak, Philip Anthony, 1904-1964
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
P. A. Hrobak
LCNAF