3 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4b3dfb1be510791b953c7ba1bf686763.pdf 1bd60abcbe147ef63cc1b2e4b7d2a222 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 21 I Met President Tiso E. L. Delaney Periodically some senators and representatives arise in the halls of Congress to eloquently deplore the plight of those people in what we rightly regard as the "Captive Nations". Apart from expressions of synthetic sympathy nothing meaningful is done to effect the liberation of those captives in the Soviet-communist combine. The short-lived Republic of Slovakia is one of those unfortunate victims. Thirty three years ago-March 14, 1939, the Slovak Parliament in Bratislava-in accordance with the CzechoSlovak constitution - unanimously proclaimed the independence of the Slovak Republic. With its population of about 4,400,000 and an area of approximately 50,000 square kilometers, Slovakia is in the heart of Eastern Europe . In the 9th and 10th centuries it was the first political, cultural and Christian center in that part of the world . But it was not until March of 1939 that Slovakia's duly elected political representatives proclaimed their right of self-determination. In March 1939 there was no war in Europe and none was imminent. Practically all European countries officially recognized Slovakia and established diplomatic or consular relations with the new political entity-including our wartime allies, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The fact that pernicious influences in our Washington administration succeeded in withholding recognition of the new Republic does not alter the indisputable fact that it did exist. Non-European countries with representation in Bratislava, the capital, were: Japan, Manchuria, Siam, China, Costa Rica and Equador. It is appropriate to mention that the Soviet had approximately 200 persons attached to its embassy in Bratislava. Other countries could operate with 10 or 12 people. But undoubtedly large staffs are �22 SLOVAEJA needed for propaganda, subversion and espionage, in which the Soviet is always engaged. During World War II, when a large part of Europe was plagued by want, Slovakia was rightfully regarded as an oasis of peace, prosperity and plenty. This paradise in war-rationed Europe had existed over three years before I had an opportunity to enjoy it. A few days after my arrival in Bratislava, the capital, I was invited to a dinner party where I met Jozef Mracna. He had been Consul for Czecho-Slovakia in New York. We soon discovered that we had many mutual friends there. He returned to Slovakia when it became a self-governing republic and was an official of the administration. I asked him if he could arrange for me to interview the President. He said he could-and did. On my arrival at the presidential palace at the appointed time I met Dr. Karol Murin, personal secretary of Msgr. Tiso who escorted me into the President's private study. Msgr. Tiso, or President Tiso as he was then, greeted me with a hearty hand-shake and a few words of English -his entire vocabulary in that language, as he laughingly admitted. He spoke Slovak, Czech, German and Hungarian, so our interview was conducted in German. His black hair was sprinkled with a few strands of grey and his dark blue eyes resembled those of the Irish. I mentioned to the President that a learned professor in Banska Bystrica told me that the Slovaks and Irish are both of Celtic origin. Msgr. Tiso observed that there is some similarity between Slovakia and Ireland; both countries are predominently Christian and have been for centuries; both are largely agrarian and both have more of their countrymen in America than in Europe. Our discussion touched on various subjects. For generations Slovakia had been a farming community but now they were promoting various industries. "A major problem confronting us," said the President, "is in getting teachers and technical instructors for the projects we hope to develop." When Slovakia was part of Czecho-Slovakia, the Czechs �SLOVAKIA 23 contrived to keep all industries in their part of the country. Now Slovakia, as the President observed, was endeavoring to encourage and develop its resources without too much reliance on Czechs, Germans, Hungarians or Russians. As the time came for me to leave, I mentioned to his Excellency that there was a twinkle of humor in his eyes and would it be quite proper for me to send him a little reminder of our visit? "What-for instance?" he asked. "I'm sure that during these winter nights it is quite cold in this ages-old palace. So I thought - that for medicinal purpose, of course, you might appreciate a half dozen bottles of good Canadian whisky." He laughed heartily and said, "I'll be glad to get it." The gift was sent. Some time later I was asked to again visit the palace when the President gave me a beautiful example of the artistic needle work that is done by many of the Slovak women and girls. That treasure is still in my possession. Little did I surmise that we were to be together several more times-but under vastly different circumstances. In the so-called histories and recordings of important events in Central and Eastern Europe during the latter weeks of World War II-much is purposely omitted. There is no mention of the unprecedented proposal made by the Soviet communists to recognize Slovakia as a sovereign state and to retain Msgr. Tiso as President. That proposal was made through diplomatic channels and told me by Stefan Tiso, then prime minister of Slovakia and confirmed by the former foreign minister of Slovakia, Dr. Ferdinand f>urcansky, presently residing in Munich, Germany. Of all the captive nations under the thraldom of Soviet communism, none would be more incongruous than a communist Slovakia with a Catholic monsignor as its president. Of course the Kremlin's proposal was curtly rejected by the Tiso administration. When the Red army advanced from Budapest toward Bratislava, President Tiso and his cabinet together with many others fled to Kremsmuenster, Austria. They expected and rightly so, that the United States forces would occupy �24 SLOVAKIA that part of Eastern Europe. The Slovak "colony" arrived in Austria April 1, 1945. (This writer left Slovakia the following day.) Although regarded as "top secret" it was known that the former president of Czecho-Slovakia, Eduard Benes, with the aid of Franklin Roosevelt had flown to Moscow where he betrayed his country to the communists, with the understanding that he would be the "president" of the republic we now know as Czecho-Slovakia. On May 8, 1945, the refugee Slovak government in Austria signed a surrender document which was co-signed by Brig. General W. A. Collier of the US Army; Col. T. 0. Curtis and Capt. David W. Allard of the US Army. General Collier assured the Slovak refugees that they would not be delivered to the communists. Like some of the other pledges of proper treatment that were made by American officialdom to the anticommunists in certain European countries, such assurances were flagrantly violated. President Tiso, with his cabinet members, private secretary and another priest were transferred from Austria to an internment establishment in Freising, Bavaria, which was maintained by the U.S. Army . In Dr. J . M. Kirschbaum's book "Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe" is noted on page 311 a caption: Denial By U.S. War Department." (as follows) "Washington, D. C. February 7, 1947. "There is no record in the files of this office which shows that Monsignor Tiso was ever held by the American Forces or delivered to the Czechoslovakian authorities from American custody. Daniel Noce, Major General, O.S.C . Chief Civil Affairs Div." That statement of General Noce was either due to lamentable and inexcusable ignorance of fact or deliberate lie. I was with Msgr. Tiso many hours of many days when he and his fellow Slovaks were imprisoned by the American military forces in barracks at Freising. The charge against me was that I "had written anti-communist articles during the war." The charge was correct. I had written anti-communist, anti-Soviet articles. I dared, in fact cordially invited the �SLOVAKIA 25 Justice Department officials to make such formal indictment against me. If anti-Soviet and anti-communist was regarded as un-American and a criminal offense, I wanted it publicized in an American court. For obvious reasons the Justice Department found it convenient not to invite such exposure of aid to communist causes of which certain departments of the administration were guilty. All were shocked one morning when word was received at the Freising barracks that the Slovaks were to be delivered to the communist regime of Eduard Benes. I went to those betrayed Slovaks and assured them that it was not real Americans who were violating every pledge given them. Among the armed guards who were to deliver the Slovaks to the communist torturers were European born refugees in American uniforms . The testimony of those Slovaks who endured that transfer from Freising into the territory of the Czech regime of communist-aiding Eduard Benes-is a matter of indisputable record. We recall with shame the barbarian brutalities suffered recently by the Lithuanian seaman who sought refuge on an American Coast Guard vessel. Equally as brutal treatment was the lot of those Slovaks whe were beaten, kicked and tortured unmercifully by the alien element in American uniforms, then delivered to the communists. During the sham "trial" in Bratislava of Msgr. Tiso the communist prosecutor endeavored to force reference by Tiso of that ordeal. But Tiso refused to speak of it. His fate was pre-ordained. Death by hanging. Because he had served his God and his beloved people to the best of his ability-he was sentenced to death. Two hours before his execution he wrote a message for his people and for all Western Christian civilization. He wrote-in part: "I consider myself a martyr in defense c:>f Christianity against Bolshevism-against which the nation must defend itself in all possible ways, not only in the spirit of its Christian character but in the interests of its future." I recall that Msgr. Tiso once impressed on me the truth that "you cannot compromise with communism." That truism should be impressed on those who now urge cooperation with communism. � SLOVAKIA 21 I Met President Tiso E. L. Delaney Periodically some senators and representatives arise in the halls of Congress to eloquently deplore the plight of those people in what we rightly regard as the "Captive Nations". Apart from expressions of synthetic sympathy nothing meaningful is done to effect the liberation of those captives in the Soviet-communist combine. The short-lived Republic of Slovakia is one of those unfortunate victims. Thirty three years ago-March 14, 1939, the Slovak Parliament in Bratislava-in accordance with the CzechoSlovak constitution - unanimously proclaimed the independence of the Slovak Republic. With its population of about 4,400,000 and an area of approximately 50,000 square kilometers, Slovakia is in the heart of Eastern Europe . In the 9th and 10th centuries it was the first political, cultural and Christian center in that part of the world . But it was not until March of 1939 that Slovakia's duly elected political representatives proclaimed their right of self-determination. In March 1939 there was no war in Europe and none was imminent. Practically all European countries officially recognized Slovakia and established diplomatic or consular relations with the new political entity-including our wartime allies, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The fact that pernicious influences in our Washington administration succeeded in withholding recognition of the new Republic does not alter the indisputable fact that it did exist. Non-European countries with representation in Bratislava, the capital, were: Japan, Manchuria, Siam, China, Costa Rica and Equador. It is appropriate to mention that the Soviet had approximately 200 persons attached to its embassy in Bratislava. Other countries could operate with 10 or 12 people. But undoubtedly large staffs are �22 SLOVAEJA needed for propaganda, subversion and espionage, in which the Soviet is always engaged. During World War II, when a large part of Europe was plagued by want, Slovakia was rightfully regarded as an oasis of peace, prosperity and plenty. This paradise in war-rationed Europe had existed over three years before I had an opportunity to enjoy it. A few days after my arrival in Bratislava, the capital, I was invited to a dinner party where I met Jozef Mracna. He had been Consul for Czecho-Slovakia in New York. We soon discovered that we had many mutual friends there. He returned to Slovakia when it became a self-governing republic and was an official of the administration. I asked him if he could arrange for me to interview the President. He said he could-and did. On my arrival at the presidential palace at the appointed time I met Dr. Karol Murin, personal secretary of Msgr. Tiso who escorted me into the President's private study. Msgr. Tiso, or President Tiso as he was then, greeted me with a hearty hand-shake and a few words of English -his entire vocabulary in that language, as he laughingly admitted. He spoke Slovak, Czech, German and Hungarian, so our interview was conducted in German. His black hair was sprinkled with a few strands of grey and his dark blue eyes resembled those of the Irish. I mentioned to the President that a learned professor in Banska Bystrica told me that the Slovaks and Irish are both of Celtic origin. Msgr. Tiso observed that there is some similarity between Slovakia and Ireland; both countries are predominently Christian and have been for centuries; both are largely agrarian and both have more of their countrymen in America than in Europe. Our discussion touched on various subjects. For generations Slovakia had been a farming community but now they were promoting various industries. "A major problem confronting us," said the President, "is in getting teachers and technical instructors for the projects we hope to develop." When Slovakia was part of Czecho-Slovakia, the Czechs �SLOVAKIA 23 contrived to keep all industries in their part of the country. Now Slovakia, as the President observed, was endeavoring to encourage and develop its resources without too much reliance on Czechs, Germans, Hungarians or Russians. As the time came for me to leave, I mentioned to his Excellency that there was a twinkle of humor in his eyes and would it be quite proper for me to send him a little reminder of our visit? "What-for instance?" he asked. "I'm sure that during these winter nights it is quite cold in this ages-old palace. So I thought - that for medicinal purpose, of course, you might appreciate a half dozen bottles of good Canadian whisky." He laughed heartily and said, "I'll be glad to get it." The gift was sent. Some time later I was asked to again visit the palace when the President gave me a beautiful example of the artistic needle work that is done by many of the Slovak women and girls. That treasure is still in my possession. Little did I surmise that we were to be together several more times-but under vastly different circumstances. In the so-called histories and recordings of important events in Central and Eastern Europe during the latter weeks of World War II-much is purposely omitted. There is no mention of the unprecedented proposal made by the Soviet communists to recognize Slovakia as a sovereign state and to retain Msgr. Tiso as President. That proposal was made through diplomatic channels and told me by Stefan Tiso, then prime minister of Slovakia and confirmed by the former foreign minister of Slovakia, Dr. Ferdinand f>urcansky, presently residing in Munich, Germany. Of all the captive nations under the thraldom of Soviet communism, none would be more incongruous than a communist Slovakia with a Catholic monsignor as its president. Of course the Kremlin's proposal was curtly rejected by the Tiso administration. When the Red army advanced from Budapest toward Bratislava, President Tiso and his cabinet together with many others fled to Kremsmuenster, Austria. They expected and rightly so, that the United States forces would occupy �24 SLOVAKIA that part of Eastern Europe. The Slovak "colony" arrived in Austria April 1, 1945. (This writer left Slovakia the following day.) Although regarded as "top secret" it was known that the former president of Czecho-Slovakia, Eduard Benes, with the aid of Franklin Roosevelt had flown to Moscow where he betrayed his country to the communists, with the understanding that he would be the "president" of the republic we now know as Czecho-Slovakia. On May 8, 1945, the refugee Slovak government in Austria signed a surrender document which was co-signed by Brig. General W. A. Collier of the US Army; Col. T. 0. Curtis and Capt. David W. Allard of the US Army. General Collier assured the Slovak refugees that they would not be delivered to the communists. Like some of the other pledges of proper treatment that were made by American officialdom to the anticommunists in certain European countries, such assurances were flagrantly violated. President Tiso, with his cabinet members, private secretary and another priest were transferred from Austria to an internment establishment in Freising, Bavaria, which was maintained by the U.S. Army . In Dr. J . M. Kirschbaum's book "Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe" is noted on page 311 a caption: Denial By U.S. War Department." (as follows) "Washington, D. C. February 7, 1947. "There is no record in the files of this office which shows that Monsignor Tiso was ever held by the American Forces or delivered to the Czechoslovakian authorities from American custody. Daniel Noce, Major General, O.S.C . Chief Civil Affairs Div." That statement of General Noce was either due to lamentable and inexcusable ignorance of fact or deliberate lie. I was with Msgr. Tiso many hours of many days when he and his fellow Slovaks were imprisoned by the American military forces in barracks at Freising. The charge against me was that I "had written anti-communist articles during the war." The charge was correct. I had written anti-communist, anti-Soviet articles. I dared, in fact cordially invited the �SLOVAKIA 25 Justice Department officials to make such formal indictment against me. If anti-Soviet and anti-communist was regarded as un-American and a criminal offense, I wanted it publicized in an American court. For obvious reasons the Justice Department found it convenient not to invite such exposure of aid to communist causes of which certain departments of the administration were guilty. All were shocked one morning when word was received at the Freising barracks that the Slovaks were to be delivered to the communist regime of Eduard Benes. I went to those betrayed Slovaks and assured them that it was not real Americans who were violating every pledge given them. Among the armed guards who were to deliver the Slovaks to the communist torturers were European born refugees in American uniforms . The testimony of those Slovaks who endured that transfer from Freising into the territory of the Czech regime of communist-aiding Eduard Benes-is a matter of indisputable record. We recall with shame the barbarian brutalities suffered recently by the Lithuanian seaman who sought refuge on an American Coast Guard vessel. Equally as brutal treatment was the lot of those Slovaks whe were beaten, kicked and tortured unmercifully by the alien element in American uniforms, then delivered to the communists. During the sham "trial" in Bratislava of Msgr. Tiso the communist prosecutor endeavored to force reference by Tiso of that ordeal. But Tiso refused to speak of it. His fate was pre-ordained. Death by hanging. Because he had served his God and his beloved people to the best of his ability-he was sentenced to death. Two hours before his execution he wrote a message for his people and for all Western Christian civilization. He wrote-in part: "I consider myself a martyr in defense c:>f Christianity against Bolshevism-against which the nation must defend itself in all possible ways, not only in the spirit of its Christian character but in the interests of its future." I recall that Msgr. Tiso once impressed on me the truth that "you cannot compromise with communism." That truism should be impressed on those who now urge cooperation with communism. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 21 I Met President Tiso E. L. Delaney Periodically some senators and representatives arise in the halls of Congress to eloquently deplore the plight of those people in what we rightly regard as the "Captive Nations". Apart from expressions of synthetic sympathy nothing meaningful is done to effect the liberation of those captives in the Soviet-communist combine. The short-lived Republic of Slovakia is one of those unfortunate victims. Thirty three years ago-March 14, 1939, the Slovak Parliament in Bratislava-in accordance with the CzechoSlovak constitution - unanimously proclaimed the independence of the Slovak Republic. With its population of about 4,400,000 and an area of approximately 50,000 square kilometers, Slovakia is in the heart of Eastern Europe . In the 9th and 10th centuries it was the first political, cultural and Christian center in that part of the world . But it was not until March of 1939 that Slovakia's duly elected political representatives proclaimed their right of self-determination. In March 1939 there was no war in Europe and none was imminent. Practically all European countries officially recognized Slovakia and established diplomatic or consular relations with the new political entity-including our wartime allies, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The fact that pernicious influences in our Washington administration succeeded in withholding recognition of the new Republic does not alter the indisputable fact that it did exist. Non-European countries with representation in Bratislava, the capital, were: Japan, Manchuria, Siam, China, Costa Rica and Equador. It is appropriate to mention that the Soviet had approximately 200 persons attached to its embassy in Bratislava. Other countries could operate with 10 or 12 people. But undoubtedly large staffs are 22 SLOVAEJA needed for propaganda, subversion and espionage, in which the Soviet is always engaged. During World War II, when a large part of Europe was plagued by want, Slovakia was rightfully regarded as an oasis of peace, prosperity and plenty. This paradise in war-rationed Europe had existed over three years before I had an opportunity to enjoy it. A few days after my arrival in Bratislava, the capital, I was invited to a dinner party where I met Jozef Mracna. He had been Consul for Czecho-Slovakia in New York. We soon discovered that we had many mutual friends there. He returned to Slovakia when it became a self-governing republic and was an official of the administration. I asked him if he could arrange for me to interview the President. He said he could-and did. On my arrival at the presidential palace at the appointed time I met Dr. Karol Murin, personal secretary of Msgr. Tiso who escorted me into the President's private study. Msgr. Tiso, or President Tiso as he was then, greeted me with a hearty hand-shake and a few words of English -his entire vocabulary in that language, as he laughingly admitted. He spoke Slovak, Czech, German and Hungarian, so our interview was conducted in German. His black hair was sprinkled with a few strands of grey and his dark blue eyes resembled those of the Irish. I mentioned to the President that a learned professor in Banska Bystrica told me that the Slovaks and Irish are both of Celtic origin. Msgr. Tiso observed that there is some similarity between Slovakia and Ireland; both countries are predominently Christian and have been for centuries; both are largely agrarian and both have more of their countrymen in America than in Europe. Our discussion touched on various subjects. For generations Slovakia had been a farming community but now they were promoting various industries. "A major problem confronting us," said the President, "is in getting teachers and technical instructors for the projects we hope to develop." When Slovakia was part of Czecho-Slovakia, the Czechs SLOVAKIA 23 contrived to keep all industries in their part of the country. Now Slovakia, as the President observed, was endeavoring to encourage and develop its resources without too much reliance on Czechs, Germans, Hungarians or Russians. As the time came for me to leave, I mentioned to his Excellency that there was a twinkle of humor in his eyes and would it be quite proper for me to send him a little reminder of our visit? "What-for instance?" he asked. "I'm sure that during these winter nights it is quite cold in this ages-old palace. So I thought - that for medicinal purpose, of course, you might appreciate a half dozen bottles of good Canadian whisky." He laughed heartily and said, "I'll be glad to get it." The gift was sent. Some time later I was asked to again visit the palace when the President gave me a beautiful example of the artistic needle work that is done by many of the Slovak women and girls. That treasure is still in my possession. Little did I surmise that we were to be together several more times-but under vastly different circumstances. In the so-called histories and recordings of important events in Central and Eastern Europe during the latter weeks of World War II-much is purposely omitted. There is no mention of the unprecedented proposal made by the Soviet communists to recognize Slovakia as a sovereign state and to retain Msgr. Tiso as President. That proposal was made through diplomatic channels and told me by Stefan Tiso, then prime minister of Slovakia and confirmed by the former foreign minister of Slovakia, Dr. Ferdinand f>urcansky, presently residing in Munich, Germany. Of all the captive nations under the thraldom of Soviet communism, none would be more incongruous than a communist Slovakia with a Catholic monsignor as its president. Of course the Kremlin's proposal was curtly rejected by the Tiso administration. When the Red army advanced from Budapest toward Bratislava, President Tiso and his cabinet together with many others fled to Kremsmuenster, Austria. They expected and rightly so, that the United States forces would occupy 24 SLOVAKIA that part of Eastern Europe. The Slovak "colony" arrived in Austria April 1, 1945. (This writer left Slovakia the following day.) Although regarded as "top secret" it was known that the former president of Czecho-Slovakia, Eduard Benes, with the aid of Franklin Roosevelt had flown to Moscow where he betrayed his country to the communists, with the understanding that he would be the "president" of the republic we now know as Czecho-Slovakia. On May 8, 1945, the refugee Slovak government in Austria signed a surrender document which was co-signed by Brig. General W. A. Collier of the US Army; Col. T. 0. Curtis and Capt. David W. Allard of the US Army. General Collier assured the Slovak refugees that they would not be delivered to the communists. Like some of the other pledges of proper treatment that were made by American officialdom to the anticommunists in certain European countries, such assurances were flagrantly violated. President Tiso, with his cabinet members, private secretary and another priest were transferred from Austria to an internment establishment in Freising, Bavaria, which was maintained by the U.S. Army . In Dr. J . M. Kirschbaum's book "Slovakia-Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe" is noted on page 311 a caption: Denial By U.S. War Department." (as follows) "Washington, D. C. February 7, 1947. "There is no record in the files of this office which shows that Monsignor Tiso was ever held by the American Forces or delivered to the Czechoslovakian authorities from American custody. Daniel Noce, Major General, O.S.C . Chief Civil Affairs Div." That statement of General Noce was either due to lamentable and inexcusable ignorance of fact or deliberate lie. I was with Msgr. Tiso many hours of many days when he and his fellow Slovaks were imprisoned by the American military forces in barracks at Freising. The charge against me was that I "had written anti-communist articles during the war." The charge was correct. I had written anti-communist, anti-Soviet articles. I dared, in fact cordially invited the SLOVAKIA 25 Justice Department officials to make such formal indictment against me. If anti-Soviet and anti-communist was regarded as un-American and a criminal offense, I wanted it publicized in an American court. For obvious reasons the Justice Department found it convenient not to invite such exposure of aid to communist causes of which certain departments of the administration were guilty. All were shocked one morning when word was received at the Freising barracks that the Slovaks were to be delivered to the communist regime of Eduard Benes. I went to those betrayed Slovaks and assured them that it was not real Americans who were violating every pledge given them. Among the armed guards who were to deliver the Slovaks to the communist torturers were European born refugees in American uniforms . The testimony of those Slovaks who endured that transfer from Freising into the territory of the Czech regime of communist-aiding Eduard Benes-is a matter of indisputable record. We recall with shame the barbarian brutalities suffered recently by the Lithuanian seaman who sought refuge on an American Coast Guard vessel. Equally as brutal treatment was the lot of those Slovaks whe were beaten, kicked and tortured unmercifully by the alien element in American uniforms, then delivered to the communists. During the sham "trial" in Bratislava of Msgr. Tiso the communist prosecutor endeavored to force reference by Tiso of that ordeal. But Tiso refused to speak of it. His fate was pre-ordained. Death by hanging. Because he had served his God and his beloved people to the best of his ability-he was sentenced to death. Two hours before his execution he wrote a message for his people and for all Western Christian civilization. He wrote-in part: "I consider myself a martyr in defense c:>f Christianity against Bolshevism-against which the nation must defend itself in all possible ways, not only in the spirit of its Christian character but in the interests of its future." I recall that Msgr. Tiso once impressed on me the truth that "you cannot compromise with communism." That truism should be impressed on those who now urge cooperation with communism.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource I Met President Tiso Description An account of the resource E. L. Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 21-25 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e95420de81f68ba44f395a5fd339a0f2.pdf 5e925a8f673b0491d1991e3c2743db18 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA LIBERATI ON INDEPEN DENCE 17 FEDERAT ION By Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky In 1952 millions of Americans voted in the great hope of seeing a moral and rational policy of liberation launched to prevent a disastrous World War III and, at the same time, to insure the eventual defeat of Russian Communist imperialism . As of today, there isn't the slightest realization of this outstanding promise. And it cannot be expected that the people will forget. No matter how one dresses it up verbally , the foreign policy of the United States today is still containmen t. The so-called policy of mass retaliation is essentially containment by threat. This retaliation version of containmen t is as devoid of moral principle, political and psychologic al inspiration, and historical perspective as the orthodox version maintained by Mr. Kennan and his well placed followers. Dedicated to the liberation and the links of independence and federation in the same policy chain, we must intens ify our efforts to bring this winning policy into being. We must s upport those who are for this American policy, and oppose those who are against it. It is the only policy capable of obstructing the genoc!dal consolidati on of the Communis t Empire in which Moscow is currently engaged. Once this consolidatio n is accomplish ed, the enemy will have established his basic and requisite position for world conquest. This consolidatio n is the prime ground for the enemy's reasonable expectation of success. Fortified by the advanta ges of a world-wide conspir acy and "the first shot ," this expectation does not require any superiority in arms. I>:: the calculus of world conquest, consolidati on, subversion a nd spontaneou s aggression are sufficient to produce "regionalized Pearl Harbors" devastating major sources of retaliatory effort. Liberation is a process of political warfar~ aimed at the ultimate defeat of the enemy and the independen ce of captive nations as a necessary and logical basis for ·'European and Asiatic reconstruct ion. History does · not - s tand still . The dynamics of Western freedom and Ru ssian Communist �1 SLOVAKIA totalitarianism leave us no choice but to carry political warfare on the present empire terrain of the enemy. By the standards of what constitutes "peace" today, this action is J.>eaceable. It demands our full, active support of the real , existing undergrounds and resistance forces in Slovakia, East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These known underground forces are fighting in a political offensive to regain the very independence and self-government for their respective nations that we must fight in to preserve for our own. Theirs is not an ersatz struggle. Last week we witnessed the spectacle of a Senate committee entertaining testimony pitched to an "underground tour" from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. There is a good deal of evidence to support the lack of credibility in such testimony and brazenly fabricated claims that border on insult to the intelligence of the American people. Observers are carefully watching to see whether the Jenner committee intends to call upon witnesses that represent real underground networks and who can expertly testify on the misleading and dishonest opera tions of the totalitarian and anti-Semitic Russian organization known as the NTS. They are also waiting to see whether this bold spectacle before a Congressional committee is nothing more than a blown, plllblicity cover-up - engineered by interested but sorely embarrassed American supporters - of the recent cases of heavy Communist infiltration in the group. A Russian "priest" and NTS leader in West Berlin, Matyslav Volonsevich, defected to the Soviets with all the addresses of his parishioners and the funds of the church. "Georg Mueller," alias Georg Vladimir Khonmzhy-Kherso nsky," another NTS leader, was recently given a prison sentence by a United States court in Frankfurt for operating as a Soviet spy. There is also the case of Alexander Trushnovich about whom much doubt exists concerning his being "kidnapped" by the Communists. On the surface this spectacle has all the marks of a publicity cover-up tuned to the gullibility of viewers in such matters. There can be no doubt, however, that this totali- �SLOVAKIA 19 tarian Russian group, which opportunistically operated with Nazism as it now seeks to do with the West, is a prime target for Communist infiltration. The totalitarianism of NTS s hares many things in common with the totalitarianism of Moscow, notably totalitarian Great Russianism with all its racist and freedom-denying qualities. The group is the best possible breeding-ground for Soviet Russian spies and, as seen in the Khersonsky case, an agency of espionage for Moscow. It scarcely deserves our trust. Even the Nazis, in the closing days of the war, saw fit to slay scores of its members. The enlightened nationalist cause of the Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian and other resisters certainly restricts the range of possible Russian Communist infiltration. It is based on the invincible fight for national independence and freedom from alien Russian domination. This is its consuming end, not that of substituting one form of totalitarianism with an empire complex for another with the same complex. It seeks the national independence that we Americans enjoy and are now challenged to defend. This spirit of national independence is the full source of power and strength of the patriotic, non-Russian resisted behind the Iron Curtain. It is our means of victory over Russian Communist imperialism. It is our formula of enduring peace beyond the defeat of Communism For only with real independence and equal soverignty can the now captive nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, begin to think of entering into free contracts of federalization. The experience of Indo-China should convince us that peoples fight for something rather than merely against Communism. We who are of these convictions must work tirelessly for their realization. This is our task in the great interest of our own country. To aid in this task, it is necessary for us to establish an American Conference on Foreign Affairs . consisting of American organizations such as yours. the Polish American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee and others, that would meet annua11y to discuss and assess our common problems. I sincerely hope that the inspiration for this will be generated here today. � SLOVAKIA LIBERATI ON INDEPEN DENCE 17 FEDERAT ION By Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky In 1952 millions of Americans voted in the great hope of seeing a moral and rational policy of liberation launched to prevent a disastrous World War III and, at the same time, to insure the eventual defeat of Russian Communist imperialism . As of today, there isn't the slightest realization of this outstanding promise. And it cannot be expected that the people will forget. No matter how one dresses it up verbally , the foreign policy of the United States today is still containmen t. The so-called policy of mass retaliation is essentially containment by threat. This retaliation version of containmen t is as devoid of moral principle, political and psychologic al inspiration, and historical perspective as the orthodox version maintained by Mr. Kennan and his well placed followers. Dedicated to the liberation and the links of independence and federation in the same policy chain, we must intens ify our efforts to bring this winning policy into being. We must s upport those who are for this American policy, and oppose those who are against it. It is the only policy capable of obstructing the genoc!dal consolidati on of the Communis t Empire in which Moscow is currently engaged. Once this consolidatio n is accomplish ed, the enemy will have established his basic and requisite position for world conquest. This consolidatio n is the prime ground for the enemy's reasonable expectation of success. Fortified by the advanta ges of a world-wide conspir acy and "the first shot ," this expectation does not require any superiority in arms. I>:: the calculus of world conquest, consolidati on, subversion a nd spontaneou s aggression are sufficient to produce "regionalized Pearl Harbors" devastating major sources of retaliatory effort. Liberation is a process of political warfar~ aimed at the ultimate defeat of the enemy and the independen ce of captive nations as a necessary and logical basis for ·'European and Asiatic reconstruct ion. History does · not - s tand still . The dynamics of Western freedom and Ru ssian Communist �1 SLOVAKIA totalitarianism leave us no choice but to carry political warfare on the present empire terrain of the enemy. By the standards of what constitutes "peace" today, this action is J.>eaceable. It demands our full, active support of the real , existing undergrounds and resistance forces in Slovakia, East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These known underground forces are fighting in a political offensive to regain the very independence and self-government for their respective nations that we must fight in to preserve for our own. Theirs is not an ersatz struggle. Last week we witnessed the spectacle of a Senate committee entertaining testimony pitched to an "underground tour" from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. There is a good deal of evidence to support the lack of credibility in such testimony and brazenly fabricated claims that border on insult to the intelligence of the American people. Observers are carefully watching to see whether the Jenner committee intends to call upon witnesses that represent real underground networks and who can expertly testify on the misleading and dishonest opera tions of the totalitarian and anti-Semitic Russian organization known as the NTS. They are also waiting to see whether this bold spectacle before a Congressional committee is nothing more than a blown, plllblicity cover-up - engineered by interested but sorely embarrassed American supporters - of the recent cases of heavy Communist infiltration in the group. A Russian "priest" and NTS leader in West Berlin, Matyslav Volonsevich, defected to the Soviets with all the addresses of his parishioners and the funds of the church. "Georg Mueller," alias Georg Vladimir Khonmzhy-Kherso nsky," another NTS leader, was recently given a prison sentence by a United States court in Frankfurt for operating as a Soviet spy. There is also the case of Alexander Trushnovich about whom much doubt exists concerning his being "kidnapped" by the Communists. On the surface this spectacle has all the marks of a publicity cover-up tuned to the gullibility of viewers in such matters. There can be no doubt, however, that this totali- �SLOVAKIA 19 tarian Russian group, which opportunistically operated with Nazism as it now seeks to do with the West, is a prime target for Communist infiltration. The totalitarianism of NTS s hares many things in common with the totalitarianism of Moscow, notably totalitarian Great Russianism with all its racist and freedom-denying qualities. The group is the best possible breeding-ground for Soviet Russian spies and, as seen in the Khersonsky case, an agency of espionage for Moscow. It scarcely deserves our trust. Even the Nazis, in the closing days of the war, saw fit to slay scores of its members. The enlightened nationalist cause of the Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian and other resisters certainly restricts the range of possible Russian Communist infiltration. It is based on the invincible fight for national independence and freedom from alien Russian domination. This is its consuming end, not that of substituting one form of totalitarianism with an empire complex for another with the same complex. It seeks the national independence that we Americans enjoy and are now challenged to defend. This spirit of national independence is the full source of power and strength of the patriotic, non-Russian resisted behind the Iron Curtain. It is our means of victory over Russian Communist imperialism. It is our formula of enduring peace beyond the defeat of Communism For only with real independence and equal soverignty can the now captive nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, begin to think of entering into free contracts of federalization. The experience of Indo-China should convince us that peoples fight for something rather than merely against Communism. We who are of these convictions must work tirelessly for their realization. This is our task in the great interest of our own country. To aid in this task, it is necessary for us to establish an American Conference on Foreign Affairs . consisting of American organizations such as yours. the Polish American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee and others, that would meet annua11y to discuss and assess our common problems. I sincerely hope that the inspiration for this will be generated here today. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA LIBERATI ON INDEPEN DENCE 17 FEDERAT ION By Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky In 1952 millions of Americans voted in the great hope of seeing a moral and rational policy of liberation launched to prevent a disastrous World War III and, at the same time, to insure the eventual defeat of Russian Communist imperialism . As of today, there isn't the slightest realization of this outstanding promise. And it cannot be expected that the people will forget. No matter how one dresses it up verbally , the foreign policy of the United States today is still containmen t. The so-called policy of mass retaliation is essentially containment by threat. This retaliation version of containmen t is as devoid of moral principle, political and psychologic al inspiration, and historical perspective as the orthodox version maintained by Mr. Kennan and his well placed followers. Dedicated to the liberation and the links of independence and federation in the same policy chain, we must intens ify our efforts to bring this winning policy into being. We must s upport those who are for this American policy, and oppose those who are against it. It is the only policy capable of obstructing the genoc!dal consolidati on of the Communis t Empire in which Moscow is currently engaged. Once this consolidatio n is accomplish ed, the enemy will have established his basic and requisite position for world conquest. This consolidatio n is the prime ground for the enemy's reasonable expectation of success. Fortified by the advanta ges of a world-wide conspir acy and "the first shot ," this expectation does not require any superiority in arms. I>:: the calculus of world conquest, consolidati on, subversion a nd spontaneou s aggression are sufficient to produce "regionalized Pearl Harbors" devastating major sources of retaliatory effort. Liberation is a process of political warfar~ aimed at the ultimate defeat of the enemy and the independen ce of captive nations as a necessary and logical basis for ·'European and Asiatic reconstruct ion. History does · not - s tand still . The dynamics of Western freedom and Ru ssian Communist 1 SLOVAKIA totalitarianism leave us no choice but to carry political warfare on the present empire terrain of the enemy. By the standards of what constitutes "peace" today, this action is J.>eaceable. It demands our full, active support of the real , existing undergrounds and resistance forces in Slovakia, East Germany, Poland, Czechia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These known underground forces are fighting in a political offensive to regain the very independence and self-government for their respective nations that we must fight in to preserve for our own. Theirs is not an ersatz struggle. Last week we witnessed the spectacle of a Senate committee entertaining testimony pitched to an "underground tour" from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. There is a good deal of evidence to support the lack of credibility in such testimony and brazenly fabricated claims that border on insult to the intelligence of the American people. Observers are carefully watching to see whether the Jenner committee intends to call upon witnesses that represent real underground networks and who can expertly testify on the misleading and dishonest opera tions of the totalitarian and anti-Semitic Russian organization known as the NTS. They are also waiting to see whether this bold spectacle before a Congressional committee is nothing more than a blown, plllblicity cover-up - engineered by interested but sorely embarrassed American supporters - of the recent cases of heavy Communist infiltration in the group. A Russian "priest" and NTS leader in West Berlin, Matyslav Volonsevich, defected to the Soviets with all the addresses of his parishioners and the funds of the church. "Georg Mueller," alias Georg Vladimir Khonmzhy-Kherso nsky," another NTS leader, was recently given a prison sentence by a United States court in Frankfurt for operating as a Soviet spy. There is also the case of Alexander Trushnovich about whom much doubt exists concerning his being "kidnapped" by the Communists. On the surface this spectacle has all the marks of a publicity cover-up tuned to the gullibility of viewers in such matters. There can be no doubt, however, that this totali- SLOVAKIA 19 tarian Russian group, which opportunistically operated with Nazism as it now seeks to do with the West, is a prime target for Communist infiltration. The totalitarianism of NTS s hares many things in common with the totalitarianism of Moscow, notably totalitarian Great Russianism with all its racist and freedom-denying qualities. The group is the best possible breeding-ground for Soviet Russian spies and, as seen in the Khersonsky case, an agency of espionage for Moscow. It scarcely deserves our trust. Even the Nazis, in the closing days of the war, saw fit to slay scores of its members. The enlightened nationalist cause of the Slovak, Polish, Ukrainian and other resisters certainly restricts the range of possible Russian Communist infiltration. It is based on the invincible fight for national independence and freedom from alien Russian domination. This is its consuming end, not that of substituting one form of totalitarianism with an empire complex for another with the same complex. It seeks the national independence that we Americans enjoy and are now challenged to defend. This spirit of national independence is the full source of power and strength of the patriotic, non-Russian resisted behind the Iron Curtain. It is our means of victory over Russian Communist imperialism. It is our formula of enduring peace beyond the defeat of Communism For only with real independence and equal soverignty can the now captive nations, from the Danube to the Pacific, begin to think of entering into free contracts of federalization. The experience of Indo-China should convince us that peoples fight for something rather than merely against Communism. We who are of these convictions must work tirelessly for their realization. This is our task in the great interest of our own country. To aid in this task, it is necessary for us to establish an American Conference on Foreign Affairs . consisting of American organizations such as yours. the Polish American Congress, the Ukrainian Congress Committee and others, that would meet annua11y to discuss and assess our common problems. I sincerely hope that the inspiration for this will be generated here today.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Liberation - Independence - Federation Description An account of the resource Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954 pp. 17-19 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dobriansky, Lev E. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1954 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/77ae7728cbfaed1948b983254b1b7916.pdf 63d60bb63d722e7fef72b40f1cb8a349 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 99 THE 1985 PILGRIMAGE AT VELEHRAD: SLOVAK CATHOLICS AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPACE David Doellinger An analysis of the 1985 pilgrimage at Velehrad reveals many of the ways that the nature of pilgrimages (and thus Catholicism's role in Communist Czechoslovakia) had begun to change during the 1980s. At this event, Catholic activists and pilgrims surprised church leaders by voicing their opposition to state policy in front of Party officials, thereby transforming a religious tradition into a public space where Slovak Catholics could meet free from state interference to assert their religious and political beliefs. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage offers an interesting window into the increas ingly contentious relationship between church and state in Czec hoslovakia. It illustrates the mobilizing influence of Pope John Paul II and reveals that restive Catholics, who had been practicing their faith secretly in the underground, helped empower some leaders in the Czechoslovakia's official hierarchy - particularly Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague - to be more critical of the state's religious policies. Man y scholars have recognized the ability of pilgrimages to serve as barometers of soc ial and political change. In their analysis of Christian pilgrimage traditi ons, anthropologists Victor and Edith Turner conclude: Pilgrimage should be regarded ... as an institution with a history. Each pilgrimage, of any length, is vulnerable to the history of its period and must come to terms with shifts of political geography. Pilgrimage is more responsive to social change and popular moods than liturgical ritual, fixed by rubric. 1 1 Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives (New York : Columbia Un ivers ity Press, 1978), 23 1. �SLOVAKIA The character of Slovak pilgrimages had certainly reflected the changing social and political landscape in Slovakia after the Second World War. Pilgrimages had been an important part of Slovak reli gious life since the middle ages. Over thirty pilgrimage sites exist throughout Slovakia and Slovak pilgrim s also visited several religious sites in the Czech lands. Until 1949, when state permission to hold public gatherings such as pilgrimages became mandatory, local church officials had organized the annu al pilgrimages and services at these sites. Thereafter, there had been little acti vity at these sites on pilgrimage days, with the exception of the moments of political liberalization, such as in 1956 (following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin) and 1968 (during the Prague Spring). 2 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage has received much attention by Western political analysts and scholars. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Keston News Service fo llowed this event closely and released extensive reports about thi s pilgrimage (and the pilgrimages that followed). 3 Although Velehrad is located in Moravi a, this pilgrimage was of particular importance to Slovak Catholi cs, who attended in relatively high numbers. Several schol ars writing in the latter half of the 1980s referred to thi s pilgrimage as evidence of a reli gious revival and the resilience of Catholicism in Slovakia. 4 Scholars writing after 1989 have referred to thi s pilgrimage and those that followed, not only in the context of a religious revival, but 2 Karel Kaplan notes that not onl y pilgrimages, but also attendance at reli gious services and the forma tion of new youth groups occurred during the upheaval s in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Karel Kaplan, " Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956 - Part III ," Religion in Comm unist Lands, 14, no. 3 (fall 1986): 280. Milan J. Reban reports a sim ilar resurgence of pilgrimages during the Prague Spring in 1968 . Milan J. Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed . Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke Uni versity Press, I 990), 15 I. 3 The Keston News Service was based at Keston College, England and provided reports and analys is of the religious situation in East Europe. 4 See Janice Brou n, Conscience and Capti vity: Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), 67- 101. Also see Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar (Bloom ington and Indianapo lis: Ind iana Universi ty Press, 1987), 78. �SLOVAKIA 101 also as an example of one of the few expressions of independent or non-state activity in Slovakia. 5 Pilgrimages and their increasing popularity throughout the 1980s became one of the most visible markers of a religious revival in Slovakia. This religious revival had begun almost a decade earlier and was closely related to the election of a Pole, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II in 1978. Pope John Paul II took a new aggressive and uncompromising stand when dealing with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe. Under Pope Paul Vi's (1963-1978) eastern policy (Ostpolitik), the Vatican had made preserving the church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia a primary goal, even at the expense of making important concessions to the Communist government. In 1973, Cardinal Casaroli, responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik, had negotiated the regime's approval of four new bishops, even though all four remained members of Pacem in Terris, a state sponsored organization that coordinated the work of priests in Czechoslovakia. Although this agreement brought the total number of bishops to five (out of thirteen dioceses), many Czech and Slovak Catholics criticized the Vatican's tolerance of Pacem in Terris. Breaking with his predecessor, Pope John Paul II refused to compromise with these governments, particularly with regards to spiritual matters. In 1982, he formally condemned Pacem in Terris. 6 As Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla had secretly ordained many Czech and Slovak priests in the 1970s. Silvester Krcmery, a leader of Slovakia's secret church and a friend of Wojtyla since 1973, described him as a protector of the Slovaks. Emphasizing the importance of their shared experiences under Communism, Krcmery pointed to a 5 Stokes refers to the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage not only in terms of attendance, but also as evidence of Cardinal Tomasek's increasing willingness to act independently of the state. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152. See also Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London : Duke University Press , 1991), 109 and Padraic Kenney , A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 36. 6 Alexander Tomsky, "Pacem in Terris," Religion in Communist Lands lO (1982): 278-279. For a discussion of bishop vacancies, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 125. �102 SLOVAKIA bond that undoubted ly other Catholics in Czechoslovakia shared by saying: "He has lived all thi s persec ution of Catholics." 7 While the election of a Polish pope in 1978 helps explain the increased popularity of Catholicism and religious traditions in Slovakia, the events at Yelehrad in 1985 indicate th at the nature of the pilgrimage experience was transformed by activists in the secret (underground) Catholic church. Such a church existed in the Czech lands and Slovakia from the late 1940s to 1989. It was organized by Catholics in response to the persec ution they faced by the Communist authorities. Members of the secret church met in private apartments for bible study , fellowship and even choir practice. Bishops and priests who had been clandestinely trained and ordained provided pastoral serv ices to these believers. By the 1980s, activists in the secret church published and distributed a wide variety of books and newsletters as samizdat. 8 The undergro und church used its samizdat network to publicize this and later pilgrimages by printing announcements of upcoming pilgrimages and it published accounts of each year's pilgrimages. A rich written record of the 1985 Velehrad pil gri mage can be found in thi s body of sa mizdat literature. 9 7 Silvester Krcmery , interview by author, 3 July I996 , Bratislava, Slovakia. For a brief description of Krcmery's first meeting with Wojtyta, see Frantisek Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct' roz vratit: z osudov katolickej cfrkvi na Slovensku v rokoch I 943-89 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 125. 8 David Doellinger, " Prayers, Pilgrims , and Petitions: The Secret Church and the Growth of Civ il Society in Slovakia," Nationalities Papers 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 215-240. 9 Samizdat (self-published) refers to newspapers, articles, essays, books , etc. that were printed with mimeograph machines or typed carbon copy, and often distributed illegall y, usuall y throu gh personal contacts and info rm al networks. Archi ves with the most extensive holdings on Slovak religious samizdat include: Listy z podzemia samizdat arch ive at the Christian Democratic Movement headq uarters, Bratislava, Slovakia ; Libri Prohibiti Samizdat Archive, Prag ue, Czech Republic; Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Dobrichovice (Prague), Czech Republic. Slovak samizda t can also be found in the Keston Institute's arc hi ve, Oxford , England and th e arc hives of Radi o Free Europe/Radio Liberty in th e Open Society Archives , Budapest, Hungary. For a comprehensive catalog of Slovak religious sam izdat, see Rudolf Lessak, Listy z podzemia: suboma dokumentacia krestanskej samizdatovej publicistiky na S/ovensku v rokoch I 945- I989 (Bratislava: US PO, 1998). �SLOVAKIA 103 The 1985 Velehrad Pilgrimage An increasing number of Catholics attended pilgrimages in Slovakia in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, samizdat reports only carried information for the pilgrimages to Sastfn and Levoca, the two most popular Slovak pilgrimages. An estimated 15 ,000 people attended the pilgrimage at Sastfn in 1983 ; attendance jumped to 50,000 in 1984. 10 About 100,000 pilgrims attended the pilgrimages at Levoca in both 1982 and 1983. 11 The new role and importance of the pilgrimage tradition became firmly established at the 1985 pilgrimage at Yelehrad. An important pil grimage site in Moravia, Velehrad had already hosted an estim ated 40,000 pilgrims in 1984. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage, however, commemorated the 1, 100th anni versary of the death of St. Methodius, who along with St. Cyril , had introduced eastern Christianity (and the Slavic liturgy) to the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. The work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius is particulai:.ly important to Slovak Catholics, who trace their political, cultural and religious history to thi s early empire and the arrival of these monks. 12 Several months prior to the pilgrimage, Czechoslovak Catholics and the Communist authorities began to contest the direction of the Yelehrad commemoration. At the center of the dispute was the question of whether Pope John Paul II would be permitted to attend the event. The Pope had made his first visit to Poland as early as 1979, and Czechoslovakia 's Catholics hoped this anniversary would bring a papal visit. An August 1984 letter to President Gustav Husak, signed simpl y the " Youth of CSSR," demanded that the Pope be 10 "Sastfnska put' I983 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'(sami zdat) 4 (1983): 2; "Sastfnsky prihovor otca Biskupa Gabrisa," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'5 ( 1984): 8; " Sastfn '84," Vy ber (sami zdat) 4 ( 1984): 38. 11 "Annual Pilgrimage to Levoca," Keston News Service (KNS), no. 156 (August I6, I982): 3-4. Also, see Vy ber, 3 (1984 ): 7. 12 See lmrich Kruzliak, "The Heritage of Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Works of Slovak Writers and Artists," in SS. Cy ril and M ethodius Among the Slovaks: Observing the 1, JOd" Anniversary of Saint Methodius' Death, eds. lmrich Kru zliak and Frances L. Mi zenko (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1985), 134-143. The territori al extent of thi s empire is unclear, but it probably included large porti ons of present day Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. �104 SLOVAKIA permitted to attend the 1, l 00 th anniversary event. The authors indicated that they were Catholics from Banska Bystrica (in central Slovakia) and argued that there was popular support for a papal visit: We are in the jubilee year of St. Methodius. Thousands of young hearts put their signature on the request that the Holy Father John Paul II come to our country for thi s jubilee celebration. We join with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, who personally invited the Holy Father to this celebration. Esteemed Mr. President, if these thousands of signatures are [too] few, we are willing to collect additional thousands from young people to agai n document for you the desire of the absolute majority of inhabitants of the CSSR, so that the Holy Father comes to our republic for this precious jubilee occasion. 13 In February 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had formally invited the Pope to Velehrad, and over 17,000 Catholic youth in Czechoslovakia 14 signed a statement demonstrating their support for thi s visit. Cardinal Tomasek also cited this petition action in a letter to the CSSR government requesting permission for the visit. 15 A samizdat author analyzing the importance of the Velehrad celebration for Slovaks and the meaning of the petition wrote: "It is a new first in the public life of our church." 16 The Slovak secret church helped publicize several of these appeals for the Pope' s attendance. Despite the authorities' refusal, public support for the Papal visit continued. On New Years Day 1985 , Cardinal Tomasek sent a letter to the Pope with an additional 500 signatures that had been collected over Christmas. The letter reaffirmed the desire of Czechoslovak Catholics for the Pope to come to Velehrad on September 14 for the Methodius commemoration. It also invited the Pope to visit Sastfn, a Slovak pilgrimage site, afterwards 17 The authorities continued to refuse permission for the visit. 18 13 Letter to President Husak from the Youth of CSS R, 29 August 1984, I, Keston st Institute Fi le (hereafter KJ): CZ ROM 7/4 1 Methodius Celebrations 1985. 14 "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1984): 17. 15 Una Sane ta Catholica (samizdat) Tu rice ( 1984 ): 35. 16 • "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," 17-1 8. 17 Naboienstvo a sucasnost'2 (1985): 19. 18 Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Do wn, 152. Though the authori ties prevented Pope John Paul II from attending the commemoration, his encyc lical Slavorum �SLOVAKIA 105 As the Velehrad pilgrimage approached, members of the secret church in both the Czech lands and Slovakia began making plans to alter the length and nature of the commemoration by organizing a special night program. Catholic activists wanted to invite youth to the site on Saturday, July 6, 1985, for a special program of song and prayer during the night preceding the official commemoration, which had been scheduled for Sunday, July 7. Night programs had already become a popular component of pilgrimages in Slovakia. Over 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at the Levoca pilgrimage in 1983. 19 At Sastfn in 1984, a night program organized by Vladimir Jukl, one of the leaders of the Slovak secret church, had also preceded the regular pilgrimage celebration.20 The plan for a night program at Velehrad appears to have originated with both Moravian and Slovak sources. Catholic youth in Moravia invited their counterparts in Slovakia and Bohemia to the Saturday program that would include prayers for the unity of the church, the Pope, bishops and others in the Church. The Slovak reli gious samizdat Vy ber helped distribute this invitation by prominently publishing it on the back of the front cover of a spring 1985 issue.2' Frantisek Miklosko, another activist in the Slovak secret church , refers to the Moravian Catholics' pl an in a history of the post-war Catholi c Church in Slovakia that he published in 1991 . He credits Vladimir Jukl with the idea of introducing the night program at Velehrad. Miklosko personally presented Jukl 's plan for a night program to Cardinal Tomasek, who supported the idea. Though the local priest and bishop responsible for Velehrad refused to officially approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in Velehrad's basilica, the plan for the night program went ahead. 22 On Saturday afternoon , Ju ly 6, the Velehrad celebration made its informal start with the arri val of an estimated 5,000 young Apostoli - which praised the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was published on the day of the event. Alexander Tomsky, "St Methodius Return s to Czechos lovakia," KNS, no. 235 (October 3, 1985): 18- 19. 19 " Vfce nez sto ti sfc poutn fku na Levocske hofe 3.7. 1983," ln fo rmace o cfrk vi (sami zdat) 9 (1983): 13. 20 "Sastfn ' 84," Vfber 4 ( 1984): 38. Miklosko writes that Ju kl developed the idea for the night program for Sastfn that year. Miklosko, Nebudete ich moct'rozvratit, 136. 21 Vfber4 (1985). 22 Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct'rozvratit;128- l 30. �106 SLOVAKIA Catholics. Accounts of their activities filled subseq uent samizdat periodicals and painted a vivid picture of their activities prior to the formal opening of the celebration at 10:00 AM on Sunday morning. As they arrived on Saturday, the young pilgrims sat in small groups in front of the basilica, some talking with friends and others singing songs, sometimes with the accompaniment of a guitar. Bishop Jan Korec , who had been secretly consecrated in 1951, visited with the young pilgrims in the afternoon and remained with them throughout the night. 23 After an evening mass inside the basilica, the pilgrims spent the night outside with one group in front of the basilica and the other in a nearby field. Each group stayed awake the entire night and observed a program of prayer, meditation and si nging. During the night, both groups chanted slogans such as "We want cloisters," "Long live Tomasek," and "Long live the Pope." One report indicated that the pilgrims also chanted "Let the Pope Come" for about twenty-five minutes. 24 One member of the Slovak secret church apparently spent Saturday afternoon and night with a tape recorder recording the songs, chants and conversations with the pilgrims. A Slovak samiz dat periodical published excerpts from this recording, capturing some of the different hopes and concerns of those in attendance, including the di sappointment of one young pilgrim that the state authorities viewed the pilgrimage and anniversary celebration as a "peace event." The pilgrim, speaking sometime late Saturday evening, described his mixed response to the weekend: I assumed that many believers would participate in this pilgrimage, but I am very surprised by the multitude of people who are already here today. I am very enthusiastic about it, because I expect rich spiritual fruits from this pilgrimage. I regret, of course - and I also think everyone else does - that we may not have the Holy Father here among us. But on the other hand, we are glad that he is represented here by Cardinal Casaro li [responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik]. 25 23 " Velehrad ' 85 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1985): 17. The largest Czech religious samizdat periodical republished this report. "Velehrad I985 , videny zo Slovenska," Jnformace o cirkvi IO (1985), 6-7. 24 "Boli sme na Velehrade," Rodinne spolocenstvo (samizdat) 5 ( 1985): 5-6. 25 "Velehrad ' 85 z magnetofonoveho zaznamu," Vyber9 (1985): 12. �SLOVAKIA 107 Early in the morning a fifty-year old priest, asked for his reaction to thi s " uncommon" event, replied: We spent this night at Velehrad together with Sai nts Cyril and Methodius. And it was very beautiful. There are groups of young believers here from all over Slovakia and also from the Czech lands, but a preponderance here are Slovaks. 26 Though located in Moravia, the night program at Velehrad was of particul ar interest to Slovak Catholics, and other observers also noted the large presence of Slovaks at Velehrad.27 . The enthusiasm of the young Catholics who had arri ved early to spend the night at Velehrad carried over to the official celebrations on Sunday. Despite the state's efforts to curtail attendance by canceling public transportation to Velehrad, pilgrims from all over Czechoslovakia arrived , many on foot, to join those who had spent the night singing, praying and chanting. 28 One samizdat periodical reported that at a 7:00 AM mass outside the Basilica, the pilgrims who had arrived only that morning were surprised that the young people, fo llowing the singing of the papal hymn, broke into chants of "Long li ve John Paul II! " and " Let us have the Hol y Father! " 29 The youth had been chanting these slogans throughout the night, and like a team coming out of a hi gh-school pep rally, they were ready for the celebration to begin. By 10:00 AM, when the official celebration began, an estimated 100,000-250,000 pilgrims had gathered outside the Basilica in the center of Velehrad. 30 A local Party official opened the celebration by welcoming everyone to what he called the St. Methodiu s " Peace Celebration ." In response to this designation, the 26 Ibid., 19. Another Slovak priest, Father Martinec, explai ned that he had he lped wi th the organization of the pilgrimage and the arriva l of Slovak Catholics at Yelehrad . Karel Martinec, interview by author, 4 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. 28 "Yelehrad 1985 ," Vzkffsenf(samizdat) 2 ( 1985): 15. 29 " Boli sme na Yelehrade," 5. 30 Religious samizdat peri odical s re ported this wide range estimate of pilgrims in attendance. See "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 8; "Yelehrad ' 85," 18; " Yelehrad 1985," Vzkifsenf2 ( 1985): 15; and " Yelehrad nas," Informace o cfrk vi 10 ( 1985): 6. Photographs of the pilgrims gathered around the Bas ilica at Yelehrad on Jul y 7 - taken from different angles - indicate that the pilgrims filled every inch of the square and support the magnitude of the size of the crowd as reported by religious samizdat. Kl: photo collection, photos# 1793 and # 1876. 27 �108 SLOVAKIA pilgrims responded negatively with whistles and shouts of "We want Holy Mass!" 3 1 Following the singi ng of the state anthem, the Minister of Culture, Dr. Milan Klu sak, spoke. Again, the pilgrims expressed their dissatisfaction with the official spin he gave to the importance of the anniversary. Several samizdat periodicals reported the following exchange between Klusak and the pilgrims: [Minister Klusak] grasped the situation and therefore improvised as he spoke. In order to stress that he did not consider the celebration to be a peace celebration, he said that he came to the pilgrimage to celebrate Methodius' memory. The crowd corrected him by chanting "Saint, Saint." When he said that Cyril and Methodius brought us a language and alphabet, the people supplemented it with "Faith , Faith!" The surpri sed minister then began a discussion with the people by saying "The Bi shop will speak about Faith to you. We have divided up the work." ... the young people replied to him: "Freedom, Religious Freedom." The minister argued back to the youth and everyone else: "If you did not have [religious freedom], you would not be here." 32 The pilgrims responded to the remainder of Klusak's speech with chants: "We Want the Holy Father!" "We Want Religious Freedom," and "We Want Bishops!" In contrast to the pilgrims' dissatisfaction with the state authorities' remarks, the pilgrims enthusiastically supported the words of the church officials. During the heckling of Minister Klu sak, the pilgrims had also chanted "Long Live Cardinal Tomasek! and "Casaroli!" 33 Cardinal Tomasek read a letter from the Pope that reportedly energized the pilgrims despite their disappointment that the Pope was not there to deliver his words personally . During the Mass, Cardinal Casaroli switched between Czech and Slovak while delivering his sermon.34 Accounts indicate that Cardinal Tomasek and Cardinal Casaroli clearly were surprised by the hi gh attendance and the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. After- 31 "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 7. fbid ., 7. A similar account of this exchange, written by a Slovak pilgrim , appeared in Czech samizdat. " Velehrad 1985 ," Vzkfisenf2 ( 1985): 16. See also Jan Korec, Od barbarskej noci na slobode (Bratislava: Luc, 1993), 342. 33 "Velehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sucasnost; 18. 34 "Boli sme na Velehrade," 7-8. 32 �SLOVAKIA 109 wards, Cardinal Tomasek reportedly told a group of young people, "This is not reality, this is a dream. " 35 The Significance of Velehrad The relatively large number of Catholic youth from Slovakia that chose to come earl y to this pilgrimage indicates both the strength of Catholicism in Slovakia and the failure of the state 's restricti ve policies against the church. Vaclav Benda, a Catholic Czech activist, afterwards commented on the significance of this pilgrimage: Yelehrad was an effective demonstration that the experiment of splitting the church was condemned to failure and ridiculous from the beginning. It must presently be clear from this pilgrimage ... that the prohibitions or radical restriction on the church drove several million active believers into the underground. 36 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage was critical turning point in a revival of the pilgrimage tradition in Slovakia. After Yelehrad, pilgrimage attendance and the number of sites hosting pilgrimages in Slovakia increased significantly. 37 Levoca, in eastern Slovakia, received the largest number of pilgrims with an estimated 150,000 in 1986,38 200,000-230,000 in 1987,39 and possibly as high as 280,000 300,000 in 1988.40 The number of pilgrims to Sastfn, a small village located north of Bratislava near the Moravian border, grew steadily from estimates of 40,000-50,000 in 1986,4 1 and 60,000 in 1987 ,42 to 35 " Yelehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sricasnost; 18. Vaclav Benda, "Ako d'alej po Yelehrade?" Naboienstvo a sricasnost'2 (I 986): 4. 37 Attendance at Slo vak pil grimages in 1989 was also high, but there is less information in samizdat about that year's pilgrimages than for earlier years. This is probably due to the fac t that reports of the summer pilgrimages usually appeared in late fa ll samizdat issues, by which time the Velvet Revolution had already begun. 38 "Levoca 1986," Voice of A merica (VOA) 12 July 1986. 39 "Record Numbers Attend Slovak Pilgrimages," Keston News Service, 280 (23 Jul y 87): 19; "Message from Jan Carnogursky to Keston College," KI: CZ ROM 7 /4 Pilgrimages; "Levoca put' 1987," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'4 ( 1987): 7. 40 " Mariansky rok na Slovensku," Katolfcky mesacnik (sami zdat) 4 (1 988): I ; Peter Marti n, "The Pilgrimage to Levoca," R FE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19. Another sami zdat periodical estimated the attendance in 1988 at " more than 200,000 ." See "Mys lienky z Levocskej pute," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'3 (I 988): 3. 41 " Putne slav nosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," Naboienstvo a sricasnost' I ( I 987): I 719. 36 �110 SLOVAKIA 60,000-70,000 in 1988. 43 The number of pilgrims to Gaboltov, estimated at 20,000-25,000 in 1985 ,44 increased more dramatically from estimates of 30,000-50,000 in 198645 to as high as l 00,000 in 1987 and 1988. 46 Large numbers of pilgrims also visited traditionally less popular pilgrimage sites in Slovakia during this period. Lutina, an important Greek Catholic pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia, received 40,000 pilgrims in 198647 and 50,000 in 1987 .48 Topolcany received 25,000 pilgrims in 1988.49 Due to the nature of a pilgrimage, usually an outdoor event with people sitting or standing in a town square or in a nearby field, only estimates, probably made by members of the secret church present at the pilgrimage, are available. Jan Camogursky , a prominent activist in the Slovak secret church, reported that as he became aware of the political significance of the pilgrimages in 1987, he began making estimates of the number of pilgrims attending the events throughout Slovakia.50 Although not an exact count, these estimates are significant as a measure of the increase in the multitude of pilgrim s attending a particular pilgrimage, an increase that the authors of samizdat reports on pilgrimages were certainly observing. The increase in attendance after 1985 suggests that pilgrimages can be more than barometers of social change; the Velehrad pilgrimage promoted a change in the function of pilgrimages and their appeal to Catholics. The active force that promoted this transformation was the secret church. Members of this community helped transform the pilgrimage tradition into a space where Catholics could meet publicly and in large numbers to worship. Velehrad 's night program allowed young people active in the underground to meet 42 "Sastfn - September 1987," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'5 (1987): l 1. "Sastfn - '88," K ato/fcky mesacnik 5 ( 1988): I. 44 "Gaboltov ' 85 ," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 (I 985): 20. 45 " Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r 1986," 17- 19. 46 " Message from Jan Camogursky to Keston College"; "Put' v Gaboltove," VOA , 24 Jul y 1988. 47 "Pout' reckokatoliku v Lu tine 1986," lnformace o cfrkvi 10 (1986): I0. 48 "Message from Jan Camogursky." 49 "Pilgrimage at Topol'cany," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 13 September 1988. 50 Jan Camogursky, interview by author, 16 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. Documents in the Keston Institute archive indicate that he sent reports of these estimates to Western news organizations. See for example, "Message from Jan Camogursky." 43 �SLOVAKIA 111 with other Catholics and express their faith publicly. Velehrad had demonstrated the secret church 's ability to mobilize its members to participate in a public event, and it continued to do so during the remainder of the decade. Slovak Catholic activists contributed to the popularity of pilgrimages and their night programs in the later half of the 1980s. The used the secret church 's samizdat network to inform its members about previous pilgrimages and to promote attendance at upcoming ones. From 1986 to 1989, the issues of Naboi enstvo a sucasnost; Rodinne spolocenstvo and later Katolfcky mesacnfk published extensive articles and reports about Slovak pilgrimages. This coverage included first hand reports of pilgrims' experiences, often including descriptions of their walk to the site and the activities of the night program. These samizdat periodicals also frequently published transcripts of prayers and sermons spoken during Mass at a pilgrimage, as well as historical information about different pilgrimage sites. 5 1 They also published schedules and information about upcoming pilgrimages in Slovakia. 52 As a result of this coverage, a written record of the experiences, worship service, activities, and even the chants at pilgrimages has been preserved. Catholics unable to attend a particular pilgrimage could learn about what had been said and done by reading these accounts. Since most samizdat reports on pilgrimages were usuall y publi shed several months after the pilgrimage, this coverage reminded Slovak Catholics of what had happened during the summer. Its reports and descriptions of previous pilgrimages promoted the events, and its schedule information certainly helped coordinate attendance at a pilgrimage. In addition to its samiz dat network, information about pilgrimages was shared through the communities of the secret church. Carnogursky reported that many of its communities "visited these pilgrimages collectively as groups." 53 The Slovak secret church also continued to promote the night program for pilgrimages after 1985, and attendance at night prog- 51 For the text of a prayer read by a local priest at the I 988 Sastfn pilgrimage, see "Modlitba na zaver marianskeho Rok u," Kato/icky mesacnfk 6 ( 1988): 5-7 . Another arti cle recounts the history of th e Sastfn pilgrim age site fro m 9 16 A.O. to 1987. "Sastfn," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'4 ( 1987): 8-10. 52 " Letna - putnicka - aktivita 1989," Kato/icky mesacmk 5 ( I 989): 6. 53 Camogursky, interview. �112 SLOVAKIA rams increased. A samizdat article describing the pilgrimage celebrations that had taken place throughout Slovakia in 1986 announced that in 1987 night programs were scheduled in Gaboltov and Uhorna in addition to Levoca and Sastin. 54 In 1988, an estimated 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at Gaboltov,55 and 100,000 attended the night program during the Marian year pilgrimage in Levoca. 56 The following year, 5,000-10,000 people attended the night pro57 gram at the smaller pilgrimage site of Lutina. At the pilgrimage, the members of the secret church could do openly and publicly what they had done since their foundation: gather for prayer, meditation, and worship. Rather than finding safety in small numbers by meeting in private apartments, the pilgrimage tradition allowed the secret church members to practice their faith publicly, on a larger scale, and in fellowship with Catholics not active in the secret church. Jan Camogursky, reporting on the significance of pilgrimages in Slovakia, writes: [While] they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society - the problem of being outnumbered by the police ... The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers ... [This] feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling - that of freedom . On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. 58 Although the secret church had traditionally distanced itself from the political opposition to avoid additional persecution by the state, the pilgrimage tradition facilitated a shift towards a new engagement in the public sphere. For members of the secret church, this issue of religious freedom could always be discussed among fellow members through its communities and samizdat press. Chants for religious freedom and in support of certain church officials had been voiced publicly to a significantly large gathering at Velehrad in 1985. The 54 "Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," 19. " Put' v Gaboltove," VOA, 24 July 1988. 56 "Mariansky rok na Slovensku," l. 57 "0 puti V Lutine," Rodinne spolocenstvo 5 (1989): 14. 58 Jan Carnogursky, "The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia," The Salisbury Review (Ju ne 1989): 36. 55 �SLOVAKIA 113 pilgrimage tradition provided a public space and forum where political demands arti culated by the secret church could be discussed, debated, and shared with the broader public in relative safety. The contest between church and state exhibited at the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage is one of the most striking feature s of this event. 59 The contest over the orientation of the commemoration could be said to have begun in 1984 as Cardinal Tomasek and Czechoslovak Catholics began demanding that Pope John Paul II be given permi ssion to attend. While the state argued that the commemoration should celebrate the cultural significance of St. Methodius, the church argued that the anniversary was a religious event. This conflict between church and state, so publicly exhibited at Velehrad in 1985, suggests that a term such as "church" fail s to capture the complexity of relations between church and state. Rather than a monolith, the "church" was represented by at least three distinct groups in this contest: the official church hierarchy , pilgrims active in the secret church, and pilgrims not active in the secret church. Of the three, it was the pilgrims (both within and without the secret church) listening to the Party officials' presentations who openly challenged the state's authority over the pilgrimage. Through their efforts, the pilgrimage became a public space where Catholics could challenge the status quo and the state 's right to define the meaning of St. Methodius and the l ,lO0 th anni versary . The pilgrimage created a forum where these three representations of the church ' s position could interact and influence one another. Even more interesting is the fact that the challenge to the status quo did not end in 1985 . Leaders of the Slovak underground church increasingly crossed into more politically-oriented public activities, most notably its collection of signatures to a 31-point petition for greater religious freedom in 1987 and 1988 and its organization of a public demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 , 1988 whi ch was violently 59 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, in the introduction to an edited vo lume of research on pilgrimages, assert that the new agenda in pilgrimage stud ies recogni zes that pilgrimage " is above all an arena for competing re ligious and secular discourses, for both the offi cial co-optation and the non-official recovery of rel igious meanings, fo r conflict between orthodoxies, sects and confess ional groups, fo r dri ves towards consensus and communities, and for counter movements towards separateness and division." John Eade and Michae l J. Sallnow , eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. �114 SLOVAKIA broken up by the police. Altogether, 600,000 Czechs and Slovaks signed the petition and a reported 300,000-400,000 of the signatures were collected in Slovakia. Samizdat reports indicate that this petition was often read aloud at pilgrimages in Slovakia during night programs in the late 1980s.60 Divisions also existed within the official hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church regarding the direction the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage should take. Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, since the election of Pope John Paul II, had become increasingly willing to criticize the state's interference in church affairs. In a 1981 letter to the editors of Katolfcke noviny, the state-approved and supported news organ of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomasek had criticized this periodical's focus on Pacem in Terris, disarmament and international relations, rather than Papal speeches and material that responded to the spiritual needs of the country ' s believers.61 In 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had not only formally invited Pope John Paul II to attend the Velehrad commemoration, but had also supported unofficial initiatives that demonstrated popular support for a papal visit. Cardinal Tomasek had also supported the secret church's plan to organize a night program at Velehrad, thus demonstrating that the lines between the secret church's activities and the official church sometimes became quite blurred. The unwillingness of the local bishop and priest responsible for Velehrad to approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in the basilica stands in stark contrast to Cardinal Tomasek's interest in it. All reports indicate that the police and other authorities in Slovakia were fairly ineffective in their efforts to clamp down on pilgrimages. Samizdat articles indicate that the pilgrims were quite aware of secret police agents dressed in civilian clothes and using cameras and video-recorders to document the event, but their presence apparently did little to deter their activities. As early as the 1984 pilgrimage to Levoca, police put several obstacles in the way of 60 For more about the 31-point petition and the March 25, 1988 demonstration, see David Doellinger, "From Prayers to Protests: The Impact of Religio us-Based Dissent on the Emergence of Civil Society in Slovakia and the GDR," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), chapter 4. 61 This letter appeared in lnformace o cirkvi, no. 4 ( 198 1): 24-25. �SLOVAKIA 115 pilgrims, such as running road checks to back up traffic to the site, canceling train and bus service to Levoca, and even cutting down trees to block the road to the basilica. More subtle efforts focused on keeping young people away from Levoca by scheduling a concert by a Slovak pop star in a nearby town . Some schools scheduled special activities on the day of pilgrimages, and others even posted notices banning participation in the pilgrimage.62 Police efforts took a more violent turn in 1986, when militia used dogs to break up groups of pilgrims making their way to Gaboltov.63 Also in 1986, the police interrogated Jozef Halko, a priest who had been sec retly ordained, and Anton Selecky, a Catholic activist, for their activities earlier in the year at the Sastin and Levoca pilgrimages. Holk.o 's interrogation focused on the fact that he had heard confessions at Levoca and Selecky ' s interrogators were concerned that he had written accounts of the pilgrimages for publication in samizdat. 64 In addition to signaling the pilgrimage' s transformation into a public space for Catholics, Velehrad also reflected the increasingly political potential of religion itself in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The political significance of religion and religious activities in the Soviet bloc had become quite apparent during the Pope 's first visit to Poland in 1979. In Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, John Paul II spoke freely about the historically close rel ationship between Christianity and the Polish nation. He also spoke about the failed Warsaw uprising in 1944 (when Soviet troops allowed the Polish Home Army to be defeated by the Nazis), Polish independence, and human dignity. 65 In his analysis of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Jan Kubik notes that Pope John Paul II 's speech and visit brought an end to the " Party-state's monopoly over public di scourse in 62 " Levoca - the Slovak National Shrine," K NS 2 14 (6 December I 984) . For references to the presence of the secret police at Velehrad in 1985, see " Velehrad 85 - spomienka studentov," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1986): 17 and " Boli sme na Velehrade," 5. 63 "Militia Set Dogs on Pilgrims (Czechoslovakia)," KNS 257 (2 1 August 1986). 64 "Slovak Cathol ics interrogated," KNS 264 (27 November 1986). 65 Pope John Paul II , "Pope John Paul IL Speaks in Victory Square, Warsaw," in ed., Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York and Oxford : Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), 200-203. �116 SLOVAKIA Poland."66 Though Solidarity was not a religious movement, Kubik argues that its close association with the Catholic Church and the use of religious symbols strengthened its ability to mobilize the Polish population and to construct a sphere of activity separate from and in defiance to the state. Among its achievements was the construction of public spaces not reserved for the state, including the Gdansk Monument and the Poznan Monument. Both incorporated crosses into their design, and, as Kubik explains, both monuments had been unveiled in religious ceremonies that emphasized the participation of society, rather than society 's subservience to the state. 67 Jan Kubik's analysis of these public events in Poland that preceded the formation of Solidarity offers insight into the political significance of religion in East Central Europe. Just as religion and religious traditions offered an alternative to the state's monopoly of power in Poland, the pilgrimage at Velehrad demonstrated that religion and religious traditions could offer a similar alternative in Czechoslovakia. Pope John Paul II had emphasized the historical significance of Christianity in Poland during his visit in 1979 and the commemoration of St. Methodius at Velehrad had allowed Catholic pilgrims the unique opportunity to confront state officials regarding Czechoslovakia's historical relationship with Christianity. The pilgrims at Velehrad, by vocally opposing the state's emphasis on the cultural contribution of Methodius, expressed their defiance of and unwillingness to be subservient to the state's religious policies. In doing so, the pilgrims transformed the traditional religious pilgrimage into an event of political significance. 66 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, I 994 ), 144. 67 For description and analysis of the Gdansk and the Poznan Monuments, see Kubik, The Power of Symbols, I 96-206, 2 14-216. � SLOVAKIA 99 THE 1985 PILGRIMAGE AT VELEHRAD: SLOVAK CATHOLICS AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPACE David Doellinger An analysis of the 1985 pilgrimage at Velehrad reveals many of the ways that the nature of pilgrimages (and thus Catholicism's role in Communist Czechoslovakia) had begun to change during the 1980s. At this event, Catholic activists and pilgrims surprised church leaders by voicing their opposition to state policy in front of Party officials, thereby transforming a religious tradition into a public space where Slovak Catholics could meet free from state interference to assert their religious and political beliefs. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage offers an interesting window into the increas ingly contentious relationship between church and state in Czec hoslovakia. It illustrates the mobilizing influence of Pope John Paul II and reveals that restive Catholics, who had been practicing their faith secretly in the underground, helped empower some leaders in the Czechoslovakia's official hierarchy - particularly Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague - to be more critical of the state's religious policies. Man y scholars have recognized the ability of pilgrimages to serve as barometers of soc ial and political change. In their analysis of Christian pilgrimage traditi ons, anthropologists Victor and Edith Turner conclude: Pilgrimage should be regarded ... as an institution with a history. Each pilgrimage, of any length, is vulnerable to the history of its period and must come to terms with shifts of political geography. Pilgrimage is more responsive to social change and popular moods than liturgical ritual, fixed by rubric. 1 1 Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives (New York : Columbia Un ivers ity Press, 1978), 23 1. �SLOVAKIA The character of Slovak pilgrimages had certainly reflected the changing social and political landscape in Slovakia after the Second World War. Pilgrimages had been an important part of Slovak reli gious life since the middle ages. Over thirty pilgrimage sites exist throughout Slovakia and Slovak pilgrim s also visited several religious sites in the Czech lands. Until 1949, when state permission to hold public gatherings such as pilgrimages became mandatory, local church officials had organized the annu al pilgrimages and services at these sites. Thereafter, there had been little acti vity at these sites on pilgrimage days, with the exception of the moments of political liberalization, such as in 1956 (following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin) and 1968 (during the Prague Spring). 2 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage has received much attention by Western political analysts and scholars. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Keston News Service fo llowed this event closely and released extensive reports about thi s pilgrimage (and the pilgrimages that followed). 3 Although Velehrad is located in Moravi a, this pilgrimage was of particular importance to Slovak Catholi cs, who attended in relatively high numbers. Several schol ars writing in the latter half of the 1980s referred to thi s pilgrimage as evidence of a reli gious revival and the resilience of Catholicism in Slovakia. 4 Scholars writing after 1989 have referred to thi s pilgrimage and those that followed, not only in the context of a religious revival, but 2 Karel Kaplan notes that not onl y pilgrimages, but also attendance at reli gious services and the forma tion of new youth groups occurred during the upheaval s in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Karel Kaplan, " Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956 - Part III ," Religion in Comm unist Lands, 14, no. 3 (fall 1986): 280. Milan J. Reban reports a sim ilar resurgence of pilgrimages during the Prague Spring in 1968 . Milan J. Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed . Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke Uni versity Press, I 990), 15 I. 3 The Keston News Service was based at Keston College, England and provided reports and analys is of the religious situation in East Europe. 4 See Janice Brou n, Conscience and Capti vity: Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), 67- 101. Also see Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar (Bloom ington and Indianapo lis: Ind iana Universi ty Press, 1987), 78. �SLOVAKIA 101 also as an example of one of the few expressions of independent or non-state activity in Slovakia. 5 Pilgrimages and their increasing popularity throughout the 1980s became one of the most visible markers of a religious revival in Slovakia. This religious revival had begun almost a decade earlier and was closely related to the election of a Pole, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II in 1978. Pope John Paul II took a new aggressive and uncompromising stand when dealing with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe. Under Pope Paul Vi's (1963-1978) eastern policy (Ostpolitik), the Vatican had made preserving the church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia a primary goal, even at the expense of making important concessions to the Communist government. In 1973, Cardinal Casaroli, responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik, had negotiated the regime's approval of four new bishops, even though all four remained members of Pacem in Terris, a state sponsored organization that coordinated the work of priests in Czechoslovakia. Although this agreement brought the total number of bishops to five (out of thirteen dioceses), many Czech and Slovak Catholics criticized the Vatican's tolerance of Pacem in Terris. Breaking with his predecessor, Pope John Paul II refused to compromise with these governments, particularly with regards to spiritual matters. In 1982, he formally condemned Pacem in Terris. 6 As Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla had secretly ordained many Czech and Slovak priests in the 1970s. Silvester Krcmery, a leader of Slovakia's secret church and a friend of Wojtyla since 1973, described him as a protector of the Slovaks. Emphasizing the importance of their shared experiences under Communism, Krcmery pointed to a 5 Stokes refers to the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage not only in terms of attendance, but also as evidence of Cardinal Tomasek's increasing willingness to act independently of the state. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152. See also Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London : Duke University Press , 1991), 109 and Padraic Kenney , A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 36. 6 Alexander Tomsky, "Pacem in Terris," Religion in Communist Lands lO (1982): 278-279. For a discussion of bishop vacancies, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 125. �102 SLOVAKIA bond that undoubted ly other Catholics in Czechoslovakia shared by saying: "He has lived all thi s persec ution of Catholics." 7 While the election of a Polish pope in 1978 helps explain the increased popularity of Catholicism and religious traditions in Slovakia, the events at Yelehrad in 1985 indicate th at the nature of the pilgrimage experience was transformed by activists in the secret (underground) Catholic church. Such a church existed in the Czech lands and Slovakia from the late 1940s to 1989. It was organized by Catholics in response to the persec ution they faced by the Communist authorities. Members of the secret church met in private apartments for bible study , fellowship and even choir practice. Bishops and priests who had been clandestinely trained and ordained provided pastoral serv ices to these believers. By the 1980s, activists in the secret church published and distributed a wide variety of books and newsletters as samizdat. 8 The undergro und church used its samizdat network to publicize this and later pilgrimages by printing announcements of upcoming pilgrimages and it published accounts of each year's pilgrimages. A rich written record of the 1985 Velehrad pil gri mage can be found in thi s body of sa mizdat literature. 9 7 Silvester Krcmery , interview by author, 3 July I996 , Bratislava, Slovakia. For a brief description of Krcmery's first meeting with Wojtyta, see Frantisek Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct' roz vratit: z osudov katolickej cfrkvi na Slovensku v rokoch I 943-89 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 125. 8 David Doellinger, " Prayers, Pilgrims , and Petitions: The Secret Church and the Growth of Civ il Society in Slovakia," Nationalities Papers 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 215-240. 9 Samizdat (self-published) refers to newspapers, articles, essays, books , etc. that were printed with mimeograph machines or typed carbon copy, and often distributed illegall y, usuall y throu gh personal contacts and info rm al networks. Archi ves with the most extensive holdings on Slovak religious samizdat include: Listy z podzemia samizdat arch ive at the Christian Democratic Movement headq uarters, Bratislava, Slovakia ; Libri Prohibiti Samizdat Archive, Prag ue, Czech Republic; Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Dobrichovice (Prague), Czech Republic. Slovak samizda t can also be found in the Keston Institute's arc hi ve, Oxford , England and th e arc hives of Radi o Free Europe/Radio Liberty in th e Open Society Archives , Budapest, Hungary. For a comprehensive catalog of Slovak religious sam izdat, see Rudolf Lessak, Listy z podzemia: suboma dokumentacia krestanskej samizdatovej publicistiky na S/ovensku v rokoch I 945- I989 (Bratislava: US PO, 1998). �SLOVAKIA 103 The 1985 Velehrad Pilgrimage An increasing number of Catholics attended pilgrimages in Slovakia in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, samizdat reports only carried information for the pilgrimages to Sastfn and Levoca, the two most popular Slovak pilgrimages. An estimated 15 ,000 people attended the pilgrimage at Sastfn in 1983 ; attendance jumped to 50,000 in 1984. 10 About 100,000 pilgrims attended the pilgrimages at Levoca in both 1982 and 1983. 11 The new role and importance of the pilgrimage tradition became firmly established at the 1985 pilgrimage at Yelehrad. An important pil grimage site in Moravia, Velehrad had already hosted an estim ated 40,000 pilgrims in 1984. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage, however, commemorated the 1, 100th anni versary of the death of St. Methodius, who along with St. Cyril , had introduced eastern Christianity (and the Slavic liturgy) to the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. The work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius is particulai:.ly important to Slovak Catholics, who trace their political, cultural and religious history to thi s early empire and the arrival of these monks. 12 Several months prior to the pilgrimage, Czechoslovak Catholics and the Communist authorities began to contest the direction of the Yelehrad commemoration. At the center of the dispute was the question of whether Pope John Paul II would be permitted to attend the event. The Pope had made his first visit to Poland as early as 1979, and Czechoslovakia 's Catholics hoped this anniversary would bring a papal visit. An August 1984 letter to President Gustav Husak, signed simpl y the " Youth of CSSR," demanded that the Pope be 10 "Sastfnska put' I983 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'(sami zdat) 4 (1983): 2; "Sastfnsky prihovor otca Biskupa Gabrisa," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'5 ( 1984): 8; " Sastfn '84," Vy ber (sami zdat) 4 ( 1984): 38. 11 "Annual Pilgrimage to Levoca," Keston News Service (KNS), no. 156 (August I6, I982): 3-4. Also, see Vy ber, 3 (1984 ): 7. 12 See lmrich Kruzliak, "The Heritage of Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Works of Slovak Writers and Artists," in SS. Cy ril and M ethodius Among the Slovaks: Observing the 1, JOd" Anniversary of Saint Methodius' Death, eds. lmrich Kru zliak and Frances L. Mi zenko (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1985), 134-143. The territori al extent of thi s empire is unclear, but it probably included large porti ons of present day Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. �104 SLOVAKIA permitted to attend the 1, l 00 th anniversary event. The authors indicated that they were Catholics from Banska Bystrica (in central Slovakia) and argued that there was popular support for a papal visit: We are in the jubilee year of St. Methodius. Thousands of young hearts put their signature on the request that the Holy Father John Paul II come to our country for thi s jubilee celebration. We join with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, who personally invited the Holy Father to this celebration. Esteemed Mr. President, if these thousands of signatures are [too] few, we are willing to collect additional thousands from young people to agai n document for you the desire of the absolute majority of inhabitants of the CSSR, so that the Holy Father comes to our republic for this precious jubilee occasion. 13 In February 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had formally invited the Pope to Velehrad, and over 17,000 Catholic youth in Czechoslovakia 14 signed a statement demonstrating their support for thi s visit. Cardinal Tomasek also cited this petition action in a letter to the CSSR government requesting permission for the visit. 15 A samizdat author analyzing the importance of the Velehrad celebration for Slovaks and the meaning of the petition wrote: "It is a new first in the public life of our church." 16 The Slovak secret church helped publicize several of these appeals for the Pope' s attendance. Despite the authorities' refusal, public support for the Papal visit continued. On New Years Day 1985 , Cardinal Tomasek sent a letter to the Pope with an additional 500 signatures that had been collected over Christmas. The letter reaffirmed the desire of Czechoslovak Catholics for the Pope to come to Velehrad on September 14 for the Methodius commemoration. It also invited the Pope to visit Sastfn, a Slovak pilgrimage site, afterwards 17 The authorities continued to refuse permission for the visit. 18 13 Letter to President Husak from the Youth of CSS R, 29 August 1984, I, Keston st Institute Fi le (hereafter KJ): CZ ROM 7/4 1 Methodius Celebrations 1985. 14 "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1984): 17. 15 Una Sane ta Catholica (samizdat) Tu rice ( 1984 ): 35. 16 • "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," 17-1 8. 17 Naboienstvo a sucasnost'2 (1985): 19. 18 Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Do wn, 152. Though the authori ties prevented Pope John Paul II from attending the commemoration, his encyc lical Slavorum �SLOVAKIA 105 As the Velehrad pilgrimage approached, members of the secret church in both the Czech lands and Slovakia began making plans to alter the length and nature of the commemoration by organizing a special night program. Catholic activists wanted to invite youth to the site on Saturday, July 6, 1985, for a special program of song and prayer during the night preceding the official commemoration, which had been scheduled for Sunday, July 7. Night programs had already become a popular component of pilgrimages in Slovakia. Over 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at the Levoca pilgrimage in 1983. 19 At Sastfn in 1984, a night program organized by Vladimir Jukl, one of the leaders of the Slovak secret church, had also preceded the regular pilgrimage celebration.20 The plan for a night program at Velehrad appears to have originated with both Moravian and Slovak sources. Catholic youth in Moravia invited their counterparts in Slovakia and Bohemia to the Saturday program that would include prayers for the unity of the church, the Pope, bishops and others in the Church. The Slovak reli gious samizdat Vy ber helped distribute this invitation by prominently publishing it on the back of the front cover of a spring 1985 issue.2' Frantisek Miklosko, another activist in the Slovak secret church , refers to the Moravian Catholics' pl an in a history of the post-war Catholi c Church in Slovakia that he published in 1991 . He credits Vladimir Jukl with the idea of introducing the night program at Velehrad. Miklosko personally presented Jukl 's plan for a night program to Cardinal Tomasek, who supported the idea. Though the local priest and bishop responsible for Velehrad refused to officially approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in Velehrad's basilica, the plan for the night program went ahead. 22 On Saturday afternoon , Ju ly 6, the Velehrad celebration made its informal start with the arri val of an estimated 5,000 young Apostoli - which praised the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was published on the day of the event. Alexander Tomsky, "St Methodius Return s to Czechos lovakia," KNS, no. 235 (October 3, 1985): 18- 19. 19 " Vfce nez sto ti sfc poutn fku na Levocske hofe 3.7. 1983," ln fo rmace o cfrk vi (sami zdat) 9 (1983): 13. 20 "Sastfn ' 84," Vfber 4 ( 1984): 38. Miklosko writes that Ju kl developed the idea for the night program for Sastfn that year. Miklosko, Nebudete ich moct'rozvratit, 136. 21 Vfber4 (1985). 22 Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct'rozvratit;128- l 30. �106 SLOVAKIA Catholics. Accounts of their activities filled subseq uent samizdat periodicals and painted a vivid picture of their activities prior to the formal opening of the celebration at 10:00 AM on Sunday morning. As they arrived on Saturday, the young pilgrims sat in small groups in front of the basilica, some talking with friends and others singing songs, sometimes with the accompaniment of a guitar. Bishop Jan Korec , who had been secretly consecrated in 1951, visited with the young pilgrims in the afternoon and remained with them throughout the night. 23 After an evening mass inside the basilica, the pilgrims spent the night outside with one group in front of the basilica and the other in a nearby field. Each group stayed awake the entire night and observed a program of prayer, meditation and si nging. During the night, both groups chanted slogans such as "We want cloisters," "Long live Tomasek," and "Long live the Pope." One report indicated that the pilgrims also chanted "Let the Pope Come" for about twenty-five minutes. 24 One member of the Slovak secret church apparently spent Saturday afternoon and night with a tape recorder recording the songs, chants and conversations with the pilgrims. A Slovak samiz dat periodical published excerpts from this recording, capturing some of the different hopes and concerns of those in attendance, including the di sappointment of one young pilgrim that the state authorities viewed the pilgrimage and anniversary celebration as a "peace event." The pilgrim, speaking sometime late Saturday evening, described his mixed response to the weekend: I assumed that many believers would participate in this pilgrimage, but I am very surprised by the multitude of people who are already here today. I am very enthusiastic about it, because I expect rich spiritual fruits from this pilgrimage. I regret, of course - and I also think everyone else does - that we may not have the Holy Father here among us. But on the other hand, we are glad that he is represented here by Cardinal Casaro li [responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik]. 25 23 " Velehrad ' 85 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1985): 17. The largest Czech religious samizdat periodical republished this report. "Velehrad I985 , videny zo Slovenska," Jnformace o cirkvi IO (1985), 6-7. 24 "Boli sme na Velehrade," Rodinne spolocenstvo (samizdat) 5 ( 1985): 5-6. 25 "Velehrad ' 85 z magnetofonoveho zaznamu," Vyber9 (1985): 12. �SLOVAKIA 107 Early in the morning a fifty-year old priest, asked for his reaction to thi s " uncommon" event, replied: We spent this night at Velehrad together with Sai nts Cyril and Methodius. And it was very beautiful. There are groups of young believers here from all over Slovakia and also from the Czech lands, but a preponderance here are Slovaks. 26 Though located in Moravia, the night program at Velehrad was of particul ar interest to Slovak Catholics, and other observers also noted the large presence of Slovaks at Velehrad.27 . The enthusiasm of the young Catholics who had arri ved early to spend the night at Velehrad carried over to the official celebrations on Sunday. Despite the state's efforts to curtail attendance by canceling public transportation to Velehrad, pilgrims from all over Czechoslovakia arrived , many on foot, to join those who had spent the night singing, praying and chanting. 28 One samizdat periodical reported that at a 7:00 AM mass outside the Basilica, the pilgrims who had arrived only that morning were surprised that the young people, fo llowing the singing of the papal hymn, broke into chants of "Long li ve John Paul II! " and " Let us have the Hol y Father! " 29 The youth had been chanting these slogans throughout the night, and like a team coming out of a hi gh-school pep rally, they were ready for the celebration to begin. By 10:00 AM, when the official celebration began, an estimated 100,000-250,000 pilgrims had gathered outside the Basilica in the center of Velehrad. 30 A local Party official opened the celebration by welcoming everyone to what he called the St. Methodiu s " Peace Celebration ." In response to this designation, the 26 Ibid., 19. Another Slovak priest, Father Martinec, explai ned that he had he lped wi th the organization of the pilgrimage and the arriva l of Slovak Catholics at Yelehrad . Karel Martinec, interview by author, 4 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. 28 "Yelehrad 1985 ," Vzkffsenf(samizdat) 2 ( 1985): 15. 29 " Boli sme na Yelehrade," 5. 30 Religious samizdat peri odical s re ported this wide range estimate of pilgrims in attendance. See "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 8; "Yelehrad ' 85," 18; " Yelehrad 1985," Vzkifsenf2 ( 1985): 15; and " Yelehrad nas," Informace o cfrk vi 10 ( 1985): 6. Photographs of the pilgrims gathered around the Bas ilica at Yelehrad on Jul y 7 - taken from different angles - indicate that the pilgrims filled every inch of the square and support the magnitude of the size of the crowd as reported by religious samizdat. Kl: photo collection, photos# 1793 and # 1876. 27 �108 SLOVAKIA pilgrims responded negatively with whistles and shouts of "We want Holy Mass!" 3 1 Following the singi ng of the state anthem, the Minister of Culture, Dr. Milan Klu sak, spoke. Again, the pilgrims expressed their dissatisfaction with the official spin he gave to the importance of the anniversary. Several samizdat periodicals reported the following exchange between Klusak and the pilgrims: [Minister Klusak] grasped the situation and therefore improvised as he spoke. In order to stress that he did not consider the celebration to be a peace celebration, he said that he came to the pilgrimage to celebrate Methodius' memory. The crowd corrected him by chanting "Saint, Saint." When he said that Cyril and Methodius brought us a language and alphabet, the people supplemented it with "Faith , Faith!" The surpri sed minister then began a discussion with the people by saying "The Bi shop will speak about Faith to you. We have divided up the work." ... the young people replied to him: "Freedom, Religious Freedom." The minister argued back to the youth and everyone else: "If you did not have [religious freedom], you would not be here." 32 The pilgrims responded to the remainder of Klusak's speech with chants: "We Want the Holy Father!" "We Want Religious Freedom," and "We Want Bishops!" In contrast to the pilgrims' dissatisfaction with the state authorities' remarks, the pilgrims enthusiastically supported the words of the church officials. During the heckling of Minister Klu sak, the pilgrims had also chanted "Long Live Cardinal Tomasek! and "Casaroli!" 33 Cardinal Tomasek read a letter from the Pope that reportedly energized the pilgrims despite their disappointment that the Pope was not there to deliver his words personally . During the Mass, Cardinal Casaroli switched between Czech and Slovak while delivering his sermon.34 Accounts indicate that Cardinal Tomasek and Cardinal Casaroli clearly were surprised by the hi gh attendance and the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. After- 31 "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 7. fbid ., 7. A similar account of this exchange, written by a Slovak pilgrim , appeared in Czech samizdat. " Velehrad 1985 ," Vzkfisenf2 ( 1985): 16. See also Jan Korec, Od barbarskej noci na slobode (Bratislava: Luc, 1993), 342. 33 "Velehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sucasnost; 18. 34 "Boli sme na Velehrade," 7-8. 32 �SLOVAKIA 109 wards, Cardinal Tomasek reportedly told a group of young people, "This is not reality, this is a dream. " 35 The Significance of Velehrad The relatively large number of Catholic youth from Slovakia that chose to come earl y to this pilgrimage indicates both the strength of Catholicism in Slovakia and the failure of the state 's restricti ve policies against the church. Vaclav Benda, a Catholic Czech activist, afterwards commented on the significance of this pilgrimage: Yelehrad was an effective demonstration that the experiment of splitting the church was condemned to failure and ridiculous from the beginning. It must presently be clear from this pilgrimage ... that the prohibitions or radical restriction on the church drove several million active believers into the underground. 36 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage was critical turning point in a revival of the pilgrimage tradition in Slovakia. After Yelehrad, pilgrimage attendance and the number of sites hosting pilgrimages in Slovakia increased significantly. 37 Levoca, in eastern Slovakia, received the largest number of pilgrims with an estimated 150,000 in 1986,38 200,000-230,000 in 1987,39 and possibly as high as 280,000 300,000 in 1988.40 The number of pilgrims to Sastfn, a small village located north of Bratislava near the Moravian border, grew steadily from estimates of 40,000-50,000 in 1986,4 1 and 60,000 in 1987 ,42 to 35 " Yelehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sricasnost; 18. Vaclav Benda, "Ako d'alej po Yelehrade?" Naboienstvo a sricasnost'2 (I 986): 4. 37 Attendance at Slo vak pil grimages in 1989 was also high, but there is less information in samizdat about that year's pilgrimages than for earlier years. This is probably due to the fac t that reports of the summer pilgrimages usually appeared in late fa ll samizdat issues, by which time the Velvet Revolution had already begun. 38 "Levoca 1986," Voice of A merica (VOA) 12 July 1986. 39 "Record Numbers Attend Slovak Pilgrimages," Keston News Service, 280 (23 Jul y 87): 19; "Message from Jan Carnogursky to Keston College," KI: CZ ROM 7 /4 Pilgrimages; "Levoca put' 1987," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'4 ( 1987): 7. 40 " Mariansky rok na Slovensku," Katolfcky mesacnik (sami zdat) 4 (1 988): I ; Peter Marti n, "The Pilgrimage to Levoca," R FE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19. Another sami zdat periodical estimated the attendance in 1988 at " more than 200,000 ." See "Mys lienky z Levocskej pute," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'3 (I 988): 3. 41 " Putne slav nosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," Naboienstvo a sricasnost' I ( I 987): I 719. 36 �110 SLOVAKIA 60,000-70,000 in 1988. 43 The number of pilgrims to Gaboltov, estimated at 20,000-25,000 in 1985 ,44 increased more dramatically from estimates of 30,000-50,000 in 198645 to as high as l 00,000 in 1987 and 1988. 46 Large numbers of pilgrims also visited traditionally less popular pilgrimage sites in Slovakia during this period. Lutina, an important Greek Catholic pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia, received 40,000 pilgrims in 198647 and 50,000 in 1987 .48 Topolcany received 25,000 pilgrims in 1988.49 Due to the nature of a pilgrimage, usually an outdoor event with people sitting or standing in a town square or in a nearby field, only estimates, probably made by members of the secret church present at the pilgrimage, are available. Jan Camogursky , a prominent activist in the Slovak secret church, reported that as he became aware of the political significance of the pilgrimages in 1987, he began making estimates of the number of pilgrims attending the events throughout Slovakia.50 Although not an exact count, these estimates are significant as a measure of the increase in the multitude of pilgrim s attending a particular pilgrimage, an increase that the authors of samizdat reports on pilgrimages were certainly observing. The increase in attendance after 1985 suggests that pilgrimages can be more than barometers of social change; the Velehrad pilgrimage promoted a change in the function of pilgrimages and their appeal to Catholics. The active force that promoted this transformation was the secret church. Members of this community helped transform the pilgrimage tradition into a space where Catholics could meet publicly and in large numbers to worship. Velehrad 's night program allowed young people active in the underground to meet 42 "Sastfn - September 1987," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'5 (1987): l 1. "Sastfn - '88," K ato/fcky mesacnik 5 ( 1988): I. 44 "Gaboltov ' 85 ," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 (I 985): 20. 45 " Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r 1986," 17- 19. 46 " Message from Jan Camogursky to Keston College"; "Put' v Gaboltove," VOA , 24 Jul y 1988. 47 "Pout' reckokatoliku v Lu tine 1986," lnformace o cfrkvi 10 (1986): I0. 48 "Message from Jan Camogursky." 49 "Pilgrimage at Topol'cany," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 13 September 1988. 50 Jan Camogursky, interview by author, 16 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. Documents in the Keston Institute archive indicate that he sent reports of these estimates to Western news organizations. See for example, "Message from Jan Camogursky." 43 �SLOVAKIA 111 with other Catholics and express their faith publicly. Velehrad had demonstrated the secret church 's ability to mobilize its members to participate in a public event, and it continued to do so during the remainder of the decade. Slovak Catholic activists contributed to the popularity of pilgrimages and their night programs in the later half of the 1980s. The used the secret church 's samizdat network to inform its members about previous pilgrimages and to promote attendance at upcoming ones. From 1986 to 1989, the issues of Naboi enstvo a sucasnost; Rodinne spolocenstvo and later Katolfcky mesacnfk published extensive articles and reports about Slovak pilgrimages. This coverage included first hand reports of pilgrims' experiences, often including descriptions of their walk to the site and the activities of the night program. These samizdat periodicals also frequently published transcripts of prayers and sermons spoken during Mass at a pilgrimage, as well as historical information about different pilgrimage sites. 5 1 They also published schedules and information about upcoming pilgrimages in Slovakia. 52 As a result of this coverage, a written record of the experiences, worship service, activities, and even the chants at pilgrimages has been preserved. Catholics unable to attend a particular pilgrimage could learn about what had been said and done by reading these accounts. Since most samizdat reports on pilgrimages were usuall y publi shed several months after the pilgrimage, this coverage reminded Slovak Catholics of what had happened during the summer. Its reports and descriptions of previous pilgrimages promoted the events, and its schedule information certainly helped coordinate attendance at a pilgrimage. In addition to its samiz dat network, information about pilgrimages was shared through the communities of the secret church. Carnogursky reported that many of its communities "visited these pilgrimages collectively as groups." 53 The Slovak secret church also continued to promote the night program for pilgrimages after 1985, and attendance at night prog- 51 For the text of a prayer read by a local priest at the I 988 Sastfn pilgrimage, see "Modlitba na zaver marianskeho Rok u," Kato/icky mesacnfk 6 ( 1988): 5-7 . Another arti cle recounts the history of th e Sastfn pilgrim age site fro m 9 16 A.O. to 1987. "Sastfn," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'4 ( 1987): 8-10. 52 " Letna - putnicka - aktivita 1989," Kato/icky mesacmk 5 ( I 989): 6. 53 Camogursky, interview. �112 SLOVAKIA rams increased. A samizdat article describing the pilgrimage celebrations that had taken place throughout Slovakia in 1986 announced that in 1987 night programs were scheduled in Gaboltov and Uhorna in addition to Levoca and Sastin. 54 In 1988, an estimated 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at Gaboltov,55 and 100,000 attended the night program during the Marian year pilgrimage in Levoca. 56 The following year, 5,000-10,000 people attended the night pro57 gram at the smaller pilgrimage site of Lutina. At the pilgrimage, the members of the secret church could do openly and publicly what they had done since their foundation: gather for prayer, meditation, and worship. Rather than finding safety in small numbers by meeting in private apartments, the pilgrimage tradition allowed the secret church members to practice their faith publicly, on a larger scale, and in fellowship with Catholics not active in the secret church. Jan Camogursky, reporting on the significance of pilgrimages in Slovakia, writes: [While] they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society - the problem of being outnumbered by the police ... The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers ... [This] feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling - that of freedom . On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. 58 Although the secret church had traditionally distanced itself from the political opposition to avoid additional persecution by the state, the pilgrimage tradition facilitated a shift towards a new engagement in the public sphere. For members of the secret church, this issue of religious freedom could always be discussed among fellow members through its communities and samizdat press. Chants for religious freedom and in support of certain church officials had been voiced publicly to a significantly large gathering at Velehrad in 1985. The 54 "Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," 19. " Put' v Gaboltove," VOA, 24 July 1988. 56 "Mariansky rok na Slovensku," l. 57 "0 puti V Lutine," Rodinne spolocenstvo 5 (1989): 14. 58 Jan Carnogursky, "The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia," The Salisbury Review (Ju ne 1989): 36. 55 �SLOVAKIA 113 pilgrimage tradition provided a public space and forum where political demands arti culated by the secret church could be discussed, debated, and shared with the broader public in relative safety. The contest between church and state exhibited at the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage is one of the most striking feature s of this event. 59 The contest over the orientation of the commemoration could be said to have begun in 1984 as Cardinal Tomasek and Czechoslovak Catholics began demanding that Pope John Paul II be given permi ssion to attend. While the state argued that the commemoration should celebrate the cultural significance of St. Methodius, the church argued that the anniversary was a religious event. This conflict between church and state, so publicly exhibited at Velehrad in 1985, suggests that a term such as "church" fail s to capture the complexity of relations between church and state. Rather than a monolith, the "church" was represented by at least three distinct groups in this contest: the official church hierarchy , pilgrims active in the secret church, and pilgrims not active in the secret church. Of the three, it was the pilgrims (both within and without the secret church) listening to the Party officials' presentations who openly challenged the state's authority over the pilgrimage. Through their efforts, the pilgrimage became a public space where Catholics could challenge the status quo and the state 's right to define the meaning of St. Methodius and the l ,lO0 th anni versary . The pilgrimage created a forum where these three representations of the church ' s position could interact and influence one another. Even more interesting is the fact that the challenge to the status quo did not end in 1985 . Leaders of the Slovak underground church increasingly crossed into more politically-oriented public activities, most notably its collection of signatures to a 31-point petition for greater religious freedom in 1987 and 1988 and its organization of a public demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 , 1988 whi ch was violently 59 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, in the introduction to an edited vo lume of research on pilgrimages, assert that the new agenda in pilgrimage stud ies recogni zes that pilgrimage " is above all an arena for competing re ligious and secular discourses, for both the offi cial co-optation and the non-official recovery of rel igious meanings, fo r conflict between orthodoxies, sects and confess ional groups, fo r dri ves towards consensus and communities, and for counter movements towards separateness and division." John Eade and Michae l J. Sallnow , eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. �114 SLOVAKIA broken up by the police. Altogether, 600,000 Czechs and Slovaks signed the petition and a reported 300,000-400,000 of the signatures were collected in Slovakia. Samizdat reports indicate that this petition was often read aloud at pilgrimages in Slovakia during night programs in the late 1980s.60 Divisions also existed within the official hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church regarding the direction the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage should take. Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, since the election of Pope John Paul II, had become increasingly willing to criticize the state's interference in church affairs. In a 1981 letter to the editors of Katolfcke noviny, the state-approved and supported news organ of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomasek had criticized this periodical's focus on Pacem in Terris, disarmament and international relations, rather than Papal speeches and material that responded to the spiritual needs of the country ' s believers.61 In 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had not only formally invited Pope John Paul II to attend the Velehrad commemoration, but had also supported unofficial initiatives that demonstrated popular support for a papal visit. Cardinal Tomasek had also supported the secret church's plan to organize a night program at Velehrad, thus demonstrating that the lines between the secret church's activities and the official church sometimes became quite blurred. The unwillingness of the local bishop and priest responsible for Velehrad to approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in the basilica stands in stark contrast to Cardinal Tomasek's interest in it. All reports indicate that the police and other authorities in Slovakia were fairly ineffective in their efforts to clamp down on pilgrimages. Samizdat articles indicate that the pilgrims were quite aware of secret police agents dressed in civilian clothes and using cameras and video-recorders to document the event, but their presence apparently did little to deter their activities. As early as the 1984 pilgrimage to Levoca, police put several obstacles in the way of 60 For more about the 31-point petition and the March 25, 1988 demonstration, see David Doellinger, "From Prayers to Protests: The Impact of Religio us-Based Dissent on the Emergence of Civil Society in Slovakia and the GDR," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), chapter 4. 61 This letter appeared in lnformace o cirkvi, no. 4 ( 198 1): 24-25. �SLOVAKIA 115 pilgrims, such as running road checks to back up traffic to the site, canceling train and bus service to Levoca, and even cutting down trees to block the road to the basilica. More subtle efforts focused on keeping young people away from Levoca by scheduling a concert by a Slovak pop star in a nearby town . Some schools scheduled special activities on the day of pilgrimages, and others even posted notices banning participation in the pilgrimage.62 Police efforts took a more violent turn in 1986, when militia used dogs to break up groups of pilgrims making their way to Gaboltov.63 Also in 1986, the police interrogated Jozef Halko, a priest who had been sec retly ordained, and Anton Selecky, a Catholic activist, for their activities earlier in the year at the Sastin and Levoca pilgrimages. Holk.o 's interrogation focused on the fact that he had heard confessions at Levoca and Selecky ' s interrogators were concerned that he had written accounts of the pilgrimages for publication in samizdat. 64 In addition to signaling the pilgrimage' s transformation into a public space for Catholics, Velehrad also reflected the increasingly political potential of religion itself in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The political significance of religion and religious activities in the Soviet bloc had become quite apparent during the Pope 's first visit to Poland in 1979. In Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, John Paul II spoke freely about the historically close rel ationship between Christianity and the Polish nation. He also spoke about the failed Warsaw uprising in 1944 (when Soviet troops allowed the Polish Home Army to be defeated by the Nazis), Polish independence, and human dignity. 65 In his analysis of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Jan Kubik notes that Pope John Paul II 's speech and visit brought an end to the " Party-state's monopoly over public di scourse in 62 " Levoca - the Slovak National Shrine," K NS 2 14 (6 December I 984) . For references to the presence of the secret police at Velehrad in 1985, see " Velehrad 85 - spomienka studentov," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1986): 17 and " Boli sme na Velehrade," 5. 63 "Militia Set Dogs on Pilgrims (Czechoslovakia)," KNS 257 (2 1 August 1986). 64 "Slovak Cathol ics interrogated," KNS 264 (27 November 1986). 65 Pope John Paul II , "Pope John Paul IL Speaks in Victory Square, Warsaw," in ed., Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York and Oxford : Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), 200-203. �116 SLOVAKIA Poland."66 Though Solidarity was not a religious movement, Kubik argues that its close association with the Catholic Church and the use of religious symbols strengthened its ability to mobilize the Polish population and to construct a sphere of activity separate from and in defiance to the state. Among its achievements was the construction of public spaces not reserved for the state, including the Gdansk Monument and the Poznan Monument. Both incorporated crosses into their design, and, as Kubik explains, both monuments had been unveiled in religious ceremonies that emphasized the participation of society, rather than society 's subservience to the state. 67 Jan Kubik's analysis of these public events in Poland that preceded the formation of Solidarity offers insight into the political significance of religion in East Central Europe. Just as religion and religious traditions offered an alternative to the state's monopoly of power in Poland, the pilgrimage at Velehrad demonstrated that religion and religious traditions could offer a similar alternative in Czechoslovakia. Pope John Paul II had emphasized the historical significance of Christianity in Poland during his visit in 1979 and the commemoration of St. Methodius at Velehrad had allowed Catholic pilgrims the unique opportunity to confront state officials regarding Czechoslovakia's historical relationship with Christianity. The pilgrims at Velehrad, by vocally opposing the state's emphasis on the cultural contribution of Methodius, expressed their defiance of and unwillingness to be subservient to the state's religious policies. In doing so, the pilgrims transformed the traditional religious pilgrimage into an event of political significance. 66 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, I 994 ), 144. 67 For description and analysis of the Gdansk and the Poznan Monuments, see Kubik, The Power of Symbols, I 96-206, 2 14-216. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2007, Vol. 39 Description An account of the resource Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 99 THE 1985 PILGRIMAGE AT VELEHRAD: SLOVAK CATHOLICS AND THE CREATION OF A PUBLIC SPACE David Doellinger An analysis of the 1985 pilgrimage at Velehrad reveals many of the ways that the nature of pilgrimages (and thus Catholicism's role in Communist Czechoslovakia) had begun to change during the 1980s. At this event, Catholic activists and pilgrims surprised church leaders by voicing their opposition to state policy in front of Party officials, thereby transforming a religious tradition into a public space where Slovak Catholics could meet free from state interference to assert their religious and political beliefs. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage offers an interesting window into the increas ingly contentious relationship between church and state in Czec hoslovakia. It illustrates the mobilizing influence of Pope John Paul II and reveals that restive Catholics, who had been practicing their faith secretly in the underground, helped empower some leaders in the Czechoslovakia's official hierarchy - particularly Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek of Prague - to be more critical of the state's religious policies. Man y scholars have recognized the ability of pilgrimages to serve as barometers of soc ial and political change. In their analysis of Christian pilgrimage traditi ons, anthropologists Victor and Edith Turner conclude: Pilgrimage should be regarded ... as an institution with a history. Each pilgrimage, of any length, is vulnerable to the history of its period and must come to terms with shifts of political geography. Pilgrimage is more responsive to social change and popular moods than liturgical ritual, fixed by rubric. 1 1 Victor Turner and Edith Turner, Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture: Anthropological Perspectives (New York : Columbia Un ivers ity Press, 1978), 23 1. SLOVAKIA The character of Slovak pilgrimages had certainly reflected the changing social and political landscape in Slovakia after the Second World War. Pilgrimages had been an important part of Slovak reli gious life since the middle ages. Over thirty pilgrimage sites exist throughout Slovakia and Slovak pilgrim s also visited several religious sites in the Czech lands. Until 1949, when state permission to hold public gatherings such as pilgrimages became mandatory, local church officials had organized the annu al pilgrimages and services at these sites. Thereafter, there had been little acti vity at these sites on pilgrimage days, with the exception of the moments of political liberalization, such as in 1956 (following Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin) and 1968 (during the Prague Spring). 2 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage has received much attention by Western political analysts and scholars. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Keston News Service fo llowed this event closely and released extensive reports about thi s pilgrimage (and the pilgrimages that followed). 3 Although Velehrad is located in Moravi a, this pilgrimage was of particular importance to Slovak Catholi cs, who attended in relatively high numbers. Several schol ars writing in the latter half of the 1980s referred to thi s pilgrimage as evidence of a reli gious revival and the resilience of Catholicism in Slovakia. 4 Scholars writing after 1989 have referred to thi s pilgrimage and those that followed, not only in the context of a religious revival, but 2 Karel Kaplan notes that not onl y pilgrimages, but also attendance at reli gious services and the forma tion of new youth groups occurred during the upheaval s in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Karel Kaplan, " Church and State in Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1956 - Part III ," Religion in Comm unist Lands, 14, no. 3 (fall 1986): 280. Milan J. Reban reports a sim ilar resurgence of pilgrimages during the Prague Spring in 1968 . Milan J. Reban, "The Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia," in Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies, ed . Pedro Ramet (Durham and London: Duke Uni versity Press, I 990), 15 I. 3 The Keston News Service was based at Keston College, England and provided reports and analys is of the religious situation in East Europe. 4 See Janice Brou n, Conscience and Capti vity: Religion in Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), 67- 101. Also see Pedro Ramet, Cross and Commissar (Bloom ington and Indianapo lis: Ind iana Universi ty Press, 1987), 78. SLOVAKIA 101 also as an example of one of the few expressions of independent or non-state activity in Slovakia. 5 Pilgrimages and their increasing popularity throughout the 1980s became one of the most visible markers of a religious revival in Slovakia. This religious revival had begun almost a decade earlier and was closely related to the election of a Pole, Karol Wojtyla, as Pope John Paul II in 1978. Pope John Paul II took a new aggressive and uncompromising stand when dealing with the Communist governments of Eastern Europe. Under Pope Paul Vi's (1963-1978) eastern policy (Ostpolitik), the Vatican had made preserving the church hierarchy in Czechoslovakia a primary goal, even at the expense of making important concessions to the Communist government. In 1973, Cardinal Casaroli, responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik, had negotiated the regime's approval of four new bishops, even though all four remained members of Pacem in Terris, a state sponsored organization that coordinated the work of priests in Czechoslovakia. Although this agreement brought the total number of bishops to five (out of thirteen dioceses), many Czech and Slovak Catholics criticized the Vatican's tolerance of Pacem in Terris. Breaking with his predecessor, Pope John Paul II refused to compromise with these governments, particularly with regards to spiritual matters. In 1982, he formally condemned Pacem in Terris. 6 As Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla had secretly ordained many Czech and Slovak priests in the 1970s. Silvester Krcmery, a leader of Slovakia's secret church and a friend of Wojtyla since 1973, described him as a protector of the Slovaks. Emphasizing the importance of their shared experiences under Communism, Krcmery pointed to a 5 Stokes refers to the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage not only in terms of attendance, but also as evidence of Cardinal Tomasek's increasing willingness to act independently of the state. Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 152. See also Sabrina Ramet, Social Currents in Eastern Europe (Durham and London : Duke University Press , 1991), 109 and Padraic Kenney , A Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 36. 6 Alexander Tomsky, "Pacem in Terris," Religion in Communist Lands lO (1982): 278-279. For a discussion of bishop vacancies, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998), 125. 102 SLOVAKIA bond that undoubted ly other Catholics in Czechoslovakia shared by saying: "He has lived all thi s persec ution of Catholics." 7 While the election of a Polish pope in 1978 helps explain the increased popularity of Catholicism and religious traditions in Slovakia, the events at Yelehrad in 1985 indicate th at the nature of the pilgrimage experience was transformed by activists in the secret (underground) Catholic church. Such a church existed in the Czech lands and Slovakia from the late 1940s to 1989. It was organized by Catholics in response to the persec ution they faced by the Communist authorities. Members of the secret church met in private apartments for bible study , fellowship and even choir practice. Bishops and priests who had been clandestinely trained and ordained provided pastoral serv ices to these believers. By the 1980s, activists in the secret church published and distributed a wide variety of books and newsletters as samizdat. 8 The undergro und church used its samizdat network to publicize this and later pilgrimages by printing announcements of upcoming pilgrimages and it published accounts of each year's pilgrimages. A rich written record of the 1985 Velehrad pil gri mage can be found in thi s body of sa mizdat literature. 9 7 Silvester Krcmery , interview by author, 3 July I996 , Bratislava, Slovakia. For a brief description of Krcmery's first meeting with Wojtyta, see Frantisek Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct' roz vratit: z osudov katolickej cfrkvi na Slovensku v rokoch I 943-89 (Bratislava: Archa, 1990), 125. 8 David Doellinger, " Prayers, Pilgrims , and Petitions: The Secret Church and the Growth of Civ il Society in Slovakia," Nationalities Papers 30, no. 2 (June 2002): 215-240. 9 Samizdat (self-published) refers to newspapers, articles, essays, books , etc. that were printed with mimeograph machines or typed carbon copy, and often distributed illegall y, usuall y throu gh personal contacts and info rm al networks. Archi ves with the most extensive holdings on Slovak religious samizdat include: Listy z podzemia samizdat arch ive at the Christian Democratic Movement headq uarters, Bratislava, Slovakia ; Libri Prohibiti Samizdat Archive, Prag ue, Czech Republic; Czechoslovak Documentation Center, Dobrichovice (Prague), Czech Republic. Slovak samizda t can also be found in the Keston Institute's arc hi ve, Oxford , England and th e arc hives of Radi o Free Europe/Radio Liberty in th e Open Society Archives , Budapest, Hungary. For a comprehensive catalog of Slovak religious sam izdat, see Rudolf Lessak, Listy z podzemia: suboma dokumentacia krestanskej samizdatovej publicistiky na S/ovensku v rokoch I 945- I989 (Bratislava: US PO, 1998). SLOVAKIA 103 The 1985 Velehrad Pilgrimage An increasing number of Catholics attended pilgrimages in Slovakia in the first half of the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1985, samizdat reports only carried information for the pilgrimages to Sastfn and Levoca, the two most popular Slovak pilgrimages. An estimated 15 ,000 people attended the pilgrimage at Sastfn in 1983 ; attendance jumped to 50,000 in 1984. 10 About 100,000 pilgrims attended the pilgrimages at Levoca in both 1982 and 1983. 11 The new role and importance of the pilgrimage tradition became firmly established at the 1985 pilgrimage at Yelehrad. An important pil grimage site in Moravia, Velehrad had already hosted an estim ated 40,000 pilgrims in 1984. The 1985 Yelehrad pilgrimage, however, commemorated the 1, 100th anni versary of the death of St. Methodius, who along with St. Cyril , had introduced eastern Christianity (and the Slavic liturgy) to the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century. The work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius is particulai:.ly important to Slovak Catholics, who trace their political, cultural and religious history to thi s early empire and the arrival of these monks. 12 Several months prior to the pilgrimage, Czechoslovak Catholics and the Communist authorities began to contest the direction of the Yelehrad commemoration. At the center of the dispute was the question of whether Pope John Paul II would be permitted to attend the event. The Pope had made his first visit to Poland as early as 1979, and Czechoslovakia 's Catholics hoped this anniversary would bring a papal visit. An August 1984 letter to President Gustav Husak, signed simpl y the " Youth of CSSR," demanded that the Pope be 10 "Sastfnska put' I983 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'(sami zdat) 4 (1983): 2; "Sastfnsky prihovor otca Biskupa Gabrisa," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'5 ( 1984): 8; " Sastfn '84," Vy ber (sami zdat) 4 ( 1984): 38. 11 "Annual Pilgrimage to Levoca," Keston News Service (KNS), no. 156 (August I6, I982): 3-4. Also, see Vy ber, 3 (1984 ): 7. 12 See lmrich Kruzliak, "The Heritage of Saints Cyril and Methodius in the Works of Slovak Writers and Artists," in SS. Cy ril and M ethodius Among the Slovaks: Observing the 1, JOd" Anniversary of Saint Methodius' Death, eds. lmrich Kru zliak and Frances L. Mi zenko (Middletown, PA : Slovak Catholic Federation, 1985), 134-143. The territori al extent of thi s empire is unclear, but it probably included large porti ons of present day Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 104 SLOVAKIA permitted to attend the 1, l 00 th anniversary event. The authors indicated that they were Catholics from Banska Bystrica (in central Slovakia) and argued that there was popular support for a papal visit: We are in the jubilee year of St. Methodius. Thousands of young hearts put their signature on the request that the Holy Father John Paul II come to our country for thi s jubilee celebration. We join with Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, who personally invited the Holy Father to this celebration. Esteemed Mr. President, if these thousands of signatures are [too] few, we are willing to collect additional thousands from young people to agai n document for you the desire of the absolute majority of inhabitants of the CSSR, so that the Holy Father comes to our republic for this precious jubilee occasion. 13 In February 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had formally invited the Pope to Velehrad, and over 17,000 Catholic youth in Czechoslovakia 14 signed a statement demonstrating their support for thi s visit. Cardinal Tomasek also cited this petition action in a letter to the CSSR government requesting permission for the visit. 15 A samizdat author analyzing the importance of the Velehrad celebration for Slovaks and the meaning of the petition wrote: "It is a new first in the public life of our church." 16 The Slovak secret church helped publicize several of these appeals for the Pope' s attendance. Despite the authorities' refusal, public support for the Papal visit continued. On New Years Day 1985 , Cardinal Tomasek sent a letter to the Pope with an additional 500 signatures that had been collected over Christmas. The letter reaffirmed the desire of Czechoslovak Catholics for the Pope to come to Velehrad on September 14 for the Methodius commemoration. It also invited the Pope to visit Sastfn, a Slovak pilgrimage site, afterwards 17 The authorities continued to refuse permission for the visit. 18 13 Letter to President Husak from the Youth of CSS R, 29 August 1984, I, Keston st Institute Fi le (hereafter KJ): CZ ROM 7/4 1 Methodius Celebrations 1985. 14 "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1984): 17. 15 Una Sane ta Catholica (samizdat) Tu rice ( 1984 ): 35. 16 • "Pozvanie sv. Otca do Ceskoslovenska," 17-1 8. 17 Naboienstvo a sucasnost'2 (1985): 19. 18 Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Do wn, 152. Though the authori ties prevented Pope John Paul II from attending the commemoration, his encyc lical Slavorum SLOVAKIA 105 As the Velehrad pilgrimage approached, members of the secret church in both the Czech lands and Slovakia began making plans to alter the length and nature of the commemoration by organizing a special night program. Catholic activists wanted to invite youth to the site on Saturday, July 6, 1985, for a special program of song and prayer during the night preceding the official commemoration, which had been scheduled for Sunday, July 7. Night programs had already become a popular component of pilgrimages in Slovakia. Over 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at the Levoca pilgrimage in 1983. 19 At Sastfn in 1984, a night program organized by Vladimir Jukl, one of the leaders of the Slovak secret church, had also preceded the regular pilgrimage celebration.20 The plan for a night program at Velehrad appears to have originated with both Moravian and Slovak sources. Catholic youth in Moravia invited their counterparts in Slovakia and Bohemia to the Saturday program that would include prayers for the unity of the church, the Pope, bishops and others in the Church. The Slovak reli gious samizdat Vy ber helped distribute this invitation by prominently publishing it on the back of the front cover of a spring 1985 issue.2' Frantisek Miklosko, another activist in the Slovak secret church , refers to the Moravian Catholics' pl an in a history of the post-war Catholi c Church in Slovakia that he published in 1991 . He credits Vladimir Jukl with the idea of introducing the night program at Velehrad. Miklosko personally presented Jukl 's plan for a night program to Cardinal Tomasek, who supported the idea. Though the local priest and bishop responsible for Velehrad refused to officially approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in Velehrad's basilica, the plan for the night program went ahead. 22 On Saturday afternoon , Ju ly 6, the Velehrad celebration made its informal start with the arri val of an estimated 5,000 young Apostoli - which praised the work of Sts. Cyril and Methodius - was published on the day of the event. Alexander Tomsky, "St Methodius Return s to Czechos lovakia," KNS, no. 235 (October 3, 1985): 18- 19. 19 " Vfce nez sto ti sfc poutn fku na Levocske hofe 3.7. 1983," ln fo rmace o cfrk vi (sami zdat) 9 (1983): 13. 20 "Sastfn ' 84," Vfber 4 ( 1984): 38. Miklosko writes that Ju kl developed the idea for the night program for Sastfn that year. Miklosko, Nebudete ich moct'rozvratit, 136. 21 Vfber4 (1985). 22 Miklosko, Nebudete ich m6ct'rozvratit;128- l 30. 106 SLOVAKIA Catholics. Accounts of their activities filled subseq uent samizdat periodicals and painted a vivid picture of their activities prior to the formal opening of the celebration at 10:00 AM on Sunday morning. As they arrived on Saturday, the young pilgrims sat in small groups in front of the basilica, some talking with friends and others singing songs, sometimes with the accompaniment of a guitar. Bishop Jan Korec , who had been secretly consecrated in 1951, visited with the young pilgrims in the afternoon and remained with them throughout the night. 23 After an evening mass inside the basilica, the pilgrims spent the night outside with one group in front of the basilica and the other in a nearby field. Each group stayed awake the entire night and observed a program of prayer, meditation and si nging. During the night, both groups chanted slogans such as "We want cloisters," "Long live Tomasek," and "Long live the Pope." One report indicated that the pilgrims also chanted "Let the Pope Come" for about twenty-five minutes. 24 One member of the Slovak secret church apparently spent Saturday afternoon and night with a tape recorder recording the songs, chants and conversations with the pilgrims. A Slovak samiz dat periodical published excerpts from this recording, capturing some of the different hopes and concerns of those in attendance, including the di sappointment of one young pilgrim that the state authorities viewed the pilgrimage and anniversary celebration as a "peace event." The pilgrim, speaking sometime late Saturday evening, described his mixed response to the weekend: I assumed that many believers would participate in this pilgrimage, but I am very surprised by the multitude of people who are already here today. I am very enthusiastic about it, because I expect rich spiritual fruits from this pilgrimage. I regret, of course - and I also think everyone else does - that we may not have the Holy Father here among us. But on the other hand, we are glad that he is represented here by Cardinal Casaro li [responsible for the Vatican's Ostpolitik]. 25 23 " Velehrad ' 85 ," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1985): 17. The largest Czech religious samizdat periodical republished this report. "Velehrad I985 , videny zo Slovenska," Jnformace o cirkvi IO (1985), 6-7. 24 "Boli sme na Velehrade," Rodinne spolocenstvo (samizdat) 5 ( 1985): 5-6. 25 "Velehrad ' 85 z magnetofonoveho zaznamu," Vyber9 (1985): 12. SLOVAKIA 107 Early in the morning a fifty-year old priest, asked for his reaction to thi s " uncommon" event, replied: We spent this night at Velehrad together with Sai nts Cyril and Methodius. And it was very beautiful. There are groups of young believers here from all over Slovakia and also from the Czech lands, but a preponderance here are Slovaks. 26 Though located in Moravia, the night program at Velehrad was of particul ar interest to Slovak Catholics, and other observers also noted the large presence of Slovaks at Velehrad.27 . The enthusiasm of the young Catholics who had arri ved early to spend the night at Velehrad carried over to the official celebrations on Sunday. Despite the state's efforts to curtail attendance by canceling public transportation to Velehrad, pilgrims from all over Czechoslovakia arrived , many on foot, to join those who had spent the night singing, praying and chanting. 28 One samizdat periodical reported that at a 7:00 AM mass outside the Basilica, the pilgrims who had arrived only that morning were surprised that the young people, fo llowing the singing of the papal hymn, broke into chants of "Long li ve John Paul II! " and " Let us have the Hol y Father! " 29 The youth had been chanting these slogans throughout the night, and like a team coming out of a hi gh-school pep rally, they were ready for the celebration to begin. By 10:00 AM, when the official celebration began, an estimated 100,000-250,000 pilgrims had gathered outside the Basilica in the center of Velehrad. 30 A local Party official opened the celebration by welcoming everyone to what he called the St. Methodiu s " Peace Celebration ." In response to this designation, the 26 Ibid., 19. Another Slovak priest, Father Martinec, explai ned that he had he lped wi th the organization of the pilgrimage and the arriva l of Slovak Catholics at Yelehrad . Karel Martinec, interview by author, 4 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. 28 "Yelehrad 1985 ," Vzkffsenf(samizdat) 2 ( 1985): 15. 29 " Boli sme na Yelehrade," 5. 30 Religious samizdat peri odical s re ported this wide range estimate of pilgrims in attendance. See "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 8; "Yelehrad ' 85," 18; " Yelehrad 1985," Vzkifsenf2 ( 1985): 15; and " Yelehrad nas," Informace o cfrk vi 10 ( 1985): 6. Photographs of the pilgrims gathered around the Bas ilica at Yelehrad on Jul y 7 - taken from different angles - indicate that the pilgrims filled every inch of the square and support the magnitude of the size of the crowd as reported by religious samizdat. Kl: photo collection, photos# 1793 and # 1876. 27 108 SLOVAKIA pilgrims responded negatively with whistles and shouts of "We want Holy Mass!" 3 1 Following the singi ng of the state anthem, the Minister of Culture, Dr. Milan Klu sak, spoke. Again, the pilgrims expressed their dissatisfaction with the official spin he gave to the importance of the anniversary. Several samizdat periodicals reported the following exchange between Klusak and the pilgrims: [Minister Klusak] grasped the situation and therefore improvised as he spoke. In order to stress that he did not consider the celebration to be a peace celebration, he said that he came to the pilgrimage to celebrate Methodius' memory. The crowd corrected him by chanting "Saint, Saint." When he said that Cyril and Methodius brought us a language and alphabet, the people supplemented it with "Faith , Faith!" The surpri sed minister then began a discussion with the people by saying "The Bi shop will speak about Faith to you. We have divided up the work." ... the young people replied to him: "Freedom, Religious Freedom." The minister argued back to the youth and everyone else: "If you did not have [religious freedom], you would not be here." 32 The pilgrims responded to the remainder of Klusak's speech with chants: "We Want the Holy Father!" "We Want Religious Freedom," and "We Want Bishops!" In contrast to the pilgrims' dissatisfaction with the state authorities' remarks, the pilgrims enthusiastically supported the words of the church officials. During the heckling of Minister Klu sak, the pilgrims had also chanted "Long Live Cardinal Tomasek! and "Casaroli!" 33 Cardinal Tomasek read a letter from the Pope that reportedly energized the pilgrims despite their disappointment that the Pope was not there to deliver his words personally . During the Mass, Cardinal Casaroli switched between Czech and Slovak while delivering his sermon.34 Accounts indicate that Cardinal Tomasek and Cardinal Casaroli clearly were surprised by the hi gh attendance and the enthusiasm of the pilgrims. After- 31 "Boli sme na Yelehrade," 7. fbid ., 7. A similar account of this exchange, written by a Slovak pilgrim , appeared in Czech samizdat. " Velehrad 1985 ," Vzkfisenf2 ( 1985): 16. See also Jan Korec, Od barbarskej noci na slobode (Bratislava: Luc, 1993), 342. 33 "Velehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sucasnost; 18. 34 "Boli sme na Velehrade," 7-8. 32 SLOVAKIA 109 wards, Cardinal Tomasek reportedly told a group of young people, "This is not reality, this is a dream. " 35 The Significance of Velehrad The relatively large number of Catholic youth from Slovakia that chose to come earl y to this pilgrimage indicates both the strength of Catholicism in Slovakia and the failure of the state 's restricti ve policies against the church. Vaclav Benda, a Catholic Czech activist, afterwards commented on the significance of this pilgrimage: Yelehrad was an effective demonstration that the experiment of splitting the church was condemned to failure and ridiculous from the beginning. It must presently be clear from this pilgrimage ... that the prohibitions or radical restriction on the church drove several million active believers into the underground. 36 The 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage was critical turning point in a revival of the pilgrimage tradition in Slovakia. After Yelehrad, pilgrimage attendance and the number of sites hosting pilgrimages in Slovakia increased significantly. 37 Levoca, in eastern Slovakia, received the largest number of pilgrims with an estimated 150,000 in 1986,38 200,000-230,000 in 1987,39 and possibly as high as 280,000 300,000 in 1988.40 The number of pilgrims to Sastfn, a small village located north of Bratislava near the Moravian border, grew steadily from estimates of 40,000-50,000 in 1986,4 1 and 60,000 in 1987 ,42 to 35 " Yelehrad '85," Naboienstvo a sricasnost; 18. Vaclav Benda, "Ako d'alej po Yelehrade?" Naboienstvo a sricasnost'2 (I 986): 4. 37 Attendance at Slo vak pil grimages in 1989 was also high, but there is less information in samizdat about that year's pilgrimages than for earlier years. This is probably due to the fac t that reports of the summer pilgrimages usually appeared in late fa ll samizdat issues, by which time the Velvet Revolution had already begun. 38 "Levoca 1986," Voice of A merica (VOA) 12 July 1986. 39 "Record Numbers Attend Slovak Pilgrimages," Keston News Service, 280 (23 Jul y 87): 19; "Message from Jan Carnogursky to Keston College," KI: CZ ROM 7 /4 Pilgrimages; "Levoca put' 1987," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'4 ( 1987): 7. 40 " Mariansky rok na Slovensku," Katolfcky mesacnik (sami zdat) 4 (1 988): I ; Peter Marti n, "The Pilgrimage to Levoca," R FE/RL, 14 July 1988, 19. Another sami zdat periodical estimated the attendance in 1988 at " more than 200,000 ." See "Mys lienky z Levocskej pute," Naboienstvo a sricasnost'3 (I 988): 3. 41 " Putne slav nosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," Naboienstvo a sricasnost' I ( I 987): I 719. 36 110 SLOVAKIA 60,000-70,000 in 1988. 43 The number of pilgrims to Gaboltov, estimated at 20,000-25,000 in 1985 ,44 increased more dramatically from estimates of 30,000-50,000 in 198645 to as high as l 00,000 in 1987 and 1988. 46 Large numbers of pilgrims also visited traditionally less popular pilgrimage sites in Slovakia during this period. Lutina, an important Greek Catholic pilgrimage site in eastern Slovakia, received 40,000 pilgrims in 198647 and 50,000 in 1987 .48 Topolcany received 25,000 pilgrims in 1988.49 Due to the nature of a pilgrimage, usually an outdoor event with people sitting or standing in a town square or in a nearby field, only estimates, probably made by members of the secret church present at the pilgrimage, are available. Jan Camogursky , a prominent activist in the Slovak secret church, reported that as he became aware of the political significance of the pilgrimages in 1987, he began making estimates of the number of pilgrims attending the events throughout Slovakia.50 Although not an exact count, these estimates are significant as a measure of the increase in the multitude of pilgrim s attending a particular pilgrimage, an increase that the authors of samizdat reports on pilgrimages were certainly observing. The increase in attendance after 1985 suggests that pilgrimages can be more than barometers of social change; the Velehrad pilgrimage promoted a change in the function of pilgrimages and their appeal to Catholics. The active force that promoted this transformation was the secret church. Members of this community helped transform the pilgrimage tradition into a space where Catholics could meet publicly and in large numbers to worship. Velehrad 's night program allowed young people active in the underground to meet 42 "Sastfn - September 1987," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'5 (1987): l 1. "Sastfn - '88," K ato/fcky mesacnik 5 ( 1988): I. 44 "Gaboltov ' 85 ," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 (I 985): 20. 45 " Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r 1986," 17- 19. 46 " Message from Jan Camogursky to Keston College"; "Put' v Gaboltove," VOA , 24 Jul y 1988. 47 "Pout' reckokatoliku v Lu tine 1986," lnformace o cfrkvi 10 (1986): I0. 48 "Message from Jan Camogursky." 49 "Pilgrimage at Topol'cany," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), 13 September 1988. 50 Jan Camogursky, interview by author, 16 Jul y 1996, Bratislava, Slovakia. Documents in the Keston Institute archive indicate that he sent reports of these estimates to Western news organizations. See for example, "Message from Jan Camogursky." 43 SLOVAKIA 111 with other Catholics and express their faith publicly. Velehrad had demonstrated the secret church 's ability to mobilize its members to participate in a public event, and it continued to do so during the remainder of the decade. Slovak Catholic activists contributed to the popularity of pilgrimages and their night programs in the later half of the 1980s. The used the secret church 's samizdat network to inform its members about previous pilgrimages and to promote attendance at upcoming ones. From 1986 to 1989, the issues of Naboi enstvo a sucasnost; Rodinne spolocenstvo and later Katolfcky mesacnfk published extensive articles and reports about Slovak pilgrimages. This coverage included first hand reports of pilgrims' experiences, often including descriptions of their walk to the site and the activities of the night program. These samizdat periodicals also frequently published transcripts of prayers and sermons spoken during Mass at a pilgrimage, as well as historical information about different pilgrimage sites. 5 1 They also published schedules and information about upcoming pilgrimages in Slovakia. 52 As a result of this coverage, a written record of the experiences, worship service, activities, and even the chants at pilgrimages has been preserved. Catholics unable to attend a particular pilgrimage could learn about what had been said and done by reading these accounts. Since most samizdat reports on pilgrimages were usuall y publi shed several months after the pilgrimage, this coverage reminded Slovak Catholics of what had happened during the summer. Its reports and descriptions of previous pilgrimages promoted the events, and its schedule information certainly helped coordinate attendance at a pilgrimage. In addition to its samiz dat network, information about pilgrimages was shared through the communities of the secret church. Carnogursky reported that many of its communities "visited these pilgrimages collectively as groups." 53 The Slovak secret church also continued to promote the night program for pilgrimages after 1985, and attendance at night prog- 51 For the text of a prayer read by a local priest at the I 988 Sastfn pilgrimage, see "Modlitba na zaver marianskeho Rok u," Kato/icky mesacnfk 6 ( 1988): 5-7 . Another arti cle recounts the history of th e Sastfn pilgrim age site fro m 9 16 A.O. to 1987. "Sastfn," Naboienstvo a sucasnost'4 ( 1987): 8-10. 52 " Letna - putnicka - aktivita 1989," Kato/icky mesacmk 5 ( I 989): 6. 53 Camogursky, interview. 112 SLOVAKIA rams increased. A samizdat article describing the pilgrimage celebrations that had taken place throughout Slovakia in 1986 announced that in 1987 night programs were scheduled in Gaboltov and Uhorna in addition to Levoca and Sastin. 54 In 1988, an estimated 50,000 pilgrims attended the night program at Gaboltov,55 and 100,000 attended the night program during the Marian year pilgrimage in Levoca. 56 The following year, 5,000-10,000 people attended the night pro57 gram at the smaller pilgrimage site of Lutina. At the pilgrimage, the members of the secret church could do openly and publicly what they had done since their foundation: gather for prayer, meditation, and worship. Rather than finding safety in small numbers by meeting in private apartments, the pilgrimage tradition allowed the secret church members to practice their faith publicly, on a larger scale, and in fellowship with Catholics not active in the secret church. Jan Camogursky, reporting on the significance of pilgrimages in Slovakia, writes: [While] they last, pilgrimages solve a basic problem of our society - the problem of being outnumbered by the police ... The police are unable even to act against individuals on pilgrimages, because they are protected in the solidarity of numbers ... [This] feeling of safety gives the pilgrims another feeling - that of freedom . On a pilgrimage they can act according to their convictions and openly display their religious faith. 58 Although the secret church had traditionally distanced itself from the political opposition to avoid additional persecution by the state, the pilgrimage tradition facilitated a shift towards a new engagement in the public sphere. For members of the secret church, this issue of religious freedom could always be discussed among fellow members through its communities and samizdat press. Chants for religious freedom and in support of certain church officials had been voiced publicly to a significantly large gathering at Velehrad in 1985. The 54 "Putne slavnosti na Slovensku v r. 1986," 19. " Put' v Gaboltove," VOA, 24 July 1988. 56 "Mariansky rok na Slovensku," l. 57 "0 puti V Lutine," Rodinne spolocenstvo 5 (1989): 14. 58 Jan Carnogursky, "The Underground Church and Pilgrimages in Slovakia," The Salisbury Review (Ju ne 1989): 36. 55 SLOVAKIA 113 pilgrimage tradition provided a public space and forum where political demands arti culated by the secret church could be discussed, debated, and shared with the broader public in relative safety. The contest between church and state exhibited at the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage is one of the most striking feature s of this event. 59 The contest over the orientation of the commemoration could be said to have begun in 1984 as Cardinal Tomasek and Czechoslovak Catholics began demanding that Pope John Paul II be given permi ssion to attend. While the state argued that the commemoration should celebrate the cultural significance of St. Methodius, the church argued that the anniversary was a religious event. This conflict between church and state, so publicly exhibited at Velehrad in 1985, suggests that a term such as "church" fail s to capture the complexity of relations between church and state. Rather than a monolith, the "church" was represented by at least three distinct groups in this contest: the official church hierarchy , pilgrims active in the secret church, and pilgrims not active in the secret church. Of the three, it was the pilgrims (both within and without the secret church) listening to the Party officials' presentations who openly challenged the state's authority over the pilgrimage. Through their efforts, the pilgrimage became a public space where Catholics could challenge the status quo and the state 's right to define the meaning of St. Methodius and the l ,lO0 th anni versary . The pilgrimage created a forum where these three representations of the church ' s position could interact and influence one another. Even more interesting is the fact that the challenge to the status quo did not end in 1985 . Leaders of the Slovak underground church increasingly crossed into more politically-oriented public activities, most notably its collection of signatures to a 31-point petition for greater religious freedom in 1987 and 1988 and its organization of a public demonstration for religious freedom in Bratislava on March 25 , 1988 whi ch was violently 59 John Eade and Michael J. Sallnow, in the introduction to an edited vo lume of research on pilgrimages, assert that the new agenda in pilgrimage stud ies recogni zes that pilgrimage " is above all an arena for competing re ligious and secular discourses, for both the offi cial co-optation and the non-official recovery of rel igious meanings, fo r conflict between orthodoxies, sects and confess ional groups, fo r dri ves towards consensus and communities, and for counter movements towards separateness and division." John Eade and Michae l J. Sallnow , eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 2. 114 SLOVAKIA broken up by the police. Altogether, 600,000 Czechs and Slovaks signed the petition and a reported 300,000-400,000 of the signatures were collected in Slovakia. Samizdat reports indicate that this petition was often read aloud at pilgrimages in Slovakia during night programs in the late 1980s.60 Divisions also existed within the official hierarchy of the Czechoslovak Catholic Church regarding the direction the 1985 Velehrad pilgrimage should take. Cardinal Frantisek Tomasek, since the election of Pope John Paul II, had become increasingly willing to criticize the state's interference in church affairs. In a 1981 letter to the editors of Katolfcke noviny, the state-approved and supported news organ of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, Cardinal Tomasek had criticized this periodical's focus on Pacem in Terris, disarmament and international relations, rather than Papal speeches and material that responded to the spiritual needs of the country ' s believers.61 In 1984, Cardinal Tomasek had not only formally invited Pope John Paul II to attend the Velehrad commemoration, but had also supported unofficial initiatives that demonstrated popular support for a papal visit. Cardinal Tomasek had also supported the secret church's plan to organize a night program at Velehrad, thus demonstrating that the lines between the secret church's activities and the official church sometimes became quite blurred. The unwillingness of the local bishop and priest responsible for Velehrad to approve the night program or permit the youth to spend the night in the basilica stands in stark contrast to Cardinal Tomasek's interest in it. All reports indicate that the police and other authorities in Slovakia were fairly ineffective in their efforts to clamp down on pilgrimages. Samizdat articles indicate that the pilgrims were quite aware of secret police agents dressed in civilian clothes and using cameras and video-recorders to document the event, but their presence apparently did little to deter their activities. As early as the 1984 pilgrimage to Levoca, police put several obstacles in the way of 60 For more about the 31-point petition and the March 25, 1988 demonstration, see David Doellinger, "From Prayers to Protests: The Impact of Religio us-Based Dissent on the Emergence of Civil Society in Slovakia and the GDR," (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Pittsburgh, 2002), chapter 4. 61 This letter appeared in lnformace o cirkvi, no. 4 ( 198 1): 24-25. SLOVAKIA 115 pilgrims, such as running road checks to back up traffic to the site, canceling train and bus service to Levoca, and even cutting down trees to block the road to the basilica. More subtle efforts focused on keeping young people away from Levoca by scheduling a concert by a Slovak pop star in a nearby town . Some schools scheduled special activities on the day of pilgrimages, and others even posted notices banning participation in the pilgrimage.62 Police efforts took a more violent turn in 1986, when militia used dogs to break up groups of pilgrims making their way to Gaboltov.63 Also in 1986, the police interrogated Jozef Halko, a priest who had been sec retly ordained, and Anton Selecky, a Catholic activist, for their activities earlier in the year at the Sastin and Levoca pilgrimages. Holk.o 's interrogation focused on the fact that he had heard confessions at Levoca and Selecky ' s interrogators were concerned that he had written accounts of the pilgrimages for publication in samizdat. 64 In addition to signaling the pilgrimage' s transformation into a public space for Catholics, Velehrad also reflected the increasingly political potential of religion itself in the Soviet bloc in the 1980s. The political significance of religion and religious activities in the Soviet bloc had become quite apparent during the Pope 's first visit to Poland in 1979. In Warsaw's Victory Square on June 2, John Paul II spoke freely about the historically close rel ationship between Christianity and the Polish nation. He also spoke about the failed Warsaw uprising in 1944 (when Soviet troops allowed the Polish Home Army to be defeated by the Nazis), Polish independence, and human dignity. 65 In his analysis of the rise of Solidarity in Poland, Jan Kubik notes that Pope John Paul II 's speech and visit brought an end to the " Party-state's monopoly over public di scourse in 62 " Levoca - the Slovak National Shrine," K NS 2 14 (6 December I 984) . For references to the presence of the secret police at Velehrad in 1985, see " Velehrad 85 - spomienka studentov," Naboi enstvo a sucasnost'3 ( 1986): 17 and " Boli sme na Velehrade," 5. 63 "Militia Set Dogs on Pilgrims (Czechoslovakia)," KNS 257 (2 1 August 1986). 64 "Slovak Cathol ics interrogated," KNS 264 (27 November 1986). 65 Pope John Paul II , "Pope John Paul IL Speaks in Victory Square, Warsaw," in ed., Gale Stokes, From Stalinism to Pluralism (New York and Oxford : Oxford Universi ty Press, 1996), 200-203. 116 SLOVAKIA Poland."66 Though Solidarity was not a religious movement, Kubik argues that its close association with the Catholic Church and the use of religious symbols strengthened its ability to mobilize the Polish population and to construct a sphere of activity separate from and in defiance to the state. Among its achievements was the construction of public spaces not reserved for the state, including the Gdansk Monument and the Poznan Monument. Both incorporated crosses into their design, and, as Kubik explains, both monuments had been unveiled in religious ceremonies that emphasized the participation of society, rather than society 's subservience to the state. 67 Jan Kubik's analysis of these public events in Poland that preceded the formation of Solidarity offers insight into the political significance of religion in East Central Europe. Just as religion and religious traditions offered an alternative to the state's monopoly of power in Poland, the pilgrimage at Velehrad demonstrated that religion and religious traditions could offer a similar alternative in Czechoslovakia. Pope John Paul II had emphasized the historical significance of Christianity in Poland during his visit in 1979 and the commemoration of St. Methodius at Velehrad had allowed Catholic pilgrims the unique opportunity to confront state officials regarding Czechoslovakia's historical relationship with Christianity. The pilgrims at Velehrad, by vocally opposing the state's emphasis on the cultural contribution of Methodius, expressed their defiance of and unwillingness to be subservient to the state's religious policies. In doing so, the pilgrims transformed the traditional religious pilgrimage into an event of political significance. 66 Jan Kubik, The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, I 994 ), 144. 67 For description and analysis of the Gdansk and the Poznan Monuments, see Kubik, The Power of Symbols, I 96-206, 2 14-216.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The 1985 Pilgrimage at Velehrad: Slovak Catholics and the Creation of a Public Space Description An account of the resource David Doellinger Slovakia, Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007 pp. 99-116 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Doellinger, David Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8affe32b1d99e5b7198ea2d629fcb183.pdf c05f2805e3ec532338bc99ce54df9bc0 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- �SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- �64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- �SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- �64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- 64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Lettrich's Regime in the Light of Truth Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5871d8288f1bb90993b597c326068fc3.pdf 05e693849668c0259d8504f0a255f049 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the �56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 �57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the �58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but �SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity � SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the �56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 �57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the �58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but �SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the 56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the 58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia in the Light of the Nuremberg Trials Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrej Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 55-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/761361c5f6afeaf3ae1ee90f14ad507b.pdf 7512a9c9e50f4c3d9f0f6d1232487783 PDF Text Text 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 �23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 �24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. �SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, �26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 �23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 �24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. �SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, �26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, 26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and the West Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 22-26 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/84fc1576fce2ebe7a0f282dd1398c614.pdf 627d8e71ad728989ee286f3133c5db4b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 36 Counter-Reformation and Early Czech Catholic Kancionaly in the Kingdom of Bohemia (1588-1683) Marie- Elizabeth Ducreux I) THE BACKGROUND It is surely unnecessary here to go deeply into the hi story of th e Counter Reformation in the Czech Kingdom , so intima tely linked in m y mind to its integration into the H apsburg Monarchy . In any case, exploring this history in detail is obviously beyond the scope of this paper , but to situate the context of my subj ect, I shall begin by sketching its general outline and suggesting a periodization. Four phases can be di stin gui shed in th e elaboration and application of the policy of co nversion . Th e first period, extending from th e arrival ofthejesuits in Prague (1556) to the d efeat at White M ountain (Nov. 8 , 1620), set the stage for what followed. The second period , from 1621 to the reign of Leopold I , witnessed active attempts to implement the poli cy of con ve rsion . This includes the Thirty Years' War, which seve rely h ampered effort s to convert the rural areas, a nd the milesto ne of 1650 , whi ch marked the energetic resurgence of the civil powers and th e archbishopric in supervi sing the population . Then , under L eopold I , followed a period of relative respite. Bohemia was then supposedl y Catholic, although proof ex ists of the persistence of m a ny non-C atholi cs, eve n in the ranks of the nobility. For inst ance, h ym nologist Vaclav Kleych (who was not an aristocrat) , born at Lazany near Litom ysl in 1682 , who emigrated with all his family to Zittau at the beginning of the 18th century . Finally the fourth period, from 1705 to 1780 , witnessed the tightening of rep ression and a search for heretics all over Bohem ia. 1 The judicial regulation of Joseph I ( 1705-1 711) made punishable by death the peddlin g of heretical books, preaching, and suspicious assembli es. �SLOVAKIA 37 The death penalty was confirmed by Charles VI ( 1711-1740) several times, with at least five patents from March 15, 1721 to February 4, 1 724. 2 He reinforced existing antiheretical legislation with a publication on Jan. 29, 1726, which was confirmed at least twenty-two times until 1770, i.e. a lso during the reign of Maria Theresa. 3 In this system of laws, heresy was punished by forced labor and, in case of relapse, the galleys, exile and death . This was, of course, also the time of the well-known bookburning - and, more often, book confiscation and rectification . 4 The patent of October 13, 1781 put an end to the repression by accepting - with reservations - the Lutheran, Calvinist and Greek Catholic confessions . But only 45,000 persons 5 publically proclaimed their adherence to these two Protestant denominations, and the adherents of popular sects (for example that of the "Lambs,'' Berankove) continued long after to be persecuted by being press-ganged into the army . 6 We shall be concerned here with only the first two periods of the Counter Reformation . They co nstitute the background for the emergency of a Catholic hymnology in Czech. II) POLITICS AND RELIGION FROM THE END OF THE 16TH CENTURY TO 1620 From the end of the 16th century to White Mountain, the Czech Counter-Reformation lacked the means to carry out its program, even though the Hapsburgs had made Catholicism one of the principal tools of their politics in Bohemia . The Diet was torn apart by the religious conflict. After 1575 and the elaboration of the Confessio Bohemica, 1 the Sub Utraque party acquired increasing importance . 8 The events leading up to the de finitive d estruction of religious coexistence in 1618, after it had finally been won in 1609 , are too well known to be gone into here. Despite this profound upheaval , part of the intellectual elite of Prague remained open to the ideas of religious tolerance. 9 In general, the towns and cities of Bohemia were mainly Neo-Utraquist (ci:-ypto-Lutheran), with the exception of Catholic Plzeii and some others. In the countrysid e, the great majority of the clergy seems also to have been NeoUtraquist; but it must be admitted that very little is known about the realities of rural religious life in 16th century Bohemia. Despite proceedings against them, 10 the Czech Brethren were well established in ce rtain areas, especially in Moravia. �38 SLOVAKIA Throughout Bohemia, where the archbishopric ' s seat remained vacant from 14 71 to 1561 ( the year of the enthronization of Brus of Mohelnice), the structures of the Catholic Church were in deep disarray. The lack of priests was so severe that it made itself felt until at least the last third of the 17th century. 11 Therefore, religious and missionary orders, especially the Jesuits , had a lot to do to fill the vacuum. Catholicism in Moravia seems to have been more resistant , for at least the episcopal seat in Olomouc never went empty. But the towns were mostly Lutheran, even as their patrician elite was perhaps more Germanized than elsewhere . Sects abounded: in the 16th century, as is well known, Moravia had become the refuge for all the heretics of Europe. 12 The bastions of the Czech Brethren were there, especially in the lands of the Zerotfns , where they printed many of their books in the second half of the century, including the famous Kralice Bible (1579-1593) . Since the beginning of the 16th century the Moravian Diet had counted freedom of religion among its acquired privileges. In the last third of the 16th century, as a party of Catholic activists and Hapsburg faithfuls was reconstituted among the great lords in the Diet of Bohemia (Zdenek and Ladislav of Lobkovic , Vilem Slavata, J aroslav Martinie, Vilem of Rozmberk and so on), Jesuits frequently had ~issions on the estates of the nobility which had been won over by the new style of the Counter-Reformation. But this still remained a sporadic phenomenon, affecting only individuals. In the last analysis, although the figures are not entirely trustworthy, the population of the Czech Kingdom around 1620 was at least 75 % non-Catholic; the figure of 90% has also been advanced and seems to be reliable for Bohemia (without Moravia) . 13 It was a hybrid " Protestantism," deeply affected by the popular sects. Unfortunately, space does not permit me to dwell upon the extremely particular case of Czech Protestantism as it developed after the period of Hussitism . 14 III) CZECH CATHOLIC HYMNOLOGY Tfanovskfs Cithara Sanctorum (Lyre of the Saints, 1636, Levoca) represented an entirely successful attempt to renew and unify the evangelical repertoire of both the Slovak and the Czech Protestants expelled from the kingdom of Bohemia after White Mountain. Nevertheless, Tfanovsky had also delved into the rich traditions of the Utraquists, the Brethren and even the Czech Lutherans , whose �SLOVAKIA 39 first printed songbooks went back to 1501 , Pfsnicky (Little Songs , Praha 1501 , editor Jan Severyn z Kapi'. Hory, a Czech Brethren songbook). 206 canticles in the 1636 edition, or 50 % , came from the abundant repertoire of his Czech predecessors . Thus even though Tfanovsky's efforts were innovative and in many respects uniqu e in contemporary Czech and Slovak Protestant hymnology, they were rooted in a rich past and inserted within a hymnological continuum. Could the same have been true for Czech Catholic hymnology? Did it possess Catholic models anterior to the Counter-Reformation? If not, what was its relationship to the repertoires of the Utraquists , the Brethren, and even Tfanovsky? Finally, why did the Counter- Reformation so consistently resort to songbooks in the vernacular throughout the 17th and 18th centuries? All these questions will guide the following investigation. 1) Quantification of Catholic canticles and anthologies from 1580 to the end of the 18th century First, to give an idea of the imposing dimensions of Czech Catholic hymnology , I would like to provide a few figures. The Utraquists, Czech Brethren and Czech Lutherans published at least 106 different collections of canticles in Czech between 1501 and 1620. 15 Between 1580 and 1800, 85 editions of Catholic anthologies appeared. This latter figure is minimal and partial, for with a few but significant exceptions, it includes only titles beginning with Pfsne, Pfsnicky, Kancional, Kancionalnfk and Kancionalek (Songs, Little Songs, Songbook , Little Songbook). 16 The sheer quantity of canticles involved is overwhelming: 24 of these anthologies are over 500 pages long, 21 of them are over 400 pages long, and some of their number contain almost 1,000 canticles (e .g. Steyer's songbooks). A few more data before we proceed: I myself have gone through and analyzed 29 of the most important collections . Taken together, they contain around 10 ,000 can tides . There is considerable overlap , and as it emerges from these 29 anthologies, some 2,330 canticles actually circulated in 17th and 18th ce ntury Bohemia and Morav ia. Included in this figure are 1,950 canticl es which first appeared between 1580 and the end of the 18th century. Ifl stick to the temporal limits ofmy paper, that is from 1588 to 1683, the fourteen pertin ent coll ections together �40 SLOVAKIA contain 1,941 canticles including 1,128 novelties, or 58 % of the 1,950 new canticles catalogued up to 1798. 2) Catholic coJlections of hymns from the beginning of the Counter-Reformation to 1683 and their relationship to Protestant Czech hymnol- ogy Before the beginning of the Counter-Reformation in Bohemia (circa 1555-1560), only one Catholic songbook existed in the face of the numerous anthologies of the Brethren, Utraquists and Lutherans. Published anonymously in Pizer\ in 1529, both its title, Pfsnicky velmi pekne a pffkladne na nedelnf ctenf do roka (Very pretty and exemplary songs on the Sunday Gospels of the year)' 7 and its contents are reminiscent of the contemporaneous publications of the Utraquist Mfrinsky (in 1522, 1531 , then 1567, 1577 and 1590). In 1550 and 1595, the poet - or rather versifier - Simon Lomnicky z Budce published his Pfsne na Evangelia (Songs on the Gospels of the year, Praha 1580) containing 115 new canticles, and his Pfsne historicke (H istorical Songs, Praha 1595) containing 51 new canticles versifying the lives of 51 Saints, for which he had delved into diverse legendary sources, including the Legenda Aurea . But Lomnicky's songbooks are not products of the Counter-Reformation. Their tone is different, and their author did not belong to the circles of those seeking the conversion of Bohemia. He was rather a provincial writer who took pleasure in converting everything coming into his hands into songs, and who belonged to the "learned middle classes," ifl am allowed to speak in such a way . He was a school master, and in publishing two songbooks he was following late sixteenth-century fashion in urban milieux which were essentially Utraquist. Furthermore, nothing indicates that Lomnicky's collections were destined for the Church , for liturgical or paraiiturgical use; on the contrary, their author himself conceived the possibility of simple reading as well as singing. 18 These three songbooks, of which two were anterior to the first hymnological efforts of the Counter-Reformation , could well have served as models for the editors of Catholic songbooks . But in fact neither the 1529 anthology nor the Pfsne na Evangelia of 1580 (with the exception of two canticles) left any traces , while Lomnicky ' s Pfsne historicke were widely used as canticles on the Saints in 1631, 1642, 1659 and then in 1712 and 1719 . 19 �SLOVAKIA 41 The first real songbook of the Counter-Reformation emerged only in 1588 in Prague, under the aegis of the Jesuits of St. Clement College . 20 Containing 91 canticles, it was entitled Pfsne nave, kratke naucenf kfestanskeho v sobe obsahujfcf, sjinymi nekterymi na vajrocnf slavnosti i k vsidnf potfebe pfidanymi, pro Mladez a sprostnejsf lid, v nave vydane .. . (New songs containing a brief instruction in the Christian religion , with others for the feast d ays of the year and daily requirements, newly published for the young and ignorant. .. , Praha 1588) . 21 The first twenty canticles adapted P eter Canisius's Parvus Catechismus and preserved its original order. The rest were divided into canticles for the feast s of the liturgical year, including the Virgin Mary and the Saints; occasion al canticles; and canticles for public and personal devotion, i.e. for mass , before and after the sermon, for the Parish patron Sa int's day (po svfcenf) , before and after meals , for morning and evening, Rogation d ays and pilgrimages; so-called "general " or "common" canticles or perhaps canticles " for the laity " (obecnf); and canticles about death (sometimes - but not always - funeral canticles) . The two big categories, the Liturgical Year and public and private needs , are the classic categories for all Catholic collections of hymns . Among the 71 canticles remaining after the catechism in the 1588 songbook, there are 34 Protestant canticles ( one of Hussite origin, 21 27 of Utraquist origin, 23 and 6 from the Czech Brethren 14 ), four earlier canticl es from the 12th to the 15th centuries, 25 and 33 novelties, almost all of which concern public and private devotional needs. 26 P aradoxically , at least in appearance, a little more than 65 % of the canticles co ncernin g the liturgical year a re of Protestant origin (25 out of 38), with special em phasis on Christmas, Easter , Lent , Ascension D ay, P entecost and Adven t. The recycling of songs used by contemporary Protestants is considerable and very interesting indeed , for four out of eight canticles for the m ass are from the Utraquists (Gloria , Cred o, Sanctus), or from the Czech Brethren (Kyrie M agn e Deus). Coincidences of thi s kind are frequ ent in the Catholic hymnology of the Counter- R efo rmation . All the collection s of hymns retain a high proportion of canticles of Utraquist or Czech Brethren origin until the end of the 18th century . 11 These Protestant canticles belon g to the unchan ged repertory of the Liturgical Year , especially Ascension D ay and Pentecost, both very rigid categories with nearl y unchan gin g repertory , but also to the more or less movin g contents of categories like Christ- �42 SLOVAKIA mas , Lent, Easter and Advent. 28 As for canticles for occasions of public and private devotional needs , the proportion varies from songbook to songbook, but recourse to Protestant canticles anterior to 1620 is a constant . Sometimes, it seems even to be incredible: for instance, the J esuit Steyer went so far as to incorporate 45 psalms of the Czech Brother Jirfk StrejcintohisKancional cesky( 1683 , then 1687 , 1697 , 171 2, 1727 and 1764), without changing a single word from the 1587 edition . Among the essential prayers - those we call '' doctrinal ,'' that is the Pater, Ave, Credo, Ten Commandments and so on - all the son gbooks include canticles of Protestant origin. A songbook of 1652, Pfsne rocnf (Songs for the Year, published by Ludmila Sipafova, printer Jirik Sipar's widow) and the 6 editions of Steyer ' s songbook even contain a Czech version of Luther's Credo, M y vsickni veffme v jednoho Boh a (Wir glauben all' an einen Gott), 29 reprinting it perhaps from the Cithara Sanctorum of 1636. 30 By the same token , up to 1683 , i.e. the first edition ofSteyer's songbook 31 but later also, whenever an anthology presents the heading "for the holy mass " it contains texts of Protestant origin (that is 6 out of 8 anthologies from 1588 until 1683) . 32 This remained the rule until the end of the 18th century, except in Kania.s 's songbooks.ll I have chosen to spend a rather long time writing about these Pfsne na ve (New Songs) of 1588, because they exemplify the orientations of early Catholic hymnology. Indeed, putting aside the three songbooks of the poet-musician Adam Michna z Otradovic (1600-1676 ?), i.e. Ceska marianska muzika (Czech Marian Music, Praha 1647), Loutna ceska (Czech Lute, Praha 1653) and Svatorocnf muzika (M u sic for the Feasts of the Year, Praha 1661), whose 197 canticles included 195 (or perhaps only 194) written by the poet himself in a very baroque and mystical lyricism, and also excludin g j eslicky (Little Cribs, Praha 1658) of the J esuit Bedrich Bride!, all the subsequent Catholic hymnbooks from 1601 to 1683 proceed accordin g to the sam e plan, with similar contents. So let us see now what exactly were these hymnbooks. In 160 1 appeared the K an cional of R ozenplut (355 canticles in Czech), and in 1622 the Pisne katolicke (Catholi c Songs) of Hlohovsky (234 canticles in Czech). Both were published at Olomouc , and both were official hymnbooks of the diocese of Moravia, with the approval of Cardinal Dietrichstein. I n Bohemia there appeared in 163 1 the Kancional (Songbook) of the Prague printer Pavel Sessius (formerly the Protestant printer of Prague University, who converted) with 325 canticles; in 1639 a little, �43 SLOVAKIA anonymou s songbook, K an cionalnfk , due to the J esu its ofKlatovy College and perhaps to Father Albrecht Chanovsky, 34 with 121 canticles ; in 1642 the Cesky D ekakord (Czech Decacorde) of the printer Jirfk Sipar (400 can ticles); then in 1652 the Pfsne rocnf (Songs of the Year) by his widow Ludmila Sipafova ( 171 canticles) . 35 In 1659 the Cesky Dekakord of 1642 was reprinted by Urban Golias, still in Prague. The first edition of Steyer' s K ancional cesky (Czech Songbook) , also known as "sva tovacla ysk y" (St. W enceslas's songbook) , dates from 1683, as we already saw, with 828 canticles. 36 For the sake of completeness, a 1618 Postilla by the J esuit Vojtech Scipio Berlicka should be mentioned as containing canticles on the yearly gospels which appeared also in the collections of 163 1, 1642 and Steyer. All in all, without Berlicka , that brings us to nine anthologies, counting one reedition (in 1659), from 1588 to 1683 . Now, to finish with the relations between Czech Catholic and Protestant hymnologies, here are some percentages of Protestant and new canticles in these nine Catholic collections: Songbooks Canticles (in all) 1588 1601 1622 1631 1639 1642 (1659)* 1652 1683 91 355 234 325 121 400 (400) 171 828 Protestant Canticles 34 46 54 103 61 145 (145 131 280 37 % 13 % 23% 32 % 50 % 36% 36 %) 77 % 34% New Canticles 53 261 81 46 4 4 (0 8 328 58 % 73,5 % 34 % 14 % 3% 1% 0) 5% 40 % • R eediti on of 1642 Cesk y dekacord b y Urban Golias. Some of the Czech Catholic collections also had canticles from the Cithara Sanctorum: collection of 1639 1642 1653 1683 " 2 7 6 34 canticles from 1636 Cithara canticles " canticles '' canticles from 1636 and 1653 Cithara �44 SLOVAKIA The 1631 Czech songbook already had 3 canticles which were later put into the Cithara of 1636, and Steyer's book of 1683 includes also one canticle from the Amsterdam songbook by Jan Amos Komensky (Kancional, Amsterdam 1659). As a comparison, here are identical data concerning now the first Slovak Catholic songbook Cantus Catholici, which appeared in Levoca m 1655 : 37 Total number of canticles in Slovak (not Latin) Czech Protestant canticles (all in Slovak) Canticles from 1636 Cithara Sanctorum " 1653 " New Canticles 227 88 (38%) 20 (10%) 3 56 (25%) Thus the percentage of Protestant canticles in the Catholic songbooks of the first Counter-Reformation from 1588 to 1683 ( not including this latter collection) was approximately 38 % . If Rozenplut 's K ancional (1601), the only one which explicitly sought to exclude the Utraquist and Czech Brethren repertory , is left aside, the percentage increases to 42 % . Later, the average percentage declines (from 1683 to 1764, for twelve collections) but remains nonetheless at 30%. Inversely, from 1588 to 1683 (not including this one), the average percentage of novelties is only 24 %, and from 1683 to 1764, it attains 36 %. 38 The hymnbook of 1601 by Rozenplut , which is very co mbative , and to a lesser extent that of 1622 by Hlohovsky , tried to create hymnology and had less recourse than their successors to Protestant texts. But subsequently, and until 1660 , Catholic hymnbooks are characterized by a progressive return to Protestant sources. After 1683, as Steyer so amply demonstrates, Jesuit editors of hymnbooks ev in ce an astounding capacity to absorb texts from multifarious origins. Even the most " heretical" texts, as we have seen, could be admitted as long as they did not attack the Church or the Catholic doctrines themselves . Moreove r , in the 17th and 18th centuries, little hymnbooks without musical notation and destined to a more popular public, retained a much more conservative, static repertoire than the great official songbooks (like Steyer, Holan , Bozan and Konias 's songbooks). Such is the case of the Pfsne rocnf (Songs of the Year), a series of little books having roots in the second halfofthe 16th century (and therefore Utraquist) and continuing until the 19th century (in the 1652 ed ition , as we saw, there were �SLOVAKIA 45 13 1 P rotes tan t canticles out of 171 !). For there were two parallel tracks in the produ ction of C atholic hy mnbooks : first , there was that of big volumes m eant fo r the Pa rish K antor and most directly controlled by the C hurch . Second , outside the official k an cionaly , was the production of little volumes or anonym ous booklets in which particular hymnologic tradition s of the 15th and 16th century Czech R eform survived . This very important point proves that can ticles actually sung in Bohemia du rin g the 17th and 18th centuries went way beyond the choice, albeit large, p roposed b y the anth ologies of the Counter-Reform a tion : vernacul ar religiou s so ngs continued to fl ourish , sha ping sensibility in a way relatively independent of the context of re-Catholicization. Obviously the production of these booklets did not escape the ecclesiastical and civil censorship . But in Bohemia, in the context of a triumphal but indeed still ve ry ill-rooted and badl y organized Catholicism , the canticle underwent the sa.{Tle fate as other in gred ients of wha t is called the " popular Baroqu e": its purity of origin was of little importance, provided that it m obili zed lay piety. 3) Places and uses of th e canticle But how and where was the Catholic canticl e supposed to mobilize thi s lay piety? Like its P rotes tant counterpart, the Catholic h ymnbook was fi rst and fo rem ost a coll ection of Church songs intended for the u se of P arish K an to ff (Cantors) and brotherhoods (mostly , for instance, socalled literack a bratrstva). Of course, in the C a tholic Church , the canticl e was no longe r at the heart of the H oly Service. Its role was to double the liturgy to stimul ate popula r participation and ardor, and in so doin g it d oubtless, in cidentall y, played also a significant role in m aintenance of the Czech lan gu age du rin g the 17th and 18th centuries . It was also employed in catechization , in mi ssionary contexts, and in diverse situat ions of d omestic or comm uni ty devotion s and praye rs. Th at will be m y fi rst conclu sion . T he second one I should like to point out is tha t from the thematic point of view, beginnin g with Steyer in 1683, there is a verita ble eruption of personal piety in can ticles. 39 Thus, alongside the traditional themes and the son gs for the litu rgical year, there appear canti cles " to combat a nxiety," " to bear one's cross," on " m an 's love for God " and som eti mes "even if H ell does not ex ist ," on "submi ssion to Divin e will ," " pat ience in cri ses," and so on , all evokin g contemporary Germ an �46 SLOVAKIA Pietism and manifesting great similarity with the collection of Evangelical emigres. Of course, it cannot be proved that all the canticles proposed by the songbooks were actually sung in community or in church . In particular, these last ones I just referred to seem rather to have been m eant for personal meditation . But I do hope to have provided a sense of the deep richness of Catholic Czech hymnology as well as of its fundamental ambivalence. The very success of the Catholic canticle was based upon this ambivalence, and upon its roots in a tradition of popular liturgy of Protestant origin (i.e . Utraquist or Brethren) origin. It thus became a privileged means of mass indoctrination for the Counter-Reformation , contributing to the reconversion of Bohemia to Catholicism. NOTES ' From 1670 ca to the end of the 17th century records kept in the Prague Archiepiscopal archives indicate only a very small number of heretics by pari sh . For instance, curates' answers (Relationes, R esponsae) to a 1677 questionnaire often do not know notoriou s or public heretics (heretici aperti) (see Statnf usti'ednf archiv, APA I , B 11/7 - B 13/4). I would like to suggest that the same conception of heresy was changing during the process of conversion . Ca 1700 , Viscars' visitations often suspect hidden heretics, especiall y in East and North Bohemia (Ci rcles of Caslav and Chrudim). Then around 17 25, some of the archbishopric Missionarii Ordinarii began to seek out both heretics a nd books all over the country. The Archiepiscopal archives also include various kinds of inquisition documents. ' However, these patents forbade the missionaries to personally imprison the accused and transferred the judgement of heretics from ecclesiastical courts to civil courts . In the same way , as of 1735 the functions of the "extra-ordinary" missionaries had to be handed ove r to 14 secular priests ( rather th an the previous 12 J esuits) . See Tomas Vaclav Bflek, R eform ace katolicka neboli obn ovenf naboienstvf k atolick eho v Kralovstvf ceskem po bitve belohorske (Praha 1892), p. 269-271 , 293. l Id., ibid. 4 See note 1 • 5 See T. V. Bflek, op. cit., p. 296. • See T. V . Bflek, op. cit., p . 296, and Antonin Rezek, Dejiny prostonarodnfho hnutf naboien sk eho v Cech ach , I (Praha 1887). ' Maximilian II only accepted this verball y in 1575 , and Rud olph II only ratified it, with the famous Letter of Majesty , as of 1609. ' The composition of the nobility present in the Diet of 1575 was as fo llows : Old Utraquists, 2 Lords (pani), including the Grand Chamberlain Jan ofValdstejn, 3 Kni ghts (rytffi); Neo-Utraquists , 4/ 5 of the attending nobility; Catholics, 1/8; Czech Brethren, 1/4. Figures are given by Jaroslav Panek, "Zapis o charakter ceske stavovske opozice a snem roku 1575 ," Ceskoslovensky casopis historicky, XXVIII ( 1980), 6, 878-880 . �SLOVAKIA 9 ' 0 " " 13 " " " 17 " " ' 0 " ll 47 See m y paper "The T welve Sons of Carnival," to be published in Fifteenth Century Studies (D etroit) . The first expulsion orders issued against the Czech Brethren d a te from the rei gn of Jiri of Podebrady, at the end of the 15th Centu ry . The last before White M ountain was issued in 1602, seven yea rs before the Letter of M ajesty. See the record s of the Archiepiscopal archives in Prague (APA I , B 11 /7 -B 13/4, for instance); see also Frantisek Kras!, Arno.st hra be H arrach , kardinal sv. cirkve i'fmske a kn fze arcibiskup prazsk y. Historick o- kritick e vypsan f nabozen sk ych pomeru v Cechach od roku 1623- 1667 (Praha 1886), p . 134. See J osef Polise nsky, T fi cetileta valk a a evropsk e krize 17. stoletf (Praha 1970), p . 59-60 . In fac t , there a re no m ode rn es tim ates of the number of P ro tes tants in Bohemia. H owever, see Zikm unt Win ter, Zivot cirkevn f v Cechach . Kulturn f historicky obraz XV. a XVI . stoletf, I-II (Praha 1895-1 896) ; see also J osef J anacek , Gesk e dejin y . D oba pfedbelohorska 1526-1 547 , l/ 1 (Praha, 2nd edition 197 1). It must be rem embered that , aft er 1436, both Catholicism and Utraquism were state religions in Bohemia whereas Lutheranism was not offi cially tolerated until 1609. The tables conta ining the confessional breakdown of these 106 son gbooks are in my D octoral disse rt ation : H ymnologia Bohemica. Cantinnaires tch equ es d e la ContreR eform e, 1588- 1764 , vol. I , p . 107, U nive rsite de Pa ri s - Ill , 1982. These figures are based on Zdenek Tobolka andJiri H orak , Knihopis ceskych a slovensk ych tisk u od doby n ejstarsi at do k once 18. stoletf. .. II. T isk y z let 1501 -1800 (Praha 1939) etc, and Vaclav Pumprla , Soupis starych tisku ve fondech Statnf vedeck e knihovn y v Olom ouci. I . T isk y vydan e na uzem f Cech a Moravy v letech 1501-1 800 , 12 vols. (Olomouc 1974- 1979) . Pfsni cky velm i pekn e a pi'fkladne na nedeln f C ten f do roka . T ez O Sva tych ze Ctenf take z postn fch Epistol i ze C ten f pfsn e a na p osledy vseck y tuto p ofadn e V n ove zpravney najdes. A znova tistene a opravene. V Plzni ujana Pekka. Leta M DCXXIX dn e X III! Unora m esfce. 8°, 122p. See the Pfedmluva k ctenafi (Preface to the reader) in the Pfsne Historick e (Historical Songs) of 1595. Lomnicky's songs can be found in the following songbooks: Sessius (K an cional, Prague 163 1), Sipai' (Cesk y D ekakord , Prague 1642) and its reprint by Golias (P ragu e 1659) , R osenmuller (Kancionalek historicky, Prague 1712), Steyer (K ancional cesk y , Prague, 1683 , 1687 , 1697, 1712, 172 7, 1764) , and Bozan (Slavfcek rajsky , H rad ec Kralove 1719). Antonfn Skarka attributes this work to th e J esuit Alexander Vojt, at that time Su perior a t St. C lem ent Coll ege . I n a ny case, d ue to his offi cia l positi on, V ojt would have had to approve a nd supervise its publication , as well as th at of th e transl ati on of Canisiu s's Parvus Ca cscchimus pu blished in 1584 by the sa me printer , Bu ryiin Valda . Printed by Buryiin V a lda. Otce Boze Vse m ohoud, j en z jsi nam dal clo vecenstvf, Syna sveho jedin eho . .. , acco rd ing to Jirecek, H ymnolog ia Bohemica (P ra ha 1878): 15th ce ntury, Tabor so ngbook, on Corpu s Christi. �48 SLOVAKIA " Canticles for Advent: I K e cti, k ch vale Krista krale Christm as: 6 Andelove, andelo ve Jsou zpfvali; Na.radii se Kristus Pan ; Na Bozf Narozenf radujf se AnJele; Nasca] nam den vesely,z rodu kralo vsk eh o; ZnameneJ, kfest'an vern y, Kristovo Vtelenf; ZvestuJem vam radost Lent: 4 - Nebesky Pan , at'by dokazal k nam dobrocu svou velikou; 0 velika milost Syna Boi fh o; Umucenf naseho Pana milostneho; PosloucheJte ialoby nebeskeho Otce Easter: 6 Vstalt'Jest teto ch v11e ctn y Vykupitel nas; Uteseny nam den nastal; Vzkffsenf Spasitele sveh o ch val k aidy clovek ; L eto chvfle teto vesele vydava; AJ ten siln y lev udatny; V eselyt' nam den nastal Ascension Day: 1 Boie Otce z velike milosti ucinils nam vice neili dosti Pentecost: 2 VftaJ sladk y tesiteli, temnosti osvetiteli; Seslanf Du cha S vateh o Holy Virgin: I Zdravas neJsveteJsf kralovno, milost i TroJice Svare osvfcena Holy Ma ss: 3 Ana zemi budii /idem pokoJ (Gloria); Vefmez v B oha Orce Stvofitele vseho (Credo); Vsemohoucf Stvofiteli, Orce Svaty (Sa nctus) Before th e sermon : 2 Boie Otce, seslii nam nynf Du cha Svateho; Otce nas, mily Pan e, deJi nam Du cha S vateh o "Common ": 1 Pam atiIJ, clo vece, proc re Pan Buh stvofil (For d eta ils and refe rences see m y Doctoral di ssertat ion, op. cit. , pp. 390-437). " Canticles for : Advent: 2 Pas/an Jest ArchanJel k M arii Panne; Vesele zpfveJm e, Boha Orce chvalme Parish Patron Saint D ay: I Chvalmei nynf Boha sveho z posvecenf mfsta Jeho Saints and Angels: I V moci moudrosti dobreh o chvalm ez Boha v Svatych Jeho H oly Mass: I Boie Orce nas, Jeni Jsi na nebesfch "Common ": I Pane Boie bud' pfi nas, kdyi budem e m ffti (For deta ils and references, see ibid., Joe. cit .). " Buh Vsemohoucf; Svaty Va.clave; Dnesn fh o dne vstal Stvofitel; VftaJ, m ily j ezu Kriste, vftaJ, Synu z Pann y ciste " Canticles for Advent: 5 Zaff pfeJasnou navstfvil Gabriel; Zdrava Bohem pozdravena, rodicku blah oslavena; Zdrava bud p feslavna matko J ezfsova; Zdravas Pann o cista, tys pfimluva Jista; Vyk vetla hill Aronova Christmas : I Tff krali znam enali hvezdu H oly Virgin: I O Maria, vsech ctn ostf zrcadlo neJkrassf Saints and Angels: 3j ezu Kriste Vsem ohoucf(St. Andrew); Pochvalm ez Boha vecneho (St. Nicholas); Vsickni Bohu ke cit, ch vale (S t . M a ry M agdalene) H oly M ass: 3 A na zemi budii lidem pokoJ, dobra ville vsechnem (Gloria); VftaJ vdecna, vftaJ vzactna, milosti z milosti dana (Eucharisi); Zdrav bud', mily jezu Kriste, Jeni narozen z Panny ciste ( Eucharist) After the serm on: 1 Poprosmez Svateho Du cha D eath : 2 Boie Orce nas, k cobe se m odlfm e; Boie Orce nebesky, prosfmJa rve milosci R ogacions, Pilgrimages: 3 H ospodin e uslys nas, spomeii na nas; - Orce Boie smiliIJ se, o Boie; - Ve Jmeno Bozfm kraceJme M orning: 7 D aru svetlych milosti; L askavy H ospodine, ch valfme Te v 1e10 hodine; M ocny Boie, sveta spravce; Nocnf temnost se zm eiiuJe; Nut vsicknipovstavse z Jute; Orce Svaty, tesiteli, vsech vernych osveticeli; VeJmenu Svaie TroJice k nebi zdvfham hffsne ru ce �SLOVAKIA 11 " " ' 0 " " " " " 36 " 49 Before and after dinn er: 2 Dfky Panu lask avemu vzd ejm ei (aft e r dinn er); Stedry darce vsech milostf (before dinn er) "Common " : 1 B oie, kteryi z sve velike milosti (For details a nd references see m y Doctoral di sse rta ti on , op . cit., pp . 390-43 7). Canticl es of Lutheran ori gin da tin g prior to 1620 a re mu ch less frequ ent . This is becau se th e rare anthologies con sidered to be " Lutheran " ran ge from 1576 to 1606, and a re little diffe rent from the U traqui st son gbooks. Although th e repertoire of C hri stm as canticles reta ins a perm an ent co re of I 5th and 16th century son gs , it is ren ewed in the 17th and 18th centuri es. The new repertory a ppears with R oze nplu t's anth ology ( 1601 ) and is henceforth reinforced from one collecti on to the nex t. The "Christmas canticle" catego ry is therefo re one of the most mobile of all. The same is tru e, to a mu ch lesser degree, of Advent son gs. On th e other ha nd , Easter ca nticl es a re mu ch more co nse rvati ve, despite the new elements which appear in the 17th and 18th centuri es. The Ascen sion and Pentecos t ca tego ri es a re ve ry traditi on al. In so far as Lent is co nce rned , thin gs are so mewh at different: canticles of Utraqui st origin and so ngs from th e C zech Brethren predomin a te until 1650 . Mi chn a's son gbooks ( 1647 a nd 1661 ) m ark the beginn ing of a renovation in th e theme of th e C ru cified Christ, whi ch is henceforth based upon a personal link with th e sinner . This th eme is continu all y enl arged upon unti l th e beginnin g of th e 18th ce ntury. If one can believe th e ca nticles, in the later thi rd of th e 17th ce ntury th e Czech Coun te r-R eform ation is "C hristological. " This te nden cy is also found in pa mphl ets featurin g a n ave rage of 1 to 4 canti cles. The numbe r of doc trin al canticl es re-used by Cath olic son gbooks now totals 14 (2 T en Co mm and m ents , 6 Pater , 2 canticles on th e Trin ity, 4 C red o). But th e Czech tex t is older than 163 6 . M atej V aclav Steye r , K an cion al cesk y, Praha 1683, 1687, 1697, 1712, 17 27 , 1764. 3 K y rie, 2 Gloria, 1 fo r th e Epi stle, 1 for th e G os pel, 2 C redo, 3 S an ctu s , in oth er word s a total of 12 canticl es. Antonin Konias, C itara Noveh o Zakona (The C ithara of the N ew T estament), Hradec Kralove 1727 , 1738 , 1746, 1750, Pra ha 1752, no date / mi d 18th century/, Hradec Kralove 1762, 1799 . So K oni as ' s m ain so n gbook was publi shed eight tim es between 1727 an d 1799. For fu rth er in for ma ti ons on Father C hanovsky see my D octoral di ssertat ion (op . cit. , pp . 2 16-222 an d pp . 225-227). J an Rozenplut z Svarcenbachu , K an cional , 4°, Olomouc 1601 ; Ji rik Hlohovsky, Pfs ne k atolick e, 8°, O lomouc 1622; Pavel Sessius, K ancional , 4°, Praha 163 1; Anonymous, K an cionalnfk , 8 ° , Praha 1639 ; Ji rik Sipai', Cesk y D ek ak ord , 4° , P raha 1642 ; Ludm ila Sipai'ova, P fs n e rocnf, 12° , Prah a 1652; Urb a n Goli as , Cesk y D ekak ord, 4° , P raha 1659. O th er ed itions of Steye r' s son gboo k contained th e fo llowing number of canticles: 1687: 883 (P ro testant: 32%) 1727: 927 (P rotest a nt: 32 % ) 1697: 896 (P rotestant: 32 % ) 1764: 927 (Protesta nt: 32 %) 1712: 947 (Protestant: 31,5 % ) Figures calcu lated on th e bas is of J an Vi li kovsky's "Cantus Catholici, " Trn avsky sbornik (Bratislava 1935) , pp 57-94. On the Levoca printi n g, see Jan Caplov ic, �50 38 39 SLOVAKIA Bibliogralia tla ci vyd an ych na Slovensku do roku 1700, Diel 1. (Martin: Matica slo· venska , 1972), p. 364. The· Catholic songbook can therefore be co mpared to contemporary Czech collec· tions, the only difference being th e much high er proportion of songs borrowed from the C ithara Sanctorum, which can be explained by their geogra phic proxi mit y. The Steyer a nd Konias songbooks co nta in 35 (for 1687- 1764 editions) and 24 (for 1752 a nd furth er editions) canticles from the 1636 Cithara Sanctorum. All of them are included in the so-called "common " or "general " canticles in Steyer's songbook. In Bozan 's and K onias's songbooks, th ey have their own categories be· sides "common " or "general" can ticles. Most of them insist on man ' s love for God . Presented in Panel 99, " Devotional Literature in Seventeenth C entury Slovakia ," at th e AAASS co nvention in W ashin gton , D.C. on 17 O ctober 1982 . � SLOVAKIA 36 Counter-Reformation and Early Czech Catholic Kancionaly in the Kingdom of Bohemia (1588-1683) Marie- Elizabeth Ducreux I) THE BACKGROUND It is surely unnecessary here to go deeply into the hi story of th e Counter Reformation in the Czech Kingdom , so intima tely linked in m y mind to its integration into the H apsburg Monarchy . In any case, exploring this history in detail is obviously beyond the scope of this paper , but to situate the context of my subj ect, I shall begin by sketching its general outline and suggesting a periodization. Four phases can be di stin gui shed in th e elaboration and application of the policy of co nversion . Th e first period, extending from th e arrival ofthejesuits in Prague (1556) to the d efeat at White M ountain (Nov. 8 , 1620), set the stage for what followed. The second period , from 1621 to the reign of Leopold I , witnessed active attempts to implement the poli cy of con ve rsion . This includes the Thirty Years' War, which seve rely h ampered effort s to convert the rural areas, a nd the milesto ne of 1650 , whi ch marked the energetic resurgence of the civil powers and th e archbishopric in supervi sing the population . Then , under L eopold I , followed a period of relative respite. Bohemia was then supposedl y Catholic, although proof ex ists of the persistence of m a ny non-C atholi cs, eve n in the ranks of the nobility. For inst ance, h ym nologist Vaclav Kleych (who was not an aristocrat) , born at Lazany near Litom ysl in 1682 , who emigrated with all his family to Zittau at the beginning of the 18th century . Finally the fourth period, from 1705 to 1780 , witnessed the tightening of rep ression and a search for heretics all over Bohem ia. 1 The judicial regulation of Joseph I ( 1705-1 711) made punishable by death the peddlin g of heretical books, preaching, and suspicious assembli es. �SLOVAKIA 37 The death penalty was confirmed by Charles VI ( 1711-1740) several times, with at least five patents from March 15, 1721 to February 4, 1 724. 2 He reinforced existing antiheretical legislation with a publication on Jan. 29, 1726, which was confirmed at least twenty-two times until 1770, i.e. a lso during the reign of Maria Theresa. 3 In this system of laws, heresy was punished by forced labor and, in case of relapse, the galleys, exile and death . This was, of course, also the time of the well-known bookburning - and, more often, book confiscation and rectification . 4 The patent of October 13, 1781 put an end to the repression by accepting - with reservations - the Lutheran, Calvinist and Greek Catholic confessions . But only 45,000 persons 5 publically proclaimed their adherence to these two Protestant denominations, and the adherents of popular sects (for example that of the "Lambs,'' Berankove) continued long after to be persecuted by being press-ganged into the army . 6 We shall be concerned here with only the first two periods of the Counter Reformation . They co nstitute the background for the emergency of a Catholic hymnology in Czech. II) POLITICS AND RELIGION FROM THE END OF THE 16TH CENTURY TO 1620 From the end of the 16th century to White Mountain, the Czech Counter-Reformation lacked the means to carry out its program, even though the Hapsburgs had made Catholicism one of the principal tools of their politics in Bohemia . The Diet was torn apart by the religious conflict. After 1575 and the elaboration of the Confessio Bohemica, 1 the Sub Utraque party acquired increasing importance . 8 The events leading up to the de finitive d estruction of religious coexistence in 1618, after it had finally been won in 1609 , are too well known to be gone into here. Despite this profound upheaval , part of the intellectual elite of Prague remained open to the ideas of religious tolerance. 9 In general, the towns and cities of Bohemia were mainly Neo-Utraquist (ci:-ypto-Lutheran), with the exception of Catholic Plzeii and some others. In the countrysid e, the great majority of the clergy seems also to have been NeoUtraquist; but it must be admitted that very little is known about the realities of rural religious life in 16th century Bohemia. Despite proceedings against them, 10 the Czech Brethren were well established in ce rtain areas, especially in Moravia. �38 SLOVAKIA Throughout Bohemia, where the archbishopric ' s seat remained vacant from 14 71 to 1561 ( the year of the enthronization of Brus of Mohelnice), the structures of the Catholic Church were in deep disarray. The lack of priests was so severe that it made itself felt until at least the last third of the 17th century. 11 Therefore, religious and missionary orders, especially the Jesuits , had a lot to do to fill the vacuum. Catholicism in Moravia seems to have been more resistant , for at least the episcopal seat in Olomouc never went empty. But the towns were mostly Lutheran, even as their patrician elite was perhaps more Germanized than elsewhere . Sects abounded: in the 16th century, as is well known, Moravia had become the refuge for all the heretics of Europe. 12 The bastions of the Czech Brethren were there, especially in the lands of the Zerotfns , where they printed many of their books in the second half of the century, including the famous Kralice Bible (1579-1593) . Since the beginning of the 16th century the Moravian Diet had counted freedom of religion among its acquired privileges. In the last third of the 16th century, as a party of Catholic activists and Hapsburg faithfuls was reconstituted among the great lords in the Diet of Bohemia (Zdenek and Ladislav of Lobkovic , Vilem Slavata, J aroslav Martinie, Vilem of Rozmberk and so on), Jesuits frequently had ~issions on the estates of the nobility which had been won over by the new style of the Counter-Reformation. But this still remained a sporadic phenomenon, affecting only individuals. In the last analysis, although the figures are not entirely trustworthy, the population of the Czech Kingdom around 1620 was at least 75 % non-Catholic; the figure of 90% has also been advanced and seems to be reliable for Bohemia (without Moravia) . 13 It was a hybrid " Protestantism," deeply affected by the popular sects. Unfortunately, space does not permit me to dwell upon the extremely particular case of Czech Protestantism as it developed after the period of Hussitism . 14 III) CZECH CATHOLIC HYMNOLOGY Tfanovskfs Cithara Sanctorum (Lyre of the Saints, 1636, Levoca) represented an entirely successful attempt to renew and unify the evangelical repertoire of both the Slovak and the Czech Protestants expelled from the kingdom of Bohemia after White Mountain. Nevertheless, Tfanovsky had also delved into the rich traditions of the Utraquists, the Brethren and even the Czech Lutherans , whose �SLOVAKIA 39 first printed songbooks went back to 1501 , Pfsnicky (Little Songs , Praha 1501 , editor Jan Severyn z Kapi'. Hory, a Czech Brethren songbook). 206 canticles in the 1636 edition, or 50 % , came from the abundant repertoire of his Czech predecessors . Thus even though Tfanovsky's efforts were innovative and in many respects uniqu e in contemporary Czech and Slovak Protestant hymnology, they were rooted in a rich past and inserted within a hymnological continuum. Could the same have been true for Czech Catholic hymnology? Did it possess Catholic models anterior to the Counter-Reformation? If not, what was its relationship to the repertoires of the Utraquists , the Brethren, and even Tfanovsky? Finally, why did the Counter- Reformation so consistently resort to songbooks in the vernacular throughout the 17th and 18th centuries? All these questions will guide the following investigation. 1) Quantification of Catholic canticles and anthologies from 1580 to the end of the 18th century First, to give an idea of the imposing dimensions of Czech Catholic hymnology , I would like to provide a few figures. The Utraquists, Czech Brethren and Czech Lutherans published at least 106 different collections of canticles in Czech between 1501 and 1620. 15 Between 1580 and 1800, 85 editions of Catholic anthologies appeared. This latter figure is minimal and partial, for with a few but significant exceptions, it includes only titles beginning with Pfsne, Pfsnicky, Kancional, Kancionalnfk and Kancionalek (Songs, Little Songs, Songbook , Little Songbook). 16 The sheer quantity of canticles involved is overwhelming: 24 of these anthologies are over 500 pages long, 21 of them are over 400 pages long, and some of their number contain almost 1,000 canticles (e .g. Steyer's songbooks). A few more data before we proceed: I myself have gone through and analyzed 29 of the most important collections . Taken together, they contain around 10 ,000 can tides . There is considerable overlap , and as it emerges from these 29 anthologies, some 2,330 canticles actually circulated in 17th and 18th ce ntury Bohemia and Morav ia. Included in this figure are 1,950 canticl es which first appeared between 1580 and the end of the 18th century. Ifl stick to the temporal limits ofmy paper, that is from 1588 to 1683, the fourteen pertin ent coll ections together �40 SLOVAKIA contain 1,941 canticles including 1,128 novelties, or 58 % of the 1,950 new canticles catalogued up to 1798. 2) Catholic coJlections of hymns from the beginning of the Counter-Reformation to 1683 and their relationship to Protestant Czech hymnol- ogy Before the beginning of the Counter-Reformation in Bohemia (circa 1555-1560), only one Catholic songbook existed in the face of the numerous anthologies of the Brethren, Utraquists and Lutherans. Published anonymously in Pizer\ in 1529, both its title, Pfsnicky velmi pekne a pffkladne na nedelnf ctenf do roka (Very pretty and exemplary songs on the Sunday Gospels of the year)' 7 and its contents are reminiscent of the contemporaneous publications of the Utraquist Mfrinsky (in 1522, 1531 , then 1567, 1577 and 1590). In 1550 and 1595, the poet - or rather versifier - Simon Lomnicky z Budce published his Pfsne na Evangelia (Songs on the Gospels of the year, Praha 1580) containing 115 new canticles, and his Pfsne historicke (H istorical Songs, Praha 1595) containing 51 new canticles versifying the lives of 51 Saints, for which he had delved into diverse legendary sources, including the Legenda Aurea . But Lomnicky's songbooks are not products of the Counter-Reformation. Their tone is different, and their author did not belong to the circles of those seeking the conversion of Bohemia. He was rather a provincial writer who took pleasure in converting everything coming into his hands into songs, and who belonged to the "learned middle classes," ifl am allowed to speak in such a way . He was a school master, and in publishing two songbooks he was following late sixteenth-century fashion in urban milieux which were essentially Utraquist. Furthermore, nothing indicates that Lomnicky's collections were destined for the Church , for liturgical or paraiiturgical use; on the contrary, their author himself conceived the possibility of simple reading as well as singing. 18 These three songbooks, of which two were anterior to the first hymnological efforts of the Counter-Reformation , could well have served as models for the editors of Catholic songbooks . But in fact neither the 1529 anthology nor the Pfsne na Evangelia of 1580 (with the exception of two canticles) left any traces , while Lomnicky ' s Pfsne historicke were widely used as canticles on the Saints in 1631, 1642, 1659 and then in 1712 and 1719 . 19 �SLOVAKIA 41 The first real songbook of the Counter-Reformation emerged only in 1588 in Prague, under the aegis of the Jesuits of St. Clement College . 20 Containing 91 canticles, it was entitled Pfsne nave, kratke naucenf kfestanskeho v sobe obsahujfcf, sjinymi nekterymi na vajrocnf slavnosti i k vsidnf potfebe pfidanymi, pro Mladez a sprostnejsf lid, v nave vydane .. . (New songs containing a brief instruction in the Christian religion , with others for the feast d ays of the year and daily requirements, newly published for the young and ignorant. .. , Praha 1588) . 21 The first twenty canticles adapted P eter Canisius's Parvus Catechismus and preserved its original order. The rest were divided into canticles for the feast s of the liturgical year, including the Virgin Mary and the Saints; occasion al canticles; and canticles for public and personal devotion, i.e. for mass , before and after the sermon, for the Parish patron Sa int's day (po svfcenf) , before and after meals , for morning and evening, Rogation d ays and pilgrimages; so-called "general " or "common" canticles or perhaps canticles " for the laity " (obecnf); and canticles about death (sometimes - but not always - funeral canticles) . The two big categories, the Liturgical Year and public and private needs , are the classic categories for all Catholic collections of hymns . Among the 71 canticles remaining after the catechism in the 1588 songbook, there are 34 Protestant canticles ( one of Hussite origin, 21 27 of Utraquist origin, 23 and 6 from the Czech Brethren 14 ), four earlier canticl es from the 12th to the 15th centuries, 25 and 33 novelties, almost all of which concern public and private devotional needs. 26 P aradoxically , at least in appearance, a little more than 65 % of the canticles co ncernin g the liturgical year a re of Protestant origin (25 out of 38), with special em phasis on Christmas, Easter , Lent , Ascension D ay, P entecost and Adven t. The recycling of songs used by contemporary Protestants is considerable and very interesting indeed , for four out of eight canticles for the m ass are from the Utraquists (Gloria , Cred o, Sanctus), or from the Czech Brethren (Kyrie M agn e Deus). Coincidences of thi s kind are frequ ent in the Catholic hymnology of the Counter- R efo rmation . All the collection s of hymns retain a high proportion of canticles of Utraquist or Czech Brethren origin until the end of the 18th century . 11 These Protestant canticles belon g to the unchan ged repertory of the Liturgical Year , especially Ascension D ay and Pentecost, both very rigid categories with nearl y unchan gin g repertory , but also to the more or less movin g contents of categories like Christ- �42 SLOVAKIA mas , Lent, Easter and Advent. 28 As for canticles for occasions of public and private devotional needs , the proportion varies from songbook to songbook, but recourse to Protestant canticles anterior to 1620 is a constant . Sometimes, it seems even to be incredible: for instance, the J esuit Steyer went so far as to incorporate 45 psalms of the Czech Brother Jirfk StrejcintohisKancional cesky( 1683 , then 1687 , 1697 , 171 2, 1727 and 1764), without changing a single word from the 1587 edition . Among the essential prayers - those we call '' doctrinal ,'' that is the Pater, Ave, Credo, Ten Commandments and so on - all the son gbooks include canticles of Protestant origin. A songbook of 1652, Pfsne rocnf (Songs for the Year, published by Ludmila Sipafova, printer Jirik Sipar's widow) and the 6 editions of Steyer ' s songbook even contain a Czech version of Luther's Credo, M y vsickni veffme v jednoho Boh a (Wir glauben all' an einen Gott), 29 reprinting it perhaps from the Cithara Sanctorum of 1636. 30 By the same token , up to 1683 , i.e. the first edition ofSteyer's songbook 31 but later also, whenever an anthology presents the heading "for the holy mass " it contains texts of Protestant origin (that is 6 out of 8 anthologies from 1588 until 1683) . 32 This remained the rule until the end of the 18th century, except in Kania.s 's songbooks.ll I have chosen to spend a rather long time writing about these Pfsne na ve (New Songs) of 1588, because they exemplify the orientations of early Catholic hymnology. Indeed, putting aside the three songbooks of the poet-musician Adam Michna z Otradovic (1600-1676 ?), i.e. Ceska marianska muzika (Czech Marian Music, Praha 1647), Loutna ceska (Czech Lute, Praha 1653) and Svatorocnf muzika (M u sic for the Feasts of the Year, Praha 1661), whose 197 canticles included 195 (or perhaps only 194) written by the poet himself in a very baroque and mystical lyricism, and also excludin g j eslicky (Little Cribs, Praha 1658) of the J esuit Bedrich Bride!, all the subsequent Catholic hymnbooks from 1601 to 1683 proceed accordin g to the sam e plan, with similar contents. So let us see now what exactly were these hymnbooks. In 160 1 appeared the K an cional of R ozenplut (355 canticles in Czech), and in 1622 the Pisne katolicke (Catholi c Songs) of Hlohovsky (234 canticles in Czech). Both were published at Olomouc , and both were official hymnbooks of the diocese of Moravia, with the approval of Cardinal Dietrichstein. I n Bohemia there appeared in 163 1 the Kancional (Songbook) of the Prague printer Pavel Sessius (formerly the Protestant printer of Prague University, who converted) with 325 canticles; in 1639 a little, �43 SLOVAKIA anonymou s songbook, K an cionalnfk , due to the J esu its ofKlatovy College and perhaps to Father Albrecht Chanovsky, 34 with 121 canticles ; in 1642 the Cesky D ekakord (Czech Decacorde) of the printer Jirfk Sipar (400 can ticles); then in 1652 the Pfsne rocnf (Songs of the Year) by his widow Ludmila Sipafova ( 171 canticles) . 35 In 1659 the Cesky Dekakord of 1642 was reprinted by Urban Golias, still in Prague. The first edition of Steyer' s K ancional cesky (Czech Songbook) , also known as "sva tovacla ysk y" (St. W enceslas's songbook) , dates from 1683, as we already saw, with 828 canticles. 36 For the sake of completeness, a 1618 Postilla by the J esuit Vojtech Scipio Berlicka should be mentioned as containing canticles on the yearly gospels which appeared also in the collections of 163 1, 1642 and Steyer. All in all, without Berlicka , that brings us to nine anthologies, counting one reedition (in 1659), from 1588 to 1683 . Now, to finish with the relations between Czech Catholic and Protestant hymnologies, here are some percentages of Protestant and new canticles in these nine Catholic collections: Songbooks Canticles (in all) 1588 1601 1622 1631 1639 1642 (1659)* 1652 1683 91 355 234 325 121 400 (400) 171 828 Protestant Canticles 34 46 54 103 61 145 (145 131 280 37 % 13 % 23% 32 % 50 % 36% 36 %) 77 % 34% New Canticles 53 261 81 46 4 4 (0 8 328 58 % 73,5 % 34 % 14 % 3% 1% 0) 5% 40 % • R eediti on of 1642 Cesk y dekacord b y Urban Golias. Some of the Czech Catholic collections also had canticles from the Cithara Sanctorum: collection of 1639 1642 1653 1683 " 2 7 6 34 canticles from 1636 Cithara canticles " canticles '' canticles from 1636 and 1653 Cithara �44 SLOVAKIA The 1631 Czech songbook already had 3 canticles which were later put into the Cithara of 1636, and Steyer's book of 1683 includes also one canticle from the Amsterdam songbook by Jan Amos Komensky (Kancional, Amsterdam 1659). As a comparison, here are identical data concerning now the first Slovak Catholic songbook Cantus Catholici, which appeared in Levoca m 1655 : 37 Total number of canticles in Slovak (not Latin) Czech Protestant canticles (all in Slovak) Canticles from 1636 Cithara Sanctorum " 1653 " New Canticles 227 88 (38%) 20 (10%) 3 56 (25%) Thus the percentage of Protestant canticles in the Catholic songbooks of the first Counter-Reformation from 1588 to 1683 ( not including this latter collection) was approximately 38 % . If Rozenplut 's K ancional (1601), the only one which explicitly sought to exclude the Utraquist and Czech Brethren repertory , is left aside, the percentage increases to 42 % . Later, the average percentage declines (from 1683 to 1764, for twelve collections) but remains nonetheless at 30%. Inversely, from 1588 to 1683 (not including this one), the average percentage of novelties is only 24 %, and from 1683 to 1764, it attains 36 %. 38 The hymnbook of 1601 by Rozenplut , which is very co mbative , and to a lesser extent that of 1622 by Hlohovsky , tried to create hymnology and had less recourse than their successors to Protestant texts. But subsequently, and until 1660 , Catholic hymnbooks are characterized by a progressive return to Protestant sources. After 1683, as Steyer so amply demonstrates, Jesuit editors of hymnbooks ev in ce an astounding capacity to absorb texts from multifarious origins. Even the most " heretical" texts, as we have seen, could be admitted as long as they did not attack the Church or the Catholic doctrines themselves . Moreove r , in the 17th and 18th centuries, little hymnbooks without musical notation and destined to a more popular public, retained a much more conservative, static repertoire than the great official songbooks (like Steyer, Holan , Bozan and Konias 's songbooks). Such is the case of the Pfsne rocnf (Songs of the Year), a series of little books having roots in the second halfofthe 16th century (and therefore Utraquist) and continuing until the 19th century (in the 1652 ed ition , as we saw, there were �SLOVAKIA 45 13 1 P rotes tan t canticles out of 171 !). For there were two parallel tracks in the produ ction of C atholic hy mnbooks : first , there was that of big volumes m eant fo r the Pa rish K antor and most directly controlled by the C hurch . Second , outside the official k an cionaly , was the production of little volumes or anonym ous booklets in which particular hymnologic tradition s of the 15th and 16th century Czech R eform survived . This very important point proves that can ticles actually sung in Bohemia du rin g the 17th and 18th centuries went way beyond the choice, albeit large, p roposed b y the anth ologies of the Counter-Reform a tion : vernacul ar religiou s so ngs continued to fl ourish , sha ping sensibility in a way relatively independent of the context of re-Catholicization. Obviously the production of these booklets did not escape the ecclesiastical and civil censorship . But in Bohemia, in the context of a triumphal but indeed still ve ry ill-rooted and badl y organized Catholicism , the canticle underwent the sa.{Tle fate as other in gred ients of wha t is called the " popular Baroqu e": its purity of origin was of little importance, provided that it m obili zed lay piety. 3) Places and uses of th e canticle But how and where was the Catholic canticl e supposed to mobilize thi s lay piety? Like its P rotes tant counterpart, the Catholic h ymnbook was fi rst and fo rem ost a coll ection of Church songs intended for the u se of P arish K an to ff (Cantors) and brotherhoods (mostly , for instance, socalled literack a bratrstva). Of course, in the C a tholic Church , the canticl e was no longe r at the heart of the H oly Service. Its role was to double the liturgy to stimul ate popula r participation and ardor, and in so doin g it d oubtless, in cidentall y, played also a significant role in m aintenance of the Czech lan gu age du rin g the 17th and 18th centuries . It was also employed in catechization , in mi ssionary contexts, and in diverse situat ions of d omestic or comm uni ty devotion s and praye rs. Th at will be m y fi rst conclu sion . T he second one I should like to point out is tha t from the thematic point of view, beginnin g with Steyer in 1683, there is a verita ble eruption of personal piety in can ticles. 39 Thus, alongside the traditional themes and the son gs for the litu rgical year, there appear canti cles " to combat a nxiety," " to bear one's cross," on " m an 's love for God " and som eti mes "even if H ell does not ex ist ," on "submi ssion to Divin e will ," " pat ience in cri ses," and so on , all evokin g contemporary Germ an �46 SLOVAKIA Pietism and manifesting great similarity with the collection of Evangelical emigres. Of course, it cannot be proved that all the canticles proposed by the songbooks were actually sung in community or in church . In particular, these last ones I just referred to seem rather to have been m eant for personal meditation . But I do hope to have provided a sense of the deep richness of Catholic Czech hymnology as well as of its fundamental ambivalence. The very success of the Catholic canticle was based upon this ambivalence, and upon its roots in a tradition of popular liturgy of Protestant origin (i.e . Utraquist or Brethren) origin. It thus became a privileged means of mass indoctrination for the Counter-Reformation , contributing to the reconversion of Bohemia to Catholicism. NOTES ' From 1670 ca to the end of the 17th century records kept in the Prague Archiepiscopal archives indicate only a very small number of heretics by pari sh . For instance, curates' answers (Relationes, R esponsae) to a 1677 questionnaire often do not know notoriou s or public heretics (heretici aperti) (see Statnf usti'ednf archiv, APA I , B 11/7 - B 13/4). I would like to suggest that the same conception of heresy was changing during the process of conversion . Ca 1700 , Viscars' visitations often suspect hidden heretics, especiall y in East and North Bohemia (Ci rcles of Caslav and Chrudim). Then around 17 25, some of the archbishopric Missionarii Ordinarii began to seek out both heretics a nd books all over the country. The Archiepiscopal archives also include various kinds of inquisition documents. ' However, these patents forbade the missionaries to personally imprison the accused and transferred the judgement of heretics from ecclesiastical courts to civil courts . In the same way , as of 1735 the functions of the "extra-ordinary" missionaries had to be handed ove r to 14 secular priests ( rather th an the previous 12 J esuits) . See Tomas Vaclav Bflek, R eform ace katolicka neboli obn ovenf naboienstvf k atolick eho v Kralovstvf ceskem po bitve belohorske (Praha 1892), p. 269-271 , 293. l Id., ibid. 4 See note 1 • 5 See T. V. Bflek, op. cit., p. 296. • See T. V . Bflek, op. cit., p . 296, and Antonin Rezek, Dejiny prostonarodnfho hnutf naboien sk eho v Cech ach , I (Praha 1887). ' Maximilian II only accepted this verball y in 1575 , and Rud olph II only ratified it, with the famous Letter of Majesty , as of 1609. ' The composition of the nobility present in the Diet of 1575 was as fo llows : Old Utraquists, 2 Lords (pani), including the Grand Chamberlain Jan ofValdstejn, 3 Kni ghts (rytffi); Neo-Utraquists , 4/ 5 of the attending nobility; Catholics, 1/8; Czech Brethren, 1/4. Figures are given by Jaroslav Panek, "Zapis o charakter ceske stavovske opozice a snem roku 1575 ," Ceskoslovensky casopis historicky, XXVIII ( 1980), 6, 878-880 . �SLOVAKIA 9 ' 0 " " 13 " " " 17 " " ' 0 " ll 47 See m y paper "The T welve Sons of Carnival," to be published in Fifteenth Century Studies (D etroit) . The first expulsion orders issued against the Czech Brethren d a te from the rei gn of Jiri of Podebrady, at the end of the 15th Centu ry . The last before White M ountain was issued in 1602, seven yea rs before the Letter of M ajesty. See the record s of the Archiepiscopal archives in Prague (APA I , B 11 /7 -B 13/4, for instance); see also Frantisek Kras!, Arno.st hra be H arrach , kardinal sv. cirkve i'fmske a kn fze arcibiskup prazsk y. Historick o- kritick e vypsan f nabozen sk ych pomeru v Cechach od roku 1623- 1667 (Praha 1886), p . 134. See J osef Polise nsky, T fi cetileta valk a a evropsk e krize 17. stoletf (Praha 1970), p . 59-60 . In fac t , there a re no m ode rn es tim ates of the number of P ro tes tants in Bohemia. H owever, see Zikm unt Win ter, Zivot cirkevn f v Cechach . Kulturn f historicky obraz XV. a XVI . stoletf, I-II (Praha 1895-1 896) ; see also J osef J anacek , Gesk e dejin y . D oba pfedbelohorska 1526-1 547 , l/ 1 (Praha, 2nd edition 197 1). It must be rem embered that , aft er 1436, both Catholicism and Utraquism were state religions in Bohemia whereas Lutheranism was not offi cially tolerated until 1609. The tables conta ining the confessional breakdown of these 106 son gbooks are in my D octoral disse rt ation : H ymnologia Bohemica. Cantinnaires tch equ es d e la ContreR eform e, 1588- 1764 , vol. I , p . 107, U nive rsite de Pa ri s - Ill , 1982. These figures are based on Zdenek Tobolka andJiri H orak , Knihopis ceskych a slovensk ych tisk u od doby n ejstarsi at do k once 18. stoletf. .. II. T isk y z let 1501 -1800 (Praha 1939) etc, and Vaclav Pumprla , Soupis starych tisku ve fondech Statnf vedeck e knihovn y v Olom ouci. I . T isk y vydan e na uzem f Cech a Moravy v letech 1501-1 800 , 12 vols. (Olomouc 1974- 1979) . Pfsni cky velm i pekn e a pi'fkladne na nedeln f C ten f do roka . T ez O Sva tych ze Ctenf take z postn fch Epistol i ze C ten f pfsn e a na p osledy vseck y tuto p ofadn e V n ove zpravney najdes. A znova tistene a opravene. V Plzni ujana Pekka. Leta M DCXXIX dn e X III! Unora m esfce. 8°, 122p. See the Pfedmluva k ctenafi (Preface to the reader) in the Pfsne Historick e (Historical Songs) of 1595. Lomnicky's songs can be found in the following songbooks: Sessius (K an cional, Prague 163 1), Sipai' (Cesk y D ekakord , Prague 1642) and its reprint by Golias (P ragu e 1659) , R osenmuller (Kancionalek historicky, Prague 1712), Steyer (K ancional cesk y , Prague, 1683 , 1687 , 1697, 1712, 172 7, 1764) , and Bozan (Slavfcek rajsky , H rad ec Kralove 1719). Antonfn Skarka attributes this work to th e J esuit Alexander Vojt, at that time Su perior a t St. C lem ent Coll ege . I n a ny case, d ue to his offi cia l positi on, V ojt would have had to approve a nd supervise its publication , as well as th at of th e transl ati on of Canisiu s's Parvus Ca cscchimus pu blished in 1584 by the sa me printer , Bu ryiin Valda . Printed by Buryiin V a lda. Otce Boze Vse m ohoud, j en z jsi nam dal clo vecenstvf, Syna sveho jedin eho . .. , acco rd ing to Jirecek, H ymnolog ia Bohemica (P ra ha 1878): 15th ce ntury, Tabor so ngbook, on Corpu s Christi. �48 SLOVAKIA " Canticles for Advent: I K e cti, k ch vale Krista krale Christm as: 6 Andelove, andelo ve Jsou zpfvali; Na.radii se Kristus Pan ; Na Bozf Narozenf radujf se AnJele; Nasca] nam den vesely,z rodu kralo vsk eh o; ZnameneJ, kfest'an vern y, Kristovo Vtelenf; ZvestuJem vam radost Lent: 4 - Nebesky Pan , at'by dokazal k nam dobrocu svou velikou; 0 velika milost Syna Boi fh o; Umucenf naseho Pana milostneho; PosloucheJte ialoby nebeskeho Otce Easter: 6 Vstalt'Jest teto ch v11e ctn y Vykupitel nas; Uteseny nam den nastal; Vzkffsenf Spasitele sveh o ch val k aidy clovek ; L eto chvfle teto vesele vydava; AJ ten siln y lev udatny; V eselyt' nam den nastal Ascension Day: 1 Boie Otce z velike milosti ucinils nam vice neili dosti Pentecost: 2 VftaJ sladk y tesiteli, temnosti osvetiteli; Seslanf Du cha S vateh o Holy Virgin: I Zdravas neJsveteJsf kralovno, milost i TroJice Svare osvfcena Holy Ma ss: 3 Ana zemi budii /idem pokoJ (Gloria); Vefmez v B oha Orce Stvofitele vseho (Credo); Vsemohoucf Stvofiteli, Orce Svaty (Sa nctus) Before th e sermon : 2 Boie Otce, seslii nam nynf Du cha Svateho; Otce nas, mily Pan e, deJi nam Du cha S vateh o "Common ": 1 Pam atiIJ, clo vece, proc re Pan Buh stvofil (For d eta ils and refe rences see m y Doctoral di ssertat ion, op. cit. , pp. 390-437). " Canticles for : Advent: 2 Pas/an Jest ArchanJel k M arii Panne; Vesele zpfveJm e, Boha Orce chvalme Parish Patron Saint D ay: I Chvalmei nynf Boha sveho z posvecenf mfsta Jeho Saints and Angels: I V moci moudrosti dobreh o chvalm ez Boha v Svatych Jeho H oly Mass: I Boie Orce nas, Jeni Jsi na nebesfch "Common ": I Pane Boie bud' pfi nas, kdyi budem e m ffti (For deta ils and references, see ibid., Joe. cit .). " Buh Vsemohoucf; Svaty Va.clave; Dnesn fh o dne vstal Stvofitel; VftaJ, m ily j ezu Kriste, vftaJ, Synu z Pann y ciste " Canticles for Advent: 5 Zaff pfeJasnou navstfvil Gabriel; Zdrava Bohem pozdravena, rodicku blah oslavena; Zdrava bud p feslavna matko J ezfsova; Zdravas Pann o cista, tys pfimluva Jista; Vyk vetla hill Aronova Christmas : I Tff krali znam enali hvezdu H oly Virgin: I O Maria, vsech ctn ostf zrcadlo neJkrassf Saints and Angels: 3j ezu Kriste Vsem ohoucf(St. Andrew); Pochvalm ez Boha vecneho (St. Nicholas); Vsickni Bohu ke cit, ch vale (S t . M a ry M agdalene) H oly M ass: 3 A na zemi budii lidem pokoJ, dobra ville vsechnem (Gloria); VftaJ vdecna, vftaJ vzactna, milosti z milosti dana (Eucharisi); Zdrav bud', mily jezu Kriste, Jeni narozen z Panny ciste ( Eucharist) After the serm on: 1 Poprosmez Svateho Du cha D eath : 2 Boie Orce nas, k cobe se m odlfm e; Boie Orce nebesky, prosfmJa rve milosci R ogacions, Pilgrimages: 3 H ospodin e uslys nas, spomeii na nas; - Orce Boie smiliIJ se, o Boie; - Ve Jmeno Bozfm kraceJme M orning: 7 D aru svetlych milosti; L askavy H ospodine, ch valfme Te v 1e10 hodine; M ocny Boie, sveta spravce; Nocnf temnost se zm eiiuJe; Nut vsicknipovstavse z Jute; Orce Svaty, tesiteli, vsech vernych osveticeli; VeJmenu Svaie TroJice k nebi zdvfham hffsne ru ce �SLOVAKIA 11 " " ' 0 " " " " " 36 " 49 Before and after dinn er: 2 Dfky Panu lask avemu vzd ejm ei (aft e r dinn er); Stedry darce vsech milostf (before dinn er) "Common " : 1 B oie, kteryi z sve velike milosti (For details a nd references see m y Doctoral di sse rta ti on , op . cit., pp . 390-43 7). Canticl es of Lutheran ori gin da tin g prior to 1620 a re mu ch less frequ ent . This is becau se th e rare anthologies con sidered to be " Lutheran " ran ge from 1576 to 1606, and a re little diffe rent from the U traqui st son gbooks. Although th e repertoire of C hri stm as canticles reta ins a perm an ent co re of I 5th and 16th century son gs , it is ren ewed in the 17th and 18th centuri es. The new repertory a ppears with R oze nplu t's anth ology ( 1601 ) and is henceforth reinforced from one collecti on to the nex t. The "Christmas canticle" catego ry is therefo re one of the most mobile of all. The same is tru e, to a mu ch lesser degree, of Advent son gs. On th e other ha nd , Easter ca nticl es a re mu ch more co nse rvati ve, despite the new elements which appear in the 17th and 18th centuri es. The Ascen sion and Pentecos t ca tego ri es a re ve ry traditi on al. In so far as Lent is co nce rned , thin gs are so mewh at different: canticles of Utraqui st origin and so ngs from th e C zech Brethren predomin a te until 1650 . Mi chn a's son gbooks ( 1647 a nd 1661 ) m ark the beginn ing of a renovation in th e theme of th e C ru cified Christ, whi ch is henceforth based upon a personal link with th e sinner . This th eme is continu all y enl arged upon unti l th e beginnin g of th e 18th ce ntury. If one can believe th e ca nticles, in the later thi rd of th e 17th ce ntury th e Czech Coun te r-R eform ation is "C hristological. " This te nden cy is also found in pa mphl ets featurin g a n ave rage of 1 to 4 canti cles. The numbe r of doc trin al canticl es re-used by Cath olic son gbooks now totals 14 (2 T en Co mm and m ents , 6 Pater , 2 canticles on th e Trin ity, 4 C red o). But th e Czech tex t is older than 163 6 . M atej V aclav Steye r , K an cion al cesk y, Praha 1683, 1687, 1697, 1712, 17 27 , 1764. 3 K y rie, 2 Gloria, 1 fo r th e Epi stle, 1 for th e G os pel, 2 C redo, 3 S an ctu s , in oth er word s a total of 12 canticl es. Antonin Konias, C itara Noveh o Zakona (The C ithara of the N ew T estament), Hradec Kralove 1727 , 1738 , 1746, 1750, Pra ha 1752, no date / mi d 18th century/, Hradec Kralove 1762, 1799 . So K oni as ' s m ain so n gbook was publi shed eight tim es between 1727 an d 1799. For fu rth er in for ma ti ons on Father C hanovsky see my D octoral di ssertat ion (op . cit. , pp . 2 16-222 an d pp . 225-227). J an Rozenplut z Svarcenbachu , K an cional , 4°, Olomouc 1601 ; Ji rik Hlohovsky, Pfs ne k atolick e, 8°, O lomouc 1622; Pavel Sessius, K ancional , 4°, Praha 163 1; Anonymous, K an cionalnfk , 8 ° , Praha 1639 ; Ji rik Sipai', Cesk y D ek ak ord , 4° , P raha 1642 ; Ludm ila Sipai'ova, P fs n e rocnf, 12° , Prah a 1652; Urb a n Goli as , Cesk y D ekak ord, 4° , P raha 1659. O th er ed itions of Steye r' s son gboo k contained th e fo llowing number of canticles: 1687: 883 (P ro testant: 32%) 1727: 927 (P rotest a nt: 32 % ) 1697: 896 (P rotestant: 32 % ) 1764: 927 (Protesta nt: 32 %) 1712: 947 (Protestant: 31,5 % ) Figures calcu lated on th e bas is of J an Vi li kovsky's "Cantus Catholici, " Trn avsky sbornik (Bratislava 1935) , pp 57-94. On the Levoca printi n g, see Jan Caplov ic, �50 38 39 SLOVAKIA Bibliogralia tla ci vyd an ych na Slovensku do roku 1700, Diel 1. (Martin: Matica slo· venska , 1972), p. 364. The· Catholic songbook can therefore be co mpared to contemporary Czech collec· tions, the only difference being th e much high er proportion of songs borrowed from the C ithara Sanctorum, which can be explained by their geogra phic proxi mit y. The Steyer a nd Konias songbooks co nta in 35 (for 1687- 1764 editions) and 24 (for 1752 a nd furth er editions) canticles from the 1636 Cithara Sanctorum. All of them are included in the so-called "common " or "general " canticles in Steyer's songbook. In Bozan 's and K onias's songbooks, th ey have their own categories be· sides "common " or "general" can ticles. Most of them insist on man ' s love for God . Presented in Panel 99, " Devotional Literature in Seventeenth C entury Slovakia ," at th e AAASS co nvention in W ashin gton , D.C. on 17 O ctober 1982 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1982-83, Vol. 30 Description An account of the resource Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 36 Counter-Reformation and Early Czech Catholic Kancionaly in the Kingdom of Bohemia (1588-1683) Marie- Elizabeth Ducreux I) THE BACKGROUND It is surely unnecessary here to go deeply into the hi story of th e Counter Reformation in the Czech Kingdom , so intima tely linked in m y mind to its integration into the H apsburg Monarchy . In any case, exploring this history in detail is obviously beyond the scope of this paper , but to situate the context of my subj ect, I shall begin by sketching its general outline and suggesting a periodization. Four phases can be di stin gui shed in th e elaboration and application of the policy of co nversion . Th e first period, extending from th e arrival ofthejesuits in Prague (1556) to the d efeat at White M ountain (Nov. 8 , 1620), set the stage for what followed. The second period , from 1621 to the reign of Leopold I , witnessed active attempts to implement the poli cy of con ve rsion . This includes the Thirty Years' War, which seve rely h ampered effort s to convert the rural areas, a nd the milesto ne of 1650 , whi ch marked the energetic resurgence of the civil powers and th e archbishopric in supervi sing the population . Then , under L eopold I , followed a period of relative respite. Bohemia was then supposedl y Catholic, although proof ex ists of the persistence of m a ny non-C atholi cs, eve n in the ranks of the nobility. For inst ance, h ym nologist Vaclav Kleych (who was not an aristocrat) , born at Lazany near Litom ysl in 1682 , who emigrated with all his family to Zittau at the beginning of the 18th century . Finally the fourth period, from 1705 to 1780 , witnessed the tightening of rep ression and a search for heretics all over Bohem ia. 1 The judicial regulation of Joseph I ( 1705-1 711) made punishable by death the peddlin g of heretical books, preaching, and suspicious assembli es. SLOVAKIA 37 The death penalty was confirmed by Charles VI ( 1711-1740) several times, with at least five patents from March 15, 1721 to February 4, 1 724. 2 He reinforced existing antiheretical legislation with a publication on Jan. 29, 1726, which was confirmed at least twenty-two times until 1770, i.e. a lso during the reign of Maria Theresa. 3 In this system of laws, heresy was punished by forced labor and, in case of relapse, the galleys, exile and death . This was, of course, also the time of the well-known bookburning - and, more often, book confiscation and rectification . 4 The patent of October 13, 1781 put an end to the repression by accepting - with reservations - the Lutheran, Calvinist and Greek Catholic confessions . But only 45,000 persons 5 publically proclaimed their adherence to these two Protestant denominations, and the adherents of popular sects (for example that of the "Lambs,'' Berankove) continued long after to be persecuted by being press-ganged into the army . 6 We shall be concerned here with only the first two periods of the Counter Reformation . They co nstitute the background for the emergency of a Catholic hymnology in Czech. II) POLITICS AND RELIGION FROM THE END OF THE 16TH CENTURY TO 1620 From the end of the 16th century to White Mountain, the Czech Counter-Reformation lacked the means to carry out its program, even though the Hapsburgs had made Catholicism one of the principal tools of their politics in Bohemia . The Diet was torn apart by the religious conflict. After 1575 and the elaboration of the Confessio Bohemica, 1 the Sub Utraque party acquired increasing importance . 8 The events leading up to the de finitive d estruction of religious coexistence in 1618, after it had finally been won in 1609 , are too well known to be gone into here. Despite this profound upheaval , part of the intellectual elite of Prague remained open to the ideas of religious tolerance. 9 In general, the towns and cities of Bohemia were mainly Neo-Utraquist (ci:-ypto-Lutheran), with the exception of Catholic Plzeii and some others. In the countrysid e, the great majority of the clergy seems also to have been NeoUtraquist; but it must be admitted that very little is known about the realities of rural religious life in 16th century Bohemia. Despite proceedings against them, 10 the Czech Brethren were well established in ce rtain areas, especially in Moravia. 38 SLOVAKIA Throughout Bohemia, where the archbishopric ' s seat remained vacant from 14 71 to 1561 ( the year of the enthronization of Brus of Mohelnice), the structures of the Catholic Church were in deep disarray. The lack of priests was so severe that it made itself felt until at least the last third of the 17th century. 11 Therefore, religious and missionary orders, especially the Jesuits , had a lot to do to fill the vacuum. Catholicism in Moravia seems to have been more resistant , for at least the episcopal seat in Olomouc never went empty. But the towns were mostly Lutheran, even as their patrician elite was perhaps more Germanized than elsewhere . Sects abounded: in the 16th century, as is well known, Moravia had become the refuge for all the heretics of Europe. 12 The bastions of the Czech Brethren were there, especially in the lands of the Zerotfns , where they printed many of their books in the second half of the century, including the famous Kralice Bible (1579-1593) . Since the beginning of the 16th century the Moravian Diet had counted freedom of religion among its acquired privileges. In the last third of the 16th century, as a party of Catholic activists and Hapsburg faithfuls was reconstituted among the great lords in the Diet of Bohemia (Zdenek and Ladislav of Lobkovic , Vilem Slavata, J aroslav Martinie, Vilem of Rozmberk and so on), Jesuits frequently had ~issions on the estates of the nobility which had been won over by the new style of the Counter-Reformation. But this still remained a sporadic phenomenon, affecting only individuals. In the last analysis, although the figures are not entirely trustworthy, the population of the Czech Kingdom around 1620 was at least 75 % non-Catholic; the figure of 90% has also been advanced and seems to be reliable for Bohemia (without Moravia) . 13 It was a hybrid " Protestantism," deeply affected by the popular sects. Unfortunately, space does not permit me to dwell upon the extremely particular case of Czech Protestantism as it developed after the period of Hussitism . 14 III) CZECH CATHOLIC HYMNOLOGY Tfanovskfs Cithara Sanctorum (Lyre of the Saints, 1636, Levoca) represented an entirely successful attempt to renew and unify the evangelical repertoire of both the Slovak and the Czech Protestants expelled from the kingdom of Bohemia after White Mountain. Nevertheless, Tfanovsky had also delved into the rich traditions of the Utraquists, the Brethren and even the Czech Lutherans , whose SLOVAKIA 39 first printed songbooks went back to 1501 , Pfsnicky (Little Songs , Praha 1501 , editor Jan Severyn z Kapi'. Hory, a Czech Brethren songbook). 206 canticles in the 1636 edition, or 50 % , came from the abundant repertoire of his Czech predecessors . Thus even though Tfanovsky's efforts were innovative and in many respects uniqu e in contemporary Czech and Slovak Protestant hymnology, they were rooted in a rich past and inserted within a hymnological continuum. Could the same have been true for Czech Catholic hymnology? Did it possess Catholic models anterior to the Counter-Reformation? If not, what was its relationship to the repertoires of the Utraquists , the Brethren, and even Tfanovsky? Finally, why did the Counter- Reformation so consistently resort to songbooks in the vernacular throughout the 17th and 18th centuries? All these questions will guide the following investigation. 1) Quantification of Catholic canticles and anthologies from 1580 to the end of the 18th century First, to give an idea of the imposing dimensions of Czech Catholic hymnology , I would like to provide a few figures. The Utraquists, Czech Brethren and Czech Lutherans published at least 106 different collections of canticles in Czech between 1501 and 1620. 15 Between 1580 and 1800, 85 editions of Catholic anthologies appeared. This latter figure is minimal and partial, for with a few but significant exceptions, it includes only titles beginning with Pfsne, Pfsnicky, Kancional, Kancionalnfk and Kancionalek (Songs, Little Songs, Songbook , Little Songbook). 16 The sheer quantity of canticles involved is overwhelming: 24 of these anthologies are over 500 pages long, 21 of them are over 400 pages long, and some of their number contain almost 1,000 canticles (e .g. Steyer's songbooks). A few more data before we proceed: I myself have gone through and analyzed 29 of the most important collections . Taken together, they contain around 10 ,000 can tides . There is considerable overlap , and as it emerges from these 29 anthologies, some 2,330 canticles actually circulated in 17th and 18th ce ntury Bohemia and Morav ia. Included in this figure are 1,950 canticl es which first appeared between 1580 and the end of the 18th century. Ifl stick to the temporal limits ofmy paper, that is from 1588 to 1683, the fourteen pertin ent coll ections together 40 SLOVAKIA contain 1,941 canticles including 1,128 novelties, or 58 % of the 1,950 new canticles catalogued up to 1798. 2) Catholic coJlections of hymns from the beginning of the Counter-Reformation to 1683 and their relationship to Protestant Czech hymnol- ogy Before the beginning of the Counter-Reformation in Bohemia (circa 1555-1560), only one Catholic songbook existed in the face of the numerous anthologies of the Brethren, Utraquists and Lutherans. Published anonymously in Pizer\ in 1529, both its title, Pfsnicky velmi pekne a pffkladne na nedelnf ctenf do roka (Very pretty and exemplary songs on the Sunday Gospels of the year)' 7 and its contents are reminiscent of the contemporaneous publications of the Utraquist Mfrinsky (in 1522, 1531 , then 1567, 1577 and 1590). In 1550 and 1595, the poet - or rather versifier - Simon Lomnicky z Budce published his Pfsne na Evangelia (Songs on the Gospels of the year, Praha 1580) containing 115 new canticles, and his Pfsne historicke (H istorical Songs, Praha 1595) containing 51 new canticles versifying the lives of 51 Saints, for which he had delved into diverse legendary sources, including the Legenda Aurea . But Lomnicky's songbooks are not products of the Counter-Reformation. Their tone is different, and their author did not belong to the circles of those seeking the conversion of Bohemia. He was rather a provincial writer who took pleasure in converting everything coming into his hands into songs, and who belonged to the "learned middle classes," ifl am allowed to speak in such a way . He was a school master, and in publishing two songbooks he was following late sixteenth-century fashion in urban milieux which were essentially Utraquist. Furthermore, nothing indicates that Lomnicky's collections were destined for the Church , for liturgical or paraiiturgical use; on the contrary, their author himself conceived the possibility of simple reading as well as singing. 18 These three songbooks, of which two were anterior to the first hymnological efforts of the Counter-Reformation , could well have served as models for the editors of Catholic songbooks . But in fact neither the 1529 anthology nor the Pfsne na Evangelia of 1580 (with the exception of two canticles) left any traces , while Lomnicky ' s Pfsne historicke were widely used as canticles on the Saints in 1631, 1642, 1659 and then in 1712 and 1719 . 19 SLOVAKIA 41 The first real songbook of the Counter-Reformation emerged only in 1588 in Prague, under the aegis of the Jesuits of St. Clement College . 20 Containing 91 canticles, it was entitled Pfsne nave, kratke naucenf kfestanskeho v sobe obsahujfcf, sjinymi nekterymi na vajrocnf slavnosti i k vsidnf potfebe pfidanymi, pro Mladez a sprostnejsf lid, v nave vydane .. . (New songs containing a brief instruction in the Christian religion , with others for the feast d ays of the year and daily requirements, newly published for the young and ignorant. .. , Praha 1588) . 21 The first twenty canticles adapted P eter Canisius's Parvus Catechismus and preserved its original order. The rest were divided into canticles for the feast s of the liturgical year, including the Virgin Mary and the Saints; occasion al canticles; and canticles for public and personal devotion, i.e. for mass , before and after the sermon, for the Parish patron Sa int's day (po svfcenf) , before and after meals , for morning and evening, Rogation d ays and pilgrimages; so-called "general " or "common" canticles or perhaps canticles " for the laity " (obecnf); and canticles about death (sometimes - but not always - funeral canticles) . The two big categories, the Liturgical Year and public and private needs , are the classic categories for all Catholic collections of hymns . Among the 71 canticles remaining after the catechism in the 1588 songbook, there are 34 Protestant canticles ( one of Hussite origin, 21 27 of Utraquist origin, 23 and 6 from the Czech Brethren 14 ), four earlier canticl es from the 12th to the 15th centuries, 25 and 33 novelties, almost all of which concern public and private devotional needs. 26 P aradoxically , at least in appearance, a little more than 65 % of the canticles co ncernin g the liturgical year a re of Protestant origin (25 out of 38), with special em phasis on Christmas, Easter , Lent , Ascension D ay, P entecost and Adven t. The recycling of songs used by contemporary Protestants is considerable and very interesting indeed , for four out of eight canticles for the m ass are from the Utraquists (Gloria , Cred o, Sanctus), or from the Czech Brethren (Kyrie M agn e Deus). Coincidences of thi s kind are frequ ent in the Catholic hymnology of the Counter- R efo rmation . All the collection s of hymns retain a high proportion of canticles of Utraquist or Czech Brethren origin until the end of the 18th century . 11 These Protestant canticles belon g to the unchan ged repertory of the Liturgical Year , especially Ascension D ay and Pentecost, both very rigid categories with nearl y unchan gin g repertory , but also to the more or less movin g contents of categories like Christ- 42 SLOVAKIA mas , Lent, Easter and Advent. 28 As for canticles for occasions of public and private devotional needs , the proportion varies from songbook to songbook, but recourse to Protestant canticles anterior to 1620 is a constant . Sometimes, it seems even to be incredible: for instance, the J esuit Steyer went so far as to incorporate 45 psalms of the Czech Brother Jirfk StrejcintohisKancional cesky( 1683 , then 1687 , 1697 , 171 2, 1727 and 1764), without changing a single word from the 1587 edition . Among the essential prayers - those we call '' doctrinal ,'' that is the Pater, Ave, Credo, Ten Commandments and so on - all the son gbooks include canticles of Protestant origin. A songbook of 1652, Pfsne rocnf (Songs for the Year, published by Ludmila Sipafova, printer Jirik Sipar's widow) and the 6 editions of Steyer ' s songbook even contain a Czech version of Luther's Credo, M y vsickni veffme v jednoho Boh a (Wir glauben all' an einen Gott), 29 reprinting it perhaps from the Cithara Sanctorum of 1636. 30 By the same token , up to 1683 , i.e. the first edition ofSteyer's songbook 31 but later also, whenever an anthology presents the heading "for the holy mass " it contains texts of Protestant origin (that is 6 out of 8 anthologies from 1588 until 1683) . 32 This remained the rule until the end of the 18th century, except in Kania.s 's songbooks.ll I have chosen to spend a rather long time writing about these Pfsne na ve (New Songs) of 1588, because they exemplify the orientations of early Catholic hymnology. Indeed, putting aside the three songbooks of the poet-musician Adam Michna z Otradovic (1600-1676 ?), i.e. Ceska marianska muzika (Czech Marian Music, Praha 1647), Loutna ceska (Czech Lute, Praha 1653) and Svatorocnf muzika (M u sic for the Feasts of the Year, Praha 1661), whose 197 canticles included 195 (or perhaps only 194) written by the poet himself in a very baroque and mystical lyricism, and also excludin g j eslicky (Little Cribs, Praha 1658) of the J esuit Bedrich Bride!, all the subsequent Catholic hymnbooks from 1601 to 1683 proceed accordin g to the sam e plan, with similar contents. So let us see now what exactly were these hymnbooks. In 160 1 appeared the K an cional of R ozenplut (355 canticles in Czech), and in 1622 the Pisne katolicke (Catholi c Songs) of Hlohovsky (234 canticles in Czech). Both were published at Olomouc , and both were official hymnbooks of the diocese of Moravia, with the approval of Cardinal Dietrichstein. I n Bohemia there appeared in 163 1 the Kancional (Songbook) of the Prague printer Pavel Sessius (formerly the Protestant printer of Prague University, who converted) with 325 canticles; in 1639 a little, 43 SLOVAKIA anonymou s songbook, K an cionalnfk , due to the J esu its ofKlatovy College and perhaps to Father Albrecht Chanovsky, 34 with 121 canticles ; in 1642 the Cesky D ekakord (Czech Decacorde) of the printer Jirfk Sipar (400 can ticles); then in 1652 the Pfsne rocnf (Songs of the Year) by his widow Ludmila Sipafova ( 171 canticles) . 35 In 1659 the Cesky Dekakord of 1642 was reprinted by Urban Golias, still in Prague. The first edition of Steyer' s K ancional cesky (Czech Songbook) , also known as "sva tovacla ysk y" (St. W enceslas's songbook) , dates from 1683, as we already saw, with 828 canticles. 36 For the sake of completeness, a 1618 Postilla by the J esuit Vojtech Scipio Berlicka should be mentioned as containing canticles on the yearly gospels which appeared also in the collections of 163 1, 1642 and Steyer. All in all, without Berlicka , that brings us to nine anthologies, counting one reedition (in 1659), from 1588 to 1683 . Now, to finish with the relations between Czech Catholic and Protestant hymnologies, here are some percentages of Protestant and new canticles in these nine Catholic collections: Songbooks Canticles (in all) 1588 1601 1622 1631 1639 1642 (1659)* 1652 1683 91 355 234 325 121 400 (400) 171 828 Protestant Canticles 34 46 54 103 61 145 (145 131 280 37 % 13 % 23% 32 % 50 % 36% 36 %) 77 % 34% New Canticles 53 261 81 46 4 4 (0 8 328 58 % 73,5 % 34 % 14 % 3% 1% 0) 5% 40 % • R eediti on of 1642 Cesk y dekacord b y Urban Golias. Some of the Czech Catholic collections also had canticles from the Cithara Sanctorum: collection of 1639 1642 1653 1683 " 2 7 6 34 canticles from 1636 Cithara canticles " canticles '' canticles from 1636 and 1653 Cithara 44 SLOVAKIA The 1631 Czech songbook already had 3 canticles which were later put into the Cithara of 1636, and Steyer's book of 1683 includes also one canticle from the Amsterdam songbook by Jan Amos Komensky (Kancional, Amsterdam 1659). As a comparison, here are identical data concerning now the first Slovak Catholic songbook Cantus Catholici, which appeared in Levoca m 1655 : 37 Total number of canticles in Slovak (not Latin) Czech Protestant canticles (all in Slovak) Canticles from 1636 Cithara Sanctorum " 1653 " New Canticles 227 88 (38%) 20 (10%) 3 56 (25%) Thus the percentage of Protestant canticles in the Catholic songbooks of the first Counter-Reformation from 1588 to 1683 ( not including this latter collection) was approximately 38 % . If Rozenplut 's K ancional (1601), the only one which explicitly sought to exclude the Utraquist and Czech Brethren repertory , is left aside, the percentage increases to 42 % . Later, the average percentage declines (from 1683 to 1764, for twelve collections) but remains nonetheless at 30%. Inversely, from 1588 to 1683 (not including this one), the average percentage of novelties is only 24 %, and from 1683 to 1764, it attains 36 %. 38 The hymnbook of 1601 by Rozenplut , which is very co mbative , and to a lesser extent that of 1622 by Hlohovsky , tried to create hymnology and had less recourse than their successors to Protestant texts. But subsequently, and until 1660 , Catholic hymnbooks are characterized by a progressive return to Protestant sources. After 1683, as Steyer so amply demonstrates, Jesuit editors of hymnbooks ev in ce an astounding capacity to absorb texts from multifarious origins. Even the most " heretical" texts, as we have seen, could be admitted as long as they did not attack the Church or the Catholic doctrines themselves . Moreove r , in the 17th and 18th centuries, little hymnbooks without musical notation and destined to a more popular public, retained a much more conservative, static repertoire than the great official songbooks (like Steyer, Holan , Bozan and Konias 's songbooks). Such is the case of the Pfsne rocnf (Songs of the Year), a series of little books having roots in the second halfofthe 16th century (and therefore Utraquist) and continuing until the 19th century (in the 1652 ed ition , as we saw, there were SLOVAKIA 45 13 1 P rotes tan t canticles out of 171 !). For there were two parallel tracks in the produ ction of C atholic hy mnbooks : first , there was that of big volumes m eant fo r the Pa rish K antor and most directly controlled by the C hurch . Second , outside the official k an cionaly , was the production of little volumes or anonym ous booklets in which particular hymnologic tradition s of the 15th and 16th century Czech R eform survived . This very important point proves that can ticles actually sung in Bohemia du rin g the 17th and 18th centuries went way beyond the choice, albeit large, p roposed b y the anth ologies of the Counter-Reform a tion : vernacul ar religiou s so ngs continued to fl ourish , sha ping sensibility in a way relatively independent of the context of re-Catholicization. Obviously the production of these booklets did not escape the ecclesiastical and civil censorship . But in Bohemia, in the context of a triumphal but indeed still ve ry ill-rooted and badl y organized Catholicism , the canticle underwent the sa.{Tle fate as other in gred ients of wha t is called the " popular Baroqu e": its purity of origin was of little importance, provided that it m obili zed lay piety. 3) Places and uses of th e canticle But how and where was the Catholic canticl e supposed to mobilize thi s lay piety? Like its P rotes tant counterpart, the Catholic h ymnbook was fi rst and fo rem ost a coll ection of Church songs intended for the u se of P arish K an to ff (Cantors) and brotherhoods (mostly , for instance, socalled literack a bratrstva). Of course, in the C a tholic Church , the canticl e was no longe r at the heart of the H oly Service. Its role was to double the liturgy to stimul ate popula r participation and ardor, and in so doin g it d oubtless, in cidentall y, played also a significant role in m aintenance of the Czech lan gu age du rin g the 17th and 18th centuries . It was also employed in catechization , in mi ssionary contexts, and in diverse situat ions of d omestic or comm uni ty devotion s and praye rs. Th at will be m y fi rst conclu sion . T he second one I should like to point out is tha t from the thematic point of view, beginnin g with Steyer in 1683, there is a verita ble eruption of personal piety in can ticles. 39 Thus, alongside the traditional themes and the son gs for the litu rgical year, there appear canti cles " to combat a nxiety," " to bear one's cross," on " m an 's love for God " and som eti mes "even if H ell does not ex ist ," on "submi ssion to Divin e will ," " pat ience in cri ses," and so on , all evokin g contemporary Germ an 46 SLOVAKIA Pietism and manifesting great similarity with the collection of Evangelical emigres. Of course, it cannot be proved that all the canticles proposed by the songbooks were actually sung in community or in church . In particular, these last ones I just referred to seem rather to have been m eant for personal meditation . But I do hope to have provided a sense of the deep richness of Catholic Czech hymnology as well as of its fundamental ambivalence. The very success of the Catholic canticle was based upon this ambivalence, and upon its roots in a tradition of popular liturgy of Protestant origin (i.e . Utraquist or Brethren) origin. It thus became a privileged means of mass indoctrination for the Counter-Reformation , contributing to the reconversion of Bohemia to Catholicism. NOTES ' From 1670 ca to the end of the 17th century records kept in the Prague Archiepiscopal archives indicate only a very small number of heretics by pari sh . For instance, curates' answers (Relationes, R esponsae) to a 1677 questionnaire often do not know notoriou s or public heretics (heretici aperti) (see Statnf usti'ednf archiv, APA I , B 11/7 - B 13/4). I would like to suggest that the same conception of heresy was changing during the process of conversion . Ca 1700 , Viscars' visitations often suspect hidden heretics, especiall y in East and North Bohemia (Ci rcles of Caslav and Chrudim). Then around 17 25, some of the archbishopric Missionarii Ordinarii began to seek out both heretics a nd books all over the country. The Archiepiscopal archives also include various kinds of inquisition documents. ' However, these patents forbade the missionaries to personally imprison the accused and transferred the judgement of heretics from ecclesiastical courts to civil courts . In the same way , as of 1735 the functions of the "extra-ordinary" missionaries had to be handed ove r to 14 secular priests ( rather th an the previous 12 J esuits) . See Tomas Vaclav Bflek, R eform ace katolicka neboli obn ovenf naboienstvf k atolick eho v Kralovstvf ceskem po bitve belohorske (Praha 1892), p. 269-271 , 293. l Id., ibid. 4 See note 1 • 5 See T. V. Bflek, op. cit., p. 296. • See T. V . Bflek, op. cit., p . 296, and Antonin Rezek, Dejiny prostonarodnfho hnutf naboien sk eho v Cech ach , I (Praha 1887). ' Maximilian II only accepted this verball y in 1575 , and Rud olph II only ratified it, with the famous Letter of Majesty , as of 1609. ' The composition of the nobility present in the Diet of 1575 was as fo llows : Old Utraquists, 2 Lords (pani), including the Grand Chamberlain Jan ofValdstejn, 3 Kni ghts (rytffi); Neo-Utraquists , 4/ 5 of the attending nobility; Catholics, 1/8; Czech Brethren, 1/4. Figures are given by Jaroslav Panek, "Zapis o charakter ceske stavovske opozice a snem roku 1575 ," Ceskoslovensky casopis historicky, XXVIII ( 1980), 6, 878-880 . SLOVAKIA 9 ' 0 " " 13 " " " 17 " " ' 0 " ll 47 See m y paper "The T welve Sons of Carnival," to be published in Fifteenth Century Studies (D etroit) . The first expulsion orders issued against the Czech Brethren d a te from the rei gn of Jiri of Podebrady, at the end of the 15th Centu ry . The last before White M ountain was issued in 1602, seven yea rs before the Letter of M ajesty. See the record s of the Archiepiscopal archives in Prague (APA I , B 11 /7 -B 13/4, for instance); see also Frantisek Kras!, Arno.st hra be H arrach , kardinal sv. cirkve i'fmske a kn fze arcibiskup prazsk y. Historick o- kritick e vypsan f nabozen sk ych pomeru v Cechach od roku 1623- 1667 (Praha 1886), p . 134. See J osef Polise nsky, T fi cetileta valk a a evropsk e krize 17. stoletf (Praha 1970), p . 59-60 . In fac t , there a re no m ode rn es tim ates of the number of P ro tes tants in Bohemia. H owever, see Zikm unt Win ter, Zivot cirkevn f v Cechach . Kulturn f historicky obraz XV. a XVI . stoletf, I-II (Praha 1895-1 896) ; see also J osef J anacek , Gesk e dejin y . D oba pfedbelohorska 1526-1 547 , l/ 1 (Praha, 2nd edition 197 1). It must be rem embered that , aft er 1436, both Catholicism and Utraquism were state religions in Bohemia whereas Lutheranism was not offi cially tolerated until 1609. The tables conta ining the confessional breakdown of these 106 son gbooks are in my D octoral disse rt ation : H ymnologia Bohemica. Cantinnaires tch equ es d e la ContreR eform e, 1588- 1764 , vol. I , p . 107, U nive rsite de Pa ri s - Ill , 1982. These figures are based on Zdenek Tobolka andJiri H orak , Knihopis ceskych a slovensk ych tisk u od doby n ejstarsi at do k once 18. stoletf. .. II. T isk y z let 1501 -1800 (Praha 1939) etc, and Vaclav Pumprla , Soupis starych tisku ve fondech Statnf vedeck e knihovn y v Olom ouci. I . T isk y vydan e na uzem f Cech a Moravy v letech 1501-1 800 , 12 vols. (Olomouc 1974- 1979) . Pfsni cky velm i pekn e a pi'fkladne na nedeln f C ten f do roka . T ez O Sva tych ze Ctenf take z postn fch Epistol i ze C ten f pfsn e a na p osledy vseck y tuto p ofadn e V n ove zpravney najdes. A znova tistene a opravene. V Plzni ujana Pekka. Leta M DCXXIX dn e X III! Unora m esfce. 8°, 122p. See the Pfedmluva k ctenafi (Preface to the reader) in the Pfsne Historick e (Historical Songs) of 1595. Lomnicky's songs can be found in the following songbooks: Sessius (K an cional, Prague 163 1), Sipai' (Cesk y D ekakord , Prague 1642) and its reprint by Golias (P ragu e 1659) , R osenmuller (Kancionalek historicky, Prague 1712), Steyer (K ancional cesk y , Prague, 1683 , 1687 , 1697, 1712, 172 7, 1764) , and Bozan (Slavfcek rajsky , H rad ec Kralove 1719). Antonfn Skarka attributes this work to th e J esuit Alexander Vojt, at that time Su perior a t St. C lem ent Coll ege . I n a ny case, d ue to his offi cia l positi on, V ojt would have had to approve a nd supervise its publication , as well as th at of th e transl ati on of Canisiu s's Parvus Ca cscchimus pu blished in 1584 by the sa me printer , Bu ryiin Valda . Printed by Buryiin V a lda. Otce Boze Vse m ohoud, j en z jsi nam dal clo vecenstvf, Syna sveho jedin eho . .. , acco rd ing to Jirecek, H ymnolog ia Bohemica (P ra ha 1878): 15th ce ntury, Tabor so ngbook, on Corpu s Christi. 48 SLOVAKIA " Canticles for Advent: I K e cti, k ch vale Krista krale Christm as: 6 Andelove, andelo ve Jsou zpfvali; Na.radii se Kristus Pan ; Na Bozf Narozenf radujf se AnJele; Nasca] nam den vesely,z rodu kralo vsk eh o; ZnameneJ, kfest'an vern y, Kristovo Vtelenf; ZvestuJem vam radost Lent: 4 - Nebesky Pan , at'by dokazal k nam dobrocu svou velikou; 0 velika milost Syna Boi fh o; Umucenf naseho Pana milostneho; PosloucheJte ialoby nebeskeho Otce Easter: 6 Vstalt'Jest teto ch v11e ctn y Vykupitel nas; Uteseny nam den nastal; Vzkffsenf Spasitele sveh o ch val k aidy clovek ; L eto chvfle teto vesele vydava; AJ ten siln y lev udatny; V eselyt' nam den nastal Ascension Day: 1 Boie Otce z velike milosti ucinils nam vice neili dosti Pentecost: 2 VftaJ sladk y tesiteli, temnosti osvetiteli; Seslanf Du cha S vateh o Holy Virgin: I Zdravas neJsveteJsf kralovno, milost i TroJice Svare osvfcena Holy Ma ss: 3 Ana zemi budii /idem pokoJ (Gloria); Vefmez v B oha Orce Stvofitele vseho (Credo); Vsemohoucf Stvofiteli, Orce Svaty (Sa nctus) Before th e sermon : 2 Boie Otce, seslii nam nynf Du cha Svateho; Otce nas, mily Pan e, deJi nam Du cha S vateh o "Common ": 1 Pam atiIJ, clo vece, proc re Pan Buh stvofil (For d eta ils and refe rences see m y Doctoral di ssertat ion, op. cit. , pp. 390-437). " Canticles for : Advent: 2 Pas/an Jest ArchanJel k M arii Panne; Vesele zpfveJm e, Boha Orce chvalme Parish Patron Saint D ay: I Chvalmei nynf Boha sveho z posvecenf mfsta Jeho Saints and Angels: I V moci moudrosti dobreh o chvalm ez Boha v Svatych Jeho H oly Mass: I Boie Orce nas, Jeni Jsi na nebesfch "Common ": I Pane Boie bud' pfi nas, kdyi budem e m ffti (For deta ils and references, see ibid., Joe. cit .). " Buh Vsemohoucf; Svaty Va.clave; Dnesn fh o dne vstal Stvofitel; VftaJ, m ily j ezu Kriste, vftaJ, Synu z Pann y ciste " Canticles for Advent: 5 Zaff pfeJasnou navstfvil Gabriel; Zdrava Bohem pozdravena, rodicku blah oslavena; Zdrava bud p feslavna matko J ezfsova; Zdravas Pann o cista, tys pfimluva Jista; Vyk vetla hill Aronova Christmas : I Tff krali znam enali hvezdu H oly Virgin: I O Maria, vsech ctn ostf zrcadlo neJkrassf Saints and Angels: 3j ezu Kriste Vsem ohoucf(St. Andrew); Pochvalm ez Boha vecneho (St. Nicholas); Vsickni Bohu ke cit, ch vale (S t . M a ry M agdalene) H oly M ass: 3 A na zemi budii lidem pokoJ, dobra ville vsechnem (Gloria); VftaJ vdecna, vftaJ vzactna, milosti z milosti dana (Eucharisi); Zdrav bud', mily jezu Kriste, Jeni narozen z Panny ciste ( Eucharist) After the serm on: 1 Poprosmez Svateho Du cha D eath : 2 Boie Orce nas, k cobe se m odlfm e; Boie Orce nebesky, prosfmJa rve milosci R ogacions, Pilgrimages: 3 H ospodin e uslys nas, spomeii na nas; - Orce Boie smiliIJ se, o Boie; - Ve Jmeno Bozfm kraceJme M orning: 7 D aru svetlych milosti; L askavy H ospodine, ch valfme Te v 1e10 hodine; M ocny Boie, sveta spravce; Nocnf temnost se zm eiiuJe; Nut vsicknipovstavse z Jute; Orce Svaty, tesiteli, vsech vernych osveticeli; VeJmenu Svaie TroJice k nebi zdvfham hffsne ru ce SLOVAKIA 11 " " ' 0 " " " " " 36 " 49 Before and after dinn er: 2 Dfky Panu lask avemu vzd ejm ei (aft e r dinn er); Stedry darce vsech milostf (before dinn er) "Common " : 1 B oie, kteryi z sve velike milosti (For details a nd references see m y Doctoral di sse rta ti on , op . cit., pp . 390-43 7). Canticl es of Lutheran ori gin da tin g prior to 1620 a re mu ch less frequ ent . This is becau se th e rare anthologies con sidered to be " Lutheran " ran ge from 1576 to 1606, and a re little diffe rent from the U traqui st son gbooks. Although th e repertoire of C hri stm as canticles reta ins a perm an ent co re of I 5th and 16th century son gs , it is ren ewed in the 17th and 18th centuri es. The new repertory a ppears with R oze nplu t's anth ology ( 1601 ) and is henceforth reinforced from one collecti on to the nex t. The "Christmas canticle" catego ry is therefo re one of the most mobile of all. The same is tru e, to a mu ch lesser degree, of Advent son gs. On th e other ha nd , Easter ca nticl es a re mu ch more co nse rvati ve, despite the new elements which appear in the 17th and 18th centuri es. The Ascen sion and Pentecos t ca tego ri es a re ve ry traditi on al. In so far as Lent is co nce rned , thin gs are so mewh at different: canticles of Utraqui st origin and so ngs from th e C zech Brethren predomin a te until 1650 . Mi chn a's son gbooks ( 1647 a nd 1661 ) m ark the beginn ing of a renovation in th e theme of th e C ru cified Christ, whi ch is henceforth based upon a personal link with th e sinner . This th eme is continu all y enl arged upon unti l th e beginnin g of th e 18th ce ntury. If one can believe th e ca nticles, in the later thi rd of th e 17th ce ntury th e Czech Coun te r-R eform ation is "C hristological. " This te nden cy is also found in pa mphl ets featurin g a n ave rage of 1 to 4 canti cles. The numbe r of doc trin al canticl es re-used by Cath olic son gbooks now totals 14 (2 T en Co mm and m ents , 6 Pater , 2 canticles on th e Trin ity, 4 C red o). But th e Czech tex t is older than 163 6 . M atej V aclav Steye r , K an cion al cesk y, Praha 1683, 1687, 1697, 1712, 17 27 , 1764. 3 K y rie, 2 Gloria, 1 fo r th e Epi stle, 1 for th e G os pel, 2 C redo, 3 S an ctu s , in oth er word s a total of 12 canticl es. Antonin Konias, C itara Noveh o Zakona (The C ithara of the N ew T estament), Hradec Kralove 1727 , 1738 , 1746, 1750, Pra ha 1752, no date / mi d 18th century/, Hradec Kralove 1762, 1799 . So K oni as ' s m ain so n gbook was publi shed eight tim es between 1727 an d 1799. For fu rth er in for ma ti ons on Father C hanovsky see my D octoral di ssertat ion (op . cit. , pp . 2 16-222 an d pp . 225-227). J an Rozenplut z Svarcenbachu , K an cional , 4°, Olomouc 1601 ; Ji rik Hlohovsky, Pfs ne k atolick e, 8°, O lomouc 1622; Pavel Sessius, K ancional , 4°, Praha 163 1; Anonymous, K an cionalnfk , 8 ° , Praha 1639 ; Ji rik Sipai', Cesk y D ek ak ord , 4° , P raha 1642 ; Ludm ila Sipai'ova, P fs n e rocnf, 12° , Prah a 1652; Urb a n Goli as , Cesk y D ekak ord, 4° , P raha 1659. O th er ed itions of Steye r' s son gboo k contained th e fo llowing number of canticles: 1687: 883 (P ro testant: 32%) 1727: 927 (P rotest a nt: 32 % ) 1697: 896 (P rotestant: 32 % ) 1764: 927 (Protesta nt: 32 %) 1712: 947 (Protestant: 31,5 % ) Figures calcu lated on th e bas is of J an Vi li kovsky's "Cantus Catholici, " Trn avsky sbornik (Bratislava 1935) , pp 57-94. On the Levoca printi n g, see Jan Caplov ic, 50 38 39 SLOVAKIA Bibliogralia tla ci vyd an ych na Slovensku do roku 1700, Diel 1. (Martin: Matica slo· venska , 1972), p. 364. The· Catholic songbook can therefore be co mpared to contemporary Czech collec· tions, the only difference being th e much high er proportion of songs borrowed from the C ithara Sanctorum, which can be explained by their geogra phic proxi mit y. The Steyer a nd Konias songbooks co nta in 35 (for 1687- 1764 editions) and 24 (for 1752 a nd furth er editions) canticles from the 1636 Cithara Sanctorum. All of them are included in the so-called "common " or "general " canticles in Steyer's songbook. In Bozan 's and K onias's songbooks, th ey have their own categories be· sides "common " or "general" can ticles. Most of them insist on man ' s love for God . Presented in Panel 99, " Devotional Literature in Seventeenth C entury Slovakia ," at th e AAASS co nvention in W ashin gton , D.C. on 17 O ctober 1982 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Counter-Reformation and Early Czech Catholic Kancionály in the Kingdom of Bohemia (1588-1683) Description An account of the resource Marie-Elizabeth Ducreux Slovakia, Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83 pp. 36-50 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ducreux, Marie-Elizabeth Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/de7449d95c77a4ef87848308a2cdb2bf.pdf 16106590001f2d94cc051620375935a2 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 47 SLOVAKIA'S LIFELINE WITH mE WEST Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky Slovakia's political plight is more difficult than that of the other countries caught behind the iron curtain because Slovakia is ruled not only by Prague, but also by Moscow, thus suffering under a double yoke. The fight of the Slovak people against tyranny and oppression is a two-front fight. There is no doubt that there are communists in Slovakia, but their number and their possibilities are so limited that they cannot impose their rule on the Slovak population without the Czech Communists. It is no mere coincidence that the first secretary of the Communist Party in Slovakia, the most powerful man in the country, is the Czech Karel Bacilek. Key positions in the party and in the state apparatus are also held by Czechs. Even when it is considered expedient to place "comrades" from Slovakia in important positions in the party, state apparatus, or labor unions, these are very often persons of other than Slovak descent. To acquire a deeper insight into this strong adhesion of Prague to Moscow, it is important to realize that the two nations are not only related by Communist, but also by the Pan-Slavic aims. Prague's objectives in ruling Slovakia are supported by Moscow at every turn. Czecho-Slovakia, falsely presented to the West by Edward Benes and his collaborators as a dam against Muscovite pressure, has in reality been nothing more than a springboard between Soviet Russia and the West since 1945. As early as World War H, technical politicians-in-exile, with Benes at their head, determined to work most intimately with Moscow and the Communists, knowing quite well that the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans would offer resistance to any future domination by Prague. Tangible evidence of this Prague-Moscow liaison is the Moscow-signed treaty between the two governments on December 12, 1943. The Kremlin even used this as a model for later treaties concluded in the building up of its satellite system in Central Europe. This act of Benes, long before Yalta agreements of February 11, 1945, shows that the Czechs were not a victim of Yalta policies 1 �48 SLOVAKIA but its precursors, paving the way for sure support of the Soviet Union in dominating Slovakia and the Sudetenland. Moscow strove during World War II to win over Slovak patriots for Communist collaboration by a ruse calling for Slovak independence. Responsible 'S lovak government officials refused this bait, whereupon the Kremlin sold out Slovakia to Prague. It would be false to speak of CzechoSlovakia as having been taken over by the Kremlin by force, for the majority of the Czech people - under Dr. Edward Benes - declared themselves in agreement with the satellite status of the "legal" introduction into the country of the Communist regime, not in February 1948 as is claimed, but back in 1945. This explains the closely knit relationship between the Czechs and the Soviets as well as the unique nationalistic aspect of the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia. To shed further and perhaps more piercing light - if such be needed - on the tight linkage between Prague and the Kremlin, it should be noted that in every controversy between the Kremlin despots and other Communists, Prague always supports Moscow against the others. It is significant that Benes's envoy to the United Nations, Dr. Jan Papanek, voted with the U.S. S. R. on practically all major issues. When misunderstanding and tensions arose, in 1948, between Moscow and Belgrade, the Prague Communist leaders had the main say in the resultant inflammatory campaign of the Soviets against Tito. During the crisis between Warsaw and Moscow in October, 1956, Prague lined up for Khrushchev against Gomulka. When on October 23, 1956, the Hungarian people revolted against Communist tyranny, Prague immediately opposed Imre Nagy in favor of the greatest possible military intervention by the Soviets in Hungary. Not only did Prague let the Soviet military units pass through Slovakia but did all it could to guarantee them unmolested transit in the face of popular indignation. Prague even intervened militarily itself along part of the frontier. When Soviets units imposed the Kadar government of the Hungarians, Prague tried from the first moment on to strengthen its position both politically and economically as far as possible. �SLOVAKIA 49 Vanguard of Soviet Imperialism When, after the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under the motto of de-Stalinization, a certain easing up of dictatorship was introduced and partial reinstatement took place for some of the victims of Stalinist lawlessness and measures of violence not only in the Soviet Union but also in the satellit es the Communist clique in Prague refused to be influenced thereby and remained completely passive. The Slovak "Titoists", the only kind there are in present Czecho-1Slovakia, have thus far not been reinstated. On the contrary, as a symbol of Stalinist instransigency and loyalty to his methods, Stalin's illuminated statue shines out over Prague after dark. By the election of Antonin Novotny, first party secretary of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, to the position of president of the republic, Moscow's most faithful servant has become the all-powerful viceroy of the Kremlin despots in the C-SR. The logical conclusion is that just as Moscow rulers could rely on 'Prague's Communist leaders in the past, so they shall rely upon them even in the future. Prague despots identify their own Czech interests not only with the Communist aims of Moscow but consider themselves a vanguard of Russian imperialism. Further evidence of Prague's loyalty to Moscow is seen continually in its indiscriminate abetting of all the latter's foreign political aims. It backs up more rigidly than any other satellite Moscow's anti-Adenauer campaign and endeavors to cement the position of the Soviet Zone government in the eastern half of Germany. In the United States, Prague's henchmen seek every opportunity to oppose the perpetuation of a status quo in Asia and Africa and favor the separation of those areas from the sphere of influence of the European powers. Prague has gone so far as to train Asiatics and Africans to become Communist agents and by shipments of arms has gone far to create the insecurity and unrest that prevail in the Near East, Africa, and Asia. Prague Communist rulers have mobilized the vast industrial potential and the capabilities of the people in lands within Czecho-Slovakia to aid Moscow's economic offensive �50 SLOVAKIA in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and - disregarding the drop in the standard of living of their own population have pursued this aim indefatigably. By means of Communist-schooled advisers, labor unionists and experts, who are employed in installing of industrial plants in these lands, Prague creates seats of unrest in these areas and helps incorporate them into the Moscow sphere of influence. In short, Prague consistently and persistently aids and abets the world-power objectives of the Soviet Union. Ever since 1945 a policy of violence has been exercised against the Slovaks by the Prague government. In May, 1947, the then head of that government, Klement Gottwald, threatened Slovak patriots and asserted that it was a matter of duty to "persecute, ideologically and politically, and if need be administrative ly, the remaining People's Party separatists in Slovakia who are a source of dissent within Czecho-Slovakia." Shortly thereafter he spoke the words: "Today, in every respect, Slovakia is the weakest link in the Republic". Attempts have been made time and again to break the resistance of the Slovak population to Communism by resorting to deportations, acts of violence, concentration camps and a wide variety of oppressive measures customary within Communist countries. Since 1945 more than one-half million persons have been taken from Slovakia and scattered throughout the entire Sudet enland as workers in mines, factories, and agricultural associations, and about 250 thousand Czechs have been resettled into Slovakia as key figures in party and State administration, in agriculture, and the security apparatus, as well as Czech military units which represents pillars of the regime. It suffices to look at the map of Central Europe to see that Slovakia, by dint of her position between Hungary and Poland, on the one side, and the fact that she serves as link for the Bohemian lands and the Soviet Union, on the other side, - while bordering on the free world in the West through Austria - has a key position in the Danubian area. ,Slovak independence is not only in harmony with the wishes of the population, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the ideals of democracy and of human �S!,OVAKIA 51 progress, but the interests of the free world. It is to the advantage of freedom-loving people to support the Slovak people's fight for freedom. The independence of Slovakia means a weakening of Prague, a weakening of the Communist empire. Since World War IT, the free world, misled by false hopes, has expected the Kremlin rulers to be satisfied with the status quo and desist from any further ag,g ression. This has caused the powers that were victorious in that war to take a positive stand only with respect to th,~ proCommunist and pro-Soviet political trends from behind the Iron Curtain while turning a cold shoulder to the principal opponent of Communism and Russian imperialism. It is this policy of the western powers and not Soviet military victories - that explains Moscow's success. Because of this unfortunate policy, Moscow's lust for power has been whetted to such a degree that today Khrushchev regards as a matter of course the recognition by the free world of the status quo which the Soviets arrived at by violence and fraud - and in fact, he demands such recognition. The free world fails to see that by supporting the traditional but artificial structure known as "Czecho-Slovakia", it is acting in opposition to its own interests. As long as Prague can continue to throttle Slovakia, the lifeline that feeds the spirit of freedom among the Slovak people runs the grave danger of being cut off from the West forever. • • • WHO SAID IT? "On this, the twenty-,seventh anniversary of the founding Oif the Union of SOIV!iet Sociallist Repu.Jblios, may I express on 'behalJ.f of Sooretary Hull and myself sincere felicitations to you. We may aJl looik forward with full confidence to an eair.ly victory aver the Nazi barbarians and the establishment of an enduring and just peace built on the firm foun:datio1ns of coQPeration and mutual understanding which have been wrought so f.inn1ly in the cru.c1ble o:f war." Edward R. Stettiniius, Acting Secretary of Staite in crublegram sent to V. M. Molotov, Nov. 6, 1944. � SLOVAKIA 47 SLOVAKIA'S LIFELINE WITH mE WEST Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky Slovakia's political plight is more difficult than that of the other countries caught behind the iron curtain because Slovakia is ruled not only by Prague, but also by Moscow, thus suffering under a double yoke. The fight of the Slovak people against tyranny and oppression is a two-front fight. There is no doubt that there are communists in Slovakia, but their number and their possibilities are so limited that they cannot impose their rule on the Slovak population without the Czech Communists. It is no mere coincidence that the first secretary of the Communist Party in Slovakia, the most powerful man in the country, is the Czech Karel Bacilek. Key positions in the party and in the state apparatus are also held by Czechs. Even when it is considered expedient to place "comrades" from Slovakia in important positions in the party, state apparatus, or labor unions, these are very often persons of other than Slovak descent. To acquire a deeper insight into this strong adhesion of Prague to Moscow, it is important to realize that the two nations are not only related by Communist, but also by the Pan-Slavic aims. Prague's objectives in ruling Slovakia are supported by Moscow at every turn. Czecho-Slovakia, falsely presented to the West by Edward Benes and his collaborators as a dam against Muscovite pressure, has in reality been nothing more than a springboard between Soviet Russia and the West since 1945. As early as World War H, technical politicians-in-exile, with Benes at their head, determined to work most intimately with Moscow and the Communists, knowing quite well that the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans would offer resistance to any future domination by Prague. Tangible evidence of this Prague-Moscow liaison is the Moscow-signed treaty between the two governments on December 12, 1943. The Kremlin even used this as a model for later treaties concluded in the building up of its satellite system in Central Europe. This act of Benes, long before Yalta agreements of February 11, 1945, shows that the Czechs were not a victim of Yalta policies 1 �48 SLOVAKIA but its precursors, paving the way for sure support of the Soviet Union in dominating Slovakia and the Sudetenland. Moscow strove during World War II to win over Slovak patriots for Communist collaboration by a ruse calling for Slovak independence. Responsible 'S lovak government officials refused this bait, whereupon the Kremlin sold out Slovakia to Prague. It would be false to speak of CzechoSlovakia as having been taken over by the Kremlin by force, for the majority of the Czech people - under Dr. Edward Benes - declared themselves in agreement with the satellite status of the "legal" introduction into the country of the Communist regime, not in February 1948 as is claimed, but back in 1945. This explains the closely knit relationship between the Czechs and the Soviets as well as the unique nationalistic aspect of the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia. To shed further and perhaps more piercing light - if such be needed - on the tight linkage between Prague and the Kremlin, it should be noted that in every controversy between the Kremlin despots and other Communists, Prague always supports Moscow against the others. It is significant that Benes's envoy to the United Nations, Dr. Jan Papanek, voted with the U.S. S. R. on practically all major issues. When misunderstanding and tensions arose, in 1948, between Moscow and Belgrade, the Prague Communist leaders had the main say in the resultant inflammatory campaign of the Soviets against Tito. During the crisis between Warsaw and Moscow in October, 1956, Prague lined up for Khrushchev against Gomulka. When on October 23, 1956, the Hungarian people revolted against Communist tyranny, Prague immediately opposed Imre Nagy in favor of the greatest possible military intervention by the Soviets in Hungary. Not only did Prague let the Soviet military units pass through Slovakia but did all it could to guarantee them unmolested transit in the face of popular indignation. Prague even intervened militarily itself along part of the frontier. When Soviets units imposed the Kadar government of the Hungarians, Prague tried from the first moment on to strengthen its position both politically and economically as far as possible. �SLOVAKIA 49 Vanguard of Soviet Imperialism When, after the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under the motto of de-Stalinization, a certain easing up of dictatorship was introduced and partial reinstatement took place for some of the victims of Stalinist lawlessness and measures of violence not only in the Soviet Union but also in the satellit es the Communist clique in Prague refused to be influenced thereby and remained completely passive. The Slovak "Titoists", the only kind there are in present Czecho-1Slovakia, have thus far not been reinstated. On the contrary, as a symbol of Stalinist instransigency and loyalty to his methods, Stalin's illuminated statue shines out over Prague after dark. By the election of Antonin Novotny, first party secretary of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, to the position of president of the republic, Moscow's most faithful servant has become the all-powerful viceroy of the Kremlin despots in the C-SR. The logical conclusion is that just as Moscow rulers could rely on 'Prague's Communist leaders in the past, so they shall rely upon them even in the future. Prague despots identify their own Czech interests not only with the Communist aims of Moscow but consider themselves a vanguard of Russian imperialism. Further evidence of Prague's loyalty to Moscow is seen continually in its indiscriminate abetting of all the latter's foreign political aims. It backs up more rigidly than any other satellite Moscow's anti-Adenauer campaign and endeavors to cement the position of the Soviet Zone government in the eastern half of Germany. In the United States, Prague's henchmen seek every opportunity to oppose the perpetuation of a status quo in Asia and Africa and favor the separation of those areas from the sphere of influence of the European powers. Prague has gone so far as to train Asiatics and Africans to become Communist agents and by shipments of arms has gone far to create the insecurity and unrest that prevail in the Near East, Africa, and Asia. Prague Communist rulers have mobilized the vast industrial potential and the capabilities of the people in lands within Czecho-Slovakia to aid Moscow's economic offensive �50 SLOVAKIA in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and - disregarding the drop in the standard of living of their own population have pursued this aim indefatigably. By means of Communist-schooled advisers, labor unionists and experts, who are employed in installing of industrial plants in these lands, Prague creates seats of unrest in these areas and helps incorporate them into the Moscow sphere of influence. In short, Prague consistently and persistently aids and abets the world-power objectives of the Soviet Union. Ever since 1945 a policy of violence has been exercised against the Slovaks by the Prague government. In May, 1947, the then head of that government, Klement Gottwald, threatened Slovak patriots and asserted that it was a matter of duty to "persecute, ideologically and politically, and if need be administrative ly, the remaining People's Party separatists in Slovakia who are a source of dissent within Czecho-Slovakia." Shortly thereafter he spoke the words: "Today, in every respect, Slovakia is the weakest link in the Republic". Attempts have been made time and again to break the resistance of the Slovak population to Communism by resorting to deportations, acts of violence, concentration camps and a wide variety of oppressive measures customary within Communist countries. Since 1945 more than one-half million persons have been taken from Slovakia and scattered throughout the entire Sudet enland as workers in mines, factories, and agricultural associations, and about 250 thousand Czechs have been resettled into Slovakia as key figures in party and State administration, in agriculture, and the security apparatus, as well as Czech military units which represents pillars of the regime. It suffices to look at the map of Central Europe to see that Slovakia, by dint of her position between Hungary and Poland, on the one side, and the fact that she serves as link for the Bohemian lands and the Soviet Union, on the other side, - while bordering on the free world in the West through Austria - has a key position in the Danubian area. ,Slovak independence is not only in harmony with the wishes of the population, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the ideals of democracy and of human �S!,OVAKIA 51 progress, but the interests of the free world. It is to the advantage of freedom-loving people to support the Slovak people's fight for freedom. The independence of Slovakia means a weakening of Prague, a weakening of the Communist empire. Since World War IT, the free world, misled by false hopes, has expected the Kremlin rulers to be satisfied with the status quo and desist from any further ag,g ression. This has caused the powers that were victorious in that war to take a positive stand only with respect to th,~ proCommunist and pro-Soviet political trends from behind the Iron Curtain while turning a cold shoulder to the principal opponent of Communism and Russian imperialism. It is this policy of the western powers and not Soviet military victories - that explains Moscow's success. Because of this unfortunate policy, Moscow's lust for power has been whetted to such a degree that today Khrushchev regards as a matter of course the recognition by the free world of the status quo which the Soviets arrived at by violence and fraud - and in fact, he demands such recognition. The free world fails to see that by supporting the traditional but artificial structure known as "Czecho-Slovakia", it is acting in opposition to its own interests. As long as Prague can continue to throttle Slovakia, the lifeline that feeds the spirit of freedom among the Slovak people runs the grave danger of being cut off from the West forever. • • • WHO SAID IT? "On this, the twenty-,seventh anniversary of the founding Oif the Union of SOIV!iet Sociallist Repu.Jblios, may I express on 'behalJ.f of Sooretary Hull and myself sincere felicitations to you. We may aJl looik forward with full confidence to an eair.ly victory aver the Nazi barbarians and the establishment of an enduring and just peace built on the firm foun:datio1ns of coQPeration and mutual understanding which have been wrought so f.inn1ly in the cru.c1ble o:f war." Edward R. Stettiniius, Acting Secretary of Staite in crublegram sent to V. M. Molotov, Nov. 6, 1944. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1958, Vol. 8 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 26), March 1958.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 27), June 1958.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 28), December 1958.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1958 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 47 SLOVAKIA'S LIFELINE WITH mE WEST Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky Slovakia's political plight is more difficult than that of the other countries caught behind the iron curtain because Slovakia is ruled not only by Prague, but also by Moscow, thus suffering under a double yoke. The fight of the Slovak people against tyranny and oppression is a two-front fight. There is no doubt that there are communists in Slovakia, but their number and their possibilities are so limited that they cannot impose their rule on the Slovak population without the Czech Communists. It is no mere coincidence that the first secretary of the Communist Party in Slovakia, the most powerful man in the country, is the Czech Karel Bacilek. Key positions in the party and in the state apparatus are also held by Czechs. Even when it is considered expedient to place "comrades" from Slovakia in important positions in the party, state apparatus, or labor unions, these are very often persons of other than Slovak descent. To acquire a deeper insight into this strong adhesion of Prague to Moscow, it is important to realize that the two nations are not only related by Communist, but also by the Pan-Slavic aims. Prague's objectives in ruling Slovakia are supported by Moscow at every turn. Czecho-Slovakia, falsely presented to the West by Edward Benes and his collaborators as a dam against Muscovite pressure, has in reality been nothing more than a springboard between Soviet Russia and the West since 1945. As early as World War H, technical politicians-in-exile, with Benes at their head, determined to work most intimately with Moscow and the Communists, knowing quite well that the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans would offer resistance to any future domination by Prague. Tangible evidence of this Prague-Moscow liaison is the Moscow-signed treaty between the two governments on December 12, 1943. The Kremlin even used this as a model for later treaties concluded in the building up of its satellite system in Central Europe. This act of Benes, long before Yalta agreements of February 11, 1945, shows that the Czechs were not a victim of Yalta policies 1 48 SLOVAKIA but its precursors, paving the way for sure support of the Soviet Union in dominating Slovakia and the Sudetenland. Moscow strove during World War II to win over Slovak patriots for Communist collaboration by a ruse calling for Slovak independence. Responsible 'S lovak government officials refused this bait, whereupon the Kremlin sold out Slovakia to Prague. It would be false to speak of CzechoSlovakia as having been taken over by the Kremlin by force, for the majority of the Czech people - under Dr. Edward Benes - declared themselves in agreement with the satellite status of the "legal" introduction into the country of the Communist regime, not in February 1948 as is claimed, but back in 1945. This explains the closely knit relationship between the Czechs and the Soviets as well as the unique nationalistic aspect of the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia. To shed further and perhaps more piercing light - if such be needed - on the tight linkage between Prague and the Kremlin, it should be noted that in every controversy between the Kremlin despots and other Communists, Prague always supports Moscow against the others. It is significant that Benes's envoy to the United Nations, Dr. Jan Papanek, voted with the U.S. S. R. on practically all major issues. When misunderstanding and tensions arose, in 1948, between Moscow and Belgrade, the Prague Communist leaders had the main say in the resultant inflammatory campaign of the Soviets against Tito. During the crisis between Warsaw and Moscow in October, 1956, Prague lined up for Khrushchev against Gomulka. When on October 23, 1956, the Hungarian people revolted against Communist tyranny, Prague immediately opposed Imre Nagy in favor of the greatest possible military intervention by the Soviets in Hungary. Not only did Prague let the Soviet military units pass through Slovakia but did all it could to guarantee them unmolested transit in the face of popular indignation. Prague even intervened militarily itself along part of the frontier. When Soviets units imposed the Kadar government of the Hungarians, Prague tried from the first moment on to strengthen its position both politically and economically as far as possible. SLOVAKIA 49 Vanguard of Soviet Imperialism When, after the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under the motto of de-Stalinization, a certain easing up of dictatorship was introduced and partial reinstatement took place for some of the victims of Stalinist lawlessness and measures of violence not only in the Soviet Union but also in the satellit es the Communist clique in Prague refused to be influenced thereby and remained completely passive. The Slovak "Titoists", the only kind there are in present Czecho-1Slovakia, have thus far not been reinstated. On the contrary, as a symbol of Stalinist instransigency and loyalty to his methods, Stalin's illuminated statue shines out over Prague after dark. By the election of Antonin Novotny, first party secretary of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, to the position of president of the republic, Moscow's most faithful servant has become the all-powerful viceroy of the Kremlin despots in the C-SR. The logical conclusion is that just as Moscow rulers could rely on 'Prague's Communist leaders in the past, so they shall rely upon them even in the future. Prague despots identify their own Czech interests not only with the Communist aims of Moscow but consider themselves a vanguard of Russian imperialism. Further evidence of Prague's loyalty to Moscow is seen continually in its indiscriminate abetting of all the latter's foreign political aims. It backs up more rigidly than any other satellite Moscow's anti-Adenauer campaign and endeavors to cement the position of the Soviet Zone government in the eastern half of Germany. In the United States, Prague's henchmen seek every opportunity to oppose the perpetuation of a status quo in Asia and Africa and favor the separation of those areas from the sphere of influence of the European powers. Prague has gone so far as to train Asiatics and Africans to become Communist agents and by shipments of arms has gone far to create the insecurity and unrest that prevail in the Near East, Africa, and Asia. Prague Communist rulers have mobilized the vast industrial potential and the capabilities of the people in lands within Czecho-Slovakia to aid Moscow's economic offensive 50 SLOVAKIA in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and - disregarding the drop in the standard of living of their own population have pursued this aim indefatigably. By means of Communist-schooled advisers, labor unionists and experts, who are employed in installing of industrial plants in these lands, Prague creates seats of unrest in these areas and helps incorporate them into the Moscow sphere of influence. In short, Prague consistently and persistently aids and abets the world-power objectives of the Soviet Union. Ever since 1945 a policy of violence has been exercised against the Slovaks by the Prague government. In May, 1947, the then head of that government, Klement Gottwald, threatened Slovak patriots and asserted that it was a matter of duty to "persecute, ideologically and politically, and if need be administrative ly, the remaining People's Party separatists in Slovakia who are a source of dissent within Czecho-Slovakia." Shortly thereafter he spoke the words: "Today, in every respect, Slovakia is the weakest link in the Republic". Attempts have been made time and again to break the resistance of the Slovak population to Communism by resorting to deportations, acts of violence, concentration camps and a wide variety of oppressive measures customary within Communist countries. Since 1945 more than one-half million persons have been taken from Slovakia and scattered throughout the entire Sudet enland as workers in mines, factories, and agricultural associations, and about 250 thousand Czechs have been resettled into Slovakia as key figures in party and State administration, in agriculture, and the security apparatus, as well as Czech military units which represents pillars of the regime. It suffices to look at the map of Central Europe to see that Slovakia, by dint of her position between Hungary and Poland, on the one side, and the fact that she serves as link for the Bohemian lands and the Soviet Union, on the other side, - while bordering on the free world in the West through Austria - has a key position in the Danubian area. ,Slovak independence is not only in harmony with the wishes of the population, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the ideals of democracy and of human S!,OVAKIA 51 progress, but the interests of the free world. It is to the advantage of freedom-loving people to support the Slovak people's fight for freedom. The independence of Slovakia means a weakening of Prague, a weakening of the Communist empire. Since World War IT, the free world, misled by false hopes, has expected the Kremlin rulers to be satisfied with the status quo and desist from any further ag,g ression. This has caused the powers that were victorious in that war to take a positive stand only with respect to th,~ proCommunist and pro-Soviet political trends from behind the Iron Curtain while turning a cold shoulder to the principal opponent of Communism and Russian imperialism. It is this policy of the western powers and not Soviet military victories - that explains Moscow's success. Because of this unfortunate policy, Moscow's lust for power has been whetted to such a degree that today Khrushchev regards as a matter of course the recognition by the free world of the status quo which the Soviets arrived at by violence and fraud - and in fact, he demands such recognition. The free world fails to see that by supporting the traditional but artificial structure known as "Czecho-Slovakia", it is acting in opposition to its own interests. As long as Prague can continue to throttle Slovakia, the lifeline that feeds the spirit of freedom among the Slovak people runs the grave danger of being cut off from the West forever. • • • WHO SAID IT? "On this, the twenty-,seventh anniversary of the founding Oif the Union of SOIV!iet Sociallist Repu.Jblios, may I express on 'behalJ.f of Sooretary Hull and myself sincere felicitations to you. We may aJl looik forward with full confidence to an eair.ly victory aver the Nazi barbarians and the establishment of an enduring and just peace built on the firm foun:datio1ns of coQPeration and mutual understanding which have been wrought so f.inn1ly in the cru.c1ble o:f war." Edward R. Stettiniius, Acting Secretary of Staite in crublegram sent to V. M. Molotov, Nov. 6, 1944.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia's Lifeline with the West Description An account of the resource Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský Slovakia, Vol. 8, No. 3 (28), December 1958 pp. 47-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ďurčanský, Ferdinand Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1958 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/092da258dd8160b010134cbdf02ee22f.pdf 8cf90adf07b58aab37e5d3e0e3a71bcc PDF Text Text 50 SLOVAKIA DEFENSE AWNE IS NOT ENOUGH By Ferdinand Durcansky It is a historical fact that the Soviet Imperium would have collapsed in the course of the second world war, without the military and economic support of America. At the end of the war the USA was still in a position - due to this active support - to emphasize America's political designs and put them into effect. Proof thereto lies in Stalin's having to withdraw his troops from Iran in 1946 at America's behest, although such a move by no means tallied with Communist strategy. U. S. political, economic and, a:bove all, military superiority was so impressive and was so highly regarded by Soviet leaders that even at the 1955 Geneva Conference they dared not show their real hand on the question of Germany's partition. To a certain extent this power relationship seems to have changed in favor of the Soviet Imperium. Russia, formerly one of the seven Great Powers, has meanwhile become one of the two World Powers, and now controls the eastern half of Europe, plus the most important areas of the Euro-Asiatic sphere. At the moment the great European Powers alone would hardly be in a position effectively to resist the Kremlin's political pressure. Even America, despite its costly system of defense, feels itself threatened. This e~lains why Khrushchev today feels he can simply refuse to discuss German reunification if it does not ta:ke place the way he thinks it should. The power complex of the Soviet Union has become so mighty that Khrushchev periodically threatens, hoping he will intimidate the allies of the United States and thereby weaken Western unity. This potential strength harbors the temptation to superimpose, even on the peoples of the still free world, the political will of the Kremlin. In any case we must reckon with the fact, that the men in the saddle in Moscow have made preparations for achieving world domination as called for by the Commu- �SLOVAKIA 51 nist ideology. The Russians have reached this position in less than twenty years, a status that is not only the expression of their own endeavors of military or economic strength, but for the most part the outcome of faulty Western policy. A continuation of such policy would stabilize the failures of the West and bring aJbout additional failures, a fact that should serve as a cogent warning to all Europe. Just how did this political and ideological Soviet Russian gain come about? Is it possible that Communist ideology and, above all, its practical application, is much more progressive than our economic and social order? Is it perhaps more in keeping with over-all human developments than ours, as the Kremlin rulers maintain? Is State capitalism more enriching and better for the people in the East than the freedom-loving order of the Western world? Facts refute the Communist theses. The basis of our social order is freedom with its ensuing initiative of the individual in all realms of human existence. The West is certainly not poor in ideas. We have both ideas and principles to offer Communism, which are effective not only in the West but even in the East. The suppressed peoples affirm these values. But our methods are wrong. Western policy refuses to look upon the ideological and political offensive of world Communism as something whole and indivisible, and preoccupies itself with only partial problems and partial aspects. Tension Is Mainly Political Too little attention is given to the fact that almost all the moral and ethical values that form the vital basis of the civilized nations of Europe are rejected by the Soviets. The leaders of the Soviet Union even regard, among other factors, the principles of international law as non-<binding for themselves. Every treaty concluded with the Kremlin is thus made suspect by a "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." An international treaty is only considered valid as long as it does not contra- �52 SLOVAKIA diet the interests of the class struggle. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that the agreements made with · the Kremlin are scarcely worth more than the paper they are printed on. Every treaty signed with the Soviets constitutes a disadvantage for the free world, which it excludes from certain actions and possibilities and does not obligate the Russians since they feel themselves dispensed from all erstwhile, generally valid, moral-legal maxims. Such principles, emanating from Western culture, contradict Marxist-Leninist teachings. The Soviets behave as if they had never assumed an obligation, a circumstance proven by t heir disregard for the treaties of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and London. Relations between the free world and the east cannot, therefore, be regarded as a normal nationally-binding relationship based on the principles of international law, because the main concern is a question of power. The behavior of the West toward the East Block has, nevertheless, been based at all times on the principles: and forms of classical foreign policy and diplomacy. In all differences of opinion and artifically trumped up crises, measures and methods are applied that scarcely differ from those employed during the periods of the Vienna Congress. The results of this conservative force behind Communist hunger for power are judged solely from the aspect of momentary security and military potential. To be sure, a number of Western political leaders have realized that the conflict is an ideological one, but they believe the controversy can be resolved by competing in the field of propaganda. Even these far-sighted statesmen, politicians, and publicists fail to see that the tension between East and West represents a political struggle. Cer tainly it has an iedological character with which it is inextricably bound. The Communists on the other hand leave no doubt that they are concerned with a whole. When they speak of a socialist society valid for the world of today they mean not only production patterns, State order and insti- �SLOVAKIA 53 tutions, but the intention of annihilating all values that we possess and that form the basis of our Christian-Western culture, and of replacing them by their ideas and patterns. We are actually witnesses of a great historical attempt to replace fre edom throughout the world with slavery. Millions of independent people are to be reduced to dependence and coercion. In this very century a decision will be made as to whether Russia is ruble to realize its plan - World Communism - and destroy the Christian"\Vestern culture, for, without crushing it, Bolshevism cannot get a foothold in these countries. It is thus a question, whether we value our culture highly enough ourselves and are resolved to fight for its preservation, or whether we want to yield to despotism step by step to make room for a false culture that levels off and nullifies the personality. Soviet Russia has forced this alternative upon us and it would be sheer suicide to evade the struggle. The ensuing political consequences would be of immeasurable importance and decisive for our future destiny. If it were only a question of distribution of power between Moscow and Washington, each of us - each nation, each people, each stratum of society - would have the right and the possibility to decide freely and, after consideration of individual interests, either to choose the friendship and alliance of the one or the other, or to remain neutral. Basic Values Are At Stake In our century, however, the matter is quite different. The traditional political struggle, which dealt with the acquisition of foreign territories, colonies and trade and customs was, with linguistically dependent national cultural propaganda, and, with competition toward the opening up of world markets, is a thing of the past. It means that if people today demand the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, of the Baltic or other oppressed peoples, this is not done in the interest of the United States of America, �54 SLOVAKIA and does not foresee therein the recognition of any claim to U. S. leadership and to strengthening U. S. policy, but that the people concerned become a simple co-combatant in a struggle for the preservation of our values, which are to remain the basis of human coexistence even in the future. When we fight against Communism and, hence, against the Soviet Union, we do not do so in the interest of so-called capitalists, but in the interest of our indivisible social order and in the struggle against the enslavement of our progeny. The fact has been cited in the September 1960 issue of Der Europaische Osten that World War III has already begun. For the time being it will be carried out on the not insignificant level of propaganda. To be sure the means employed, such as radio, television, press cinema, and literature, are less frightening than those of military, yet they are powerful and effective. Since the Soviets are resolved to impose their system on the entire world, it would be dangerous shortsightedness to believe that in the current tussle between the West and the East - in which all peoples are involved willy-nilly - the West can succeed by ,p urely defensive measures only. So far, however, the political leadership of the West has limited itself to defensive tactics. The outcome of this behavior which has been alarming for many millons, was the de facto recognition of the Iron Curtain, an abandonment of the moral and cultural mission and obligation to defend the freedom of all people and, if need be, to fight for it. By giving up the right of political control psychological prerequisites were estalblished for the ideological and political integration of East and Southeast Europe and the Soviets were given the chance to integrate more than one hundred millions of human beings into their sphere of power. Western Doors Always Open Much worse, however, is he fact that this Bolshevization of the Eastern half of Europe, effectuated in four to five years, has given the Kremlin the opportunity of �SLOVAKIA 55 unfolding a general political and ideological offensive against the free world without the West having a chance to look Jnto the darkness behind the wings of the Communist stage. At the same time the doors of the West remained open to agents and spies from all over the Communist world, thus enabling ~he Kremlin to cause unrest on a global scale under the motto of the class struggle and to allow a fabulous measure of propaganda to take effect that has brought whole peoples to ruin. The initiation of the so-called containment policy meant the indirect and de facto -r ecognition of the status quo resulting from Communist violence. Western leadership at the time believed that by sacrificing the European East and South it was possible to buy genuine peaceful cooperation with Russia and that it would put a stop to further spread of Communist power. Was it not sheer delusion to believe in a change in the European status quo? A change did take place, year after year, but always in favor of the Soviet Union. It is utopia to think that coexistence with the Communist world can go on permanently and that the Russians would be ready without any compelling reason to change the current status quo by the reunification of Germany or by free elections within the Satellite countries. This is dangerous wishful thinking which contradicts the facts as we see them happening in Asia and Africa. A Western policy that is prepared to recognize the status quo is not only a betrayal of hundreds of millions of people hungering for fredom, but a threat to the entire world. The final phase of colonialism that we are going through today, gave the Russians a golden opportunity for action. They demanded freedom and independence for nations that already enjoyed them without benefit of Soviet propaganda. Although Russia is subjugation incarnate, it claims the role of freedom fighter and liberator. This boastful sham of Soviet policy and the political naivete and inexperi,mce of the non-white peoples paved the way for it. �56 SLOVAKIA If an opportunistically-minded person observes the fanaticism with which the Soviet Russians work toward greater domination, it is no wonder if he begins to waver. If today the colored man - treated roughly in past centuries by many a European - falls prey to Communism, his attitude for the most part is the result of the West's own attitude of defense. The peoples of the East, then, often gain the impression that the political leaders of the West repeatedly fail, because the will and resolve to effectively combat the Communist world is simply lacking. Even on the West the opinion is winning ground that our culture and the nations and peoples who sustain this culture are doomed to extinction. Why, then, should a colored man choose the cultrue that limits itself to defense and, hence, can have no prospects for the future? Although this opinion stems from an optical illusion it can, nevertheless, have fateful consequences. Active Western St.and Is Imperative The Russians are everywhere engaged in a ruthless class struggle. Thus far the West has only been able to prevent Soviet world domination by non-military power, by recourse to costly armaments and military preparedness. As events in Asia and Africa prove, military preparedness and even superiority alone will not prevent Russia from spreading its influence and political control to other territories. The fact that the West has no voice and, hence, no control in the Soviet-dominated areas, while Soviet Russia, on the other hand, together with the West, decides all important affairs of the West, has unduly strengthened Communist self-confidence and the USSR's aggressive attitude. The Communists are more than ever convinced of the progr:essive nature of their ideology and of the correctness of their theses. It has merely heightened their fanaticism. This development is very disquieting because it intensifies instead of diminishing the danger of war. We should apply the principle of mutuality and draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that the Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 Russians disregard the principles of international law and automatically exclude themselves from the community of nations. The West dare not limit itself to being ready to fight for the preservation of freedom in the still free world as, for example, in Berlin or South Korea. Whenever Khrushchev says that he will never cease to encourage Communist victory throughout the entire world, the Western answer should ring out bold and clear, that we shall never cease to fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain and shall do everything we can to make freedom and Christian-Western culture apply on a world~wide basis. This should not be confused with a "crusade" against the Soviet Union or the enkindling of a third world war. On the contrary, conditions must be created that will prevent war. Psychological means must be applied to drive home to the Kremlin oppressors that their ideological fanaticism cannot intimidate the whole world and perpetuate a condition of slavery ad infinitum. 'l'he free world is still in a position to take political, economic, and diplomatic measures which can strengthen the actual political desires of millions of enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain and make it possible some day to see them realized It is not enough, however, to support the right of self-determination of peoples merely for tactical reasons. It is of no use as long as the men in the Kremlin notice that behind such speeches, declarations, and assertions there is no serious resolve to take political measures as well. Balance Can Be Restored The United States of America has created various anti~Communist institutions. They have been seriously weakened, however, by political compromise so that they could not live up to expectations. It is impossible to hope to carry out the struggle for freedom and at the same time divide the oppressed peoples into two categories. If one promises the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, �58 SLOVAKIA and Baltic Peoples freedom, independence, and the right of self-determination, one cannot withhold it from the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others . . The West sporadically fostered the hope that the Russians, in the course of time, would make certain political concessions · by easing terror and by liberalization. The fifteen years that lie immediately behind us prove that such expectations are illusory. Instead of allowing the dominated countries more freedom and self-determination, Russia has ruthlessly incorporated these peoples into its sphere of power. When one enters the large libraries of the West and leafs through the tables of contents, one finds numerous publications on American, German, English, French, Japanese, and even Soviet imperialism. But one seldom finds, and then but recently, references to a Russian imperialism although the Russians for centuries have ruled more non-Russians than Russians. Is this sheer coincidence? Moscow tries to exploit the dissatisfaction of five or ten per cent of the population of the West for purposes of propaganda. The West could use the dissatisfaction of at least 80 per cent of the people behind the Iron Curtain as a political weapon. This would be in the interest of freedom and Western culture. Yet it has not been done. Such a program should be adopted. If the Western Powers would decide to demand freedom for the peoples under Moscow's oppression and if appropriate political measures would be taken, they could again take the initiative in world politics and force the Kremlin to go on the defensive. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the existence and the continued development of our culture and social order. Only in this way can we restore ':he balance and create the conditions for a lasting peace. HROBAK'S E:NGLISH-SLOV AK DICTION ARY there is none better on the market today - can be yours for only $4.00. � 50 SLOVAKIA DEFENSE AWNE IS NOT ENOUGH By Ferdinand Durcansky It is a historical fact that the Soviet Imperium would have collapsed in the course of the second world war, without the military and economic support of America. At the end of the war the USA was still in a position - due to this active support - to emphasize America's political designs and put them into effect. Proof thereto lies in Stalin's having to withdraw his troops from Iran in 1946 at America's behest, although such a move by no means tallied with Communist strategy. U. S. political, economic and, a:bove all, military superiority was so impressive and was so highly regarded by Soviet leaders that even at the 1955 Geneva Conference they dared not show their real hand on the question of Germany's partition. To a certain extent this power relationship seems to have changed in favor of the Soviet Imperium. Russia, formerly one of the seven Great Powers, has meanwhile become one of the two World Powers, and now controls the eastern half of Europe, plus the most important areas of the Euro-Asiatic sphere. At the moment the great European Powers alone would hardly be in a position effectively to resist the Kremlin's political pressure. Even America, despite its costly system of defense, feels itself threatened. This e~lains why Khrushchev today feels he can simply refuse to discuss German reunification if it does not ta:ke place the way he thinks it should. The power complex of the Soviet Union has become so mighty that Khrushchev periodically threatens, hoping he will intimidate the allies of the United States and thereby weaken Western unity. This potential strength harbors the temptation to superimpose, even on the peoples of the still free world, the political will of the Kremlin. In any case we must reckon with the fact, that the men in the saddle in Moscow have made preparations for achieving world domination as called for by the Commu- �SLOVAKIA 51 nist ideology. The Russians have reached this position in less than twenty years, a status that is not only the expression of their own endeavors of military or economic strength, but for the most part the outcome of faulty Western policy. A continuation of such policy would stabilize the failures of the West and bring aJbout additional failures, a fact that should serve as a cogent warning to all Europe. Just how did this political and ideological Soviet Russian gain come about? Is it possible that Communist ideology and, above all, its practical application, is much more progressive than our economic and social order? Is it perhaps more in keeping with over-all human developments than ours, as the Kremlin rulers maintain? Is State capitalism more enriching and better for the people in the East than the freedom-loving order of the Western world? Facts refute the Communist theses. The basis of our social order is freedom with its ensuing initiative of the individual in all realms of human existence. The West is certainly not poor in ideas. We have both ideas and principles to offer Communism, which are effective not only in the West but even in the East. The suppressed peoples affirm these values. But our methods are wrong. Western policy refuses to look upon the ideological and political offensive of world Communism as something whole and indivisible, and preoccupies itself with only partial problems and partial aspects. Tension Is Mainly Political Too little attention is given to the fact that almost all the moral and ethical values that form the vital basis of the civilized nations of Europe are rejected by the Soviets. The leaders of the Soviet Union even regard, among other factors, the principles of international law as non-<binding for themselves. Every treaty concluded with the Kremlin is thus made suspect by a "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." An international treaty is only considered valid as long as it does not contra- �52 SLOVAKIA diet the interests of the class struggle. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that the agreements made with · the Kremlin are scarcely worth more than the paper they are printed on. Every treaty signed with the Soviets constitutes a disadvantage for the free world, which it excludes from certain actions and possibilities and does not obligate the Russians since they feel themselves dispensed from all erstwhile, generally valid, moral-legal maxims. Such principles, emanating from Western culture, contradict Marxist-Leninist teachings. The Soviets behave as if they had never assumed an obligation, a circumstance proven by t heir disregard for the treaties of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and London. Relations between the free world and the east cannot, therefore, be regarded as a normal nationally-binding relationship based on the principles of international law, because the main concern is a question of power. The behavior of the West toward the East Block has, nevertheless, been based at all times on the principles: and forms of classical foreign policy and diplomacy. In all differences of opinion and artifically trumped up crises, measures and methods are applied that scarcely differ from those employed during the periods of the Vienna Congress. The results of this conservative force behind Communist hunger for power are judged solely from the aspect of momentary security and military potential. To be sure, a number of Western political leaders have realized that the conflict is an ideological one, but they believe the controversy can be resolved by competing in the field of propaganda. Even these far-sighted statesmen, politicians, and publicists fail to see that the tension between East and West represents a political struggle. Cer tainly it has an iedological character with which it is inextricably bound. The Communists on the other hand leave no doubt that they are concerned with a whole. When they speak of a socialist society valid for the world of today they mean not only production patterns, State order and insti- �SLOVAKIA 53 tutions, but the intention of annihilating all values that we possess and that form the basis of our Christian-Western culture, and of replacing them by their ideas and patterns. We are actually witnesses of a great historical attempt to replace fre edom throughout the world with slavery. Millions of independent people are to be reduced to dependence and coercion. In this very century a decision will be made as to whether Russia is ruble to realize its plan - World Communism - and destroy the Christian"\Vestern culture, for, without crushing it, Bolshevism cannot get a foothold in these countries. It is thus a question, whether we value our culture highly enough ourselves and are resolved to fight for its preservation, or whether we want to yield to despotism step by step to make room for a false culture that levels off and nullifies the personality. Soviet Russia has forced this alternative upon us and it would be sheer suicide to evade the struggle. The ensuing political consequences would be of immeasurable importance and decisive for our future destiny. If it were only a question of distribution of power between Moscow and Washington, each of us - each nation, each people, each stratum of society - would have the right and the possibility to decide freely and, after consideration of individual interests, either to choose the friendship and alliance of the one or the other, or to remain neutral. Basic Values Are At Stake In our century, however, the matter is quite different. The traditional political struggle, which dealt with the acquisition of foreign territories, colonies and trade and customs was, with linguistically dependent national cultural propaganda, and, with competition toward the opening up of world markets, is a thing of the past. It means that if people today demand the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, of the Baltic or other oppressed peoples, this is not done in the interest of the United States of America, �54 SLOVAKIA and does not foresee therein the recognition of any claim to U. S. leadership and to strengthening U. S. policy, but that the people concerned become a simple co-combatant in a struggle for the preservation of our values, which are to remain the basis of human coexistence even in the future. When we fight against Communism and, hence, against the Soviet Union, we do not do so in the interest of so-called capitalists, but in the interest of our indivisible social order and in the struggle against the enslavement of our progeny. The fact has been cited in the September 1960 issue of Der Europaische Osten that World War III has already begun. For the time being it will be carried out on the not insignificant level of propaganda. To be sure the means employed, such as radio, television, press cinema, and literature, are less frightening than those of military, yet they are powerful and effective. Since the Soviets are resolved to impose their system on the entire world, it would be dangerous shortsightedness to believe that in the current tussle between the West and the East - in which all peoples are involved willy-nilly - the West can succeed by ,p urely defensive measures only. So far, however, the political leadership of the West has limited itself to defensive tactics. The outcome of this behavior which has been alarming for many millons, was the de facto recognition of the Iron Curtain, an abandonment of the moral and cultural mission and obligation to defend the freedom of all people and, if need be, to fight for it. By giving up the right of political control psychological prerequisites were estalblished for the ideological and political integration of East and Southeast Europe and the Soviets were given the chance to integrate more than one hundred millions of human beings into their sphere of power. Western Doors Always Open Much worse, however, is he fact that this Bolshevization of the Eastern half of Europe, effectuated in four to five years, has given the Kremlin the opportunity of �SLOVAKIA 55 unfolding a general political and ideological offensive against the free world without the West having a chance to look Jnto the darkness behind the wings of the Communist stage. At the same time the doors of the West remained open to agents and spies from all over the Communist world, thus enabling ~he Kremlin to cause unrest on a global scale under the motto of the class struggle and to allow a fabulous measure of propaganda to take effect that has brought whole peoples to ruin. The initiation of the so-called containment policy meant the indirect and de facto -r ecognition of the status quo resulting from Communist violence. Western leadership at the time believed that by sacrificing the European East and South it was possible to buy genuine peaceful cooperation with Russia and that it would put a stop to further spread of Communist power. Was it not sheer delusion to believe in a change in the European status quo? A change did take place, year after year, but always in favor of the Soviet Union. It is utopia to think that coexistence with the Communist world can go on permanently and that the Russians would be ready without any compelling reason to change the current status quo by the reunification of Germany or by free elections within the Satellite countries. This is dangerous wishful thinking which contradicts the facts as we see them happening in Asia and Africa. A Western policy that is prepared to recognize the status quo is not only a betrayal of hundreds of millions of people hungering for fredom, but a threat to the entire world. The final phase of colonialism that we are going through today, gave the Russians a golden opportunity for action. They demanded freedom and independence for nations that already enjoyed them without benefit of Soviet propaganda. Although Russia is subjugation incarnate, it claims the role of freedom fighter and liberator. This boastful sham of Soviet policy and the political naivete and inexperi,mce of the non-white peoples paved the way for it. �56 SLOVAKIA If an opportunistically-minded person observes the fanaticism with which the Soviet Russians work toward greater domination, it is no wonder if he begins to waver. If today the colored man - treated roughly in past centuries by many a European - falls prey to Communism, his attitude for the most part is the result of the West's own attitude of defense. The peoples of the East, then, often gain the impression that the political leaders of the West repeatedly fail, because the will and resolve to effectively combat the Communist world is simply lacking. Even on the West the opinion is winning ground that our culture and the nations and peoples who sustain this culture are doomed to extinction. Why, then, should a colored man choose the cultrue that limits itself to defense and, hence, can have no prospects for the future? Although this opinion stems from an optical illusion it can, nevertheless, have fateful consequences. Active Western St.and Is Imperative The Russians are everywhere engaged in a ruthless class struggle. Thus far the West has only been able to prevent Soviet world domination by non-military power, by recourse to costly armaments and military preparedness. As events in Asia and Africa prove, military preparedness and even superiority alone will not prevent Russia from spreading its influence and political control to other territories. The fact that the West has no voice and, hence, no control in the Soviet-dominated areas, while Soviet Russia, on the other hand, together with the West, decides all important affairs of the West, has unduly strengthened Communist self-confidence and the USSR's aggressive attitude. The Communists are more than ever convinced of the progr:essive nature of their ideology and of the correctness of their theses. It has merely heightened their fanaticism. This development is very disquieting because it intensifies instead of diminishing the danger of war. We should apply the principle of mutuality and draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that the Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 Russians disregard the principles of international law and automatically exclude themselves from the community of nations. The West dare not limit itself to being ready to fight for the preservation of freedom in the still free world as, for example, in Berlin or South Korea. Whenever Khrushchev says that he will never cease to encourage Communist victory throughout the entire world, the Western answer should ring out bold and clear, that we shall never cease to fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain and shall do everything we can to make freedom and Christian-Western culture apply on a world~wide basis. This should not be confused with a "crusade" against the Soviet Union or the enkindling of a third world war. On the contrary, conditions must be created that will prevent war. Psychological means must be applied to drive home to the Kremlin oppressors that their ideological fanaticism cannot intimidate the whole world and perpetuate a condition of slavery ad infinitum. 'l'he free world is still in a position to take political, economic, and diplomatic measures which can strengthen the actual political desires of millions of enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain and make it possible some day to see them realized It is not enough, however, to support the right of self-determination of peoples merely for tactical reasons. It is of no use as long as the men in the Kremlin notice that behind such speeches, declarations, and assertions there is no serious resolve to take political measures as well. Balance Can Be Restored The United States of America has created various anti~Communist institutions. They have been seriously weakened, however, by political compromise so that they could not live up to expectations. It is impossible to hope to carry out the struggle for freedom and at the same time divide the oppressed peoples into two categories. If one promises the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, �58 SLOVAKIA and Baltic Peoples freedom, independence, and the right of self-determination, one cannot withhold it from the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others . . The West sporadically fostered the hope that the Russians, in the course of time, would make certain political concessions · by easing terror and by liberalization. The fifteen years that lie immediately behind us prove that such expectations are illusory. Instead of allowing the dominated countries more freedom and self-determination, Russia has ruthlessly incorporated these peoples into its sphere of power. When one enters the large libraries of the West and leafs through the tables of contents, one finds numerous publications on American, German, English, French, Japanese, and even Soviet imperialism. But one seldom finds, and then but recently, references to a Russian imperialism although the Russians for centuries have ruled more non-Russians than Russians. Is this sheer coincidence? Moscow tries to exploit the dissatisfaction of five or ten per cent of the population of the West for purposes of propaganda. The West could use the dissatisfaction of at least 80 per cent of the people behind the Iron Curtain as a political weapon. This would be in the interest of freedom and Western culture. Yet it has not been done. Such a program should be adopted. If the Western Powers would decide to demand freedom for the peoples under Moscow's oppression and if appropriate political measures would be taken, they could again take the initiative in world politics and force the Kremlin to go on the defensive. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the existence and the continued development of our culture and social order. Only in this way can we restore ':he balance and create the conditions for a lasting peace. HROBAK'S E:NGLISH-SLOV AK DICTION ARY there is none better on the market today - can be yours for only $4.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1962, Vol. 12 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 35), March-June 1962. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 50 SLOVAKIA DEFENSE AWNE IS NOT ENOUGH By Ferdinand Durcansky It is a historical fact that the Soviet Imperium would have collapsed in the course of the second world war, without the military and economic support of America. At the end of the war the USA was still in a position - due to this active support - to emphasize America's political designs and put them into effect. Proof thereto lies in Stalin's having to withdraw his troops from Iran in 1946 at America's behest, although such a move by no means tallied with Communist strategy. U. S. political, economic and, a:bove all, military superiority was so impressive and was so highly regarded by Soviet leaders that even at the 1955 Geneva Conference they dared not show their real hand on the question of Germany's partition. To a certain extent this power relationship seems to have changed in favor of the Soviet Imperium. Russia, formerly one of the seven Great Powers, has meanwhile become one of the two World Powers, and now controls the eastern half of Europe, plus the most important areas of the Euro-Asiatic sphere. At the moment the great European Powers alone would hardly be in a position effectively to resist the Kremlin's political pressure. Even America, despite its costly system of defense, feels itself threatened. This e~lains why Khrushchev today feels he can simply refuse to discuss German reunification if it does not ta:ke place the way he thinks it should. The power complex of the Soviet Union has become so mighty that Khrushchev periodically threatens, hoping he will intimidate the allies of the United States and thereby weaken Western unity. This potential strength harbors the temptation to superimpose, even on the peoples of the still free world, the political will of the Kremlin. In any case we must reckon with the fact, that the men in the saddle in Moscow have made preparations for achieving world domination as called for by the Commu- SLOVAKIA 51 nist ideology. The Russians have reached this position in less than twenty years, a status that is not only the expression of their own endeavors of military or economic strength, but for the most part the outcome of faulty Western policy. A continuation of such policy would stabilize the failures of the West and bring aJbout additional failures, a fact that should serve as a cogent warning to all Europe. Just how did this political and ideological Soviet Russian gain come about? Is it possible that Communist ideology and, above all, its practical application, is much more progressive than our economic and social order? Is it perhaps more in keeping with over-all human developments than ours, as the Kremlin rulers maintain? Is State capitalism more enriching and better for the people in the East than the freedom-loving order of the Western world? Facts refute the Communist theses. The basis of our social order is freedom with its ensuing initiative of the individual in all realms of human existence. The West is certainly not poor in ideas. We have both ideas and principles to offer Communism, which are effective not only in the West but even in the East. The suppressed peoples affirm these values. But our methods are wrong. Western policy refuses to look upon the ideological and political offensive of world Communism as something whole and indivisible, and preoccupies itself with only partial problems and partial aspects. Tension Is Mainly Political Too little attention is given to the fact that almost all the moral and ethical values that form the vital basis of the civilized nations of Europe are rejected by the Soviets. The leaders of the Soviet Union even regard, among other factors, the principles of international law as non-<binding for themselves. Every treaty concluded with the Kremlin is thus made suspect by a "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." An international treaty is only considered valid as long as it does not contra- 52 SLOVAKIA diet the interests of the class struggle. Nor is it an exaggeration to state that the agreements made with · the Kremlin are scarcely worth more than the paper they are printed on. Every treaty signed with the Soviets constitutes a disadvantage for the free world, which it excludes from certain actions and possibilities and does not obligate the Russians since they feel themselves dispensed from all erstwhile, generally valid, moral-legal maxims. Such principles, emanating from Western culture, contradict Marxist-Leninist teachings. The Soviets behave as if they had never assumed an obligation, a circumstance proven by t heir disregard for the treaties of Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and London. Relations between the free world and the east cannot, therefore, be regarded as a normal nationally-binding relationship based on the principles of international law, because the main concern is a question of power. The behavior of the West toward the East Block has, nevertheless, been based at all times on the principles: and forms of classical foreign policy and diplomacy. In all differences of opinion and artifically trumped up crises, measures and methods are applied that scarcely differ from those employed during the periods of the Vienna Congress. The results of this conservative force behind Communist hunger for power are judged solely from the aspect of momentary security and military potential. To be sure, a number of Western political leaders have realized that the conflict is an ideological one, but they believe the controversy can be resolved by competing in the field of propaganda. Even these far-sighted statesmen, politicians, and publicists fail to see that the tension between East and West represents a political struggle. Cer tainly it has an iedological character with which it is inextricably bound. The Communists on the other hand leave no doubt that they are concerned with a whole. When they speak of a socialist society valid for the world of today they mean not only production patterns, State order and insti- SLOVAKIA 53 tutions, but the intention of annihilating all values that we possess and that form the basis of our Christian-Western culture, and of replacing them by their ideas and patterns. We are actually witnesses of a great historical attempt to replace fre edom throughout the world with slavery. Millions of independent people are to be reduced to dependence and coercion. In this very century a decision will be made as to whether Russia is ruble to realize its plan - World Communism - and destroy the Christian"\Vestern culture, for, without crushing it, Bolshevism cannot get a foothold in these countries. It is thus a question, whether we value our culture highly enough ourselves and are resolved to fight for its preservation, or whether we want to yield to despotism step by step to make room for a false culture that levels off and nullifies the personality. Soviet Russia has forced this alternative upon us and it would be sheer suicide to evade the struggle. The ensuing political consequences would be of immeasurable importance and decisive for our future destiny. If it were only a question of distribution of power between Moscow and Washington, each of us - each nation, each people, each stratum of society - would have the right and the possibility to decide freely and, after consideration of individual interests, either to choose the friendship and alliance of the one or the other, or to remain neutral. Basic Values Are At Stake In our century, however, the matter is quite different. The traditional political struggle, which dealt with the acquisition of foreign territories, colonies and trade and customs was, with linguistically dependent national cultural propaganda, and, with competition toward the opening up of world markets, is a thing of the past. It means that if people today demand the reunification of Germany, the freedom of the Slovaks, Hungarians, Rumanians, of the Baltic or other oppressed peoples, this is not done in the interest of the United States of America, 54 SLOVAKIA and does not foresee therein the recognition of any claim to U. S. leadership and to strengthening U. S. policy, but that the people concerned become a simple co-combatant in a struggle for the preservation of our values, which are to remain the basis of human coexistence even in the future. When we fight against Communism and, hence, against the Soviet Union, we do not do so in the interest of so-called capitalists, but in the interest of our indivisible social order and in the struggle against the enslavement of our progeny. The fact has been cited in the September 1960 issue of Der Europaische Osten that World War III has already begun. For the time being it will be carried out on the not insignificant level of propaganda. To be sure the means employed, such as radio, television, press cinema, and literature, are less frightening than those of military, yet they are powerful and effective. Since the Soviets are resolved to impose their system on the entire world, it would be dangerous shortsightedness to believe that in the current tussle between the West and the East - in which all peoples are involved willy-nilly - the West can succeed by ,p urely defensive measures only. So far, however, the political leadership of the West has limited itself to defensive tactics. The outcome of this behavior which has been alarming for many millons, was the de facto recognition of the Iron Curtain, an abandonment of the moral and cultural mission and obligation to defend the freedom of all people and, if need be, to fight for it. By giving up the right of political control psychological prerequisites were estalblished for the ideological and political integration of East and Southeast Europe and the Soviets were given the chance to integrate more than one hundred millions of human beings into their sphere of power. Western Doors Always Open Much worse, however, is he fact that this Bolshevization of the Eastern half of Europe, effectuated in four to five years, has given the Kremlin the opportunity of SLOVAKIA 55 unfolding a general political and ideological offensive against the free world without the West having a chance to look Jnto the darkness behind the wings of the Communist stage. At the same time the doors of the West remained open to agents and spies from all over the Communist world, thus enabling ~he Kremlin to cause unrest on a global scale under the motto of the class struggle and to allow a fabulous measure of propaganda to take effect that has brought whole peoples to ruin. The initiation of the so-called containment policy meant the indirect and de facto -r ecognition of the status quo resulting from Communist violence. Western leadership at the time believed that by sacrificing the European East and South it was possible to buy genuine peaceful cooperation with Russia and that it would put a stop to further spread of Communist power. Was it not sheer delusion to believe in a change in the European status quo? A change did take place, year after year, but always in favor of the Soviet Union. It is utopia to think that coexistence with the Communist world can go on permanently and that the Russians would be ready without any compelling reason to change the current status quo by the reunification of Germany or by free elections within the Satellite countries. This is dangerous wishful thinking which contradicts the facts as we see them happening in Asia and Africa. A Western policy that is prepared to recognize the status quo is not only a betrayal of hundreds of millions of people hungering for fredom, but a threat to the entire world. The final phase of colonialism that we are going through today, gave the Russians a golden opportunity for action. They demanded freedom and independence for nations that already enjoyed them without benefit of Soviet propaganda. Although Russia is subjugation incarnate, it claims the role of freedom fighter and liberator. This boastful sham of Soviet policy and the political naivete and inexperi,mce of the non-white peoples paved the way for it. 56 SLOVAKIA If an opportunistically-minded person observes the fanaticism with which the Soviet Russians work toward greater domination, it is no wonder if he begins to waver. If today the colored man - treated roughly in past centuries by many a European - falls prey to Communism, his attitude for the most part is the result of the West's own attitude of defense. The peoples of the East, then, often gain the impression that the political leaders of the West repeatedly fail, because the will and resolve to effectively combat the Communist world is simply lacking. Even on the West the opinion is winning ground that our culture and the nations and peoples who sustain this culture are doomed to extinction. Why, then, should a colored man choose the cultrue that limits itself to defense and, hence, can have no prospects for the future? Although this opinion stems from an optical illusion it can, nevertheless, have fateful consequences. Active Western St.and Is Imperative The Russians are everywhere engaged in a ruthless class struggle. Thus far the West has only been able to prevent Soviet world domination by non-military power, by recourse to costly armaments and military preparedness. As events in Asia and Africa prove, military preparedness and even superiority alone will not prevent Russia from spreading its influence and political control to other territories. The fact that the West has no voice and, hence, no control in the Soviet-dominated areas, while Soviet Russia, on the other hand, together with the West, decides all important affairs of the West, has unduly strengthened Communist self-confidence and the USSR's aggressive attitude. The Communists are more than ever convinced of the progr:essive nature of their ideology and of the correctness of their theses. It has merely heightened their fanaticism. This development is very disquieting because it intensifies instead of diminishing the danger of war. We should apply the principle of mutuality and draw the necessary conclusions from the fact that the Soviet SLOVAKIA 57 Russians disregard the principles of international law and automatically exclude themselves from the community of nations. The West dare not limit itself to being ready to fight for the preservation of freedom in the still free world as, for example, in Berlin or South Korea. Whenever Khrushchev says that he will never cease to encourage Communist victory throughout the entire world, the Western answer should ring out bold and clear, that we shall never cease to fight for the liberation of the oppressed peoples behind the Iron Curtain and shall do everything we can to make freedom and Christian-Western culture apply on a world~wide basis. This should not be confused with a "crusade" against the Soviet Union or the enkindling of a third world war. On the contrary, conditions must be created that will prevent war. Psychological means must be applied to drive home to the Kremlin oppressors that their ideological fanaticism cannot intimidate the whole world and perpetuate a condition of slavery ad infinitum. 'l'he free world is still in a position to take political, economic, and diplomatic measures which can strengthen the actual political desires of millions of enslaved people behind the Iron Curtain and make it possible some day to see them realized It is not enough, however, to support the right of self-determination of peoples merely for tactical reasons. It is of no use as long as the men in the Kremlin notice that behind such speeches, declarations, and assertions there is no serious resolve to take political measures as well. Balance Can Be Restored The United States of America has created various anti~Communist institutions. They have been seriously weakened, however, by political compromise so that they could not live up to expectations. It is impossible to hope to carry out the struggle for freedom and at the same time divide the oppressed peoples into two categories. If one promises the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, 58 SLOVAKIA and Baltic Peoples freedom, independence, and the right of self-determination, one cannot withhold it from the Slovaks, Croats, Ukrainians, Georgians, and others . . The West sporadically fostered the hope that the Russians, in the course of time, would make certain political concessions · by easing terror and by liberalization. The fifteen years that lie immediately behind us prove that such expectations are illusory. Instead of allowing the dominated countries more freedom and self-determination, Russia has ruthlessly incorporated these peoples into its sphere of power. When one enters the large libraries of the West and leafs through the tables of contents, one finds numerous publications on American, German, English, French, Japanese, and even Soviet imperialism. But one seldom finds, and then but recently, references to a Russian imperialism although the Russians for centuries have ruled more non-Russians than Russians. Is this sheer coincidence? Moscow tries to exploit the dissatisfaction of five or ten per cent of the population of the West for purposes of propaganda. The West could use the dissatisfaction of at least 80 per cent of the people behind the Iron Curtain as a political weapon. This would be in the interest of freedom and Western culture. Yet it has not been done. Such a program should be adopted. If the Western Powers would decide to demand freedom for the peoples under Moscow's oppression and if appropriate political measures would be taken, they could again take the initiative in world politics and force the Kremlin to go on the defensive. Only in this way will it be possible to guarantee the existence and the continued development of our culture and social order. Only in this way can we restore ':he balance and create the conditions for a lasting peace. HROBAK'S E:NGLISH-SLOV AK DICTION ARY there is none better on the market today - can be yours for only $4.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Defense Alone is Not Enough Description An account of the resource Ferdinand Ďurčanský Slovakia, Vol. 12, No. 1 (35), March-June 1962 pp. 50-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ďurčanský, Ferdinand Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1962 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7b2aec6cfb355c412f5c2249098659fc.pdf 5b181452e9a4fd694829f643e849b9c1 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Pub I ished VOL. V II quart erly by the Slovak League SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER, 195 7 of America NO. 3-4(24-25) DR. JOSEPH TISO AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN SLOVAKIA MILAN S. DURI CA The fact that, during the period when Dr. Joseph Tiso was at the head of the Slova)k Republic as its president, there ,w ere "liqttidated" in an inhumane manner, in Nazi concentration camps, per.haps also severa1 tens of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, has tempted many authors either to hold Dr. Tiso directly responsible for these crimes, or at -least to consider this point as t,h e real weaJkness of Tiso's policy and his defense< 1 >. We are convinced that the so1ution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia is a very complicated proiblem and, therefore, it is necessary to gather in an objective study all existing documents so that the _true state of affairs might become known (2) . While awaiting the results of such a study, we are attempting here to focalize some of the actualities which already h ave been documented - facts which can put some light on definite, shadowy sides of this problem and also note in what direction it is necessary to move in making a further study so that we might arrive at an objective statement of the facts that had taken iplace and thus also at a correct moral evaluation of them. J EW RY IN S LOVAK IA Already in the past century, native and foreign observers were stunned by the great influx of Jews to Hungary and especially to the part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks from time immemorial. While Caplovic noted 6,850 J ews in the Trencin area h efore 1829, according to. the census of 1869 there already were 13,365 of them among 237,702 SlavaJks. Sveto,z ar Hurban, writing in 1881, said: A hundred years ago, there were 75,098 Jews in Hun- �2 SLOVAKJA gary; 55 years later there were already 241,632 of them (the increase burdened Slovakia mostly); in 1'870 they numbered 552,133 and now there are more than 600,000 of them in Hungary!" (Slovenske Pohl'ady, 1881, p. 291). The Czech writer Rudolph Pokorny, who reproduces these figures from direct eX:perience, describes the methods of Jewish immigrants in SlovaJkia as parasitical and exploitative (3). It would be very interesting to study in detaril the relations between the influx of Jews to Slovakia by the strengthening of their economic position and the economic decline orf the Slovak in1halbitants which resulted in an increasing exodus of Slovaks into foreign lands especially to the United States. According to our impressions from Hterature already reviewed, such a study would most li!kely lead to the conclusion that the exodus of the Sl()IVaks was in part caused by the great influx of Jews into rSl()IVaJkia. The strengthened economic positions of t:he Jews in Slovakia gave them the opportunity to exert stronger politicai influence and to propagate their ideology. A Polish observer A:gaton GiHer, ,w riting in 1876, described how the Jews in Slovalkia systematically worked against the Catholic Church and against Christianity in general( 4) under the aegis of the liberalism that was preached lby t:he Hungarian government ,o f the same Colman Tisza who, at the same time (1875) , denied the fact that the Slovak nation existed.(5). Jif we bear in mind the eX:tent and the constant increase of these mentioned effects of the Jewish minority in Slovak,ia, we shall more readily understand the spontaneous psychological reaction of the intelligentsia and the broad masses of the SloviaJk people. This reaction expressed itself, first of aill, in response to the tolerant nature of the SlovaJks and the fact that they laciked means of -power, in a blood-perspir~ng effort to save their own economic situation, ( with dollars made in American mines, the Slovak peasant tried to secure his livelihood in his native 'land) , then in t:he effort to emancipate themselves from dependence on the Jews in commerce to provide the daily necessities of life (by establishnig self-help cooperatives), amd also by an intensive building of institutions to preserve �SLOVAKIA 3 and •f .urther their original national culture both in a general and also in a specifically Christian sense (it suffices to mention the -Matica .Slovenska •a nd the Society of St. Adalbert). The situation did not change substantially even after the c,r eation oif the Czecho-Slova:k Republic in 1918(6). In 1923, a !French observer wa'S amazed \by the dis:proportion., ate preponderance of Jewish students in the universities and trade schools(7) and he foresaw that the Jews would thus soon capture the best positions in the new State(8). This prediction was if'll'lfilled, especiaUy a'S far as Slovakia was concerned. After the Vienna Arbitration, when the Jews constituted only 3.3'5 % of the population in S1ov,alkia(9), they owned almost one-half of the entire nation.a{ wealth(l0) and occupied most of the econ.omicaHy and civically important pwbl:i!c functionsO1). That this fact influenced the daily press and cultural production in general is evidence which needs no special proof(J2). It was only natural that the Slovak with all his legendary peace-loving characteristics, lbore the situation with difficulty; and the :Slovalk demands for autonomy, whicih characterized Slovak activities in the twenties and thirties of thi:s century, were accompanied by demands for a solution of the Jewish !problem. The current of anti-Semitism, which had overtalken many countries on the initiative of German Nazism, even such countries in whi·c h objectively suppositions fo'!" anti-Jew,i sh feeling were really insignificant if not directly fictitious, definitely did 1ha;ve some inf1uence even in 'Slova;kia(13). But who could stop Hitler at that time? It is not the fau~t •o f the Slovalks that many arguments of anti-Jewish :propaganda, originating outside of Slovalkia but ascribed to ,Slovakia, found at iJeast partial su!bstantiation in fact. THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Tiso took over the government of Sl01Vakia under the most difficult circumstances. His first worry was to preserve order and to prevent arbitray acts of usurpers even in the so,l ution of the Jewish .problem<14). Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, whose public opinion 1 �SLOVAKIA already for a longer time impatiently demanded radical regulations with regard to the privileged Czec,h and Jewish minority in Slovarkia(15), Dr. Tiso sought a legal solution of the matter already in federated Czecho-Slovakia(l6), as well as after March 14, 1919, in the Slova;k Republic. For an objectively moral evaluation of Tiso's conduct in the solution of the Jewish problem in .Slovakia, is is necessary to clearly distinguish ,various time periods, during which the legal and practical possibilities of Dr. Tiso to decide this question personally changed substantially. 1. From October 6, 1938, to October 26, 1939: Dr. Joseph Tiso, as Prime Mini:ster of the Slo,vaJk Go,vernment, had broad ;possiibilities oif legislative and executive intrative and, therefore, also dir,e ct, personal responsibility in this regard(17 ). 2. From October 26, 1939, to July 28, 1940: As President of the Slova:k Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso could intervene in the legislative acti,viby of the Assembly and influence the executive power reserived to the government, which was responsible to the Assembly and not to the President, only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the S'lovaJk Republic(18) . During this ,p eriod, we cannot regard Dr. Tiso directly res,ponsible for the various initiatives in the solution of the Jewis'h problem, but only for the acts of his office as prescrilbed by the Constitution: whether and how he used the rights of intervention., ·a s defined 'by the Constitution, in regard to legislative and exec,utirve acts which required his appm,val. For the latter, as head of the State, Dr. Tiso carries the responsibility, dividing it with the respective Constitutional organs. 3. From July 28, 1940, to August 30, 1944: at the Salziburg meeting with Germany's intervention in the internal affairs of 'Slova'kia(19) - Dr. Tiso lost a definite part of the effective possibilities to exercise his Constitutional rights in regard to persons who were forced by Hitler into the Slovaik Government, especially with regard to expressed demands of the Germans upon the Slova;k Government(20). Such was the problem of e~pelling or liquidating the Jew:? <21) . In this period we can hold Tiso as responsible, as in the previous period, only in proportion 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 to the effective possibilities of free action which remained open to him after !Hitler's intervention at Salzburg. 4. From August 30, 1944, to April 5, 1945: Slovakia was to a great extent a battleground, where actual governmental power was exercised by various fighting units, most of the time completely independent of civil governmental organs, nay even expressly in opposition to them. (22). Here the responsibility of Dr. Tiso is limited to those acts, which - aliWays within the extent of this Constitutional rights and duties - took ·p lace on the territory and at ra time when the Government of the SlovaJk Republic still go;verned there and had effective 1possibility to exercise its power. TISO'S SOLUTION Despite the critical political - internal and international - situation and the revolutionary events of October, 1938, and of March, 1939, with his resolute influence, Dr. Joseph Tiso checked all violent intervention of incited masses of ,people in the solution of the Jewish problem (23) and consistently in;volked a legal courne to- solve this problem. Such a course, while it secured for the Slovaks time for the necessary study of the various aspects of the complicated situation and for a democratic negotation .o f various motions, with regard to the Jews themselves, it eliminated the typically Nazi factor of surprise(2-!), giving them time and opportunity to prepare themselves psychologically and to make necessary provisions, including financial(25) in the face of the new situation. After such a preliminary preparation, the first Slo;vruk governmental regulation was issued April 30, 1939, with the force of law, the object of which was to solve the Jewish pro1blem (26). This regulation defined the concept of a confessional and civic viewpoint, without considering racial motives at all. Its aim was to reduce the disproportionate preponderance of Jews in the economic life of Slovakia. The Jews could continue to manage their enterprises if they allowed a 51 % per cent ,participation of Slovaks the 51 % not being confiscated, but lbought in a regular manner by Slovak participants (shareholders). The participation of Jews in the legal, medical, and other important �6 SLOVAKIA and profitable professions was to be regulated gradually in proportion to the total number of the Jewish minority. Besides this, the Slovak Government of Dr. Joseph Tiso supported. the voluntary emigration of Jews to Palestine in all possible ways< 27) . If we consider all the facts of the matter objecttvely, we must admit that in these regulations there really was nothing w'hich, under the given circumstances, would exceed the normal competency of a legislator that did not emanate from the natural law itself, or that would be opposed to the principles of justice and humanity(28). The first 'S lovak resolution of the J ewish question - and tihe only one which, in the full sense, we can call Tiso's solution - contained and realized the attributes proposed by Tiso when he ,proclaimed. that "t'he Jewish question in Slovakia shall be solved justly, socially, and humanly"( 29) . THE SLOVAK "JEWISH LAW" These :provisions clearly, but not altogether effectively because they left wide possibilities to evade the law(30), proved to be insufficient in attaining their aim. 'Dherefore, but probably also under German pressure(31), the Slovak Parliament prepared. a new so-catled "Jewish Law," which was approved on iFeb11uary 29, 1940(32). Fundamentally, this law differed little from the previous provision; it defined more accurately many details and fixed the principle of participation o.f the Jews in economic, civic, and cultural life in proportion to their number of the tdtal population, that is, 4 percent(33) . The confessional and civic principle remained in force, therefore not that of racial discrimination; so did the principle of selling 51 % of the shares of Jewish ente11prises to companion SloJVaks freely chosen lby them. This .principle of "Aryani:zation" Dr. Tiso defended consistently, even by using his constitutional authority as President(34) . GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE "JEWISH CODE" It aippears t'hat even these new legal dispositions were not sufficient in practice to attain the goal. Several loopholes were left open for escape from the consequences of �SLOVAKIA 7 the [aw - and those affected naturally did not hesitate to use them in every way(35) - so t:Jhat the more radical circles in Slovakia expressed their dissatisfaction with such a solution. However, it was chiefly in Germany that the Slovak solution of the Jewish question was bitterly criticized as being basiically in conflict with the German Jewish !aws(36). It was this consistent originality and independence of Dr. Tiso and his government in regard to the so1ution of the Jewish question that was one of the reasons for intervention o,f Adol'ph Hitler in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic at SalzJburg on July 28, 1940(37). There Dr. Tiso was forced to drop Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, who collorborated with him in the independent solution of the Jewish question. Dr. Vojtech T,uik,a, who was ,g reatly influenced by the Germans, was forced on tJhe Slova,k Government as Minister of Fo·r eign Affairs against the will of President Tiso(38), as was journalist Alexander Mach, who became the executor of German dictates especially in the Jewish question as Minister of the Interior(39) . For Dr. Joseph Tiso, Salzburg meant personally such a blow that he was determined to, tender his resignation( 40). It was only at the insistence of moderate SloivaJk ciroles, nay, even the Jews themselves, that he remained at his post to use his authority to check the radical group which was under the influence of the Germans(41). Tiso's position after SalaJbur,g, therefore, became substantially a defensi'Ve one: not only did he lose in notable measure the possibility of concrete intiative in regard to the Jewish question, but also his constitutional authority of intervention was ,partially reduced by t:Jhe facts of this new political situation. Thus it happened that on September 10, Prime Minister Tuika could force the parliament to pass an enabling law for the solution of the Jewish question by the government. This "emandpated" ,goivernment of Dr. T,uka issued in the form of a goivernment regulation - without the signature of the President of the Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - the so-called "Jewish Code"< 42 >, Wihich copied the Ger~ man Nuremberg Laiw. Apparently the Germans were de- �8 SLOVAKIA termined to impose Hitler's order in SlovaJkia - the same imperial imposition of Hitler's Germaniy to which all the governments of states in the German sphere of influence had succumbed. In comparison with the Jewish laws of Germany and the other States (iltaly, France, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Holland, Denmark, Norway - and even annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the General Governorship of Poland), the "Jewish Code" of S1ovakia contained two lucid points which were hers exclusive ly: the first reserved to the Preside nt of the Repulblic the right of direct administrational "exception" of anyone from the power of this law <43), while the second confirmed the validity of all exce ptions alre ady granted according to the aforementioned Slovak law(44 ). These two paragraphs, leaving tJhe head of the State an open possibility to protect in the face of an avalanche of force which evidently it was impossible to oppose, were the motive why Dr. Joseiph Tiso finally decided not to resign his office after the .promulgation of the "Jewish Code"< 45 ). PRESIDENT TISO'S STAND The question was a real "ca:sus conscientiae," which today ,w e can reconstruct in its main outlines. Dr. Tiso was opposed to any violent solution of the Jewish question; he was ready to .p rotest against it by resigning his office. The following realities, however , came into ,c onsideration: if Tiso did resign, it was c ertain that Tu.ka would be put into his office - and it was generally !known that Tu!ka was strongly under German influences. I,f this would have happened, not only all the Jews of SlovaJkia would ha'Ve been completely subject to German inte:vventions, but even government power of all Slovakia would practically have passed ()IVer completely into German hands and this w·o uld have had catastrophic consequences for the entire nation. Let it suffice here to mention the forced participation in the war and the system of National 1Socialism promoted b.y Dr. Tutka. Under such circumstances, the resignation o;f Dr. Tiso would have meant deserting from a position of responsi- �SLOVAKIA 9 bility, disappointing the h0ipes of all the people who sa,w in him the salvation of the nation in a critical world situation and a ,g uarantee aigainst the 'Very actual ideological danger of Nazi,sm(46). By retaining t:Jhe funcUon o.f the President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso had a hoipe not only of continuing the defensive policy of Slova!kia a,gainst Nazism, but a:lso to sarve, if not all, at least as many as possible Jews of Slovakia who were persecuted by Nazism. Were these ihoipes however, sUJbstantiated? The answer to this question is very impo,r tant for the moral qualification of the stand of Dr. Joseph Tiso and thereby of his entire relationship to the proiblem orf the Jews in SlovaJkia. It is not difficult to answer the first part of the question: It has been proved that by remaining President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso not only sruved the SlovaJk nation from threatened occupation and division, from the flood of Nazi ideolo,gy, from most of the economic and social consequences of the world rwar, but, despite the exceptional circumstances, he also organized Slovakia legally, culturally and economically as an independent State and thereby demonstrated t:Jhat Sloiva,kia had all the ;prerequisites orf developmernt as an independent State. Under his guidance Slovalk ia attained "brilliant results and the elan of autonomous life was reaHy wonderful"< 47). So that we could answer the second part of the question, we must objecti'Ve1y examine the cause of Jewish provisions and their exeoution in Slovakia in the third and fourth periods (1941-1945). After the promulgation of the "Jewish Code," the Jews were supposed to be transferred from Slovakia to the territory between the Visla and t:Jhe Bug in former Poland, where there was to be found some kind of state creation reserved for them. Here it is necessary to, note that the project of a separate territory for European Jews presented a solution which was seriously studied not only in Ckrmany( 48), but ,a iso iby other powers, such as, for example, the United States (4 9). To:l. order to ascertain the situation the SlovaJk Gov•e rnment sent to Poland a representatiive of the Ministry of the Interior, Isidore Koso, to whom they 1, 1 �10 SLOVAKIA actually did show the Jewish city of Sosnowitz, Oppel, with its own administration, police, etc. Well, even .after this the SlovaJk Government did not begin to transfer Jews, but arranged labor camps for them in Slovakia, where they were to be gradually concentrated. This course, which Reitlinger explains as motivated by economy(50), is apparently 1b etter ex.plained as a reaction of the Slovak Government to the Memorandum of the Slovak Catholic Bishops of October 7, 1941(51), and to the reminders of the Holy See of Novemfber 12, 1941 (52). In both these doouments ecclesiastical representatives protested against the racist principle which inspired governmentrul regulation No. 198--1941 of the Slova!k Code, especiaUy however rugainst those ,p oints which were out of line with the teachings of the Church (outlawing mixed marriages, ex:pulsion from schools) and called upon the SlovaJk G()IVernment to recall or at least change the mentioned regulations in this seinse. The Holy See, wihich was for apparent reasons generally regarded as "the best informed political center of the world"(53 ), at the same time manifested its understanding for the situation of the ,Slov,a;k Government when it concluded its note with these words,: "The Holy See hopes that the Slovak Government, as long as the government regulations are not repealed or amended, will try to ex;plain and to validate the issued regulations in suoh a measUTe and in such a manner so that they mig1ht become as far as is possible least harmful to the needs (demands) of Catholic conscience"(54). These words appear to be the norm and therefore the explanation of the course not only of Dr. Tiso, but also that of the :SloIVaJk gOIVemment followed in practice until the end of their activities. Thus it was that despite the Nuremberg t01J1e of the "Jewish Code," the f,unda:mental :points of that code were not practically applied until March 10, 1942. Thus far it has not been conclusively ascertained, whether under German pressure or not(5,5), Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach issued the decree on March 7, 1942, which confined all the Jews of Slovakia to their homes until their transfer to the East(5&) . This provision, which was soon followed by the first transports of Jews from Slo- �SLOVAKIA 11 vakia to Galicia (March 10, 1942), inspired a strong opposition of public opinion, new protests of ecclesiastical circles (.57), nay, even dissent of the rest of the members of the government.(5<8). But it has been safely ascertained that Germany did pressure the Slovak Government to adopt the solution of the Jewish question in the form of transferring the Jews which had been accepted by the other States (Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Hungary). To this end Heydrich himself came to Bratislava on April 10, 1942, to tell Tuka that the Jews of Slovakia would be transferred to the Lublin area where they would be settled permanently. Separate settlements were to be arranged for baptized Jews (59). After repeated insistence and assurances from the German side that Jewish families would be respected and that they would be dealt with decently(·60), the Slovak Government began to send to the East the members of the families of those young, able-to-work Jews who had been transported the previous month. In this second intervention of the Slovak Government, it is possible to see an effort to correct in some way the mistake of the first transfer by which many Jewish families were broken up. It became tragic that the promises of Heydrich and Eichmann were the treacherous trap which was not without effect(&l). At that time the Slovak Government could not know about the real intentions of the Nazis: Wisliceny himself found this out, as we shall see, only several months later. Nevertheless Dr. Tuka insisted that he might send an inspection mission to ascertain on the spot just how the transferred Jews were being dealt with. The Slovak Government presented this demand also formally in the form of a note addressed to the German Government(,62) - but received only an evasive reply. It was this, most likely, that roused suspicions on the Slovak side. Therefore already on May 15, 1942, the Slovak parliament approved a constitutional law by which it practically repealed the power given the government in September, 1941, and legally set the course for the problem of emigration. The substance of this law was, however, the practical cessation of deportations; the law, that is, sanctioned all the previously granted presidential and minis- �12 SLOVAKIA terial "exceptions" and established a new general exception for Jews baptized before March 14, 1939(63) . Furthermore, it established that Jews, affected by the law, would be concentrated in labor camps in Slovakia. In July, 1942, when the representative of the Holy See in Bratislava notified President Tiso that the Jews in the Lublin area were being murdered, Dr. Tiso with absolute determination insisted on the realization of a Slovak inspection mission - or else there would be no further transfer of Jews from Slovakia. In August, Wisliceny went to Berlin with the matter. There Eichmann told him that Tiso was asking an impossible thing because those Jews were no longer alive. Thereupon he showed him a secret order, issued by the will of Hitler and signed by Himmler, according to which the entire Jewish race was to be gradually destroyed(64). Wisliceny returned to Bratislava again with an evasive reply. After this deportations from Slovakia were completely stopped. From what has been said it is quite clear that the Slovak Government allowed the transfer of a part of the Jews from Slovakia under the imperialistic pressure of Germany - in the face of guarantees to respect basic human rights and humanitarian treatment. As soon as there arose a reason to doubt that the Nazis were fulfilling the guarantees given, the parliament of the Slovak Republic with the strength of a constitutional law stood up to protect the Jewish citizens of Slovakia. The fact that it is necessary to explain the law of May 15, 1942, in this maner, is also supported by the following realities : 1. The motive for voting this law was the merciless exportation of the Jews on the basis of the decree of Minister Mach of March 7, 1942 (65). 2. By this law, constitutionally, were sanctioned all the exceptions granted by the President of the Republic and the resort Ministers ; also a new general exception was established by which a confessional criterion was given priority - which the Germans sharply criticized already in 1940 as opposed to the racist principles of Nuremberg. 3. The real aim of concentrating the Jews, who did not have the mentioned exceptions, in Slovak labor camps was �SLOVAKIA 13 to save them from possible transfer elsewhere on the initiative of radical circles around Minister Mach behind which stood the power of Germany. This was evident from the way these camps were set up - the living conditions of which were but little different from complete freedom(66). 4. Despite repeated insistence from the side of the Germans, nay, even despite the intervention of Hitler himself with President Tiso(67), Slovakia did not retreat from her position and protected the Jews with all means of political tactics(68) and her own State power. 5. After September 1, 1944, when Slovakia became a battlefield and governmental power was factually exercised by the fighting armies, despite German occupation of practically the whole of Slovakia, the new Minister of National Defense and State Security of the Slovak Republic, Stephen Hrussik, ordered the abolishment of all concentration camps and of all anti-Jewish administrational regulations(69). 6. When German army commanders defied the above order and by force transported to Germany all Jews that fell into their hands during military operations, the new Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Stephen Tiso, energetically protested to the German Government(70). 7. Later, when the commander of the occupation army and "the only representative of the Reich in Slovakia"(71), SS-General Berger forced the Slovak Government regulation in regard to concentrating the Jews (Nov. 16, 1944), the provision had practically no effect because the Slovak Government and Slovak officials silently agreed that the Jews be free to hide themselves(72). From the given facts it is quite clear that despite some drastic interventions of the Nazis and their several Slovak collaborators in the spring of 1942, for which they gained partial accord of the Slovak Government by cunning, the great part of the Jewish minority could remain in Slovakia and there be effectively protected to such an extent that the Slovak Republic in certain periods was regarded as a relative asylum even for the Jews from other countries, especially those from Poland and Hungary(73). The stand of the Slovak Republic in regard to the "definite solution" (Endlosung) of the Jewish question, pres- �14 SLOVAKIA sured by the Nazis, immediately from the first moments of suspicion about the real aim of these " regulations," was unanimously and consistently so rejective that it really presents "the story of the first outright failure of the 'Final Solution' and a failure at a time when there was no glimmer of hope for Jewry in Axis-controlled Europe" (74). The fact that the small Slovak State, even though it could not prevent all violence, knew how to stand up against it - and with such a determination that an objective historian can today talk about "a challenge to war" and about "a revolt" of the Slovak Government(75) - proves t hat t he Slovak Government even in this r egard not only did not accept without reservations the principles of Hitler's National Socialism, but even knew how to defend itself against them, nay, even to repudiate them forcefully, as long as it was not completely overpowered by the brutal preponderance of military occupation and frontal operations. This important fact has thus far not been properly evaluated in world literature which concerns itself with this historical period. If we pause now in our search for the reasons of the described facts, we shall come to the conclusion that one of the most decisive factors in the course of events in Slovakia was the personality of President Dr. Joseph Tiso. To this conclusion we are led by the following facts: 1. While Dr. Joseph Tiso held the initiative of solving the Jewish question in Slovakia( we saw that he solved it in a sense of strict justice, in a legal way, and in a most human manner. 2. As President of the Republic he used his constitutional right in order that the laws proposed by the parliament remained within the confines of the same principles which were in opposition to the Nazi anti-Jewish laws( 7,6). 3. When he could not prevent the issuance of the "Jewish Codex," he reserved the right for himself to limit its effectiveness as much as possible by personal "exceptions." That this was the intent of the mentioned paragraph 225 is confirmed by the fact ascertained by the court that Dr. Joseph Tiso used his authority as a matter of principle for every case placed before him, by which in a short time he �SLOVAKIA 15 liberated a great part of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia from the "Jewish Codex"(77). 4. It was generally known that the initiative of proGerman politics was held by the ministers forced on Tiso (Dr. Tuka and A. Mach) - and that there were basic conflicts between them and President Tiso. If, therefore, the Slovak parliament could pass the constitutional law of May 15, 1942 - which was in fact aimed against German Nazis and the executors of their influence in Slovakia this is understandable only if we allow that it did so not only within the support of the authority of the President of the Republic and the chairman of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, but, as it has been safely ascertained: directly on his initiative (78) . 5. Finally, only such a consistently anti-Nazi stand of President Tiso in regard to the Jewish question can explain the fact that, even despite the regulations of the government and the Minister of the Interior, some of the regional representatives of state power could during that entire time take positions of open protection of the Jewish inhabitants, nay, even actually intervene in the initiative of government trustees in the Jewish question on territory administered by them( 79) . CONCLUSION As we emphasized at the outset, in this study we were interested in focalizing some of the facts that are important and pertinent for a correct evaluation of the relationship of Dr. Joseph Tiso to the Jewish problem in Slovakia. Intentionally we have not touched upon some undoubtedly interesting and relatively important aspects of this complicated problem which require a separate study (e.g., the question of statistical data, the question of the legal and moral side of the individual regulations and respective responsibilities, etc.) . This study, we believe, does prove that we cannot honestly regard Dr. Joseph Tiso as a persecutor of the Jews or as a collaborator of the Nazis in their inhuman work of genocide of the Jewish nation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that the President of the Slovak Republic did prove himself an eminent opponent of every injustice against the Jews, whether perpetrated by �16 SLOVAKIA the German Nazis or by others in their service. Dr. Tiso did everything in his power to save them - and we say, without fear of contradiction, that he did for the Jews what no other statesman dared to do in the Europe controlled by Hitler at that time. If, despite this, a part of the Jews of Slovakia was taken out of Slovakia by violent intervention of brute force, it is certain that this happened without any direct participation of Dr. Joseph Tiso - nay, against his will - and, hence, we cannot hold him responsible for it. Dr. Tiso found himself face to face with a current "which it was possible to impede and probably even to influence, but not stop," as he himself had said during his trial in Bratislava <SO) . There is no evidence to prove that Dr. Tiso aided or abetted, motivated or approved in any way, the brutal treatment of Jews in Slovakia or anywhere else. To lie in the face of death is not easy. So much the less can we allow that Dr. Joseph Tiso could do so - the same Dr. Tiso who could proclaim before the entire nation that never in his life did he utter an untruth intentionally. And he did not fear that someone might be able to prove the opposite. Would that the world were managed by politicians and statesmen who would follow the noble example of the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso! REFERENCES: 1. The first opm10n is practically current in encyclopedic and scientific literature; some Slovak authors are inclined to the second; e.g., Th. J. Zubek ("Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality" - The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Nov. 1955, p. 125). 2. Dr. Joseph Pauco: Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Passaic, N. J ., 1952; pp. 323-323. 3. R. Pokorny: Z potulek po Slovensku, Prague, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 56-. 4. It was not by accident that the German translation of Rabbi Benjamin Halvey's Hebrew pasquinade "Das leben Jesu. Zurn ersten Male historisch bearbeitet nach neuentdeckten jiidisch orientalischen Quellen" was published in Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1875. According to the translator, who personally offered it to Giller in Trencianske Teplice, it surpassed by far the dilettante attempts of Strauss, Voltaire and other blasphemous pseudo-historians. See A. Giller - Z podrozy po kraju slowackim" - Lw6w, -876; pp. 197-. 5. Th. G. Locher: Die nationale Differenzeirung und lntegrie• rung der Slowaken und Tschechen in ihren geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 - Haarlem, 1931; p. 196. 6. J. A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe - Paris, 1955; p. 133. 7. While Hungary, for example, had a "numerus clausus" estab- �SLOVAKIA 17 lished by law, in Czecho-Slova kia, where the number of J ews was estimated at 3--4 percent of the population, the secondary schools became practically the exclusive domain of the Jews. In Prague itself over half the students were Jewish; the State Gymnazium for girls bad 163 Jewish pupils out of a total of 248; in several gymnaziums for boys the relationship of Jews to non-Jews was: 116 out of 254; 123 out of 250; 185 out of 240. At the university for every three nonJewish professors there was one Jewish professor. See: J. Boubee Tcheco-Slova quie - in "ETUDES," Paris, Vol. 60, No. 174, 1923; pp. 225-. 8. Ibidem. 9. G. Reitlinger: The Final Solution - London, 1953; p. 386. 10. The value of Jewish properties was evaluated at 3,150 million Slovak Crowns; besides this, the Jews controlled over 12,000 industrial enterprises with a capital of 1,250 million Slovak Crowns, especially the textile industry where they controlled 90 percent oi the production. The situation was much the same in the wood and alcohol industries. See the article "La Slovacchia e gli Ebrei" in the periodical RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milan, Vol. 8, No. 34, 1942; p , 902. 11. Ibidem: 72 percent of the lawyers and 64 percent of the medics were Jews, while 58 percent of all restaurant and liquor concessions was in their hands. 12. See the statement, e.g., of P . R. Mikus in the SLOVAK, Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 34, February 10, 1939; p. 1. 13. Here we do not have in mind only States, such as Italy, for example, which did adopt various anti-Jewish regulations. Count Ciano noted that on January 13, 1939, in a conversation with Mussolini, Chamberlain expressed grave fears that "further immigration of Jews into England would incite anti-Semitism which is already being planned in many sectors of the country." Besides the Jewish minority in England was negligible: according to Chamberlain , 60,000 (Mussolini stated that it was over 200,000) - G. Ciano, "Diario, 1939-1940," Milan, 1946; p. 22. - In regard to the anti-Jewish mood in other States, see "Les archives secre de la Wilhelmstras se" - Vol V, Book II, Paris, 1954, Documents Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-. 14. Dr. Tiso stressed this in general in his first speech after taking over government in Slovakia, Oct. 8, 1938 (K. Culen: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava," Middletown, Pa., 1948; p. 215). Later, on March 15, 1939, in a broadcast he warned all who would be guilty of such acts and threatened that the government would prosecute all culprits ("SLOVAK" - Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 63, 1939; p . 4). 15. "SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1939. 16. "SLOVAK" - Vol XXI, No. 28, Feb. 3, 1939; p. 3. Compare also the government declaration of Feb. 22, 1939 ("SLOVAK," Vol. XXI, Nos. 44-45, Feb. 22-23, 1939). 17. Speech of Dr. Tiso at the Eighth Convention of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at Trencin, Oct. 1, 1939 ("SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 227, Oct. 3, 1939; pp. 3-4). 18. An analysis of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic by H. Schimani: "Die Verfassun~ der Slowakischen Republik" - Vienna, 1947. 19. Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov - Vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1954; p. 196. 20. Dr. J. Pauco: op. cit., p. 55. �18 SLOVAKIA Dr. F. Durcansky: op. cit., p. 237. J. A. Mikus: op. cit., pp. 185-; F. Durcansky: op. cit.; pp. 475: In an official pronouncement, Feb. 21, 1939, Tiso declared: "It is proof of the maturity of our nation that despite all incitements the Slovak nation waited for the legal solution of the Jewish question" (stenographic report of the second meeting of the Slovak Assembly, Bratislava, Feb. 21-23, 1939, p. 9). 24. That this was the expressed intention of Dr. Tiso is attested to by his statement to the correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, J. Frankel, Feb. 8, 1939: "The coming Jewish law will certainly serve the purpose that the Jews might not be caught by surprises and would know just how far they will be able to go in economic life" (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). 25. Memorandum of the British Consul in Bratislava, Mr. P. Pares, Feb. 3, 1939, in the "DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939" - Third Series, Vol. IV, No. 97, 1951, London; p. 96. 26. No. 63-39 SLOVAK CODE; No. 102-39 Ur. nov. (Official News). 27. It approved the transfer and emigration plan of Dr. S. E. Soskin (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). Innsbruck28. Compare, e.g., J. Messner: Das Naturrecht Vienna, 1950, pp. 365-366 - and: P. Pavan: l.'.uomo nella communita internazionale - Rome, s.d., p. 47. 29. SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3. 30. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, op. cit., p. 902. 31. We did not find documents which would definitely confirm such pressure in this period, but the testimony of F. Durcansky inclines us to believe that pressures were exercised. He said: "secret influences of the Germans did not validate themselves anywhere to such an extent as they did in the attempt to attain the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia according to the desires of the National Socialistic circles. . . . " (Speaking of the period prior to July 28, 1940) - F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. 32. No. 46-40, SLOVAK CODE. 33. Commenting on this law on March 10, 1940, Tiso stressed that we are here concerned "with our own reasonable course. This is not an imitation of foreign patterns." - (SLOVAK, March 13, 21. 22. 23. 1940, p. 3). 34. Thus, e.g., in April, 1940, he returned to the Parliament for renewed debate on the draft of the law about Jewish enterprises with his own remarks and reminders; the parliament then approved the law with Tiso's recommendations on April 25, 1940 (SLOVAK, April 26, 1940), p. 2). 35. The amount which the Jews transferred abroad at that time was estimated at 2,000 million Slovak Crowns. Even in the "Aryan- only ized" enterprises "the Jews frequently remained bosses names changed on paper" (GARDISTA, June 14, 1941, p. 3). 36. Compare the study of the German legal expert for Slovak affairs, K. 0. Rabl, "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsleben in der neuen Slowakei" (in the periodical: ZEITSCHRIFT fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht - Berlin, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1940), which concludes categorically: "The Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically, therefore, according to previous provisions, not solved at all. Mainly the economic and imperial position of Jewry remains the same as it was before" (p. 867). �SLOVAKIA 37. 38. 39. 40, 41. l!} F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. K. Culen, op. cit., pp. 263-; p. 480; J . A. Mikus, op. cit. p. 163. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 386. J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 35; K. Culen, op. cit., p. 380. Minister Gejza Medricky's testimony during the Tiso trial ; this is reproduced by K. Culen, op. cit., p. 480. 42. SLOVAK CODE, part 52, No. 198, September 10, 1941. 43. "Jewish Codex" - part X, par. 255. 44. Ibidem, par. 256. 45. J . Pauco, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 323. 46. Compare the testimony of Archbishop Kmet'ko before the National Court in Bratislava, January 6, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit. pp. 369-370. 47. A. Giannini: Monsignor Tiso (in "Rivista di studi politici internazionali" - Firenze, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1952, p. 451); a wealth of documentaton is produced also by F . Durcansky, op. cit., pp. 166-169, 190-248. 48. Dr. Ley, German Minister, informed Count Ciano about the project in Rome, Dec. 6, 1939. In 1940, Ribbentrop told Ciano about Hitler's plan to create a Jewish free state on the island of Madagascar, where all the Jews of Europe were supposed to be concentrated. (l!Europa verso la catastrofe - Verona, 1948; G. Ciano, Diario 19391943, Milan, 1946, Vol. I, p. 280). 49. On December 7, 1938, President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal letter in which he proposed that a part of the south and southwest territory of Abyssinia be reserved for the Jews. Mussolini declared that personally he sympathized with the idea of creating a Jewish state, but decidely not in Abyssinia, nor anywhere in Africa. He proposed Russia, Brazil or the United States of America (Les Archives Secretes de la Wilhelmstrasse, Vol. IV, Les suites de Munich, Paris, 1953, doc. No. 341, pp. 498-500; compare also Vol. V, Book II, Paris, 1954, doc. Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-158). 50. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. -387. 51. Partially reproduced in K. Sidor's "~est' rokov pri Vatik'• ne" - Scranton, Pa., 1947, pp. 135-138. 52. In the note of the State Secretariate to His Holiness, No. 8355-41 , published in Sidor's op. cit., pp. 138-140. 53. W. Theimer: Lexicon der Politik, Bern, 1947, under "Vatikan" - p. 482. 54. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Sidor used the Slovak word "potrebam" (needs) in translating the Italian "esigenze," but the latter would probably be better expressed by "poziadavkam" (demands). 55. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 387. 56. At a press conference, March 27, 1942, Minister A. Mach declared that "the ultimate aim is to transfer all Jews to a territory, which would be ordered for the settlement within the framework of a new European order" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942, p. 3). 57. The Vatican protested with the note of the State Secretariate of His Holiness, No. 2027-42 ,dated March 14, 1942. At the end of March, the Slovak Minister at the Vatican, Karol Sidor, personally was in Bratislava with a demand to stop deportations (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 141-142). 58. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 388; from this reaction, as well as from the declaration of Minister A. Mach at the press conference �20 SLOVAKIA mentioned above (56), it is apparent that the personal intervention of the minister forced by Ribbentrop on Tiso was concerned and/ or his group of Slovak extremists. Mach publicly repudiated "speeches (which implied) that we had been somehow asked from the outside or forced to this solution. We ourselves have undertaken everything possible to have the opportunity to get rid of the Jews" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942). According to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, No. 8.325/ 1/ 42, of May 8, 1942, addressed to the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican (concerning the reply to the mentioned interventions of the Vatican of Nov. 12, 1941, and March 14, 1942), at that time " there were negotiations between the factors of the Slovak Republic and the Greman Reich in regard to the problem of the European Jews," in the sense of which "the Jews of Slovakia would be placed in several areas in the vicinity of Lublin ... where they would remain permanently" (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 142-143). This connection of matters appears to be more probable. 59. F . Steiner: Tragedy of Slovak Jewry - Bratislava, 1949, p. 6; reprod. from G. Reitlinger, op. cit. 60. At the beginning of May, Eichmann negotiated in this sense with Dr. Tuka and A. Mach. 61. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 388. 62. Wisliceny admitted this before the Nuremberg Court The Trial of the Major War Criminals - Vol. ill, pp. 276-278; reprod . .bY G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390). 63. "In practice the way was open in this intensely Catholic country for any professed convert to demand protection" (B. Shub: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews, New York, 1943, p . 54;reprod. by G. Reitlingeh ,op. cit. , p. 390). 64. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390. 65. Compare the testimony of Minister G. Medricky before the National Court in Bratislava, Feb. 21, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit., p . 482. 66. The official report of the International Red Cross describes them thusly: " ... les camps qui presentaient des conditions de nouriture et de logement passables, les internes etaient admis a travailler moyennant salaire dans des conditio se rapprochant de :Ueconomie libre" (Rapport du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge sur son action pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Geneve, 1948, p. 674). 67. After various messengers and plenipotentiaries had pressured Tiso and the Slovak Government, Tiso was called to Salzburg in May, 1943, where Hitler angrily marked the Slovak resolution of the Jewish question 'insufficient." 68. In the light of realities, such would appear to be the various public manifestations (as, e.g., the anti-Jewish speech of Min. A. Mach in Ruzomberok, Feb. 7, 1943) and the conditioned promises of President Tiso (in December, 1943, to Himmler's special agent E. Weesenmayer) which, however, were never fulfilled . Compare Sidor's account, op. cit., pp. 146-147, and G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390. 69. According to unpublished testimonies in manuscript which are in the hands of the author. 70. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 148. 71. It was thus that he presented himself to President Tiso on his arrival to Bratislava "as the accredited agent of Hitler" at the end of August, 1944. See: J . Pauco, op. cit., p. 293. 72. The regulation was formulated as a summons to come to a �SLOVAKIA 21 definite place on Nov. 24. A delegate of the International Red Cr oss ascertained on the spot that the summons was answered only by about 50 Jews: "Comme les Autorites slovaques l'avaient d'ailleurs prevu" he relates literally - "les Israelites se cachaient" (Rapport du Comite .. . . op. cit., p. 674). The hidden Jews could be aided not only by the population, but also by the International Red Cross with the help of the Slovak Red Cross and the Catholic Church (p. 675). 73. Intern. Red Cross Report, op. cit., p. 674; F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 239. 74. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 385. 75. "Yet as early as July, 1942, this Government rebelled" writes G. Reitlinger (op. cit., p. 385). We note, apparent as it is from the foregoing, that it is necessary to see this "rebellion" already in the constitutional law of May 15, 1942. The same autor says in another place: "We have seen in the case of Slovakia, how a Government which defied German pressure and abandoned the Final Solution, was forced to return to it, when, on the eve of capitulation to the enemy, the country was occupied by German troops" (p. 412). 76. It is worthy of note here that Tiso's insistence on a per centual participation of the Jews in the economy of Slovakia in relation to their number of the entire population could in no way be regarded as a repressive regulation, inasmuch as the principle concerned here was the same as that which Tiso ordered to be applied even in regards to the other minorities, not even excluding the Germans themselves. It has been ascertained, e.g. , that in official State positions the Germans could not occupy more than 5 percent of them (K. Culen , op. cit., p. 432); the same applied in regards to the "aryanization" of Jewish enterprises - their participation was limited percentually (J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 238). 77. The actual number of "Presidential exceptions" granted by Tiso has thus far not been accurately ascertained. Some authors estimate the number "above 9,000" (J. Pauco, who bases his account on the statements of lawyers during the Tiso trial; op. cit., p. 323); Dr. J. A. Mikus gives the figure 9,964 without, however, quoting any document or source (op . cit., p. 135); Minister Stephen Hassik estimated "about 15,000" (manuscript in author's possession). The report of J. Luther to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, indicates a greater number; according to that report, at that time 35,000 Jews in Slovakia were already safeguarded "by special legitimation" (G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390); a greater number is also indicated by the fact that the presiding judge of the National Court in Bratislava, Dr. Igor Daxner, in the trial against Dr. Tiso and his associates, did not allow an accurate ascertainment of the number of "exceptions"; he did this as a rule whenever it came to ascertaining matters that were favorable for Dr. Tiso (compare K. Culen, op. cit.). 78. Already on March 23, 1942, Dr. Tiso had Monsignor John Postenyi present the question to the State Council to sound out the ground and to gain a basis for his further intervention, which he later realized by means of the parliament (Dr. Zabkaj, in the National Court in Bratislava, March 15, 1947, according to mimeographed reports of the Slovak Press Bureau, Bratislava). 79. Typical is the example of Nitra Province, which in 1940-1944 was administered by Stephen Hassik, where the Jews were consistently protected and where, in 1943, the administrator, even though �22 SLOVAKIA not present, was able to obstruct the transfer of a certain number of Jews into Germany even after the action had begun (Manuscript in author's hands). 80. J. Pauco Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe), op. cit., p. 322. SOURCES: CIANO, Galeazzo: Diario - Volume primo, 1939-1940; Milano, Rizzoli, 1946; L'Europa verso la catastrofe; 184 colloqui con Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Sumner Welles, Rustu Aras, Stoiadinovic, Goring, Zog, Francois-Poncet ecc. verbalizzati da Galeazzo Ciano, con 40 documenti diplomatici inediti; (Verona), A. Mondadori, 1948. CULEN, Konstantin: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu); Middletown, Pa. , Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947-1948; 2Vols. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN :POLICY 1919--1939, Third Series; London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. DURCANSKY, Ferdinand: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, Vol. 1, Biela kniha; Buenos Aires, Slovensky Oslobodzovaci Vybor, 1954. GILLER, Agaton, Z podr6zy po kraju slowackim; Lw6w, Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1876. ·HAssiK, Stefan: Prispevok O rieseni iidovskej otazky V Sloven• skei republike (unpublished manuscript). INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAffiS: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews; New York, 1943. LES ARCHIVES SECRETES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE: Documents traduits de l' allemand par Michael TOURNIER; Paris, Librairie Plon, 1950. Les Juives en Europe 1939-1945; Paris, CDJC, 1947. MIKUS, Joseph A., La Slovaquie dans le drame de I' Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 a 1950); Paris, Les Iles d' Or, 1955. POKORNY, Rudolf: Z potulek po Slovensku; Praha, 1884-1885, 2 Vols .. RAPPORT DU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIXROUGE sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 - 30 juin 1947); Geneve, 1948. REITLINGER, Gerald: The Final Solution. The Attempt to Ex• ter~inate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945; London, Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953. SIDOR, Karol: ~est' rokov pri Vatikane; Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. STEINER, Frederick: The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry; Bratislava, 1949; (Documentation Centre CUJCR). TISO, Jozef : Obhajobna rec pred Narodnym sudom v Bratislave dna 17. a 18. marca 1947; edited by Dr. Jozef PAUCO : Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe; Passaic, N. J ., Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952. PERIODICALS: ETUDES, Paris. GARDISTA, Bratislava-Zilina. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milano. RIVISTA DI STUD! POLITIC! INTERNAZIONALI, Firenze. SLOVAK, Bratislava. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Berlin. � SLOVAKIA Pub I ished VOL. V II quart erly by the Slovak League SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER, 195 7 of America NO. 3-4(24-25) DR. JOSEPH TISO AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN SLOVAKIA MILAN S. DURI CA The fact that, during the period when Dr. Joseph Tiso was at the head of the Slova)k Republic as its president, there ,w ere "liqttidated" in an inhumane manner, in Nazi concentration camps, per.haps also severa1 tens of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, has tempted many authors either to hold Dr. Tiso directly responsible for these crimes, or at -least to consider this point as t,h e real weaJkness of Tiso's policy and his defense< 1 >. We are convinced that the so1ution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia is a very complicated proiblem and, therefore, it is necessary to gather in an objective study all existing documents so that the _true state of affairs might become known (2) . While awaiting the results of such a study, we are attempting here to focalize some of the actualities which already h ave been documented - facts which can put some light on definite, shadowy sides of this problem and also note in what direction it is necessary to move in making a further study so that we might arrive at an objective statement of the facts that had taken iplace and thus also at a correct moral evaluation of them. J EW RY IN S LOVAK IA Already in the past century, native and foreign observers were stunned by the great influx of Jews to Hungary and especially to the part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks from time immemorial. While Caplovic noted 6,850 J ews in the Trencin area h efore 1829, according to. the census of 1869 there already were 13,365 of them among 237,702 SlavaJks. Sveto,z ar Hurban, writing in 1881, said: A hundred years ago, there were 75,098 Jews in Hun- �2 SLOVAKJA gary; 55 years later there were already 241,632 of them (the increase burdened Slovakia mostly); in 1'870 they numbered 552,133 and now there are more than 600,000 of them in Hungary!" (Slovenske Pohl'ady, 1881, p. 291). The Czech writer Rudolph Pokorny, who reproduces these figures from direct eX:perience, describes the methods of Jewish immigrants in SlovaJkia as parasitical and exploitative (3). It would be very interesting to study in detaril the relations between the influx of Jews to Slovakia by the strengthening of their economic position and the economic decline orf the Slovak in1halbitants which resulted in an increasing exodus of Slovaks into foreign lands especially to the United States. According to our impressions from Hterature already reviewed, such a study would most li!kely lead to the conclusion that the exodus of the Sl()IVaks was in part caused by the great influx of Jews into rSl()IVaJkia. The strengthened economic positions of t:he Jews in Slovakia gave them the opportunity to exert stronger politicai influence and to propagate their ideology. A Polish observer A:gaton GiHer, ,w riting in 1876, described how the Jews in Slovalkia systematically worked against the Catholic Church and against Christianity in general( 4) under the aegis of the liberalism that was preached lby t:he Hungarian government ,o f the same Colman Tisza who, at the same time (1875) , denied the fact that the Slovak nation existed.(5). Jif we bear in mind the eX:tent and the constant increase of these mentioned effects of the Jewish minority in Slovak,ia, we shall more readily understand the spontaneous psychological reaction of the intelligentsia and the broad masses of the SloviaJk people. This reaction expressed itself, first of aill, in response to the tolerant nature of the SlovaJks and the fact that they laciked means of -power, in a blood-perspir~ng effort to save their own economic situation, ( with dollars made in American mines, the Slovak peasant tried to secure his livelihood in his native 'land) , then in t:he effort to emancipate themselves from dependence on the Jews in commerce to provide the daily necessities of life (by establishnig self-help cooperatives), amd also by an intensive building of institutions to preserve �SLOVAKIA 3 and •f .urther their original national culture both in a general and also in a specifically Christian sense (it suffices to mention the -Matica .Slovenska •a nd the Society of St. Adalbert). The situation did not change substantially even after the c,r eation oif the Czecho-Slova:k Republic in 1918(6). In 1923, a !French observer wa'S amazed \by the dis:proportion., ate preponderance of Jewish students in the universities and trade schools(7) and he foresaw that the Jews would thus soon capture the best positions in the new State(8). This prediction was if'll'lfilled, especiaUy a'S far as Slovakia was concerned. After the Vienna Arbitration, when the Jews constituted only 3.3'5 % of the population in S1ov,alkia(9), they owned almost one-half of the entire nation.a{ wealth(l0) and occupied most of the econ.omicaHy and civically important pwbl:i!c functionsO1). That this fact influenced the daily press and cultural production in general is evidence which needs no special proof(J2). It was only natural that the Slovak with all his legendary peace-loving characteristics, lbore the situation with difficulty; and the :Slovalk demands for autonomy, whicih characterized Slovak activities in the twenties and thirties of thi:s century, were accompanied by demands for a solution of the Jewish !problem. The current of anti-Semitism, which had overtalken many countries on the initiative of German Nazism, even such countries in whi·c h objectively suppositions fo'!" anti-Jew,i sh feeling were really insignificant if not directly fictitious, definitely did 1ha;ve some inf1uence even in 'Slova;kia(13). But who could stop Hitler at that time? It is not the fau~t •o f the Slovalks that many arguments of anti-Jewish :propaganda, originating outside of Slovalkia but ascribed to ,Slovakia, found at iJeast partial su!bstantiation in fact. THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Tiso took over the government of Sl01Vakia under the most difficult circumstances. His first worry was to preserve order and to prevent arbitray acts of usurpers even in the so,l ution of the Jewish .problem<14). Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, whose public opinion 1 �SLOVAKIA already for a longer time impatiently demanded radical regulations with regard to the privileged Czec,h and Jewish minority in Slovarkia(15), Dr. Tiso sought a legal solution of the matter already in federated Czecho-Slovakia(l6), as well as after March 14, 1919, in the Slova;k Republic. For an objectively moral evaluation of Tiso's conduct in the solution of the Jewish problem in .Slovakia, is is necessary to clearly distinguish ,various time periods, during which the legal and practical possibilities of Dr. Tiso to decide this question personally changed substantially. 1. From October 6, 1938, to October 26, 1939: Dr. Joseph Tiso, as Prime Mini:ster of the Slo,vaJk Go,vernment, had broad ;possiibilities oif legislative and executive intrative and, therefore, also dir,e ct, personal responsibility in this regard(17 ). 2. From October 26, 1939, to July 28, 1940: As President of the Slova:k Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso could intervene in the legislative acti,viby of the Assembly and influence the executive power reserived to the government, which was responsible to the Assembly and not to the President, only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the S'lovaJk Republic(18) . During this ,p eriod, we cannot regard Dr. Tiso directly res,ponsible for the various initiatives in the solution of the Jewis'h problem, but only for the acts of his office as prescrilbed by the Constitution: whether and how he used the rights of intervention., ·a s defined 'by the Constitution, in regard to legislative and exec,utirve acts which required his appm,val. For the latter, as head of the State, Dr. Tiso carries the responsibility, dividing it with the respective Constitutional organs. 3. From July 28, 1940, to August 30, 1944: at the Salziburg meeting with Germany's intervention in the internal affairs of 'Slova'kia(19) - Dr. Tiso lost a definite part of the effective possibilities to exercise his Constitutional rights in regard to persons who were forced by Hitler into the Slovaik Government, especially with regard to expressed demands of the Germans upon the Slova;k Government(20). Such was the problem of e~pelling or liquidating the Jew:? <21) . In this period we can hold Tiso as responsible, as in the previous period, only in proportion 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 to the effective possibilities of free action which remained open to him after !Hitler's intervention at Salzburg. 4. From August 30, 1944, to April 5, 1945: Slovakia was to a great extent a battleground, where actual governmental power was exercised by various fighting units, most of the time completely independent of civil governmental organs, nay even expressly in opposition to them. (22). Here the responsibility of Dr. Tiso is limited to those acts, which - aliWays within the extent of this Constitutional rights and duties - took ·p lace on the territory and at ra time when the Government of the SlovaJk Republic still go;verned there and had effective 1possibility to exercise its power. TISO'S SOLUTION Despite the critical political - internal and international - situation and the revolutionary events of October, 1938, and of March, 1939, with his resolute influence, Dr. Joseph Tiso checked all violent intervention of incited masses of ,people in the solution of the Jewish problem (23) and consistently in;volked a legal courne to- solve this problem. Such a course, while it secured for the Slovaks time for the necessary study of the various aspects of the complicated situation and for a democratic negotation .o f various motions, with regard to the Jews themselves, it eliminated the typically Nazi factor of surprise(2-!), giving them time and opportunity to prepare themselves psychologically and to make necessary provisions, including financial(25) in the face of the new situation. After such a preliminary preparation, the first Slo;vruk governmental regulation was issued April 30, 1939, with the force of law, the object of which was to solve the Jewish pro1blem (26). This regulation defined the concept of a confessional and civic viewpoint, without considering racial motives at all. Its aim was to reduce the disproportionate preponderance of Jews in the economic life of Slovakia. The Jews could continue to manage their enterprises if they allowed a 51 % per cent ,participation of Slovaks the 51 % not being confiscated, but lbought in a regular manner by Slovak participants (shareholders). The participation of Jews in the legal, medical, and other important �6 SLOVAKIA and profitable professions was to be regulated gradually in proportion to the total number of the Jewish minority. Besides this, the Slovak Government of Dr. Joseph Tiso supported. the voluntary emigration of Jews to Palestine in all possible ways< 27) . If we consider all the facts of the matter objecttvely, we must admit that in these regulations there really was nothing w'hich, under the given circumstances, would exceed the normal competency of a legislator that did not emanate from the natural law itself, or that would be opposed to the principles of justice and humanity(28). The first 'S lovak resolution of the J ewish question - and tihe only one which, in the full sense, we can call Tiso's solution - contained and realized the attributes proposed by Tiso when he ,proclaimed. that "t'he Jewish question in Slovakia shall be solved justly, socially, and humanly"( 29) . THE SLOVAK "JEWISH LAW" These :provisions clearly, but not altogether effectively because they left wide possibilities to evade the law(30), proved to be insufficient in attaining their aim. 'Dherefore, but probably also under German pressure(31), the Slovak Parliament prepared. a new so-catled "Jewish Law," which was approved on iFeb11uary 29, 1940(32). Fundamentally, this law differed little from the previous provision; it defined more accurately many details and fixed the principle of participation o.f the Jews in economic, civic, and cultural life in proportion to their number of the tdtal population, that is, 4 percent(33) . The confessional and civic principle remained in force, therefore not that of racial discrimination; so did the principle of selling 51 % of the shares of Jewish ente11prises to companion SloJVaks freely chosen lby them. This .principle of "Aryani:zation" Dr. Tiso defended consistently, even by using his constitutional authority as President(34) . GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE "JEWISH CODE" It aippears t'hat even these new legal dispositions were not sufficient in practice to attain the goal. Several loopholes were left open for escape from the consequences of �SLOVAKIA 7 the [aw - and those affected naturally did not hesitate to use them in every way(35) - so t:Jhat the more radical circles in Slovakia expressed their dissatisfaction with such a solution. However, it was chiefly in Germany that the Slovak solution of the Jewish question was bitterly criticized as being basiically in conflict with the German Jewish !aws(36). It was this consistent originality and independence of Dr. Tiso and his government in regard to the so1ution of the Jewish question that was one of the reasons for intervention o,f Adol'ph Hitler in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic at SalzJburg on July 28, 1940(37). There Dr. Tiso was forced to drop Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, who collorborated with him in the independent solution of the Jewish question. Dr. Vojtech T,uik,a, who was ,g reatly influenced by the Germans, was forced on tJhe Slova,k Government as Minister of Fo·r eign Affairs against the will of President Tiso(38), as was journalist Alexander Mach, who became the executor of German dictates especially in the Jewish question as Minister of the Interior(39) . For Dr. Joseph Tiso, Salzburg meant personally such a blow that he was determined to, tender his resignation( 40). It was only at the insistence of moderate SloivaJk ciroles, nay, even the Jews themselves, that he remained at his post to use his authority to check the radical group which was under the influence of the Germans(41). Tiso's position after SalaJbur,g, therefore, became substantially a defensi'Ve one: not only did he lose in notable measure the possibility of concrete intiative in regard to the Jewish question, but also his constitutional authority of intervention was ,partially reduced by t:Jhe facts of this new political situation. Thus it happened that on September 10, Prime Minister Tuika could force the parliament to pass an enabling law for the solution of the Jewish question by the government. This "emandpated" ,goivernment of Dr. T,uka issued in the form of a goivernment regulation - without the signature of the President of the Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - the so-called "Jewish Code"< 42 >, Wihich copied the Ger~ man Nuremberg Laiw. Apparently the Germans were de- �8 SLOVAKIA termined to impose Hitler's order in SlovaJkia - the same imperial imposition of Hitler's Germaniy to which all the governments of states in the German sphere of influence had succumbed. In comparison with the Jewish laws of Germany and the other States (iltaly, France, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Holland, Denmark, Norway - and even annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the General Governorship of Poland), the "Jewish Code" of S1ovakia contained two lucid points which were hers exclusive ly: the first reserved to the Preside nt of the Repulblic the right of direct administrational "exception" of anyone from the power of this law <43), while the second confirmed the validity of all exce ptions alre ady granted according to the aforementioned Slovak law(44 ). These two paragraphs, leaving tJhe head of the State an open possibility to protect in the face of an avalanche of force which evidently it was impossible to oppose, were the motive why Dr. Joseiph Tiso finally decided not to resign his office after the .promulgation of the "Jewish Code"< 45 ). PRESIDENT TISO'S STAND The question was a real "ca:sus conscientiae," which today ,w e can reconstruct in its main outlines. Dr. Tiso was opposed to any violent solution of the Jewish question; he was ready to .p rotest against it by resigning his office. The following realities, however , came into ,c onsideration: if Tiso did resign, it was c ertain that Tu.ka would be put into his office - and it was generally !known that Tu!ka was strongly under German influences. I,f this would have happened, not only all the Jews of SlovaJkia would ha'Ve been completely subject to German inte:vventions, but even government power of all Slovakia would practically have passed ()IVer completely into German hands and this w·o uld have had catastrophic consequences for the entire nation. Let it suffice here to mention the forced participation in the war and the system of National 1Socialism promoted b.y Dr. Tutka. Under such circumstances, the resignation o;f Dr. Tiso would have meant deserting from a position of responsi- �SLOVAKIA 9 bility, disappointing the h0ipes of all the people who sa,w in him the salvation of the nation in a critical world situation and a ,g uarantee aigainst the 'Very actual ideological danger of Nazi,sm(46). By retaining t:Jhe funcUon o.f the President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso had a hoipe not only of continuing the defensive policy of Slova!kia a,gainst Nazism, but a:lso to sarve, if not all, at least as many as possible Jews of Slovakia who were persecuted by Nazism. Were these ihoipes however, sUJbstantiated? The answer to this question is very impo,r tant for the moral qualification of the stand of Dr. Joseph Tiso and thereby of his entire relationship to the proiblem orf the Jews in SlovaJkia. It is not difficult to answer the first part of the question: It has been proved that by remaining President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso not only sruved the SlovaJk nation from threatened occupation and division, from the flood of Nazi ideolo,gy, from most of the economic and social consequences of the world rwar, but, despite the exceptional circumstances, he also organized Slovakia legally, culturally and economically as an independent State and thereby demonstrated t:Jhat Sloiva,kia had all the ;prerequisites orf developmernt as an independent State. Under his guidance Slovalk ia attained "brilliant results and the elan of autonomous life was reaHy wonderful"< 47). So that we could answer the second part of the question, we must objecti'Ve1y examine the cause of Jewish provisions and their exeoution in Slovakia in the third and fourth periods (1941-1945). After the promulgation of the "Jewish Code," the Jews were supposed to be transferred from Slovakia to the territory between the Visla and t:Jhe Bug in former Poland, where there was to be found some kind of state creation reserved for them. Here it is necessary to, note that the project of a separate territory for European Jews presented a solution which was seriously studied not only in Ckrmany( 48), but ,a iso iby other powers, such as, for example, the United States (4 9). To:l. order to ascertain the situation the SlovaJk Gov•e rnment sent to Poland a representatiive of the Ministry of the Interior, Isidore Koso, to whom they 1, 1 �10 SLOVAKIA actually did show the Jewish city of Sosnowitz, Oppel, with its own administration, police, etc. Well, even .after this the SlovaJk Government did not begin to transfer Jews, but arranged labor camps for them in Slovakia, where they were to be gradually concentrated. This course, which Reitlinger explains as motivated by economy(50), is apparently 1b etter ex.plained as a reaction of the Slovak Government to the Memorandum of the Slovak Catholic Bishops of October 7, 1941(51), and to the reminders of the Holy See of Novemfber 12, 1941 (52). In both these doouments ecclesiastical representatives protested against the racist principle which inspired governmentrul regulation No. 198--1941 of the Slova!k Code, especiaUy however rugainst those ,p oints which were out of line with the teachings of the Church (outlawing mixed marriages, ex:pulsion from schools) and called upon the SlovaJk G()IVernment to recall or at least change the mentioned regulations in this seinse. The Holy See, wihich was for apparent reasons generally regarded as "the best informed political center of the world"(53 ), at the same time manifested its understanding for the situation of the ,Slov,a;k Government when it concluded its note with these words,: "The Holy See hopes that the Slovak Government, as long as the government regulations are not repealed or amended, will try to ex;plain and to validate the issued regulations in suoh a measUTe and in such a manner so that they mig1ht become as far as is possible least harmful to the needs (demands) of Catholic conscience"(54). These words appear to be the norm and therefore the explanation of the course not only of Dr. Tiso, but also that of the :SloIVaJk gOIVemment followed in practice until the end of their activities. Thus it was that despite the Nuremberg t01J1e of the "Jewish Code," the f,unda:mental :points of that code were not practically applied until March 10, 1942. Thus far it has not been conclusively ascertained, whether under German pressure or not(5,5), Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach issued the decree on March 7, 1942, which confined all the Jews of Slovakia to their homes until their transfer to the East(5&) . This provision, which was soon followed by the first transports of Jews from Slo- �SLOVAKIA 11 vakia to Galicia (March 10, 1942), inspired a strong opposition of public opinion, new protests of ecclesiastical circles (.57), nay, even dissent of the rest of the members of the government.(5<8). But it has been safely ascertained that Germany did pressure the Slovak Government to adopt the solution of the Jewish question in the form of transferring the Jews which had been accepted by the other States (Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Hungary). To this end Heydrich himself came to Bratislava on April 10, 1942, to tell Tuka that the Jews of Slovakia would be transferred to the Lublin area where they would be settled permanently. Separate settlements were to be arranged for baptized Jews (59). After repeated insistence and assurances from the German side that Jewish families would be respected and that they would be dealt with decently(·60), the Slovak Government began to send to the East the members of the families of those young, able-to-work Jews who had been transported the previous month. In this second intervention of the Slovak Government, it is possible to see an effort to correct in some way the mistake of the first transfer by which many Jewish families were broken up. It became tragic that the promises of Heydrich and Eichmann were the treacherous trap which was not without effect(&l). At that time the Slovak Government could not know about the real intentions of the Nazis: Wisliceny himself found this out, as we shall see, only several months later. Nevertheless Dr. Tuka insisted that he might send an inspection mission to ascertain on the spot just how the transferred Jews were being dealt with. The Slovak Government presented this demand also formally in the form of a note addressed to the German Government(,62) - but received only an evasive reply. It was this, most likely, that roused suspicions on the Slovak side. Therefore already on May 15, 1942, the Slovak parliament approved a constitutional law by which it practically repealed the power given the government in September, 1941, and legally set the course for the problem of emigration. The substance of this law was, however, the practical cessation of deportations; the law, that is, sanctioned all the previously granted presidential and minis- �12 SLOVAKIA terial "exceptions" and established a new general exception for Jews baptized before March 14, 1939(63) . Furthermore, it established that Jews, affected by the law, would be concentrated in labor camps in Slovakia. In July, 1942, when the representative of the Holy See in Bratislava notified President Tiso that the Jews in the Lublin area were being murdered, Dr. Tiso with absolute determination insisted on the realization of a Slovak inspection mission - or else there would be no further transfer of Jews from Slovakia. In August, Wisliceny went to Berlin with the matter. There Eichmann told him that Tiso was asking an impossible thing because those Jews were no longer alive. Thereupon he showed him a secret order, issued by the will of Hitler and signed by Himmler, according to which the entire Jewish race was to be gradually destroyed(64). Wisliceny returned to Bratislava again with an evasive reply. After this deportations from Slovakia were completely stopped. From what has been said it is quite clear that the Slovak Government allowed the transfer of a part of the Jews from Slovakia under the imperialistic pressure of Germany - in the face of guarantees to respect basic human rights and humanitarian treatment. As soon as there arose a reason to doubt that the Nazis were fulfilling the guarantees given, the parliament of the Slovak Republic with the strength of a constitutional law stood up to protect the Jewish citizens of Slovakia. The fact that it is necessary to explain the law of May 15, 1942, in this maner, is also supported by the following realities : 1. The motive for voting this law was the merciless exportation of the Jews on the basis of the decree of Minister Mach of March 7, 1942 (65). 2. By this law, constitutionally, were sanctioned all the exceptions granted by the President of the Republic and the resort Ministers ; also a new general exception was established by which a confessional criterion was given priority - which the Germans sharply criticized already in 1940 as opposed to the racist principles of Nuremberg. 3. The real aim of concentrating the Jews, who did not have the mentioned exceptions, in Slovak labor camps was �SLOVAKIA 13 to save them from possible transfer elsewhere on the initiative of radical circles around Minister Mach behind which stood the power of Germany. This was evident from the way these camps were set up - the living conditions of which were but little different from complete freedom(66). 4. Despite repeated insistence from the side of the Germans, nay, even despite the intervention of Hitler himself with President Tiso(67), Slovakia did not retreat from her position and protected the Jews with all means of political tactics(68) and her own State power. 5. After September 1, 1944, when Slovakia became a battlefield and governmental power was factually exercised by the fighting armies, despite German occupation of practically the whole of Slovakia, the new Minister of National Defense and State Security of the Slovak Republic, Stephen Hrussik, ordered the abolishment of all concentration camps and of all anti-Jewish administrational regulations(69). 6. When German army commanders defied the above order and by force transported to Germany all Jews that fell into their hands during military operations, the new Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Stephen Tiso, energetically protested to the German Government(70). 7. Later, when the commander of the occupation army and "the only representative of the Reich in Slovakia"(71), SS-General Berger forced the Slovak Government regulation in regard to concentrating the Jews (Nov. 16, 1944), the provision had practically no effect because the Slovak Government and Slovak officials silently agreed that the Jews be free to hide themselves(72). From the given facts it is quite clear that despite some drastic interventions of the Nazis and their several Slovak collaborators in the spring of 1942, for which they gained partial accord of the Slovak Government by cunning, the great part of the Jewish minority could remain in Slovakia and there be effectively protected to such an extent that the Slovak Republic in certain periods was regarded as a relative asylum even for the Jews from other countries, especially those from Poland and Hungary(73). The stand of the Slovak Republic in regard to the "definite solution" (Endlosung) of the Jewish question, pres- �14 SLOVAKIA sured by the Nazis, immediately from the first moments of suspicion about the real aim of these " regulations," was unanimously and consistently so rejective that it really presents "the story of the first outright failure of the 'Final Solution' and a failure at a time when there was no glimmer of hope for Jewry in Axis-controlled Europe" (74). The fact that the small Slovak State, even though it could not prevent all violence, knew how to stand up against it - and with such a determination that an objective historian can today talk about "a challenge to war" and about "a revolt" of the Slovak Government(75) - proves t hat t he Slovak Government even in this r egard not only did not accept without reservations the principles of Hitler's National Socialism, but even knew how to defend itself against them, nay, even to repudiate them forcefully, as long as it was not completely overpowered by the brutal preponderance of military occupation and frontal operations. This important fact has thus far not been properly evaluated in world literature which concerns itself with this historical period. If we pause now in our search for the reasons of the described facts, we shall come to the conclusion that one of the most decisive factors in the course of events in Slovakia was the personality of President Dr. Joseph Tiso. To this conclusion we are led by the following facts: 1. While Dr. Joseph Tiso held the initiative of solving the Jewish question in Slovakia( we saw that he solved it in a sense of strict justice, in a legal way, and in a most human manner. 2. As President of the Republic he used his constitutional right in order that the laws proposed by the parliament remained within the confines of the same principles which were in opposition to the Nazi anti-Jewish laws( 7,6). 3. When he could not prevent the issuance of the "Jewish Codex," he reserved the right for himself to limit its effectiveness as much as possible by personal "exceptions." That this was the intent of the mentioned paragraph 225 is confirmed by the fact ascertained by the court that Dr. Joseph Tiso used his authority as a matter of principle for every case placed before him, by which in a short time he �SLOVAKIA 15 liberated a great part of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia from the "Jewish Codex"(77). 4. It was generally known that the initiative of proGerman politics was held by the ministers forced on Tiso (Dr. Tuka and A. Mach) - and that there were basic conflicts between them and President Tiso. If, therefore, the Slovak parliament could pass the constitutional law of May 15, 1942 - which was in fact aimed against German Nazis and the executors of their influence in Slovakia this is understandable only if we allow that it did so not only within the support of the authority of the President of the Republic and the chairman of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, but, as it has been safely ascertained: directly on his initiative (78) . 5. Finally, only such a consistently anti-Nazi stand of President Tiso in regard to the Jewish question can explain the fact that, even despite the regulations of the government and the Minister of the Interior, some of the regional representatives of state power could during that entire time take positions of open protection of the Jewish inhabitants, nay, even actually intervene in the initiative of government trustees in the Jewish question on territory administered by them( 79) . CONCLUSION As we emphasized at the outset, in this study we were interested in focalizing some of the facts that are important and pertinent for a correct evaluation of the relationship of Dr. Joseph Tiso to the Jewish problem in Slovakia. Intentionally we have not touched upon some undoubtedly interesting and relatively important aspects of this complicated problem which require a separate study (e.g., the question of statistical data, the question of the legal and moral side of the individual regulations and respective responsibilities, etc.) . This study, we believe, does prove that we cannot honestly regard Dr. Joseph Tiso as a persecutor of the Jews or as a collaborator of the Nazis in their inhuman work of genocide of the Jewish nation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that the President of the Slovak Republic did prove himself an eminent opponent of every injustice against the Jews, whether perpetrated by �16 SLOVAKIA the German Nazis or by others in their service. Dr. Tiso did everything in his power to save them - and we say, without fear of contradiction, that he did for the Jews what no other statesman dared to do in the Europe controlled by Hitler at that time. If, despite this, a part of the Jews of Slovakia was taken out of Slovakia by violent intervention of brute force, it is certain that this happened without any direct participation of Dr. Joseph Tiso - nay, against his will - and, hence, we cannot hold him responsible for it. Dr. Tiso found himself face to face with a current "which it was possible to impede and probably even to influence, but not stop," as he himself had said during his trial in Bratislava <SO) . There is no evidence to prove that Dr. Tiso aided or abetted, motivated or approved in any way, the brutal treatment of Jews in Slovakia or anywhere else. To lie in the face of death is not easy. So much the less can we allow that Dr. Joseph Tiso could do so - the same Dr. Tiso who could proclaim before the entire nation that never in his life did he utter an untruth intentionally. And he did not fear that someone might be able to prove the opposite. Would that the world were managed by politicians and statesmen who would follow the noble example of the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso! REFERENCES: 1. The first opm10n is practically current in encyclopedic and scientific literature; some Slovak authors are inclined to the second; e.g., Th. J. Zubek ("Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality" - The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Nov. 1955, p. 125). 2. Dr. Joseph Pauco: Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Passaic, N. J ., 1952; pp. 323-323. 3. R. Pokorny: Z potulek po Slovensku, Prague, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 56-. 4. It was not by accident that the German translation of Rabbi Benjamin Halvey's Hebrew pasquinade "Das leben Jesu. Zurn ersten Male historisch bearbeitet nach neuentdeckten jiidisch orientalischen Quellen" was published in Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1875. According to the translator, who personally offered it to Giller in Trencianske Teplice, it surpassed by far the dilettante attempts of Strauss, Voltaire and other blasphemous pseudo-historians. See A. Giller - Z podrozy po kraju slowackim" - Lw6w, -876; pp. 197-. 5. Th. G. Locher: Die nationale Differenzeirung und lntegrie• rung der Slowaken und Tschechen in ihren geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 - Haarlem, 1931; p. 196. 6. J. A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe - Paris, 1955; p. 133. 7. While Hungary, for example, had a "numerus clausus" estab- �SLOVAKIA 17 lished by law, in Czecho-Slova kia, where the number of J ews was estimated at 3--4 percent of the population, the secondary schools became practically the exclusive domain of the Jews. In Prague itself over half the students were Jewish; the State Gymnazium for girls bad 163 Jewish pupils out of a total of 248; in several gymnaziums for boys the relationship of Jews to non-Jews was: 116 out of 254; 123 out of 250; 185 out of 240. At the university for every three nonJewish professors there was one Jewish professor. See: J. Boubee Tcheco-Slova quie - in "ETUDES," Paris, Vol. 60, No. 174, 1923; pp. 225-. 8. Ibidem. 9. G. Reitlinger: The Final Solution - London, 1953; p. 386. 10. The value of Jewish properties was evaluated at 3,150 million Slovak Crowns; besides this, the Jews controlled over 12,000 industrial enterprises with a capital of 1,250 million Slovak Crowns, especially the textile industry where they controlled 90 percent oi the production. The situation was much the same in the wood and alcohol industries. See the article "La Slovacchia e gli Ebrei" in the periodical RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milan, Vol. 8, No. 34, 1942; p , 902. 11. Ibidem: 72 percent of the lawyers and 64 percent of the medics were Jews, while 58 percent of all restaurant and liquor concessions was in their hands. 12. See the statement, e.g., of P . R. Mikus in the SLOVAK, Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 34, February 10, 1939; p. 1. 13. Here we do not have in mind only States, such as Italy, for example, which did adopt various anti-Jewish regulations. Count Ciano noted that on January 13, 1939, in a conversation with Mussolini, Chamberlain expressed grave fears that "further immigration of Jews into England would incite anti-Semitism which is already being planned in many sectors of the country." Besides the Jewish minority in England was negligible: according to Chamberlain , 60,000 (Mussolini stated that it was over 200,000) - G. Ciano, "Diario, 1939-1940," Milan, 1946; p. 22. - In regard to the anti-Jewish mood in other States, see "Les archives secre de la Wilhelmstras se" - Vol V, Book II, Paris, 1954, Documents Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-. 14. Dr. Tiso stressed this in general in his first speech after taking over government in Slovakia, Oct. 8, 1938 (K. Culen: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava," Middletown, Pa., 1948; p. 215). Later, on March 15, 1939, in a broadcast he warned all who would be guilty of such acts and threatened that the government would prosecute all culprits ("SLOVAK" - Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 63, 1939; p . 4). 15. "SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1939. 16. "SLOVAK" - Vol XXI, No. 28, Feb. 3, 1939; p. 3. Compare also the government declaration of Feb. 22, 1939 ("SLOVAK," Vol. XXI, Nos. 44-45, Feb. 22-23, 1939). 17. Speech of Dr. Tiso at the Eighth Convention of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at Trencin, Oct. 1, 1939 ("SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 227, Oct. 3, 1939; pp. 3-4). 18. An analysis of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic by H. Schimani: "Die Verfassun~ der Slowakischen Republik" - Vienna, 1947. 19. Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov - Vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1954; p. 196. 20. Dr. J. Pauco: op. cit., p. 55. �18 SLOVAKIA Dr. F. Durcansky: op. cit., p. 237. J. A. Mikus: op. cit., pp. 185-; F. Durcansky: op. cit.; pp. 475: In an official pronouncement, Feb. 21, 1939, Tiso declared: "It is proof of the maturity of our nation that despite all incitements the Slovak nation waited for the legal solution of the Jewish question" (stenographic report of the second meeting of the Slovak Assembly, Bratislava, Feb. 21-23, 1939, p. 9). 24. That this was the expressed intention of Dr. Tiso is attested to by his statement to the correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, J. Frankel, Feb. 8, 1939: "The coming Jewish law will certainly serve the purpose that the Jews might not be caught by surprises and would know just how far they will be able to go in economic life" (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). 25. Memorandum of the British Consul in Bratislava, Mr. P. Pares, Feb. 3, 1939, in the "DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939" - Third Series, Vol. IV, No. 97, 1951, London; p. 96. 26. No. 63-39 SLOVAK CODE; No. 102-39 Ur. nov. (Official News). 27. It approved the transfer and emigration plan of Dr. S. E. Soskin (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). Innsbruck28. Compare, e.g., J. Messner: Das Naturrecht Vienna, 1950, pp. 365-366 - and: P. Pavan: l.'.uomo nella communita internazionale - Rome, s.d., p. 47. 29. SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3. 30. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, op. cit., p. 902. 31. We did not find documents which would definitely confirm such pressure in this period, but the testimony of F. Durcansky inclines us to believe that pressures were exercised. He said: "secret influences of the Germans did not validate themselves anywhere to such an extent as they did in the attempt to attain the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia according to the desires of the National Socialistic circles. . . . " (Speaking of the period prior to July 28, 1940) - F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. 32. No. 46-40, SLOVAK CODE. 33. Commenting on this law on March 10, 1940, Tiso stressed that we are here concerned "with our own reasonable course. This is not an imitation of foreign patterns." - (SLOVAK, March 13, 21. 22. 23. 1940, p. 3). 34. Thus, e.g., in April, 1940, he returned to the Parliament for renewed debate on the draft of the law about Jewish enterprises with his own remarks and reminders; the parliament then approved the law with Tiso's recommendations on April 25, 1940 (SLOVAK, April 26, 1940), p. 2). 35. The amount which the Jews transferred abroad at that time was estimated at 2,000 million Slovak Crowns. Even in the "Aryan- only ized" enterprises "the Jews frequently remained bosses names changed on paper" (GARDISTA, June 14, 1941, p. 3). 36. Compare the study of the German legal expert for Slovak affairs, K. 0. Rabl, "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsleben in der neuen Slowakei" (in the periodical: ZEITSCHRIFT fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht - Berlin, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1940), which concludes categorically: "The Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically, therefore, according to previous provisions, not solved at all. Mainly the economic and imperial position of Jewry remains the same as it was before" (p. 867). �SLOVAKIA 37. 38. 39. 40, 41. l!} F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. K. Culen, op. cit., pp. 263-; p. 480; J . A. Mikus, op. cit. p. 163. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 386. J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 35; K. Culen, op. cit., p. 380. Minister Gejza Medricky's testimony during the Tiso trial ; this is reproduced by K. Culen, op. cit., p. 480. 42. SLOVAK CODE, part 52, No. 198, September 10, 1941. 43. "Jewish Codex" - part X, par. 255. 44. Ibidem, par. 256. 45. J . Pauco, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 323. 46. Compare the testimony of Archbishop Kmet'ko before the National Court in Bratislava, January 6, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit. pp. 369-370. 47. A. Giannini: Monsignor Tiso (in "Rivista di studi politici internazionali" - Firenze, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1952, p. 451); a wealth of documentaton is produced also by F . Durcansky, op. cit., pp. 166-169, 190-248. 48. Dr. Ley, German Minister, informed Count Ciano about the project in Rome, Dec. 6, 1939. In 1940, Ribbentrop told Ciano about Hitler's plan to create a Jewish free state on the island of Madagascar, where all the Jews of Europe were supposed to be concentrated. (l!Europa verso la catastrofe - Verona, 1948; G. Ciano, Diario 19391943, Milan, 1946, Vol. I, p. 280). 49. On December 7, 1938, President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal letter in which he proposed that a part of the south and southwest territory of Abyssinia be reserved for the Jews. Mussolini declared that personally he sympathized with the idea of creating a Jewish state, but decidely not in Abyssinia, nor anywhere in Africa. He proposed Russia, Brazil or the United States of America (Les Archives Secretes de la Wilhelmstrasse, Vol. IV, Les suites de Munich, Paris, 1953, doc. No. 341, pp. 498-500; compare also Vol. V, Book II, Paris, 1954, doc. Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-158). 50. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. -387. 51. Partially reproduced in K. Sidor's "~est' rokov pri Vatik'• ne" - Scranton, Pa., 1947, pp. 135-138. 52. In the note of the State Secretariate to His Holiness, No. 8355-41 , published in Sidor's op. cit., pp. 138-140. 53. W. Theimer: Lexicon der Politik, Bern, 1947, under "Vatikan" - p. 482. 54. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Sidor used the Slovak word "potrebam" (needs) in translating the Italian "esigenze," but the latter would probably be better expressed by "poziadavkam" (demands). 55. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 387. 56. At a press conference, March 27, 1942, Minister A. Mach declared that "the ultimate aim is to transfer all Jews to a territory, which would be ordered for the settlement within the framework of a new European order" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942, p. 3). 57. The Vatican protested with the note of the State Secretariate of His Holiness, No. 2027-42 ,dated March 14, 1942. At the end of March, the Slovak Minister at the Vatican, Karol Sidor, personally was in Bratislava with a demand to stop deportations (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 141-142). 58. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 388; from this reaction, as well as from the declaration of Minister A. Mach at the press conference �20 SLOVAKIA mentioned above (56), it is apparent that the personal intervention of the minister forced by Ribbentrop on Tiso was concerned and/ or his group of Slovak extremists. Mach publicly repudiated "speeches (which implied) that we had been somehow asked from the outside or forced to this solution. We ourselves have undertaken everything possible to have the opportunity to get rid of the Jews" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942). According to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, No. 8.325/ 1/ 42, of May 8, 1942, addressed to the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican (concerning the reply to the mentioned interventions of the Vatican of Nov. 12, 1941, and March 14, 1942), at that time " there were negotiations between the factors of the Slovak Republic and the Greman Reich in regard to the problem of the European Jews," in the sense of which "the Jews of Slovakia would be placed in several areas in the vicinity of Lublin ... where they would remain permanently" (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 142-143). This connection of matters appears to be more probable. 59. F . Steiner: Tragedy of Slovak Jewry - Bratislava, 1949, p. 6; reprod. from G. Reitlinger, op. cit. 60. At the beginning of May, Eichmann negotiated in this sense with Dr. Tuka and A. Mach. 61. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 388. 62. Wisliceny admitted this before the Nuremberg Court The Trial of the Major War Criminals - Vol. ill, pp. 276-278; reprod . .bY G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390). 63. "In practice the way was open in this intensely Catholic country for any professed convert to demand protection" (B. Shub: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews, New York, 1943, p . 54;reprod. by G. Reitlingeh ,op. cit. , p. 390). 64. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390. 65. Compare the testimony of Minister G. Medricky before the National Court in Bratislava, Feb. 21, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit., p . 482. 66. The official report of the International Red Cross describes them thusly: " ... les camps qui presentaient des conditions de nouriture et de logement passables, les internes etaient admis a travailler moyennant salaire dans des conditio se rapprochant de :Ueconomie libre" (Rapport du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge sur son action pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Geneve, 1948, p. 674). 67. After various messengers and plenipotentiaries had pressured Tiso and the Slovak Government, Tiso was called to Salzburg in May, 1943, where Hitler angrily marked the Slovak resolution of the Jewish question 'insufficient." 68. In the light of realities, such would appear to be the various public manifestations (as, e.g., the anti-Jewish speech of Min. A. Mach in Ruzomberok, Feb. 7, 1943) and the conditioned promises of President Tiso (in December, 1943, to Himmler's special agent E. Weesenmayer) which, however, were never fulfilled . Compare Sidor's account, op. cit., pp. 146-147, and G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390. 69. According to unpublished testimonies in manuscript which are in the hands of the author. 70. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 148. 71. It was thus that he presented himself to President Tiso on his arrival to Bratislava "as the accredited agent of Hitler" at the end of August, 1944. See: J . Pauco, op. cit., p. 293. 72. The regulation was formulated as a summons to come to a �SLOVAKIA 21 definite place on Nov. 24. A delegate of the International Red Cr oss ascertained on the spot that the summons was answered only by about 50 Jews: "Comme les Autorites slovaques l'avaient d'ailleurs prevu" he relates literally - "les Israelites se cachaient" (Rapport du Comite .. . . op. cit., p. 674). The hidden Jews could be aided not only by the population, but also by the International Red Cross with the help of the Slovak Red Cross and the Catholic Church (p. 675). 73. Intern. Red Cross Report, op. cit., p. 674; F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 239. 74. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 385. 75. "Yet as early as July, 1942, this Government rebelled" writes G. Reitlinger (op. cit., p. 385). We note, apparent as it is from the foregoing, that it is necessary to see this "rebellion" already in the constitutional law of May 15, 1942. The same autor says in another place: "We have seen in the case of Slovakia, how a Government which defied German pressure and abandoned the Final Solution, was forced to return to it, when, on the eve of capitulation to the enemy, the country was occupied by German troops" (p. 412). 76. It is worthy of note here that Tiso's insistence on a per centual participation of the Jews in the economy of Slovakia in relation to their number of the entire population could in no way be regarded as a repressive regulation, inasmuch as the principle concerned here was the same as that which Tiso ordered to be applied even in regards to the other minorities, not even excluding the Germans themselves. It has been ascertained, e.g. , that in official State positions the Germans could not occupy more than 5 percent of them (K. Culen , op. cit., p. 432); the same applied in regards to the "aryanization" of Jewish enterprises - their participation was limited percentually (J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 238). 77. The actual number of "Presidential exceptions" granted by Tiso has thus far not been accurately ascertained. Some authors estimate the number "above 9,000" (J. Pauco, who bases his account on the statements of lawyers during the Tiso trial; op. cit., p. 323); Dr. J. A. Mikus gives the figure 9,964 without, however, quoting any document or source (op . cit., p. 135); Minister Stephen Hassik estimated "about 15,000" (manuscript in author's possession). The report of J. Luther to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, indicates a greater number; according to that report, at that time 35,000 Jews in Slovakia were already safeguarded "by special legitimation" (G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390); a greater number is also indicated by the fact that the presiding judge of the National Court in Bratislava, Dr. Igor Daxner, in the trial against Dr. Tiso and his associates, did not allow an accurate ascertainment of the number of "exceptions"; he did this as a rule whenever it came to ascertaining matters that were favorable for Dr. Tiso (compare K. Culen, op. cit.). 78. Already on March 23, 1942, Dr. Tiso had Monsignor John Postenyi present the question to the State Council to sound out the ground and to gain a basis for his further intervention, which he later realized by means of the parliament (Dr. Zabkaj, in the National Court in Bratislava, March 15, 1947, according to mimeographed reports of the Slovak Press Bureau, Bratislava). 79. Typical is the example of Nitra Province, which in 1940-1944 was administered by Stephen Hassik, where the Jews were consistently protected and where, in 1943, the administrator, even though �22 SLOVAKIA not present, was able to obstruct the transfer of a certain number of Jews into Germany even after the action had begun (Manuscript in author's hands). 80. J. Pauco Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe), op. cit., p. 322. SOURCES: CIANO, Galeazzo: Diario - Volume primo, 1939-1940; Milano, Rizzoli, 1946; L'Europa verso la catastrofe; 184 colloqui con Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Sumner Welles, Rustu Aras, Stoiadinovic, Goring, Zog, Francois-Poncet ecc. verbalizzati da Galeazzo Ciano, con 40 documenti diplomatici inediti; (Verona), A. Mondadori, 1948. CULEN, Konstantin: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu); Middletown, Pa. , Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947-1948; 2Vols. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN :POLICY 1919--1939, Third Series; London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. DURCANSKY, Ferdinand: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, Vol. 1, Biela kniha; Buenos Aires, Slovensky Oslobodzovaci Vybor, 1954. GILLER, Agaton, Z podr6zy po kraju slowackim; Lw6w, Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1876. ·HAssiK, Stefan: Prispevok O rieseni iidovskej otazky V Sloven• skei republike (unpublished manuscript). INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAffiS: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews; New York, 1943. LES ARCHIVES SECRETES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE: Documents traduits de l' allemand par Michael TOURNIER; Paris, Librairie Plon, 1950. Les Juives en Europe 1939-1945; Paris, CDJC, 1947. MIKUS, Joseph A., La Slovaquie dans le drame de I' Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 a 1950); Paris, Les Iles d' Or, 1955. POKORNY, Rudolf: Z potulek po Slovensku; Praha, 1884-1885, 2 Vols .. RAPPORT DU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIXROUGE sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 - 30 juin 1947); Geneve, 1948. REITLINGER, Gerald: The Final Solution. The Attempt to Ex• ter~inate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945; London, Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953. SIDOR, Karol: ~est' rokov pri Vatikane; Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. STEINER, Frederick: The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry; Bratislava, 1949; (Documentation Centre CUJCR). TISO, Jozef : Obhajobna rec pred Narodnym sudom v Bratislave dna 17. a 18. marca 1947; edited by Dr. Jozef PAUCO : Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe; Passaic, N. J ., Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952. PERIODICALS: ETUDES, Paris. GARDISTA, Bratislava-Zilina. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milano. RIVISTA DI STUD! POLITIC! INTERNAZIONALI, Firenze. SLOVAK, Bratislava. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Berlin. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1957, Vol. 7 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 22), March 1957.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 23), June 1957.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 24-25), September-December 1957.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1957 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Pub I ished VOL. V II quart erly by the Slovak League SEPTEMBER- DECEMBER, 195 7 of America NO. 3-4(24-25) DR. JOSEPH TISO AND THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN SLOVAKIA MILAN S. DURI CA The fact that, during the period when Dr. Joseph Tiso was at the head of the Slova)k Republic as its president, there ,w ere "liqttidated" in an inhumane manner, in Nazi concentration camps, per.haps also severa1 tens of thousands of Jews from Slovakia, has tempted many authors either to hold Dr. Tiso directly responsible for these crimes, or at -least to consider this point as t,h e real weaJkness of Tiso's policy and his defense< 1 >. We are convinced that the so1ution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia is a very complicated proiblem and, therefore, it is necessary to gather in an objective study all existing documents so that the _true state of affairs might become known (2) . While awaiting the results of such a study, we are attempting here to focalize some of the actualities which already h ave been documented - facts which can put some light on definite, shadowy sides of this problem and also note in what direction it is necessary to move in making a further study so that we might arrive at an objective statement of the facts that had taken iplace and thus also at a correct moral evaluation of them. J EW RY IN S LOVAK IA Already in the past century, native and foreign observers were stunned by the great influx of Jews to Hungary and especially to the part of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks from time immemorial. While Caplovic noted 6,850 J ews in the Trencin area h efore 1829, according to. the census of 1869 there already were 13,365 of them among 237,702 SlavaJks. Sveto,z ar Hurban, writing in 1881, said: A hundred years ago, there were 75,098 Jews in Hun- 2 SLOVAKJA gary; 55 years later there were already 241,632 of them (the increase burdened Slovakia mostly); in 1'870 they numbered 552,133 and now there are more than 600,000 of them in Hungary!" (Slovenske Pohl'ady, 1881, p. 291). The Czech writer Rudolph Pokorny, who reproduces these figures from direct eX:perience, describes the methods of Jewish immigrants in SlovaJkia as parasitical and exploitative (3). It would be very interesting to study in detaril the relations between the influx of Jews to Slovakia by the strengthening of their economic position and the economic decline orf the Slovak in1halbitants which resulted in an increasing exodus of Slovaks into foreign lands especially to the United States. According to our impressions from Hterature already reviewed, such a study would most li!kely lead to the conclusion that the exodus of the Sl()IVaks was in part caused by the great influx of Jews into rSl()IVaJkia. The strengthened economic positions of t:he Jews in Slovakia gave them the opportunity to exert stronger politicai influence and to propagate their ideology. A Polish observer A:gaton GiHer, ,w riting in 1876, described how the Jews in Slovalkia systematically worked against the Catholic Church and against Christianity in general( 4) under the aegis of the liberalism that was preached lby t:he Hungarian government ,o f the same Colman Tisza who, at the same time (1875) , denied the fact that the Slovak nation existed.(5). Jif we bear in mind the eX:tent and the constant increase of these mentioned effects of the Jewish minority in Slovak,ia, we shall more readily understand the spontaneous psychological reaction of the intelligentsia and the broad masses of the SloviaJk people. This reaction expressed itself, first of aill, in response to the tolerant nature of the SlovaJks and the fact that they laciked means of -power, in a blood-perspir~ng effort to save their own economic situation, ( with dollars made in American mines, the Slovak peasant tried to secure his livelihood in his native 'land) , then in t:he effort to emancipate themselves from dependence on the Jews in commerce to provide the daily necessities of life (by establishnig self-help cooperatives), amd also by an intensive building of institutions to preserve SLOVAKIA 3 and •f .urther their original national culture both in a general and also in a specifically Christian sense (it suffices to mention the -Matica .Slovenska •a nd the Society of St. Adalbert). The situation did not change substantially even after the c,r eation oif the Czecho-Slova:k Republic in 1918(6). In 1923, a !French observer wa'S amazed \by the dis:proportion., ate preponderance of Jewish students in the universities and trade schools(7) and he foresaw that the Jews would thus soon capture the best positions in the new State(8). This prediction was if'll'lfilled, especiaUy a'S far as Slovakia was concerned. After the Vienna Arbitration, when the Jews constituted only 3.3'5 % of the population in S1ov,alkia(9), they owned almost one-half of the entire nation.a{ wealth(l0) and occupied most of the econ.omicaHy and civically important pwbl:i!c functionsO1). That this fact influenced the daily press and cultural production in general is evidence which needs no special proof(J2). It was only natural that the Slovak with all his legendary peace-loving characteristics, lbore the situation with difficulty; and the :Slovalk demands for autonomy, whicih characterized Slovak activities in the twenties and thirties of thi:s century, were accompanied by demands for a solution of the Jewish !problem. The current of anti-Semitism, which had overtalken many countries on the initiative of German Nazism, even such countries in whi·c h objectively suppositions fo'!" anti-Jew,i sh feeling were really insignificant if not directly fictitious, definitely did 1ha;ve some inf1uence even in 'Slova;kia(13). But who could stop Hitler at that time? It is not the fau~t •o f the Slovalks that many arguments of anti-Jewish :propaganda, originating outside of Slovalkia but ascribed to ,Slovakia, found at iJeast partial su!bstantiation in fact. THE JEWISH PROBLEM AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Tiso took over the government of Sl01Vakia under the most difficult circumstances. His first worry was to preserve order and to prevent arbitray acts of usurpers even in the so,l ution of the Jewish .problem<14). Conscious of his responsibility to the nation, whose public opinion 1 SLOVAKIA already for a longer time impatiently demanded radical regulations with regard to the privileged Czec,h and Jewish minority in Slovarkia(15), Dr. Tiso sought a legal solution of the matter already in federated Czecho-Slovakia(l6), as well as after March 14, 1919, in the Slova;k Republic. For an objectively moral evaluation of Tiso's conduct in the solution of the Jewish problem in .Slovakia, is is necessary to clearly distinguish ,various time periods, during which the legal and practical possibilities of Dr. Tiso to decide this question personally changed substantially. 1. From October 6, 1938, to October 26, 1939: Dr. Joseph Tiso, as Prime Mini:ster of the Slo,vaJk Go,vernment, had broad ;possiibilities oif legislative and executive intrative and, therefore, also dir,e ct, personal responsibility in this regard(17 ). 2. From October 26, 1939, to July 28, 1940: As President of the Slova:k Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso could intervene in the legislative acti,viby of the Assembly and influence the executive power reserived to the government, which was responsible to the Assembly and not to the President, only within the limits prescribed by the Constitution of the S'lovaJk Republic(18) . During this ,p eriod, we cannot regard Dr. Tiso directly res,ponsible for the various initiatives in the solution of the Jewis'h problem, but only for the acts of his office as prescrilbed by the Constitution: whether and how he used the rights of intervention., ·a s defined 'by the Constitution, in regard to legislative and exec,utirve acts which required his appm,val. For the latter, as head of the State, Dr. Tiso carries the responsibility, dividing it with the respective Constitutional organs. 3. From July 28, 1940, to August 30, 1944: at the Salziburg meeting with Germany's intervention in the internal affairs of 'Slova'kia(19) - Dr. Tiso lost a definite part of the effective possibilities to exercise his Constitutional rights in regard to persons who were forced by Hitler into the Slovaik Government, especially with regard to expressed demands of the Germans upon the Slova;k Government(20). Such was the problem of e~pelling or liquidating the Jew:? <21) . In this period we can hold Tiso as responsible, as in the previous period, only in proportion 1 1 SLOVAKIA 5 to the effective possibilities of free action which remained open to him after !Hitler's intervention at Salzburg. 4. From August 30, 1944, to April 5, 1945: Slovakia was to a great extent a battleground, where actual governmental power was exercised by various fighting units, most of the time completely independent of civil governmental organs, nay even expressly in opposition to them. (22). Here the responsibility of Dr. Tiso is limited to those acts, which - aliWays within the extent of this Constitutional rights and duties - took ·p lace on the territory and at ra time when the Government of the SlovaJk Republic still go;verned there and had effective 1possibility to exercise its power. TISO'S SOLUTION Despite the critical political - internal and international - situation and the revolutionary events of October, 1938, and of March, 1939, with his resolute influence, Dr. Joseph Tiso checked all violent intervention of incited masses of ,people in the solution of the Jewish problem (23) and consistently in;volked a legal courne to- solve this problem. Such a course, while it secured for the Slovaks time for the necessary study of the various aspects of the complicated situation and for a democratic negotation .o f various motions, with regard to the Jews themselves, it eliminated the typically Nazi factor of surprise(2-!), giving them time and opportunity to prepare themselves psychologically and to make necessary provisions, including financial(25) in the face of the new situation. After such a preliminary preparation, the first Slo;vruk governmental regulation was issued April 30, 1939, with the force of law, the object of which was to solve the Jewish pro1blem (26). This regulation defined the concept of a confessional and civic viewpoint, without considering racial motives at all. Its aim was to reduce the disproportionate preponderance of Jews in the economic life of Slovakia. The Jews could continue to manage their enterprises if they allowed a 51 % per cent ,participation of Slovaks the 51 % not being confiscated, but lbought in a regular manner by Slovak participants (shareholders). The participation of Jews in the legal, medical, and other important 6 SLOVAKIA and profitable professions was to be regulated gradually in proportion to the total number of the Jewish minority. Besides this, the Slovak Government of Dr. Joseph Tiso supported. the voluntary emigration of Jews to Palestine in all possible ways< 27) . If we consider all the facts of the matter objecttvely, we must admit that in these regulations there really was nothing w'hich, under the given circumstances, would exceed the normal competency of a legislator that did not emanate from the natural law itself, or that would be opposed to the principles of justice and humanity(28). The first 'S lovak resolution of the J ewish question - and tihe only one which, in the full sense, we can call Tiso's solution - contained and realized the attributes proposed by Tiso when he ,proclaimed. that "t'he Jewish question in Slovakia shall be solved justly, socially, and humanly"( 29) . THE SLOVAK "JEWISH LAW" These :provisions clearly, but not altogether effectively because they left wide possibilities to evade the law(30), proved to be insufficient in attaining their aim. 'Dherefore, but probably also under German pressure(31), the Slovak Parliament prepared. a new so-catled "Jewish Law," which was approved on iFeb11uary 29, 1940(32). Fundamentally, this law differed little from the previous provision; it defined more accurately many details and fixed the principle of participation o.f the Jews in economic, civic, and cultural life in proportion to their number of the tdtal population, that is, 4 percent(33) . The confessional and civic principle remained in force, therefore not that of racial discrimination; so did the principle of selling 51 % of the shares of Jewish ente11prises to companion SloJVaks freely chosen lby them. This .principle of "Aryani:zation" Dr. Tiso defended consistently, even by using his constitutional authority as President(34) . GERMAN INTERVENTION AND THE "JEWISH CODE" It aippears t'hat even these new legal dispositions were not sufficient in practice to attain the goal. Several loopholes were left open for escape from the consequences of SLOVAKIA 7 the [aw - and those affected naturally did not hesitate to use them in every way(35) - so t:Jhat the more radical circles in Slovakia expressed their dissatisfaction with such a solution. However, it was chiefly in Germany that the Slovak solution of the Jewish question was bitterly criticized as being basiically in conflict with the German Jewish !aws(36). It was this consistent originality and independence of Dr. Tiso and his government in regard to the so1ution of the Jewish question that was one of the reasons for intervention o,f Adol'ph Hitler in the internal affairs of the Slovak Republic at SalzJburg on July 28, 1940(37). There Dr. Tiso was forced to drop Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky, Minister of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, who collorborated with him in the independent solution of the Jewish question. Dr. Vojtech T,uik,a, who was ,g reatly influenced by the Germans, was forced on tJhe Slova,k Government as Minister of Fo·r eign Affairs against the will of President Tiso(38), as was journalist Alexander Mach, who became the executor of German dictates especially in the Jewish question as Minister of the Interior(39) . For Dr. Joseph Tiso, Salzburg meant personally such a blow that he was determined to, tender his resignation( 40). It was only at the insistence of moderate SloivaJk ciroles, nay, even the Jews themselves, that he remained at his post to use his authority to check the radical group which was under the influence of the Germans(41). Tiso's position after SalaJbur,g, therefore, became substantially a defensi'Ve one: not only did he lose in notable measure the possibility of concrete intiative in regard to the Jewish question, but also his constitutional authority of intervention was ,partially reduced by t:Jhe facts of this new political situation. Thus it happened that on September 10, Prime Minister Tuika could force the parliament to pass an enabling law for the solution of the Jewish question by the government. This "emandpated" ,goivernment of Dr. T,uka issued in the form of a goivernment regulation - without the signature of the President of the Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - the so-called "Jewish Code"< 42 >, Wihich copied the Ger~ man Nuremberg Laiw. Apparently the Germans were de- 8 SLOVAKIA termined to impose Hitler's order in SlovaJkia - the same imperial imposition of Hitler's Germaniy to which all the governments of states in the German sphere of influence had succumbed. In comparison with the Jewish laws of Germany and the other States (iltaly, France, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Holland, Denmark, Norway - and even annexed Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and the General Governorship of Poland), the "Jewish Code" of S1ovakia contained two lucid points which were hers exclusive ly: the first reserved to the Preside nt of the Repulblic the right of direct administrational "exception" of anyone from the power of this law <43), while the second confirmed the validity of all exce ptions alre ady granted according to the aforementioned Slovak law(44 ). These two paragraphs, leaving tJhe head of the State an open possibility to protect in the face of an avalanche of force which evidently it was impossible to oppose, were the motive why Dr. Joseiph Tiso finally decided not to resign his office after the .promulgation of the "Jewish Code"< 45 ). PRESIDENT TISO'S STAND The question was a real "ca:sus conscientiae," which today ,w e can reconstruct in its main outlines. Dr. Tiso was opposed to any violent solution of the Jewish question; he was ready to .p rotest against it by resigning his office. The following realities, however , came into ,c onsideration: if Tiso did resign, it was c ertain that Tu.ka would be put into his office - and it was generally !known that Tu!ka was strongly under German influences. I,f this would have happened, not only all the Jews of SlovaJkia would ha'Ve been completely subject to German inte:vventions, but even government power of all Slovakia would practically have passed ()IVer completely into German hands and this w·o uld have had catastrophic consequences for the entire nation. Let it suffice here to mention the forced participation in the war and the system of National 1Socialism promoted b.y Dr. Tutka. Under such circumstances, the resignation o;f Dr. Tiso would have meant deserting from a position of responsi- SLOVAKIA 9 bility, disappointing the h0ipes of all the people who sa,w in him the salvation of the nation in a critical world situation and a ,g uarantee aigainst the 'Very actual ideological danger of Nazi,sm(46). By retaining t:Jhe funcUon o.f the President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso had a hoipe not only of continuing the defensive policy of Slova!kia a,gainst Nazism, but a:lso to sarve, if not all, at least as many as possible Jews of Slovakia who were persecuted by Nazism. Were these ihoipes however, sUJbstantiated? The answer to this question is very impo,r tant for the moral qualification of the stand of Dr. Joseph Tiso and thereby of his entire relationship to the proiblem orf the Jews in SlovaJkia. It is not difficult to answer the first part of the question: It has been proved that by remaining President of the Republic, Dr. Tiso not only sruved the SlovaJk nation from threatened occupation and division, from the flood of Nazi ideolo,gy, from most of the economic and social consequences of the world rwar, but, despite the exceptional circumstances, he also organized Slovakia legally, culturally and economically as an independent State and thereby demonstrated t:Jhat Sloiva,kia had all the ;prerequisites orf developmernt as an independent State. Under his guidance Slovalk ia attained "brilliant results and the elan of autonomous life was reaHy wonderful"< 47). So that we could answer the second part of the question, we must objecti'Ve1y examine the cause of Jewish provisions and their exeoution in Slovakia in the third and fourth periods (1941-1945). After the promulgation of the "Jewish Code," the Jews were supposed to be transferred from Slovakia to the territory between the Visla and t:Jhe Bug in former Poland, where there was to be found some kind of state creation reserved for them. Here it is necessary to, note that the project of a separate territory for European Jews presented a solution which was seriously studied not only in Ckrmany( 48), but ,a iso iby other powers, such as, for example, the United States (4 9). To:l. order to ascertain the situation the SlovaJk Gov•e rnment sent to Poland a representatiive of the Ministry of the Interior, Isidore Koso, to whom they 1, 1 10 SLOVAKIA actually did show the Jewish city of Sosnowitz, Oppel, with its own administration, police, etc. Well, even .after this the SlovaJk Government did not begin to transfer Jews, but arranged labor camps for them in Slovakia, where they were to be gradually concentrated. This course, which Reitlinger explains as motivated by economy(50), is apparently 1b etter ex.plained as a reaction of the Slovak Government to the Memorandum of the Slovak Catholic Bishops of October 7, 1941(51), and to the reminders of the Holy See of Novemfber 12, 1941 (52). In both these doouments ecclesiastical representatives protested against the racist principle which inspired governmentrul regulation No. 198--1941 of the Slova!k Code, especiaUy however rugainst those ,p oints which were out of line with the teachings of the Church (outlawing mixed marriages, ex:pulsion from schools) and called upon the SlovaJk G()IVernment to recall or at least change the mentioned regulations in this seinse. The Holy See, wihich was for apparent reasons generally regarded as "the best informed political center of the world"(53 ), at the same time manifested its understanding for the situation of the ,Slov,a;k Government when it concluded its note with these words,: "The Holy See hopes that the Slovak Government, as long as the government regulations are not repealed or amended, will try to ex;plain and to validate the issued regulations in suoh a measUTe and in such a manner so that they mig1ht become as far as is possible least harmful to the needs (demands) of Catholic conscience"(54). These words appear to be the norm and therefore the explanation of the course not only of Dr. Tiso, but also that of the :SloIVaJk gOIVemment followed in practice until the end of their activities. Thus it was that despite the Nuremberg t01J1e of the "Jewish Code," the f,unda:mental :points of that code were not practically applied until March 10, 1942. Thus far it has not been conclusively ascertained, whether under German pressure or not(5,5), Minister of the Interior Alexander Mach issued the decree on March 7, 1942, which confined all the Jews of Slovakia to their homes until their transfer to the East(5&) . This provision, which was soon followed by the first transports of Jews from Slo- SLOVAKIA 11 vakia to Galicia (March 10, 1942), inspired a strong opposition of public opinion, new protests of ecclesiastical circles (.57), nay, even dissent of the rest of the members of the government.(5<8). But it has been safely ascertained that Germany did pressure the Slovak Government to adopt the solution of the Jewish question in the form of transferring the Jews which had been accepted by the other States (Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Hungary). To this end Heydrich himself came to Bratislava on April 10, 1942, to tell Tuka that the Jews of Slovakia would be transferred to the Lublin area where they would be settled permanently. Separate settlements were to be arranged for baptized Jews (59). After repeated insistence and assurances from the German side that Jewish families would be respected and that they would be dealt with decently(·60), the Slovak Government began to send to the East the members of the families of those young, able-to-work Jews who had been transported the previous month. In this second intervention of the Slovak Government, it is possible to see an effort to correct in some way the mistake of the first transfer by which many Jewish families were broken up. It became tragic that the promises of Heydrich and Eichmann were the treacherous trap which was not without effect(&l). At that time the Slovak Government could not know about the real intentions of the Nazis: Wisliceny himself found this out, as we shall see, only several months later. Nevertheless Dr. Tuka insisted that he might send an inspection mission to ascertain on the spot just how the transferred Jews were being dealt with. The Slovak Government presented this demand also formally in the form of a note addressed to the German Government(,62) - but received only an evasive reply. It was this, most likely, that roused suspicions on the Slovak side. Therefore already on May 15, 1942, the Slovak parliament approved a constitutional law by which it practically repealed the power given the government in September, 1941, and legally set the course for the problem of emigration. The substance of this law was, however, the practical cessation of deportations; the law, that is, sanctioned all the previously granted presidential and minis- 12 SLOVAKIA terial "exceptions" and established a new general exception for Jews baptized before March 14, 1939(63) . Furthermore, it established that Jews, affected by the law, would be concentrated in labor camps in Slovakia. In July, 1942, when the representative of the Holy See in Bratislava notified President Tiso that the Jews in the Lublin area were being murdered, Dr. Tiso with absolute determination insisted on the realization of a Slovak inspection mission - or else there would be no further transfer of Jews from Slovakia. In August, Wisliceny went to Berlin with the matter. There Eichmann told him that Tiso was asking an impossible thing because those Jews were no longer alive. Thereupon he showed him a secret order, issued by the will of Hitler and signed by Himmler, according to which the entire Jewish race was to be gradually destroyed(64). Wisliceny returned to Bratislava again with an evasive reply. After this deportations from Slovakia were completely stopped. From what has been said it is quite clear that the Slovak Government allowed the transfer of a part of the Jews from Slovakia under the imperialistic pressure of Germany - in the face of guarantees to respect basic human rights and humanitarian treatment. As soon as there arose a reason to doubt that the Nazis were fulfilling the guarantees given, the parliament of the Slovak Republic with the strength of a constitutional law stood up to protect the Jewish citizens of Slovakia. The fact that it is necessary to explain the law of May 15, 1942, in this maner, is also supported by the following realities : 1. The motive for voting this law was the merciless exportation of the Jews on the basis of the decree of Minister Mach of March 7, 1942 (65). 2. By this law, constitutionally, were sanctioned all the exceptions granted by the President of the Republic and the resort Ministers ; also a new general exception was established by which a confessional criterion was given priority - which the Germans sharply criticized already in 1940 as opposed to the racist principles of Nuremberg. 3. The real aim of concentrating the Jews, who did not have the mentioned exceptions, in Slovak labor camps was SLOVAKIA 13 to save them from possible transfer elsewhere on the initiative of radical circles around Minister Mach behind which stood the power of Germany. This was evident from the way these camps were set up - the living conditions of which were but little different from complete freedom(66). 4. Despite repeated insistence from the side of the Germans, nay, even despite the intervention of Hitler himself with President Tiso(67), Slovakia did not retreat from her position and protected the Jews with all means of political tactics(68) and her own State power. 5. After September 1, 1944, when Slovakia became a battlefield and governmental power was factually exercised by the fighting armies, despite German occupation of practically the whole of Slovakia, the new Minister of National Defense and State Security of the Slovak Republic, Stephen Hrussik, ordered the abolishment of all concentration camps and of all anti-Jewish administrational regulations(69). 6. When German army commanders defied the above order and by force transported to Germany all Jews that fell into their hands during military operations, the new Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Stephen Tiso, energetically protested to the German Government(70). 7. Later, when the commander of the occupation army and "the only representative of the Reich in Slovakia"(71), SS-General Berger forced the Slovak Government regulation in regard to concentrating the Jews (Nov. 16, 1944), the provision had practically no effect because the Slovak Government and Slovak officials silently agreed that the Jews be free to hide themselves(72). From the given facts it is quite clear that despite some drastic interventions of the Nazis and their several Slovak collaborators in the spring of 1942, for which they gained partial accord of the Slovak Government by cunning, the great part of the Jewish minority could remain in Slovakia and there be effectively protected to such an extent that the Slovak Republic in certain periods was regarded as a relative asylum even for the Jews from other countries, especially those from Poland and Hungary(73). The stand of the Slovak Republic in regard to the "definite solution" (Endlosung) of the Jewish question, pres- 14 SLOVAKIA sured by the Nazis, immediately from the first moments of suspicion about the real aim of these " regulations," was unanimously and consistently so rejective that it really presents "the story of the first outright failure of the 'Final Solution' and a failure at a time when there was no glimmer of hope for Jewry in Axis-controlled Europe" (74). The fact that the small Slovak State, even though it could not prevent all violence, knew how to stand up against it - and with such a determination that an objective historian can today talk about "a challenge to war" and about "a revolt" of the Slovak Government(75) - proves t hat t he Slovak Government even in this r egard not only did not accept without reservations the principles of Hitler's National Socialism, but even knew how to defend itself against them, nay, even to repudiate them forcefully, as long as it was not completely overpowered by the brutal preponderance of military occupation and frontal operations. This important fact has thus far not been properly evaluated in world literature which concerns itself with this historical period. If we pause now in our search for the reasons of the described facts, we shall come to the conclusion that one of the most decisive factors in the course of events in Slovakia was the personality of President Dr. Joseph Tiso. To this conclusion we are led by the following facts: 1. While Dr. Joseph Tiso held the initiative of solving the Jewish question in Slovakia( we saw that he solved it in a sense of strict justice, in a legal way, and in a most human manner. 2. As President of the Republic he used his constitutional right in order that the laws proposed by the parliament remained within the confines of the same principles which were in opposition to the Nazi anti-Jewish laws( 7,6). 3. When he could not prevent the issuance of the "Jewish Codex," he reserved the right for himself to limit its effectiveness as much as possible by personal "exceptions." That this was the intent of the mentioned paragraph 225 is confirmed by the fact ascertained by the court that Dr. Joseph Tiso used his authority as a matter of principle for every case placed before him, by which in a short time he SLOVAKIA 15 liberated a great part of the Jewish inhabitants of Slovakia from the "Jewish Codex"(77). 4. It was generally known that the initiative of proGerman politics was held by the ministers forced on Tiso (Dr. Tuka and A. Mach) - and that there were basic conflicts between them and President Tiso. If, therefore, the Slovak parliament could pass the constitutional law of May 15, 1942 - which was in fact aimed against German Nazis and the executors of their influence in Slovakia this is understandable only if we allow that it did so not only within the support of the authority of the President of the Republic and the chairman of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, but, as it has been safely ascertained: directly on his initiative (78) . 5. Finally, only such a consistently anti-Nazi stand of President Tiso in regard to the Jewish question can explain the fact that, even despite the regulations of the government and the Minister of the Interior, some of the regional representatives of state power could during that entire time take positions of open protection of the Jewish inhabitants, nay, even actually intervene in the initiative of government trustees in the Jewish question on territory administered by them( 79) . CONCLUSION As we emphasized at the outset, in this study we were interested in focalizing some of the facts that are important and pertinent for a correct evaluation of the relationship of Dr. Joseph Tiso to the Jewish problem in Slovakia. Intentionally we have not touched upon some undoubtedly interesting and relatively important aspects of this complicated problem which require a separate study (e.g., the question of statistical data, the question of the legal and moral side of the individual regulations and respective responsibilities, etc.) . This study, we believe, does prove that we cannot honestly regard Dr. Joseph Tiso as a persecutor of the Jews or as a collaborator of the Nazis in their inhuman work of genocide of the Jewish nation. It is necessary, however, to acknowledge that the President of the Slovak Republic did prove himself an eminent opponent of every injustice against the Jews, whether perpetrated by 16 SLOVAKIA the German Nazis or by others in their service. Dr. Tiso did everything in his power to save them - and we say, without fear of contradiction, that he did for the Jews what no other statesman dared to do in the Europe controlled by Hitler at that time. If, despite this, a part of the Jews of Slovakia was taken out of Slovakia by violent intervention of brute force, it is certain that this happened without any direct participation of Dr. Joseph Tiso - nay, against his will - and, hence, we cannot hold him responsible for it. Dr. Tiso found himself face to face with a current "which it was possible to impede and probably even to influence, but not stop," as he himself had said during his trial in Bratislava <SO) . There is no evidence to prove that Dr. Tiso aided or abetted, motivated or approved in any way, the brutal treatment of Jews in Slovakia or anywhere else. To lie in the face of death is not easy. So much the less can we allow that Dr. Joseph Tiso could do so - the same Dr. Tiso who could proclaim before the entire nation that never in his life did he utter an untruth intentionally. And he did not fear that someone might be able to prove the opposite. Would that the world were managed by politicians and statesmen who would follow the noble example of the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso! REFERENCES: 1. The first opm10n is practically current in encyclopedic and scientific literature; some Slovak authors are inclined to the second; e.g., Th. J. Zubek ("Monsignor Jozef Tiso - Controversial Personality" - The Homiletic and Pastoral Review, Nov. 1955, p. 125). 2. Dr. Joseph Pauco: Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe, Passaic, N. J ., 1952; pp. 323-323. 3. R. Pokorny: Z potulek po Slovensku, Prague, 1884, Vol. I, pp. 56-. 4. It was not by accident that the German translation of Rabbi Benjamin Halvey's Hebrew pasquinade "Das leben Jesu. Zurn ersten Male historisch bearbeitet nach neuentdeckten jiidisch orientalischen Quellen" was published in Bratislava (Pressburg) in 1875. According to the translator, who personally offered it to Giller in Trencianske Teplice, it surpassed by far the dilettante attempts of Strauss, Voltaire and other blasphemous pseudo-historians. See A. Giller - Z podrozy po kraju slowackim" - Lw6w, -876; pp. 197-. 5. Th. G. Locher: Die nationale Differenzeirung und lntegrie• rung der Slowaken und Tschechen in ihren geschichtlichen Verlauf bis 1848 - Haarlem, 1931; p. 196. 6. J. A. Mikus: La Slovaquie dans le drame de l'Europe - Paris, 1955; p. 133. 7. While Hungary, for example, had a "numerus clausus" estab- SLOVAKIA 17 lished by law, in Czecho-Slova kia, where the number of J ews was estimated at 3--4 percent of the population, the secondary schools became practically the exclusive domain of the Jews. In Prague itself over half the students were Jewish; the State Gymnazium for girls bad 163 Jewish pupils out of a total of 248; in several gymnaziums for boys the relationship of Jews to non-Jews was: 116 out of 254; 123 out of 250; 185 out of 240. At the university for every three nonJewish professors there was one Jewish professor. See: J. Boubee Tcheco-Slova quie - in "ETUDES," Paris, Vol. 60, No. 174, 1923; pp. 225-. 8. Ibidem. 9. G. Reitlinger: The Final Solution - London, 1953; p. 386. 10. The value of Jewish properties was evaluated at 3,150 million Slovak Crowns; besides this, the Jews controlled over 12,000 industrial enterprises with a capital of 1,250 million Slovak Crowns, especially the textile industry where they controlled 90 percent oi the production. The situation was much the same in the wood and alcohol industries. See the article "La Slovacchia e gli Ebrei" in the periodical RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milan, Vol. 8, No. 34, 1942; p , 902. 11. Ibidem: 72 percent of the lawyers and 64 percent of the medics were Jews, while 58 percent of all restaurant and liquor concessions was in their hands. 12. See the statement, e.g., of P . R. Mikus in the SLOVAK, Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 34, February 10, 1939; p. 1. 13. Here we do not have in mind only States, such as Italy, for example, which did adopt various anti-Jewish regulations. Count Ciano noted that on January 13, 1939, in a conversation with Mussolini, Chamberlain expressed grave fears that "further immigration of Jews into England would incite anti-Semitism which is already being planned in many sectors of the country." Besides the Jewish minority in England was negligible: according to Chamberlain , 60,000 (Mussolini stated that it was over 200,000) - G. Ciano, "Diario, 1939-1940," Milan, 1946; p. 22. - In regard to the anti-Jewish mood in other States, see "Les archives secre de la Wilhelmstras se" - Vol V, Book II, Paris, 1954, Documents Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-. 14. Dr. Tiso stressed this in general in his first speech after taking over government in Slovakia, Oct. 8, 1938 (K. Culen: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava," Middletown, Pa., 1948; p. 215). Later, on March 15, 1939, in a broadcast he warned all who would be guilty of such acts and threatened that the government would prosecute all culprits ("SLOVAK" - Bratislava, Vol. XXI, No. 63, 1939; p . 4). 15. "SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 25, Jan. 31, 1939. 16. "SLOVAK" - Vol XXI, No. 28, Feb. 3, 1939; p. 3. Compare also the government declaration of Feb. 22, 1939 ("SLOVAK," Vol. XXI, Nos. 44-45, Feb. 22-23, 1939). 17. Speech of Dr. Tiso at the Eighth Convention of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party at Trencin, Oct. 1, 1939 ("SLOVAK" - Vol. XXI, No. 227, Oct. 3, 1939; pp. 3-4). 18. An analysis of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic by H. Schimani: "Die Verfassun~ der Slowakischen Republik" - Vienna, 1947. 19. Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov - Vol. I, Buenos Aires, 1954; p. 196. 20. Dr. J. Pauco: op. cit., p. 55. 18 SLOVAKIA Dr. F. Durcansky: op. cit., p. 237. J. A. Mikus: op. cit., pp. 185-; F. Durcansky: op. cit.; pp. 475: In an official pronouncement, Feb. 21, 1939, Tiso declared: "It is proof of the maturity of our nation that despite all incitements the Slovak nation waited for the legal solution of the Jewish question" (stenographic report of the second meeting of the Slovak Assembly, Bratislava, Feb. 21-23, 1939, p. 9). 24. That this was the expressed intention of Dr. Tiso is attested to by his statement to the correspondent of the Jewish Telegraph Agency, J. Frankel, Feb. 8, 1939: "The coming Jewish law will certainly serve the purpose that the Jews might not be caught by surprises and would know just how far they will be able to go in economic life" (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). 25. Memorandum of the British Consul in Bratislava, Mr. P. Pares, Feb. 3, 1939, in the "DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939" - Third Series, Vol. IV, No. 97, 1951, London; p. 96. 26. No. 63-39 SLOVAK CODE; No. 102-39 Ur. nov. (Official News). 27. It approved the transfer and emigration plan of Dr. S. E. Soskin (SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3). Innsbruck28. Compare, e.g., J. Messner: Das Naturrecht Vienna, 1950, pp. 365-366 - and: P. Pavan: l.'.uomo nella communita internazionale - Rome, s.d., p. 47. 29. SLOVAK, Feb. 10, 1939, p. 3. 30. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, op. cit., p. 902. 31. We did not find documents which would definitely confirm such pressure in this period, but the testimony of F. Durcansky inclines us to believe that pressures were exercised. He said: "secret influences of the Germans did not validate themselves anywhere to such an extent as they did in the attempt to attain the solution of the Jewish question in Slovakia according to the desires of the National Socialistic circles. . . . " (Speaking of the period prior to July 28, 1940) - F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. 32. No. 46-40, SLOVAK CODE. 33. Commenting on this law on March 10, 1940, Tiso stressed that we are here concerned "with our own reasonable course. This is not an imitation of foreign patterns." - (SLOVAK, March 13, 21. 22. 23. 1940, p. 3). 34. Thus, e.g., in April, 1940, he returned to the Parliament for renewed debate on the draft of the law about Jewish enterprises with his own remarks and reminders; the parliament then approved the law with Tiso's recommendations on April 25, 1940 (SLOVAK, April 26, 1940), p. 2). 35. The amount which the Jews transferred abroad at that time was estimated at 2,000 million Slovak Crowns. Even in the "Aryan- only ized" enterprises "the Jews frequently remained bosses names changed on paper" (GARDISTA, June 14, 1941, p. 3). 36. Compare the study of the German legal expert for Slovak affairs, K. 0. Rabl, "Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungsleben in der neuen Slowakei" (in the periodical: ZEITSCHRIFT fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht - Berlin, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1940), which concludes categorically: "The Jewish problem in Slovakia is practically, therefore, according to previous provisions, not solved at all. Mainly the economic and imperial position of Jewry remains the same as it was before" (p. 867). SLOVAKIA 37. 38. 39. 40, 41. l!} F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 237. K. Culen, op. cit., pp. 263-; p. 480; J . A. Mikus, op. cit. p. 163. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 386. J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 35; K. Culen, op. cit., p. 380. Minister Gejza Medricky's testimony during the Tiso trial ; this is reproduced by K. Culen, op. cit., p. 480. 42. SLOVAK CODE, part 52, No. 198, September 10, 1941. 43. "Jewish Codex" - part X, par. 255. 44. Ibidem, par. 256. 45. J . Pauco, op. cit., footnote 92, p. 323. 46. Compare the testimony of Archbishop Kmet'ko before the National Court in Bratislava, January 6, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit. pp. 369-370. 47. A. Giannini: Monsignor Tiso (in "Rivista di studi politici internazionali" - Firenze, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1952, p. 451); a wealth of documentaton is produced also by F . Durcansky, op. cit., pp. 166-169, 190-248. 48. Dr. Ley, German Minister, informed Count Ciano about the project in Rome, Dec. 6, 1939. In 1940, Ribbentrop told Ciano about Hitler's plan to create a Jewish free state on the island of Madagascar, where all the Jews of Europe were supposed to be concentrated. (l!Europa verso la catastrofe - Verona, 1948; G. Ciano, Diario 19391943, Milan, 1946, Vol. I, p. 280). 49. On December 7, 1938, President Roosevelt sent Mussolini a personal letter in which he proposed that a part of the south and southwest territory of Abyssinia be reserved for the Jews. Mussolini declared that personally he sympathized with the idea of creating a Jewish state, but decidely not in Abyssinia, nor anywhere in Africa. He proposed Russia, Brazil or the United States of America (Les Archives Secretes de la Wilhelmstrasse, Vol. IV, Les suites de Munich, Paris, 1953, doc. No. 341, pp. 498-500; compare also Vol. V, Book II, Paris, 1954, doc. Nos. 469-493, pp. 113-158). 50. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. -387. 51. Partially reproduced in K. Sidor's "~est' rokov pri Vatik'• ne" - Scranton, Pa., 1947, pp. 135-138. 52. In the note of the State Secretariate to His Holiness, No. 8355-41 , published in Sidor's op. cit., pp. 138-140. 53. W. Theimer: Lexicon der Politik, Bern, 1947, under "Vatikan" - p. 482. 54. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 140. Sidor used the Slovak word "potrebam" (needs) in translating the Italian "esigenze," but the latter would probably be better expressed by "poziadavkam" (demands). 55. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 387. 56. At a press conference, March 27, 1942, Minister A. Mach declared that "the ultimate aim is to transfer all Jews to a territory, which would be ordered for the settlement within the framework of a new European order" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942, p. 3). 57. The Vatican protested with the note of the State Secretariate of His Holiness, No. 2027-42 ,dated March 14, 1942. At the end of March, the Slovak Minister at the Vatican, Karol Sidor, personally was in Bratislava with a demand to stop deportations (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 141-142). 58. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 388; from this reaction, as well as from the declaration of Minister A. Mach at the press conference 20 SLOVAKIA mentioned above (56), it is apparent that the personal intervention of the minister forced by Ribbentrop on Tiso was concerned and/ or his group of Slovak extremists. Mach publicly repudiated "speeches (which implied) that we had been somehow asked from the outside or forced to this solution. We ourselves have undertaken everything possible to have the opportunity to get rid of the Jews" (SLOVAK, March 28, 1942). According to the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava, No. 8.325/ 1/ 42, of May 8, 1942, addressed to the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican (concerning the reply to the mentioned interventions of the Vatican of Nov. 12, 1941, and March 14, 1942), at that time " there were negotiations between the factors of the Slovak Republic and the Greman Reich in regard to the problem of the European Jews," in the sense of which "the Jews of Slovakia would be placed in several areas in the vicinity of Lublin ... where they would remain permanently" (K. Sidor, op. cit., pp. 142-143). This connection of matters appears to be more probable. 59. F . Steiner: Tragedy of Slovak Jewry - Bratislava, 1949, p. 6; reprod. from G. Reitlinger, op. cit. 60. At the beginning of May, Eichmann negotiated in this sense with Dr. Tuka and A. Mach. 61. G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 388. 62. Wisliceny admitted this before the Nuremberg Court The Trial of the Major War Criminals - Vol. ill, pp. 276-278; reprod . .bY G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390). 63. "In practice the way was open in this intensely Catholic country for any professed convert to demand protection" (B. Shub: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews, New York, 1943, p . 54;reprod. by G. Reitlingeh ,op. cit. , p. 390). 64. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 390. 65. Compare the testimony of Minister G. Medricky before the National Court in Bratislava, Feb. 21, 1947; K. Culen, op. cit., p . 482. 66. The official report of the International Red Cross describes them thusly: " ... les camps qui presentaient des conditions de nouriture et de logement passables, les internes etaient admis a travailler moyennant salaire dans des conditio se rapprochant de :Ueconomie libre" (Rapport du Comite international de la Croix-Rouge sur son action pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, Geneve, 1948, p. 674). 67. After various messengers and plenipotentiaries had pressured Tiso and the Slovak Government, Tiso was called to Salzburg in May, 1943, where Hitler angrily marked the Slovak resolution of the Jewish question 'insufficient." 68. In the light of realities, such would appear to be the various public manifestations (as, e.g., the anti-Jewish speech of Min. A. Mach in Ruzomberok, Feb. 7, 1943) and the conditioned promises of President Tiso (in December, 1943, to Himmler's special agent E. Weesenmayer) which, however, were never fulfilled . Compare Sidor's account, op. cit., pp. 146-147, and G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390. 69. According to unpublished testimonies in manuscript which are in the hands of the author. 70. K. Sidor, op. cit., p. 148. 71. It was thus that he presented himself to President Tiso on his arrival to Bratislava "as the accredited agent of Hitler" at the end of August, 1944. See: J . Pauco, op. cit., p. 293. 72. The regulation was formulated as a summons to come to a SLOVAKIA 21 definite place on Nov. 24. A delegate of the International Red Cr oss ascertained on the spot that the summons was answered only by about 50 Jews: "Comme les Autorites slovaques l'avaient d'ailleurs prevu" he relates literally - "les Israelites se cachaient" (Rapport du Comite .. . . op. cit., p. 674). The hidden Jews could be aided not only by the population, but also by the International Red Cross with the help of the Slovak Red Cross and the Catholic Church (p. 675). 73. Intern. Red Cross Report, op. cit., p. 674; F. Durcansky, op. cit., p. 239. 74. G. Reitlinger, op. cit. , p. 385. 75. "Yet as early as July, 1942, this Government rebelled" writes G. Reitlinger (op. cit., p. 385). We note, apparent as it is from the foregoing, that it is necessary to see this "rebellion" already in the constitutional law of May 15, 1942. The same autor says in another place: "We have seen in the case of Slovakia, how a Government which defied German pressure and abandoned the Final Solution, was forced to return to it, when, on the eve of capitulation to the enemy, the country was occupied by German troops" (p. 412). 76. It is worthy of note here that Tiso's insistence on a per centual participation of the Jews in the economy of Slovakia in relation to their number of the entire population could in no way be regarded as a repressive regulation, inasmuch as the principle concerned here was the same as that which Tiso ordered to be applied even in regards to the other minorities, not even excluding the Germans themselves. It has been ascertained, e.g. , that in official State positions the Germans could not occupy more than 5 percent of them (K. Culen , op. cit., p. 432); the same applied in regards to the "aryanization" of Jewish enterprises - their participation was limited percentually (J. Pauco, op. cit., p. 238). 77. The actual number of "Presidential exceptions" granted by Tiso has thus far not been accurately ascertained. Some authors estimate the number "above 9,000" (J. Pauco, who bases his account on the statements of lawyers during the Tiso trial; op. cit., p. 323); Dr. J. A. Mikus gives the figure 9,964 without, however, quoting any document or source (op . cit., p. 135); Minister Stephen Hassik estimated "about 15,000" (manuscript in author's possession). The report of J. Luther to Ribbentrop, August 17, 1942, indicates a greater number; according to that report, at that time 35,000 Jews in Slovakia were already safeguarded "by special legitimation" (G. Reitlinger, op. cit., p. 390); a greater number is also indicated by the fact that the presiding judge of the National Court in Bratislava, Dr. Igor Daxner, in the trial against Dr. Tiso and his associates, did not allow an accurate ascertainment of the number of "exceptions"; he did this as a rule whenever it came to ascertaining matters that were favorable for Dr. Tiso (compare K. Culen, op. cit.). 78. Already on March 23, 1942, Dr. Tiso had Monsignor John Postenyi present the question to the State Council to sound out the ground and to gain a basis for his further intervention, which he later realized by means of the parliament (Dr. Zabkaj, in the National Court in Bratislava, March 15, 1947, according to mimeographed reports of the Slovak Press Bureau, Bratislava). 79. Typical is the example of Nitra Province, which in 1940-1944 was administered by Stephen Hassik, where the Jews were consistently protected and where, in 1943, the administrator, even though 22 SLOVAKIA not present, was able to obstruct the transfer of a certain number of Jews into Germany even after the action had begun (Manuscript in author's hands). 80. J. Pauco Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe), op. cit., p. 322. SOURCES: CIANO, Galeazzo: Diario - Volume primo, 1939-1940; Milano, Rizzoli, 1946; L'Europa verso la catastrofe; 184 colloqui con Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Sumner Welles, Rustu Aras, Stoiadinovic, Goring, Zog, Francois-Poncet ecc. verbalizzati da Galeazzo Ciano, con 40 documenti diplomatici inediti; (Verona), A. Mondadori, 1948. CULEN, Konstantin: Po Svatoplukovi druha nasa hlava (Zivot Dr. Jozefa Tisu); Middletown, Pa. , Prva Katolicka Slovenska Jednota, 1947-1948; 2Vols. DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN :POLICY 1919--1939, Third Series; London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. DURCANSKY, Ferdinand: Pravo Slovakov na samostatnost' vo svetle dokumentov, Vol. 1, Biela kniha; Buenos Aires, Slovensky Oslobodzovaci Vybor, 1954. GILLER, Agaton, Z podr6zy po kraju slowackim; Lw6w, Gubrynowicz and Schmidt, 1876. ·HAssiK, Stefan: Prispevok O rieseni iidovskej otazky V Sloven• skei republike (unpublished manuscript). INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAffiS: Hitler's Ten-Year War on the Jews; New York, 1943. LES ARCHIVES SECRETES DE LA WILHELMSTRASSE: Documents traduits de l' allemand par Michael TOURNIER; Paris, Librairie Plon, 1950. Les Juives en Europe 1939-1945; Paris, CDJC, 1947. MIKUS, Joseph A., La Slovaquie dans le drame de I' Europe (Histoire politique de 1918 a 1950); Paris, Les Iles d' Or, 1955. POKORNY, Rudolf: Z potulek po Slovensku; Praha, 1884-1885, 2 Vols .. RAPPORT DU COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIXROUGE sur son activite pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (ler septembre 1939 - 30 juin 1947); Geneve, 1948. REITLINGER, Gerald: The Final Solution. The Attempt to Ex• ter~inate the Jews of Europe 1939-1945; London, Vallentine-Mitchell, 1953. SIDOR, Karol: ~est' rokov pri Vatikane; Scranton, Pa., Obrana Press, Inc., 1947. STEINER, Frederick: The Tragedy of Slovak Jewry; Bratislava, 1949; (Documentation Centre CUJCR). TISO, Jozef : Obhajobna rec pred Narodnym sudom v Bratislave dna 17. a 18. marca 1947; edited by Dr. Jozef PAUCO : Dr. Jozef Tiso o sebe; Passaic, N. J ., Slovensky Katolicky Sokol, 1952. PERIODICALS: ETUDES, Paris. GARDISTA, Bratislava-Zilina. RELAZIONI INTERNAZIONALI, Milano. RIVISTA DI STUD! POLITIC! INTERNAZIONALI, Firenze. SLOVAK, Bratislava. ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, Berlin.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso and the Jewish Problem in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Milan S. Ďurica Slovakia, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (24-25), September-December 1957 pp. 1-22 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ďurica, Milan S., 1925- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1957 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/75eb07a548c0c77c60cfb3f202c9cbe0.pdf ddecf2530d55a511fc06bdc628e03714 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 23 NATIONALISM VS INTERNATIONALISM By Michael A. Feighan, Member of U.S. Congress The sulbject of N aJtionalism vs. Internationalism has been a wpic of heated debate for well aver half a century. Vollllmes ,hSJVe been written on the sui})ject. Political pa.rti~ and ideological movements have based their platform on one or the other side of the issue. Yet today there is greaJt confusion and misunderstanding on just what these political terms mean. That is - there is great COil!.fusion in · the non..,communist world in general and among a considerable element of the non-<Xllllmlunist intellectuals in parbicular. It can be said with certainty that tltis confusi01I1 does not exist in the ideological Marx.:.st camp or among its multicolored agents. This confusion results mainly from a perversion of both political terms which -has taiken place in the last quarter of a century. The 1.mha;ppy practice of fixing an e'Vil and all inclusive meruning to words, a practice which received unusual impetus during the World War fil, has also added to this confusion. In this atmosphere the advocates of Marxism have been enjoy.i.ng an undisturbed political holiday. Their formula for maintaining an unchallenged right orf way is to occasionally stir up the false ,b eliefs they have created aibout nationalism while devoting a constant effort at promotin1g the ty,p e of internationalism best calculated to lead the way to world communism. There is a healthy nationalism and a healthy internationalism - !both of which are mortal enemies of Marxism in any form. When they are healthy they in no way conflict with one another, but in reality co.mpliment each other. Properly nurtured and ~loited. these two political forces could lead the way in lifting the heavy chains of Russian Communism which now enslave a minimum of 29 nations and part oif 4 other nations. As a first .s tep we must understand the component parts of healthy nationalism.. The te:rm na.tion:alisrrn is derived from and related to the term nation. The nation is best defined a;s a people having a common and distinctive heritage, culture, tradition, folklore and language whioh �24 SLOVAKIA is supported by a geographical oontiguity. When these basic factors are S1timulated by one or several of the ,great inspirational forces of religion, freedom or independence, the flower of nationhood blooms. Healthy n:ationaJ.ism places loy,alty to one's nation very high on the scale of human values. In a poprnar sense it is best descrilbed iby the inspiring phrase "Lorve of God and Couliltry." The American revolutionary war which gave birth to our nation has long lbeen regarded as the first major demonstration of healthy nationalism. The deep political impaJCt upon the world of our 'Victorious st:mgigle for national independence caused historiams to refer to the 19th Ce:ntuTy as the "century of niationalism." We as a nation and the policy we pursued in the conduct of our foreign affairs, frcan the birth of our nation up to 1920, associated OlUlr destiny with the f ovces of na;tionalism at work in the wor-ld. We had noithi!Ilg in common with the imperialists OT the autocrats of that period and ,i n reality we were coveted by all of them. Standing a:s the solitary republic in a world di:vided by empires which oOIIllStantly sought to extend their reailm, we survived and grew to our pres,ent stature in the world arena by sU1pporung the farces of healit:ihy nationalism. The MonToe Doctrine is a classic example of the manner in which our d'oreign policy welded the forces of nationalism. against the .predatory schemes of empires. World Wair I opened at a point in history when nationalism wa,s the most ·c01mpe1Hng force in world politics. The era rnf empires Wl3JS coming to a close as the popular demands of many !Ilations bound within them called out forr national sovereignty. 'Tihe Russian Tsarist empire, a,p propriately calloo. the prison of nations, was seething with discontent. The Austro~ungarian empire had already made many concessions to the variOl.lis national elements within the realm in an effort to stern the tide. The Ott01man empire wias tottering from the same internal pressures. As the w.aJr ,progressed into its, final stages it became increas. ingly 3!pparent that the demands of nationalism would hiwe to ibe faced up to in the p ~ a r settlements. It was in these circumstances that President Woodrow Wilson advanced the political princ1ple of national self-determin- �SLOVAKIA 25 ation as the only just formula for bringing order out of the ruins of those ibrolken empires. It is important to note that Wilson, in truking this ,position, wcted in accord with the ,b asic ,p rinciple which had guided our foreign policy for over 140 years. Iwen before the end ()If Wo:rld War I national independence movements sprrung UJP throughout central and eastern Europe and Eurasia. The non-1Russian nations of the Russian 'Dsarist Empire, long held captive by the autocrats of Muscovy, lost no time in proclaiming their national independence The Ukrainian Il!ation, the largest of these captirve nations, was in the 'Vianguard of this movement. By the time the statesmen of the gr.e at powers gathered in Paris for the peace conference, the era of empires was dead and had already 1b een replaced by the young but vig'Orous era of national sovereignty. But that golden era which held so much hope for suffering mamk.ind was short lived. Preside111t Wilson soon learned that the European statesmen were unconcerned with the popular movements supporting his principle of self-determina tioo. They rwere more concerned with settlements based UJPOil power politics, the cornerstone of which called for the estalblishment of a cordon srunitaire in eastern EurOipe. Wlhile paying lip service to the iprog,r am advanced by President Wilson, tJhe European statesmen reshaiped the map of central and eastern Europe to fit their selfish and shortsighted notions of contemporary peace. The peace settlements following World War I set the stage for the events which inevitalbly led the westeTIIl world to its present .precarious positon. ln the period between the great wars, the Uruited States pU!rsued a policy of isolationism. The hard disaippointmenits brought aJbout lby the power ,politics settlements after World War I played a major role in the estaJb1ishment of that policy. Meanwhile the Bolshevi!ks had estaJblished total power in Moscow. After creating the Russian Fedemted Socialist Republic of Soviets they then emlbar.ked upon a series m aggressive newly erected cordon sanitaire. They were engaged in those a:ggressive wars as late as 1923. It is an. estarblished fact that the Bolshevik masters of Musoovy met with all-out �26 SLOVAKIA resist:am.ce from the people of the reborn non-Russian nations whi!Ch sprang up uipon the 11uins of the feudal Tsarist empire. War in the traditional sense was not in itself sufficient to .p ut down .fille spirit of I11ationaJl independence which swept 1i1ke wildifire tfrom t!he Baltic Sea to the areas east of the Caspian 1Sea. The 'brutal tactics of forced sta11vation, forced population transfers and the vast networlr of slave l:aJbor camps follOIWed quickly on the heels of the Russian occ111pation of these reJbor.n na;tions. It was in these circumstances that the masters of the Kremlin announced to the world in 1922 the formation of the Union of Sov.iet !Socialist Repu!blics. After they ihad managed by armed ag;gression and the crime of genocide to reestaJblish the largest portion of the Russian empire, they found it necessary to create a caver name in order to hide the terrible events which had taiken place east of the Euroipean created cordon samtaire. Moreover, the iMusco~ vites were anxious to aivoid the charge ·o f a resurgence of Russian super-racism and to retain the support of the advocates oif wm-ld oociallism. Thus the high sounding and cleverly misleading cover of U.,S.1S.iR. was lall!lliched in the international ,p olitical -arena. Shortly thereafter a new political force was injected into the saim.e political a;rena. It lbeca.me known as national socialism, then as NaJz:iism, or Fascism, and :fi.nally as super-racism. .Some asturte political obseIWers of that period were quicik to recognize the i,nherenit anomaly in the po'litical laJbel ''national socialism." How was it possible to have the ingredients of nationalism and socialism mixed in the same politi~l movement? Obviously it was i,mpossilble to mix two diametrically opposed political theories. It w.as noit long 'before the one rworld propa;gandists worked out the formula to resolve the anomaly. Nationalism equalled Na!ZiiSIIn - Nazi.ism equalled everything that was evil therefore Nationalism equaUed everything that was evil. But what of socialism? By a queer turn of the 1propagM1dists pen, Socialism became the bulwarlc of democra·ey. Socialism was the politcal system of the U.iS.S.R - therefore the U.S.S.R. was a democracy. By this process the experts in the use of weasel words put an evil CU'l1se upon Il!ation- �SLOVAKIA 27 alism in any form, while at the same time manufacturing a d.ynamically effective co;yer for the Muscovite -plan of world conquest We entered World War fil the victims of tbis diabolical iperversion of political terms. The same must be said a:bout the other sovereign nations of the West which entered the struggle against the axis powers. This accounts, in large measure, for our failure to devekllp a positive plan for the reconstruction of the post-war world along truly democratic lines, with gQIVernments representatiive of the will of tJhe people. In lwger measure it accounts for the success af the masters of the Kremlin in extending their empire of ruthless control over 800 milliOIIl. people wvering an area encompassing a.l:most one-ithird of the earth's surface. It is in this context that we can best understand the "new internationalism" ,p eddled by the multi-colored agents of Moscow. Only a fool oc the Ivory Tower Theoreticians will fail to recognme that the dominant school of internationalism operating in the world today is completely pos• sessed iby the Russian communists. To ibe sure there are other schools of internationalism ~ing adhex:-en,ts and supporters which aTe not attached to the Moscow oribit. Unfortunately none of these competing schools ·p ossess any real polWcal dyniamics af a magnitude comparaJble to the Russian-Communist movement. Moreover, none of them are backed by aggressive military forces such as clearly support the "new internationalism" promoted by the Mus• covites in their age long drive for world empire. Fram this analysis one might too quiokly conclude that the Ruissian imperialists haive discredited and killed off hoolthy nationalism and healthy intemiaticmalism. So far as healthy nationalism is concerned, just the contra.Ty in the case. The clhaitwinistic practices of the Russians have tremendously in:creased healthy national.ism ,w ithin the Russian-Comrl)..unist empire. Within the past year the civilized world has had ample proof to swpport this conten· tion. These two exa:mples bear -O'Ut the point. 1. Shortly :after Stalin was elim.i,nated, MalenJmv and Beria became enga;ged m a life and death struggle fOT total �28 SLOVAKIA power. Mialenkov, a Russian, chose the course of support,. ing the historic cause of Russian super--racism. Beria, a renegade Geor,gian, attempted to ,harness the p01Werful nationalist forces of the non-<Russiam. nations of the U. S. S. R. to his side. Beria, as head of the dread secret police and oommissar of the slaive la,'bor system, certainly knew the most dynamic political forces at woiik within the U. S. S. R. Since 'he was in a liife and death struggle, he naturally wanted these forces in his camp. Malenkov on the other hand was the darlinrg of the Russian burea,ucracy and he had to cast his lot with traiditional Russ ian super-racism. Thi,s struggle raged for months during which time Beria was replacing the <Russian pro...consuls in the non~Rus:siian nations with natives of those nations. To be su:re ,t hose natives. were tied to communism ibut they opposed Russian dominratiorn of the a,ffairs of their nation. Beria eame very close to winnin'g that struggle the effect of which might haJVe well caused a great revolutionary outbrealk throughout the U .ISJS.R. Only a deal between the Russian bureaucracy and the Jea,ders of the Red Army saved the day for Russian super-racism. Beria was arrested iby the Red Army and executed, but the seeds of internal revolt weire increased in consequence af his struggle for power. 2. This year ma:riks the 300tfu a.n.niiversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslaiv - the instrument .by which the Russians enslaved the Ukrainians. The !Russians are using this occasion lfoir a never ending series of pronouncements and celebrations, all of which seeik to prove that the Russians are the true friends of the Uikraintains. The official announcement of the Kremlin inaugurating these celebrations admitted that every decent Ukranian down through history ha,d struggled for the goal of national independence . It also claimed that the Utkraill'ian n 1ation had finally attained its long struggle for national independ€!Il1Ce - "thanks to the Russians ,and the Communist Party." But what kind of national ,i ndependence? They define it as natjornia.1 in form and socialist in SU!bstance. This of course means no independence at all. IHowever it is important to note the manner in which the Muscoivites are associating nationalism with socialiSIID. Thi s is most reminiscent of the tactics of 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 29 Adolph Hitler. Healthy nationalism is very much alive in the world today. It is more vigorous within the Russian communist empire than elsewhere in the world. This fact must be understood and exiploited by the leaders of the free world if we are going to hawe .peace and freedom throughout the warild while a,voiding World War IiLI. Unfortunately the same crurmot 'be said aJbout healthy internationalism. Internationalism as a t'heocy- and a;s a po- · litical ipractice has boon thoroughly infected by the goals of world Manci,sm. The Russd.an Communist con1Spiracy has taken over the leadershlp in this field. Movements free from this infection have :neitlher the internal dynamics nor the military 'Sllllpport necessary to offiset those- sponsored or controlled by the Russian communists. Buit rwe can build a healthy internationalism and one that would be far more ,p owerful in the political arena than the Moscorw brand. To accomplish this goal we must understand healthy nationalism. Then we must foster and support it as a counteracting force to World Communism. Having done thi-s we will harve taken the first step in creating a healthy internationalism. The second step in this ,process calls for the development and support oif free regional federations. These regio1rml federations would he colffi!prised of a numlber of sovereign and independent n:ations which freely elected to become party to .the regi01I1al federation. The economic, political and security adlvantages of the regiona,l federation concept would lead the way in gaining the support of the memlber states. This pattern is completely consistent with .the charter of the United Nations. Indeed it springs from the basic idea whioh created the associatio,n of Ame.rican States which stands as a regional arrangement of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is a ,sollilld pattern because it recognizes that healthy internatiootalism must lbe 'based upon full recognition of healthy nationalism. Moreover it supports a political philosophy which is consistent with the American way of life and therefore the antithesis of World Communism. � SLOVAKIA 23 NATIONALISM VS INTERNATIONALISM By Michael A. Feighan, Member of U.S. Congress The sulbject of N aJtionalism vs. Internationalism has been a wpic of heated debate for well aver half a century. Vollllmes ,hSJVe been written on the sui})ject. Political pa.rti~ and ideological movements have based their platform on one or the other side of the issue. Yet today there is greaJt confusion and misunderstanding on just what these political terms mean. That is - there is great COil!.fusion in · the non..,communist world in general and among a considerable element of the non-<Xllllmlunist intellectuals in parbicular. It can be said with certainty that tltis confusi01I1 does not exist in the ideological Marx.:.st camp or among its multicolored agents. This confusion results mainly from a perversion of both political terms which -has taiken place in the last quarter of a century. The 1.mha;ppy practice of fixing an e'Vil and all inclusive meruning to words, a practice which received unusual impetus during the World War fil, has also added to this confusion. In this atmosphere the advocates of Marxism have been enjoy.i.ng an undisturbed political holiday. Their formula for maintaining an unchallenged right orf way is to occasionally stir up the false ,b eliefs they have created aibout nationalism while devoting a constant effort at promotin1g the ty,p e of internationalism best calculated to lead the way to world communism. There is a healthy nationalism and a healthy internationalism - !both of which are mortal enemies of Marxism in any form. When they are healthy they in no way conflict with one another, but in reality co.mpliment each other. Properly nurtured and ~loited. these two political forces could lead the way in lifting the heavy chains of Russian Communism which now enslave a minimum of 29 nations and part oif 4 other nations. As a first .s tep we must understand the component parts of healthy nationalism.. The te:rm na.tion:alisrrn is derived from and related to the term nation. The nation is best defined a;s a people having a common and distinctive heritage, culture, tradition, folklore and language whioh �24 SLOVAKIA is supported by a geographical oontiguity. When these basic factors are S1timulated by one or several of the ,great inspirational forces of religion, freedom or independence, the flower of nationhood blooms. Healthy n:ationaJ.ism places loy,alty to one's nation very high on the scale of human values. In a poprnar sense it is best descrilbed iby the inspiring phrase "Lorve of God and Couliltry." The American revolutionary war which gave birth to our nation has long lbeen regarded as the first major demonstration of healthy nationalism. The deep political impaJCt upon the world of our 'Victorious st:mgigle for national independence caused historiams to refer to the 19th Ce:ntuTy as the "century of niationalism." We as a nation and the policy we pursued in the conduct of our foreign affairs, frcan the birth of our nation up to 1920, associated OlUlr destiny with the f ovces of na;tionalism at work in the wor-ld. We had noithi!Ilg in common with the imperialists OT the autocrats of that period and ,i n reality we were coveted by all of them. Standing a:s the solitary republic in a world di:vided by empires which oOIIllStantly sought to extend their reailm, we survived and grew to our pres,ent stature in the world arena by sU1pporung the farces of healit:ihy nationalism. The MonToe Doctrine is a classic example of the manner in which our d'oreign policy welded the forces of nationalism. against the .predatory schemes of empires. World Wair I opened at a point in history when nationalism wa,s the most ·c01mpe1Hng force in world politics. The era rnf empires Wl3JS coming to a close as the popular demands of many !Ilations bound within them called out forr national sovereignty. 'Tihe Russian Tsarist empire, a,p propriately calloo. the prison of nations, was seething with discontent. The Austro~ungarian empire had already made many concessions to the variOl.lis national elements within the realm in an effort to stern the tide. The Ott01man empire wias tottering from the same internal pressures. As the w.aJr ,progressed into its, final stages it became increas. ingly 3!pparent that the demands of nationalism would hiwe to ibe faced up to in the p ~ a r settlements. It was in these circumstances that President Woodrow Wilson advanced the political princ1ple of national self-determin- �SLOVAKIA 25 ation as the only just formula for bringing order out of the ruins of those ibrolken empires. It is important to note that Wilson, in truking this ,position, wcted in accord with the ,b asic ,p rinciple which had guided our foreign policy for over 140 years. Iwen before the end ()If Wo:rld War I national independence movements sprrung UJP throughout central and eastern Europe and Eurasia. The non-1Russian nations of the Russian 'Dsarist Empire, long held captive by the autocrats of Muscovy, lost no time in proclaiming their national independence The Ukrainian Il!ation, the largest of these captirve nations, was in the 'Vianguard of this movement. By the time the statesmen of the gr.e at powers gathered in Paris for the peace conference, the era of empires was dead and had already 1b een replaced by the young but vig'Orous era of national sovereignty. But that golden era which held so much hope for suffering mamk.ind was short lived. Preside111t Wilson soon learned that the European statesmen were unconcerned with the popular movements supporting his principle of self-determina tioo. They rwere more concerned with settlements based UJPOil power politics, the cornerstone of which called for the estalblishment of a cordon srunitaire in eastern EurOipe. Wlhile paying lip service to the iprog,r am advanced by President Wilson, tJhe European statesmen reshaiped the map of central and eastern Europe to fit their selfish and shortsighted notions of contemporary peace. The peace settlements following World War I set the stage for the events which inevitalbly led the westeTIIl world to its present .precarious positon. ln the period between the great wars, the Uruited States pU!rsued a policy of isolationism. The hard disaippointmenits brought aJbout lby the power ,politics settlements after World War I played a major role in the estaJb1ishment of that policy. Meanwhile the Bolshevi!ks had estaJblished total power in Moscow. After creating the Russian Fedemted Socialist Republic of Soviets they then emlbar.ked upon a series m aggressive newly erected cordon sanitaire. They were engaged in those a:ggressive wars as late as 1923. It is an. estarblished fact that the Bolshevik masters of Musoovy met with all-out �26 SLOVAKIA resist:am.ce from the people of the reborn non-Russian nations whi!Ch sprang up uipon the 11uins of the feudal Tsarist empire. War in the traditional sense was not in itself sufficient to .p ut down .fille spirit of I11ationaJl independence which swept 1i1ke wildifire tfrom t!he Baltic Sea to the areas east of the Caspian 1Sea. The 'brutal tactics of forced sta11vation, forced population transfers and the vast networlr of slave l:aJbor camps follOIWed quickly on the heels of the Russian occ111pation of these reJbor.n na;tions. It was in these circumstances that the masters of the Kremlin announced to the world in 1922 the formation of the Union of Sov.iet !Socialist Repu!blics. After they ihad managed by armed ag;gression and the crime of genocide to reestaJblish the largest portion of the Russian empire, they found it necessary to create a caver name in order to hide the terrible events which had taiken place east of the Euroipean created cordon samtaire. Moreover, the iMusco~ vites were anxious to aivoid the charge ·o f a resurgence of Russian super-racism and to retain the support of the advocates oif wm-ld oociallism. Thus the high sounding and cleverly misleading cover of U.,S.1S.iR. was lall!lliched in the international ,p olitical -arena. Shortly thereafter a new political force was injected into the saim.e political a;rena. It lbeca.me known as national socialism, then as NaJz:iism, or Fascism, and :fi.nally as super-racism. .Some asturte political obseIWers of that period were quicik to recognize the i,nherenit anomaly in the po'litical laJbel ''national socialism." How was it possible to have the ingredients of nationalism and socialism mixed in the same politi~l movement? Obviously it was i,mpossilble to mix two diametrically opposed political theories. It w.as noit long 'before the one rworld propa;gandists worked out the formula to resolve the anomaly. Nationalism equalled Na!ZiiSIIn - Nazi.ism equalled everything that was evil therefore Nationalism equaUed everything that was evil. But what of socialism? By a queer turn of the 1propagM1dists pen, Socialism became the bulwarlc of democra·ey. Socialism was the politcal system of the U.iS.S.R - therefore the U.S.S.R. was a democracy. By this process the experts in the use of weasel words put an evil CU'l1se upon Il!ation- �SLOVAKIA 27 alism in any form, while at the same time manufacturing a d.ynamically effective co;yer for the Muscovite -plan of world conquest We entered World War fil the victims of tbis diabolical iperversion of political terms. The same must be said a:bout the other sovereign nations of the West which entered the struggle against the axis powers. This accounts, in large measure, for our failure to devekllp a positive plan for the reconstruction of the post-war world along truly democratic lines, with gQIVernments representatiive of the will of tJhe people. In lwger measure it accounts for the success af the masters of the Kremlin in extending their empire of ruthless control over 800 milliOIIl. people wvering an area encompassing a.l:most one-ithird of the earth's surface. It is in this context that we can best understand the "new internationalism" ,p eddled by the multi-colored agents of Moscow. Only a fool oc the Ivory Tower Theoreticians will fail to recognme that the dominant school of internationalism operating in the world today is completely pos• sessed iby the Russian communists. To ibe sure there are other schools of internationalism ~ing adhex:-en,ts and supporters which aTe not attached to the Moscow oribit. Unfortunately none of these competing schools ·p ossess any real polWcal dyniamics af a magnitude comparaJble to the Russian-Communist movement. Moreover, none of them are backed by aggressive military forces such as clearly support the "new internationalism" promoted by the Mus• covites in their age long drive for world empire. Fram this analysis one might too quiokly conclude that the Ruissian imperialists haive discredited and killed off hoolthy nationalism and healthy intemiaticmalism. So far as healthy nationalism is concerned, just the contra.Ty in the case. The clhaitwinistic practices of the Russians have tremendously in:creased healthy national.ism ,w ithin the Russian-Comrl)..unist empire. Within the past year the civilized world has had ample proof to swpport this conten· tion. These two exa:mples bear -O'Ut the point. 1. Shortly :after Stalin was elim.i,nated, MalenJmv and Beria became enga;ged m a life and death struggle fOT total �28 SLOVAKIA power. Mialenkov, a Russian, chose the course of support,. ing the historic cause of Russian super--racism. Beria, a renegade Geor,gian, attempted to ,harness the p01Werful nationalist forces of the non-<Russiam. nations of the U. S. S. R. to his side. Beria, as head of the dread secret police and oommissar of the slaive la,'bor system, certainly knew the most dynamic political forces at woiik within the U. S. S. R. Since 'he was in a liife and death struggle, he naturally wanted these forces in his camp. Malenkov on the other hand was the darlinrg of the Russian burea,ucracy and he had to cast his lot with traiditional Russ ian super-racism. Thi,s struggle raged for months during which time Beria was replacing the <Russian pro...consuls in the non~Rus:siian nations with natives of those nations. To be su:re ,t hose natives. were tied to communism ibut they opposed Russian dominratiorn of the a,ffairs of their nation. Beria eame very close to winnin'g that struggle the effect of which might haJVe well caused a great revolutionary outbrealk throughout the U .ISJS.R. Only a deal between the Russian bureaucracy and the Jea,ders of the Red Army saved the day for Russian super-racism. Beria was arrested iby the Red Army and executed, but the seeds of internal revolt weire increased in consequence af his struggle for power. 2. This year ma:riks the 300tfu a.n.niiversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslaiv - the instrument .by which the Russians enslaved the Ukrainians. The !Russians are using this occasion lfoir a never ending series of pronouncements and celebrations, all of which seeik to prove that the Russians are the true friends of the Uikraintains. The official announcement of the Kremlin inaugurating these celebrations admitted that every decent Ukranian down through history ha,d struggled for the goal of national independence . It also claimed that the Utkraill'ian n 1ation had finally attained its long struggle for national independ€!Il1Ce - "thanks to the Russians ,and the Communist Party." But what kind of national ,i ndependence? They define it as natjornia.1 in form and socialist in SU!bstance. This of course means no independence at all. IHowever it is important to note the manner in which the Muscoivites are associating nationalism with socialiSIID. Thi s is most reminiscent of the tactics of 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 29 Adolph Hitler. Healthy nationalism is very much alive in the world today. It is more vigorous within the Russian communist empire than elsewhere in the world. This fact must be understood and exiploited by the leaders of the free world if we are going to hawe .peace and freedom throughout the warild while a,voiding World War IiLI. Unfortunately the same crurmot 'be said aJbout healthy internationalism. Internationalism as a t'heocy- and a;s a po- · litical ipractice has boon thoroughly infected by the goals of world Manci,sm. The Russd.an Communist con1Spiracy has taken over the leadershlp in this field. Movements free from this infection have :neitlher the internal dynamics nor the military 'Sllllpport necessary to offiset those- sponsored or controlled by the Russian communists. Buit rwe can build a healthy internationalism and one that would be far more ,p owerful in the political arena than the Moscorw brand. To accomplish this goal we must understand healthy nationalism. Then we must foster and support it as a counteracting force to World Communism. Having done thi-s we will harve taken the first step in creating a healthy internationalism. The second step in this ,process calls for the development and support oif free regional federations. These regio1rml federations would he colffi!prised of a numlber of sovereign and independent n:ations which freely elected to become party to .the regi01I1al federation. The economic, political and security adlvantages of the regiona,l federation concept would lead the way in gaining the support of the memlber states. This pattern is completely consistent with .the charter of the United Nations. Indeed it springs from the basic idea whioh created the associatio,n of Ame.rican States which stands as a regional arrangement of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is a ,sollilld pattern because it recognizes that healthy internatiootalism must lbe 'based upon full recognition of healthy nationalism. Moreover it supports a political philosophy which is consistent with the American way of life and therefore the antithesis of World Communism. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 23 NATIONALISM VS INTERNATIONALISM By Michael A. Feighan, Member of U.S. Congress The sulbject of N aJtionalism vs. Internationalism has been a wpic of heated debate for well aver half a century. Vollllmes ,hSJVe been written on the sui})ject. Political pa.rti~ and ideological movements have based their platform on one or the other side of the issue. Yet today there is greaJt confusion and misunderstanding on just what these political terms mean. That is - there is great COil!.fusion in · the non..,communist world in general and among a considerable element of the non-<Xllllmlunist intellectuals in parbicular. It can be said with certainty that tltis confusi01I1 does not exist in the ideological Marx.:.st camp or among its multicolored agents. This confusion results mainly from a perversion of both political terms which -has taiken place in the last quarter of a century. The 1.mha;ppy practice of fixing an e'Vil and all inclusive meruning to words, a practice which received unusual impetus during the World War fil, has also added to this confusion. In this atmosphere the advocates of Marxism have been enjoy.i.ng an undisturbed political holiday. Their formula for maintaining an unchallenged right orf way is to occasionally stir up the false ,b eliefs they have created aibout nationalism while devoting a constant effort at promotin1g the ty,p e of internationalism best calculated to lead the way to world communism. There is a healthy nationalism and a healthy internationalism - !both of which are mortal enemies of Marxism in any form. When they are healthy they in no way conflict with one another, but in reality co.mpliment each other. Properly nurtured and ~loited. these two political forces could lead the way in lifting the heavy chains of Russian Communism which now enslave a minimum of 29 nations and part oif 4 other nations. As a first .s tep we must understand the component parts of healthy nationalism.. The te:rm na.tion:alisrrn is derived from and related to the term nation. The nation is best defined a;s a people having a common and distinctive heritage, culture, tradition, folklore and language whioh 24 SLOVAKIA is supported by a geographical oontiguity. When these basic factors are S1timulated by one or several of the ,great inspirational forces of religion, freedom or independence, the flower of nationhood blooms. Healthy n:ationaJ.ism places loy,alty to one's nation very high on the scale of human values. In a poprnar sense it is best descrilbed iby the inspiring phrase "Lorve of God and Couliltry." The American revolutionary war which gave birth to our nation has long lbeen regarded as the first major demonstration of healthy nationalism. The deep political impaJCt upon the world of our 'Victorious st:mgigle for national independence caused historiams to refer to the 19th Ce:ntuTy as the "century of niationalism." We as a nation and the policy we pursued in the conduct of our foreign affairs, frcan the birth of our nation up to 1920, associated OlUlr destiny with the f ovces of na;tionalism at work in the wor-ld. We had noithi!Ilg in common with the imperialists OT the autocrats of that period and ,i n reality we were coveted by all of them. Standing a:s the solitary republic in a world di:vided by empires which oOIIllStantly sought to extend their reailm, we survived and grew to our pres,ent stature in the world arena by sU1pporung the farces of healit:ihy nationalism. The MonToe Doctrine is a classic example of the manner in which our d'oreign policy welded the forces of nationalism. against the .predatory schemes of empires. World Wair I opened at a point in history when nationalism wa,s the most ·c01mpe1Hng force in world politics. The era rnf empires Wl3JS coming to a close as the popular demands of many !Ilations bound within them called out forr national sovereignty. 'Tihe Russian Tsarist empire, a,p propriately calloo. the prison of nations, was seething with discontent. The Austro~ungarian empire had already made many concessions to the variOl.lis national elements within the realm in an effort to stern the tide. The Ott01man empire wias tottering from the same internal pressures. As the w.aJr ,progressed into its, final stages it became increas. ingly 3!pparent that the demands of nationalism would hiwe to ibe faced up to in the p ~ a r settlements. It was in these circumstances that President Woodrow Wilson advanced the political princ1ple of national self-determin- SLOVAKIA 25 ation as the only just formula for bringing order out of the ruins of those ibrolken empires. It is important to note that Wilson, in truking this ,position, wcted in accord with the ,b asic ,p rinciple which had guided our foreign policy for over 140 years. Iwen before the end ()If Wo:rld War I national independence movements sprrung UJP throughout central and eastern Europe and Eurasia. The non-1Russian nations of the Russian 'Dsarist Empire, long held captive by the autocrats of Muscovy, lost no time in proclaiming their national independence The Ukrainian Il!ation, the largest of these captirve nations, was in the 'Vianguard of this movement. By the time the statesmen of the gr.e at powers gathered in Paris for the peace conference, the era of empires was dead and had already 1b een replaced by the young but vig'Orous era of national sovereignty. But that golden era which held so much hope for suffering mamk.ind was short lived. Preside111t Wilson soon learned that the European statesmen were unconcerned with the popular movements supporting his principle of self-determina tioo. They rwere more concerned with settlements based UJPOil power politics, the cornerstone of which called for the estalblishment of a cordon srunitaire in eastern EurOipe. Wlhile paying lip service to the iprog,r am advanced by President Wilson, tJhe European statesmen reshaiped the map of central and eastern Europe to fit their selfish and shortsighted notions of contemporary peace. The peace settlements following World War I set the stage for the events which inevitalbly led the westeTIIl world to its present .precarious positon. ln the period between the great wars, the Uruited States pU!rsued a policy of isolationism. The hard disaippointmenits brought aJbout lby the power ,politics settlements after World War I played a major role in the estaJb1ishment of that policy. Meanwhile the Bolshevi!ks had estaJblished total power in Moscow. After creating the Russian Fedemted Socialist Republic of Soviets they then emlbar.ked upon a series m aggressive newly erected cordon sanitaire. They were engaged in those a:ggressive wars as late as 1923. It is an. estarblished fact that the Bolshevik masters of Musoovy met with all-out 26 SLOVAKIA resist:am.ce from the people of the reborn non-Russian nations whi!Ch sprang up uipon the 11uins of the feudal Tsarist empire. War in the traditional sense was not in itself sufficient to .p ut down .fille spirit of I11ationaJl independence which swept 1i1ke wildifire tfrom t!he Baltic Sea to the areas east of the Caspian 1Sea. The 'brutal tactics of forced sta11vation, forced population transfers and the vast networlr of slave l:aJbor camps follOIWed quickly on the heels of the Russian occ111pation of these reJbor.n na;tions. It was in these circumstances that the masters of the Kremlin announced to the world in 1922 the formation of the Union of Sov.iet !Socialist Repu!blics. After they ihad managed by armed ag;gression and the crime of genocide to reestaJblish the largest portion of the Russian empire, they found it necessary to create a caver name in order to hide the terrible events which had taiken place east of the Euroipean created cordon samtaire. Moreover, the iMusco~ vites were anxious to aivoid the charge ·o f a resurgence of Russian super-racism and to retain the support of the advocates oif wm-ld oociallism. Thus the high sounding and cleverly misleading cover of U.,S.1S.iR. was lall!lliched in the international ,p olitical -arena. Shortly thereafter a new political force was injected into the saim.e political a;rena. It lbeca.me known as national socialism, then as NaJz:iism, or Fascism, and :fi.nally as super-racism. .Some asturte political obseIWers of that period were quicik to recognize the i,nherenit anomaly in the po'litical laJbel ''national socialism." How was it possible to have the ingredients of nationalism and socialism mixed in the same politi~l movement? Obviously it was i,mpossilble to mix two diametrically opposed political theories. It w.as noit long 'before the one rworld propa;gandists worked out the formula to resolve the anomaly. Nationalism equalled Na!ZiiSIIn - Nazi.ism equalled everything that was evil therefore Nationalism equaUed everything that was evil. But what of socialism? By a queer turn of the 1propagM1dists pen, Socialism became the bulwarlc of democra·ey. Socialism was the politcal system of the U.iS.S.R - therefore the U.S.S.R. was a democracy. By this process the experts in the use of weasel words put an evil CU'l1se upon Il!ation- SLOVAKIA 27 alism in any form, while at the same time manufacturing a d.ynamically effective co;yer for the Muscovite -plan of world conquest We entered World War fil the victims of tbis diabolical iperversion of political terms. The same must be said a:bout the other sovereign nations of the West which entered the struggle against the axis powers. This accounts, in large measure, for our failure to devekllp a positive plan for the reconstruction of the post-war world along truly democratic lines, with gQIVernments representatiive of the will of tJhe people. In lwger measure it accounts for the success af the masters of the Kremlin in extending their empire of ruthless control over 800 milliOIIl. people wvering an area encompassing a.l:most one-ithird of the earth's surface. It is in this context that we can best understand the "new internationalism" ,p eddled by the multi-colored agents of Moscow. Only a fool oc the Ivory Tower Theoreticians will fail to recognme that the dominant school of internationalism operating in the world today is completely pos• sessed iby the Russian communists. To ibe sure there are other schools of internationalism ~ing adhex:-en,ts and supporters which aTe not attached to the Moscow oribit. Unfortunately none of these competing schools ·p ossess any real polWcal dyniamics af a magnitude comparaJble to the Russian-Communist movement. Moreover, none of them are backed by aggressive military forces such as clearly support the "new internationalism" promoted by the Mus• covites in their age long drive for world empire. Fram this analysis one might too quiokly conclude that the Ruissian imperialists haive discredited and killed off hoolthy nationalism and healthy intemiaticmalism. So far as healthy nationalism is concerned, just the contra.Ty in the case. The clhaitwinistic practices of the Russians have tremendously in:creased healthy national.ism ,w ithin the Russian-Comrl)..unist empire. Within the past year the civilized world has had ample proof to swpport this conten· tion. These two exa:mples bear -O'Ut the point. 1. Shortly :after Stalin was elim.i,nated, MalenJmv and Beria became enga;ged m a life and death struggle fOT total 28 SLOVAKIA power. Mialenkov, a Russian, chose the course of support,. ing the historic cause of Russian super--racism. Beria, a renegade Geor,gian, attempted to ,harness the p01Werful nationalist forces of the non-<Russiam. nations of the U. S. S. R. to his side. Beria, as head of the dread secret police and oommissar of the slaive la,'bor system, certainly knew the most dynamic political forces at woiik within the U. S. S. R. Since 'he was in a liife and death struggle, he naturally wanted these forces in his camp. Malenkov on the other hand was the darlinrg of the Russian burea,ucracy and he had to cast his lot with traiditional Russ ian super-racism. Thi,s struggle raged for months during which time Beria was replacing the <Russian pro...consuls in the non~Rus:siian nations with natives of those nations. To be su:re ,t hose natives. were tied to communism ibut they opposed Russian dominratiorn of the a,ffairs of their nation. Beria eame very close to winnin'g that struggle the effect of which might haJVe well caused a great revolutionary outbrealk throughout the U .ISJS.R. Only a deal between the Russian bureaucracy and the Jea,ders of the Red Army saved the day for Russian super-racism. Beria was arrested iby the Red Army and executed, but the seeds of internal revolt weire increased in consequence af his struggle for power. 2. This year ma:riks the 300tfu a.n.niiversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslaiv - the instrument .by which the Russians enslaved the Ukrainians. The !Russians are using this occasion lfoir a never ending series of pronouncements and celebrations, all of which seeik to prove that the Russians are the true friends of the Uikraintains. The official announcement of the Kremlin inaugurating these celebrations admitted that every decent Ukranian down through history ha,d struggled for the goal of national independence . It also claimed that the Utkraill'ian n 1ation had finally attained its long struggle for national independ€!Il1Ce - "thanks to the Russians ,and the Communist Party." But what kind of national ,i ndependence? They define it as natjornia.1 in form and socialist in SU!bstance. This of course means no independence at all. IHowever it is important to note the manner in which the Muscoivites are associating nationalism with socialiSIID. Thi s is most reminiscent of the tactics of 1 1 SLOVAKIA 29 Adolph Hitler. Healthy nationalism is very much alive in the world today. It is more vigorous within the Russian communist empire than elsewhere in the world. This fact must be understood and exiploited by the leaders of the free world if we are going to hawe .peace and freedom throughout the warild while a,voiding World War IiLI. Unfortunately the same crurmot 'be said aJbout healthy internationalism. Internationalism as a t'heocy- and a;s a po- · litical ipractice has boon thoroughly infected by the goals of world Manci,sm. The Russd.an Communist con1Spiracy has taken over the leadershlp in this field. Movements free from this infection have :neitlher the internal dynamics nor the military 'Sllllpport necessary to offiset those- sponsored or controlled by the Russian communists. Buit rwe can build a healthy internationalism and one that would be far more ,p owerful in the political arena than the Moscorw brand. To accomplish this goal we must understand healthy nationalism. Then we must foster and support it as a counteracting force to World Communism. Having done thi-s we will harve taken the first step in creating a healthy internationalism. The second step in this ,process calls for the development and support oif free regional federations. These regio1rml federations would he colffi!prised of a numlber of sovereign and independent n:ations which freely elected to become party to .the regi01I1al federation. The economic, political and security adlvantages of the regiona,l federation concept would lead the way in gaining the support of the memlber states. This pattern is completely consistent with .the charter of the United Nations. Indeed it springs from the basic idea whioh created the associatio,n of Ame.rican States which stands as a regional arrangement of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. It is a ,sollilld pattern because it recognizes that healthy internatiootalism must lbe 'based upon full recognition of healthy nationalism. Moreover it supports a political philosophy which is consistent with the American way of life and therefore the antithesis of World Communism.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nationalism vs. Internationalism Description An account of the resource Michael A. Feighan, Member of U. S. Congress Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 23-29 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Feighan, Michael Aloysius, 1905- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1e5f8edf8c62b30c4b789a5d8ca7afe4.pdf cac4ae1c1f89b75ce5a4120f8ad1723d PDF Text Text 42 SLOVAKIA and share it, the more abundant and lasting are its fruits. Peace without freedom is unthinkable. If we are truly int erested in a permanent and just peace, let us not deny freedom to any nation - not even the Slo,v ak nation . • MARCH 14 - • • SLOVAK INDEPENDENOE DAY1 ( Address of the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, 20th District, Ohio, delivered on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Slovak Declaration of Independence at a meeting sponsored by the Slovak League of America and the Catholic Slovak Federation of America, at the Benedictine High School Auditorium, Cleveland, March 13, 1954, on "National Sovereignty Against World Socialism.") It is an honor for me to be here with you this evening and to join with you in commemorating the love of Slovak people everywhere in the world for God, freedom, and individual liberty. Anyone who has taken the time to study the history of the Slovak people, or to acquaint themselves with the traditions of Slovaks in America, will immediately recognize my point of associating God with human freedom. Like the Irish , their slogan is and has always been for God and country. Some years ago, when the storm clouds of World War II were gathering over the skies of Europe, I became intense1y interested in the cause of nations which were then hanging in the balance. On the one hand, we, the people of the free world, were confronted with the menace of national socialism as represented by Hitler, and on the other hand, the menace of international socialism as represented by Stalin, the czar of Russian communism. It was then clear to me that the tyrants, Stalin and Hitler, had a common purpose - to dominate the world. It was therefore no shock to me when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was announced to the world in 1939. It was, however, a tremendous shock to the unprepared homegrown Communists and fellow travelers in the United States and their fellow conspirators in other parts of the world. �SLOVAKIA 43 The first act of the two international gangsters in their drive for world domain, was to divide up the Eurasian continent into spheres of influence. The future of the many small nations which then made u:p all of Central and Eastern Europe, were determined by the expediency of dictatorial decision. It was in these circumstances that I first began my interesting study orf the Slovak Nation. I was struok by the fact that the Slovak people had made a continuous and unremitting struggle for national independence for over 1,000 years. I was impressed by the fact that alien occupation and oppression had not dimmed the aspirations and the hopes of the Slo,v aks, but had increased their determination for national independence. The more I read about the Slovak cause, the more amazed I became with the fact that so little was known about it in the United States. This compelled me to delve deeper into the glorious history of the Slovak people. The things I learned are undoubtedly common knowledge to you, but I should like to use this occasion to say a few words about the struggle for freedom of the Slovak people down through the ages, in the hope that other Americans may become better acquainted with these facts. Slovak history really begins with the arrival of the brother Saints Cyril and Methodius in Slovakia. These scholarly saints brought to Slovakia. which later spread to other Slavic lands, the first written language of the Slavs, which we know as Church Slovanic. They also brought to Slovakia a vast knowledge of government administration and law. They were quick to see the need for training Slovak scholars and training them in the masterful art of law and administration. They established the first school system in Slovakia. The contributions of the brother Saints Cyril and Methodius are everywhere apparent in the long and heroic history of the Slovak people. Slovakia, like its sister nations of Central and Eastern Europe, has stood throughout history as the rampart of Christian civilization. The loyal sons of Saints Cyril and Methodius have stood firm in their faith for God and country. Beginning �44 SLOVAKIA with Janosik, to Anton Bernolak, to Tomasik, to Kollar, to Joseph Hurban, the Daniel O'Connell of Slovak history, to General Stefanik, symbol of Slovak nationhood, to the beloved leader, Msgr. Andrew Hlinka, who ' symbolized the fight for independence of the Slovak people. Each and everyone of these great patriots is synonymous with the fight for human freedom and the preservation of the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, like many other of the oppressed people of Central · and Eastern Europe, began to emigrate to the new world in the middle part of the 19th century. It has been said, and with good reason, that almost half of the population of Slovakia emigrated to the United States to build a new life in dignity and human freedom. It is no accident that today we find that the population of present day enslaved Slovakia is only slightly double that of the number of Americans of Slovak descent here in the United States. The Slovaks who have emigrated to the United States, their children, and their children's children have always demonstrated their adherence to the banner of God and country. They have never failed in their allegiance to God nor have they ever failed in their allegiance to their adopted land, the United States of America. With their adjustment to the American scene, they have never failed in · the advocacy of freedom and independence for the Slovak nation. I would like to say here now that it is right and proper for them to maintain that position. We admire the Irish for their demands for Irish union and independence; we admire the Poles · for their de~ :i.. nd for Polish independence; we support them and all other groups in the United States who support the political principles enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence and our Constitution and Bill of Rights. We, as good Americans, must always stand firmly behind the right of every nation, large or small, to attain and hold its national sovereignty. For well over 100 years, adherence to this principle was the keystone of our foreign policy. This caused national patriots and fighters for human freedom the world over to look to the United State& of �SLOVAKIA 45 America for moral and material support. Many nations of the world won their freedom and have maintained their independence because of our courageous . adherence to this basic principle of a successful foreign policy. It is no overstatement to say that our current place in world affairs in no small measure results from our devotion to this basic human principle. Slovakia has never ceased in its struggles to attain national sovereignty and self government for its people. During and following World War I this effort was led by Monsignor Hlinka, who is revered by all the people of Slovakia as well as those in adopted homelands in · many parts of the world. As founder of the Slovak People's Party, Monsignor Hlinka crystallized the hopes of· the Slovak ·people for over 1,000 years to attain national sovereignty. Monsignor Hlinka died in 1938, at a time when the gathering storm c)f World ·war II threatened. all of Europe, but the spirit of Monsignor Hlinka did not die, because the Slovak _People'~ Party remained. ever dedicated to his historic cause. When the evil despots, Hitler and Stalin, began dividing up the geography (),f Europe, it was only natural that the Slovak people would make their bid for national sovereignty. Caught as they were between the powerful forces of Hitler and Stalin, it is all the more remarkable that they were able to attain national statehood when all other smaller nations of Eur9pe' were being destroyed. , Every conceivable charge has . been laid against the Slovak people, and the period of Nation.a] sovereignty they enjoyed from 1939 to 1945. Most of tqese charges have now been washed away. In the aftermath of World War II and as the dust has begun to settle on the events of that period in history, we are able to appreciate more adequately the facts in this matter. I am convinced that only after the world-wide struggle between human freedom and despotic slavery is settled, will we be ab!e to .fully understand, and appreciate that period of Slovak national independence from 1939 to 1945. If we, the God fearing people of the free world, fail to win the crucial struggle in which we are now engaged, these questions .wjll be buried deep in the thousand years of darkness which will �46 SLOVAKIA surely follow. But we shall not lose this struggle, and in our hour of inevitable triumph, all civilized men shall have the full and truthful answers to all the questions that have been raised about the period of Slovak independence that we commemorate here this evening. I am prepared, as I am sure you are, to let history answer for the heroi:c efforts of the Slovak people to attain their national independence. We are saddened by the events which are taking place in Slovakia today. There the evil hand of the Russian Communist is attempting to destroy the very spirit of Saints Cyril and Methodius and to reduce the Slovak people to a state of servility worse than that of the dark ages. But in their evil cause the Russian Communists shall fail, because the spirit of Saints Cyril and Methodius shall prevail so long as there is a Slovak alive anywhere in the world. I join with you this evening in commemorating this, the l 5th anniversary of Slovak independence and share with you the unwavering conviction that just as surely as day follows night, the Slovak Nation will once again be free and independent. • • * .. The 14th day of March is annually celebrated by the Slovak people everywhere in the world as Slovak Independence Day. This year, as for a number of years past, the residents of Slovakia are unable to participate in this celebration as they are still suffering under the yoke of Communist tyranny. The strongest characteristic of the peace-loving Slovak people has always been and still is their ardent devotion to the cause of liberty and freedom, and their strong adherence to the sa.me truly democratic principles for which our country stands. Their sons and daughters have given their lives for these principles and many still linger in prisons and concentration camps because of their refusal to submit to Communist domination. On this, their Independence Day, I join with millions of Americans in expressing my hopes that the day may soon come when they will again be free and have the God-given right of self-determination of their own national future. Slovak Independence Day. Extension of Remarks of Hon. �SLOVAKIA 47 Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 14, 1954. March 14 was the 15th anniversary of the independence of Slovakia, which occasion found the people of Slovakia engaged in a continuing battle of resistance against Communist tyranny to retrieve their freedom and national independence. I know I speak for the American people in proclaiming our belief that the principles set forth in our Declaration of Independence of the rights of all peoples to self-determination and the opportunity to pursue their own national destiny under the government of their choice or the rights of all civilized peoples everywhere. By its brutal aggression against the Slovak nation, the Soviet Union placed itself squarely in opposition to the ideals held by the whole of the free world. In their resistance to the bolshevization of their country and in their suffering under a foreign tyranny which has attempted to undermine the most enduring basis of human society, the dignity and rights of the individual together with these national rights, the people of Slovakia have the moral backing and the sincere sympathy of the free world. - Fifteenth Anniversary of the Independence of Slovakia. Extension Of Remarks of Hon. B. W. (Pat) Kearney of New York in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 15, 1954. On Sunday next we observe the Slovak Independence Day, and from Americans everywhere will come a prayer that soon again liberty and the dignity of man will be restored to the brave men and women of the land of the Slovak. I am glad to have the opportunity of joining with other Members of the Congress of the United States in sincere assurance that we are standing by in their time of trial and tribulation and will not desist in our efforts until the people of the once proud Slovak Republic again are free. It was on March 14, 1939, in the spirit of our own July 4, 1776, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed. The Slovak Republic came into being before World War II and was recognized by 27 countries. · �48 SLOVAKIA The Red army occupied the Slovak Republic at the end of World War II, and put an end to the freedom and independence of the Slovak people. Disregarding the right of self-determination and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, a foreign reign was forced upon this young Republic which in Febmary 1948 wa,s taken over _completely by the Communist regime. From the very beginning the Slovaks took a negative attitude toward communism. General Milan Rastislav Stefanik, the scientist-astronomer, after completing a trip through Russia in 1919, telegraphed his government: Say it loud to everybody: Bolshevism is not only a philosophical ideology but a morbid phenomenon, an apocalyptic chaos, in which the lowest instincts manifest themselves and the Bolshevist leaders are dictators in the most terr~ble sense of the word. Clad in rags, they seize wealth and in reality claim privileges. . . . To flirt with bolshevism means to leave the path of honor and of human commonsense. And I tell you out of the depth of my soul: The fight against all phenomena of bolshevism must dominate our policy. Let us act energetically as long as there is time. If we will not decide ourselves to act, bolshevism will weaken small nations and, at the end, will cause their full dissolution. A prophetic warning. Today the Slovak people are leading a double fight: the fight against Communist tyranny and against foreign rule. They are fighting heroically for their freedom and independence within a free and united Europe. That fight is marked by martyrs at home and refugees abroad. On Sunday, March 14, throughout the free world national independence day will be celebrated by the Slovak people, as a signal to Moscow that they have in their minds and hearts two purposes to free their country from foreign domination and an ideology to which by nature and tradition they are unalterably opposed. - Slo'Vak Independence Day. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Barratt O'Hara of Illinois in the House of Representatives, Tuesday, March 9, 1954. � 42 SLOVAKIA and share it, the more abundant and lasting are its fruits. Peace without freedom is unthinkable. If we are truly int erested in a permanent and just peace, let us not deny freedom to any nation - not even the Slo,v ak nation . • MARCH 14 - • • SLOVAK INDEPENDENOE DAY1 ( Address of the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, 20th District, Ohio, delivered on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Slovak Declaration of Independence at a meeting sponsored by the Slovak League of America and the Catholic Slovak Federation of America, at the Benedictine High School Auditorium, Cleveland, March 13, 1954, on "National Sovereignty Against World Socialism.") It is an honor for me to be here with you this evening and to join with you in commemorating the love of Slovak people everywhere in the world for God, freedom, and individual liberty. Anyone who has taken the time to study the history of the Slovak people, or to acquaint themselves with the traditions of Slovaks in America, will immediately recognize my point of associating God with human freedom. Like the Irish , their slogan is and has always been for God and country. Some years ago, when the storm clouds of World War II were gathering over the skies of Europe, I became intense1y interested in the cause of nations which were then hanging in the balance. On the one hand, we, the people of the free world, were confronted with the menace of national socialism as represented by Hitler, and on the other hand, the menace of international socialism as represented by Stalin, the czar of Russian communism. It was then clear to me that the tyrants, Stalin and Hitler, had a common purpose - to dominate the world. It was therefore no shock to me when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was announced to the world in 1939. It was, however, a tremendous shock to the unprepared homegrown Communists and fellow travelers in the United States and their fellow conspirators in other parts of the world. �SLOVAKIA 43 The first act of the two international gangsters in their drive for world domain, was to divide up the Eurasian continent into spheres of influence. The future of the many small nations which then made u:p all of Central and Eastern Europe, were determined by the expediency of dictatorial decision. It was in these circumstances that I first began my interesting study orf the Slovak Nation. I was struok by the fact that the Slovak people had made a continuous and unremitting struggle for national independence for over 1,000 years. I was impressed by the fact that alien occupation and oppression had not dimmed the aspirations and the hopes of the Slo,v aks, but had increased their determination for national independence. The more I read about the Slovak cause, the more amazed I became with the fact that so little was known about it in the United States. This compelled me to delve deeper into the glorious history of the Slovak people. The things I learned are undoubtedly common knowledge to you, but I should like to use this occasion to say a few words about the struggle for freedom of the Slovak people down through the ages, in the hope that other Americans may become better acquainted with these facts. Slovak history really begins with the arrival of the brother Saints Cyril and Methodius in Slovakia. These scholarly saints brought to Slovakia. which later spread to other Slavic lands, the first written language of the Slavs, which we know as Church Slovanic. They also brought to Slovakia a vast knowledge of government administration and law. They were quick to see the need for training Slovak scholars and training them in the masterful art of law and administration. They established the first school system in Slovakia. The contributions of the brother Saints Cyril and Methodius are everywhere apparent in the long and heroic history of the Slovak people. Slovakia, like its sister nations of Central and Eastern Europe, has stood throughout history as the rampart of Christian civilization. The loyal sons of Saints Cyril and Methodius have stood firm in their faith for God and country. Beginning �44 SLOVAKIA with Janosik, to Anton Bernolak, to Tomasik, to Kollar, to Joseph Hurban, the Daniel O'Connell of Slovak history, to General Stefanik, symbol of Slovak nationhood, to the beloved leader, Msgr. Andrew Hlinka, who ' symbolized the fight for independence of the Slovak people. Each and everyone of these great patriots is synonymous with the fight for human freedom and the preservation of the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, like many other of the oppressed people of Central · and Eastern Europe, began to emigrate to the new world in the middle part of the 19th century. It has been said, and with good reason, that almost half of the population of Slovakia emigrated to the United States to build a new life in dignity and human freedom. It is no accident that today we find that the population of present day enslaved Slovakia is only slightly double that of the number of Americans of Slovak descent here in the United States. The Slovaks who have emigrated to the United States, their children, and their children's children have always demonstrated their adherence to the banner of God and country. They have never failed in their allegiance to God nor have they ever failed in their allegiance to their adopted land, the United States of America. With their adjustment to the American scene, they have never failed in · the advocacy of freedom and independence for the Slovak nation. I would like to say here now that it is right and proper for them to maintain that position. We admire the Irish for their demands for Irish union and independence; we admire the Poles · for their de~ :i.. nd for Polish independence; we support them and all other groups in the United States who support the political principles enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence and our Constitution and Bill of Rights. We, as good Americans, must always stand firmly behind the right of every nation, large or small, to attain and hold its national sovereignty. For well over 100 years, adherence to this principle was the keystone of our foreign policy. This caused national patriots and fighters for human freedom the world over to look to the United State& of �SLOVAKIA 45 America for moral and material support. Many nations of the world won their freedom and have maintained their independence because of our courageous . adherence to this basic principle of a successful foreign policy. It is no overstatement to say that our current place in world affairs in no small measure results from our devotion to this basic human principle. Slovakia has never ceased in its struggles to attain national sovereignty and self government for its people. During and following World War I this effort was led by Monsignor Hlinka, who is revered by all the people of Slovakia as well as those in adopted homelands in · many parts of the world. As founder of the Slovak People's Party, Monsignor Hlinka crystallized the hopes of· the Slovak ·people for over 1,000 years to attain national sovereignty. Monsignor Hlinka died in 1938, at a time when the gathering storm c)f World ·war II threatened. all of Europe, but the spirit of Monsignor Hlinka did not die, because the Slovak _People'~ Party remained. ever dedicated to his historic cause. When the evil despots, Hitler and Stalin, began dividing up the geography (),f Europe, it was only natural that the Slovak people would make their bid for national sovereignty. Caught as they were between the powerful forces of Hitler and Stalin, it is all the more remarkable that they were able to attain national statehood when all other smaller nations of Eur9pe' were being destroyed. , Every conceivable charge has . been laid against the Slovak people, and the period of Nation.a] sovereignty they enjoyed from 1939 to 1945. Most of tqese charges have now been washed away. In the aftermath of World War II and as the dust has begun to settle on the events of that period in history, we are able to appreciate more adequately the facts in this matter. I am convinced that only after the world-wide struggle between human freedom and despotic slavery is settled, will we be ab!e to .fully understand, and appreciate that period of Slovak national independence from 1939 to 1945. If we, the God fearing people of the free world, fail to win the crucial struggle in which we are now engaged, these questions .wjll be buried deep in the thousand years of darkness which will �46 SLOVAKIA surely follow. But we shall not lose this struggle, and in our hour of inevitable triumph, all civilized men shall have the full and truthful answers to all the questions that have been raised about the period of Slovak independence that we commemorate here this evening. I am prepared, as I am sure you are, to let history answer for the heroi:c efforts of the Slovak people to attain their national independence. We are saddened by the events which are taking place in Slovakia today. There the evil hand of the Russian Communist is attempting to destroy the very spirit of Saints Cyril and Methodius and to reduce the Slovak people to a state of servility worse than that of the dark ages. But in their evil cause the Russian Communists shall fail, because the spirit of Saints Cyril and Methodius shall prevail so long as there is a Slovak alive anywhere in the world. I join with you this evening in commemorating this, the l 5th anniversary of Slovak independence and share with you the unwavering conviction that just as surely as day follows night, the Slovak Nation will once again be free and independent. • • * .. The 14th day of March is annually celebrated by the Slovak people everywhere in the world as Slovak Independence Day. This year, as for a number of years past, the residents of Slovakia are unable to participate in this celebration as they are still suffering under the yoke of Communist tyranny. The strongest characteristic of the peace-loving Slovak people has always been and still is their ardent devotion to the cause of liberty and freedom, and their strong adherence to the sa.me truly democratic principles for which our country stands. Their sons and daughters have given their lives for these principles and many still linger in prisons and concentration camps because of their refusal to submit to Communist domination. On this, their Independence Day, I join with millions of Americans in expressing my hopes that the day may soon come when they will again be free and have the God-given right of self-determination of their own national future. Slovak Independence Day. Extension of Remarks of Hon. �SLOVAKIA 47 Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 14, 1954. March 14 was the 15th anniversary of the independence of Slovakia, which occasion found the people of Slovakia engaged in a continuing battle of resistance against Communist tyranny to retrieve their freedom and national independence. I know I speak for the American people in proclaiming our belief that the principles set forth in our Declaration of Independence of the rights of all peoples to self-determination and the opportunity to pursue their own national destiny under the government of their choice or the rights of all civilized peoples everywhere. By its brutal aggression against the Slovak nation, the Soviet Union placed itself squarely in opposition to the ideals held by the whole of the free world. In their resistance to the bolshevization of their country and in their suffering under a foreign tyranny which has attempted to undermine the most enduring basis of human society, the dignity and rights of the individual together with these national rights, the people of Slovakia have the moral backing and the sincere sympathy of the free world. - Fifteenth Anniversary of the Independence of Slovakia. Extension Of Remarks of Hon. B. W. (Pat) Kearney of New York in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 15, 1954. On Sunday next we observe the Slovak Independence Day, and from Americans everywhere will come a prayer that soon again liberty and the dignity of man will be restored to the brave men and women of the land of the Slovak. I am glad to have the opportunity of joining with other Members of the Congress of the United States in sincere assurance that we are standing by in their time of trial and tribulation and will not desist in our efforts until the people of the once proud Slovak Republic again are free. It was on March 14, 1939, in the spirit of our own July 4, 1776, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed. The Slovak Republic came into being before World War II and was recognized by 27 countries. · �48 SLOVAKIA The Red army occupied the Slovak Republic at the end of World War II, and put an end to the freedom and independence of the Slovak people. Disregarding the right of self-determination and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, a foreign reign was forced upon this young Republic which in Febmary 1948 wa,s taken over _completely by the Communist regime. From the very beginning the Slovaks took a negative attitude toward communism. General Milan Rastislav Stefanik, the scientist-astronomer, after completing a trip through Russia in 1919, telegraphed his government: Say it loud to everybody: Bolshevism is not only a philosophical ideology but a morbid phenomenon, an apocalyptic chaos, in which the lowest instincts manifest themselves and the Bolshevist leaders are dictators in the most terr~ble sense of the word. Clad in rags, they seize wealth and in reality claim privileges. . . . To flirt with bolshevism means to leave the path of honor and of human commonsense. And I tell you out of the depth of my soul: The fight against all phenomena of bolshevism must dominate our policy. Let us act energetically as long as there is time. If we will not decide ourselves to act, bolshevism will weaken small nations and, at the end, will cause their full dissolution. A prophetic warning. Today the Slovak people are leading a double fight: the fight against Communist tyranny and against foreign rule. They are fighting heroically for their freedom and independence within a free and united Europe. That fight is marked by martyrs at home and refugees abroad. On Sunday, March 14, throughout the free world national independence day will be celebrated by the Slovak people, as a signal to Moscow that they have in their minds and hearts two purposes to free their country from foreign domination and an ideology to which by nature and tradition they are unalterably opposed. - Slo'Vak Independence Day. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Barratt O'Hara of Illinois in the House of Representatives, Tuesday, March 9, 1954. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 42 SLOVAKIA and share it, the more abundant and lasting are its fruits. Peace without freedom is unthinkable. If we are truly int erested in a permanent and just peace, let us not deny freedom to any nation - not even the Slo,v ak nation . • MARCH 14 - • • SLOVAK INDEPENDENOE DAY1 ( Address of the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, 20th District, Ohio, delivered on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Slovak Declaration of Independence at a meeting sponsored by the Slovak League of America and the Catholic Slovak Federation of America, at the Benedictine High School Auditorium, Cleveland, March 13, 1954, on "National Sovereignty Against World Socialism.") It is an honor for me to be here with you this evening and to join with you in commemorating the love of Slovak people everywhere in the world for God, freedom, and individual liberty. Anyone who has taken the time to study the history of the Slovak people, or to acquaint themselves with the traditions of Slovaks in America, will immediately recognize my point of associating God with human freedom. Like the Irish , their slogan is and has always been for God and country. Some years ago, when the storm clouds of World War II were gathering over the skies of Europe, I became intense1y interested in the cause of nations which were then hanging in the balance. On the one hand, we, the people of the free world, were confronted with the menace of national socialism as represented by Hitler, and on the other hand, the menace of international socialism as represented by Stalin, the czar of Russian communism. It was then clear to me that the tyrants, Stalin and Hitler, had a common purpose - to dominate the world. It was therefore no shock to me when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was announced to the world in 1939. It was, however, a tremendous shock to the unprepared homegrown Communists and fellow travelers in the United States and their fellow conspirators in other parts of the world. SLOVAKIA 43 The first act of the two international gangsters in their drive for world domain, was to divide up the Eurasian continent into spheres of influence. The future of the many small nations which then made u:p all of Central and Eastern Europe, were determined by the expediency of dictatorial decision. It was in these circumstances that I first began my interesting study orf the Slovak Nation. I was struok by the fact that the Slovak people had made a continuous and unremitting struggle for national independence for over 1,000 years. I was impressed by the fact that alien occupation and oppression had not dimmed the aspirations and the hopes of the Slo,v aks, but had increased their determination for national independence. The more I read about the Slovak cause, the more amazed I became with the fact that so little was known about it in the United States. This compelled me to delve deeper into the glorious history of the Slovak people. The things I learned are undoubtedly common knowledge to you, but I should like to use this occasion to say a few words about the struggle for freedom of the Slovak people down through the ages, in the hope that other Americans may become better acquainted with these facts. Slovak history really begins with the arrival of the brother Saints Cyril and Methodius in Slovakia. These scholarly saints brought to Slovakia. which later spread to other Slavic lands, the first written language of the Slavs, which we know as Church Slovanic. They also brought to Slovakia a vast knowledge of government administration and law. They were quick to see the need for training Slovak scholars and training them in the masterful art of law and administration. They established the first school system in Slovakia. The contributions of the brother Saints Cyril and Methodius are everywhere apparent in the long and heroic history of the Slovak people. Slovakia, like its sister nations of Central and Eastern Europe, has stood throughout history as the rampart of Christian civilization. The loyal sons of Saints Cyril and Methodius have stood firm in their faith for God and country. Beginning 44 SLOVAKIA with Janosik, to Anton Bernolak, to Tomasik, to Kollar, to Joseph Hurban, the Daniel O'Connell of Slovak history, to General Stefanik, symbol of Slovak nationhood, to the beloved leader, Msgr. Andrew Hlinka, who ' symbolized the fight for independence of the Slovak people. Each and everyone of these great patriots is synonymous with the fight for human freedom and the preservation of the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, like many other of the oppressed people of Central · and Eastern Europe, began to emigrate to the new world in the middle part of the 19th century. It has been said, and with good reason, that almost half of the population of Slovakia emigrated to the United States to build a new life in dignity and human freedom. It is no accident that today we find that the population of present day enslaved Slovakia is only slightly double that of the number of Americans of Slovak descent here in the United States. The Slovaks who have emigrated to the United States, their children, and their children's children have always demonstrated their adherence to the banner of God and country. They have never failed in their allegiance to God nor have they ever failed in their allegiance to their adopted land, the United States of America. With their adjustment to the American scene, they have never failed in · the advocacy of freedom and independence for the Slovak nation. I would like to say here now that it is right and proper for them to maintain that position. We admire the Irish for their demands for Irish union and independence; we admire the Poles · for their de~ :i.. nd for Polish independence; we support them and all other groups in the United States who support the political principles enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence and our Constitution and Bill of Rights. We, as good Americans, must always stand firmly behind the right of every nation, large or small, to attain and hold its national sovereignty. For well over 100 years, adherence to this principle was the keystone of our foreign policy. This caused national patriots and fighters for human freedom the world over to look to the United State& of SLOVAKIA 45 America for moral and material support. Many nations of the world won their freedom and have maintained their independence because of our courageous . adherence to this basic principle of a successful foreign policy. It is no overstatement to say that our current place in world affairs in no small measure results from our devotion to this basic human principle. Slovakia has never ceased in its struggles to attain national sovereignty and self government for its people. During and following World War I this effort was led by Monsignor Hlinka, who is revered by all the people of Slovakia as well as those in adopted homelands in · many parts of the world. As founder of the Slovak People's Party, Monsignor Hlinka crystallized the hopes of· the Slovak ·people for over 1,000 years to attain national sovereignty. Monsignor Hlinka died in 1938, at a time when the gathering storm c)f World ·war II threatened. all of Europe, but the spirit of Monsignor Hlinka did not die, because the Slovak _People'~ Party remained. ever dedicated to his historic cause. When the evil despots, Hitler and Stalin, began dividing up the geography (),f Europe, it was only natural that the Slovak people would make their bid for national sovereignty. Caught as they were between the powerful forces of Hitler and Stalin, it is all the more remarkable that they were able to attain national statehood when all other smaller nations of Eur9pe' were being destroyed. , Every conceivable charge has . been laid against the Slovak people, and the period of Nation.a] sovereignty they enjoyed from 1939 to 1945. Most of tqese charges have now been washed away. In the aftermath of World War II and as the dust has begun to settle on the events of that period in history, we are able to appreciate more adequately the facts in this matter. I am convinced that only after the world-wide struggle between human freedom and despotic slavery is settled, will we be ab!e to .fully understand, and appreciate that period of Slovak national independence from 1939 to 1945. If we, the God fearing people of the free world, fail to win the crucial struggle in which we are now engaged, these questions .wjll be buried deep in the thousand years of darkness which will 46 SLOVAKIA surely follow. But we shall not lose this struggle, and in our hour of inevitable triumph, all civilized men shall have the full and truthful answers to all the questions that have been raised about the period of Slovak independence that we commemorate here this evening. I am prepared, as I am sure you are, to let history answer for the heroi:c efforts of the Slovak people to attain their national independence. We are saddened by the events which are taking place in Slovakia today. There the evil hand of the Russian Communist is attempting to destroy the very spirit of Saints Cyril and Methodius and to reduce the Slovak people to a state of servility worse than that of the dark ages. But in their evil cause the Russian Communists shall fail, because the spirit of Saints Cyril and Methodius shall prevail so long as there is a Slovak alive anywhere in the world. I join with you this evening in commemorating this, the l 5th anniversary of Slovak independence and share with you the unwavering conviction that just as surely as day follows night, the Slovak Nation will once again be free and independent. • • * .. The 14th day of March is annually celebrated by the Slovak people everywhere in the world as Slovak Independence Day. This year, as for a number of years past, the residents of Slovakia are unable to participate in this celebration as they are still suffering under the yoke of Communist tyranny. The strongest characteristic of the peace-loving Slovak people has always been and still is their ardent devotion to the cause of liberty and freedom, and their strong adherence to the sa.me truly democratic principles for which our country stands. Their sons and daughters have given their lives for these principles and many still linger in prisons and concentration camps because of their refusal to submit to Communist domination. On this, their Independence Day, I join with millions of Americans in expressing my hopes that the day may soon come when they will again be free and have the God-given right of self-determination of their own national future. Slovak Independence Day. Extension of Remarks of Hon. SLOVAKIA 47 Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 14, 1954. March 14 was the 15th anniversary of the independence of Slovakia, which occasion found the people of Slovakia engaged in a continuing battle of resistance against Communist tyranny to retrieve their freedom and national independence. I know I speak for the American people in proclaiming our belief that the principles set forth in our Declaration of Independence of the rights of all peoples to self-determination and the opportunity to pursue their own national destiny under the government of their choice or the rights of all civilized peoples everywhere. By its brutal aggression against the Slovak nation, the Soviet Union placed itself squarely in opposition to the ideals held by the whole of the free world. In their resistance to the bolshevization of their country and in their suffering under a foreign tyranny which has attempted to undermine the most enduring basis of human society, the dignity and rights of the individual together with these national rights, the people of Slovakia have the moral backing and the sincere sympathy of the free world. - Fifteenth Anniversary of the Independence of Slovakia. Extension Of Remarks of Hon. B. W. (Pat) Kearney of New York in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 15, 1954. On Sunday next we observe the Slovak Independence Day, and from Americans everywhere will come a prayer that soon again liberty and the dignity of man will be restored to the brave men and women of the land of the Slovak. I am glad to have the opportunity of joining with other Members of the Congress of the United States in sincere assurance that we are standing by in their time of trial and tribulation and will not desist in our efforts until the people of the once proud Slovak Republic again are free. It was on March 14, 1939, in the spirit of our own July 4, 1776, the independence of Slovakia was proclaimed. The Slovak Republic came into being before World War II and was recognized by 27 countries. · 48 SLOVAKIA The Red army occupied the Slovak Republic at the end of World War II, and put an end to the freedom and independence of the Slovak people. Disregarding the right of self-determination and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, a foreign reign was forced upon this young Republic which in Febmary 1948 wa,s taken over _completely by the Communist regime. From the very beginning the Slovaks took a negative attitude toward communism. General Milan Rastislav Stefanik, the scientist-astronomer, after completing a trip through Russia in 1919, telegraphed his government: Say it loud to everybody: Bolshevism is not only a philosophical ideology but a morbid phenomenon, an apocalyptic chaos, in which the lowest instincts manifest themselves and the Bolshevist leaders are dictators in the most terr~ble sense of the word. Clad in rags, they seize wealth and in reality claim privileges. . . . To flirt with bolshevism means to leave the path of honor and of human commonsense. And I tell you out of the depth of my soul: The fight against all phenomena of bolshevism must dominate our policy. Let us act energetically as long as there is time. If we will not decide ourselves to act, bolshevism will weaken small nations and, at the end, will cause their full dissolution. A prophetic warning. Today the Slovak people are leading a double fight: the fight against Communist tyranny and against foreign rule. They are fighting heroically for their freedom and independence within a free and united Europe. That fight is marked by martyrs at home and refugees abroad. On Sunday, March 14, throughout the free world national independence day will be celebrated by the Slovak people, as a signal to Moscow that they have in their minds and hearts two purposes to free their country from foreign domination and an ideology to which by nature and tradition they are unalterably opposed. - Slo'Vak Independence Day. Extension of Remarks of Hon. Barratt O'Hara of Illinois in the House of Representatives, Tuesday, March 9, 1954.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource March 14 - Slovak Independence Day Description An account of the resource Address of the Hon. Michael A. Feighan, 20th District, Ohio, delivered on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the Slovak Declaration of Independence at a meeting sponsored by the Slovak League of America and the Catholic Slovak Federation of America, at the Benedictine High School Auditorium, Cleveland, March 13, 1954, on "National Sovereignty Against World Socialism" Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954 pp. 42-48 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Feighan, Michael Aloysius, 1905- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1954 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7155cf795df7a666e89ec3a5139d7624.pdf be842bcc0051ac2e0d9cb08edb4a2d72 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 29 ADDRESS OF HONORABLE MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN United States Representative 20th Ohio District, Delivered at 25:~h Anniversary of Slovak Independence, Sts. Cyril and Methodius Auditorium, Alameda Avenue, Lakewood, Ohio Sunday, March 15, 1964 It is most fitting that the observance of this 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Independence should be held iin this AuditoriUJlll dedieated to the Brother Saints, Cyril and Mebhodius. For the Brother Sair.ts Cyril and Methodius are indelibly linke<l wibh eleven centuries of Slovak culture and history. They were invited by Rastislav, who then rules Slovakia. To bring th e civiliziir.,g message of Christianity to the Slovak people. That was in the year 863 and so effective was bheir work that history records them as the A,postles o,f bht: Slavs. Slovakia has stood fast by her Christian faitih from the days of Cyril and Methodius to bhe present. T•hat faith has carrie<l her over epics of great suffering and has preserved the cu-lture o.f her people in the face of foreign occupation and rule. The stre!llgth of that faith is matched only by the sturdi.ness and resolve of her people . No Natio·n in history has fought harder or long.:-r for freedom and National Independence than Slovakia. No peo,ple have paid a greater pri-ce for their allegiance to liberty and human diignity than paid by the Slovak peo-ple. And no nation or peo,ple are more firmly committed to the principles of freedom today. To understa,r.-d the aspirations o,f the Slovak people and bheir plight as a nation today we need but look back upon events o,f the century in which WI} live. When this century ope-n ed Slovakia was a part of tihe AustroHungarian Empire - but a very restive part. Their struggle for a-uto,r.,o,my and self-rule over the previous century prepared them well for the politica,l stmggle durin•g and following World War I. It was no accident of history that bhe Austro Hu!llgarian , Russian . German and Ottoman Empires fell in the wake of that war. For it was the yearnings and strug,gles for nation-al independence by nations long suibjugated which to,ppled those empires. In pr e•p aring bhe people o,f Slovakia for their po.Utica! independence the name of Ms,gr . Andrew Hlinka looms large. A great patriotic leader. He took the initiative to form the Slovak peoples party as a un,i ted and demo-cratic voice of his peop:e. That party adopted the guiding priindples of bhe great encyclicals on the socia'1 order as their guideposts for bhe formation of a new soeiail order in central Europe . Meanwhile there were diwussions among Czechs and Slovaks in the United States concer,n,in,g the formation of a common federation following th-e war. One historic meeting took place in Cleveland in 1915. At that meeting the Slovak League of America made clear its intention to support a Czecho Slovak federal state, providing Slovakia would be an equal member with Czoohia and would retain complete auton,o,my in all legislative, executive, judiciary, c-U!ltural and national matters . Matters of common concern such as defense and fore ign affairs were to be handled by a common parliament, that agreement together wit•h the Pittsburgh Pact led to the establishment of a provisional .government at Paris wi-th Thomas Masaryk ,as President. 'Dhat provisional governmen,t was ratified by a Czechoslovak National �30 SLOVAKIA Assembly on November 14, 1918 ar.d eleded Thomas Masaryk a& President of the Republic. It was not long before serious disagreements between the Czechs and Slovaks developed over the issue o-f a strongly centralist state and the concept of a federation of co-equal states. In the opin-ion of the Slovak leaders the Czecho-Slovak Republic was rapidly becoming a Czech state and the identity as well as the independence of Slovakia was thereby threatened. This trend was contrary to all agreements entered ir.to before the formation of bhe Czeoho-Slovak Republic. Under these circumstances Msgr. Hli n,ka went to Paris in September o.f 1919 to plead the cause of Slovak independence before the Pea-ce Conference of the victorious Western Powers. There he was falsely denounced to the Frenc,h authorities by the Czechoslovak delegation as a Hapsburg spy and was forced to depart the coun try. Returning to his homeland he was immediately imprisoned by order of the Prague central government and his release was won by the Slovak people who elected him a deputy. In the years between the wars the Slovaks people fared poorly under the centralized regime in Prague Their ho,pes for self-government were denied by a system they had opposed and rejeded and which laid upon 1:Jhem laws and demands to which they had not given their free consent. Slovaks were the victoms of harsh discriminations in all phases of government, education and public life. Their ancie,nt culture was put under a barra-ge of controls and regulations whiC!h had no other purpose but to suffocate their national heritage and yearnings Practically all the distrkt and county public offices in Slovakia were directed ar.d run by Czechs assigned by Prague. They, along with the police establishment, were directly respon-sible to Prague and none of these arms of a central goverin,ment were responsive to the will of the Slovak people. For example, in 1938, there were 120,926 Czech public officials quartered in Slovakia. 'Ilhe Slo,v ak ,people made numerous attempts to win their just national ri,g hts from the central government in Prague. But these attempts were rebuffed and rejected by a series of delaying tactics, untfulfilled promises and outright deceit. Since a,n alleged parhamentary form of government was established in Pra,gue, the Slovak leaders took their series of complaints to that central body for redress. But there they were faced with impossible odds for bhe parliament was loaded with 233 Czech deputies a,gainst 58 deputtes from S!ovakia _.and 9 deputies from Ruthenia . Hence. the Slovak grievances fell upon unreceptive and unyielding ears. Then the Slovaks leaders took their grievances to President Edward Ben-es, who had succeeded to that post after the death of Thomas Masa,ryk. There they met ,thie s,ame treatment of delay, .ejection and rebuff. When Hitler came to power in Germany and began to manipulate the smaller and weaker nations of Europe, the Slovak people did not seize upon this situation to attain bheir long neglected grievances against the government of Pra•g ue. Contrarywise, all the legitimate political parties of Slovakia moved into a state of cohesive unity. Moreover. they eased their complaints against Prague, conscious of the coming- storm over all of Europe . The Mumch conference of September 22, 1938, which was alleged to be a peace co,niference, unleasherl r.ew forces of division and discord throughout all of central Europe. When the Sudentenland was �SLOVAKIA 31 ceded to Germany as the price of peace, tht centralist government of Pra.gue was doomed. Czecho-Slovakia was forced by the circumstances of political reality to become a federation of Boihemia-Moravia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia . Slovakia, at long last, was to become master of its destiny as well as self-goverr.ing. But the removal of 9,000 Czech officials in Slovakia to make room for officials chosen by the Slovak people caused additional strains on relations with Prague, although Edward Benes had fled into exile, the centralist vent of Prague remained, and this despite the lesson of Munich. On March 10, 1939, the Prague government, annoyed at the serious manner in which the Slovaks were taking their responsibilities for self-government, dismm,ed the autonomous Slovak government headed by Dr. Josep,h Tiso and declared martial Jaw over all o<f Slovakia Pubiic demonstrations against the Prague ,g overnment spread throughout Slovakia a,n.ct threatened a blood bath revolution. Under these circumstances, Hitler invited Dr. Tiso to a conference in Berlin where he showed him a telegram from Von Ribbentrop, then forei,gn minister oif the Reich, in which the threat of forei-gn occupation of Slovakia was made. Hitler then suggested this threat mi,g ht be avoided Lf Slovakia declared its national independence. While Hitler was a mad fooL he was by no means ignorant about the aspirations of bh-e Slovak people for national independence. Dr. Tiso returned to Bratislava where he reported fully to the Slovak diet on his conference with Hitler in Berlin. The Slovak diet then proclaimed the nation-a:! independence of Slovakia on March 14, 193·9. That, in quick summary, is the history of the 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Independence we obs·e rve here today. All that I have said, and more, can be found in an official report o,f the United States Congress, rendered by the select Comm ittee to In-vestiga te Communist aggression 83rd Congress. I was a member of that committee and I can tell you its members had no fear of the truth as we sought the facts on this vital issue. That report also tells the story of Slovakia's loss of national independence follow ing World War II and the Manner in which the unprincipled po.Jitical rogues who made up the centralist goverr.ment of Pra,gue sold out t,heir own people as well as the Slovak nation to Imperial R•ussia. It is fitting at bhis moment t,hat we o·f.fer u,p a prayer for the s-0ul of Dr. Joseph Tiso, who m1de the supreme Sa•c rifice for the Political ideals of a free and iir.,dependent Slovakia. Dr. Tiso was tried in a Mo-ck tial, sentenced and har.,g ed by the Communist quislin•gs who eventually so,Jd out their own country to the Russian Communists. But history will treat Dr. Tiso kindly because the passa,ge of time has brou.ght forth and will continue to bring forth the tru t,h a-bout his desperate efforts to save his native land. Slovakia today suffers under bhe harsh heel of Russia,n Communist occupation. That occupation has sou,ght to rob the Slovak pe o,ple of t,heir ancient traditions, their religious, and their heritage as well as their political liberties. But the Slovak people are stee,Jed in the tactics which must be employed agamst a foreign occupier. Time and the experience of centuries has prepared them well for the tests they now endure. It is little wonder that the spirit o•f resista,r.,ce to tyranny Tuns so ,s,tro,n g -i n Slovak-i:a: :today. The Russians as well a,s their Czech �32 SLOVAKIA quislings in Prague, know the power of Slovak national aspirations. History is repeating itself today as the people of Slovakia are bringing pressures upon the die-hard Russia,n stalinist regime entrenohed at Prague. Those pressures are agai-n st the twin chauvinisms which seek to erase the distmct nationa,l character of the Slovak peo,ple. Genuine dissent against the Prague regime comes only fro,m Siovakia while Bohemia and Moravia- remain stra,r.,gely silent even on the old hat Russian trick of de-stalinization . All of us remember that on the occasion of the Hungarian freedom revolution in 1956 the people of Slovakia afone amon,g all the peo,ple of a Russian restored centralist Czeehoslovakia demonstrate<l .sympathy for the aims of that freedom revolution. The da,r.,ger of that demonstrated sympathy was quickly recognized by Moscow As a result three Czech divisions were moved to the common border between Slovakia and Hungary, to seal off any prospeet of assistance to and collaboration with the Hungarian freedom fighters That is a lesson of history which must never be for gotten bv those who love freedom a,nd fight against tyranny m any form There is another lesson to be gained from the era of the Hunga.rian freedom r. volution which needs tellin,g, but wh ich up to this moment, has remained buried in the archives of trut~. That lesson occured several weeks before the outbreak ot the Hungarian revolution. The scene was Poland, lo,n,g under occupation by the oppressive Russian Communists. The Poznan revolt m the spring of 1956 was an important event in history, but it failed to expose to the free world the fuH story o-f the human pressures which had built up amon,g the people of Poland. 'I\hat revolt served as a short fused safety valve for the pent up feelings of the Polish peo,ple. But by September and early October of 1956 the oppressed people of poland had rea,ohed a breaking point. They were willing to risk all in a heroic effort to t>r eak the chains of Russian slavery whi,oh had been fixed to their nat10n al life and ancient heritage. The Russia,n quis,Jings in control of Pol and became alarmed by these develo,pm ents and sent urgent warnings to Moseow. Khru shchsv knew the full meaning of these warning~ and flew to Warsaw to avert disaster for the Russian Empire But the Po:es were r eady for him. They had ma,n-aged tu gain anti-communist discipline and control over 40 divi sions of Po les and East Germans Whzn Khrushchev's plane arrived over Warsaw airport it was not allowed to land. The Russians then surrounded Warsaw airport with a Russian armored divisio,n. But the Poles cou ntered this move by surrounding the Russian division with severa l loyal divisions o.f their own. The Polish leaders o,f revolt sought time to negotiate with th e American Ambassador in Wars-aw. What they sought in these negotiatior.s was assurance of United States moral support if they att:acked the Russians a,nd drove them from P o-lish soil. In thes-e n.egotiations the Po,les were discouraged m then efforts and reminded that their ambition s would likely unlea sh a nuclear war The Polish n,egotiators left the United States Embassy discouraged and disillusione<l and returned to the Warsaw airport There they agre,ed upo,n a pl,a-n to for.ce as ma,n y conc-esstons ou~ of Khrushchev as they cou'1d. They agree-d to demand the release of Cardinal Wyczynski from ho-use arrest, the release of Gomulka from pris•on and a general relaxation of oppressio,n whioh had been laid �SLOVAKIA 33 upon the Polish people . This brave action on the part of the enslaved Polish people held Khrushchev in thr air over Warsaw fo.r four to five hours. When his plane was allowed to land, there was no pounding of a Russiar. shoe on a desk a·n-d there were no insults poured upon the negotiators because the Poles stood firm in their promise of unrestricted bloodshed unless their demands were met, Khrushchev understands that kind of negotiation. He met the demands of the Polish negotiators who negotiated upon n-othing more than their confidence in the Polish people to stand up in support of their ideals arud aspirations. These facts were not known to the people of Hungary. All they knew was that the people of Poland were standing up to the RUJSsian-s. In support of that stand they began peaceful demonstrations in Budapest. It was no accident that these peaceful demostrations moved toward the historic statue of General Bern. A Polish hero who went to the rescue of Hungary a century before when the people of Hungary fought for their national independence, nor was it a,n. accident when the Russian secret po-lice machine gunned the peaceful Hungarian demostrators . Moscow remembered the events ~n Warsaw a few weeks prior ar.,d knew or.!y too well their meaning, a show of brute strength, the traditional source of Russian power, was ordered. That bruta-1 action triggered off the Hungarian freedom revolution which co-uld have bro-ught the Russian Empire down in shambles if the United States had demostrated the moral and political courage which has brought us to a position of leadership in the free world. Looking back on that heroic chapter in history, in light o.f these facts which I have exposed, I must conclude that one of the greatest opportunities in history was bungled in Warsaw in the early days of October 1956. The Poles and East Germans would have been joined by Slovakia. Hungary, Ukraine, Lithuania, R,umania, Byelorussia and all the rest of the peoples in the captive nations. A popular revolution of that dimension, reaching from the Baltic sea to the Caspian sea, wo-uld have brought about the total disintegration of the Russian! Empire. The Russians would have been powerless in the face of such a popular movement for freedom. The Red Army would have fallen i-n-to total collapse, as its occupation elements did during the Hungarian revolution. and Moscow would have been rendered powerless. These conclusions are ir.escapable and they will become more apparent with the passage of time. Truth will not be buried because truth endures time. mortal men and the Imperial Russians. For these reasons I am ho,n,ored by the opportunity which you have given me to participatP. with you in this observance of the 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Inde·p endence. This is the Silver Anniversary of a,n important event in the annuals of freedom's cause. It serves well to provide a brig,ht linmg, a silver lining, to the dark clouds of war which stretch over much of the civilized world. That silver linin-g raises our ho-pes for peace with justice and freedom . It reminds us that the power of human aspirations dwarfs the power and threat of all the nuclear weapons stockpiled thro,u,ghout the world. God bless the Slovak people and hasten the day when their hard journey toward freedom and national independence shall end in a glorious triumph. � SLOVAKIA 29 ADDRESS OF HONORABLE MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN United States Representative 20th Ohio District, Delivered at 25:~h Anniversary of Slovak Independence, Sts. Cyril and Methodius Auditorium, Alameda Avenue, Lakewood, Ohio Sunday, March 15, 1964 It is most fitting that the observance of this 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Independence should be held iin this AuditoriUJlll dedieated to the Brother Saints, Cyril and Mebhodius. For the Brother Sair.ts Cyril and Methodius are indelibly linke<l wibh eleven centuries of Slovak culture and history. They were invited by Rastislav, who then rules Slovakia. To bring th e civiliziir.,g message of Christianity to the Slovak people. That was in the year 863 and so effective was bheir work that history records them as the A,postles o,f bht: Slavs. Slovakia has stood fast by her Christian faitih from the days of Cyril and Methodius to bhe present. T•hat faith has carrie<l her over epics of great suffering and has preserved the cu-lture o.f her people in the face of foreign occupation and rule. The stre!llgth of that faith is matched only by the sturdi.ness and resolve of her people . No Natio·n in history has fought harder or long.:-r for freedom and National Independence than Slovakia. No peo,ple have paid a greater pri-ce for their allegiance to liberty and human diignity than paid by the Slovak peo-ple. And no nation or peo,ple are more firmly committed to the principles of freedom today. To understa,r.-d the aspirations o,f the Slovak people and bheir plight as a nation today we need but look back upon events o,f the century in which WI} live. When this century ope-n ed Slovakia was a part of tihe AustroHungarian Empire - but a very restive part. Their struggle for a-uto,r.,o,my and self-rule over the previous century prepared them well for the politica,l stmggle durin•g and following World War I. It was no accident of history that bhe Austro Hu!llgarian , Russian . German and Ottoman Empires fell in the wake of that war. For it was the yearnings and strug,gles for nation-al independence by nations long suibjugated which to,ppled those empires. In pr e•p aring bhe people o,f Slovakia for their po.Utica! independence the name of Ms,gr . Andrew Hlinka looms large. A great patriotic leader. He took the initiative to form the Slovak peoples party as a un,i ted and demo-cratic voice of his peop:e. That party adopted the guiding priindples of bhe great encyclicals on the socia'1 order as their guideposts for bhe formation of a new soeiail order in central Europe . Meanwhile there were diwussions among Czechs and Slovaks in the United States concer,n,in,g the formation of a common federation following th-e war. One historic meeting took place in Cleveland in 1915. At that meeting the Slovak League of America made clear its intention to support a Czecho Slovak federal state, providing Slovakia would be an equal member with Czoohia and would retain complete auton,o,my in all legislative, executive, judiciary, c-U!ltural and national matters . Matters of common concern such as defense and fore ign affairs were to be handled by a common parliament, that agreement together wit•h the Pittsburgh Pact led to the establishment of a provisional .government at Paris wi-th Thomas Masaryk ,as President. 'Dhat provisional governmen,t was ratified by a Czechoslovak National �30 SLOVAKIA Assembly on November 14, 1918 ar.d eleded Thomas Masaryk a& President of the Republic. It was not long before serious disagreements between the Czechs and Slovaks developed over the issue o-f a strongly centralist state and the concept of a federation of co-equal states. In the opin-ion of the Slovak leaders the Czecho-Slovak Republic was rapidly becoming a Czech state and the identity as well as the independence of Slovakia was thereby threatened. This trend was contrary to all agreements entered ir.to before the formation of bhe Czeoho-Slovak Republic. Under these circumstances Msgr. Hli n,ka went to Paris in September o.f 1919 to plead the cause of Slovak independence before the Pea-ce Conference of the victorious Western Powers. There he was falsely denounced to the Frenc,h authorities by the Czechoslovak delegation as a Hapsburg spy and was forced to depart the coun try. Returning to his homeland he was immediately imprisoned by order of the Prague central government and his release was won by the Slovak people who elected him a deputy. In the years between the wars the Slovaks people fared poorly under the centralized regime in Prague Their ho,pes for self-government were denied by a system they had opposed and rejeded and which laid upon 1:Jhem laws and demands to which they had not given their free consent. Slovaks were the victoms of harsh discriminations in all phases of government, education and public life. Their ancie,nt culture was put under a barra-ge of controls and regulations whiC!h had no other purpose but to suffocate their national heritage and yearnings Practically all the distrkt and county public offices in Slovakia were directed ar.d run by Czechs assigned by Prague. They, along with the police establishment, were directly respon-sible to Prague and none of these arms of a central goverin,ment were responsive to the will of the Slovak people. For example, in 1938, there were 120,926 Czech public officials quartered in Slovakia. 'Ilhe Slo,v ak ,people made numerous attempts to win their just national ri,g hts from the central government in Prague. But these attempts were rebuffed and rejected by a series of delaying tactics, untfulfilled promises and outright deceit. Since a,n alleged parhamentary form of government was established in Pra,gue, the Slovak leaders took their series of complaints to that central body for redress. But there they were faced with impossible odds for bhe parliament was loaded with 233 Czech deputies a,gainst 58 deputtes from S!ovakia _.and 9 deputies from Ruthenia . Hence. the Slovak grievances fell upon unreceptive and unyielding ears. Then the Slovaks leaders took their grievances to President Edward Ben-es, who had succeeded to that post after the death of Thomas Masa,ryk. There they met ,thie s,ame treatment of delay, .ejection and rebuff. When Hitler came to power in Germany and began to manipulate the smaller and weaker nations of Europe, the Slovak people did not seize upon this situation to attain bheir long neglected grievances against the government of Pra•g ue. Contrarywise, all the legitimate political parties of Slovakia moved into a state of cohesive unity. Moreover. they eased their complaints against Prague, conscious of the coming- storm over all of Europe . The Mumch conference of September 22, 1938, which was alleged to be a peace co,niference, unleasherl r.ew forces of division and discord throughout all of central Europe. When the Sudentenland was �SLOVAKIA 31 ceded to Germany as the price of peace, tht centralist government of Pra.gue was doomed. Czecho-Slovakia was forced by the circumstances of political reality to become a federation of Boihemia-Moravia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia . Slovakia, at long last, was to become master of its destiny as well as self-goverr.ing. But the removal of 9,000 Czech officials in Slovakia to make room for officials chosen by the Slovak people caused additional strains on relations with Prague, although Edward Benes had fled into exile, the centralist vent of Prague remained, and this despite the lesson of Munich. On March 10, 1939, the Prague government, annoyed at the serious manner in which the Slovaks were taking their responsibilities for self-government, dismm,ed the autonomous Slovak government headed by Dr. Josep,h Tiso and declared martial Jaw over all o<f Slovakia Pubiic demonstrations against the Prague ,g overnment spread throughout Slovakia a,n.ct threatened a blood bath revolution. Under these circumstances, Hitler invited Dr. Tiso to a conference in Berlin where he showed him a telegram from Von Ribbentrop, then forei,gn minister oif the Reich, in which the threat of forei-gn occupation of Slovakia was made. Hitler then suggested this threat mi,g ht be avoided Lf Slovakia declared its national independence. While Hitler was a mad fooL he was by no means ignorant about the aspirations of bh-e Slovak people for national independence. Dr. Tiso returned to Bratislava where he reported fully to the Slovak diet on his conference with Hitler in Berlin. The Slovak diet then proclaimed the nation-a:! independence of Slovakia on March 14, 193·9. That, in quick summary, is the history of the 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Independence we obs·e rve here today. All that I have said, and more, can be found in an official report o,f the United States Congress, rendered by the select Comm ittee to In-vestiga te Communist aggression 83rd Congress. I was a member of that committee and I can tell you its members had no fear of the truth as we sought the facts on this vital issue. That report also tells the story of Slovakia's loss of national independence follow ing World War II and the Manner in which the unprincipled po.Jitical rogues who made up the centralist goverr.ment of Pra,gue sold out t,heir own people as well as the Slovak nation to Imperial R•ussia. It is fitting at bhis moment t,hat we o·f.fer u,p a prayer for the s-0ul of Dr. Joseph Tiso, who m1de the supreme Sa•c rifice for the Political ideals of a free and iir.,dependent Slovakia. Dr. Tiso was tried in a Mo-ck tial, sentenced and har.,g ed by the Communist quislin•gs who eventually so,Jd out their own country to the Russian Communists. But history will treat Dr. Tiso kindly because the passa,ge of time has brou.ght forth and will continue to bring forth the tru t,h a-bout his desperate efforts to save his native land. Slovakia today suffers under bhe harsh heel of Russia,n Communist occupation. That occupation has sou,ght to rob the Slovak pe o,ple of t,heir ancient traditions, their religious, and their heritage as well as their political liberties. But the Slovak people are stee,Jed in the tactics which must be employed agamst a foreign occupier. Time and the experience of centuries has prepared them well for the tests they now endure. It is little wonder that the spirit o•f resista,r.,ce to tyranny Tuns so ,s,tro,n g -i n Slovak-i:a: :today. The Russians as well a,s their Czech �32 SLOVAKIA quislings in Prague, know the power of Slovak national aspirations. History is repeating itself today as the people of Slovakia are bringing pressures upon the die-hard Russia,n stalinist regime entrenohed at Prague. Those pressures are agai-n st the twin chauvinisms which seek to erase the distmct nationa,l character of the Slovak peo,ple. Genuine dissent against the Prague regime comes only fro,m Siovakia while Bohemia and Moravia- remain stra,r.,gely silent even on the old hat Russian trick of de-stalinization . All of us remember that on the occasion of the Hungarian freedom revolution in 1956 the people of Slovakia afone amon,g all the peo,ple of a Russian restored centralist Czeehoslovakia demonstrate<l .sympathy for the aims of that freedom revolution. The da,r.,ger of that demonstrated sympathy was quickly recognized by Moscow As a result three Czech divisions were moved to the common border between Slovakia and Hungary, to seal off any prospeet of assistance to and collaboration with the Hungarian freedom fighters That is a lesson of history which must never be for gotten bv those who love freedom a,nd fight against tyranny m any form There is another lesson to be gained from the era of the Hunga.rian freedom r. volution which needs tellin,g, but wh ich up to this moment, has remained buried in the archives of trut~. That lesson occured several weeks before the outbreak ot the Hungarian revolution. The scene was Poland, lo,n,g under occupation by the oppressive Russian Communists. The Poznan revolt m the spring of 1956 was an important event in history, but it failed to expose to the free world the fuH story o-f the human pressures which had built up amon,g the people of Poland. 'I\hat revolt served as a short fused safety valve for the pent up feelings of the Polish peo,ple. But by September and early October of 1956 the oppressed people of poland had rea,ohed a breaking point. They were willing to risk all in a heroic effort to t>r eak the chains of Russian slavery whi,oh had been fixed to their nat10n al life and ancient heritage. The Russia,n quis,Jings in control of Pol and became alarmed by these develo,pm ents and sent urgent warnings to Moseow. Khru shchsv knew the full meaning of these warning~ and flew to Warsaw to avert disaster for the Russian Empire But the Po:es were r eady for him. They had ma,n-aged tu gain anti-communist discipline and control over 40 divi sions of Po les and East Germans Whzn Khrushchev's plane arrived over Warsaw airport it was not allowed to land. The Russians then surrounded Warsaw airport with a Russian armored divisio,n. But the Poles cou ntered this move by surrounding the Russian division with severa l loyal divisions o.f their own. The Polish leaders o,f revolt sought time to negotiate with th e American Ambassador in Wars-aw. What they sought in these negotiatior.s was assurance of United States moral support if they att:acked the Russians a,nd drove them from P o-lish soil. In thes-e n.egotiations the Po,les were discouraged m then efforts and reminded that their ambition s would likely unlea sh a nuclear war The Polish n,egotiators left the United States Embassy discouraged and disillusione<l and returned to the Warsaw airport There they agre,ed upo,n a pl,a-n to for.ce as ma,n y conc-esstons ou~ of Khrushchev as they cou'1d. They agree-d to demand the release of Cardinal Wyczynski from ho-use arrest, the release of Gomulka from pris•on and a general relaxation of oppressio,n whioh had been laid �SLOVAKIA 33 upon the Polish people . This brave action on the part of the enslaved Polish people held Khrushchev in thr air over Warsaw fo.r four to five hours. When his plane was allowed to land, there was no pounding of a Russiar. shoe on a desk a·n-d there were no insults poured upon the negotiators because the Poles stood firm in their promise of unrestricted bloodshed unless their demands were met, Khrushchev understands that kind of negotiation. He met the demands of the Polish negotiators who negotiated upon n-othing more than their confidence in the Polish people to stand up in support of their ideals arud aspirations. These facts were not known to the people of Hungary. All they knew was that the people of Poland were standing up to the RUJSsian-s. In support of that stand they began peaceful demonstrations in Budapest. It was no accident that these peaceful demostrations moved toward the historic statue of General Bern. A Polish hero who went to the rescue of Hungary a century before when the people of Hungary fought for their national independence, nor was it a,n. accident when the Russian secret po-lice machine gunned the peaceful Hungarian demostrators . Moscow remembered the events ~n Warsaw a few weeks prior ar.,d knew or.!y too well their meaning, a show of brute strength, the traditional source of Russian power, was ordered. That bruta-1 action triggered off the Hungarian freedom revolution which co-uld have bro-ught the Russian Empire down in shambles if the United States had demostrated the moral and political courage which has brought us to a position of leadership in the free world. Looking back on that heroic chapter in history, in light o.f these facts which I have exposed, I must conclude that one of the greatest opportunities in history was bungled in Warsaw in the early days of October 1956. The Poles and East Germans would have been joined by Slovakia. Hungary, Ukraine, Lithuania, R,umania, Byelorussia and all the rest of the peoples in the captive nations. A popular revolution of that dimension, reaching from the Baltic sea to the Caspian sea, wo-uld have brought about the total disintegration of the Russian! Empire. The Russians would have been powerless in the face of such a popular movement for freedom. The Red Army would have fallen i-n-to total collapse, as its occupation elements did during the Hungarian revolution. and Moscow would have been rendered powerless. These conclusions are ir.escapable and they will become more apparent with the passage of time. Truth will not be buried because truth endures time. mortal men and the Imperial Russians. For these reasons I am ho,n,ored by the opportunity which you have given me to participatP. with you in this observance of the 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Inde·p endence. This is the Silver Anniversary of a,n important event in the annuals of freedom's cause. It serves well to provide a brig,ht linmg, a silver lining, to the dark clouds of war which stretch over much of the civilized world. That silver linin-g raises our ho-pes for peace with justice and freedom . It reminds us that the power of human aspirations dwarfs the power and threat of all the nuclear weapons stockpiled thro,u,ghout the world. God bless the Slovak people and hasten the day when their hard journey toward freedom and national independence shall end in a glorious triumph. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1964, Vol. 14 Description An account of the resource Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 29 ADDRESS OF HONORABLE MICHAEL A. FEIGHAN United States Representative 20th Ohio District, Delivered at 25:~h Anniversary of Slovak Independence, Sts. Cyril and Methodius Auditorium, Alameda Avenue, Lakewood, Ohio Sunday, March 15, 1964 It is most fitting that the observance of this 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Independence should be held iin this AuditoriUJlll dedieated to the Brother Saints, Cyril and Mebhodius. For the Brother Sair.ts Cyril and Methodius are indelibly linke<l wibh eleven centuries of Slovak culture and history. They were invited by Rastislav, who then rules Slovakia. To bring th e civiliziir.,g message of Christianity to the Slovak people. That was in the year 863 and so effective was bheir work that history records them as the A,postles o,f bht: Slavs. Slovakia has stood fast by her Christian faitih from the days of Cyril and Methodius to bhe present. T•hat faith has carrie<l her over epics of great suffering and has preserved the cu-lture o.f her people in the face of foreign occupation and rule. The stre!llgth of that faith is matched only by the sturdi.ness and resolve of her people . No Natio·n in history has fought harder or long.:-r for freedom and National Independence than Slovakia. No peo,ple have paid a greater pri-ce for their allegiance to liberty and human diignity than paid by the Slovak peo-ple. And no nation or peo,ple are more firmly committed to the principles of freedom today. To understa,r.-d the aspirations o,f the Slovak people and bheir plight as a nation today we need but look back upon events o,f the century in which WI} live. When this century ope-n ed Slovakia was a part of tihe AustroHungarian Empire - but a very restive part. Their struggle for a-uto,r.,o,my and self-rule over the previous century prepared them well for the politica,l stmggle durin•g and following World War I. It was no accident of history that bhe Austro Hu!llgarian , Russian . German and Ottoman Empires fell in the wake of that war. For it was the yearnings and strug,gles for nation-al independence by nations long suibjugated which to,ppled those empires. In pr e•p aring bhe people o,f Slovakia for their po.Utica! independence the name of Ms,gr . Andrew Hlinka looms large. A great patriotic leader. He took the initiative to form the Slovak peoples party as a un,i ted and demo-cratic voice of his peop:e. That party adopted the guiding priindples of bhe great encyclicals on the socia'1 order as their guideposts for bhe formation of a new soeiail order in central Europe . Meanwhile there were diwussions among Czechs and Slovaks in the United States concer,n,in,g the formation of a common federation following th-e war. One historic meeting took place in Cleveland in 1915. At that meeting the Slovak League of America made clear its intention to support a Czecho Slovak federal state, providing Slovakia would be an equal member with Czoohia and would retain complete auton,o,my in all legislative, executive, judiciary, c-U!ltural and national matters . Matters of common concern such as defense and fore ign affairs were to be handled by a common parliament, that agreement together wit•h the Pittsburgh Pact led to the establishment of a provisional .government at Paris wi-th Thomas Masaryk ,as President. 'Dhat provisional governmen,t was ratified by a Czechoslovak National 30 SLOVAKIA Assembly on November 14, 1918 ar.d eleded Thomas Masaryk a& President of the Republic. It was not long before serious disagreements between the Czechs and Slovaks developed over the issue o-f a strongly centralist state and the concept of a federation of co-equal states. In the opin-ion of the Slovak leaders the Czecho-Slovak Republic was rapidly becoming a Czech state and the identity as well as the independence of Slovakia was thereby threatened. This trend was contrary to all agreements entered ir.to before the formation of bhe Czeoho-Slovak Republic. Under these circumstances Msgr. Hli n,ka went to Paris in September o.f 1919 to plead the cause of Slovak independence before the Pea-ce Conference of the victorious Western Powers. There he was falsely denounced to the Frenc,h authorities by the Czechoslovak delegation as a Hapsburg spy and was forced to depart the coun try. Returning to his homeland he was immediately imprisoned by order of the Prague central government and his release was won by the Slovak people who elected him a deputy. In the years between the wars the Slovaks people fared poorly under the centralized regime in Prague Their ho,pes for self-government were denied by a system they had opposed and rejeded and which laid upon 1:Jhem laws and demands to which they had not given their free consent. Slovaks were the victoms of harsh discriminations in all phases of government, education and public life. Their ancie,nt culture was put under a barra-ge of controls and regulations whiC!h had no other purpose but to suffocate their national heritage and yearnings Practically all the distrkt and county public offices in Slovakia were directed ar.d run by Czechs assigned by Prague. They, along with the police establishment, were directly respon-sible to Prague and none of these arms of a central goverin,ment were responsive to the will of the Slovak people. For example, in 1938, there were 120,926 Czech public officials quartered in Slovakia. 'Ilhe Slo,v ak ,people made numerous attempts to win their just national ri,g hts from the central government in Prague. But these attempts were rebuffed and rejected by a series of delaying tactics, untfulfilled promises and outright deceit. Since a,n alleged parhamentary form of government was established in Pra,gue, the Slovak leaders took their series of complaints to that central body for redress. But there they were faced with impossible odds for bhe parliament was loaded with 233 Czech deputies a,gainst 58 deputtes from S!ovakia _.and 9 deputies from Ruthenia . Hence. the Slovak grievances fell upon unreceptive and unyielding ears. Then the Slovaks leaders took their grievances to President Edward Ben-es, who had succeeded to that post after the death of Thomas Masa,ryk. There they met ,thie s,ame treatment of delay, .ejection and rebuff. When Hitler came to power in Germany and began to manipulate the smaller and weaker nations of Europe, the Slovak people did not seize upon this situation to attain bheir long neglected grievances against the government of Pra•g ue. Contrarywise, all the legitimate political parties of Slovakia moved into a state of cohesive unity. Moreover. they eased their complaints against Prague, conscious of the coming- storm over all of Europe . The Mumch conference of September 22, 1938, which was alleged to be a peace co,niference, unleasherl r.ew forces of division and discord throughout all of central Europe. When the Sudentenland was SLOVAKIA 31 ceded to Germany as the price of peace, tht centralist government of Pra.gue was doomed. Czecho-Slovakia was forced by the circumstances of political reality to become a federation of Boihemia-Moravia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia . Slovakia, at long last, was to become master of its destiny as well as self-goverr.ing. But the removal of 9,000 Czech officials in Slovakia to make room for officials chosen by the Slovak people caused additional strains on relations with Prague, although Edward Benes had fled into exile, the centralist vent of Prague remained, and this despite the lesson of Munich. On March 10, 1939, the Prague government, annoyed at the serious manner in which the Slovaks were taking their responsibilities for self-government, dismm,ed the autonomous Slovak government headed by Dr. Josep,h Tiso and declared martial Jaw over all o<f Slovakia Pubiic demonstrations against the Prague ,g overnment spread throughout Slovakia a,n.ct threatened a blood bath revolution. Under these circumstances, Hitler invited Dr. Tiso to a conference in Berlin where he showed him a telegram from Von Ribbentrop, then forei,gn minister oif the Reich, in which the threat of forei-gn occupation of Slovakia was made. Hitler then suggested this threat mi,g ht be avoided Lf Slovakia declared its national independence. While Hitler was a mad fooL he was by no means ignorant about the aspirations of bh-e Slovak people for national independence. Dr. Tiso returned to Bratislava where he reported fully to the Slovak diet on his conference with Hitler in Berlin. The Slovak diet then proclaimed the nation-a:! independence of Slovakia on March 14, 193·9. That, in quick summary, is the history of the 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Independence we obs·e rve here today. All that I have said, and more, can be found in an official report o,f the United States Congress, rendered by the select Comm ittee to In-vestiga te Communist aggression 83rd Congress. I was a member of that committee and I can tell you its members had no fear of the truth as we sought the facts on this vital issue. That report also tells the story of Slovakia's loss of national independence follow ing World War II and the Manner in which the unprincipled po.Jitical rogues who made up the centralist goverr.ment of Pra,gue sold out t,heir own people as well as the Slovak nation to Imperial R•ussia. It is fitting at bhis moment t,hat we o·f.fer u,p a prayer for the s-0ul of Dr. Joseph Tiso, who m1de the supreme Sa•c rifice for the Political ideals of a free and iir.,dependent Slovakia. Dr. Tiso was tried in a Mo-ck tial, sentenced and har.,g ed by the Communist quislin•gs who eventually so,Jd out their own country to the Russian Communists. But history will treat Dr. Tiso kindly because the passa,ge of time has brou.ght forth and will continue to bring forth the tru t,h a-bout his desperate efforts to save his native land. Slovakia today suffers under bhe harsh heel of Russia,n Communist occupation. That occupation has sou,ght to rob the Slovak pe o,ple of t,heir ancient traditions, their religious, and their heritage as well as their political liberties. But the Slovak people are stee,Jed in the tactics which must be employed agamst a foreign occupier. Time and the experience of centuries has prepared them well for the tests they now endure. It is little wonder that the spirit o•f resista,r.,ce to tyranny Tuns so ,s,tro,n g -i n Slovak-i:a: :today. The Russians as well a,s their Czech 32 SLOVAKIA quislings in Prague, know the power of Slovak national aspirations. History is repeating itself today as the people of Slovakia are bringing pressures upon the die-hard Russia,n stalinist regime entrenohed at Prague. Those pressures are agai-n st the twin chauvinisms which seek to erase the distmct nationa,l character of the Slovak peo,ple. Genuine dissent against the Prague regime comes only fro,m Siovakia while Bohemia and Moravia- remain stra,r.,gely silent even on the old hat Russian trick of de-stalinization . All of us remember that on the occasion of the Hungarian freedom revolution in 1956 the people of Slovakia afone amon,g all the peo,ple of a Russian restored centralist Czeehoslovakia demonstrate<l .sympathy for the aims of that freedom revolution. The da,r.,ger of that demonstrated sympathy was quickly recognized by Moscow As a result three Czech divisions were moved to the common border between Slovakia and Hungary, to seal off any prospeet of assistance to and collaboration with the Hungarian freedom fighters That is a lesson of history which must never be for gotten bv those who love freedom a,nd fight against tyranny m any form There is another lesson to be gained from the era of the Hunga.rian freedom r. volution which needs tellin,g, but wh ich up to this moment, has remained buried in the archives of trut~. That lesson occured several weeks before the outbreak ot the Hungarian revolution. The scene was Poland, lo,n,g under occupation by the oppressive Russian Communists. The Poznan revolt m the spring of 1956 was an important event in history, but it failed to expose to the free world the fuH story o-f the human pressures which had built up amon,g the people of Poland. 'I\hat revolt served as a short fused safety valve for the pent up feelings of the Polish peo,ple. But by September and early October of 1956 the oppressed people of poland had rea,ohed a breaking point. They were willing to risk all in a heroic effort to t>r eak the chains of Russian slavery whi,oh had been fixed to their nat10n al life and ancient heritage. The Russia,n quis,Jings in control of Pol and became alarmed by these develo,pm ents and sent urgent warnings to Moseow. Khru shchsv knew the full meaning of these warning~ and flew to Warsaw to avert disaster for the Russian Empire But the Po:es were r eady for him. They had ma,n-aged tu gain anti-communist discipline and control over 40 divi sions of Po les and East Germans Whzn Khrushchev's plane arrived over Warsaw airport it was not allowed to land. The Russians then surrounded Warsaw airport with a Russian armored divisio,n. But the Poles cou ntered this move by surrounding the Russian division with severa l loyal divisions o.f their own. The Polish leaders o,f revolt sought time to negotiate with th e American Ambassador in Wars-aw. What they sought in these negotiatior.s was assurance of United States moral support if they att:acked the Russians a,nd drove them from P o-lish soil. In thes-e n.egotiations the Po,les were discouraged m then efforts and reminded that their ambition s would likely unlea sh a nuclear war The Polish n,egotiators left the United States Embassy discouraged and disillusione<l and returned to the Warsaw airport There they agre,ed upo,n a pl,a-n to for.ce as ma,n y conc-esstons ou~ of Khrushchev as they cou'1d. They agree-d to demand the release of Cardinal Wyczynski from ho-use arrest, the release of Gomulka from pris•on and a general relaxation of oppressio,n whioh had been laid SLOVAKIA 33 upon the Polish people . This brave action on the part of the enslaved Polish people held Khrushchev in thr air over Warsaw fo.r four to five hours. When his plane was allowed to land, there was no pounding of a Russiar. shoe on a desk a·n-d there were no insults poured upon the negotiators because the Poles stood firm in their promise of unrestricted bloodshed unless their demands were met, Khrushchev understands that kind of negotiation. He met the demands of the Polish negotiators who negotiated upon n-othing more than their confidence in the Polish people to stand up in support of their ideals arud aspirations. These facts were not known to the people of Hungary. All they knew was that the people of Poland were standing up to the RUJSsian-s. In support of that stand they began peaceful demonstrations in Budapest. It was no accident that these peaceful demostrations moved toward the historic statue of General Bern. A Polish hero who went to the rescue of Hungary a century before when the people of Hungary fought for their national independence, nor was it a,n. accident when the Russian secret po-lice machine gunned the peaceful Hungarian demostrators . Moscow remembered the events ~n Warsaw a few weeks prior ar.,d knew or.!y too well their meaning, a show of brute strength, the traditional source of Russian power, was ordered. That bruta-1 action triggered off the Hungarian freedom revolution which co-uld have bro-ught the Russian Empire down in shambles if the United States had demostrated the moral and political courage which has brought us to a position of leadership in the free world. Looking back on that heroic chapter in history, in light o.f these facts which I have exposed, I must conclude that one of the greatest opportunities in history was bungled in Warsaw in the early days of October 1956. The Poles and East Germans would have been joined by Slovakia. Hungary, Ukraine, Lithuania, R,umania, Byelorussia and all the rest of the peoples in the captive nations. A popular revolution of that dimension, reaching from the Baltic sea to the Caspian sea, wo-uld have brought about the total disintegration of the Russian! Empire. The Russians would have been powerless in the face of such a popular movement for freedom. The Red Army would have fallen i-n-to total collapse, as its occupation elements did during the Hungarian revolution. and Moscow would have been rendered powerless. These conclusions are ir.escapable and they will become more apparent with the passage of time. Truth will not be buried because truth endures time. mortal men and the Imperial Russians. For these reasons I am ho,n,ored by the opportunity which you have given me to participatP. with you in this observance of the 25th Anniversary of Slovak National Inde·p endence. This is the Silver Anniversary of a,n important event in the annuals of freedom's cause. It serves well to provide a brig,ht linmg, a silver lining, to the dark clouds of war which stretch over much of the civilized world. That silver linin-g raises our ho-pes for peace with justice and freedom . It reminds us that the power of human aspirations dwarfs the power and threat of all the nuclear weapons stockpiled thro,u,ghout the world. God bless the Slovak people and hasten the day when their hard journey toward freedom and national independence shall end in a glorious triumph.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Address of Honorable Michael A. Feighan Description An account of the resource United States Representative 20th Ohio District, Delivered at 25th Anniversary of Slovak Independence, Sts. Cyril and Methodius Auditorium, Alameda Avenue, Lakewood, Ohio - Sunday, March 15, 1964 Slovakia, Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964 pp. 29-33 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Feighan, Michael Aloysius, 1905- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/375a17065561ca0734c57eedcc9369fa.pdf dd43b677299f0b58fc78d8aab55eaa58 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 7 The Slovak Question in the Interwar (1918-1938) and Post-War (1945-1948) Czechoslovak Republics James R. Felak A key element of the aura of tragedy that surrounds Czechoslovakia's history in the eyes of many of its students, observers, and sympathizers is that state's experience in having its liberal, Western-oriented, parliamentary democratic, pluralistic political system destroyed by a powerful, aggressive, neighboring totalitarian empire twice in this century. In the early fall of 1938, threatened by Hitler's Germany, abandoned by their allies, and facing pressure from discontented ethnic minorities at home, Czechoslovakia's leaders succumbed to the Munich Agreement and dismantled their parliamentary democratic regime, the last one remaining in East Central Europe, and replaced it with a quasiauthoritarian alternative. In February 1948, a restored multi-party democracy in Czechoslovakia once again met its end, this time through the machinations of a pro-Soviet Communist minority that was able to seize power and thereafter transform Czechoslovakia into a carbon-copy of the Stalinist "people's democracies" that had been imposed over the previous years on most of the countries of the region. In the periods that concluded with the demise of both of these experiments in liberal democracy, the relations, and particularly the tensions between Slovaks and Czechs �8 SLOVAKIA played an important role. This paper will examine the state of Slovak-Czech relations in both the inter-war, and post-war Republics, arguing that the obstacles to a mutually satisfactory solution to the Slovak question were formidable in both situations. It will also draw comparisons between the two cases, identifying elements of continuity and change. The events of autumn 1918, with the collapse of the AustroHungarian empire and proclamation of an independent Czechoslovak Republic, brought Czechs and Slovaks together in a single state. Slovak discontent became apparent from very early on. It was inevitable that Czechs would dominate the new Republic. Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by more than two-to-one, and the Czech lands were much more highly developed economically than Slovakia. Czechs had large middle and working classes, and had acquired considerable political and administrative experience in the Austrian half of the Empire. By 1900, they were a well-organized, well-educated, confident nation with a strong sense of national identity. This was in stark contrast to relatively poor, largely rural Slovakia, where discriminatory Hungarian policies had kept Slovaks from acquiring much political or administrative experience or educating themselves in a Slovak national spirit. As the twentieth century dawned on Slovakia, Slovak nationalists were only just beginning to build a mass national movement. The new regime, both in its structure and its justification, carried the seeds of Slovak discontent. First, Czechoslovakia was based on the idea that a Czechoslovak nation existed, which served as the so-called constituent nation (statotvomy narocf) upon which the Republic was based. 1 This notion was anchored in ' See Ladislav Lipscher, Verfassung und politische Verwaltung in der Tschechos/owakei 1918-1939 (Munich, 1979), pp. 41 -42 for a discussion of the statotvornyconcept . �SLOVAKJA 9 the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, along with the belief that a Czechoslovak language existed and would serve as the Republic 's official language.2 These stipulations, while freeing the Slovaks from Magyarization, denied them one of the major goals of the Slovak national movement since its inception at the time of Cudovft Stur in the 1830s and 40-the recognition that a distinct Slovak nation in fact existed. In hand with the Czechoslovak idea went a centralistic administrative structure for the new state, with decision-making powers concentrated in the central government in Prague, which was situated in the heart of the Czech lands . Aside from being a corollary to the idea that the state was based on a single Czechoslovak nation, it reflected fears among Czechs and a number of Czech-oriented Slovaks that autonomy for Slovakia would set a precedent for similar demands by the German and Hungarian minorities and aid Hungary's efforts to ultimately detach Slovakia from Czechoslovakia and return it to Budapest 's control. As Czechoslovakia's then Foreign Minister Edvard Benes said in 1932, greater autonomy for Slovakia would "mean for this state the slogan Slovakia to the Slovaks, German regions to the Germans, Magyar regions to the Magyars." 3 There was also a strong anti-Catholic sentiment among Czech elites and some of their Slovak collaborators, manifested in a fear that if ' The Constitution opens with the words, "We, the Czechoslovak nation," and goes on to stipulate that "The Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the Republic." For an English translation of the Constitution, see Howard Lee McBain and Lindsay Rogers, Eds., The New Constitutions of Europe(New York, 1922), pp. 307-342. ' Quoted in Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia; The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ, 1988), p. 137. �10 SLOVAKIA Slovaks governed themselves, they would choose a government that was too reactionary and clerical for the progressive tastes shared by most of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Finally, there was a widespread belief that, blighted by Magyarization, Slovaks were not yet capable of self-government. Two further issues that served to fuel Slovak discontent were the economy and religion. Along with the damage done by the First World War, Slovaks now had to cope with a new international boundary that, among other things, cut them off from the traditional markets, resources, and outlets for surplus labor that they had enjoyed in the larger Austro-Hungarian economic unit. Furthermore, the industry that Slovakia did have, lost the subsidies that the Hungarian government had been providing and had to compete with the more efficient and more heavily capitalized industry of the Czech lands. The result was an economic depression and, in effect, a de-industrialization of Slovakia during the early l 920s. The tax rate was also higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands during the l 920s. 4 Religion proved to be a major irritant in Slovak-Czech relations. Many Czech nationalists, drawing inspiration from the Hussite tradition and regarding Catholicism as a reactionary historical force identified with German-Austrian hegemony over the Czech lands, viewed the Roman Catholic Church with suspicion and even outright hostility. This was dramatically demonstrated shortly after Czechoslovakia achieved her independence, when a Czech 4 See C. A. Macartney , Hungary and Her Successors, The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937(London, 1937), pp. 127- 131 and R. W. SetonWatson, Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey(London, 1931), pp. 36-37, for contemporary discussions of Slovakia's economic problems. Despite their divergent interpretations of the Slovak question, Macartney's and SetonWatson's characterizations of Slovakia's economic plight are quite similar. �SLOVAKIA 11 mob smashed to pieces the statue of the Virgin Mary on Old Town Square in Prague. Reports of this renunciation of a part of the Bohemian past did not play well in Slovakia, where among Slovaks such hostility toward the Church was considerably weaker, if operative at all. The forced removal of crucifixes from the walls of schools, disruption of religions services and desecration of sacred places and objects, and state seizure of Catholic schools and church lands helped foster in Slovakia the image of the Czech as an enemy of Christianity, especially as traditionally understood in Slovakia. 5 Also contributing to religious tensions was the fact that Czech political elites had, already before 1918, developed their closest relations with members of Slovakia's Protestant (Lutheran) minority. Slovak Protestants had traditional links with Czech culture, and were more likely than Slovak Catholics to share the modernist world view that was standard among Czechoslovakia' s founders. By way of example, of the fifty-seven Slovaks appointed to the Provisional National Assembly that was established to draw up Czechoslovakia's constitution, twenty-eight were Protestants. This in a land that was approximately 79 per cent Catholic. 6 Such an outcome could hardly fail to appear discriminatory and unrepresentative to many Slovaks. One final irritant in Slovak-Czech relations is worth discussing at some length, as it shows just how complicated this relationship could be. This is the question of the migration of Czech administrators , teachers, and other professionals and government emplo5 Jozef Spirko, Cirkevne dejiny s osobitnym zretefom na vyvin cirkevnych de- Jin Slovenska, sv. IV (Bratislava, 1993), p. 466; see E L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, Eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy 19 I 9-1939, First Series, Vol. IV, 1919 (London, 1956), p. 3, for a reference co anti-Catholic actions in Slovakia in a report by the British Charge d' affaires in Prague . 6 Ladislav Lipscher, "Klub slovenskych poslancov v rokoch 1918-1920," Historicky casopis, XVI, 2 ( 1968), pp. 140- 141 . �12 SLOVAKIA yees to Slovakia after 1918. Slovakia lacked qualified professionals and administrators who were untainted by affiliation with the former Hungarian regime and its education system, given the fact that Slovaks before 1918 could rarely advance socially and professionally except by becoming "Magyarized." For this reason, tens of thousands of Czechs moved to Slovakia in the 1920s. 7 Though many of them were needed, their presence in Slovakia proved to be a major cause of Slovak discontent. First, they represented a cultural intrusion of modern-thinking, largely urban progressive types into a traditional, rural society, and as such offended many Slovaks with paternalism and tactlessness. Second , they received considerable salary supplements since Slovakia was regarded as a hardship post. 8 This income disparity between imported Czechs and native Slovak employees was also a sore point. Third, there was a perception among Slovaks that their native land was being used by Czechs as a dumping ground for officials who were second-rate. Finally, Slovak resentment was especially acute over the fact that among the Czechs who received employment in Slovakia were not only professionals and high-level administrators , but railway porters, postmen, doormen, messengers , and janitors, positions for which there were plenty of capable Slo- vaks at hand .9 This situation can be explained at least in part by the nature of Czechoslovakia's political system. In Czechoslovakia's coalition ' See Jan Rychlfk, Cesi a Slovaci ve 20.stoletf; cesko-slo venske vztahy J 9 J41945 (Bratislava, 1997), pp. 86-87 for statistics on the number of Czechs employed in Slovakia during the interwar period . ' Natasa Krajcovicova, "K otazke personalneho obsadzovania organov statnej a verejnej spravy na Slovensku v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR", Historickf casopis, XLIV , 4, 1996, pp. 619-620. 9 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 61 -62; Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 34. �SLOVAKIA 13 governments, certain parties tended to retain particular ministries over the long-term. Thus, it was not unusual for a political party, whose support came almost exclusively from the Czech lands, to control a substantial number of state administrative positions in Slovakia which it would allot to its Czech adherents as patronage. Such was the case, for example, with the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and the railroads. Compounding the problem of Czech employment in Slovakia was the fact that Prague, with the help of these migrants, was so successful in developing a Czechoslovak education system in Slovakia that by the end of the 1920s, Slovakia was producing for the first time a native intelligentsia fully trained in Czechoslovak high schools and colleges. Unfortunately, precisely at the time that these cohorts of educated Slovaks were coming onto the job market, Czechoslovakia was hit by the Great Depression. These young Slovaks, many of whom could not find appropriate employment, came to resent the fact that Czechs were working in Slovakia in positions that they coveted. Many of these Czechs meanwhile had struck roots in Slovakia and, even if they wished, had little to return to in Depressionstricken Bohemia and Moravia. Many of these members of the young Slovak intelligentsia inclined toward radical politics of the left and right; among the latter, calls for Czechs to go home became standard fare at political rallies. Though, as one scholar recently pointed out, the personnel question was an extremely complicated issue that cannot be understood from a purely ethnic standpoint, the fact that Czechs were working in Slovakia while Slovaks were unemployed provided grist for Slovak nationalist mills and made this issue a constant irritant for Slovak-Czech relations. 10 ' 0 Krajcovicova, "K otazke", pp. 627, 628 . �14 SLOVAKIA Politically, Slovaks responded to this growing discontent in a number of ways. The antidote to Czechoslovak centralism was Slovak autonomy, a call that was embraced by the Slovak party with the greatest popularity, the Slovak People's Party (SPP). Led by the populist priest Andrej Hlinka, it sought to mobilize Slovak religious, economic, political and cultural discontent into a broadbased movement for autonomy and national recognition. It staunchly supported an autonomous Slovakia right up to the end of the First Republic. Two other groups also called for autonomy for Slovakia, at least in their rhetoric-the Communists and the parties of the Hungarian minority. This meant that in the parliamentary elections of 1925, 1929, and 1935, over 50% of voters in Slovakia opted for parties that rejected Czechoslovak centralism. 11 While about half of ethnic Slovaks voted for the SPP, most other Slovaks voted for the Slovak affiliates of Czechoslovak-wide parties. These parties supported the idea of a Czechoslovak nation and the centralist system. Because they were always or nearly always in the government, they could provide supporters with certain material advantages that the SPP could not, so it was quite likely that considerably more Slovaks supported autonomy than voted for the autonomist SPP. The most significant of such parties was the Agrarians, which alone among the government parties had a strong Slovak wing, led by Milan Hodza. Though officially accepting the Czechoslovak idea and opposing autonomy for Slovakia, the Agrarians tried in the 1930s to develop an alternative to both Prague centralism and SPP autonomism - the socalled regionalist option. This involved promoting cooperation of Slovaks on behalf of Slovak interests on regional rather than national grounds. In theory, regionalism gave the Slovak Agra- 11 For electoral statistics, see Leff, National Conflict, p. 52. �SLOVAKIA 15 rians the possibility to champion Slovak interests without the sort of nationalism that could upset Prague and the Czechoslovak constitutional order. 12 Despite considerable support for autonomy in Slovakia throughout the inter-war period, the cards were stacked against success in this regard for a number of reasons. Some of these have been discussed above and need little further elaboration- the Czech numerical preponderance over Slovaks, and superiority in terms of modem economic, cultural, and political development; the constitutional stipulation that a Czechoslovak nation, rather than separate Czech and Slovak nations, existed and was the basis of the state; the distaste for traditional Catholicism among the Republic's ruling elites; the fears that autonomy for Slovakia would play into the hands of Hungarian and German nationalists and make it harder for Prague to resist their autonomist demands; the belief that Slovaks were not capable of governing themselves; and the difficulties, owing to problems of political patronage and economic stagnation, of finding appropriate employment for the university-educated Slovaks the system was producing by the late 1920s and their consequent tum towards radicalism. Other factors were at play as well. It should be kept in mind that both of Czechoslovakia's presidents during the inter-war period, Tomas G. Masaryk and Edvard Benes, were staunch champions of the Czechoslovak idea and opponents of autonomy for Slovakia. Furthermore, the autonomist forces in Slovakia were not united, and in fact were fundamentally divided over their conceptions of just what sort of autonomous Slovakia they wanted. The Hungarian parties regarded Slovaks and Hungarians as minorities with an equal claim to self-government in Slovakia, 12 M. Kropilak, ed., Dejiny S/ovenska, V ( 1918-1945) (Bratislava, 1985), p. 195. �16 SLOVAKlA with hopes that someday that territory would return to a restored Kingdom of Hungary. The SPP, on the other hand, believed in "Slovakia for the Slovaks," as one of its most cherished slogans rang out, and saw Slovaks as the statotvomy narod in Slovakia, with Hungarians as merely a minority. The Communists , for their part, were open to autonomy for Slovakia only if it were to come in conjunction with the establishment of a Communist dictatorship of the proletariat, something that repelled the other pro-autonomy parties. The nature of the Czechoslovak political system was particularly crucial in making it highly unlikely that the SPP, barring some sort of exceptional circumstances, would be able to realize its autonomist goals via normal political channels. While winning the votes of around half of the ethnic Slovaks, the SPP 's support statewide was only around 7%. This meant that it would have to find allies if it wished to establish influence in or increase pressure on the government. Such alliance-seeking was problematic, however. Several leading Czechoslovak parties were outright hostile to Slovak nationalism and the idea of autonomy, for example the Social Democratic Party, National Socialist Party, and, after 1921 , the Czechoslovak People 's Party. Taken together, these three parties represented a considerable proportion of the governing majority. 13 Among the opposition parties were a few that were open to cooperation with the SPP, such as the Hungarian nationalists, Czech fascists, and the Slovak National Party (a Protestant autonomist party), but they were either insignificant in numbers and influence, or holding fundamentally different ultimate goals from the SPP. The Slovak wing of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, the second strongest electoral draw in Slovakia, could theoreti13 For example, of the government 's 206 seats in Parliament after the 1929 elections, these three parties held 96 seats. �SLOVAKJA 17 cally have formed a powerful bloc had its regionalist program developed into a genuine political collaboration with the SPP. However, two factors-the Agrarians' fear that the SPP would dominate an autonomous Slovakia, and the fact that the Agrarian Party 's leadership in Prague was unwilling to abandon centralism-kept such collaboration at a minimum. As with many national conflicts, it was probably the vicious circle of fear that accounted most for the failure to solve the Slovak question satisfactorily. In the 1920s, Czechoslovak centralists feared that an autonomous Slovakia would be easy prey for Hungarians eager to revise the post-War peace treaties and detach Slovakia from the Czech lands and return it to Hungary. The close collaboration after 1918 between SPP leader Hlinka and two notorious Hungarian sympathizers, Frantisek Jehlicka and Vojtech Tuka, only heightened Prague's apprehensions. 14 By the mid1930s, the Germans had replaced the Hungarians as the chief fear of Czechoslovak centralists with respect to Slovakia. After Konrad Henlein 's strong showing in the 1935 parliamentary elections, Prague worried that autonomy for Slovakia would make it harder to resist similar demands by Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority. The SPP, at the same time, had a great fear that Czechs would solve the Sudeten German question by granting autonomy to the predominately and historically German lands, while ignoring similar demands from Slovaks. This fear, combined with the 1 • Jehlicka was a Slovak priest of pro-Hungarian sympathy who accompanied Hlinka on a trip to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where they sought to present the Slovak national case to the Great Powers . After the trip, which proved to be a fiasco, Hlinka was imprisoned by the Czechoslovak government while Jehlicka went into exile; Tuka was a pro-Hungarian university professor who lost his job after 1918 and found a new career in the SPP as an editor, parliamentarian, and advisor to Hlinka. He was inv o lved in various intrigues against the Czechoslovak Republic in the 1920s. �18 SLOVAKJA SPP's inability to realize its demands via normal channels, led that party, or at least certain factions within it, to seek support repeatedly from abroad. And since the Western democracies tended to support the post-War status quo, the SPP sometimes looked to those neighbors of Czechoslovakia who were seeking change and, hence, were seen by the Republic's rulers as a threat. Hlinka and his party consistently cultivated good relations with official and unofficial circles in Poland, while SPP radicals sought closer ties with Germany and Czechoslovakia's pro-Nazi Sudeten Germans . 15 This in turn frightened Czechs and made it even less likely that autonomy for Slovakia would be agreed to by the power brokers in Prague. Throughout 1938, fears on both sides increased as German pressure, both from within and without Czechoslovakia, intensified, as did Slovak demands for autonomy. Once the Czechoslovak government elected to accept the Munich Agreement and hand over large tracts of its territory to Nazi Germany, the SPP pressed its claims and got a demoralized Czechoslovak government not only to acquiesce in its autonomist demands but also to accept the existence of a distinct Slovak nation. Scarcely a week after the Munich Agreement, Prague and the SPP agreed that Czechoslovakia would be restructured as Czecho-Slovakia, with an autonomous Slovakia run by the SPP. When Hitler opted to destroy Czecho-Slovakia m March of 1939, this autonomous Slovakia became the independent Slovak Republic, closely allied with Nazi Germany as one of its satellites, while the Czech lands were incorporated wholly into the Third Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia 15 See, for example, James Ramon Felak, "At the Price of the Republic": Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party 1929- 1938 (Pittsburgh , PA, 1994), pp. 171 -175, for a discussion of SPP flirtations with Polish and German nationalists. �SLOVAKIA 19 survived the war as an authoritarian, one-party state, led by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso, who succeeded Hlinka in the summer of 1938 as head of the SPP. Both Roman Catholics and their Church were privileged in this period. At the same time, a resistance movement emerged composed of an uneasy alliance of Communists and democrats, which erupted in the Slovak National Uprising of August-September 1944. Both the Slovak Republic and the Uprising would have major impacts on the post-War situation in Slovakia. First, by having their own state, Slovaks gained the confidence and experience necessary for self-government. By 1945, the idea of returning to a Czechoslovak nation and state run from Prague was repellent across the political spectrum in Slovakia. Second, the very fact of this state which, like the autonomous Slovakia of October 1938, came into existence on the coattails of Hitler's march into Central Europe, tainted Slovak accomplishments, as many Czechs regarded Slovaks, especially those in the SPP, as collaborators with the Czechs' mortal enemy, Nazi Germany. Thus, Czechs often saw manifestations of Slovak nationalism as fascist in nature and threatening to the Republic. Third, despite the susceptibility of Slovaks to charges of collaboration, at the same time, thanks to the Slovak National Uprising, Slovaks could point to the fact that their own homegrown resistance to Nazism far exceeded Czech efforts in numbers and intensity. It also created a politically influential association of partisan veterans who could potentially throw their weight around in the postWar situation. With Germany's defeat, Czechoslovakia was restored. This time, however, there would be no Czechoslovak idea. Slovaks were recognized as a distinct nation, and allowed to retain the Slovak national organs that they had set up during the Uprising. �20 SLOVAKJA Czech Communist leader Klement Gottwald, Czechoslovakia's most powerful politician at war's end, proclaimed that "the Slovaks are to be the masters in their own Slovak land." 16 A whole host of problems emerged however, some almost at once, to foil what was a hopeful beginning for advocates of Slovak autonomy. First, the set-up was an asymmetrical one. Slovak national organs, such as the Slovak National Council and Board of Commissioners, were established, but with no parallel Czech organs, only federal organs with competence for the entire state. This led to conflicts over where the competence of the central organs ended and that of the Slovak ones began. The "Slovak question" returned in a new form. Second, the cultural differences that plagued SlovakCzech relations during the First Republic continued. Czech suspicion of Slovak Catholicism was, if anything, even more intense after the experience of the Second World War, when the pro-Nazi Slovak state was led by a Catholic priest under whom the Church enjoyed far more privilege and influence than it had under the First Republic or could hope to after 1945. Third, Czech numerical dominance remained, and if Czech parties could be united on the issue, they would be able to scale back Slovak self-government with little resistance. It also became clear, especially after Czechoslovakia's first post-war parliamentary elections in May of 1946, that Slovakia was far less friendly politically to the Left than were the Czech lands. While Czechs chose left-wing parties in percentages that rank among all-time highs for Europe (the Communists, Social Democrats, and National Socialists together received over 79% of the vote in the Czech lands, with the Communists leading the way with 40% ), Slovaks rejected the Com16 Joseph A. Mikus, ed., Slovakia, A Political and Constitutional History, Acta Academica Slovaca 48 (Bratislava, 1995), p. 242; this work contains an English translation of the text of the Kosice Agreement of April 5, 1945, pp. 242-243. �SLOVAKIA 21 munists in favor of the Democrats by a slightly more than two-to• one margm . 17 These above factors combined to complicate post-war Czechoslovak politics and to pose formidable impediments to the realization of the promised program of autonomy for Slovakia. The political landscape in Slovakia after the War was occupied by three main groups, politically speaking. On the Left were the Communists, belonging to the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), separate from, yet ultimately under the control of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) in Prague. The KSS was divided between those Slovak Communists who were willing to assert what they regarded as Slovak interests, and those who were more closely under the thumb of Prague. By August 1945 the latter, on Prague 's intervention, were given the upper hand in the KSS. 18 The only significant party besides the Communists was the Slovak Democratic Party (DP), founded by non-Communist veterans of the Slovak National Uprising, attracting above all those Slovak Protestants who had been alienated by the SPP's assertive Catholicism but at the same time suspicious of Prague 's centralism. The third group was the Catholics themselves, most of whom were unorganized politically with the outlawing of the SPP at war 's end. Thus, the party that traditionally drew about half the Slovak vote no longer existed, and a land that was 80% Catholic was offered only parties dominated by atheists or Protestants. This large bloc of voters without a party home would, as both the Communists and the Democrats realized, be decisive in the parlia- 17 Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch 1945-1948 na ceste ku komunistickej tota/ite(Bratislava, 1994), p. 39. " l.'.ubomir Liptak, ed., Politicke strany na Slovensku, 1860-1989 (Bratislava, 1992), pp. 267-268; and Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism. Slovakia, and the Communists, 19 I 8-1948 (Boulder, CO, 1983), p. 86. �22 SLOVAKJA mentary elections. Thus, the KSS began to woo Slovak Catholics, hoping to create a separate Slovak Catholic party that would keep Catholic voters away from the DP and thereby keep Slovakia's non-Communist population divided. 19 Just as it appeared that Communist intrigues would succeed, the DP delivered an olive branch to disgruntled Slovak Catholics. It was called the April Agreement, and involved the DP and leading Slovak Catholics. This Agreement specified that the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in all DP organs and institutions was to be seven-to-three, with Catholics to be allotted two-thirds of the party's seats in Parliament. In addition, Catholics were to get their own DP daily, the Demokraticke hlasy. 20 As a result of the April Agreement, Catholics moved into leading positions in the DP's presidium and general secretariat. Nevertheless, this Catholic-Protestant reconciliation was a Pyrrhic victory for Slovakia's non-Communist forces. It did enable the DP to win the May 1946 parliamentary elections in a resounding manner, and made it clear that Slovakia was overwhelmingly anti-Communist. At the same time, however, the Communists were able to exploit the April Agreement successfully for their own ends. With an influx of Catholics into the DP, the same Catholics that Communists had been wooing up to that point, the KSS now sought to portray the DP as riddled with fascist traitors loyal to former leader Tiso, and dangerous to the integrity and democracy of the Czechoslovak state. 21 Thus began a determined , 19 Letz, Slovensko, pp. 28-29 ; Michal Bamovsky, Na ceste k monopolu moci; Mocenskopoliticke zapasy na S/ovensku v rokoch 1945-1948 (Bratislava, 1993), p. 73 . 20 Bamovsky, Na ceste, p. 80; Letz, S/ovensko, p. 36. 21 See United States Department of State, Decimal Files, 860f.00/6- l 346, no. 985 ; (hereafter referred to as DOS). �SLOVAKIA 23 sustained, and aggressive effort by Communist propaganda to slander the DP. Furthermore, the election results made it clear to the Communists that autonomy for Slovakia would be a disaster for Communist interests. Consequently, the Communists began to push aggressively for a scaling back of the competence of Slovak national organs in favor of federal ones. At the same time, Communists sought to use the alarm they could generate over a "fascist restoration" in Slovakia to frighten Czech non-Communists into keeping the DP at a distance. With the acquiescence, and at times the support of the Czech democratic parties, the Communists succeeded in reasserting Prague's control over Slovakia and largely isolating the DP. As U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt wrote in May, 1947: For the Czech non-Communist parties and their leaders , including Benes, as a result of their experiences in 1938-1939 when Slovak aspirations contributed materially to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak State, feel with a deep intensity that Slovak autonomy, while acceptable in theory, must have definite limitations in practice. These leaders are therefore all too likely to side with the Communists on any issues to which the latter are able to give a Czech versus Slovak or autonomy versus centralism complexion. As a result the Democrats are very frequently left to face the Communist onslaught alone. 22 Although, strictly speaking, Czechoslovakia was a democracy, with free elections and multiple political parties with their own periodicals, one is struck by just how circumscribed the system in fact was. A number of political parties were banned, including the most popular Czech and Slovak parties of the inter-war years, the Agrarians and SPP, respectively. New parties were prohibited 22 DOS, 5-2947, no. 2477. �24 SLOVAKIA without the consent of the existing parties. Nor could one set up an individual periodical without their permission. Government intervention in and influence over the media was considerable, and publication of anything critical of the Soviet Union was taboo. The regime was also established to accord the Communists more influence than electoral results would warrant. 23 This was particularly the case in Slovakia, where despite losing by nearly a two-to-one margin in the parliamentary elections, the Communists retained the chairmanship of the Board of CoJilIIlissioners, which acted as the executive branch in Slovakia, and kept the Democrats from holding the crucial post of Commissioner of the Interior, which went to the non-partisan Mikulas Ferjencfk.24 Without much support from the Czech non-Communist parties and facing a Communist-influenced political police, the DP was an easy prey for the most concentrated Communist attack yet. In June of 1947, the security police in Slovakia uncovered an alleged "anti-state conspiracy", which the Communists used to blackmail and intimidate the DP.25 Using their influence in and control over state security organs and employing 'agents provocateurs', the Communists were able, reminiscent of their assault on the Smallholders Party in Hungary, to charge leading Slovak Democrats with complicity in the conspiracy. Though the Czech democratic parties were by this time wise to Communist intrigues and took some steps in defense of the DP, they never quite lost their suspicions that, just possibly, Communist charges against the 23 For a discussion of Czechoslovakia's "people's democratic" system, see Karel Kaplan, The Short March; The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 19451948 (London, 1987), pp. 33-54. 24 Bamovsky, Na ceste, pp. 116- I I 7. 25 lbid., pp. 140-141 ; Letz, Slovensko, pp. 54-55. �SLOVAKIA 25 DP might be accurate.26 With the Czech democrats thereby paralyzed, the Communists, with the police in their pockets, and the trade union and partisan organizations that they dominated mobilized on their behalf, felt that the correlation of forces were such in Slovakia that they attempted a 'putsch' in November of 194 7. This involved a KSS attempt to force a reconstitution of the Slovak Board of Commissioners through a political crisis caused by the planned and coordinated resignation of its Communist members. Though only partly successful, and though the DP and Czech non-Marxist parties stuck together from this point on, this cooperation proved to be too little, too late. The attempted coup in Slovakia was followed by a successful one in Prague in February 1948; in the latter case, it was the Czechoslovak Social Democrats who broke ranks with Czec hoslovakia's democratic parties and allowed the Communists' divide and rule tactics to bring Czec hoslovak democracy to an end . In contrasting the inter-war period and the post-war period , one finds much continuity in the Slovak-Czech relationship. The Czech bias against traditional Slovak Catholicism impeded relations both after 1918 and, reinforced by the events of 1938-1945, maintained itself into the post-war era. Czech fears of Slovaks as disloyal also continued, again reinforced by the events of the inter-war period and especially of 1938- 1939, and made evident in the ease with which the Communists could find Czech support for their efforts to undo 'de facto' the results of the elections in Slovakia. Both situations, though in quite different ways, presented insurmountable obstacles to the realization of Slovak autonomist desires, with Slovaks themselves divided over the iss ue, unable to bring sufficient pressure to bear on their behalf. Finally, in both 26 DOS, 10-647, no. 1342; see also Hu bert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London, 1950), p. 113. �26 SLOVAKIA situations, external developments were crucial - in one case Nazi Germany's pressure against Czechoslovakia, in the other the intensifying Cold War, which made Czechoslovakia 's hopes of being a bridge between East and West futile and even dangerous. Along with important similarities, the Slovak question in the inter-war period and post-war period shows significant differences. After World War II, the Czechoslovak idea was abandoned and the existence of a Slovak nation was officially recognized. Furthermore, Prague came to believe that the best way to ease Slovak discontent was via the economic development of Slovakia. There were also important differences in the political structure of the two cases. In the inter-war period, the Government was composed of parties committed to the maintenance of Czechoslovak democracy, with Communists and fascists in the opposition along with Slovak nationalists. After the War, an opposition technically ceased to exist, Communists held key positions within the system they sought to destroy, and Slovak nationalists, albeit a new breed more moderate than the former SPP, sat in the Government. A final crucial difference lies in the relationship between the Slovak question and the health and survival of the democratic order in Czechoslovakia. In the inter-war period, Slovak nationalists had at best an ambivalent attitude toward Czechoslovakia's system. While a fascist element within the SPP viewed it with hostility, most Slovak nationalists accepted the system or were indifferent toward it. When Czechoslovakia faced potentially fatal threats in 1938, the SPP's primary concern was not "How can we defend Czechoslovak democracy at this critical time?" but rather the more parochial "What's in it for the Slovaks?" For all their failure to address satisfactorily the Slovak question in the 1920s and 1930s, most Czech political elites had a better grasp of just what was at stake as Nazism intensified its pressure on the First �SLOVAKIA 27 Republic from within and without. After the war, however, autonomy-minded Slovaks, now represented in the DP, had a very clear notion of just what was at stake, and arguably a better grasp of the situation than the Czechoslovak democrats, who well into 1947 seemed to fear an SPP-revival in Slovakia more than they feared the Communists . For national tensions to ease, both sides of a conflict need to relinquish, or at least moderate, their fears of the other. This the Czechs never really succeeded in doing, as the idea that Slovakia was disloyal and separatist was always in the back, and often in the front, of the minds of many of them. Slovak actions, whether it was Hlinka's consorting with Hungarian sympathizers in the 1920s, the SPP radical wing's flirting with fascism in the 19 30s, or the SPP's demand for autonomy and eventual secession from Czecho-Slovakia in conjunction with Hitler's penetration of East Central Europe, only reaffirmed or deepened Czech fears. When one takes into account these mutual suspicions, the psychological baggage both sides brought into their relationship, the structure of Czechoslovakia's regimes during this century, the persistent bias of Czech elites against Slovak Catholicism, the disparities between Slovak and Czech economic development, the presence of hostile neighbors hoping to exploit Slovak-Czech tensions, and the trauma that this part of Europe experienced from 1914 to 1989, it is not surprising that the Slovak question remained a running sore on Czechoslovakia's body politic throughout the twentieth century. � SLOVAKIA 7 The Slovak Question in the Interwar (1918-1938) and Post-War (1945-1948) Czechoslovak Republics James R. Felak A key element of the aura of tragedy that surrounds Czechoslovakia's history in the eyes of many of its students, observers, and sympathizers is that state's experience in having its liberal, Western-oriented, parliamentary democratic, pluralistic political system destroyed by a powerful, aggressive, neighboring totalitarian empire twice in this century. In the early fall of 1938, threatened by Hitler's Germany, abandoned by their allies, and facing pressure from discontented ethnic minorities at home, Czechoslovakia's leaders succumbed to the Munich Agreement and dismantled their parliamentary democratic regime, the last one remaining in East Central Europe, and replaced it with a quasiauthoritarian alternative. In February 1948, a restored multi-party democracy in Czechoslovakia once again met its end, this time through the machinations of a pro-Soviet Communist minority that was able to seize power and thereafter transform Czechoslovakia into a carbon-copy of the Stalinist "people's democracies" that had been imposed over the previous years on most of the countries of the region. In the periods that concluded with the demise of both of these experiments in liberal democracy, the relations, and particularly the tensions between Slovaks and Czechs �8 SLOVAKIA played an important role. This paper will examine the state of Slovak-Czech relations in both the inter-war, and post-war Republics, arguing that the obstacles to a mutually satisfactory solution to the Slovak question were formidable in both situations. It will also draw comparisons between the two cases, identifying elements of continuity and change. The events of autumn 1918, with the collapse of the AustroHungarian empire and proclamation of an independent Czechoslovak Republic, brought Czechs and Slovaks together in a single state. Slovak discontent became apparent from very early on. It was inevitable that Czechs would dominate the new Republic. Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by more than two-to-one, and the Czech lands were much more highly developed economically than Slovakia. Czechs had large middle and working classes, and had acquired considerable political and administrative experience in the Austrian half of the Empire. By 1900, they were a well-organized, well-educated, confident nation with a strong sense of national identity. This was in stark contrast to relatively poor, largely rural Slovakia, where discriminatory Hungarian policies had kept Slovaks from acquiring much political or administrative experience or educating themselves in a Slovak national spirit. As the twentieth century dawned on Slovakia, Slovak nationalists were only just beginning to build a mass national movement. The new regime, both in its structure and its justification, carried the seeds of Slovak discontent. First, Czechoslovakia was based on the idea that a Czechoslovak nation existed, which served as the so-called constituent nation (statotvomy narocf) upon which the Republic was based. 1 This notion was anchored in ' See Ladislav Lipscher, Verfassung und politische Verwaltung in der Tschechos/owakei 1918-1939 (Munich, 1979), pp. 41 -42 for a discussion of the statotvornyconcept . �SLOVAKJA 9 the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, along with the belief that a Czechoslovak language existed and would serve as the Republic 's official language.2 These stipulations, while freeing the Slovaks from Magyarization, denied them one of the major goals of the Slovak national movement since its inception at the time of Cudovft Stur in the 1830s and 40-the recognition that a distinct Slovak nation in fact existed. In hand with the Czechoslovak idea went a centralistic administrative structure for the new state, with decision-making powers concentrated in the central government in Prague, which was situated in the heart of the Czech lands . Aside from being a corollary to the idea that the state was based on a single Czechoslovak nation, it reflected fears among Czechs and a number of Czech-oriented Slovaks that autonomy for Slovakia would set a precedent for similar demands by the German and Hungarian minorities and aid Hungary's efforts to ultimately detach Slovakia from Czechoslovakia and return it to Budapest 's control. As Czechoslovakia's then Foreign Minister Edvard Benes said in 1932, greater autonomy for Slovakia would "mean for this state the slogan Slovakia to the Slovaks, German regions to the Germans, Magyar regions to the Magyars." 3 There was also a strong anti-Catholic sentiment among Czech elites and some of their Slovak collaborators, manifested in a fear that if ' The Constitution opens with the words, "We, the Czechoslovak nation," and goes on to stipulate that "The Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the Republic." For an English translation of the Constitution, see Howard Lee McBain and Lindsay Rogers, Eds., The New Constitutions of Europe(New York, 1922), pp. 307-342. ' Quoted in Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia; The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ, 1988), p. 137. �10 SLOVAKIA Slovaks governed themselves, they would choose a government that was too reactionary and clerical for the progressive tastes shared by most of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Finally, there was a widespread belief that, blighted by Magyarization, Slovaks were not yet capable of self-government. Two further issues that served to fuel Slovak discontent were the economy and religion. Along with the damage done by the First World War, Slovaks now had to cope with a new international boundary that, among other things, cut them off from the traditional markets, resources, and outlets for surplus labor that they had enjoyed in the larger Austro-Hungarian economic unit. Furthermore, the industry that Slovakia did have, lost the subsidies that the Hungarian government had been providing and had to compete with the more efficient and more heavily capitalized industry of the Czech lands. The result was an economic depression and, in effect, a de-industrialization of Slovakia during the early l 920s. The tax rate was also higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands during the l 920s. 4 Religion proved to be a major irritant in Slovak-Czech relations. Many Czech nationalists, drawing inspiration from the Hussite tradition and regarding Catholicism as a reactionary historical force identified with German-Austrian hegemony over the Czech lands, viewed the Roman Catholic Church with suspicion and even outright hostility. This was dramatically demonstrated shortly after Czechoslovakia achieved her independence, when a Czech 4 See C. A. Macartney , Hungary and Her Successors, The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937(London, 1937), pp. 127- 131 and R. W. SetonWatson, Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey(London, 1931), pp. 36-37, for contemporary discussions of Slovakia's economic problems. Despite their divergent interpretations of the Slovak question, Macartney's and SetonWatson's characterizations of Slovakia's economic plight are quite similar. �SLOVAKIA 11 mob smashed to pieces the statue of the Virgin Mary on Old Town Square in Prague. Reports of this renunciation of a part of the Bohemian past did not play well in Slovakia, where among Slovaks such hostility toward the Church was considerably weaker, if operative at all. The forced removal of crucifixes from the walls of schools, disruption of religions services and desecration of sacred places and objects, and state seizure of Catholic schools and church lands helped foster in Slovakia the image of the Czech as an enemy of Christianity, especially as traditionally understood in Slovakia. 5 Also contributing to religious tensions was the fact that Czech political elites had, already before 1918, developed their closest relations with members of Slovakia's Protestant (Lutheran) minority. Slovak Protestants had traditional links with Czech culture, and were more likely than Slovak Catholics to share the modernist world view that was standard among Czechoslovakia' s founders. By way of example, of the fifty-seven Slovaks appointed to the Provisional National Assembly that was established to draw up Czechoslovakia's constitution, twenty-eight were Protestants. This in a land that was approximately 79 per cent Catholic. 6 Such an outcome could hardly fail to appear discriminatory and unrepresentative to many Slovaks. One final irritant in Slovak-Czech relations is worth discussing at some length, as it shows just how complicated this relationship could be. This is the question of the migration of Czech administrators , teachers, and other professionals and government emplo5 Jozef Spirko, Cirkevne dejiny s osobitnym zretefom na vyvin cirkevnych de- Jin Slovenska, sv. IV (Bratislava, 1993), p. 466; see E L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, Eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy 19 I 9-1939, First Series, Vol. IV, 1919 (London, 1956), p. 3, for a reference co anti-Catholic actions in Slovakia in a report by the British Charge d' affaires in Prague . 6 Ladislav Lipscher, "Klub slovenskych poslancov v rokoch 1918-1920," Historicky casopis, XVI, 2 ( 1968), pp. 140- 141 . �12 SLOVAKIA yees to Slovakia after 1918. Slovakia lacked qualified professionals and administrators who were untainted by affiliation with the former Hungarian regime and its education system, given the fact that Slovaks before 1918 could rarely advance socially and professionally except by becoming "Magyarized." For this reason, tens of thousands of Czechs moved to Slovakia in the 1920s. 7 Though many of them were needed, their presence in Slovakia proved to be a major cause of Slovak discontent. First, they represented a cultural intrusion of modern-thinking, largely urban progressive types into a traditional, rural society, and as such offended many Slovaks with paternalism and tactlessness. Second , they received considerable salary supplements since Slovakia was regarded as a hardship post. 8 This income disparity between imported Czechs and native Slovak employees was also a sore point. Third, there was a perception among Slovaks that their native land was being used by Czechs as a dumping ground for officials who were second-rate. Finally, Slovak resentment was especially acute over the fact that among the Czechs who received employment in Slovakia were not only professionals and high-level administrators , but railway porters, postmen, doormen, messengers , and janitors, positions for which there were plenty of capable Slo- vaks at hand .9 This situation can be explained at least in part by the nature of Czechoslovakia's political system. In Czechoslovakia's coalition ' See Jan Rychlfk, Cesi a Slovaci ve 20.stoletf; cesko-slo venske vztahy J 9 J41945 (Bratislava, 1997), pp. 86-87 for statistics on the number of Czechs employed in Slovakia during the interwar period . ' Natasa Krajcovicova, "K otazke personalneho obsadzovania organov statnej a verejnej spravy na Slovensku v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR", Historickf casopis, XLIV , 4, 1996, pp. 619-620. 9 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 61 -62; Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 34. �SLOVAKIA 13 governments, certain parties tended to retain particular ministries over the long-term. Thus, it was not unusual for a political party, whose support came almost exclusively from the Czech lands, to control a substantial number of state administrative positions in Slovakia which it would allot to its Czech adherents as patronage. Such was the case, for example, with the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and the railroads. Compounding the problem of Czech employment in Slovakia was the fact that Prague, with the help of these migrants, was so successful in developing a Czechoslovak education system in Slovakia that by the end of the 1920s, Slovakia was producing for the first time a native intelligentsia fully trained in Czechoslovak high schools and colleges. Unfortunately, precisely at the time that these cohorts of educated Slovaks were coming onto the job market, Czechoslovakia was hit by the Great Depression. These young Slovaks, many of whom could not find appropriate employment, came to resent the fact that Czechs were working in Slovakia in positions that they coveted. Many of these Czechs meanwhile had struck roots in Slovakia and, even if they wished, had little to return to in Depressionstricken Bohemia and Moravia. Many of these members of the young Slovak intelligentsia inclined toward radical politics of the left and right; among the latter, calls for Czechs to go home became standard fare at political rallies. Though, as one scholar recently pointed out, the personnel question was an extremely complicated issue that cannot be understood from a purely ethnic standpoint, the fact that Czechs were working in Slovakia while Slovaks were unemployed provided grist for Slovak nationalist mills and made this issue a constant irritant for Slovak-Czech relations. 10 ' 0 Krajcovicova, "K otazke", pp. 627, 628 . �14 SLOVAKIA Politically, Slovaks responded to this growing discontent in a number of ways. The antidote to Czechoslovak centralism was Slovak autonomy, a call that was embraced by the Slovak party with the greatest popularity, the Slovak People's Party (SPP). Led by the populist priest Andrej Hlinka, it sought to mobilize Slovak religious, economic, political and cultural discontent into a broadbased movement for autonomy and national recognition. It staunchly supported an autonomous Slovakia right up to the end of the First Republic. Two other groups also called for autonomy for Slovakia, at least in their rhetoric-the Communists and the parties of the Hungarian minority. This meant that in the parliamentary elections of 1925, 1929, and 1935, over 50% of voters in Slovakia opted for parties that rejected Czechoslovak centralism. 11 While about half of ethnic Slovaks voted for the SPP, most other Slovaks voted for the Slovak affiliates of Czechoslovak-wide parties. These parties supported the idea of a Czechoslovak nation and the centralist system. Because they were always or nearly always in the government, they could provide supporters with certain material advantages that the SPP could not, so it was quite likely that considerably more Slovaks supported autonomy than voted for the autonomist SPP. The most significant of such parties was the Agrarians, which alone among the government parties had a strong Slovak wing, led by Milan Hodza. Though officially accepting the Czechoslovak idea and opposing autonomy for Slovakia, the Agrarians tried in the 1930s to develop an alternative to both Prague centralism and SPP autonomism - the socalled regionalist option. This involved promoting cooperation of Slovaks on behalf of Slovak interests on regional rather than national grounds. In theory, regionalism gave the Slovak Agra- 11 For electoral statistics, see Leff, National Conflict, p. 52. �SLOVAKIA 15 rians the possibility to champion Slovak interests without the sort of nationalism that could upset Prague and the Czechoslovak constitutional order. 12 Despite considerable support for autonomy in Slovakia throughout the inter-war period, the cards were stacked against success in this regard for a number of reasons. Some of these have been discussed above and need little further elaboration- the Czech numerical preponderance over Slovaks, and superiority in terms of modem economic, cultural, and political development; the constitutional stipulation that a Czechoslovak nation, rather than separate Czech and Slovak nations, existed and was the basis of the state; the distaste for traditional Catholicism among the Republic's ruling elites; the fears that autonomy for Slovakia would play into the hands of Hungarian and German nationalists and make it harder for Prague to resist their autonomist demands; the belief that Slovaks were not capable of governing themselves; and the difficulties, owing to problems of political patronage and economic stagnation, of finding appropriate employment for the university-educated Slovaks the system was producing by the late 1920s and their consequent tum towards radicalism. Other factors were at play as well. It should be kept in mind that both of Czechoslovakia's presidents during the inter-war period, Tomas G. Masaryk and Edvard Benes, were staunch champions of the Czechoslovak idea and opponents of autonomy for Slovakia. Furthermore, the autonomist forces in Slovakia were not united, and in fact were fundamentally divided over their conceptions of just what sort of autonomous Slovakia they wanted. The Hungarian parties regarded Slovaks and Hungarians as minorities with an equal claim to self-government in Slovakia, 12 M. Kropilak, ed., Dejiny S/ovenska, V ( 1918-1945) (Bratislava, 1985), p. 195. �16 SLOVAKlA with hopes that someday that territory would return to a restored Kingdom of Hungary. The SPP, on the other hand, believed in "Slovakia for the Slovaks," as one of its most cherished slogans rang out, and saw Slovaks as the statotvomy narod in Slovakia, with Hungarians as merely a minority. The Communists , for their part, were open to autonomy for Slovakia only if it were to come in conjunction with the establishment of a Communist dictatorship of the proletariat, something that repelled the other pro-autonomy parties. The nature of the Czechoslovak political system was particularly crucial in making it highly unlikely that the SPP, barring some sort of exceptional circumstances, would be able to realize its autonomist goals via normal political channels. While winning the votes of around half of the ethnic Slovaks, the SPP 's support statewide was only around 7%. This meant that it would have to find allies if it wished to establish influence in or increase pressure on the government. Such alliance-seeking was problematic, however. Several leading Czechoslovak parties were outright hostile to Slovak nationalism and the idea of autonomy, for example the Social Democratic Party, National Socialist Party, and, after 1921 , the Czechoslovak People 's Party. Taken together, these three parties represented a considerable proportion of the governing majority. 13 Among the opposition parties were a few that were open to cooperation with the SPP, such as the Hungarian nationalists, Czech fascists, and the Slovak National Party (a Protestant autonomist party), but they were either insignificant in numbers and influence, or holding fundamentally different ultimate goals from the SPP. The Slovak wing of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, the second strongest electoral draw in Slovakia, could theoreti13 For example, of the government 's 206 seats in Parliament after the 1929 elections, these three parties held 96 seats. �SLOVAKJA 17 cally have formed a powerful bloc had its regionalist program developed into a genuine political collaboration with the SPP. However, two factors-the Agrarians' fear that the SPP would dominate an autonomous Slovakia, and the fact that the Agrarian Party 's leadership in Prague was unwilling to abandon centralism-kept such collaboration at a minimum. As with many national conflicts, it was probably the vicious circle of fear that accounted most for the failure to solve the Slovak question satisfactorily. In the 1920s, Czechoslovak centralists feared that an autonomous Slovakia would be easy prey for Hungarians eager to revise the post-War peace treaties and detach Slovakia from the Czech lands and return it to Hungary. The close collaboration after 1918 between SPP leader Hlinka and two notorious Hungarian sympathizers, Frantisek Jehlicka and Vojtech Tuka, only heightened Prague's apprehensions. 14 By the mid1930s, the Germans had replaced the Hungarians as the chief fear of Czechoslovak centralists with respect to Slovakia. After Konrad Henlein 's strong showing in the 1935 parliamentary elections, Prague worried that autonomy for Slovakia would make it harder to resist similar demands by Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority. The SPP, at the same time, had a great fear that Czechs would solve the Sudeten German question by granting autonomy to the predominately and historically German lands, while ignoring similar demands from Slovaks. This fear, combined with the 1 • Jehlicka was a Slovak priest of pro-Hungarian sympathy who accompanied Hlinka on a trip to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where they sought to present the Slovak national case to the Great Powers . After the trip, which proved to be a fiasco, Hlinka was imprisoned by the Czechoslovak government while Jehlicka went into exile; Tuka was a pro-Hungarian university professor who lost his job after 1918 and found a new career in the SPP as an editor, parliamentarian, and advisor to Hlinka. He was inv o lved in various intrigues against the Czechoslovak Republic in the 1920s. �18 SLOVAKJA SPP's inability to realize its demands via normal channels, led that party, or at least certain factions within it, to seek support repeatedly from abroad. And since the Western democracies tended to support the post-War status quo, the SPP sometimes looked to those neighbors of Czechoslovakia who were seeking change and, hence, were seen by the Republic's rulers as a threat. Hlinka and his party consistently cultivated good relations with official and unofficial circles in Poland, while SPP radicals sought closer ties with Germany and Czechoslovakia's pro-Nazi Sudeten Germans . 15 This in turn frightened Czechs and made it even less likely that autonomy for Slovakia would be agreed to by the power brokers in Prague. Throughout 1938, fears on both sides increased as German pressure, both from within and without Czechoslovakia, intensified, as did Slovak demands for autonomy. Once the Czechoslovak government elected to accept the Munich Agreement and hand over large tracts of its territory to Nazi Germany, the SPP pressed its claims and got a demoralized Czechoslovak government not only to acquiesce in its autonomist demands but also to accept the existence of a distinct Slovak nation. Scarcely a week after the Munich Agreement, Prague and the SPP agreed that Czechoslovakia would be restructured as Czecho-Slovakia, with an autonomous Slovakia run by the SPP. When Hitler opted to destroy Czecho-Slovakia m March of 1939, this autonomous Slovakia became the independent Slovak Republic, closely allied with Nazi Germany as one of its satellites, while the Czech lands were incorporated wholly into the Third Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia 15 See, for example, James Ramon Felak, "At the Price of the Republic": Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party 1929- 1938 (Pittsburgh , PA, 1994), pp. 171 -175, for a discussion of SPP flirtations with Polish and German nationalists. �SLOVAKIA 19 survived the war as an authoritarian, one-party state, led by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso, who succeeded Hlinka in the summer of 1938 as head of the SPP. Both Roman Catholics and their Church were privileged in this period. At the same time, a resistance movement emerged composed of an uneasy alliance of Communists and democrats, which erupted in the Slovak National Uprising of August-September 1944. Both the Slovak Republic and the Uprising would have major impacts on the post-War situation in Slovakia. First, by having their own state, Slovaks gained the confidence and experience necessary for self-government. By 1945, the idea of returning to a Czechoslovak nation and state run from Prague was repellent across the political spectrum in Slovakia. Second, the very fact of this state which, like the autonomous Slovakia of October 1938, came into existence on the coattails of Hitler's march into Central Europe, tainted Slovak accomplishments, as many Czechs regarded Slovaks, especially those in the SPP, as collaborators with the Czechs' mortal enemy, Nazi Germany. Thus, Czechs often saw manifestations of Slovak nationalism as fascist in nature and threatening to the Republic. Third, despite the susceptibility of Slovaks to charges of collaboration, at the same time, thanks to the Slovak National Uprising, Slovaks could point to the fact that their own homegrown resistance to Nazism far exceeded Czech efforts in numbers and intensity. It also created a politically influential association of partisan veterans who could potentially throw their weight around in the postWar situation. With Germany's defeat, Czechoslovakia was restored. This time, however, there would be no Czechoslovak idea. Slovaks were recognized as a distinct nation, and allowed to retain the Slovak national organs that they had set up during the Uprising. �20 SLOVAKJA Czech Communist leader Klement Gottwald, Czechoslovakia's most powerful politician at war's end, proclaimed that "the Slovaks are to be the masters in their own Slovak land." 16 A whole host of problems emerged however, some almost at once, to foil what was a hopeful beginning for advocates of Slovak autonomy. First, the set-up was an asymmetrical one. Slovak national organs, such as the Slovak National Council and Board of Commissioners, were established, but with no parallel Czech organs, only federal organs with competence for the entire state. This led to conflicts over where the competence of the central organs ended and that of the Slovak ones began. The "Slovak question" returned in a new form. Second, the cultural differences that plagued SlovakCzech relations during the First Republic continued. Czech suspicion of Slovak Catholicism was, if anything, even more intense after the experience of the Second World War, when the pro-Nazi Slovak state was led by a Catholic priest under whom the Church enjoyed far more privilege and influence than it had under the First Republic or could hope to after 1945. Third, Czech numerical dominance remained, and if Czech parties could be united on the issue, they would be able to scale back Slovak self-government with little resistance. It also became clear, especially after Czechoslovakia's first post-war parliamentary elections in May of 1946, that Slovakia was far less friendly politically to the Left than were the Czech lands. While Czechs chose left-wing parties in percentages that rank among all-time highs for Europe (the Communists, Social Democrats, and National Socialists together received over 79% of the vote in the Czech lands, with the Communists leading the way with 40% ), Slovaks rejected the Com16 Joseph A. Mikus, ed., Slovakia, A Political and Constitutional History, Acta Academica Slovaca 48 (Bratislava, 1995), p. 242; this work contains an English translation of the text of the Kosice Agreement of April 5, 1945, pp. 242-243. �SLOVAKIA 21 munists in favor of the Democrats by a slightly more than two-to• one margm . 17 These above factors combined to complicate post-war Czechoslovak politics and to pose formidable impediments to the realization of the promised program of autonomy for Slovakia. The political landscape in Slovakia after the War was occupied by three main groups, politically speaking. On the Left were the Communists, belonging to the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), separate from, yet ultimately under the control of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) in Prague. The KSS was divided between those Slovak Communists who were willing to assert what they regarded as Slovak interests, and those who were more closely under the thumb of Prague. By August 1945 the latter, on Prague 's intervention, were given the upper hand in the KSS. 18 The only significant party besides the Communists was the Slovak Democratic Party (DP), founded by non-Communist veterans of the Slovak National Uprising, attracting above all those Slovak Protestants who had been alienated by the SPP's assertive Catholicism but at the same time suspicious of Prague 's centralism. The third group was the Catholics themselves, most of whom were unorganized politically with the outlawing of the SPP at war 's end. Thus, the party that traditionally drew about half the Slovak vote no longer existed, and a land that was 80% Catholic was offered only parties dominated by atheists or Protestants. This large bloc of voters without a party home would, as both the Communists and the Democrats realized, be decisive in the parlia- 17 Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch 1945-1948 na ceste ku komunistickej tota/ite(Bratislava, 1994), p. 39. " l.'.ubomir Liptak, ed., Politicke strany na Slovensku, 1860-1989 (Bratislava, 1992), pp. 267-268; and Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism. Slovakia, and the Communists, 19 I 8-1948 (Boulder, CO, 1983), p. 86. �22 SLOVAKJA mentary elections. Thus, the KSS began to woo Slovak Catholics, hoping to create a separate Slovak Catholic party that would keep Catholic voters away from the DP and thereby keep Slovakia's non-Communist population divided. 19 Just as it appeared that Communist intrigues would succeed, the DP delivered an olive branch to disgruntled Slovak Catholics. It was called the April Agreement, and involved the DP and leading Slovak Catholics. This Agreement specified that the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in all DP organs and institutions was to be seven-to-three, with Catholics to be allotted two-thirds of the party's seats in Parliament. In addition, Catholics were to get their own DP daily, the Demokraticke hlasy. 20 As a result of the April Agreement, Catholics moved into leading positions in the DP's presidium and general secretariat. Nevertheless, this Catholic-Protestant reconciliation was a Pyrrhic victory for Slovakia's non-Communist forces. It did enable the DP to win the May 1946 parliamentary elections in a resounding manner, and made it clear that Slovakia was overwhelmingly anti-Communist. At the same time, however, the Communists were able to exploit the April Agreement successfully for their own ends. With an influx of Catholics into the DP, the same Catholics that Communists had been wooing up to that point, the KSS now sought to portray the DP as riddled with fascist traitors loyal to former leader Tiso, and dangerous to the integrity and democracy of the Czechoslovak state. 21 Thus began a determined , 19 Letz, Slovensko, pp. 28-29 ; Michal Bamovsky, Na ceste k monopolu moci; Mocenskopoliticke zapasy na S/ovensku v rokoch 1945-1948 (Bratislava, 1993), p. 73 . 20 Bamovsky, Na ceste, p. 80; Letz, S/ovensko, p. 36. 21 See United States Department of State, Decimal Files, 860f.00/6- l 346, no. 985 ; (hereafter referred to as DOS). �SLOVAKIA 23 sustained, and aggressive effort by Communist propaganda to slander the DP. Furthermore, the election results made it clear to the Communists that autonomy for Slovakia would be a disaster for Communist interests. Consequently, the Communists began to push aggressively for a scaling back of the competence of Slovak national organs in favor of federal ones. At the same time, Communists sought to use the alarm they could generate over a "fascist restoration" in Slovakia to frighten Czech non-Communists into keeping the DP at a distance. With the acquiescence, and at times the support of the Czech democratic parties, the Communists succeeded in reasserting Prague's control over Slovakia and largely isolating the DP. As U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt wrote in May, 1947: For the Czech non-Communist parties and their leaders , including Benes, as a result of their experiences in 1938-1939 when Slovak aspirations contributed materially to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak State, feel with a deep intensity that Slovak autonomy, while acceptable in theory, must have definite limitations in practice. These leaders are therefore all too likely to side with the Communists on any issues to which the latter are able to give a Czech versus Slovak or autonomy versus centralism complexion. As a result the Democrats are very frequently left to face the Communist onslaught alone. 22 Although, strictly speaking, Czechoslovakia was a democracy, with free elections and multiple political parties with their own periodicals, one is struck by just how circumscribed the system in fact was. A number of political parties were banned, including the most popular Czech and Slovak parties of the inter-war years, the Agrarians and SPP, respectively. New parties were prohibited 22 DOS, 5-2947, no. 2477. �24 SLOVAKIA without the consent of the existing parties. Nor could one set up an individual periodical without their permission. Government intervention in and influence over the media was considerable, and publication of anything critical of the Soviet Union was taboo. The regime was also established to accord the Communists more influence than electoral results would warrant. 23 This was particularly the case in Slovakia, where despite losing by nearly a two-to-one margin in the parliamentary elections, the Communists retained the chairmanship of the Board of CoJilIIlissioners, which acted as the executive branch in Slovakia, and kept the Democrats from holding the crucial post of Commissioner of the Interior, which went to the non-partisan Mikulas Ferjencfk.24 Without much support from the Czech non-Communist parties and facing a Communist-influenced political police, the DP was an easy prey for the most concentrated Communist attack yet. In June of 1947, the security police in Slovakia uncovered an alleged "anti-state conspiracy", which the Communists used to blackmail and intimidate the DP.25 Using their influence in and control over state security organs and employing 'agents provocateurs', the Communists were able, reminiscent of their assault on the Smallholders Party in Hungary, to charge leading Slovak Democrats with complicity in the conspiracy. Though the Czech democratic parties were by this time wise to Communist intrigues and took some steps in defense of the DP, they never quite lost their suspicions that, just possibly, Communist charges against the 23 For a discussion of Czechoslovakia's "people's democratic" system, see Karel Kaplan, The Short March; The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 19451948 (London, 1987), pp. 33-54. 24 Bamovsky, Na ceste, pp. 116- I I 7. 25 lbid., pp. 140-141 ; Letz, Slovensko, pp. 54-55. �SLOVAKIA 25 DP might be accurate.26 With the Czech democrats thereby paralyzed, the Communists, with the police in their pockets, and the trade union and partisan organizations that they dominated mobilized on their behalf, felt that the correlation of forces were such in Slovakia that they attempted a 'putsch' in November of 194 7. This involved a KSS attempt to force a reconstitution of the Slovak Board of Commissioners through a political crisis caused by the planned and coordinated resignation of its Communist members. Though only partly successful, and though the DP and Czech non-Marxist parties stuck together from this point on, this cooperation proved to be too little, too late. The attempted coup in Slovakia was followed by a successful one in Prague in February 1948; in the latter case, it was the Czechoslovak Social Democrats who broke ranks with Czec hoslovakia's democratic parties and allowed the Communists' divide and rule tactics to bring Czec hoslovak democracy to an end . In contrasting the inter-war period and the post-war period , one finds much continuity in the Slovak-Czech relationship. The Czech bias against traditional Slovak Catholicism impeded relations both after 1918 and, reinforced by the events of 1938-1945, maintained itself into the post-war era. Czech fears of Slovaks as disloyal also continued, again reinforced by the events of the inter-war period and especially of 1938- 1939, and made evident in the ease with which the Communists could find Czech support for their efforts to undo 'de facto' the results of the elections in Slovakia. Both situations, though in quite different ways, presented insurmountable obstacles to the realization of Slovak autonomist desires, with Slovaks themselves divided over the iss ue, unable to bring sufficient pressure to bear on their behalf. Finally, in both 26 DOS, 10-647, no. 1342; see also Hu bert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London, 1950), p. 113. �26 SLOVAKIA situations, external developments were crucial - in one case Nazi Germany's pressure against Czechoslovakia, in the other the intensifying Cold War, which made Czechoslovakia 's hopes of being a bridge between East and West futile and even dangerous. Along with important similarities, the Slovak question in the inter-war period and post-war period shows significant differences. After World War II, the Czechoslovak idea was abandoned and the existence of a Slovak nation was officially recognized. Furthermore, Prague came to believe that the best way to ease Slovak discontent was via the economic development of Slovakia. There were also important differences in the political structure of the two cases. In the inter-war period, the Government was composed of parties committed to the maintenance of Czechoslovak democracy, with Communists and fascists in the opposition along with Slovak nationalists. After the War, an opposition technically ceased to exist, Communists held key positions within the system they sought to destroy, and Slovak nationalists, albeit a new breed more moderate than the former SPP, sat in the Government. A final crucial difference lies in the relationship between the Slovak question and the health and survival of the democratic order in Czechoslovakia. In the inter-war period, Slovak nationalists had at best an ambivalent attitude toward Czechoslovakia's system. While a fascist element within the SPP viewed it with hostility, most Slovak nationalists accepted the system or were indifferent toward it. When Czechoslovakia faced potentially fatal threats in 1938, the SPP's primary concern was not "How can we defend Czechoslovak democracy at this critical time?" but rather the more parochial "What's in it for the Slovaks?" For all their failure to address satisfactorily the Slovak question in the 1920s and 1930s, most Czech political elites had a better grasp of just what was at stake as Nazism intensified its pressure on the First �SLOVAKIA 27 Republic from within and without. After the war, however, autonomy-minded Slovaks, now represented in the DP, had a very clear notion of just what was at stake, and arguably a better grasp of the situation than the Czechoslovak democrats, who well into 1947 seemed to fear an SPP-revival in Slovakia more than they feared the Communists . For national tensions to ease, both sides of a conflict need to relinquish, or at least moderate, their fears of the other. This the Czechs never really succeeded in doing, as the idea that Slovakia was disloyal and separatist was always in the back, and often in the front, of the minds of many of them. Slovak actions, whether it was Hlinka's consorting with Hungarian sympathizers in the 1920s, the SPP radical wing's flirting with fascism in the 19 30s, or the SPP's demand for autonomy and eventual secession from Czecho-Slovakia in conjunction with Hitler's penetration of East Central Europe, only reaffirmed or deepened Czech fears. When one takes into account these mutual suspicions, the psychological baggage both sides brought into their relationship, the structure of Czechoslovakia's regimes during this century, the persistent bias of Czech elites against Slovak Catholicism, the disparities between Slovak and Czech economic development, the presence of hostile neighbors hoping to exploit Slovak-Czech tensions, and the trauma that this part of Europe experienced from 1914 to 1989, it is not surprising that the Slovak question remained a running sore on Czechoslovakia's body politic throughout the twentieth century. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2003, Vol. 37 Description An account of the resource Vol. 37 (No. 68-69), 2003. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 7 The Slovak Question in the Interwar (1918-1938) and Post-War (1945-1948) Czechoslovak Republics James R. Felak A key element of the aura of tragedy that surrounds Czechoslovakia's history in the eyes of many of its students, observers, and sympathizers is that state's experience in having its liberal, Western-oriented, parliamentary democratic, pluralistic political system destroyed by a powerful, aggressive, neighboring totalitarian empire twice in this century. In the early fall of 1938, threatened by Hitler's Germany, abandoned by their allies, and facing pressure from discontented ethnic minorities at home, Czechoslovakia's leaders succumbed to the Munich Agreement and dismantled their parliamentary democratic regime, the last one remaining in East Central Europe, and replaced it with a quasiauthoritarian alternative. In February 1948, a restored multi-party democracy in Czechoslovakia once again met its end, this time through the machinations of a pro-Soviet Communist minority that was able to seize power and thereafter transform Czechoslovakia into a carbon-copy of the Stalinist "people's democracies" that had been imposed over the previous years on most of the countries of the region. In the periods that concluded with the demise of both of these experiments in liberal democracy, the relations, and particularly the tensions between Slovaks and Czechs 8 SLOVAKIA played an important role. This paper will examine the state of Slovak-Czech relations in both the inter-war, and post-war Republics, arguing that the obstacles to a mutually satisfactory solution to the Slovak question were formidable in both situations. It will also draw comparisons between the two cases, identifying elements of continuity and change. The events of autumn 1918, with the collapse of the AustroHungarian empire and proclamation of an independent Czechoslovak Republic, brought Czechs and Slovaks together in a single state. Slovak discontent became apparent from very early on. It was inevitable that Czechs would dominate the new Republic. Czechs outnumbered Slovaks by more than two-to-one, and the Czech lands were much more highly developed economically than Slovakia. Czechs had large middle and working classes, and had acquired considerable political and administrative experience in the Austrian half of the Empire. By 1900, they were a well-organized, well-educated, confident nation with a strong sense of national identity. This was in stark contrast to relatively poor, largely rural Slovakia, where discriminatory Hungarian policies had kept Slovaks from acquiring much political or administrative experience or educating themselves in a Slovak national spirit. As the twentieth century dawned on Slovakia, Slovak nationalists were only just beginning to build a mass national movement. The new regime, both in its structure and its justification, carried the seeds of Slovak discontent. First, Czechoslovakia was based on the idea that a Czechoslovak nation existed, which served as the so-called constituent nation (statotvomy narocf) upon which the Republic was based. 1 This notion was anchored in ' See Ladislav Lipscher, Verfassung und politische Verwaltung in der Tschechos/owakei 1918-1939 (Munich, 1979), pp. 41 -42 for a discussion of the statotvornyconcept . SLOVAKJA 9 the Czechoslovak Constitution of 1920, along with the belief that a Czechoslovak language existed and would serve as the Republic 's official language.2 These stipulations, while freeing the Slovaks from Magyarization, denied them one of the major goals of the Slovak national movement since its inception at the time of Cudovft Stur in the 1830s and 40-the recognition that a distinct Slovak nation in fact existed. In hand with the Czechoslovak idea went a centralistic administrative structure for the new state, with decision-making powers concentrated in the central government in Prague, which was situated in the heart of the Czech lands . Aside from being a corollary to the idea that the state was based on a single Czechoslovak nation, it reflected fears among Czechs and a number of Czech-oriented Slovaks that autonomy for Slovakia would set a precedent for similar demands by the German and Hungarian minorities and aid Hungary's efforts to ultimately detach Slovakia from Czechoslovakia and return it to Budapest 's control. As Czechoslovakia's then Foreign Minister Edvard Benes said in 1932, greater autonomy for Slovakia would "mean for this state the slogan Slovakia to the Slovaks, German regions to the Germans, Magyar regions to the Magyars." 3 There was also a strong anti-Catholic sentiment among Czech elites and some of their Slovak collaborators, manifested in a fear that if ' The Constitution opens with the words, "We, the Czechoslovak nation," and goes on to stipulate that "The Czechoslovak language shall be the state, official language of the Republic." For an English translation of the Constitution, see Howard Lee McBain and Lindsay Rogers, Eds., The New Constitutions of Europe(New York, 1922), pp. 307-342. ' Quoted in Carol Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia; The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987 (Princeton, NJ, 1988), p. 137. 10 SLOVAKIA Slovaks governed themselves, they would choose a government that was too reactionary and clerical for the progressive tastes shared by most of Czechoslovakia's founding fathers. Finally, there was a widespread belief that, blighted by Magyarization, Slovaks were not yet capable of self-government. Two further issues that served to fuel Slovak discontent were the economy and religion. Along with the damage done by the First World War, Slovaks now had to cope with a new international boundary that, among other things, cut them off from the traditional markets, resources, and outlets for surplus labor that they had enjoyed in the larger Austro-Hungarian economic unit. Furthermore, the industry that Slovakia did have, lost the subsidies that the Hungarian government had been providing and had to compete with the more efficient and more heavily capitalized industry of the Czech lands. The result was an economic depression and, in effect, a de-industrialization of Slovakia during the early l 920s. The tax rate was also higher in Slovakia than in the Czech lands during the l 920s. 4 Religion proved to be a major irritant in Slovak-Czech relations. Many Czech nationalists, drawing inspiration from the Hussite tradition and regarding Catholicism as a reactionary historical force identified with German-Austrian hegemony over the Czech lands, viewed the Roman Catholic Church with suspicion and even outright hostility. This was dramatically demonstrated shortly after Czechoslovakia achieved her independence, when a Czech 4 See C. A. Macartney , Hungary and Her Successors, The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937(London, 1937), pp. 127- 131 and R. W. SetonWatson, Slovakia Then and Now: A Political Survey(London, 1931), pp. 36-37, for contemporary discussions of Slovakia's economic problems. Despite their divergent interpretations of the Slovak question, Macartney's and SetonWatson's characterizations of Slovakia's economic plight are quite similar. SLOVAKIA 11 mob smashed to pieces the statue of the Virgin Mary on Old Town Square in Prague. Reports of this renunciation of a part of the Bohemian past did not play well in Slovakia, where among Slovaks such hostility toward the Church was considerably weaker, if operative at all. The forced removal of crucifixes from the walls of schools, disruption of religions services and desecration of sacred places and objects, and state seizure of Catholic schools and church lands helped foster in Slovakia the image of the Czech as an enemy of Christianity, especially as traditionally understood in Slovakia. 5 Also contributing to religious tensions was the fact that Czech political elites had, already before 1918, developed their closest relations with members of Slovakia's Protestant (Lutheran) minority. Slovak Protestants had traditional links with Czech culture, and were more likely than Slovak Catholics to share the modernist world view that was standard among Czechoslovakia' s founders. By way of example, of the fifty-seven Slovaks appointed to the Provisional National Assembly that was established to draw up Czechoslovakia's constitution, twenty-eight were Protestants. This in a land that was approximately 79 per cent Catholic. 6 Such an outcome could hardly fail to appear discriminatory and unrepresentative to many Slovaks. One final irritant in Slovak-Czech relations is worth discussing at some length, as it shows just how complicated this relationship could be. This is the question of the migration of Czech administrators , teachers, and other professionals and government emplo5 Jozef Spirko, Cirkevne dejiny s osobitnym zretefom na vyvin cirkevnych de- Jin Slovenska, sv. IV (Bratislava, 1993), p. 466; see E L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, Eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy 19 I 9-1939, First Series, Vol. IV, 1919 (London, 1956), p. 3, for a reference co anti-Catholic actions in Slovakia in a report by the British Charge d' affaires in Prague . 6 Ladislav Lipscher, "Klub slovenskych poslancov v rokoch 1918-1920," Historicky casopis, XVI, 2 ( 1968), pp. 140- 141 . 12 SLOVAKIA yees to Slovakia after 1918. Slovakia lacked qualified professionals and administrators who were untainted by affiliation with the former Hungarian regime and its education system, given the fact that Slovaks before 1918 could rarely advance socially and professionally except by becoming "Magyarized." For this reason, tens of thousands of Czechs moved to Slovakia in the 1920s. 7 Though many of them were needed, their presence in Slovakia proved to be a major cause of Slovak discontent. First, they represented a cultural intrusion of modern-thinking, largely urban progressive types into a traditional, rural society, and as such offended many Slovaks with paternalism and tactlessness. Second , they received considerable salary supplements since Slovakia was regarded as a hardship post. 8 This income disparity between imported Czechs and native Slovak employees was also a sore point. Third, there was a perception among Slovaks that their native land was being used by Czechs as a dumping ground for officials who were second-rate. Finally, Slovak resentment was especially acute over the fact that among the Czechs who received employment in Slovakia were not only professionals and high-level administrators , but railway porters, postmen, doormen, messengers , and janitors, positions for which there were plenty of capable Slo- vaks at hand .9 This situation can be explained at least in part by the nature of Czechoslovakia's political system. In Czechoslovakia's coalition ' See Jan Rychlfk, Cesi a Slovaci ve 20.stoletf; cesko-slo venske vztahy J 9 J41945 (Bratislava, 1997), pp. 86-87 for statistics on the number of Czechs employed in Slovakia during the interwar period . ' Natasa Krajcovicova, "K otazke personalneho obsadzovania organov statnej a verejnej spravy na Slovensku v prvych rokoch po vzniku CSR", Historickf casopis, XLIV , 4, 1996, pp. 619-620. 9 Jozef Lettrich, History of Modem Slovakia (New York, 1955), pp. 61 -62; Seton-Watson, Slovakia, p. 34. SLOVAKIA 13 governments, certain parties tended to retain particular ministries over the long-term. Thus, it was not unusual for a political party, whose support came almost exclusively from the Czech lands, to control a substantial number of state administrative positions in Slovakia which it would allot to its Czech adherents as patronage. Such was the case, for example, with the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party and the railroads. Compounding the problem of Czech employment in Slovakia was the fact that Prague, with the help of these migrants, was so successful in developing a Czechoslovak education system in Slovakia that by the end of the 1920s, Slovakia was producing for the first time a native intelligentsia fully trained in Czechoslovak high schools and colleges. Unfortunately, precisely at the time that these cohorts of educated Slovaks were coming onto the job market, Czechoslovakia was hit by the Great Depression. These young Slovaks, many of whom could not find appropriate employment, came to resent the fact that Czechs were working in Slovakia in positions that they coveted. Many of these Czechs meanwhile had struck roots in Slovakia and, even if they wished, had little to return to in Depressionstricken Bohemia and Moravia. Many of these members of the young Slovak intelligentsia inclined toward radical politics of the left and right; among the latter, calls for Czechs to go home became standard fare at political rallies. Though, as one scholar recently pointed out, the personnel question was an extremely complicated issue that cannot be understood from a purely ethnic standpoint, the fact that Czechs were working in Slovakia while Slovaks were unemployed provided grist for Slovak nationalist mills and made this issue a constant irritant for Slovak-Czech relations. 10 ' 0 Krajcovicova, "K otazke", pp. 627, 628 . 14 SLOVAKIA Politically, Slovaks responded to this growing discontent in a number of ways. The antidote to Czechoslovak centralism was Slovak autonomy, a call that was embraced by the Slovak party with the greatest popularity, the Slovak People's Party (SPP). Led by the populist priest Andrej Hlinka, it sought to mobilize Slovak religious, economic, political and cultural discontent into a broadbased movement for autonomy and national recognition. It staunchly supported an autonomous Slovakia right up to the end of the First Republic. Two other groups also called for autonomy for Slovakia, at least in their rhetoric-the Communists and the parties of the Hungarian minority. This meant that in the parliamentary elections of 1925, 1929, and 1935, over 50% of voters in Slovakia opted for parties that rejected Czechoslovak centralism. 11 While about half of ethnic Slovaks voted for the SPP, most other Slovaks voted for the Slovak affiliates of Czechoslovak-wide parties. These parties supported the idea of a Czechoslovak nation and the centralist system. Because they were always or nearly always in the government, they could provide supporters with certain material advantages that the SPP could not, so it was quite likely that considerably more Slovaks supported autonomy than voted for the autonomist SPP. The most significant of such parties was the Agrarians, which alone among the government parties had a strong Slovak wing, led by Milan Hodza. Though officially accepting the Czechoslovak idea and opposing autonomy for Slovakia, the Agrarians tried in the 1930s to develop an alternative to both Prague centralism and SPP autonomism - the socalled regionalist option. This involved promoting cooperation of Slovaks on behalf of Slovak interests on regional rather than national grounds. In theory, regionalism gave the Slovak Agra- 11 For electoral statistics, see Leff, National Conflict, p. 52. SLOVAKIA 15 rians the possibility to champion Slovak interests without the sort of nationalism that could upset Prague and the Czechoslovak constitutional order. 12 Despite considerable support for autonomy in Slovakia throughout the inter-war period, the cards were stacked against success in this regard for a number of reasons. Some of these have been discussed above and need little further elaboration- the Czech numerical preponderance over Slovaks, and superiority in terms of modem economic, cultural, and political development; the constitutional stipulation that a Czechoslovak nation, rather than separate Czech and Slovak nations, existed and was the basis of the state; the distaste for traditional Catholicism among the Republic's ruling elites; the fears that autonomy for Slovakia would play into the hands of Hungarian and German nationalists and make it harder for Prague to resist their autonomist demands; the belief that Slovaks were not capable of governing themselves; and the difficulties, owing to problems of political patronage and economic stagnation, of finding appropriate employment for the university-educated Slovaks the system was producing by the late 1920s and their consequent tum towards radicalism. Other factors were at play as well. It should be kept in mind that both of Czechoslovakia's presidents during the inter-war period, Tomas G. Masaryk and Edvard Benes, were staunch champions of the Czechoslovak idea and opponents of autonomy for Slovakia. Furthermore, the autonomist forces in Slovakia were not united, and in fact were fundamentally divided over their conceptions of just what sort of autonomous Slovakia they wanted. The Hungarian parties regarded Slovaks and Hungarians as minorities with an equal claim to self-government in Slovakia, 12 M. Kropilak, ed., Dejiny S/ovenska, V ( 1918-1945) (Bratislava, 1985), p. 195. 16 SLOVAKlA with hopes that someday that territory would return to a restored Kingdom of Hungary. The SPP, on the other hand, believed in "Slovakia for the Slovaks," as one of its most cherished slogans rang out, and saw Slovaks as the statotvomy narod in Slovakia, with Hungarians as merely a minority. The Communists , for their part, were open to autonomy for Slovakia only if it were to come in conjunction with the establishment of a Communist dictatorship of the proletariat, something that repelled the other pro-autonomy parties. The nature of the Czechoslovak political system was particularly crucial in making it highly unlikely that the SPP, barring some sort of exceptional circumstances, would be able to realize its autonomist goals via normal political channels. While winning the votes of around half of the ethnic Slovaks, the SPP 's support statewide was only around 7%. This meant that it would have to find allies if it wished to establish influence in or increase pressure on the government. Such alliance-seeking was problematic, however. Several leading Czechoslovak parties were outright hostile to Slovak nationalism and the idea of autonomy, for example the Social Democratic Party, National Socialist Party, and, after 1921 , the Czechoslovak People 's Party. Taken together, these three parties represented a considerable proportion of the governing majority. 13 Among the opposition parties were a few that were open to cooperation with the SPP, such as the Hungarian nationalists, Czech fascists, and the Slovak National Party (a Protestant autonomist party), but they were either insignificant in numbers and influence, or holding fundamentally different ultimate goals from the SPP. The Slovak wing of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party, the second strongest electoral draw in Slovakia, could theoreti13 For example, of the government 's 206 seats in Parliament after the 1929 elections, these three parties held 96 seats. SLOVAKJA 17 cally have formed a powerful bloc had its regionalist program developed into a genuine political collaboration with the SPP. However, two factors-the Agrarians' fear that the SPP would dominate an autonomous Slovakia, and the fact that the Agrarian Party 's leadership in Prague was unwilling to abandon centralism-kept such collaboration at a minimum. As with many national conflicts, it was probably the vicious circle of fear that accounted most for the failure to solve the Slovak question satisfactorily. In the 1920s, Czechoslovak centralists feared that an autonomous Slovakia would be easy prey for Hungarians eager to revise the post-War peace treaties and detach Slovakia from the Czech lands and return it to Hungary. The close collaboration after 1918 between SPP leader Hlinka and two notorious Hungarian sympathizers, Frantisek Jehlicka and Vojtech Tuka, only heightened Prague's apprehensions. 14 By the mid1930s, the Germans had replaced the Hungarians as the chief fear of Czechoslovak centralists with respect to Slovakia. After Konrad Henlein 's strong showing in the 1935 parliamentary elections, Prague worried that autonomy for Slovakia would make it harder to resist similar demands by Czechoslovakia's Sudeten German minority. The SPP, at the same time, had a great fear that Czechs would solve the Sudeten German question by granting autonomy to the predominately and historically German lands, while ignoring similar demands from Slovaks. This fear, combined with the 1 • Jehlicka was a Slovak priest of pro-Hungarian sympathy who accompanied Hlinka on a trip to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, where they sought to present the Slovak national case to the Great Powers . After the trip, which proved to be a fiasco, Hlinka was imprisoned by the Czechoslovak government while Jehlicka went into exile; Tuka was a pro-Hungarian university professor who lost his job after 1918 and found a new career in the SPP as an editor, parliamentarian, and advisor to Hlinka. He was inv o lved in various intrigues against the Czechoslovak Republic in the 1920s. 18 SLOVAKJA SPP's inability to realize its demands via normal channels, led that party, or at least certain factions within it, to seek support repeatedly from abroad. And since the Western democracies tended to support the post-War status quo, the SPP sometimes looked to those neighbors of Czechoslovakia who were seeking change and, hence, were seen by the Republic's rulers as a threat. Hlinka and his party consistently cultivated good relations with official and unofficial circles in Poland, while SPP radicals sought closer ties with Germany and Czechoslovakia's pro-Nazi Sudeten Germans . 15 This in turn frightened Czechs and made it even less likely that autonomy for Slovakia would be agreed to by the power brokers in Prague. Throughout 1938, fears on both sides increased as German pressure, both from within and without Czechoslovakia, intensified, as did Slovak demands for autonomy. Once the Czechoslovak government elected to accept the Munich Agreement and hand over large tracts of its territory to Nazi Germany, the SPP pressed its claims and got a demoralized Czechoslovak government not only to acquiesce in its autonomist demands but also to accept the existence of a distinct Slovak nation. Scarcely a week after the Munich Agreement, Prague and the SPP agreed that Czechoslovakia would be restructured as Czecho-Slovakia, with an autonomous Slovakia run by the SPP. When Hitler opted to destroy Czecho-Slovakia m March of 1939, this autonomous Slovakia became the independent Slovak Republic, closely allied with Nazi Germany as one of its satellites, while the Czech lands were incorporated wholly into the Third Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia 15 See, for example, James Ramon Felak, "At the Price of the Republic": Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party 1929- 1938 (Pittsburgh , PA, 1994), pp. 171 -175, for a discussion of SPP flirtations with Polish and German nationalists. SLOVAKIA 19 survived the war as an authoritarian, one-party state, led by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso, who succeeded Hlinka in the summer of 1938 as head of the SPP. Both Roman Catholics and their Church were privileged in this period. At the same time, a resistance movement emerged composed of an uneasy alliance of Communists and democrats, which erupted in the Slovak National Uprising of August-September 1944. Both the Slovak Republic and the Uprising would have major impacts on the post-War situation in Slovakia. First, by having their own state, Slovaks gained the confidence and experience necessary for self-government. By 1945, the idea of returning to a Czechoslovak nation and state run from Prague was repellent across the political spectrum in Slovakia. Second, the very fact of this state which, like the autonomous Slovakia of October 1938, came into existence on the coattails of Hitler's march into Central Europe, tainted Slovak accomplishments, as many Czechs regarded Slovaks, especially those in the SPP, as collaborators with the Czechs' mortal enemy, Nazi Germany. Thus, Czechs often saw manifestations of Slovak nationalism as fascist in nature and threatening to the Republic. Third, despite the susceptibility of Slovaks to charges of collaboration, at the same time, thanks to the Slovak National Uprising, Slovaks could point to the fact that their own homegrown resistance to Nazism far exceeded Czech efforts in numbers and intensity. It also created a politically influential association of partisan veterans who could potentially throw their weight around in the postWar situation. With Germany's defeat, Czechoslovakia was restored. This time, however, there would be no Czechoslovak idea. Slovaks were recognized as a distinct nation, and allowed to retain the Slovak national organs that they had set up during the Uprising. 20 SLOVAKJA Czech Communist leader Klement Gottwald, Czechoslovakia's most powerful politician at war's end, proclaimed that "the Slovaks are to be the masters in their own Slovak land." 16 A whole host of problems emerged however, some almost at once, to foil what was a hopeful beginning for advocates of Slovak autonomy. First, the set-up was an asymmetrical one. Slovak national organs, such as the Slovak National Council and Board of Commissioners, were established, but with no parallel Czech organs, only federal organs with competence for the entire state. This led to conflicts over where the competence of the central organs ended and that of the Slovak ones began. The "Slovak question" returned in a new form. Second, the cultural differences that plagued SlovakCzech relations during the First Republic continued. Czech suspicion of Slovak Catholicism was, if anything, even more intense after the experience of the Second World War, when the pro-Nazi Slovak state was led by a Catholic priest under whom the Church enjoyed far more privilege and influence than it had under the First Republic or could hope to after 1945. Third, Czech numerical dominance remained, and if Czech parties could be united on the issue, they would be able to scale back Slovak self-government with little resistance. It also became clear, especially after Czechoslovakia's first post-war parliamentary elections in May of 1946, that Slovakia was far less friendly politically to the Left than were the Czech lands. While Czechs chose left-wing parties in percentages that rank among all-time highs for Europe (the Communists, Social Democrats, and National Socialists together received over 79% of the vote in the Czech lands, with the Communists leading the way with 40% ), Slovaks rejected the Com16 Joseph A. Mikus, ed., Slovakia, A Political and Constitutional History, Acta Academica Slovaca 48 (Bratislava, 1995), p. 242; this work contains an English translation of the text of the Kosice Agreement of April 5, 1945, pp. 242-243. SLOVAKIA 21 munists in favor of the Democrats by a slightly more than two-to• one margm . 17 These above factors combined to complicate post-war Czechoslovak politics and to pose formidable impediments to the realization of the promised program of autonomy for Slovakia. The political landscape in Slovakia after the War was occupied by three main groups, politically speaking. On the Left were the Communists, belonging to the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), separate from, yet ultimately under the control of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) in Prague. The KSS was divided between those Slovak Communists who were willing to assert what they regarded as Slovak interests, and those who were more closely under the thumb of Prague. By August 1945 the latter, on Prague 's intervention, were given the upper hand in the KSS. 18 The only significant party besides the Communists was the Slovak Democratic Party (DP), founded by non-Communist veterans of the Slovak National Uprising, attracting above all those Slovak Protestants who had been alienated by the SPP's assertive Catholicism but at the same time suspicious of Prague 's centralism. The third group was the Catholics themselves, most of whom were unorganized politically with the outlawing of the SPP at war 's end. Thus, the party that traditionally drew about half the Slovak vote no longer existed, and a land that was 80% Catholic was offered only parties dominated by atheists or Protestants. This large bloc of voters without a party home would, as both the Communists and the Democrats realized, be decisive in the parlia- 17 Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch 1945-1948 na ceste ku komunistickej tota/ite(Bratislava, 1994), p. 39. " l.'.ubomir Liptak, ed., Politicke strany na Slovensku, 1860-1989 (Bratislava, 1992), pp. 267-268; and Yeshayahu Jelinek, The Lust for Power: Nationalism. Slovakia, and the Communists, 19 I 8-1948 (Boulder, CO, 1983), p. 86. 22 SLOVAKJA mentary elections. Thus, the KSS began to woo Slovak Catholics, hoping to create a separate Slovak Catholic party that would keep Catholic voters away from the DP and thereby keep Slovakia's non-Communist population divided. 19 Just as it appeared that Communist intrigues would succeed, the DP delivered an olive branch to disgruntled Slovak Catholics. It was called the April Agreement, and involved the DP and leading Slovak Catholics. This Agreement specified that the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in all DP organs and institutions was to be seven-to-three, with Catholics to be allotted two-thirds of the party's seats in Parliament. In addition, Catholics were to get their own DP daily, the Demokraticke hlasy. 20 As a result of the April Agreement, Catholics moved into leading positions in the DP's presidium and general secretariat. Nevertheless, this Catholic-Protestant reconciliation was a Pyrrhic victory for Slovakia's non-Communist forces. It did enable the DP to win the May 1946 parliamentary elections in a resounding manner, and made it clear that Slovakia was overwhelmingly anti-Communist. At the same time, however, the Communists were able to exploit the April Agreement successfully for their own ends. With an influx of Catholics into the DP, the same Catholics that Communists had been wooing up to that point, the KSS now sought to portray the DP as riddled with fascist traitors loyal to former leader Tiso, and dangerous to the integrity and democracy of the Czechoslovak state. 21 Thus began a determined , 19 Letz, Slovensko, pp. 28-29 ; Michal Bamovsky, Na ceste k monopolu moci; Mocenskopoliticke zapasy na S/ovensku v rokoch 1945-1948 (Bratislava, 1993), p. 73 . 20 Bamovsky, Na ceste, p. 80; Letz, S/ovensko, p. 36. 21 See United States Department of State, Decimal Files, 860f.00/6- l 346, no. 985 ; (hereafter referred to as DOS). SLOVAKIA 23 sustained, and aggressive effort by Communist propaganda to slander the DP. Furthermore, the election results made it clear to the Communists that autonomy for Slovakia would be a disaster for Communist interests. Consequently, the Communists began to push aggressively for a scaling back of the competence of Slovak national organs in favor of federal ones. At the same time, Communists sought to use the alarm they could generate over a "fascist restoration" in Slovakia to frighten Czech non-Communists into keeping the DP at a distance. With the acquiescence, and at times the support of the Czech democratic parties, the Communists succeeded in reasserting Prague's control over Slovakia and largely isolating the DP. As U.S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt wrote in May, 1947: For the Czech non-Communist parties and their leaders , including Benes, as a result of their experiences in 1938-1939 when Slovak aspirations contributed materially to the dissolution of the Czechoslovak State, feel with a deep intensity that Slovak autonomy, while acceptable in theory, must have definite limitations in practice. These leaders are therefore all too likely to side with the Communists on any issues to which the latter are able to give a Czech versus Slovak or autonomy versus centralism complexion. As a result the Democrats are very frequently left to face the Communist onslaught alone. 22 Although, strictly speaking, Czechoslovakia was a democracy, with free elections and multiple political parties with their own periodicals, one is struck by just how circumscribed the system in fact was. A number of political parties were banned, including the most popular Czech and Slovak parties of the inter-war years, the Agrarians and SPP, respectively. New parties were prohibited 22 DOS, 5-2947, no. 2477. 24 SLOVAKIA without the consent of the existing parties. Nor could one set up an individual periodical without their permission. Government intervention in and influence over the media was considerable, and publication of anything critical of the Soviet Union was taboo. The regime was also established to accord the Communists more influence than electoral results would warrant. 23 This was particularly the case in Slovakia, where despite losing by nearly a two-to-one margin in the parliamentary elections, the Communists retained the chairmanship of the Board of CoJilIIlissioners, which acted as the executive branch in Slovakia, and kept the Democrats from holding the crucial post of Commissioner of the Interior, which went to the non-partisan Mikulas Ferjencfk.24 Without much support from the Czech non-Communist parties and facing a Communist-influenced political police, the DP was an easy prey for the most concentrated Communist attack yet. In June of 1947, the security police in Slovakia uncovered an alleged "anti-state conspiracy", which the Communists used to blackmail and intimidate the DP.25 Using their influence in and control over state security organs and employing 'agents provocateurs', the Communists were able, reminiscent of their assault on the Smallholders Party in Hungary, to charge leading Slovak Democrats with complicity in the conspiracy. Though the Czech democratic parties were by this time wise to Communist intrigues and took some steps in defense of the DP, they never quite lost their suspicions that, just possibly, Communist charges against the 23 For a discussion of Czechoslovakia's "people's democratic" system, see Karel Kaplan, The Short March; The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia, 19451948 (London, 1987), pp. 33-54. 24 Bamovsky, Na ceste, pp. 116- I I 7. 25 lbid., pp. 140-141 ; Letz, Slovensko, pp. 54-55. SLOVAKIA 25 DP might be accurate.26 With the Czech democrats thereby paralyzed, the Communists, with the police in their pockets, and the trade union and partisan organizations that they dominated mobilized on their behalf, felt that the correlation of forces were such in Slovakia that they attempted a 'putsch' in November of 194 7. This involved a KSS attempt to force a reconstitution of the Slovak Board of Commissioners through a political crisis caused by the planned and coordinated resignation of its Communist members. Though only partly successful, and though the DP and Czech non-Marxist parties stuck together from this point on, this cooperation proved to be too little, too late. The attempted coup in Slovakia was followed by a successful one in Prague in February 1948; in the latter case, it was the Czechoslovak Social Democrats who broke ranks with Czec hoslovakia's democratic parties and allowed the Communists' divide and rule tactics to bring Czec hoslovak democracy to an end . In contrasting the inter-war period and the post-war period , one finds much continuity in the Slovak-Czech relationship. The Czech bias against traditional Slovak Catholicism impeded relations both after 1918 and, reinforced by the events of 1938-1945, maintained itself into the post-war era. Czech fears of Slovaks as disloyal also continued, again reinforced by the events of the inter-war period and especially of 1938- 1939, and made evident in the ease with which the Communists could find Czech support for their efforts to undo 'de facto' the results of the elections in Slovakia. Both situations, though in quite different ways, presented insurmountable obstacles to the realization of Slovak autonomist desires, with Slovaks themselves divided over the iss ue, unable to bring sufficient pressure to bear on their behalf. Finally, in both 26 DOS, 10-647, no. 1342; see also Hu bert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London, 1950), p. 113. 26 SLOVAKIA situations, external developments were crucial - in one case Nazi Germany's pressure against Czechoslovakia, in the other the intensifying Cold War, which made Czechoslovakia 's hopes of being a bridge between East and West futile and even dangerous. Along with important similarities, the Slovak question in the inter-war period and post-war period shows significant differences. After World War II, the Czechoslovak idea was abandoned and the existence of a Slovak nation was officially recognized. Furthermore, Prague came to believe that the best way to ease Slovak discontent was via the economic development of Slovakia. There were also important differences in the political structure of the two cases. In the inter-war period, the Government was composed of parties committed to the maintenance of Czechoslovak democracy, with Communists and fascists in the opposition along with Slovak nationalists. After the War, an opposition technically ceased to exist, Communists held key positions within the system they sought to destroy, and Slovak nationalists, albeit a new breed more moderate than the former SPP, sat in the Government. A final crucial difference lies in the relationship between the Slovak question and the health and survival of the democratic order in Czechoslovakia. In the inter-war period, Slovak nationalists had at best an ambivalent attitude toward Czechoslovakia's system. While a fascist element within the SPP viewed it with hostility, most Slovak nationalists accepted the system or were indifferent toward it. When Czechoslovakia faced potentially fatal threats in 1938, the SPP's primary concern was not "How can we defend Czechoslovak democracy at this critical time?" but rather the more parochial "What's in it for the Slovaks?" For all their failure to address satisfactorily the Slovak question in the 1920s and 1930s, most Czech political elites had a better grasp of just what was at stake as Nazism intensified its pressure on the First SLOVAKIA 27 Republic from within and without. After the war, however, autonomy-minded Slovaks, now represented in the DP, had a very clear notion of just what was at stake, and arguably a better grasp of the situation than the Czechoslovak democrats, who well into 1947 seemed to fear an SPP-revival in Slovakia more than they feared the Communists . For national tensions to ease, both sides of a conflict need to relinquish, or at least moderate, their fears of the other. This the Czechs never really succeeded in doing, as the idea that Slovakia was disloyal and separatist was always in the back, and often in the front, of the minds of many of them. Slovak actions, whether it was Hlinka's consorting with Hungarian sympathizers in the 1920s, the SPP radical wing's flirting with fascism in the 19 30s, or the SPP's demand for autonomy and eventual secession from Czecho-Slovakia in conjunction with Hitler's penetration of East Central Europe, only reaffirmed or deepened Czech fears. When one takes into account these mutual suspicions, the psychological baggage both sides brought into their relationship, the structure of Czechoslovakia's regimes during this century, the persistent bias of Czech elites against Slovak Catholicism, the disparities between Slovak and Czech economic development, the presence of hostile neighbors hoping to exploit Slovak-Czech tensions, and the trauma that this part of Europe experienced from 1914 to 1989, it is not surprising that the Slovak question remained a running sore on Czechoslovakia's body politic throughout the twentieth century.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak Question in the lnterwar (1918-1938) and Post-War (1945-1948) Czechoslovak Republics Description An account of the resource James R. Felak Slovakia, Vol. 37 (No. 68-69), 2003 pp. 7-27 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Felak, James Ramon, 1957- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5ba51466eb2c6a48d6534028ecbcea2d.pdf c28a1530c11c2ff3197ecce61b791010 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 33 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James Ramon Felak On April 15 , 1947, Igor Daxne r, Chairman of the National Court in Brati s lava, pronounced the verd ict agai nst Father Jozef Ti so, the head of Slovakia's wartime state that was closely alli ed with Naz i Germany. The Co urt found Ti so guilty of 95 of 11 3 charges aga inst him, in c ludin g treason, betraya l of the Slovak National Uprising , co ll aborati on with the Naz is, and de portation of Slovak Jews to Naz i death ca mps. Hi s sente nce was death by han g in g, to be carried out within 48 hours. At once, Tiso, along w ith hi s two defense attorneys , submitted a requ est for c le me ncy. 1 Thi s pape r w ill in vesti gate the fate of thi s request, the last official chance to spare Ti so from death. Though the final deci sion on clemency rested with Czechoslovakia ' s Pres ide nt Edvard Be nes, the request passed like a hot potato over the next dozen ho urs, from Daxner to Slovakia's Commissioner of th e Interior Iva n Stefanik, to Slovakia ' s c hi ef organ of se lf-governme nt , the Slovak Nation al Council (SNC) , to the Czechoslovak gove rnme nt in Prague , and ultimatel y to Be nes. De mocra tic Party (DP) leaders had lobbi ed for c lemency during the tri al, voted for it at the gove rnme nt 's mee tin g on the eve nin g of April 16, a nd frantically appea led on its behalf to Be nes in the hours before Tiso ' s exec uti on. However, they c uri ously refused to take a stand for clemency at the meeting of the SNC's Pres idium on the afternoon of April 16, where they had a 3-to-2 majority and where a stand on Ti so 's behalf would have g ive n offic ial sanction to the view , w idely shared by many and 1 ' One of the three prosecutors. l.'.udovft Ri gan. also made a request for clemency to the Court; K arel K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy . Komentovane dokumenty, (Prague. I 992), p. 221 (Document 37). �SLOVAKIA 34 probably most Slovaks, that Tiso should not be executed. The Democrats' refusal to take a stand in the SNC meant that Tiso's opponents could point to the failure of any official Slovak organs to recommend clemency as proof that his execution reflected the will of the Slovak people. The fate of Jozef Tiso was very much connected with the DP's fortunes in Czechoslovak and Slovak politics . Shortly after her liberation from Nazi rule and reattachment to Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had only two significant political parties-the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP). The latter, in many ways a legacy of the interwar Agrarian party, emerged out of the Lutheran-dominated wing of the resistance to the Tiso regime. When the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party (SPP) was outlawed at war ' s end , many Slovak Catholics became political orphans.2 In the spring of 1946, however, the DP adopted them through the so-called April Agreement, a pact between the party's leaders and important Catholic political activi sts whereby Catholics were promised a large share of influence in the DP and a Democratic commitment to promote the Catholic Church ' s position on issues such as education in exchange for Catholic electoral support. The fruit of the April Agreement was a landslide victory for the DP over the Communists in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, with Democrats winning 63 % of the vote to the Communists' 30%. From that point on , the CPS focused its energies on undoing the electoral results by seeking to paralyze, fracture , or dis solve the DP. Among other things, the Tiso trial figured in Communist calculations of how to cripple their rival. The Communist plan was to force the DP to navigate between the Scylla of angering its Catholic members and voters , who had hopes that the Democrats would rescue Tiso from a death sentence, and the Charybdis of being sucked into a police investigation for 2 Catholics comprised nearly 80% of the Slovak population. The majority of Slovak Catholics voted for the SPP during the interwar period. �SLOVAKIA 35 allegations of pandering to the reactionaries and war criminals it was all egedl y harboring th anks to the April Agreeme nt. Idea ll y, the DP wo uld be di scredited in the eyes of Catholics as an ineffectua l and lukewarm defe nder of Ti so, while concurrently di sc redited in the eyes of everyone else as a haven for reactionaries. With little room for mane uver, and in the face of enormo us press ure, the DP had to face thi s chall enge. What fo ll ows is how the Com muni sts were able to acco mpli sh these end s, partl y due to the ir own tactics, partl y due to the dynami c of the situ ati on, and part ly due to the cho ices made by the Democrats. Ri ght after the anno unceme nt of the verd ict, Ti so's lawyers, Ernest Zabkay and Martin Greco, submitted an official requ est for c lemency, as king for a more "appropriate" sentence for the ir c lient. 3 They particularly stressed lega l tec hni ca lities. Tiso's lawyers argued th at the defense was not all owed to speak with the acc used without the sec urity organs present-a violati on of a fund amental principle of criminal tri al procedure-and that the defense did not have certain archiv al materials at its disposal , while the prosec uti on did. Furthermore, records of testimony were not made avail able within the requisite three days, but lagged by nearly two month s, thereby mak in g it impossible for the defense to c ite testimon y made after January 15 in its concluding statements. In addition to these and a number of other technicalities, Tiso ' s lawyers arg ued th at the trial was po litica ll y biased, both because Daxner himse lf was bi ased, as the SNC itself had recognized in the past, and because, despite a leg islati ve order ca llin g for political pari ty in the Senate, no me mbers of the DP took part in the judg ment. Tiso's attorn eys a lso arg ued that Tiso was being puni shed for eve nts beyond his co ntro l. They claimed th at he did not prepare for Slovakia's independence in 1939, or he lp cause it, and that he showed no initiative and intention ality in hi s cooperation wi th Nazi Germany. Rather, he simpl y tri ed to make the best of a bad situ ation that was thru st upo n him . Finally, Ti so's atto rneys, in the .1 Kaplan, Ova retribucnf procesy. pp. 2 15-2 19 (Document 35) . �SLOVAKIA 36 onl y argument that the DP would make its ow n, argued th at clemency would strengthen Czech-Slovak relations, e liminate the threat of ill will between Slovakia ' s Catholics and Protestants, and strengthen ti es between Slovak emigrants and their motherl and. The National Court quick ly decided agai nst recommending c lemency for Ti so, and passed Tiso ' s request on to Slovak Commissioner of Ju stice Ivan Stefanik , a Democrat. Stefa nik in turn supported Tiso's request, and submitted a proposal to the Presidium of the SNC, which read , " I propose that the death se ntence of Dr. Jozef Ti so be commuted to life impri sonment. " 4 The proposal was to the point, absent the argumentation included in Ti so ' s request, and un like Ti so ' s request, allowed for no sentence less than life impri sonment. On April 16, the SNC ' s Presidium met to consider Stefa nik ' s proposal, along with some other matters connected with Ti so ' s tri al. When the Pres idium convened, it was already under enormous pressure. By law , Tiso ' s exec ution was to be carried out within 48 hours of the announcement of the verdict, so matters had to be considered quickly. Moreover, the gove rnm ent in Prag ue was meet in g later that day to discuss c lemency , and was eagerly awaiting the views of Slovakia 's leadin g organs on the matter. Adding to the pressure was the fact that the Presidium received the 214 page judgment aga inst Tiso only shortl y before its meeti ng.5 Moreover, te legrams, letters, and petitions (for and against c leme ncy) were pourin g in to the President 's office, the government, and the SNC, while Parti san and labor organizations staged anti-Ti so rallies across Slovakia and de legation s from trade union s, hou sing estates, and espec ially resistance organizations arrived in Brati slava to add their presence to the de liberations. 6 Though there were no reported cases of violence, it is not difficult to imagine the presence of these groups, enco uraged if not orchestrated by the Communists, adding a menac in g character to 4 K aplan , Dva relribucnf procesy. p. 220 (Document 36). ' Th e DP claimed the Presidium had onl y ten minutes to look over the length y judgmen t; see Cas. April 23 , 1947 , no. 93, p. I. 6 Cas, Apri l 23, 1947, no. 93 , p. I. �SLOVAKIA 37 the already inte nse pressure on the Presidium , or more prec ise ly, its Democratic me mbers. For example, a consortium of major res istance organi zati o ns iss ued a decl aration on April 16 th at conde mned c lemency as a "s hameful defilement (popl'u vanie) of all the sac rifi ces of o ur nation al stru gg le" th at co uld e mbolde n Ti so's supporte rs into provokin g unrest in S lovakia aimed at undermining the Re public.7 If cle mency was gra nted to Tiso, these organizations promi sed to assess the situation and cons ide r what mean s to emp loy in de fe nse of the Republic and the ga ins of the Slovak National Upri sin g. The DP had a majority on the Presi dium , which conta ined three Democrats (Jozef Lettrich, who was chairman of both the DP and the SNC, Andrej Cvincek, Milan Po la k) a nd two Communi sts (Karol Smidke, Ivan Horvath ). Nevertheless, the Pres idium did not e ndorse Stefanik's proposa l for c le me nc y; rather, it reso lved to submit the proposa l to the governme nt without co mme nt. In hi s me moirs, Jan Ursfny, a top DP leader and its Deputy Chairman, argued that Lettric h went into the meetin g with the intention of avo idin g debate over clemency, a position Ursfny strongly advised against. 8 Lettrich 's behav ior at the meeting does betray the actions of a man inte nt on avoi ding debate. 9 First of all , most of the meetin g 's di scuss ion dea lt with De mocratic di ssati sfaction with Daxner's ha ndling of the tri al. Whe n the Presidium did get around to the Ti so verdict, Le ttri c h made it clear th at he fe lt th at the press ure of time mad e it imposs ible to acq uire sufficie nt knowledge to take a pos ition on c le mency, and that any recommendation would thu s have to be " politica l." The Communi st Horvath the n proposed that the Presidium take no stand , but simpl y pass on Stefa nik 's proposa l to the government without co mment. He argued that a recomme nd ation from the SNC was ne ithe r requi- 1 Pravda. Apri l 18, 1947 . no. 90, p. I: th e Slovak term pop!ii vct nie could be rendered as .. spitting on". • Jan Ursfny. Z m6jho i i votct. (M artin . 2000), pp. 123- 124. " See Sl ovensky narod ny archfv (hereafter referred to as SNA). Fond Urad predsednfctva Slovenskej narodnej rady , Carton 139, Folder 134. Folios 49-58 , S R Presidiu m meetin g of A pril 16. 1947. �SLOVAKIA 38 red nor necessary, for it was the government and Benes whose views would be decisive. According to Horvath, since the Communists were opposed to clemency, they would be unable to support Stefanik ' s proposa l, and hence any vote in the SNC would be on a parti san basis, setting a bad precedent for future Communist-Democratic cooperation. When it came time to vote on Horvath ' s proposal , the Presidium accepted it unanimously. Before examining why the SNC , or more specifically its Democratic members, opted not to recommend c lemency for Tiso, let us track the proposal ' s course to Prague and ultimately to Benes. The Communists and Social Democrats were openly hostile to Tiso, and the non-parti san mini sters, Ludvfk Svoboda (Defense) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), could be expected to be so as well. Together, these constituted 13 of the 23 members of the government, enough to tip any vote to Ti so's detriment. On top of that, the Czech National Soc ialists were at best ambivalent. A number of leading National Socialists opposed clemency and wanted their party to vote against it or at least to abstain. 10 However, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, one of the party's top leaders, had earlier assured Lettrich that he would support clemency provided the SNC did. 11 In the last of a series of meetings on the issue , held right before the government session began , Drtina managed to convince his colleagues to agree to the following position : to oppose clemency, but only after first proposing that the request for clemency be returned to the Presid ium of the SNC for that organ's recommendation. In thi s way, Drtina could present himself as makin g a good faith effort to honor hi s promise to Lettrich , while entertaining hopes that a vote to return the request to the SNC would fail, thu s getting himself off the hook. 12 The government meeting opened at approximately 5: 15 p.m ., after a delay of over an hour as its members waited for reports from ° Kaplan. Dva retribucnf procesy. p. 25 . 1 " Prokop Drtina. Ceskos lovensko muj osud, II. 2, (Toronto, I 982). pp. 297-298. 302. 12 Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muj osud. II , 2, p. 302. �SLOVAKIA 39 Slovakia. 13 Within ten minutes, a delegation of representatives from the Union of Czechoslovak Partisans and so me similar organizations asked to be admitted. Since the National Socialists had yet to arrive, mak ing their last minute plans in a nearby room , the meetin g was adjourned for 45 minutes while the parti san organizations were given the opportunity to press ure the mini sters to vote against clemency. 14 Once the de legation s had their say and engaged some of the mini sters over the iss ue , and the National Sociali st mini sters had arrived, the meeting was reconvened. Prime Mini ster Kl ement Gottwald began by sharin g two pieces of information he had just rece ived from Slovaki a- the memorandum from the SNC' s Pres idium pass in g on Stefanik's proposal for clemency without comment, and a telegram from Gu stav Husak, Chairman of Slovakia 's Board of Commissioners (Cabinet). Husak noted that Stefanik 's proposal did not reflect the views of the Board of Commissioners nor its Presidium, whose standpoint Stefanik did not seek, and should therefore be regarded as hi s own personal proposal. Husak added that he did not agree with the proposa l. Thus, the meeting opened with reports from Slovakia 's two chief political organs, neither of which endorsed clemency. Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party , then proposed that the government reso lve aga inst clemency, since the National Court in Brati slava recommended against it, and the Pres idium of the SNC did not recommend for it. In a long and sometimes pass ionate debate, mini sters from both sides weighed in on the que stion, with positions breaking down along party lines. The Communists led the charge against clemency. Vladimfr Clementi s, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a Slovak, read a CPS 13 For the minutes of the meeting. see K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy. pp. 225-254. 14 Ursfny . in his memoirs, recou nts be ing asked by one member of the parti san dele- gati on: "M r. Deput y Chairman, tell me, w ith whom do you wan t to go. w ith th e Ludak underground. or with us?" A nother partisan representati ve. however, spoke up for Ursfny as ··one of the greates t partisans. " (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota, p. 125): see footnote 17 for an ex planation of the term " Ludak. " �40 SLOVAKIA decl aration that la id o ut the Co mmuni st pos iti on. The dec larati o n stressed the did acti c function of the tri al, that is, its purpose in di sco urag ing enemies of the Republic. A death sentence co uld do that far better than a life sentence in thi s res pect. C lemency, on the co ntrary, would onl y encou rage enemi es of the state and sympathizers of Ti so and hi s reg ime . Reactionari es, as before, were tryin g to take over Slovaki a "even at the price of the Re public." 15 The dec laration arg ued that c leme ncy would evoke di stru st in the judic ial sys tem. Veterans of the Sl ovak Nati onal Upri sin g would be upset with the de parture from the idea ls of the res istance; peo ple wo uld note the inj ustice of lesser crimin als hav ing been more harshl y puni shed than Ti so; and politics would be seen once more as " panske huncutst vo", that is "gentl emen's mi sc hi ef." 16 The declarati o n noted in parti cul ar that Ti so showed no remorse for hi s crimes, and in fac t gave succor to th e Re public 's ene mi es in hi s co ncludin g statement at hi s tri al. Much of what Cleme nti s read was identica l to a dec larati on made a day earli er by Slovaki a's res istance organi zati o ns, testifyin g to the leadin g ro le the Co mmuni sts pl ayed in those orga ni zati o ns and the success the party had in coordin atin g various soc ial orga ni zati ons on behalf of its objecti ves . Indeed , both dec laration s co nc luded with the sa me threat to assess the s ituation and consider what mea ns to employ in defense of the Republic and its character. Czech Communi sts also spoke out again st clemency, asserting th at Ti so was a traitor and a war crimina l, and that fa ilin g to exec ute him would be a blow to Czec hos lovakia 's unity and inde pendence. Communi st speakers also arg ued th at it was the will of th e Slovak people that Ti so be exec u- 15 The express ion ··ani za ce nu republiky", th at is, •·even at the price of the rep ublic" . was a reference to a statement made by HSL:S leader A ndrej Hlin ka at a rall y in Trencfn in 1932, where he asse rted th e degree to whi ch his party wo uld pu rsue Slovak interests; see James Ramon Felak, •A l the Price of the Republic·_. Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party. 1929- 1938. (Pittsburg h, 1994 ), p. 96. 16 " Poli tika je panske huncutstvo" was an expression curre nt among Slovaks , rooted in Slovakia ' s feudal pas t. It was the recog nition by peasan ts th at pol itics was the domain where the lords made mi sch ief. �SLOVAKIA 41 ted , as ev ide nced by the pos iti ons of the Nati ona l Co urt, the SNC, and the Board of Co mmi ss ione rs, all organs composed e ntire ly of Slova ks and re prese nting S lovakia. Thi s was why, the Czec h Co mmuni st Vac lav Kopecky noted , the DP would not speak up fo r c leme ncy on the SNC's Pres idium. Th e Soc ia l De mocrati c mini sters we re just as o pposed to c lemency as the Communi sts, and no less assertive about the ir pos iti on. Zdene k Fierlin ger, the leader of the SOP and a Deputy Prime Minister, argued th at a vote fo r c le me ncy wo uld upset Czec hoslovaki a's alli es in the Slav ic world , in part because it would fu e l Slova k independe nce, whi c h itse lf th reate ned Czec hos lovaki a 's border w ith the Sov iet Uni o n. Fie rlinger even re marked th at how o ne voted o n the cleme ncy questi on was a test of one's patri oti sm. With respect to the reli g io us dim e ns ion of the ques ti o n, the Soc ial De mocrati c leade r asserted th at the fac t of Tiso's be ing a priest was not a miti gating c irc um stance, but rathe r one th at made matters worse. He noted th at it was not good for the Catho lic Churc h to e ncumbe r itse lf with Ti so . Whil e Fie rlinger re prese nted the pro-C ommuni st left-win g of the SOP, that party's ri ght-wing was no less vehe me nt about Ti so. Vaclav Maj er, the leader of the ri ght-wing Soc ial De mocrats, referred to the Sl ovak pri est as one of the chi e f war crimin als, guilty of mass murder. The most ex te ns ive attac k on Ti so a nd argume nt against cle me ncy, however, came not fro m the mini ste rs o f the le fti st parties, but from the oste nsibl y ne utra l (a lbeit c loset Communi st) Ludvfk Svoboda, the Mini ster o f Defe nse. As a Czec hoslovak hero of both the First and Second World Wars, Svoboda's word s carri ed a certain cac het. Svoboda spoke at le ngth about why T iso mu st die . He came o ut strong ly aga inst so-ca ll ed ha lf-so luti o ns; at ha nd was a definiti ve hi stori ca l qu esti o n w ith long- te rm impli cati o ns th at sho uld not be judged accordin g to the needs a nd mood of the mo me nt. Ti so was �42 SLOVAKIA not just a war criminal ; he was the sy mbol of " Ludakism," 17 fasci sm, treason , and collaboration . To grant clemency to Tiso, according to Svoboda, would render hi s trial vain and superfluous. If alive, Ti so would remain to poison cooperation and unity between Czechs and Slovaks; clemency would encourage hi s supporters, while disappointing others. Like many speakers and writers of the time, Svoboda noted that Tiso showed no remorse. He ca lled for a firm and resolute action agai nst him as a means of strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position and prestige. To those w ho argued th at Ti so should be spared because he was a priest, Svoboda dec lared that "we are not judging a priest, but a traitor, a destroyer of the Czechoslovak state, and a criminal. That Tiso is a priest only makes matters worse; he profaned the priestly office and Church at a time when thou sands of other priests fought bravely again st Nazi sm and perished in concentration camps and prisons." On the other s ide of the equation were those mini sters who championed c lemency-on ly the Democrats and Czech Populi sts. Here the most prominent speaker was Ursfny . The Democratic Deputy Chairman argued that clemency would improve relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics, and aid in the overall consolidation of the post-war Republic. Such a goodwi ll gesture might also win over some of Czechoslovakia' s enemi es. Ursfny noted that religiou s fee lings ran strong in Slovakia, where the exec ution of a priest was a serious , and potentiall y upsetting matter. He pointed out that many good people were for clemency, includin g so me bishops and hi gh functionari es in the Lutheran church , a church that itself had suffered under Ti so's regi me. The Democratic Minister of Transportation Ivan Pietor also spelled out a number of reasons for clemency. He argued that Ti so was popular among the majority of Slovaks, and that the preva ilin g majority of Slovaks would vote for 17 Lud aki sm, or "l'udactvo" was the term employed to refer to fo ll owers of th e Slovak People 's Party, whose members were know n as '• Ludaks" or " l'udaci ." It best approximates the Engli sh word " Populi sm. " Communi sts applied the term to any Slovak Catholics they did not like. �SLOVAKIA 43 clemency if given the chance, thou gh thi s did not mean they agreed with Ti so ' s politics. He too noted that important Lutheran leaders sent ardent appeals on Tiso's behalf in the interest of the peaceful deve lopment of Slovaki a and Czechoslovakia. The g iven politica l s ituation , accordin g to Pietor, demanded statesmanlike thinkin g, wi sdom , and sensiti vity to the prevailing political condition s and mood. In such a co ntext, clemency would be a gesture to win over hearts in Slovakia and bring the Czech and Slovak nation s together. While the Court may have unanimou sly estab lished Tiso 's guilt and ca ll ed for hi s exec ution , that was a judicial decision , not a political one. What the Republic now faced was a manifestly political deci sion , and that was the task of the government to settl e, in accordance with political considerations. The Czec h Populi sts, as members of a Catholic party with moderate inclinations, also supported clemency. Minister Franti se k Ha.la (Post Office), him se lf a Catholic priest, presented c le mency as the most suitable solution for Czechoslovak and Slovak interests. The Populi st Adolf Prochazka (Health ) remarked that c lemency was the des ire of most Slovaks, and of the Lutheran church leadership . Jan Kopecky (Mini ster without Portfolio) supported clemency as a way to consolidate the Repub li c, and reminded hi s mini sterial colleagues that life impri sonment was not tantamount to acq uittal. In makin g hi s case, Ursfny co ntended that the SNC did not recommend aga inst c lemency ; rather it was not the Pres idium 's function to ex press a position on the proposa l, but only to pass it on to the government. Technically , he was correct because the Second Prague Agreement of April I I , 1946, the statute under which such matters were regulated , stated that the commissioner's proposal be submitted to the go vernment "v ia the Pres idium of the Slovak National Counci l. " 18 However, this strict construction is not the way the SNC had hitherto been dealing with proposa ls. Gottwald snide ly noted that the '" Jan Mechyr. Slo vensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I . (Prague. 1991 ). �44 SLOVAKIA Pres idium had sudde nl y dec ided in thi s case to limit itse lf to the ro le of a post office, and al ong with Fie rlinger, he regarded Ursfny 's expl a nati on as sophi stry. They were not bu ying th e De moc rats ' claim that the Pres idium ' s position was not a fa ilure to endorse c le mency. It was the centri st parties, however, that ex pressed the most anger over the SNC 's sile nce regardin g c leme ncy - a sil e nce th at, because the DP had a majority in the Pres idium, was c learl y bl a med on the De mocrats. A number of Nati ona l Soc iali st and Populi st mini ste rs vo iced their indi gnati on at the SNC's atte mpt to pass th e buck. Jaroslav Stra nsky (Edu cati on) said th at he wa nted Ursfny and hi s frie nds to recogni ze the situ ation into whi ch they had gotte n the governme nt , whi c h thanks to the m now had to dec ide on a matter about whi c h it did not have s uffic ie nt kn ow ledge. In thi s s itu ati on, th e gove rnm e nt co uld be bl a med if Ti so did not get cle me ncy, thereby bein g burde ned with what is primaril y a Sl ovak pro bl e m. Drtina, s imil arly, sa id he was perpl exed by the Pres idium ' s unex pected course of acti on, one whi ch now put the go vernme nt in a diffi c ult situati on. He pro posed se ndin g th e pro posal bac k to th e Pres idium fo r its opini o n, in acco rdance with the Second Prague Agree me nt, whi c h stipul ated that the governme nt return proposa ls to the SNC's Pres idium if it had objecti ons to them from the point of view of statew ide inte res ts. Foll o win g suit , Nation a l Soc ia li st Mini ste r o f Fore ig n Trade Hube rt Ripka noted hi s party ' s astoni shme nt at th e SNC's acti on - how it limited its ro le to th at of a mailbox in the way it interpre ted the Seco nd Prag ue Agree me nt. He noted th at Sl ovaki a ' s se lf-proc laimed leadin g orga n did not have the courage to ex press itse lf on a questi on of suc h importance fo r the future and fa te of the Slovak people . Accordin g to Ripka, it was c lear that the SNC Pres idium wa nted to shi ft the res po nsibility for Ti so's fate o nto the governme nt. He in sisted that the Pres idum ex press itse lf on the iss ue, and as qui ckl y as poss ibl e. Hala, spea kin g for th e Czech Populi sts, echoed the sentiments o f the Nation al Soc ia li sts, notin g th at the Presidium ' s action greatl y surpri sed him and that it see med to want to pass responsibility onto the governme nt. �SLOVAKIA 45 While the National Sociali sts and Populi sts expressed agreement with Drtina 's motion to return the proposa l to the SNC, the leftist parties adamantly opposed it. Gottwald, Fierlinger, and others noted that the SNC had already taken a position by failing to endorse clemency. They argued that further delay of Ti so's execution would only drag thin gs out, sustain a state of tension and provoke and evoke supporters of Ti so, as well as open the floodgates for clemency for others sentenced to death. When Drtina 's motion to return the proposal to the Presidium of the SNC came to a vote, it was defeated 13 to I0 . The voting broke down according to party lines: the National Socialists, Populists, and Democrats supported the proposal; the leftist parties and non-parti san ministers opposed it. While the Populists may well have sincerely believed that the best remedy for the crisis would have been for the SNC to voice its opinion on the matter, the National Socialists made and supported the motion simply for cosmetic purposes, hoping that it would fail. 19 The Democrats, of course, were in a quite unenviable position. The motion' s failure meant that they would not be g iven a second chance to make a stand for clemency in the Presidium. At the same time, it is not certain that they would have known what to do with a second chance; the factors that kept them from endorsing clemency the first time around were still operative. As the debate over Stefanik 's proposal resumed , the National Socialists came out against clemency, and sought to present the anticlemency position as the one identified with Slovakia. Drtina, noting th at the government was not fully informed of the detail s of the case, thought the matter should be best settled by Slovakia, as it indeed was - a Slovak Court had establi shed Tiso's guilt and had unanimously rejected clemency, which the SNC had also failed to recommend. Ripka , de mon stratin g the sort of Czech ignorance of Slovakia that ran kles Slovaks, claimed that Ti so, long before 1938 , was as bad or worse than Vojtech Tuka, Ti so 's main political rival during the war 19 Drtina adm its thi s in hi s me moirs: see Ceskoslovensko mu) osud, II , 2, p. 302. �46 SLOVAKIA and the leader of the radically pro-Nazi faction ple 's Party. 20 in the Slovak Peo- Because the consequences of Ludakism had not yet di- sappeared from Slovakia, clemency should be rejected. Ripka not only came out again st it, but also appealed to the DP and Czech Populists to abstain on the vote, so the government could present a united front. He addressed the Democrats with the rebuke that, if they did not vote for clemency in Slovakia, they should not now at the governmental level, where the domestic and international ramifications of such a vote were great. After more di sc uss ion, the government ultimately passed a resolution voicing its opposition to c lemency, on the grounds th at the National Court in Brati slava had recommended against it, and that the Pres idium of the SNC did not endorse it when pass ing Stefanik's proposal on to Prague. The vote was 17 in favor , 6 against. All mini sters rejected c lemency except those from the DP and Czech People 's Party. The meeting was adjourned at 8:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Gottwald took the government 's recommendation to Benes, who accepted it and informed Slovakia's Commissioner of Ju stice that hi s request for clemency had been officially denied. 2 1 Upon learn in g of the dec ision , Lettrich made a last-ditch intervention , telephoning Benes ' s chancellery. He conveyed the message that the government's standpoint was in conflict with Article I.b. of the Second Prague Agreement, which instructed the government, if it had objections aga inst a proposal from Slovaki a, to return that proposal to the SNC' s Presidium, not pass it on to Benes with a 20 Tuka was a notoriou s ri ghti st rad ica l who made a political career out of intriguing with foreign enemi es of the Czec hos lovak Republi c almost right from th e Republi c ' s founding. He spent most of th e 1930s in pri son for treason, and was executed for war crimes in the summer of 1946. we ll before the tri al of Tiso. 21 K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, p. 27: Benes had informed Gottwald the day before th at he planned to ac t in accordance wi th whatever th e governm ent recommended regardin g clemency fo r Tiso, K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, pp. 222-224 (Document 38). �SLOVAKIA 47 recommendation. 22 Lettrich warned Benes of possible " immense political consequences" that could resu lt from a rejection of clemency, and fo r which the DP could not accept responsibility . Lettrich conc luded by notin g th at the DP had an absolute majority in the SNC and its Pres idium and fully agreed with Stefanik ' s proposal, considering clemency as a paramount state and nation al interest. Benes received the message early the next morning, instructing hi s chancellery to tell Lettrich that he had gone to the countryside, and would discuss the matter with Gottw ald if Lettrich so desired. 23 Ursfny too attempted an appeal on behalf of clemency, and also found out that the rej ection of clemency was an accomplished fact and that Benes was incommunicado. 24 Stefanik him self made a final attempt on Tiso ' s behalf, asking the National Court that Tiso be tran sferred to the jail of the Office of the Public Prosec utor, so he could be questioned regarding some other cases. Thi s the National Court rejected on the ground s that Ti so could be just as eas ily be questioned at its own jail. 25 With all avenues for clemency now ex hausted , Ti so was hanged early on the morning of April 18, officiall y pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. It was no surpri se that Ti so was found guilty, nor th at he was sentenced to die. Nor was it astoni shing that the majority of government mini sters in Prague rejected the reco mmendation for clemency, and that Benes acted in accordance with their position. But what was puzzling was the behavior of the DP -supporting clemency in Prague , but not in Bratislava; desperately appealin g for clemency on the 22 Mi chal Barn ovsky , Na ceste k monopolu moci, ( Bratislava , 1993) , p. 145 n; K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 28. 23 Kaplan , D va retribucnf procesy, p. 28 ; Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch I 945- 1948, (Bratislava, 1994 ), p. 48 . 24 Ursfny, Z m6jho t i vota, p. 127 . 25 K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 29; the motive behind this attempt was to delay Ti so ' s exec uti on and thu s increase the chances that he would ultimately receive clemency . �48 SLOVAKIA eve of Tiso 's exec uti on, while letting the issue pass right throu gh the hands of the SNC Presidium that they had dominated the day before. Did the DP want the appeal for c lemency to fail? Such a view ca n be found in the po lice record , where a report me nti ons that Lettrich was opposed to cle me ncy for Tiso. 26 Like many scenarios sketched out by police inform ants, however, this one seems to be w ithout merit. Lettrich had earli er lobbi ed Tiso ' s three prosecutors for c lemency, and had persuaded Minister of Ju sti ce Drtina to promi se hi s support as well. These are hardl y the acti ons of a man desiring Tiso 's execution . Other ex planat io ns must li e behind the timidity of Lettrich and the DP at the notoriou s SNC Pres idium meeting of April 16. Hi storian s who have exa mined the meetin g, a nd the issue of clemency overall, ha ve co me up with a numbe r of ex pl anation s, which will be di sc ussed here in ascend in g order of pl a usibility and influence. 27 Most dubi o us is the view th at the De mocrats trusted that Benes would grant clemency regardless of the recommendations he rece ived. Whil e the re appare ntly was public spec ulation that Be nes mi ght spare Tiso, the DP leadership had littl e reason to put their tru st in such suppos ition s. Benes had already g ive n Lettrich and Ursfny quite c lear indication s of hi s oppositi on to cle mency. 28 Another of the weaker arguments for why the SNC did not take a stand on c le me ncy was the one the DP used to ex pl ai n itse lf at the 26 Barno vsky, Na ceste. p. 130. 27 For exp lanati ons of why the OS acted the way it did at th e SNR Pres idiu m mee- ting of Apri l 16, see Barnovsky , Na ceste, p. 130: Letz, Slovensko. pp. 47-48: Kaplan . Ova relribucnf procesy, pp. 24-26 : Ursfny, Z m6jho i i vota. pp. 123- 124 : for the DP ' s attempt to j ustify its ac ti ons at the time, see Cas. April 23, 1947. no. 93 . p. I. 28 Lettrich , in a meeting with the three state prosecutors of the Tiso trial on March 12. I 94 7, mentioned that he had discussed the matter of clemency for Tiso w ith Benes on two occasions, and th at Benes's positi on was th at he would not take a stand but rather all ow th e governmen t' s decis ion on th e matter to guide him : (see SNA. Demokraticka strana, Carton 2, Bundle 99 , Folios 1-2): moreover. Ursfny claims in hi s memoirs that in fall of 1946. Daxner asked Benes how he shou ld handle the Tiso case, to which Benes replied, " I th in k that he deserves death, but thi s is an affair for an independent court. "; (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota. p. 11 3). �SLOVAKIA 49 government meetin g of April 16 and thereafter, i.e. that accordin g to the 2 nd Prague Agreement , the S C's role in the process was simpl y to pass proposals on to the Government and not to co mment on them, and that i f the government had obj ection s to Stefanik's proposa l, it wo uld soli cit the SNC Presidium 's views on it. Upon refl ec ti on, thi s ex plan ati on holds no more water th an it did at the tim e. A party that believed Slovak organs should speak for Slovakia, and a good bit of whose appeal was based on its advocacy of autonomy fo r Slovakia, is behav ing out of character w hen it surrenders to Prague the prerogati ve to decide on a matter so c lose to th e hearts of so many Slovaks. Another ex pl anation put forth by the DP was that it lacked sufficient time to stud y the doc umentation pertinent to th e Tiso tri al. Whil e on the surface thi s is true , still , the SNC was not being asked to render a lega l or judicial judgment, but a politi ca l one. In the latter case, the party could have made up its mind on a pos ition long before the verdi ct, as the Communists had. M ore convincing are the views th at th e DP was simpl y afra id th at a vote for clemency wo uld prompt the Communi sts to provoke a politica l crisis in Slovakia, halting cooperation w ithin the SNC, mobili zing Parti san and trade union groups against the Democrats, and forcing Prague to step in . Indeed, such threats and pressures were already ev ident on the Slovak political stage for over a yea r, and were com mon everywhere else in East Central Europe w here Communi st parti es were acti ve. In thi s view , the DP simpl y lost its nerve and opted to pass the matter on to Prague ra ther than deal w ith it in Bra ti slava. Thi s explanati on seems va lid enough because Communi st pres sure was al ways an influence. However, i f fear of reperc uss ions was the main reason for keeping the DP quiet, w hy did Democrats vote for clemency at the government sess ions in Prag ue? Wa s it to gi ve public assura nce to th eir co nstitu ents th at th ey opposed clemency , but at a ven ue w here they did not have to worry about their vote carry ing any influence and thereby provoking a clemency- induced �SLOVAKIA 50 cris is back home? This question is moot , give n the influence of the most significant factor of all. A final ex pl anati on is most like ly the crucial o ne - that the DP could not co unt on one of its own representatives on the Presidi um , Milan Po lak , to vote for c le mency. Po lak ' s record, both before and after 1947, place him on the left wing of the DP. A former Parti san, and leader in the Parti sa n vetera ns' movement, Po lak collaborated with the Communists durin g and after the February co up of 1948 . 29 Unable to co unt on hi s vote, Lettrich preferred no vote on c lemency to one in which Polak would abstain or vote no. Thus he chose the leas t pa inful but st ill damaging option. While many of Slovakia ' s Catholics would be upset if the DP-controll ed Presidium failed to take a vote on clemency, they wo uld be even more outraged if a DPcontrolled Pres idium rejected clemency, or could not mu ste r th e three votes needed to pass it. Ursfny 's memo irs prov ide further ev idence for thi s ex planation. Ursfny reported that, when on a vis it to the United States in the fa ll of 1967 , he spoke by telephone with Lettrich , who told him that he wanted the SNC to avoid the iss ue of clemency because Pol ak wo uld not have voted for it. 30 Thus, while the DP owed its success to a large ly Catholic e lectorate, it contained a core of resistance veterans who simpl y could not countenance anything short of Ti so's exec ution. Since the leader of those veterans he ld the deciding vote on the SNC Presidium , the DP 's efforts to support c le mency were futile. Tho ugh the DP had good reason to suspect that Polak would not vote for c lemency, the Communists had their own fears that he mi ght not vote aga inst it. This ex plains why the Communists on the SNC were as eager as the Democrats to pass the matter on to Prague. A number of factors contributed to the exec ution of Jozef Tiso-a Pres ident who disliked him and welcomed hi s exec ution ; a gove rn ment where the cards were stacked agai nst him from the start , with 19 See Barnovsky , Na ceste, pp. 240, 245 , for Pol ak ' s acti vity during the .. February Crisis" of 1948. )o Ursfny, Z mojho i ivoui, p. 124. �SLOVAKIA 51 the Soc ial Democrats, Nati onal Soc iali sts, and non-parti san mini sters un sy mpatheti c to hi s cause; a Co mmuni st Party and the labor and res istance orga ni zati ons it mo bili zed workin g agg ressive ly aga in st him ; a staunchl y anti -Ti so j udge; and Ti so 's own wartime acti vities, whi ch made a death se nte nce pl ausi bl e. Nothin g th at th e DP did could have spared Ti so from exec utio n in thi s contex t. Neverthe less, th e way the Democrats mane uvered th ro ugh the cri s is had several consequ ences. The DP did eno ugh for T iso to buttress Communi st arguments that the Democrats catered to the Ludaks they were all eged ly harboring, arg uments th at in the ensuing months would mu shroom into the arrest of several leading De mocrats for ant i-state co nspiracy. At the same time, the DP 's fa ilure to sec ure an SNC vote on T iso's beha lf made it eas ier for the government 's Co mmuni st and non-Cath o li c Czec h parti es to argue th at Slo vaki a was opposed to c lemency fo r Tiso, thu s he lpin g abso lve Czechs of any charges that T iso's exec uti on was a Czech operati on done against the w ill of the Slovak people . Fin all y, the DP's impotence in defending T iso led to increased di si llusionment amo ng S lovak ia's Catho lic voters. For the DP, the who le undertaking was a lose-lose situ ati on, an indi cati on of just how d ifficult th at party's road was in spite of, or better said , on acco unt of, its bi g e lec tora l victo ry in May of 1946. To a great ex tent, the events surroundin g the iss ue of c lemency fo r Jozef Tiso were a mi crocos m of th e proble mati c pos itio n of the De mocrati c Party in postwar Czechos lovak ia. � SLOVAKIA 33 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James Ramon Felak On April 15 , 1947, Igor Daxne r, Chairman of the National Court in Brati s lava, pronounced the verd ict agai nst Father Jozef Ti so, the head of Slovakia's wartime state that was closely alli ed with Naz i Germany. The Co urt found Ti so guilty of 95 of 11 3 charges aga inst him, in c ludin g treason, betraya l of the Slovak National Uprising , co ll aborati on with the Naz is, and de portation of Slovak Jews to Naz i death ca mps. Hi s sente nce was death by han g in g, to be carried out within 48 hours. At once, Tiso, along w ith hi s two defense attorneys , submitted a requ est for c le me ncy. 1 Thi s pape r w ill in vesti gate the fate of thi s request, the last official chance to spare Ti so from death. Though the final deci sion on clemency rested with Czechoslovakia ' s Pres ide nt Edvard Be nes, the request passed like a hot potato over the next dozen ho urs, from Daxner to Slovakia's Commissioner of th e Interior Iva n Stefanik, to Slovakia ' s c hi ef organ of se lf-governme nt , the Slovak Nation al Council (SNC) , to the Czechoslovak gove rnme nt in Prague , and ultimatel y to Be nes. De mocra tic Party (DP) leaders had lobbi ed for c lemency during the tri al, voted for it at the gove rnme nt 's mee tin g on the eve nin g of April 16, a nd frantically appea led on its behalf to Be nes in the hours before Tiso ' s exec uti on. However, they c uri ously refused to take a stand for clemency at the meeting of the SNC's Pres idium on the afternoon of April 16, where they had a 3-to-2 majority and where a stand on Ti so 's behalf would have g ive n offic ial sanction to the view , w idely shared by many and 1 ' One of the three prosecutors. l.'.udovft Ri gan. also made a request for clemency to the Court; K arel K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy . Komentovane dokumenty, (Prague. I 992), p. 221 (Document 37). �SLOVAKIA 34 probably most Slovaks, that Tiso should not be executed. The Democrats' refusal to take a stand in the SNC meant that Tiso's opponents could point to the failure of any official Slovak organs to recommend clemency as proof that his execution reflected the will of the Slovak people. The fate of Jozef Tiso was very much connected with the DP's fortunes in Czechoslovak and Slovak politics . Shortly after her liberation from Nazi rule and reattachment to Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had only two significant political parties-the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP). The latter, in many ways a legacy of the interwar Agrarian party, emerged out of the Lutheran-dominated wing of the resistance to the Tiso regime. When the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party (SPP) was outlawed at war ' s end , many Slovak Catholics became political orphans.2 In the spring of 1946, however, the DP adopted them through the so-called April Agreement, a pact between the party's leaders and important Catholic political activi sts whereby Catholics were promised a large share of influence in the DP and a Democratic commitment to promote the Catholic Church ' s position on issues such as education in exchange for Catholic electoral support. The fruit of the April Agreement was a landslide victory for the DP over the Communists in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, with Democrats winning 63 % of the vote to the Communists' 30%. From that point on , the CPS focused its energies on undoing the electoral results by seeking to paralyze, fracture , or dis solve the DP. Among other things, the Tiso trial figured in Communist calculations of how to cripple their rival. The Communist plan was to force the DP to navigate between the Scylla of angering its Catholic members and voters , who had hopes that the Democrats would rescue Tiso from a death sentence, and the Charybdis of being sucked into a police investigation for 2 Catholics comprised nearly 80% of the Slovak population. The majority of Slovak Catholics voted for the SPP during the interwar period. �SLOVAKIA 35 allegations of pandering to the reactionaries and war criminals it was all egedl y harboring th anks to the April Agreeme nt. Idea ll y, the DP wo uld be di scredited in the eyes of Catholics as an ineffectua l and lukewarm defe nder of Ti so, while concurrently di sc redited in the eyes of everyone else as a haven for reactionaries. With little room for mane uver, and in the face of enormo us press ure, the DP had to face thi s chall enge. What fo ll ows is how the Com muni sts were able to acco mpli sh these end s, partl y due to the ir own tactics, partl y due to the dynami c of the situ ati on, and part ly due to the cho ices made by the Democrats. Ri ght after the anno unceme nt of the verd ict, Ti so's lawyers, Ernest Zabkay and Martin Greco, submitted an official requ est for c lemency, as king for a more "appropriate" sentence for the ir c lient. 3 They particularly stressed lega l tec hni ca lities. Tiso's lawyers argued th at the defense was not all owed to speak with the acc used without the sec urity organs present-a violati on of a fund amental principle of criminal tri al procedure-and that the defense did not have certain archiv al materials at its disposal , while the prosec uti on did. Furthermore, records of testimony were not made avail able within the requisite three days, but lagged by nearly two month s, thereby mak in g it impossible for the defense to c ite testimon y made after January 15 in its concluding statements. In addition to these and a number of other technicalities, Tiso ' s lawyers arg ued th at the trial was po litica ll y biased, both because Daxner himse lf was bi ased, as the SNC itself had recognized in the past, and because, despite a leg islati ve order ca llin g for political pari ty in the Senate, no me mbers of the DP took part in the judg ment. Tiso's attorn eys a lso arg ued that Tiso was being puni shed for eve nts beyond his co ntro l. They claimed th at he did not prepare for Slovakia's independence in 1939, or he lp cause it, and that he showed no initiative and intention ality in hi s cooperation wi th Nazi Germany. Rather, he simpl y tri ed to make the best of a bad situ ation that was thru st upo n him . Finally, Ti so's atto rneys, in the .1 Kaplan, Ova retribucnf procesy. pp. 2 15-2 19 (Document 35) . �SLOVAKIA 36 onl y argument that the DP would make its ow n, argued th at clemency would strengthen Czech-Slovak relations, e liminate the threat of ill will between Slovakia ' s Catholics and Protestants, and strengthen ti es between Slovak emigrants and their motherl and. The National Court quick ly decided agai nst recommending c lemency for Ti so, and passed Tiso ' s request on to Slovak Commissioner of Ju stice Ivan Stefanik , a Democrat. Stefa nik in turn supported Tiso's request, and submitted a proposal to the Presidium of the SNC, which read , " I propose that the death se ntence of Dr. Jozef Ti so be commuted to life impri sonment. " 4 The proposal was to the point, absent the argumentation included in Ti so ' s request, and un like Ti so ' s request, allowed for no sentence less than life impri sonment. On April 16, the SNC ' s Presidium met to consider Stefa nik ' s proposal, along with some other matters connected with Ti so ' s tri al. When the Pres idium convened, it was already under enormous pressure. By law , Tiso ' s exec ution was to be carried out within 48 hours of the announcement of the verdict, so matters had to be considered quickly. Moreover, the gove rnm ent in Prag ue was meet in g later that day to discuss c lemency , and was eagerly awaiting the views of Slovakia 's leadin g organs on the matter. Adding to the pressure was the fact that the Presidium received the 214 page judgment aga inst Tiso only shortl y before its meeti ng.5 Moreover, te legrams, letters, and petitions (for and against c leme ncy) were pourin g in to the President 's office, the government, and the SNC, while Parti san and labor organizations staged anti-Ti so rallies across Slovakia and de legation s from trade union s, hou sing estates, and espec ially resistance organizations arrived in Brati slava to add their presence to the de liberations. 6 Though there were no reported cases of violence, it is not difficult to imagine the presence of these groups, enco uraged if not orchestrated by the Communists, adding a menac in g character to 4 K aplan , Dva relribucnf procesy. p. 220 (Document 36). ' Th e DP claimed the Presidium had onl y ten minutes to look over the length y judgmen t; see Cas. April 23 , 1947 , no. 93, p. I. 6 Cas, Apri l 23, 1947, no. 93 , p. I. �SLOVAKIA 37 the already inte nse pressure on the Presidium , or more prec ise ly, its Democratic me mbers. For example, a consortium of major res istance organi zati o ns iss ued a decl aration on April 16 th at conde mned c lemency as a "s hameful defilement (popl'u vanie) of all the sac rifi ces of o ur nation al stru gg le" th at co uld e mbolde n Ti so's supporte rs into provokin g unrest in S lovakia aimed at undermining the Re public.7 If cle mency was gra nted to Tiso, these organizations promi sed to assess the situation and cons ide r what mean s to emp loy in de fe nse of the Republic and the ga ins of the Slovak National Upri sin g. The DP had a majority on the Presi dium , which conta ined three Democrats (Jozef Lettrich, who was chairman of both the DP and the SNC, Andrej Cvincek, Milan Po la k) a nd two Communi sts (Karol Smidke, Ivan Horvath ). Nevertheless, the Pres idium did not e ndorse Stefanik's proposa l for c le me nc y; rather, it reso lved to submit the proposa l to the governme nt without co mme nt. In hi s me moirs, Jan Ursfny, a top DP leader and its Deputy Chairman, argued that Lettric h went into the meetin g with the intention of avo idin g debate over clemency, a position Ursfny strongly advised against. 8 Lettrich 's behav ior at the meeting does betray the actions of a man inte nt on avoi ding debate. 9 First of all , most of the meetin g 's di scuss ion dea lt with De mocratic di ssati sfaction with Daxner's ha ndling of the tri al. Whe n the Presidium did get around to the Ti so verdict, Le ttri c h made it clear th at he fe lt th at the press ure of time mad e it imposs ible to acq uire sufficie nt knowledge to take a pos ition on c le mency, and that any recommendation would thu s have to be " politica l." The Communi st Horvath the n proposed that the Presidium take no stand , but simpl y pass on Stefa nik 's proposa l to the government without co mment. He argued that a recomme nd ation from the SNC was ne ithe r requi- 1 Pravda. Apri l 18, 1947 . no. 90, p. I: th e Slovak term pop!ii vct nie could be rendered as .. spitting on". • Jan Ursfny. Z m6jho i i votct. (M artin . 2000), pp. 123- 124. " See Sl ovensky narod ny archfv (hereafter referred to as SNA). Fond Urad predsednfctva Slovenskej narodnej rady , Carton 139, Folder 134. Folios 49-58 , S R Presidiu m meetin g of A pril 16. 1947. �SLOVAKIA 38 red nor necessary, for it was the government and Benes whose views would be decisive. According to Horvath, since the Communists were opposed to clemency, they would be unable to support Stefanik ' s proposa l, and hence any vote in the SNC would be on a parti san basis, setting a bad precedent for future Communist-Democratic cooperation. When it came time to vote on Horvath ' s proposal , the Presidium accepted it unanimously. Before examining why the SNC , or more specifically its Democratic members, opted not to recommend c lemency for Tiso, let us track the proposal ' s course to Prague and ultimately to Benes. The Communists and Social Democrats were openly hostile to Tiso, and the non-parti san mini sters, Ludvfk Svoboda (Defense) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), could be expected to be so as well. Together, these constituted 13 of the 23 members of the government, enough to tip any vote to Ti so's detriment. On top of that, the Czech National Soc ialists were at best ambivalent. A number of leading National Socialists opposed clemency and wanted their party to vote against it or at least to abstain. 10 However, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, one of the party's top leaders, had earlier assured Lettrich that he would support clemency provided the SNC did. 11 In the last of a series of meetings on the issue , held right before the government session began , Drtina managed to convince his colleagues to agree to the following position : to oppose clemency, but only after first proposing that the request for clemency be returned to the Presid ium of the SNC for that organ's recommendation. In thi s way, Drtina could present himself as makin g a good faith effort to honor hi s promise to Lettrich , while entertaining hopes that a vote to return the request to the SNC would fail, thu s getting himself off the hook. 12 The government meeting opened at approximately 5: 15 p.m ., after a delay of over an hour as its members waited for reports from ° Kaplan. Dva retribucnf procesy. p. 25 . 1 " Prokop Drtina. Ceskos lovensko muj osud, II. 2, (Toronto, I 982). pp. 297-298. 302. 12 Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muj osud. II , 2, p. 302. �SLOVAKIA 39 Slovakia. 13 Within ten minutes, a delegation of representatives from the Union of Czechoslovak Partisans and so me similar organizations asked to be admitted. Since the National Socialists had yet to arrive, mak ing their last minute plans in a nearby room , the meetin g was adjourned for 45 minutes while the parti san organizations were given the opportunity to press ure the mini sters to vote against clemency. 14 Once the de legation s had their say and engaged some of the mini sters over the iss ue , and the National Sociali st mini sters had arrived, the meeting was reconvened. Prime Mini ster Kl ement Gottwald began by sharin g two pieces of information he had just rece ived from Slovaki a- the memorandum from the SNC' s Pres idium pass in g on Stefanik's proposal for clemency without comment, and a telegram from Gu stav Husak, Chairman of Slovakia 's Board of Commissioners (Cabinet). Husak noted that Stefanik 's proposal did not reflect the views of the Board of Commissioners nor its Presidium, whose standpoint Stefanik did not seek, and should therefore be regarded as hi s own personal proposal. Husak added that he did not agree with the proposa l. Thus, the meeting opened with reports from Slovakia 's two chief political organs, neither of which endorsed clemency. Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party , then proposed that the government reso lve aga inst clemency, since the National Court in Brati slava recommended against it, and the Pres idium of the SNC did not recommend for it. In a long and sometimes pass ionate debate, mini sters from both sides weighed in on the que stion, with positions breaking down along party lines. The Communists led the charge against clemency. Vladimfr Clementi s, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a Slovak, read a CPS 13 For the minutes of the meeting. see K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy. pp. 225-254. 14 Ursfny . in his memoirs, recou nts be ing asked by one member of the parti san dele- gati on: "M r. Deput y Chairman, tell me, w ith whom do you wan t to go. w ith th e Ludak underground. or with us?" A nother partisan representati ve. however, spoke up for Ursfny as ··one of the greates t partisans. " (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota, p. 125): see footnote 17 for an ex planation of the term " Ludak. " �40 SLOVAKIA decl aration that la id o ut the Co mmuni st pos iti on. The dec larati o n stressed the did acti c function of the tri al, that is, its purpose in di sco urag ing enemies of the Republic. A death sentence co uld do that far better than a life sentence in thi s res pect. C lemency, on the co ntrary, would onl y encou rage enemi es of the state and sympathizers of Ti so and hi s reg ime . Reactionari es, as before, were tryin g to take over Slovaki a "even at the price of the Re public." 15 The dec laration arg ued that c leme ncy would evoke di stru st in the judic ial sys tem. Veterans of the Sl ovak Nati onal Upri sin g would be upset with the de parture from the idea ls of the res istance; peo ple wo uld note the inj ustice of lesser crimin als hav ing been more harshl y puni shed than Ti so; and politics would be seen once more as " panske huncutst vo", that is "gentl emen's mi sc hi ef." 16 The declarati o n noted in parti cul ar that Ti so showed no remorse for hi s crimes, and in fac t gave succor to th e Re public 's ene mi es in hi s co ncludin g statement at hi s tri al. Much of what Cleme nti s read was identica l to a dec larati on made a day earli er by Slovaki a's res istance organi zati o ns, testifyin g to the leadin g ro le the Co mmuni sts pl ayed in those orga ni zati o ns and the success the party had in coordin atin g various soc ial orga ni zati ons on behalf of its objecti ves . Indeed , both dec laration s co nc luded with the sa me threat to assess the s ituation and consider what mea ns to employ in defense of the Republic and its character. Czech Communi sts also spoke out again st clemency, asserting th at Ti so was a traitor and a war crimina l, and that fa ilin g to exec ute him would be a blow to Czec hos lovakia 's unity and inde pendence. Communi st speakers also arg ued th at it was the will of th e Slovak people that Ti so be exec u- 15 The express ion ··ani za ce nu republiky", th at is, •·even at the price of the rep ublic" . was a reference to a statement made by HSL:S leader A ndrej Hlin ka at a rall y in Trencfn in 1932, where he asse rted th e degree to whi ch his party wo uld pu rsue Slovak interests; see James Ramon Felak, •A l the Price of the Republic·_. Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party. 1929- 1938. (Pittsburg h, 1994 ), p. 96. 16 " Poli tika je panske huncutstvo" was an expression curre nt among Slovaks , rooted in Slovakia ' s feudal pas t. It was the recog nition by peasan ts th at pol itics was the domain where the lords made mi sch ief. �SLOVAKIA 41 ted , as ev ide nced by the pos iti ons of the Nati ona l Co urt, the SNC, and the Board of Co mmi ss ione rs, all organs composed e ntire ly of Slova ks and re prese nting S lovakia. Thi s was why, the Czec h Co mmuni st Vac lav Kopecky noted , the DP would not speak up fo r c leme ncy on the SNC's Pres idium. Th e Soc ia l De mocrati c mini sters we re just as o pposed to c lemency as the Communi sts, and no less assertive about the ir pos iti on. Zdene k Fierlin ger, the leader of the SOP and a Deputy Prime Minister, argued th at a vote fo r c le me ncy wo uld upset Czec hoslovaki a's alli es in the Slav ic world , in part because it would fu e l Slova k independe nce, whi c h itse lf th reate ned Czec hos lovaki a 's border w ith the Sov iet Uni o n. Fie rlinger even re marked th at how o ne voted o n the cleme ncy questi on was a test of one's patri oti sm. With respect to the reli g io us dim e ns ion of the ques ti o n, the Soc ial De mocrati c leade r asserted th at the fac t of Tiso's be ing a priest was not a miti gating c irc um stance, but rathe r one th at made matters worse. He noted th at it was not good for the Catho lic Churc h to e ncumbe r itse lf with Ti so . Whil e Fie rlinger re prese nted the pro-C ommuni st left-win g of the SOP, that party's ri ght-wing was no less vehe me nt about Ti so. Vaclav Maj er, the leader of the ri ght-wing Soc ial De mocrats, referred to the Sl ovak pri est as one of the chi e f war crimin als, guilty of mass murder. The most ex te ns ive attac k on Ti so a nd argume nt against cle me ncy, however, came not fro m the mini ste rs o f the le fti st parties, but from the oste nsibl y ne utra l (a lbeit c loset Communi st) Ludvfk Svoboda, the Mini ster o f Defe nse. As a Czec hoslovak hero of both the First and Second World Wars, Svoboda's word s carri ed a certain cac het. Svoboda spoke at le ngth about why T iso mu st die . He came o ut strong ly aga inst so-ca ll ed ha lf-so luti o ns; at ha nd was a definiti ve hi stori ca l qu esti o n w ith long- te rm impli cati o ns th at sho uld not be judged accordin g to the needs a nd mood of the mo me nt. Ti so was �42 SLOVAKIA not just a war criminal ; he was the sy mbol of " Ludakism," 17 fasci sm, treason , and collaboration . To grant clemency to Tiso, according to Svoboda, would render hi s trial vain and superfluous. If alive, Ti so would remain to poison cooperation and unity between Czechs and Slovaks; clemency would encourage hi s supporters, while disappointing others. Like many speakers and writers of the time, Svoboda noted that Tiso showed no remorse. He ca lled for a firm and resolute action agai nst him as a means of strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position and prestige. To those w ho argued th at Ti so should be spared because he was a priest, Svoboda dec lared that "we are not judging a priest, but a traitor, a destroyer of the Czechoslovak state, and a criminal. That Tiso is a priest only makes matters worse; he profaned the priestly office and Church at a time when thou sands of other priests fought bravely again st Nazi sm and perished in concentration camps and prisons." On the other s ide of the equation were those mini sters who championed c lemency-on ly the Democrats and Czech Populi sts. Here the most prominent speaker was Ursfny . The Democratic Deputy Chairman argued that clemency would improve relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics, and aid in the overall consolidation of the post-war Republic. Such a goodwi ll gesture might also win over some of Czechoslovakia' s enemi es. Ursfny noted that religiou s fee lings ran strong in Slovakia, where the exec ution of a priest was a serious , and potentiall y upsetting matter. He pointed out that many good people were for clemency, includin g so me bishops and hi gh functionari es in the Lutheran church , a church that itself had suffered under Ti so's regi me. The Democratic Minister of Transportation Ivan Pietor also spelled out a number of reasons for clemency. He argued that Ti so was popular among the majority of Slovaks, and that the preva ilin g majority of Slovaks would vote for 17 Lud aki sm, or "l'udactvo" was the term employed to refer to fo ll owers of th e Slovak People 's Party, whose members were know n as '• Ludaks" or " l'udaci ." It best approximates the Engli sh word " Populi sm. " Communi sts applied the term to any Slovak Catholics they did not like. �SLOVAKIA 43 clemency if given the chance, thou gh thi s did not mean they agreed with Ti so ' s politics. He too noted that important Lutheran leaders sent ardent appeals on Tiso's behalf in the interest of the peaceful deve lopment of Slovaki a and Czechoslovakia. The g iven politica l s ituation , accordin g to Pietor, demanded statesmanlike thinkin g, wi sdom , and sensiti vity to the prevailing political condition s and mood. In such a co ntext, clemency would be a gesture to win over hearts in Slovakia and bring the Czech and Slovak nation s together. While the Court may have unanimou sly estab lished Tiso 's guilt and ca ll ed for hi s exec ution , that was a judicial decision , not a political one. What the Republic now faced was a manifestly political deci sion , and that was the task of the government to settl e, in accordance with political considerations. The Czec h Populi sts, as members of a Catholic party with moderate inclinations, also supported clemency. Minister Franti se k Ha.la (Post Office), him se lf a Catholic priest, presented c le mency as the most suitable solution for Czechoslovak and Slovak interests. The Populi st Adolf Prochazka (Health ) remarked that c lemency was the des ire of most Slovaks, and of the Lutheran church leadership . Jan Kopecky (Mini ster without Portfolio) supported clemency as a way to consolidate the Repub li c, and reminded hi s mini sterial colleagues that life impri sonment was not tantamount to acq uittal. In makin g hi s case, Ursfny co ntended that the SNC did not recommend aga inst c lemency ; rather it was not the Pres idium 's function to ex press a position on the proposa l, but only to pass it on to the government. Technically , he was correct because the Second Prague Agreement of April I I , 1946, the statute under which such matters were regulated , stated that the commissioner's proposal be submitted to the go vernment "v ia the Pres idium of the Slovak National Counci l. " 18 However, this strict construction is not the way the SNC had hitherto been dealing with proposa ls. Gottwald snide ly noted that the '" Jan Mechyr. Slo vensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I . (Prague. 1991 ). �44 SLOVAKIA Pres idium had sudde nl y dec ided in thi s case to limit itse lf to the ro le of a post office, and al ong with Fie rlinger, he regarded Ursfny 's expl a nati on as sophi stry. They were not bu ying th e De moc rats ' claim that the Pres idium ' s position was not a fa ilure to endorse c le mency. It was the centri st parties, however, that ex pressed the most anger over the SNC 's sile nce regardin g c leme ncy - a sil e nce th at, because the DP had a majority in the Pres idium, was c learl y bl a med on the De mocrats. A number of Nati ona l Soc iali st and Populi st mini ste rs vo iced their indi gnati on at the SNC's atte mpt to pass th e buck. Jaroslav Stra nsky (Edu cati on) said th at he wa nted Ursfny and hi s frie nds to recogni ze the situ ation into whi ch they had gotte n the governme nt , whi c h thanks to the m now had to dec ide on a matter about whi c h it did not have s uffic ie nt kn ow ledge. In thi s s itu ati on, th e gove rnm e nt co uld be bl a med if Ti so did not get cle me ncy, thereby bein g burde ned with what is primaril y a Sl ovak pro bl e m. Drtina, s imil arly, sa id he was perpl exed by the Pres idium ' s unex pected course of acti on, one whi ch now put the go vernme nt in a diffi c ult situati on. He pro posed se ndin g th e pro posal bac k to th e Pres idium fo r its opini o n, in acco rdance with the Second Prague Agree me nt, whi c h stipul ated that the governme nt return proposa ls to the SNC's Pres idium if it had objecti ons to them from the point of view of statew ide inte res ts. Foll o win g suit , Nation a l Soc ia li st Mini ste r o f Fore ig n Trade Hube rt Ripka noted hi s party ' s astoni shme nt at th e SNC's acti on - how it limited its ro le to th at of a mailbox in the way it interpre ted the Seco nd Prag ue Agree me nt. He noted th at Sl ovaki a ' s se lf-proc laimed leadin g orga n did not have the courage to ex press itse lf on a questi on of suc h importance fo r the future and fa te of the Slovak people . Accordin g to Ripka, it was c lear that the SNC Pres idium wa nted to shi ft the res po nsibility for Ti so's fate o nto the governme nt. He in sisted that the Pres idum ex press itse lf on the iss ue, and as qui ckl y as poss ibl e. Hala, spea kin g for th e Czech Populi sts, echoed the sentiments o f the Nation al Soc ia li sts, notin g th at the Presidium ' s action greatl y surpri sed him and that it see med to want to pass responsibility onto the governme nt. �SLOVAKIA 45 While the National Sociali sts and Populi sts expressed agreement with Drtina 's motion to return the proposa l to the SNC, the leftist parties adamantly opposed it. Gottwald, Fierlinger, and others noted that the SNC had already taken a position by failing to endorse clemency. They argued that further delay of Ti so's execution would only drag thin gs out, sustain a state of tension and provoke and evoke supporters of Ti so, as well as open the floodgates for clemency for others sentenced to death. When Drtina 's motion to return the proposal to the Presidium of the SNC came to a vote, it was defeated 13 to I0 . The voting broke down according to party lines: the National Socialists, Populists, and Democrats supported the proposal; the leftist parties and non-parti san ministers opposed it. While the Populists may well have sincerely believed that the best remedy for the crisis would have been for the SNC to voice its opinion on the matter, the National Socialists made and supported the motion simply for cosmetic purposes, hoping that it would fail. 19 The Democrats, of course, were in a quite unenviable position. The motion' s failure meant that they would not be g iven a second chance to make a stand for clemency in the Presidium. At the same time, it is not certain that they would have known what to do with a second chance; the factors that kept them from endorsing clemency the first time around were still operative. As the debate over Stefanik 's proposal resumed , the National Socialists came out against clemency, and sought to present the anticlemency position as the one identified with Slovakia. Drtina, noting th at the government was not fully informed of the detail s of the case, thought the matter should be best settled by Slovakia, as it indeed was - a Slovak Court had establi shed Tiso's guilt and had unanimously rejected clemency, which the SNC had also failed to recommend. Ripka , de mon stratin g the sort of Czech ignorance of Slovakia that ran kles Slovaks, claimed that Ti so, long before 1938 , was as bad or worse than Vojtech Tuka, Ti so 's main political rival during the war 19 Drtina adm its thi s in hi s me moirs: see Ceskoslovensko mu) osud, II , 2, p. 302. �46 SLOVAKIA and the leader of the radically pro-Nazi faction ple 's Party. 20 in the Slovak Peo- Because the consequences of Ludakism had not yet di- sappeared from Slovakia, clemency should be rejected. Ripka not only came out again st it, but also appealed to the DP and Czech Populists to abstain on the vote, so the government could present a united front. He addressed the Democrats with the rebuke that, if they did not vote for clemency in Slovakia, they should not now at the governmental level, where the domestic and international ramifications of such a vote were great. After more di sc uss ion, the government ultimately passed a resolution voicing its opposition to c lemency, on the grounds th at the National Court in Brati slava had recommended against it, and that the Pres idium of the SNC did not endorse it when pass ing Stefanik's proposal on to Prague. The vote was 17 in favor , 6 against. All mini sters rejected c lemency except those from the DP and Czech People 's Party. The meeting was adjourned at 8:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Gottwald took the government 's recommendation to Benes, who accepted it and informed Slovakia's Commissioner of Ju stice that hi s request for clemency had been officially denied. 2 1 Upon learn in g of the dec ision , Lettrich made a last-ditch intervention , telephoning Benes ' s chancellery. He conveyed the message that the government's standpoint was in conflict with Article I.b. of the Second Prague Agreement, which instructed the government, if it had objections aga inst a proposal from Slovaki a, to return that proposal to the SNC' s Presidium, not pass it on to Benes with a 20 Tuka was a notoriou s ri ghti st rad ica l who made a political career out of intriguing with foreign enemi es of the Czec hos lovak Republi c almost right from th e Republi c ' s founding. He spent most of th e 1930s in pri son for treason, and was executed for war crimes in the summer of 1946. we ll before the tri al of Tiso. 21 K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, p. 27: Benes had informed Gottwald the day before th at he planned to ac t in accordance wi th whatever th e governm ent recommended regardin g clemency fo r Tiso, K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, pp. 222-224 (Document 38). �SLOVAKIA 47 recommendation. 22 Lettrich warned Benes of possible " immense political consequences" that could resu lt from a rejection of clemency, and fo r which the DP could not accept responsibility . Lettrich conc luded by notin g th at the DP had an absolute majority in the SNC and its Pres idium and fully agreed with Stefanik ' s proposal, considering clemency as a paramount state and nation al interest. Benes received the message early the next morning, instructing hi s chancellery to tell Lettrich that he had gone to the countryside, and would discuss the matter with Gottw ald if Lettrich so desired. 23 Ursfny too attempted an appeal on behalf of clemency, and also found out that the rej ection of clemency was an accomplished fact and that Benes was incommunicado. 24 Stefanik him self made a final attempt on Tiso ' s behalf, asking the National Court that Tiso be tran sferred to the jail of the Office of the Public Prosec utor, so he could be questioned regarding some other cases. Thi s the National Court rejected on the ground s that Ti so could be just as eas ily be questioned at its own jail. 25 With all avenues for clemency now ex hausted , Ti so was hanged early on the morning of April 18, officiall y pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. It was no surpri se that Ti so was found guilty, nor th at he was sentenced to die. Nor was it astoni shing that the majority of government mini sters in Prague rejected the reco mmendation for clemency, and that Benes acted in accordance with their position. But what was puzzling was the behavior of the DP -supporting clemency in Prague , but not in Bratislava; desperately appealin g for clemency on the 22 Mi chal Barn ovsky , Na ceste k monopolu moci, ( Bratislava , 1993) , p. 145 n; K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 28. 23 Kaplan , D va retribucnf procesy, p. 28 ; Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch I 945- 1948, (Bratislava, 1994 ), p. 48 . 24 Ursfny, Z m6jho t i vota, p. 127 . 25 K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 29; the motive behind this attempt was to delay Ti so ' s exec uti on and thu s increase the chances that he would ultimately receive clemency . �48 SLOVAKIA eve of Tiso 's exec uti on, while letting the issue pass right throu gh the hands of the SNC Presidium that they had dominated the day before. Did the DP want the appeal for c lemency to fail? Such a view ca n be found in the po lice record , where a report me nti ons that Lettrich was opposed to cle me ncy for Tiso. 26 Like many scenarios sketched out by police inform ants, however, this one seems to be w ithout merit. Lettrich had earli er lobbi ed Tiso ' s three prosecutors for c lemency, and had persuaded Minister of Ju sti ce Drtina to promi se hi s support as well. These are hardl y the acti ons of a man desiring Tiso 's execution . Other ex planat io ns must li e behind the timidity of Lettrich and the DP at the notoriou s SNC Pres idium meeting of April 16. Hi storian s who have exa mined the meetin g, a nd the issue of clemency overall, ha ve co me up with a numbe r of ex pl anation s, which will be di sc ussed here in ascend in g order of pl a usibility and influence. 27 Most dubi o us is the view th at the De mocrats trusted that Benes would grant clemency regardless of the recommendations he rece ived. Whil e the re appare ntly was public spec ulation that Be nes mi ght spare Tiso, the DP leadership had littl e reason to put their tru st in such suppos ition s. Benes had already g ive n Lettrich and Ursfny quite c lear indication s of hi s oppositi on to cle mency. 28 Another of the weaker arguments for why the SNC did not take a stand on c le me ncy was the one the DP used to ex pl ai n itse lf at the 26 Barno vsky, Na ceste. p. 130. 27 For exp lanati ons of why the OS acted the way it did at th e SNR Pres idiu m mee- ting of Apri l 16, see Barnovsky , Na ceste, p. 130: Letz, Slovensko. pp. 47-48: Kaplan . Ova relribucnf procesy, pp. 24-26 : Ursfny, Z m6jho i i vota. pp. 123- 124 : for the DP ' s attempt to j ustify its ac ti ons at the time, see Cas. April 23, 1947. no. 93 . p. I. 28 Lettrich , in a meeting with the three state prosecutors of the Tiso trial on March 12. I 94 7, mentioned that he had discussed the matter of clemency for Tiso w ith Benes on two occasions, and th at Benes's positi on was th at he would not take a stand but rather all ow th e governmen t' s decis ion on th e matter to guide him : (see SNA. Demokraticka strana, Carton 2, Bundle 99 , Folios 1-2): moreover. Ursfny claims in hi s memoirs that in fall of 1946. Daxner asked Benes how he shou ld handle the Tiso case, to which Benes replied, " I th in k that he deserves death, but thi s is an affair for an independent court. "; (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota. p. 11 3). �SLOVAKIA 49 government meetin g of April 16 and thereafter, i.e. that accordin g to the 2 nd Prague Agreement , the S C's role in the process was simpl y to pass proposals on to the Government and not to co mment on them, and that i f the government had obj ection s to Stefanik's proposa l, it wo uld soli cit the SNC Presidium 's views on it. Upon refl ec ti on, thi s ex plan ati on holds no more water th an it did at the tim e. A party that believed Slovak organs should speak for Slovakia, and a good bit of whose appeal was based on its advocacy of autonomy fo r Slovakia, is behav ing out of character w hen it surrenders to Prague the prerogati ve to decide on a matter so c lose to th e hearts of so many Slovaks. Another ex pl anation put forth by the DP was that it lacked sufficient time to stud y the doc umentation pertinent to th e Tiso tri al. Whil e on the surface thi s is true , still , the SNC was not being asked to render a lega l or judicial judgment, but a politi ca l one. In the latter case, the party could have made up its mind on a pos ition long before the verdi ct, as the Communists had. M ore convincing are the views th at th e DP was simpl y afra id th at a vote for clemency wo uld prompt the Communi sts to provoke a politica l crisis in Slovakia, halting cooperation w ithin the SNC, mobili zing Parti san and trade union groups against the Democrats, and forcing Prague to step in . Indeed, such threats and pressures were already ev ident on the Slovak political stage for over a yea r, and were com mon everywhere else in East Central Europe w here Communi st parti es were acti ve. In thi s view , the DP simpl y lost its nerve and opted to pass the matter on to Prague ra ther than deal w ith it in Bra ti slava. Thi s explanati on seems va lid enough because Communi st pres sure was al ways an influence. However, i f fear of reperc uss ions was the main reason for keeping the DP quiet, w hy did Democrats vote for clemency at the government sess ions in Prag ue? Wa s it to gi ve public assura nce to th eir co nstitu ents th at th ey opposed clemency , but at a ven ue w here they did not have to worry about their vote carry ing any influence and thereby provoking a clemency- induced �SLOVAKIA 50 cris is back home? This question is moot , give n the influence of the most significant factor of all. A final ex pl anati on is most like ly the crucial o ne - that the DP could not co unt on one of its own representatives on the Presidi um , Milan Po lak , to vote for c le mency. Po lak ' s record, both before and after 1947, place him on the left wing of the DP. A former Parti san, and leader in the Parti sa n vetera ns' movement, Po lak collaborated with the Communists durin g and after the February co up of 1948 . 29 Unable to co unt on hi s vote, Lettrich preferred no vote on c lemency to one in which Polak would abstain or vote no. Thus he chose the leas t pa inful but st ill damaging option. While many of Slovakia ' s Catholics would be upset if the DP-controll ed Presidium failed to take a vote on clemency, they wo uld be even more outraged if a DPcontrolled Pres idium rejected clemency, or could not mu ste r th e three votes needed to pass it. Ursfny 's memo irs prov ide further ev idence for thi s ex planation. Ursfny reported that, when on a vis it to the United States in the fa ll of 1967 , he spoke by telephone with Lettrich , who told him that he wanted the SNC to avoid the iss ue of clemency because Pol ak wo uld not have voted for it. 30 Thus, while the DP owed its success to a large ly Catholic e lectorate, it contained a core of resistance veterans who simpl y could not countenance anything short of Ti so's exec ution. Since the leader of those veterans he ld the deciding vote on the SNC Presidium , the DP 's efforts to support c le mency were futile. Tho ugh the DP had good reason to suspect that Polak would not vote for c lemency, the Communists had their own fears that he mi ght not vote aga inst it. This ex plains why the Communists on the SNC were as eager as the Democrats to pass the matter on to Prague. A number of factors contributed to the exec ution of Jozef Tiso-a Pres ident who disliked him and welcomed hi s exec ution ; a gove rn ment where the cards were stacked agai nst him from the start , with 19 See Barnovsky , Na ceste, pp. 240, 245 , for Pol ak ' s acti vity during the .. February Crisis" of 1948. )o Ursfny, Z mojho i ivoui, p. 124. �SLOVAKIA 51 the Soc ial Democrats, Nati onal Soc iali sts, and non-parti san mini sters un sy mpatheti c to hi s cause; a Co mmuni st Party and the labor and res istance orga ni zati ons it mo bili zed workin g agg ressive ly aga in st him ; a staunchl y anti -Ti so j udge; and Ti so 's own wartime acti vities, whi ch made a death se nte nce pl ausi bl e. Nothin g th at th e DP did could have spared Ti so from exec utio n in thi s contex t. Neverthe less, th e way the Democrats mane uvered th ro ugh the cri s is had several consequ ences. The DP did eno ugh for T iso to buttress Communi st arguments that the Democrats catered to the Ludaks they were all eged ly harboring, arg uments th at in the ensuing months would mu shroom into the arrest of several leading De mocrats for ant i-state co nspiracy. At the same time, the DP 's fa ilure to sec ure an SNC vote on T iso's beha lf made it eas ier for the government 's Co mmuni st and non-Cath o li c Czec h parti es to argue th at Slo vaki a was opposed to c lemency fo r Tiso, thu s he lpin g abso lve Czechs of any charges that T iso's exec uti on was a Czech operati on done against the w ill of the Slovak people . Fin all y, the DP's impotence in defending T iso led to increased di si llusionment amo ng S lovak ia's Catho lic voters. For the DP, the who le undertaking was a lose-lose situ ati on, an indi cati on of just how d ifficult th at party's road was in spite of, or better said , on acco unt of, its bi g e lec tora l victo ry in May of 1946. To a great ex tent, the events surroundin g the iss ue of c lemency fo r Jozef Tiso were a mi crocos m of th e proble mati c pos itio n of the De mocrati c Party in postwar Czechos lovak ia. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 33 The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso James Ramon Felak On April 15 , 1947, Igor Daxne r, Chairman of the National Court in Brati s lava, pronounced the verd ict agai nst Father Jozef Ti so, the head of Slovakia's wartime state that was closely alli ed with Naz i Germany. The Co urt found Ti so guilty of 95 of 11 3 charges aga inst him, in c ludin g treason, betraya l of the Slovak National Uprising , co ll aborati on with the Naz is, and de portation of Slovak Jews to Naz i death ca mps. Hi s sente nce was death by han g in g, to be carried out within 48 hours. At once, Tiso, along w ith hi s two defense attorneys , submitted a requ est for c le me ncy. 1 Thi s pape r w ill in vesti gate the fate of thi s request, the last official chance to spare Ti so from death. Though the final deci sion on clemency rested with Czechoslovakia ' s Pres ide nt Edvard Be nes, the request passed like a hot potato over the next dozen ho urs, from Daxner to Slovakia's Commissioner of th e Interior Iva n Stefanik, to Slovakia ' s c hi ef organ of se lf-governme nt , the Slovak Nation al Council (SNC) , to the Czechoslovak gove rnme nt in Prague , and ultimatel y to Be nes. De mocra tic Party (DP) leaders had lobbi ed for c lemency during the tri al, voted for it at the gove rnme nt 's mee tin g on the eve nin g of April 16, a nd frantically appea led on its behalf to Be nes in the hours before Tiso ' s exec uti on. However, they c uri ously refused to take a stand for clemency at the meeting of the SNC's Pres idium on the afternoon of April 16, where they had a 3-to-2 majority and where a stand on Ti so 's behalf would have g ive n offic ial sanction to the view , w idely shared by many and 1 ' One of the three prosecutors. l.'.udovft Ri gan. also made a request for clemency to the Court; K arel K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy . Komentovane dokumenty, (Prague. I 992), p. 221 (Document 37). SLOVAKIA 34 probably most Slovaks, that Tiso should not be executed. The Democrats' refusal to take a stand in the SNC meant that Tiso's opponents could point to the failure of any official Slovak organs to recommend clemency as proof that his execution reflected the will of the Slovak people. The fate of Jozef Tiso was very much connected with the DP's fortunes in Czechoslovak and Slovak politics . Shortly after her liberation from Nazi rule and reattachment to Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had only two significant political parties-the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) and the Democratic Party (DP). The latter, in many ways a legacy of the interwar Agrarian party, emerged out of the Lutheran-dominated wing of the resistance to the Tiso regime. When the Catholic and nationalist Slovak People's Party (SPP) was outlawed at war ' s end , many Slovak Catholics became political orphans.2 In the spring of 1946, however, the DP adopted them through the so-called April Agreement, a pact between the party's leaders and important Catholic political activi sts whereby Catholics were promised a large share of influence in the DP and a Democratic commitment to promote the Catholic Church ' s position on issues such as education in exchange for Catholic electoral support. The fruit of the April Agreement was a landslide victory for the DP over the Communists in the May 1946 parliamentary elections, with Democrats winning 63 % of the vote to the Communists' 30%. From that point on , the CPS focused its energies on undoing the electoral results by seeking to paralyze, fracture , or dis solve the DP. Among other things, the Tiso trial figured in Communist calculations of how to cripple their rival. The Communist plan was to force the DP to navigate between the Scylla of angering its Catholic members and voters , who had hopes that the Democrats would rescue Tiso from a death sentence, and the Charybdis of being sucked into a police investigation for 2 Catholics comprised nearly 80% of the Slovak population. The majority of Slovak Catholics voted for the SPP during the interwar period. SLOVAKIA 35 allegations of pandering to the reactionaries and war criminals it was all egedl y harboring th anks to the April Agreeme nt. Idea ll y, the DP wo uld be di scredited in the eyes of Catholics as an ineffectua l and lukewarm defe nder of Ti so, while concurrently di sc redited in the eyes of everyone else as a haven for reactionaries. With little room for mane uver, and in the face of enormo us press ure, the DP had to face thi s chall enge. What fo ll ows is how the Com muni sts were able to acco mpli sh these end s, partl y due to the ir own tactics, partl y due to the dynami c of the situ ati on, and part ly due to the cho ices made by the Democrats. Ri ght after the anno unceme nt of the verd ict, Ti so's lawyers, Ernest Zabkay and Martin Greco, submitted an official requ est for c lemency, as king for a more "appropriate" sentence for the ir c lient. 3 They particularly stressed lega l tec hni ca lities. Tiso's lawyers argued th at the defense was not all owed to speak with the acc used without the sec urity organs present-a violati on of a fund amental principle of criminal tri al procedure-and that the defense did not have certain archiv al materials at its disposal , while the prosec uti on did. Furthermore, records of testimony were not made avail able within the requisite three days, but lagged by nearly two month s, thereby mak in g it impossible for the defense to c ite testimon y made after January 15 in its concluding statements. In addition to these and a number of other technicalities, Tiso ' s lawyers arg ued th at the trial was po litica ll y biased, both because Daxner himse lf was bi ased, as the SNC itself had recognized in the past, and because, despite a leg islati ve order ca llin g for political pari ty in the Senate, no me mbers of the DP took part in the judg ment. Tiso's attorn eys a lso arg ued that Tiso was being puni shed for eve nts beyond his co ntro l. They claimed th at he did not prepare for Slovakia's independence in 1939, or he lp cause it, and that he showed no initiative and intention ality in hi s cooperation wi th Nazi Germany. Rather, he simpl y tri ed to make the best of a bad situ ation that was thru st upo n him . Finally, Ti so's atto rneys, in the .1 Kaplan, Ova retribucnf procesy. pp. 2 15-2 19 (Document 35) . SLOVAKIA 36 onl y argument that the DP would make its ow n, argued th at clemency would strengthen Czech-Slovak relations, e liminate the threat of ill will between Slovakia ' s Catholics and Protestants, and strengthen ti es between Slovak emigrants and their motherl and. The National Court quick ly decided agai nst recommending c lemency for Ti so, and passed Tiso ' s request on to Slovak Commissioner of Ju stice Ivan Stefanik , a Democrat. Stefa nik in turn supported Tiso's request, and submitted a proposal to the Presidium of the SNC, which read , " I propose that the death se ntence of Dr. Jozef Ti so be commuted to life impri sonment. " 4 The proposal was to the point, absent the argumentation included in Ti so ' s request, and un like Ti so ' s request, allowed for no sentence less than life impri sonment. On April 16, the SNC ' s Presidium met to consider Stefa nik ' s proposal, along with some other matters connected with Ti so ' s tri al. When the Pres idium convened, it was already under enormous pressure. By law , Tiso ' s exec ution was to be carried out within 48 hours of the announcement of the verdict, so matters had to be considered quickly. Moreover, the gove rnm ent in Prag ue was meet in g later that day to discuss c lemency , and was eagerly awaiting the views of Slovakia 's leadin g organs on the matter. Adding to the pressure was the fact that the Presidium received the 214 page judgment aga inst Tiso only shortl y before its meeti ng.5 Moreover, te legrams, letters, and petitions (for and against c leme ncy) were pourin g in to the President 's office, the government, and the SNC, while Parti san and labor organizations staged anti-Ti so rallies across Slovakia and de legation s from trade union s, hou sing estates, and espec ially resistance organizations arrived in Brati slava to add their presence to the de liberations. 6 Though there were no reported cases of violence, it is not difficult to imagine the presence of these groups, enco uraged if not orchestrated by the Communists, adding a menac in g character to 4 K aplan , Dva relribucnf procesy. p. 220 (Document 36). ' Th e DP claimed the Presidium had onl y ten minutes to look over the length y judgmen t; see Cas. April 23 , 1947 , no. 93, p. I. 6 Cas, Apri l 23, 1947, no. 93 , p. I. SLOVAKIA 37 the already inte nse pressure on the Presidium , or more prec ise ly, its Democratic me mbers. For example, a consortium of major res istance organi zati o ns iss ued a decl aration on April 16 th at conde mned c lemency as a "s hameful defilement (popl'u vanie) of all the sac rifi ces of o ur nation al stru gg le" th at co uld e mbolde n Ti so's supporte rs into provokin g unrest in S lovakia aimed at undermining the Re public.7 If cle mency was gra nted to Tiso, these organizations promi sed to assess the situation and cons ide r what mean s to emp loy in de fe nse of the Republic and the ga ins of the Slovak National Upri sin g. The DP had a majority on the Presi dium , which conta ined three Democrats (Jozef Lettrich, who was chairman of both the DP and the SNC, Andrej Cvincek, Milan Po la k) a nd two Communi sts (Karol Smidke, Ivan Horvath ). Nevertheless, the Pres idium did not e ndorse Stefanik's proposa l for c le me nc y; rather, it reso lved to submit the proposa l to the governme nt without co mme nt. In hi s me moirs, Jan Ursfny, a top DP leader and its Deputy Chairman, argued that Lettric h went into the meetin g with the intention of avo idin g debate over clemency, a position Ursfny strongly advised against. 8 Lettrich 's behav ior at the meeting does betray the actions of a man inte nt on avoi ding debate. 9 First of all , most of the meetin g 's di scuss ion dea lt with De mocratic di ssati sfaction with Daxner's ha ndling of the tri al. Whe n the Presidium did get around to the Ti so verdict, Le ttri c h made it clear th at he fe lt th at the press ure of time mad e it imposs ible to acq uire sufficie nt knowledge to take a pos ition on c le mency, and that any recommendation would thu s have to be " politica l." The Communi st Horvath the n proposed that the Presidium take no stand , but simpl y pass on Stefa nik 's proposa l to the government without co mment. He argued that a recomme nd ation from the SNC was ne ithe r requi- 1 Pravda. Apri l 18, 1947 . no. 90, p. I: th e Slovak term pop!ii vct nie could be rendered as .. spitting on". • Jan Ursfny. Z m6jho i i votct. (M artin . 2000), pp. 123- 124. " See Sl ovensky narod ny archfv (hereafter referred to as SNA). Fond Urad predsednfctva Slovenskej narodnej rady , Carton 139, Folder 134. Folios 49-58 , S R Presidiu m meetin g of A pril 16. 1947. SLOVAKIA 38 red nor necessary, for it was the government and Benes whose views would be decisive. According to Horvath, since the Communists were opposed to clemency, they would be unable to support Stefanik ' s proposa l, and hence any vote in the SNC would be on a parti san basis, setting a bad precedent for future Communist-Democratic cooperation. When it came time to vote on Horvath ' s proposal , the Presidium accepted it unanimously. Before examining why the SNC , or more specifically its Democratic members, opted not to recommend c lemency for Tiso, let us track the proposal ' s course to Prague and ultimately to Benes. The Communists and Social Democrats were openly hostile to Tiso, and the non-parti san mini sters, Ludvfk Svoboda (Defense) and Jan Masaryk (Foreign Affairs), could be expected to be so as well. Together, these constituted 13 of the 23 members of the government, enough to tip any vote to Ti so's detriment. On top of that, the Czech National Soc ialists were at best ambivalent. A number of leading National Socialists opposed clemency and wanted their party to vote against it or at least to abstain. 10 However, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, one of the party's top leaders, had earlier assured Lettrich that he would support clemency provided the SNC did. 11 In the last of a series of meetings on the issue , held right before the government session began , Drtina managed to convince his colleagues to agree to the following position : to oppose clemency, but only after first proposing that the request for clemency be returned to the Presid ium of the SNC for that organ's recommendation. In thi s way, Drtina could present himself as makin g a good faith effort to honor hi s promise to Lettrich , while entertaining hopes that a vote to return the request to the SNC would fail, thu s getting himself off the hook. 12 The government meeting opened at approximately 5: 15 p.m ., after a delay of over an hour as its members waited for reports from ° Kaplan. Dva retribucnf procesy. p. 25 . 1 " Prokop Drtina. Ceskos lovensko muj osud, II. 2, (Toronto, I 982). pp. 297-298. 302. 12 Drtina, Ceskoslovensko muj osud. II , 2, p. 302. SLOVAKIA 39 Slovakia. 13 Within ten minutes, a delegation of representatives from the Union of Czechoslovak Partisans and so me similar organizations asked to be admitted. Since the National Socialists had yet to arrive, mak ing their last minute plans in a nearby room , the meetin g was adjourned for 45 minutes while the parti san organizations were given the opportunity to press ure the mini sters to vote against clemency. 14 Once the de legation s had their say and engaged some of the mini sters over the iss ue , and the National Sociali st mini sters had arrived, the meeting was reconvened. Prime Mini ster Kl ement Gottwald began by sharin g two pieces of information he had just rece ived from Slovaki a- the memorandum from the SNC' s Pres idium pass in g on Stefanik's proposal for clemency without comment, and a telegram from Gu stav Husak, Chairman of Slovakia 's Board of Commissioners (Cabinet). Husak noted that Stefanik 's proposal did not reflect the views of the Board of Commissioners nor its Presidium, whose standpoint Stefanik did not seek, and should therefore be regarded as hi s own personal proposal. Husak added that he did not agree with the proposa l. Thus, the meeting opened with reports from Slovakia 's two chief political organs, neither of which endorsed clemency. Gottwald, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party , then proposed that the government reso lve aga inst clemency, since the National Court in Brati slava recommended against it, and the Pres idium of the SNC did not recommend for it. In a long and sometimes pass ionate debate, mini sters from both sides weighed in on the que stion, with positions breaking down along party lines. The Communists led the charge against clemency. Vladimfr Clementi s, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and a Slovak, read a CPS 13 For the minutes of the meeting. see K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy. pp. 225-254. 14 Ursfny . in his memoirs, recou nts be ing asked by one member of the parti san dele- gati on: "M r. Deput y Chairman, tell me, w ith whom do you wan t to go. w ith th e Ludak underground. or with us?" A nother partisan representati ve. however, spoke up for Ursfny as ··one of the greates t partisans. " (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota, p. 125): see footnote 17 for an ex planation of the term " Ludak. " 40 SLOVAKIA decl aration that la id o ut the Co mmuni st pos iti on. The dec larati o n stressed the did acti c function of the tri al, that is, its purpose in di sco urag ing enemies of the Republic. A death sentence co uld do that far better than a life sentence in thi s res pect. C lemency, on the co ntrary, would onl y encou rage enemi es of the state and sympathizers of Ti so and hi s reg ime . Reactionari es, as before, were tryin g to take over Slovaki a "even at the price of the Re public." 15 The dec laration arg ued that c leme ncy would evoke di stru st in the judic ial sys tem. Veterans of the Sl ovak Nati onal Upri sin g would be upset with the de parture from the idea ls of the res istance; peo ple wo uld note the inj ustice of lesser crimin als hav ing been more harshl y puni shed than Ti so; and politics would be seen once more as " panske huncutst vo", that is "gentl emen's mi sc hi ef." 16 The declarati o n noted in parti cul ar that Ti so showed no remorse for hi s crimes, and in fac t gave succor to th e Re public 's ene mi es in hi s co ncludin g statement at hi s tri al. Much of what Cleme nti s read was identica l to a dec larati on made a day earli er by Slovaki a's res istance organi zati o ns, testifyin g to the leadin g ro le the Co mmuni sts pl ayed in those orga ni zati o ns and the success the party had in coordin atin g various soc ial orga ni zati ons on behalf of its objecti ves . Indeed , both dec laration s co nc luded with the sa me threat to assess the s ituation and consider what mea ns to employ in defense of the Republic and its character. Czech Communi sts also spoke out again st clemency, asserting th at Ti so was a traitor and a war crimina l, and that fa ilin g to exec ute him would be a blow to Czec hos lovakia 's unity and inde pendence. Communi st speakers also arg ued th at it was the will of th e Slovak people that Ti so be exec u- 15 The express ion ··ani za ce nu republiky", th at is, •·even at the price of the rep ublic" . was a reference to a statement made by HSL:S leader A ndrej Hlin ka at a rall y in Trencfn in 1932, where he asse rted th e degree to whi ch his party wo uld pu rsue Slovak interests; see James Ramon Felak, •A l the Price of the Republic·_. Hlinka 's Slovak People 's Party. 1929- 1938. (Pittsburg h, 1994 ), p. 96. 16 " Poli tika je panske huncutstvo" was an expression curre nt among Slovaks , rooted in Slovakia ' s feudal pas t. It was the recog nition by peasan ts th at pol itics was the domain where the lords made mi sch ief. SLOVAKIA 41 ted , as ev ide nced by the pos iti ons of the Nati ona l Co urt, the SNC, and the Board of Co mmi ss ione rs, all organs composed e ntire ly of Slova ks and re prese nting S lovakia. Thi s was why, the Czec h Co mmuni st Vac lav Kopecky noted , the DP would not speak up fo r c leme ncy on the SNC's Pres idium. Th e Soc ia l De mocrati c mini sters we re just as o pposed to c lemency as the Communi sts, and no less assertive about the ir pos iti on. Zdene k Fierlin ger, the leader of the SOP and a Deputy Prime Minister, argued th at a vote fo r c le me ncy wo uld upset Czec hoslovaki a's alli es in the Slav ic world , in part because it would fu e l Slova k independe nce, whi c h itse lf th reate ned Czec hos lovaki a 's border w ith the Sov iet Uni o n. Fie rlinger even re marked th at how o ne voted o n the cleme ncy questi on was a test of one's patri oti sm. With respect to the reli g io us dim e ns ion of the ques ti o n, the Soc ial De mocrati c leade r asserted th at the fac t of Tiso's be ing a priest was not a miti gating c irc um stance, but rathe r one th at made matters worse. He noted th at it was not good for the Catho lic Churc h to e ncumbe r itse lf with Ti so . Whil e Fie rlinger re prese nted the pro-C ommuni st left-win g of the SOP, that party's ri ght-wing was no less vehe me nt about Ti so. Vaclav Maj er, the leader of the ri ght-wing Soc ial De mocrats, referred to the Sl ovak pri est as one of the chi e f war crimin als, guilty of mass murder. The most ex te ns ive attac k on Ti so a nd argume nt against cle me ncy, however, came not fro m the mini ste rs o f the le fti st parties, but from the oste nsibl y ne utra l (a lbeit c loset Communi st) Ludvfk Svoboda, the Mini ster o f Defe nse. As a Czec hoslovak hero of both the First and Second World Wars, Svoboda's word s carri ed a certain cac het. Svoboda spoke at le ngth about why T iso mu st die . He came o ut strong ly aga inst so-ca ll ed ha lf-so luti o ns; at ha nd was a definiti ve hi stori ca l qu esti o n w ith long- te rm impli cati o ns th at sho uld not be judged accordin g to the needs a nd mood of the mo me nt. Ti so was 42 SLOVAKIA not just a war criminal ; he was the sy mbol of " Ludakism," 17 fasci sm, treason , and collaboration . To grant clemency to Tiso, according to Svoboda, would render hi s trial vain and superfluous. If alive, Ti so would remain to poison cooperation and unity between Czechs and Slovaks; clemency would encourage hi s supporters, while disappointing others. Like many speakers and writers of the time, Svoboda noted that Tiso showed no remorse. He ca lled for a firm and resolute action agai nst him as a means of strengthening Czechoslovakia's international position and prestige. To those w ho argued th at Ti so should be spared because he was a priest, Svoboda dec lared that "we are not judging a priest, but a traitor, a destroyer of the Czechoslovak state, and a criminal. That Tiso is a priest only makes matters worse; he profaned the priestly office and Church at a time when thou sands of other priests fought bravely again st Nazi sm and perished in concentration camps and prisons." On the other s ide of the equation were those mini sters who championed c lemency-on ly the Democrats and Czech Populi sts. Here the most prominent speaker was Ursfny . The Democratic Deputy Chairman argued that clemency would improve relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Lutherans and Catholics, and aid in the overall consolidation of the post-war Republic. Such a goodwi ll gesture might also win over some of Czechoslovakia' s enemi es. Ursfny noted that religiou s fee lings ran strong in Slovakia, where the exec ution of a priest was a serious , and potentiall y upsetting matter. He pointed out that many good people were for clemency, includin g so me bishops and hi gh functionari es in the Lutheran church , a church that itself had suffered under Ti so's regi me. The Democratic Minister of Transportation Ivan Pietor also spelled out a number of reasons for clemency. He argued that Ti so was popular among the majority of Slovaks, and that the preva ilin g majority of Slovaks would vote for 17 Lud aki sm, or "l'udactvo" was the term employed to refer to fo ll owers of th e Slovak People 's Party, whose members were know n as '• Ludaks" or " l'udaci ." It best approximates the Engli sh word " Populi sm. " Communi sts applied the term to any Slovak Catholics they did not like. SLOVAKIA 43 clemency if given the chance, thou gh thi s did not mean they agreed with Ti so ' s politics. He too noted that important Lutheran leaders sent ardent appeals on Tiso's behalf in the interest of the peaceful deve lopment of Slovaki a and Czechoslovakia. The g iven politica l s ituation , accordin g to Pietor, demanded statesmanlike thinkin g, wi sdom , and sensiti vity to the prevailing political condition s and mood. In such a co ntext, clemency would be a gesture to win over hearts in Slovakia and bring the Czech and Slovak nation s together. While the Court may have unanimou sly estab lished Tiso 's guilt and ca ll ed for hi s exec ution , that was a judicial decision , not a political one. What the Republic now faced was a manifestly political deci sion , and that was the task of the government to settl e, in accordance with political considerations. The Czec h Populi sts, as members of a Catholic party with moderate inclinations, also supported clemency. Minister Franti se k Ha.la (Post Office), him se lf a Catholic priest, presented c le mency as the most suitable solution for Czechoslovak and Slovak interests. The Populi st Adolf Prochazka (Health ) remarked that c lemency was the des ire of most Slovaks, and of the Lutheran church leadership . Jan Kopecky (Mini ster without Portfolio) supported clemency as a way to consolidate the Repub li c, and reminded hi s mini sterial colleagues that life impri sonment was not tantamount to acq uittal. In makin g hi s case, Ursfny co ntended that the SNC did not recommend aga inst c lemency ; rather it was not the Pres idium 's function to ex press a position on the proposa l, but only to pass it on to the government. Technically , he was correct because the Second Prague Agreement of April I I , 1946, the statute under which such matters were regulated , stated that the commissioner's proposal be submitted to the go vernment "v ia the Pres idium of the Slovak National Counci l. " 18 However, this strict construction is not the way the SNC had hitherto been dealing with proposa ls. Gottwald snide ly noted that the '" Jan Mechyr. Slo vensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I . (Prague. 1991 ). 44 SLOVAKIA Pres idium had sudde nl y dec ided in thi s case to limit itse lf to the ro le of a post office, and al ong with Fie rlinger, he regarded Ursfny 's expl a nati on as sophi stry. They were not bu ying th e De moc rats ' claim that the Pres idium ' s position was not a fa ilure to endorse c le mency. It was the centri st parties, however, that ex pressed the most anger over the SNC 's sile nce regardin g c leme ncy - a sil e nce th at, because the DP had a majority in the Pres idium, was c learl y bl a med on the De mocrats. A number of Nati ona l Soc iali st and Populi st mini ste rs vo iced their indi gnati on at the SNC's atte mpt to pass th e buck. Jaroslav Stra nsky (Edu cati on) said th at he wa nted Ursfny and hi s frie nds to recogni ze the situ ation into whi ch they had gotte n the governme nt , whi c h thanks to the m now had to dec ide on a matter about whi c h it did not have s uffic ie nt kn ow ledge. In thi s s itu ati on, th e gove rnm e nt co uld be bl a med if Ti so did not get cle me ncy, thereby bein g burde ned with what is primaril y a Sl ovak pro bl e m. Drtina, s imil arly, sa id he was perpl exed by the Pres idium ' s unex pected course of acti on, one whi ch now put the go vernme nt in a diffi c ult situati on. He pro posed se ndin g th e pro posal bac k to th e Pres idium fo r its opini o n, in acco rdance with the Second Prague Agree me nt, whi c h stipul ated that the governme nt return proposa ls to the SNC's Pres idium if it had objecti ons to them from the point of view of statew ide inte res ts. Foll o win g suit , Nation a l Soc ia li st Mini ste r o f Fore ig n Trade Hube rt Ripka noted hi s party ' s astoni shme nt at th e SNC's acti on - how it limited its ro le to th at of a mailbox in the way it interpre ted the Seco nd Prag ue Agree me nt. He noted th at Sl ovaki a ' s se lf-proc laimed leadin g orga n did not have the courage to ex press itse lf on a questi on of suc h importance fo r the future and fa te of the Slovak people . Accordin g to Ripka, it was c lear that the SNC Pres idium wa nted to shi ft the res po nsibility for Ti so's fate o nto the governme nt. He in sisted that the Pres idum ex press itse lf on the iss ue, and as qui ckl y as poss ibl e. Hala, spea kin g for th e Czech Populi sts, echoed the sentiments o f the Nation al Soc ia li sts, notin g th at the Presidium ' s action greatl y surpri sed him and that it see med to want to pass responsibility onto the governme nt. SLOVAKIA 45 While the National Sociali sts and Populi sts expressed agreement with Drtina 's motion to return the proposa l to the SNC, the leftist parties adamantly opposed it. Gottwald, Fierlinger, and others noted that the SNC had already taken a position by failing to endorse clemency. They argued that further delay of Ti so's execution would only drag thin gs out, sustain a state of tension and provoke and evoke supporters of Ti so, as well as open the floodgates for clemency for others sentenced to death. When Drtina 's motion to return the proposal to the Presidium of the SNC came to a vote, it was defeated 13 to I0 . The voting broke down according to party lines: the National Socialists, Populists, and Democrats supported the proposal; the leftist parties and non-parti san ministers opposed it. While the Populists may well have sincerely believed that the best remedy for the crisis would have been for the SNC to voice its opinion on the matter, the National Socialists made and supported the motion simply for cosmetic purposes, hoping that it would fail. 19 The Democrats, of course, were in a quite unenviable position. The motion' s failure meant that they would not be g iven a second chance to make a stand for clemency in the Presidium. At the same time, it is not certain that they would have known what to do with a second chance; the factors that kept them from endorsing clemency the first time around were still operative. As the debate over Stefanik 's proposal resumed , the National Socialists came out against clemency, and sought to present the anticlemency position as the one identified with Slovakia. Drtina, noting th at the government was not fully informed of the detail s of the case, thought the matter should be best settled by Slovakia, as it indeed was - a Slovak Court had establi shed Tiso's guilt and had unanimously rejected clemency, which the SNC had also failed to recommend. Ripka , de mon stratin g the sort of Czech ignorance of Slovakia that ran kles Slovaks, claimed that Ti so, long before 1938 , was as bad or worse than Vojtech Tuka, Ti so 's main political rival during the war 19 Drtina adm its thi s in hi s me moirs: see Ceskoslovensko mu) osud, II , 2, p. 302. 46 SLOVAKIA and the leader of the radically pro-Nazi faction ple 's Party. 20 in the Slovak Peo- Because the consequences of Ludakism had not yet di- sappeared from Slovakia, clemency should be rejected. Ripka not only came out again st it, but also appealed to the DP and Czech Populists to abstain on the vote, so the government could present a united front. He addressed the Democrats with the rebuke that, if they did not vote for clemency in Slovakia, they should not now at the governmental level, where the domestic and international ramifications of such a vote were great. After more di sc uss ion, the government ultimately passed a resolution voicing its opposition to c lemency, on the grounds th at the National Court in Brati slava had recommended against it, and that the Pres idium of the SNC did not endorse it when pass ing Stefanik's proposal on to Prague. The vote was 17 in favor , 6 against. All mini sters rejected c lemency except those from the DP and Czech People 's Party. The meeting was adjourned at 8:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Gottwald took the government 's recommendation to Benes, who accepted it and informed Slovakia's Commissioner of Ju stice that hi s request for clemency had been officially denied. 2 1 Upon learn in g of the dec ision , Lettrich made a last-ditch intervention , telephoning Benes ' s chancellery. He conveyed the message that the government's standpoint was in conflict with Article I.b. of the Second Prague Agreement, which instructed the government, if it had objections aga inst a proposal from Slovaki a, to return that proposal to the SNC' s Presidium, not pass it on to Benes with a 20 Tuka was a notoriou s ri ghti st rad ica l who made a political career out of intriguing with foreign enemi es of the Czec hos lovak Republi c almost right from th e Republi c ' s founding. He spent most of th e 1930s in pri son for treason, and was executed for war crimes in the summer of 1946. we ll before the tri al of Tiso. 21 K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, p. 27: Benes had informed Gottwald the day before th at he planned to ac t in accordance wi th whatever th e governm ent recommended regardin g clemency fo r Tiso, K apl an, D va retribucnf procesy, pp. 222-224 (Document 38). SLOVAKIA 47 recommendation. 22 Lettrich warned Benes of possible " immense political consequences" that could resu lt from a rejection of clemency, and fo r which the DP could not accept responsibility . Lettrich conc luded by notin g th at the DP had an absolute majority in the SNC and its Pres idium and fully agreed with Stefanik ' s proposal, considering clemency as a paramount state and nation al interest. Benes received the message early the next morning, instructing hi s chancellery to tell Lettrich that he had gone to the countryside, and would discuss the matter with Gottw ald if Lettrich so desired. 23 Ursfny too attempted an appeal on behalf of clemency, and also found out that the rej ection of clemency was an accomplished fact and that Benes was incommunicado. 24 Stefanik him self made a final attempt on Tiso ' s behalf, asking the National Court that Tiso be tran sferred to the jail of the Office of the Public Prosec utor, so he could be questioned regarding some other cases. Thi s the National Court rejected on the ground s that Ti so could be just as eas ily be questioned at its own jail. 25 With all avenues for clemency now ex hausted , Ti so was hanged early on the morning of April 18, officiall y pronounced dead at 5:30 a.m. It was no surpri se that Ti so was found guilty, nor th at he was sentenced to die. Nor was it astoni shing that the majority of government mini sters in Prague rejected the reco mmendation for clemency, and that Benes acted in accordance with their position. But what was puzzling was the behavior of the DP -supporting clemency in Prague , but not in Bratislava; desperately appealin g for clemency on the 22 Mi chal Barn ovsky , Na ceste k monopolu moci, ( Bratislava , 1993) , p. 145 n; K apl an, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 28. 23 Kaplan , D va retribucnf procesy, p. 28 ; Robert Letz, S/ovensko v rokoch I 945- 1948, (Bratislava, 1994 ), p. 48 . 24 Ursfny, Z m6jho t i vota, p. 127 . 25 K aplan, Dva retribucnf procesy, p. 29; the motive behind this attempt was to delay Ti so ' s exec uti on and thu s increase the chances that he would ultimately receive clemency . 48 SLOVAKIA eve of Tiso 's exec uti on, while letting the issue pass right throu gh the hands of the SNC Presidium that they had dominated the day before. Did the DP want the appeal for c lemency to fail? Such a view ca n be found in the po lice record , where a report me nti ons that Lettrich was opposed to cle me ncy for Tiso. 26 Like many scenarios sketched out by police inform ants, however, this one seems to be w ithout merit. Lettrich had earli er lobbi ed Tiso ' s three prosecutors for c lemency, and had persuaded Minister of Ju sti ce Drtina to promi se hi s support as well. These are hardl y the acti ons of a man desiring Tiso 's execution . Other ex planat io ns must li e behind the timidity of Lettrich and the DP at the notoriou s SNC Pres idium meeting of April 16. Hi storian s who have exa mined the meetin g, a nd the issue of clemency overall, ha ve co me up with a numbe r of ex pl anation s, which will be di sc ussed here in ascend in g order of pl a usibility and influence. 27 Most dubi o us is the view th at the De mocrats trusted that Benes would grant clemency regardless of the recommendations he rece ived. Whil e the re appare ntly was public spec ulation that Be nes mi ght spare Tiso, the DP leadership had littl e reason to put their tru st in such suppos ition s. Benes had already g ive n Lettrich and Ursfny quite c lear indication s of hi s oppositi on to cle mency. 28 Another of the weaker arguments for why the SNC did not take a stand on c le me ncy was the one the DP used to ex pl ai n itse lf at the 26 Barno vsky, Na ceste. p. 130. 27 For exp lanati ons of why the OS acted the way it did at th e SNR Pres idiu m mee- ting of Apri l 16, see Barnovsky , Na ceste, p. 130: Letz, Slovensko. pp. 47-48: Kaplan . Ova relribucnf procesy, pp. 24-26 : Ursfny, Z m6jho i i vota. pp. 123- 124 : for the DP ' s attempt to j ustify its ac ti ons at the time, see Cas. April 23, 1947. no. 93 . p. I. 28 Lettrich , in a meeting with the three state prosecutors of the Tiso trial on March 12. I 94 7, mentioned that he had discussed the matter of clemency for Tiso w ith Benes on two occasions, and th at Benes's positi on was th at he would not take a stand but rather all ow th e governmen t' s decis ion on th e matter to guide him : (see SNA. Demokraticka strana, Carton 2, Bundle 99 , Folios 1-2): moreover. Ursfny claims in hi s memoirs that in fall of 1946. Daxner asked Benes how he shou ld handle the Tiso case, to which Benes replied, " I th in k that he deserves death, but thi s is an affair for an independent court. "; (see Ursfny, Z m6jho i ivota. p. 11 3). SLOVAKIA 49 government meetin g of April 16 and thereafter, i.e. that accordin g to the 2 nd Prague Agreement , the S C's role in the process was simpl y to pass proposals on to the Government and not to co mment on them, and that i f the government had obj ection s to Stefanik's proposa l, it wo uld soli cit the SNC Presidium 's views on it. Upon refl ec ti on, thi s ex plan ati on holds no more water th an it did at the tim e. A party that believed Slovak organs should speak for Slovakia, and a good bit of whose appeal was based on its advocacy of autonomy fo r Slovakia, is behav ing out of character w hen it surrenders to Prague the prerogati ve to decide on a matter so c lose to th e hearts of so many Slovaks. Another ex pl anation put forth by the DP was that it lacked sufficient time to stud y the doc umentation pertinent to th e Tiso tri al. Whil e on the surface thi s is true , still , the SNC was not being asked to render a lega l or judicial judgment, but a politi ca l one. In the latter case, the party could have made up its mind on a pos ition long before the verdi ct, as the Communists had. M ore convincing are the views th at th e DP was simpl y afra id th at a vote for clemency wo uld prompt the Communi sts to provoke a politica l crisis in Slovakia, halting cooperation w ithin the SNC, mobili zing Parti san and trade union groups against the Democrats, and forcing Prague to step in . Indeed, such threats and pressures were already ev ident on the Slovak political stage for over a yea r, and were com mon everywhere else in East Central Europe w here Communi st parti es were acti ve. In thi s view , the DP simpl y lost its nerve and opted to pass the matter on to Prague ra ther than deal w ith it in Bra ti slava. Thi s explanati on seems va lid enough because Communi st pres sure was al ways an influence. However, i f fear of reperc uss ions was the main reason for keeping the DP quiet, w hy did Democrats vote for clemency at the government sess ions in Prag ue? Wa s it to gi ve public assura nce to th eir co nstitu ents th at th ey opposed clemency , but at a ven ue w here they did not have to worry about their vote carry ing any influence and thereby provoking a clemency- induced SLOVAKIA 50 cris is back home? This question is moot , give n the influence of the most significant factor of all. A final ex pl anati on is most like ly the crucial o ne - that the DP could not co unt on one of its own representatives on the Presidi um , Milan Po lak , to vote for c le mency. Po lak ' s record, both before and after 1947, place him on the left wing of the DP. A former Parti san, and leader in the Parti sa n vetera ns' movement, Po lak collaborated with the Communists durin g and after the February co up of 1948 . 29 Unable to co unt on hi s vote, Lettrich preferred no vote on c lemency to one in which Polak would abstain or vote no. Thus he chose the leas t pa inful but st ill damaging option. While many of Slovakia ' s Catholics would be upset if the DP-controll ed Presidium failed to take a vote on clemency, they wo uld be even more outraged if a DPcontrolled Pres idium rejected clemency, or could not mu ste r th e three votes needed to pass it. Ursfny 's memo irs prov ide further ev idence for thi s ex planation. Ursfny reported that, when on a vis it to the United States in the fa ll of 1967 , he spoke by telephone with Lettrich , who told him that he wanted the SNC to avoid the iss ue of clemency because Pol ak wo uld not have voted for it. 30 Thus, while the DP owed its success to a large ly Catholic e lectorate, it contained a core of resistance veterans who simpl y could not countenance anything short of Ti so's exec ution. Since the leader of those veterans he ld the deciding vote on the SNC Presidium , the DP 's efforts to support c le mency were futile. Tho ugh the DP had good reason to suspect that Polak would not vote for c lemency, the Communists had their own fears that he mi ght not vote aga inst it. This ex plains why the Communists on the SNC were as eager as the Democrats to pass the matter on to Prague. A number of factors contributed to the exec ution of Jozef Tiso-a Pres ident who disliked him and welcomed hi s exec ution ; a gove rn ment where the cards were stacked agai nst him from the start , with 19 See Barnovsky , Na ceste, pp. 240, 245 , for Pol ak ' s acti vity during the .. February Crisis" of 1948. )o Ursfny, Z mojho i ivoui, p. 124. SLOVAKIA 51 the Soc ial Democrats, Nati onal Soc iali sts, and non-parti san mini sters un sy mpatheti c to hi s cause; a Co mmuni st Party and the labor and res istance orga ni zati ons it mo bili zed workin g agg ressive ly aga in st him ; a staunchl y anti -Ti so j udge; and Ti so 's own wartime acti vities, whi ch made a death se nte nce pl ausi bl e. Nothin g th at th e DP did could have spared Ti so from exec utio n in thi s contex t. Neverthe less, th e way the Democrats mane uvered th ro ugh the cri s is had several consequ ences. The DP did eno ugh for T iso to buttress Communi st arguments that the Democrats catered to the Ludaks they were all eged ly harboring, arg uments th at in the ensuing months would mu shroom into the arrest of several leading De mocrats for ant i-state co nspiracy. At the same time, the DP 's fa ilure to sec ure an SNC vote on T iso's beha lf made it eas ier for the government 's Co mmuni st and non-Cath o li c Czec h parti es to argue th at Slo vaki a was opposed to c lemency fo r Tiso, thu s he lpin g abso lve Czechs of any charges that T iso's exec uti on was a Czech operati on done against the w ill of the Slovak people . Fin all y, the DP's impotence in defending T iso led to increased di si llusionment amo ng S lovak ia's Catho lic voters. For the DP, the who le undertaking was a lose-lose situ ati on, an indi cati on of just how d ifficult th at party's road was in spite of, or better said , on acco unt of, its bi g e lec tora l victo ry in May of 1946. To a great ex tent, the events surroundin g the iss ue of c lemency fo r Jozef Tiso were a mi crocos m of th e proble mati c pos itio n of the De mocrati c Party in postwar Czechos lovak ia.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Democratic Party and the Execution of Jozef Tiso Description An account of the resource James Ramon Felak Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 33-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Felak, James Ramon, 1957- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/46fdc3e0c813f2a93adbad435b51483e.pdf 9061638c10f0fc8565df947913f2662b PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 131 Jan Steinhtibe l, Nitrianske knieiatstvo: Pociatky stredovekeho Slovenska. Rozpravanie o dejinach nasho tizemia a okolitych krajfn od st!lho vania narodov do zaciatku 12. storocia. Brati slava: Veda, 2004. 575pp., bibliography, index of names, index of places, maps, photos, illustration s. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This massive sy nthesis is the culmination of fifteen years of research and publication on the ancestors of the Slovaks in Central Europe. Jan Steinhi.ibel, who works for the Historical Institute of the Sloak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, is a worthy successor to the late Peter Ratkos, the age ing Richard Marsina, and the recentl yretired Matus Kucera , all ex perts on the ancient hi story of the Slovaks. According to Ste inhtibel , the Principality of Nitra was the earliest state of the ancestors of the Slovaks. It started to form in the 6th century, and was independent from 805 to 833. After it was conquered by the nearby Moravians, it remained an important Principality until the demi se of the Great Morav ian Empire in 906. Once the Magyar Arpad dynasty establi shed itself in Central Europe in the 10th century, Nitra, which was inhabited large ly by Slavs, remained a key Principality in the emerging Hungarian Kin gdom until the beginning of the I 2th century. Prince l mri ch, ruler of Nitra and son of King (Sa int) Stephen, was even dubbed " Henricus nobilis dux Sc lavoni e" by a Polish chronicler in I029. And, as long as the Principality existed, its people were called "Nytrenses Sclavi" by Hungarian chroniclers. For three ce nturi es Nitra served as the steppingstone for the future rulers of, first Great Moravia, and later the Kingdom of Hungary. Indeed, the rul ers of Nitra were sovereign over nine counties (large ly coterminous with present-day Slovakia, with the exception of the eastern counties), commanded armies of 3,000 soldiers and often struck their own coins. Eventuall y, however, the early Kings of Hungary, who had traditionally shared their rule wi th their brothers as Princes of Nitra, came to regard this principality as a source of rebellion against them selves or their designated successsors (their leg itimate sons). As a result, in 1108 King Koloman depo- �132 SLOVAKIA sed and blinded his brother Almos, along with the latter's son, and two years later abolished the Principality, along wi th its southern border. Thereafter, medieval chroniclers referred to the local inhabitants si mply as " Sclavi ," but by the 15th century they had become "Slowak." Of course the 18th century Czech linguist Josef Dobrovsky , who claimed that the term "Slovak" or "Slovensko" were recent inventions, did not know any of this. After 336 pages of text, lavishly illustrated with relevant quotations from medieval chroniclers, Steinhiibel concluded that one can trace the beginnings of Slovak history to the Principality of Nitra. Indeed, he continued, one has to look to thi s Principality to find the national, territorial and historical roots of Slovakia. This book is a testament to the deep eruditon of the author. As the 1900 footnotes covering pages 337-495 testify, SteinhUbel mined virtually all (largely Latin) medieval sources written by German, Magyar, Polish, Czech, Ru ssian and Byzantine chroniclers that pertain to Central Europe. He also read the relevant books and articles in the vernacular languages of contemporary scholars of Central Europe and he judiciously illustrated his book with copies of medieval manuscripts , drawings and photos of artifacts. This monograph was a pleasure to read and I will eagerly mine it for relevant quotations for my course on the early history of the Slovaks. Dusan Kovac et. al. Na zaciatku storocia, 1901 -1914. Bratislava: Veda, 2004. 292 pp. , ill., index . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University This is the first of a scheduled seven volume series entitled Slovensko v 20. storoci (Slovakia in the 2(Jh Century) sponsored by the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, under the chief editorship of Dusan Kovac, a leading Slovak historian. Kovac, one of five historians who wrote chapters in this volume penned the introduction and the first "Raku sko-Uhorsko a slo venska otazka v narodnych vztahoch" (A ustria-Hungary and the Slovak Question in International Affairs) and sixth "Pred prvou svetovou vojnou" (Be- �SLOVAKIA 133 fore the First World War) chapters. Other eminent Slovak historians included in this volume are alphabetically: Roman Holec, Chapter 3 "Hospodarstvo" (Economics), Elena Jakesova, chapter 2 "Spolocnost" (Society), Elena Mannova, Chapter 7 "Ideove smery. Kulturny a spolocensky zivot" (Ideological Movements. Cultural and Social Life), and Milan Podrimavsky, Chapters 4 "Krfza liberalneho rezimu 1901-1904" (Crisis of the Liberal Regime 1901-1904) and 5 "Vyvrcholenie politickej krfzy. Koalicna vlada 1905-1910" (Culmination of the Political Crisis. The Coalition Government 1905-1910). Although only these five authors receive credit for the entries, Kovac notes that they relied on the research of another ten historians. This is the most comprehensive general history of Slovakia produced thus far. As Kovac states in his introduction, the Slovak public, and indeed the world, has not until this time possessed a true synthesized historical work written by experts. Previous attempts developed under the totalitarian regime failed to fulfill this goal because they presented distorted interpretations. Kovac hopes this and subsequent works of the series will return to the tradition of noted historian Cubomfr Liptak when he wrote his Slovensko v 20. storoci in 1968 This volume contains traditional aspects of any society, but also gives coverage to areas rarely found in general historical works such as architecture, the beaux arts, mass communication, education, the family , business, and economics . It is not intended to be an all encompassing in-depth study, but rather explores the topics with sufficient coverage without becoming too bogged down in detail. It is meant to be a starting point for further research and study , and it accomplishes this feat quite well. The fourteen years prior to the outbreak of war were a very dynamic and dramatic period, so much so that Slovakia, in the spring of 1914, was quite a different place than in1901 , especially in its urban areas. Despite the Slovaks politically and culturally waging an uphill battle against intensive Magyarization aimed at their assimilation, they fared much better than they had in 1901. The book contains information about the Slovak diaspora, including Budapest, Vienna, the United States, and the Yojvodina/Banat region. The authors explained that a general history of Slovakia and Slovaks before the First World War needs to explore territories other than that of �134 SLOVAKIA Slovakia or Upper Hungary. Indeed, during this time, the true urban center of the Slovaks was Budapest. The work also covers, in much less detail, the other inhabitants of the region including Jews, Germans, Rusyns, and Gypsies (Romany) and provides ample evidence of the ethnic plurali sm of Upper Hungary . At times, too much emphasis appears to be placed on trends and developments throughout Hungary, but, naturall y, it proves impossible to divorce Slovakia from the rest of the Lands of St. Stephen. Each chapter is broken down into numerous short subsections of several pages thereby enabling the reader to easily digest and comprehend them without becoming lost in lengthy discu ssions. Seven charts placed throughout the work and numerous photographs in five section s better illustrate and clarify the points made in the text. The bibliography is intended to be used for further study of the various issues addressed in this work. It contains older essential, fundamental works alongside newly published research. As is often the case for books published in Slovakia, this work contains an index of names, but not subjects, rendering it of marginal value. Overall, this is a fine volume that will become an accepted, starting point for anyone wishing to delve into virtually all aspects of Slovak history at the turn of the last century. Its thoughtful, well constructed chapters present information that piques the interest of the reader. If the quality of this work is upheld in the sc heduled six additional volumes, this series will prove to be a definiti ve collection. Hopefully, an English translation will follow. Ivan A. Petran sky, Stat a katolfcka cirkev na Slovensku 19451946. Nitra: Garmond, 2001, 318pp, summary in English, bibliography, index. JAMES RAMON FELAK University of Washington Ivan Petransky ' s Stat a katolfcka cirkev na Slovensku 1945-1946 covers a brief but crucial period in church-state relations in the history of Slovakia. This was a time of transition between the wartime �SLOVAKIA 135 regime, when the Catholic Church had a rel atively pri vi leged place due to its more or less positive relations with the Tiso regime, and the Communist era, when the state brought immense press ure and control on the Church. This period has been largely ignored in the past, though increasingly it is becoming a topic of research across East Central Europe. Petransky used a number of archival sources. At the Slovak National Archive, he employed the collections of the Slovak National Council, the Commission of Education, the Commission of the Interior, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. In addition, he made significant use of diocesan archives, in partic ular those of Kosice, Banska Bystrica, and Nitra. These latter sources enabled him to present and discuss conversations that occurred within the church leadership, and he revealed some of the differences of opinion among Slovak bishops over how best to defend Catholic interests and respond to state press ures. They also provided insight into the nature of decision-making and consensus-building within the hierarchy . Among the other sources employed by Petransky are documents from the post- 1948 trial s of Catholic bishops and political leaders, documents of the Foreign Ministry pertaining to relations with the Vatican, memoirs, and articles from the press. After a brief overview of relations between church and state in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia from 191 8 to 1945, Petransky presented a narrative of developments in church-state relations during the period from the liberation of Slovakia from Nazi occupation in the spring of 1945 to the parliamentary elections of May 1946. During this period the Communists tried both to weaken the Catholic Church and its social influence, and to attract Catholics to the Communi st camp, or at least keep them away from the rival Democratic Party. Petransky's narrati ve is followed by the longest section of the book, an examination of a variety conflicts between church and state. These include the state 's attempt at a near-complete takeover of education , the outlawing of a number of Catholic organizations, restriction s on the Catholic press, state claims to the Church' s agricultural property, and the persec ution of bishops, priests, and members of reli gious orders. Petransky also examined the question of Church ties with Slovakia 's illegal underground opposition, and the Church's policies toward s the national minorities, in particular the Magyars. �136 SLOVAKIA Finally, he gave his book an international dimension by looking at the situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia from the perspectives of the Slovak emigre press and the Vatican. This book has several strengths. It keeps its focus on the issues of church-state relations, while providing sufficient context for understanding how those issues fit into the larger context of post-war Slovakia. Though the author's sympathies are clearly with the Catholics, the work remained fair to all sides. This is not simply a litany of crimes and abuses aga inst the Catholic Church, though there were enough of those. Rather, it is a serious and largely successful attempt to present and ana lyze the complex and dynamic relationship between Church , state, Catholics, and Democrats during a cruc ial period of Slovakia 's modern history. One definitely takes away from this book a deeper understanding of the period and the forces at play in it. It is to be hoped that Mr. Petransky, or someone of his caliber, writes a sequel up to the Communist takeover of February 1948. Anton Hyki sch, Ako chutf politika, Spomienky a zaznamy z rokov 1990-1992. Yydavatel'stvo Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava, 2004. 349pp. Index of names. MARCEL JESENSKY University of Ottawa The years I 990-1992 represent one of the most fascinating periods in the modern-day history of Slovakia. During the last months of 1989 the seemingly permanent political , social and eco nomi c order in Czechoslovakia disintegrated and set into motion a process of dramatic reforms that changed the lives of the majority of Slovaks and Czechs. Anton Hykisch, an acclaimed Slovak writer, Christian Democratic politician and member of parliament, and a former diplomat, presents his personal narrative of those dynamic days. He offers an analys is of Slovak society based on his personal diaries and consultations of other primary so urces. Like many of his contemporaries, Hykisch could not resist the challenges of active participation in Slovak society's revitalization and transformation. His long-cherished �SLOVAKIA 137 idea of the creation of a Christian political movement in Slovakia materialized in 1990, although not entirely according to his wishes. Should it be a movement or a political party? There was no time for such "details." Everything happened so quickly before the first free elections (since 1946) in 1990. Anton Hykisch became a member of the Slovak Parliament (SNR) for the Christian Democratic Movement (KOH), as well as a member of its Executive Council (Predsednfctvo ). In l 990-1992 Slovakia experienced its own revolution, one pertaining to its identity. What should be Slovakia's place in post-communist Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia or the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic? How could one re-formulate the relations between Slovaks and Czechs? The " revolutionaries" from the ruling VPN (Verejnost' proti nasiliu), the strongest political force in the aftermath of the " Velvet Revolution" of 1989, wished to transform Slovakia into a non-national civic society. The crowds in Brati slava that brought the "velvet revolutionaries" to power in November 1989, merely one year later denounced many of them as traitors to the Slovak national cause. What went wrong? The author believes that Slovakia experienced twin revo lutions, the "velvet" anti-communist one, as well as a national one. This was contrary to the plans and expectations of president Vaclav Havel's followers in Prague. Slovakia " wanted and had to abandon its twin yoke. ls it so difficult to understand?" (p.51) Hykisc h believes that Slovakia became a victim of the post-November 1989 myth originating in Prague. Havel and hi s colleagues dreamed of proving to the world that " their" Czechoslovakia could defy the national selfdetermination trends prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In other words, Slovaks and Czechs should demonstrate their allegedly more advanced moral and civic feelings by defying the laws and trends of national movements, the wave of creation of new national states in Europe (p.52). Slovaks and Czechs allegedly wanted to only be citizens of the world, and Czechoslovakia was merely a way-station to the " blessed civic society of the world" (p.53). To put it more bluntly, Czechoslovakia should not di sintegrate. According to Hykisch, thi s, quixotic task, dream or vision, was politically unrealistic and practically impossible. Throughout the book the reader detects the author's disappoint- �138 SLOVAKIA ment over missed opportunities. Hykisc h believes that the Christian Democrats (KOH) mishandled the question of Slovakia ' s sovereignty. "Had we (i.e. the Christian Democrats), hal f a year before the general elections of June 1992, submitted to ourselves, to our Czech partners and to the world, a serious, economically-sound plan of gradual self-determination or a plan of suitable union of Slovak and Czech states, it would not have to be done after the 1992 elections by somebody else" (p.241). The question of Slovakia's sovereignty played a decisive role in the author 's decision to eventually break with the Christian Democrats and to join a new political party , the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, led by Jan Klepac. Thi s book offers an interesting, personal , interpretation of the 1990-1992 events in Slovakia and Czechoslovakia. Anton Hykisch 's attractive literary style, as well as his informed and insightful perspecti ve, will not di sappoint those who desire to submerge themselves into the complexities of Slovakia's modern history and the deteriorating Slovak-Czech relationship of the early l 990 's. Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska. Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989-1992. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2002, 457 pp., notes, summaries in English and German, bibliography , documents, index . JURAJ HOCMAN University of Ottawa Both the " Velvet Revolution" and the "Velvet Divorce" of Czechoslovakia have fascinated many scholars and much has been written about them. After a decade had passed, Jan Rychlik published his interpretation of the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The author is a trained and experienced Czech historian who witnessed the collapse of the communist regime and the emergence of new political elites in Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1980s. He started with the so-called era of "normalization", while analyzing the reasons for the collapse of the ancien regime. He then describes the appearance of the new, inexperienced , Czech and Slovak national political elites. In his introduction Rychlfk stresses the fact that wes- �SLOVAKIA 139 tern scholars, such as Eric Stein in his Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (1997), looked at the recent events in this country from a legal perspective that lacked empathy for the overlapping, but also diverging histories of the country's constituent parts. By contrast, as Rychlfk rightly points out, it was the residua of the past, not the constitutional issues emerging in 1990-1992, that sealed the fa te of Czechoslovakia (pp.1011 ). For a good history book, however, empathy is not enough. Ryc hlfk added access to primary documents that had not been released or commented on before to hi s personal proximity to the events, which proceeded from a federation to the creation of two separate states. He strengthened his work with narrati ves stemming from interv iews wi th several prominent former di ssidents and moderate politicians such as Petr Pithart and Jan Carnogursky, for they pl ayed a deci sive role in the negotiations between the Czech and Slovak governments in the period 1990-1992. At the same time, Rychlfk demonstrates his familiarity with the sc holarly literature published in the West. While the general picture of what took place in post-communist Czechoslovakia is well-known, Rychlfk adds many detai ls to the story. First, radicals and nationalists appeared on both sides. During the constitutional crisis the names of the radical Slovak politicians were frequently reported in the media. Nevertheless, as the author shows, Jan Slota, Jan Klep ac and Stanislav Panis had their counterparts across the Morava River who voiced Czech national interests. They were Jan Kalvoda, Dagmar Buresova, Jan Bratinka, and Miroslav Macek, to name but a few. Strangely enough, Rudolf Sladek, the leader of the Republican Party , who favored , quite paradoxi cally, a common state, does not appear in the book at all. Secondly, Rychlfk poi nts out that already on November 16, 1989, university students in Slovakia had demonstrated against the regime in Bratislava, without any coordination with their Czech counterparts in Prague. This clearly showed Slovak initiati ve and courage. Thirdly, the Charta dissenters were not the only ones in Communist Czechoslovakia, though they appeared in the West as the most prominent ones. Since the mid- I 980s, there had already ex isted two �140 SLOVAKIA main groups of dissenters in Slovakia: the environmentalists, and for the communist regime the far more dangerous Catholic dissenters. Furthermore, Rychlfk cites Slovak emigre historians as well. However, he differentiates between the ' hard core' sympathizers of the J'udaks (the term describing the members of the Slovak People's Party prior to and during WWII) and of the Slovak Republic (19391945), and acceptable ' moderates '. While cliches and stereotypes regarding the past have existed on both sides, Rychlfk shows courage vis a vis his fellow citizens as this most recent perspective may still be something totally new for general Czech audiences. While the author made a sincere effort to be sy mpathetic to Slovak political objectives, there are some instances where important details are missing. For example, in the dispute over the Gabcikovo dam on the Danube between Czechoslovakia and Hungary , the author seems to have limited himself to telling only a part of the story. He sees the Gabcfkovo dispute as exclusively a Slovak problem in which the Czechs were not interested, especially in the last couple of months before the negotiated breakup (pp.308-3 I I). This is only partly true as Josef Vavrousek, the last Czechoslovak federal minister of the environment, seemed particularly keen to be engaged in the negotiations, even to lead them, when Slovak politicians already took the initiative from the federal government. Likewise, the author rightly argues that the forced expatriation of the Magyars, who had collaborated with the fascists in the Slovak (Czechoslovak) territories in 1945, which had stemmed from the Benes Decrees, had negatively affected the current Slovak - Magyar relationship. On the other hand, the author states that such a problem did not arise in the Czech lands with regard to the expulsion of the German minority (p.255). This statement, if meant as a sharp antipode to the Slovak-Magyar relationship, would deserve far more historic and contextual background. Rychlik' s book is a very solid overview of what happened in the ' heart of Europe' after the fall of communism. Due to its complex and balanced perspective, it could serve as a valuable textbook for graduate students and a good primary source for scholars dealing with the last chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 131 Jan Steinhtibe l, Nitrianske knieiatstvo: Pociatky stredovekeho Slovenska. Rozpravanie o dejinach nasho tizemia a okolitych krajfn od st!lho vania narodov do zaciatku 12. storocia. Brati slava: Veda, 2004. 575pp., bibliography, index of names, index of places, maps, photos, illustration s. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This massive sy nthesis is the culmination of fifteen years of research and publication on the ancestors of the Slovaks in Central Europe. Jan Steinhi.ibel, who works for the Historical Institute of the Sloak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, is a worthy successor to the late Peter Ratkos, the age ing Richard Marsina, and the recentl yretired Matus Kucera , all ex perts on the ancient hi story of the Slovaks. According to Ste inhtibel , the Principality of Nitra was the earliest state of the ancestors of the Slovaks. It started to form in the 6th century, and was independent from 805 to 833. After it was conquered by the nearby Moravians, it remained an important Principality until the demi se of the Great Morav ian Empire in 906. Once the Magyar Arpad dynasty establi shed itself in Central Europe in the 10th century, Nitra, which was inhabited large ly by Slavs, remained a key Principality in the emerging Hungarian Kin gdom until the beginning of the I 2th century. Prince l mri ch, ruler of Nitra and son of King (Sa int) Stephen, was even dubbed " Henricus nobilis dux Sc lavoni e" by a Polish chronicler in I029. And, as long as the Principality existed, its people were called "Nytrenses Sclavi" by Hungarian chroniclers. For three ce nturi es Nitra served as the steppingstone for the future rulers of, first Great Moravia, and later the Kingdom of Hungary. Indeed, the rul ers of Nitra were sovereign over nine counties (large ly coterminous with present-day Slovakia, with the exception of the eastern counties), commanded armies of 3,000 soldiers and often struck their own coins. Eventuall y, however, the early Kings of Hungary, who had traditionally shared their rule wi th their brothers as Princes of Nitra, came to regard this principality as a source of rebellion against them selves or their designated successsors (their leg itimate sons). As a result, in 1108 King Koloman depo- �132 SLOVAKIA sed and blinded his brother Almos, along with the latter's son, and two years later abolished the Principality, along wi th its southern border. Thereafter, medieval chroniclers referred to the local inhabitants si mply as " Sclavi ," but by the 15th century they had become "Slowak." Of course the 18th century Czech linguist Josef Dobrovsky , who claimed that the term "Slovak" or "Slovensko" were recent inventions, did not know any of this. After 336 pages of text, lavishly illustrated with relevant quotations from medieval chroniclers, Steinhiibel concluded that one can trace the beginnings of Slovak history to the Principality of Nitra. Indeed, he continued, one has to look to thi s Principality to find the national, territorial and historical roots of Slovakia. This book is a testament to the deep eruditon of the author. As the 1900 footnotes covering pages 337-495 testify, SteinhUbel mined virtually all (largely Latin) medieval sources written by German, Magyar, Polish, Czech, Ru ssian and Byzantine chroniclers that pertain to Central Europe. He also read the relevant books and articles in the vernacular languages of contemporary scholars of Central Europe and he judiciously illustrated his book with copies of medieval manuscripts , drawings and photos of artifacts. This monograph was a pleasure to read and I will eagerly mine it for relevant quotations for my course on the early history of the Slovaks. Dusan Kovac et. al. Na zaciatku storocia, 1901 -1914. Bratislava: Veda, 2004. 292 pp. , ill., index . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University This is the first of a scheduled seven volume series entitled Slovensko v 20. storoci (Slovakia in the 2(Jh Century) sponsored by the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, under the chief editorship of Dusan Kovac, a leading Slovak historian. Kovac, one of five historians who wrote chapters in this volume penned the introduction and the first "Raku sko-Uhorsko a slo venska otazka v narodnych vztahoch" (A ustria-Hungary and the Slovak Question in International Affairs) and sixth "Pred prvou svetovou vojnou" (Be- �SLOVAKIA 133 fore the First World War) chapters. Other eminent Slovak historians included in this volume are alphabetically: Roman Holec, Chapter 3 "Hospodarstvo" (Economics), Elena Jakesova, chapter 2 "Spolocnost" (Society), Elena Mannova, Chapter 7 "Ideove smery. Kulturny a spolocensky zivot" (Ideological Movements. Cultural and Social Life), and Milan Podrimavsky, Chapters 4 "Krfza liberalneho rezimu 1901-1904" (Crisis of the Liberal Regime 1901-1904) and 5 "Vyvrcholenie politickej krfzy. Koalicna vlada 1905-1910" (Culmination of the Political Crisis. The Coalition Government 1905-1910). Although only these five authors receive credit for the entries, Kovac notes that they relied on the research of another ten historians. This is the most comprehensive general history of Slovakia produced thus far. As Kovac states in his introduction, the Slovak public, and indeed the world, has not until this time possessed a true synthesized historical work written by experts. Previous attempts developed under the totalitarian regime failed to fulfill this goal because they presented distorted interpretations. Kovac hopes this and subsequent works of the series will return to the tradition of noted historian Cubomfr Liptak when he wrote his Slovensko v 20. storoci in 1968 This volume contains traditional aspects of any society, but also gives coverage to areas rarely found in general historical works such as architecture, the beaux arts, mass communication, education, the family , business, and economics . It is not intended to be an all encompassing in-depth study, but rather explores the topics with sufficient coverage without becoming too bogged down in detail. It is meant to be a starting point for further research and study , and it accomplishes this feat quite well. The fourteen years prior to the outbreak of war were a very dynamic and dramatic period, so much so that Slovakia, in the spring of 1914, was quite a different place than in1901 , especially in its urban areas. Despite the Slovaks politically and culturally waging an uphill battle against intensive Magyarization aimed at their assimilation, they fared much better than they had in 1901. The book contains information about the Slovak diaspora, including Budapest, Vienna, the United States, and the Yojvodina/Banat region. The authors explained that a general history of Slovakia and Slovaks before the First World War needs to explore territories other than that of �134 SLOVAKIA Slovakia or Upper Hungary. Indeed, during this time, the true urban center of the Slovaks was Budapest. The work also covers, in much less detail, the other inhabitants of the region including Jews, Germans, Rusyns, and Gypsies (Romany) and provides ample evidence of the ethnic plurali sm of Upper Hungary . At times, too much emphasis appears to be placed on trends and developments throughout Hungary, but, naturall y, it proves impossible to divorce Slovakia from the rest of the Lands of St. Stephen. Each chapter is broken down into numerous short subsections of several pages thereby enabling the reader to easily digest and comprehend them without becoming lost in lengthy discu ssions. Seven charts placed throughout the work and numerous photographs in five section s better illustrate and clarify the points made in the text. The bibliography is intended to be used for further study of the various issues addressed in this work. It contains older essential, fundamental works alongside newly published research. As is often the case for books published in Slovakia, this work contains an index of names, but not subjects, rendering it of marginal value. Overall, this is a fine volume that will become an accepted, starting point for anyone wishing to delve into virtually all aspects of Slovak history at the turn of the last century. Its thoughtful, well constructed chapters present information that piques the interest of the reader. If the quality of this work is upheld in the sc heduled six additional volumes, this series will prove to be a definiti ve collection. Hopefully, an English translation will follow. Ivan A. Petran sky, Stat a katolfcka cirkev na Slovensku 19451946. Nitra: Garmond, 2001, 318pp, summary in English, bibliography, index. JAMES RAMON FELAK University of Washington Ivan Petransky ' s Stat a katolfcka cirkev na Slovensku 1945-1946 covers a brief but crucial period in church-state relations in the history of Slovakia. This was a time of transition between the wartime �SLOVAKIA 135 regime, when the Catholic Church had a rel atively pri vi leged place due to its more or less positive relations with the Tiso regime, and the Communist era, when the state brought immense press ure and control on the Church. This period has been largely ignored in the past, though increasingly it is becoming a topic of research across East Central Europe. Petransky used a number of archival sources. At the Slovak National Archive, he employed the collections of the Slovak National Council, the Commission of Education, the Commission of the Interior, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. In addition, he made significant use of diocesan archives, in partic ular those of Kosice, Banska Bystrica, and Nitra. These latter sources enabled him to present and discuss conversations that occurred within the church leadership, and he revealed some of the differences of opinion among Slovak bishops over how best to defend Catholic interests and respond to state press ures. They also provided insight into the nature of decision-making and consensus-building within the hierarchy . Among the other sources employed by Petransky are documents from the post- 1948 trial s of Catholic bishops and political leaders, documents of the Foreign Ministry pertaining to relations with the Vatican, memoirs, and articles from the press. After a brief overview of relations between church and state in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia from 191 8 to 1945, Petransky presented a narrative of developments in church-state relations during the period from the liberation of Slovakia from Nazi occupation in the spring of 1945 to the parliamentary elections of May 1946. During this period the Communists tried both to weaken the Catholic Church and its social influence, and to attract Catholics to the Communi st camp, or at least keep them away from the rival Democratic Party. Petransky's narrati ve is followed by the longest section of the book, an examination of a variety conflicts between church and state. These include the state 's attempt at a near-complete takeover of education , the outlawing of a number of Catholic organizations, restriction s on the Catholic press, state claims to the Church' s agricultural property, and the persec ution of bishops, priests, and members of reli gious orders. Petransky also examined the question of Church ties with Slovakia 's illegal underground opposition, and the Church's policies toward s the national minorities, in particular the Magyars. �136 SLOVAKIA Finally, he gave his book an international dimension by looking at the situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia from the perspectives of the Slovak emigre press and the Vatican. This book has several strengths. It keeps its focus on the issues of church-state relations, while providing sufficient context for understanding how those issues fit into the larger context of post-war Slovakia. Though the author's sympathies are clearly with the Catholics, the work remained fair to all sides. This is not simply a litany of crimes and abuses aga inst the Catholic Church, though there were enough of those. Rather, it is a serious and largely successful attempt to present and ana lyze the complex and dynamic relationship between Church , state, Catholics, and Democrats during a cruc ial period of Slovakia 's modern history. One definitely takes away from this book a deeper understanding of the period and the forces at play in it. It is to be hoped that Mr. Petransky, or someone of his caliber, writes a sequel up to the Communist takeover of February 1948. Anton Hyki sch, Ako chutf politika, Spomienky a zaznamy z rokov 1990-1992. Yydavatel'stvo Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava, 2004. 349pp. Index of names. MARCEL JESENSKY University of Ottawa The years I 990-1992 represent one of the most fascinating periods in the modern-day history of Slovakia. During the last months of 1989 the seemingly permanent political , social and eco nomi c order in Czechoslovakia disintegrated and set into motion a process of dramatic reforms that changed the lives of the majority of Slovaks and Czechs. Anton Hykisch, an acclaimed Slovak writer, Christian Democratic politician and member of parliament, and a former diplomat, presents his personal narrative of those dynamic days. He offers an analys is of Slovak society based on his personal diaries and consultations of other primary so urces. Like many of his contemporaries, Hykisch could not resist the challenges of active participation in Slovak society's revitalization and transformation. His long-cherished �SLOVAKIA 137 idea of the creation of a Christian political movement in Slovakia materialized in 1990, although not entirely according to his wishes. Should it be a movement or a political party? There was no time for such "details." Everything happened so quickly before the first free elections (since 1946) in 1990. Anton Hykisch became a member of the Slovak Parliament (SNR) for the Christian Democratic Movement (KOH), as well as a member of its Executive Council (Predsednfctvo ). In l 990-1992 Slovakia experienced its own revolution, one pertaining to its identity. What should be Slovakia's place in post-communist Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia or the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic? How could one re-formulate the relations between Slovaks and Czechs? The " revolutionaries" from the ruling VPN (Verejnost' proti nasiliu), the strongest political force in the aftermath of the " Velvet Revolution" of 1989, wished to transform Slovakia into a non-national civic society. The crowds in Brati slava that brought the "velvet revolutionaries" to power in November 1989, merely one year later denounced many of them as traitors to the Slovak national cause. What went wrong? The author believes that Slovakia experienced twin revo lutions, the "velvet" anti-communist one, as well as a national one. This was contrary to the plans and expectations of president Vaclav Havel's followers in Prague. Slovakia " wanted and had to abandon its twin yoke. ls it so difficult to understand?" (p.51) Hykisc h believes that Slovakia became a victim of the post-November 1989 myth originating in Prague. Havel and hi s colleagues dreamed of proving to the world that " their" Czechoslovakia could defy the national selfdetermination trends prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In other words, Slovaks and Czechs should demonstrate their allegedly more advanced moral and civic feelings by defying the laws and trends of national movements, the wave of creation of new national states in Europe (p.52). Slovaks and Czechs allegedly wanted to only be citizens of the world, and Czechoslovakia was merely a way-station to the " blessed civic society of the world" (p.53). To put it more bluntly, Czechoslovakia should not di sintegrate. According to Hykisch, thi s, quixotic task, dream or vision, was politically unrealistic and practically impossible. Throughout the book the reader detects the author's disappoint- �138 SLOVAKIA ment over missed opportunities. Hykisc h believes that the Christian Democrats (KOH) mishandled the question of Slovakia ' s sovereignty. "Had we (i.e. the Christian Democrats), hal f a year before the general elections of June 1992, submitted to ourselves, to our Czech partners and to the world, a serious, economically-sound plan of gradual self-determination or a plan of suitable union of Slovak and Czech states, it would not have to be done after the 1992 elections by somebody else" (p.241). The question of Slovakia's sovereignty played a decisive role in the author 's decision to eventually break with the Christian Democrats and to join a new political party , the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, led by Jan Klepac. Thi s book offers an interesting, personal , interpretation of the 1990-1992 events in Slovakia and Czechoslovakia. Anton Hykisch 's attractive literary style, as well as his informed and insightful perspecti ve, will not di sappoint those who desire to submerge themselves into the complexities of Slovakia's modern history and the deteriorating Slovak-Czech relationship of the early l 990 's. Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska. Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989-1992. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2002, 457 pp., notes, summaries in English and German, bibliography , documents, index . JURAJ HOCMAN University of Ottawa Both the " Velvet Revolution" and the "Velvet Divorce" of Czechoslovakia have fascinated many scholars and much has been written about them. After a decade had passed, Jan Rychlik published his interpretation of the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The author is a trained and experienced Czech historian who witnessed the collapse of the communist regime and the emergence of new political elites in Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1980s. He started with the so-called era of "normalization", while analyzing the reasons for the collapse of the ancien regime. He then describes the appearance of the new, inexperienced , Czech and Slovak national political elites. In his introduction Rychlfk stresses the fact that wes- �SLOVAKIA 139 tern scholars, such as Eric Stein in his Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (1997), looked at the recent events in this country from a legal perspective that lacked empathy for the overlapping, but also diverging histories of the country's constituent parts. By contrast, as Rychlfk rightly points out, it was the residua of the past, not the constitutional issues emerging in 1990-1992, that sealed the fa te of Czechoslovakia (pp.1011 ). For a good history book, however, empathy is not enough. Ryc hlfk added access to primary documents that had not been released or commented on before to hi s personal proximity to the events, which proceeded from a federation to the creation of two separate states. He strengthened his work with narrati ves stemming from interv iews wi th several prominent former di ssidents and moderate politicians such as Petr Pithart and Jan Carnogursky, for they pl ayed a deci sive role in the negotiations between the Czech and Slovak governments in the period 1990-1992. At the same time, Rychlfk demonstrates his familiarity with the sc holarly literature published in the West. While the general picture of what took place in post-communist Czechoslovakia is well-known, Rychlfk adds many detai ls to the story. First, radicals and nationalists appeared on both sides. During the constitutional crisis the names of the radical Slovak politicians were frequently reported in the media. Nevertheless, as the author shows, Jan Slota, Jan Klep ac and Stanislav Panis had their counterparts across the Morava River who voiced Czech national interests. They were Jan Kalvoda, Dagmar Buresova, Jan Bratinka, and Miroslav Macek, to name but a few. Strangely enough, Rudolf Sladek, the leader of the Republican Party , who favored , quite paradoxi cally, a common state, does not appear in the book at all. Secondly, Rychlfk poi nts out that already on November 16, 1989, university students in Slovakia had demonstrated against the regime in Bratislava, without any coordination with their Czech counterparts in Prague. This clearly showed Slovak initiati ve and courage. Thirdly, the Charta dissenters were not the only ones in Communist Czechoslovakia, though they appeared in the West as the most prominent ones. Since the mid- I 980s, there had already ex isted two �140 SLOVAKIA main groups of dissenters in Slovakia: the environmentalists, and for the communist regime the far more dangerous Catholic dissenters. Furthermore, Rychlfk cites Slovak emigre historians as well. However, he differentiates between the ' hard core' sympathizers of the J'udaks (the term describing the members of the Slovak People's Party prior to and during WWII) and of the Slovak Republic (19391945), and acceptable ' moderates '. While cliches and stereotypes regarding the past have existed on both sides, Rychlfk shows courage vis a vis his fellow citizens as this most recent perspective may still be something totally new for general Czech audiences. While the author made a sincere effort to be sy mpathetic to Slovak political objectives, there are some instances where important details are missing. For example, in the dispute over the Gabcikovo dam on the Danube between Czechoslovakia and Hungary , the author seems to have limited himself to telling only a part of the story. He sees the Gabcfkovo dispute as exclusively a Slovak problem in which the Czechs were not interested, especially in the last couple of months before the negotiated breakup (pp.308-3 I I). This is only partly true as Josef Vavrousek, the last Czechoslovak federal minister of the environment, seemed particularly keen to be engaged in the negotiations, even to lead them, when Slovak politicians already took the initiative from the federal government. Likewise, the author rightly argues that the forced expatriation of the Magyars, who had collaborated with the fascists in the Slovak (Czechoslovak) territories in 1945, which had stemmed from the Benes Decrees, had negatively affected the current Slovak - Magyar relationship. On the other hand, the author states that such a problem did not arise in the Czech lands with regard to the expulsion of the German minority (p.255). This statement, if meant as a sharp antipode to the Slovak-Magyar relationship, would deserve far more historic and contextual background. Rychlik' s book is a very solid overview of what happened in the ' heart of Europe' after the fall of communism. Due to its complex and balanced perspective, it could serve as a valuable textbook for graduate students and a good primary source for scholars dealing with the last chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2007, Vol. 39 Description An account of the resource Vol. 39 (No. 72-73), 2007. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 131 Jan Steinhtibe l, Nitrianske knieiatstvo: Pociatky stredovekeho Slovenska. Rozpravanie o dejinach nasho tizemia a okolitych krajfn od st!lho vania narodov do zaciatku 12. storocia. Brati slava: Veda, 2004. 575pp., bibliography, index of names, index of places, maps, photos, illustration s. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This massive sy nthesis is the culmination of fifteen years of research and publication on the ancestors of the Slovaks in Central Europe. Jan Steinhi.ibel, who works for the Historical Institute of the Sloak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, is a worthy successor to the late Peter Ratkos, the age ing Richard Marsina, and the recentl yretired Matus Kucera , all ex perts on the ancient hi story of the Slovaks. According to Ste inhtibel , the Principality of Nitra was the earliest state of the ancestors of the Slovaks. It started to form in the 6th century, and was independent from 805 to 833. After it was conquered by the nearby Moravians, it remained an important Principality until the demi se of the Great Morav ian Empire in 906. Once the Magyar Arpad dynasty establi shed itself in Central Europe in the 10th century, Nitra, which was inhabited large ly by Slavs, remained a key Principality in the emerging Hungarian Kin gdom until the beginning of the I 2th century. Prince l mri ch, ruler of Nitra and son of King (Sa int) Stephen, was even dubbed " Henricus nobilis dux Sc lavoni e" by a Polish chronicler in I029. And, as long as the Principality existed, its people were called "Nytrenses Sclavi" by Hungarian chroniclers. For three ce nturi es Nitra served as the steppingstone for the future rulers of, first Great Moravia, and later the Kingdom of Hungary. Indeed, the rul ers of Nitra were sovereign over nine counties (large ly coterminous with present-day Slovakia, with the exception of the eastern counties), commanded armies of 3,000 soldiers and often struck their own coins. Eventuall y, however, the early Kings of Hungary, who had traditionally shared their rule wi th their brothers as Princes of Nitra, came to regard this principality as a source of rebellion against them selves or their designated successsors (their leg itimate sons). As a result, in 1108 King Koloman depo- 132 SLOVAKIA sed and blinded his brother Almos, along with the latter's son, and two years later abolished the Principality, along wi th its southern border. Thereafter, medieval chroniclers referred to the local inhabitants si mply as " Sclavi ," but by the 15th century they had become "Slowak." Of course the 18th century Czech linguist Josef Dobrovsky , who claimed that the term "Slovak" or "Slovensko" were recent inventions, did not know any of this. After 336 pages of text, lavishly illustrated with relevant quotations from medieval chroniclers, Steinhiibel concluded that one can trace the beginnings of Slovak history to the Principality of Nitra. Indeed, he continued, one has to look to thi s Principality to find the national, territorial and historical roots of Slovakia. This book is a testament to the deep eruditon of the author. As the 1900 footnotes covering pages 337-495 testify, SteinhUbel mined virtually all (largely Latin) medieval sources written by German, Magyar, Polish, Czech, Ru ssian and Byzantine chroniclers that pertain to Central Europe. He also read the relevant books and articles in the vernacular languages of contemporary scholars of Central Europe and he judiciously illustrated his book with copies of medieval manuscripts , drawings and photos of artifacts. This monograph was a pleasure to read and I will eagerly mine it for relevant quotations for my course on the early history of the Slovaks. Dusan Kovac et. al. Na zaciatku storocia, 1901 -1914. Bratislava: Veda, 2004. 292 pp. , ill., index . GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University This is the first of a scheduled seven volume series entitled Slovensko v 20. storoci (Slovakia in the 2(Jh Century) sponsored by the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, under the chief editorship of Dusan Kovac, a leading Slovak historian. Kovac, one of five historians who wrote chapters in this volume penned the introduction and the first "Raku sko-Uhorsko a slo venska otazka v narodnych vztahoch" (A ustria-Hungary and the Slovak Question in International Affairs) and sixth "Pred prvou svetovou vojnou" (Be- SLOVAKIA 133 fore the First World War) chapters. Other eminent Slovak historians included in this volume are alphabetically: Roman Holec, Chapter 3 "Hospodarstvo" (Economics), Elena Jakesova, chapter 2 "Spolocnost" (Society), Elena Mannova, Chapter 7 "Ideove smery. Kulturny a spolocensky zivot" (Ideological Movements. Cultural and Social Life), and Milan Podrimavsky, Chapters 4 "Krfza liberalneho rezimu 1901-1904" (Crisis of the Liberal Regime 1901-1904) and 5 "Vyvrcholenie politickej krfzy. Koalicna vlada 1905-1910" (Culmination of the Political Crisis. The Coalition Government 1905-1910). Although only these five authors receive credit for the entries, Kovac notes that they relied on the research of another ten historians. This is the most comprehensive general history of Slovakia produced thus far. As Kovac states in his introduction, the Slovak public, and indeed the world, has not until this time possessed a true synthesized historical work written by experts. Previous attempts developed under the totalitarian regime failed to fulfill this goal because they presented distorted interpretations. Kovac hopes this and subsequent works of the series will return to the tradition of noted historian Cubomfr Liptak when he wrote his Slovensko v 20. storoci in 1968 This volume contains traditional aspects of any society, but also gives coverage to areas rarely found in general historical works such as architecture, the beaux arts, mass communication, education, the family , business, and economics . It is not intended to be an all encompassing in-depth study, but rather explores the topics with sufficient coverage without becoming too bogged down in detail. It is meant to be a starting point for further research and study , and it accomplishes this feat quite well. The fourteen years prior to the outbreak of war were a very dynamic and dramatic period, so much so that Slovakia, in the spring of 1914, was quite a different place than in1901 , especially in its urban areas. Despite the Slovaks politically and culturally waging an uphill battle against intensive Magyarization aimed at their assimilation, they fared much better than they had in 1901. The book contains information about the Slovak diaspora, including Budapest, Vienna, the United States, and the Yojvodina/Banat region. The authors explained that a general history of Slovakia and Slovaks before the First World War needs to explore territories other than that of 134 SLOVAKIA Slovakia or Upper Hungary. Indeed, during this time, the true urban center of the Slovaks was Budapest. The work also covers, in much less detail, the other inhabitants of the region including Jews, Germans, Rusyns, and Gypsies (Romany) and provides ample evidence of the ethnic plurali sm of Upper Hungary . At times, too much emphasis appears to be placed on trends and developments throughout Hungary, but, naturall y, it proves impossible to divorce Slovakia from the rest of the Lands of St. Stephen. Each chapter is broken down into numerous short subsections of several pages thereby enabling the reader to easily digest and comprehend them without becoming lost in lengthy discu ssions. Seven charts placed throughout the work and numerous photographs in five section s better illustrate and clarify the points made in the text. The bibliography is intended to be used for further study of the various issues addressed in this work. It contains older essential, fundamental works alongside newly published research. As is often the case for books published in Slovakia, this work contains an index of names, but not subjects, rendering it of marginal value. Overall, this is a fine volume that will become an accepted, starting point for anyone wishing to delve into virtually all aspects of Slovak history at the turn of the last century. Its thoughtful, well constructed chapters present information that piques the interest of the reader. If the quality of this work is upheld in the sc heduled six additional volumes, this series will prove to be a definiti ve collection. Hopefully, an English translation will follow. Ivan A. Petran sky, Stat a katolfcka cirkev na Slovensku 19451946. Nitra: Garmond, 2001, 318pp, summary in English, bibliography, index. JAMES RAMON FELAK University of Washington Ivan Petransky ' s Stat a katolfcka cirkev na Slovensku 1945-1946 covers a brief but crucial period in church-state relations in the history of Slovakia. This was a time of transition between the wartime SLOVAKIA 135 regime, when the Catholic Church had a rel atively pri vi leged place due to its more or less positive relations with the Tiso regime, and the Communist era, when the state brought immense press ure and control on the Church. This period has been largely ignored in the past, though increasingly it is becoming a topic of research across East Central Europe. Petransky used a number of archival sources. At the Slovak National Archive, he employed the collections of the Slovak National Council, the Commission of Education, the Commission of the Interior, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia. In addition, he made significant use of diocesan archives, in partic ular those of Kosice, Banska Bystrica, and Nitra. These latter sources enabled him to present and discuss conversations that occurred within the church leadership, and he revealed some of the differences of opinion among Slovak bishops over how best to defend Catholic interests and respond to state press ures. They also provided insight into the nature of decision-making and consensus-building within the hierarchy . Among the other sources employed by Petransky are documents from the post- 1948 trial s of Catholic bishops and political leaders, documents of the Foreign Ministry pertaining to relations with the Vatican, memoirs, and articles from the press. After a brief overview of relations between church and state in Czechoslovakia and Slovakia from 191 8 to 1945, Petransky presented a narrative of developments in church-state relations during the period from the liberation of Slovakia from Nazi occupation in the spring of 1945 to the parliamentary elections of May 1946. During this period the Communists tried both to weaken the Catholic Church and its social influence, and to attract Catholics to the Communi st camp, or at least keep them away from the rival Democratic Party. Petransky's narrati ve is followed by the longest section of the book, an examination of a variety conflicts between church and state. These include the state 's attempt at a near-complete takeover of education , the outlawing of a number of Catholic organizations, restriction s on the Catholic press, state claims to the Church' s agricultural property, and the persec ution of bishops, priests, and members of reli gious orders. Petransky also examined the question of Church ties with Slovakia 's illegal underground opposition, and the Church's policies toward s the national minorities, in particular the Magyars. 136 SLOVAKIA Finally, he gave his book an international dimension by looking at the situation of the Catholic Church in Slovakia from the perspectives of the Slovak emigre press and the Vatican. This book has several strengths. It keeps its focus on the issues of church-state relations, while providing sufficient context for understanding how those issues fit into the larger context of post-war Slovakia. Though the author's sympathies are clearly with the Catholics, the work remained fair to all sides. This is not simply a litany of crimes and abuses aga inst the Catholic Church, though there were enough of those. Rather, it is a serious and largely successful attempt to present and ana lyze the complex and dynamic relationship between Church , state, Catholics, and Democrats during a cruc ial period of Slovakia 's modern history. One definitely takes away from this book a deeper understanding of the period and the forces at play in it. It is to be hoped that Mr. Petransky, or someone of his caliber, writes a sequel up to the Communist takeover of February 1948. Anton Hyki sch, Ako chutf politika, Spomienky a zaznamy z rokov 1990-1992. Yydavatel'stvo Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava, 2004. 349pp. Index of names. MARCEL JESENSKY University of Ottawa The years I 990-1992 represent one of the most fascinating periods in the modern-day history of Slovakia. During the last months of 1989 the seemingly permanent political , social and eco nomi c order in Czechoslovakia disintegrated and set into motion a process of dramatic reforms that changed the lives of the majority of Slovaks and Czechs. Anton Hykisch, an acclaimed Slovak writer, Christian Democratic politician and member of parliament, and a former diplomat, presents his personal narrative of those dynamic days. He offers an analys is of Slovak society based on his personal diaries and consultations of other primary so urces. Like many of his contemporaries, Hykisch could not resist the challenges of active participation in Slovak society's revitalization and transformation. His long-cherished SLOVAKIA 137 idea of the creation of a Christian political movement in Slovakia materialized in 1990, although not entirely according to his wishes. Should it be a movement or a political party? There was no time for such "details." Everything happened so quickly before the first free elections (since 1946) in 1990. Anton Hykisch became a member of the Slovak Parliament (SNR) for the Christian Democratic Movement (KOH), as well as a member of its Executive Council (Predsednfctvo ). In l 990-1992 Slovakia experienced its own revolution, one pertaining to its identity. What should be Slovakia's place in post-communist Czechoslovakia, Czecho-Slovakia or the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic? How could one re-formulate the relations between Slovaks and Czechs? The " revolutionaries" from the ruling VPN (Verejnost' proti nasiliu), the strongest political force in the aftermath of the " Velvet Revolution" of 1989, wished to transform Slovakia into a non-national civic society. The crowds in Brati slava that brought the "velvet revolutionaries" to power in November 1989, merely one year later denounced many of them as traitors to the Slovak national cause. What went wrong? The author believes that Slovakia experienced twin revo lutions, the "velvet" anti-communist one, as well as a national one. This was contrary to the plans and expectations of president Vaclav Havel's followers in Prague. Slovakia " wanted and had to abandon its twin yoke. ls it so difficult to understand?" (p.51) Hykisc h believes that Slovakia became a victim of the post-November 1989 myth originating in Prague. Havel and hi s colleagues dreamed of proving to the world that " their" Czechoslovakia could defy the national selfdetermination trends prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. In other words, Slovaks and Czechs should demonstrate their allegedly more advanced moral and civic feelings by defying the laws and trends of national movements, the wave of creation of new national states in Europe (p.52). Slovaks and Czechs allegedly wanted to only be citizens of the world, and Czechoslovakia was merely a way-station to the " blessed civic society of the world" (p.53). To put it more bluntly, Czechoslovakia should not di sintegrate. According to Hykisch, thi s, quixotic task, dream or vision, was politically unrealistic and practically impossible. Throughout the book the reader detects the author's disappoint- 138 SLOVAKIA ment over missed opportunities. Hykisc h believes that the Christian Democrats (KOH) mishandled the question of Slovakia ' s sovereignty. "Had we (i.e. the Christian Democrats), hal f a year before the general elections of June 1992, submitted to ourselves, to our Czech partners and to the world, a serious, economically-sound plan of gradual self-determination or a plan of suitable union of Slovak and Czech states, it would not have to be done after the 1992 elections by somebody else" (p.241). The question of Slovakia's sovereignty played a decisive role in the author 's decision to eventually break with the Christian Democrats and to join a new political party , the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement, led by Jan Klepac. Thi s book offers an interesting, personal , interpretation of the 1990-1992 events in Slovakia and Czechoslovakia. Anton Hykisch 's attractive literary style, as well as his informed and insightful perspecti ve, will not di sappoint those who desire to submerge themselves into the complexities of Slovakia's modern history and the deteriorating Slovak-Czech relationship of the early l 990 's. Jan Rychlfk, Rozpad Ceskoslovenska. Cesko-slovenske vztahy 1989-1992. Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 2002, 457 pp., notes, summaries in English and German, bibliography , documents, index . JURAJ HOCMAN University of Ottawa Both the " Velvet Revolution" and the "Velvet Divorce" of Czechoslovakia have fascinated many scholars and much has been written about them. After a decade had passed, Jan Rychlik published his interpretation of the breakup of Czechoslovakia. The author is a trained and experienced Czech historian who witnessed the collapse of the communist regime and the emergence of new political elites in Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1980s. He started with the so-called era of "normalization", while analyzing the reasons for the collapse of the ancien regime. He then describes the appearance of the new, inexperienced , Czech and Slovak national political elites. In his introduction Rychlfk stresses the fact that wes- SLOVAKIA 139 tern scholars, such as Eric Stein in his Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (1997), looked at the recent events in this country from a legal perspective that lacked empathy for the overlapping, but also diverging histories of the country's constituent parts. By contrast, as Rychlfk rightly points out, it was the residua of the past, not the constitutional issues emerging in 1990-1992, that sealed the fa te of Czechoslovakia (pp.1011 ). For a good history book, however, empathy is not enough. Ryc hlfk added access to primary documents that had not been released or commented on before to hi s personal proximity to the events, which proceeded from a federation to the creation of two separate states. He strengthened his work with narrati ves stemming from interv iews wi th several prominent former di ssidents and moderate politicians such as Petr Pithart and Jan Carnogursky, for they pl ayed a deci sive role in the negotiations between the Czech and Slovak governments in the period 1990-1992. At the same time, Rychlfk demonstrates his familiarity with the sc holarly literature published in the West. While the general picture of what took place in post-communist Czechoslovakia is well-known, Rychlfk adds many detai ls to the story. First, radicals and nationalists appeared on both sides. During the constitutional crisis the names of the radical Slovak politicians were frequently reported in the media. Nevertheless, as the author shows, Jan Slota, Jan Klep ac and Stanislav Panis had their counterparts across the Morava River who voiced Czech national interests. They were Jan Kalvoda, Dagmar Buresova, Jan Bratinka, and Miroslav Macek, to name but a few. Strangely enough, Rudolf Sladek, the leader of the Republican Party , who favored , quite paradoxi cally, a common state, does not appear in the book at all. Secondly, Rychlfk poi nts out that already on November 16, 1989, university students in Slovakia had demonstrated against the regime in Bratislava, without any coordination with their Czech counterparts in Prague. This clearly showed Slovak initiati ve and courage. Thirdly, the Charta dissenters were not the only ones in Communist Czechoslovakia, though they appeared in the West as the most prominent ones. Since the mid- I 980s, there had already ex isted two 140 SLOVAKIA main groups of dissenters in Slovakia: the environmentalists, and for the communist regime the far more dangerous Catholic dissenters. Furthermore, Rychlfk cites Slovak emigre historians as well. However, he differentiates between the ' hard core' sympathizers of the J'udaks (the term describing the members of the Slovak People's Party prior to and during WWII) and of the Slovak Republic (19391945), and acceptable ' moderates '. While cliches and stereotypes regarding the past have existed on both sides, Rychlfk shows courage vis a vis his fellow citizens as this most recent perspective may still be something totally new for general Czech audiences. While the author made a sincere effort to be sy mpathetic to Slovak political objectives, there are some instances where important details are missing. For example, in the dispute over the Gabcikovo dam on the Danube between Czechoslovakia and Hungary , the author seems to have limited himself to telling only a part of the story. He sees the Gabcfkovo dispute as exclusively a Slovak problem in which the Czechs were not interested, especially in the last couple of months before the negotiated breakup (pp.308-3 I I). This is only partly true as Josef Vavrousek, the last Czechoslovak federal minister of the environment, seemed particularly keen to be engaged in the negotiations, even to lead them, when Slovak politicians already took the initiative from the federal government. Likewise, the author rightly argues that the forced expatriation of the Magyars, who had collaborated with the fascists in the Slovak (Czechoslovak) territories in 1945, which had stemmed from the Benes Decrees, had negatively affected the current Slovak - Magyar relationship. On the other hand, the author states that such a problem did not arise in the Czech lands with regard to the expulsion of the German minority (p.255). This statement, if meant as a sharp antipode to the Slovak-Magyar relationship, would deserve far more historic and contextual background. Rychlik' s book is a very solid overview of what happened in the ' heart of Europe' after the fall of communism. Due to its complex and balanced perspective, it could serve as a valuable textbook for graduate students and a good primary source for scholars dealing with the last chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Books Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 39 (No. 72-73) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Ján Steinhübel, Nitrianske kniežatstvo: Počiatky stredovekého Slovenska (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 131</li> <li>Dušan Kováč et. al., Na začiatku storočia, 1901-1914 (Gregory C. Ference), p. 132</li> <li>Ivan A. Petranský, Štát a katolícka cirkev na Slovensku 1945-1946 (James Ramon Felak), p. 134</li> <li>Anton Hykisch, Ako chutí politika, Spomienky a záznamy z rokov 1990-1992 (Marcel Jesenský), p. 136</li> <li>Jan Rychlík, Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vztahy 1989-1992 (Juraj Hocman), p. 138</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Felak, James Ramon, 1957- Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Hocman, Juraj Jesenský, Marcel Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2007 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2665a947275bb254be9e3a566380943b.pdf 735a3280b60052bd52944c0d480379ca PDF Text Text 112 SLOVAKIA The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs By Paul F e n c h a k In Dickens' novel Oliver Twist, Jack Dawkins, called the Artful Dodger, is a teacher - albeit one who taught the art of pickpocketing to innocent youngsters such as Oliver Twist. His motive: personal gain. The writer of this article is convinced that the counterparts of the Artful Dodger are today directing ethnic studies programs in the public schools of the United States. Seemingly they are no more altruistic towards needful ethnic groups in America than the Artful Dodger was toward the welfare of Oliver Twist. Formulators of ethnic studies programs dodge no small number of ethnic groups as they label "minority groups" to the Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and Orientals. Frequently space is also given to Jews, Germans, Italians, and Poles. Scholars who would talk of Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Rumanians, among others, are judged to be divining in some dark, mysterious regions, presided over by pagan gods who, midst Gog and Magog, are all agog in exotic studies about areas considered to be "powder kegs" and "tinderboxes" - "balkanized" beyond comprehension to sensible people. The powerful National Education Association boasts of having a "strong program to improve the lot of minority groups, including Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and other bi-lingual groups." Often Croatians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Finns, et al., are more bi-lingual than some groups cited by the NEA, yet the amount of coverage given East European-Americ ans is usually nil. In 1972 the writer wrote the State Superintendents of Schools of the fifty state education departments requesting copies of curriculum guides, brochures, bulletins, etc., �SLOVAKIA 113 dealing with racial, cultural, multi-cultural, inter-cultural, disadvantaged, etc., matters of ethnics in America. For sundry reasons the responses were not rapid in arriving. To date 24 of 50 state education departments have either forwarded materials or have indicated that materials will be forthcoming. In summary of the vast amount of ethnic studies promoted by state education departments, one conclusion can easily be made: East European ethnics do not exist in the United States. Even Pennsylvania, the most Slavic of the fifty states, with fraternal, religious, and educational institutions located throughout the commonwealth in large numbers, is guilty of producing ethnic materials that are absolutely ignominous to the mass of citizens of East European ancestry living within the state. In Pennsylvania one need just travel from town to town, stopping to examine the names of those who served and those who died for the United States in both World Wars, as registered on community Honor Rolls. Seemingly then, the non-sense of excluding East Europeans would end - and even the very productive efforts of these peoples in the mines, mills, and farms, in athletics, in scholarship, and in good citizenship would then be recognized. The map of Pennsylvania already recognizes these peoples: Mazeppa, Kossuth, Pulaski, Po1and Mines, Dalmatia, Zelienople, Gallitzin, Livonia, St. Petersburg, and Slovan, among others. The bulk of the state curriculum guides, with Texas being a noteworthy exception, on ethnic and racial/cultural studies focus on the groups cited by the National Education Association: Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-Americans. Orientals and Jews are reasonably well-covered as are Italians, Irish, English, Germans, and French. It is always interesting to observe how state and local education experts use the term "minority group." One county in Maryland that contains thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, et al., admits having "5,603 black students and another 706 pupils from various other minority groups." The thruth is that in most states the term "minority groups" as presented in curriculum guides excludes Americans of East European ancestry and consequently millions of Americans are being denied the �114 SLOVAKIA opportunity of studying their heritages. Likewise, they are being denied opportunity in employment quests and, worst of all, some Americans are being deprived of the opportunity of attaining optimum psychological and emotional growth. Whereas the successful guidance counselor can help students to correctly answer the important question, "Whom am I?," counselors rarely talk about, or know anything about, Slavic languages, Finno-Ugric languages, Baltic languages, etc. But it is ever so fashionable in American schools to talk about the pleasantries of French, Spanish, German, and Latin. Evidently one of the major problems in education re ethnics is that the artful dodgers are not honest enough to admit that they need re-trained in order to be able to properly assemble the American mosaic. How many Slavic-Americans live in Peoria, Illinois? Frankly, the writer doesn't know, yet he assumes that in an industrial area of ca. 150,000 some Croatians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Poles, et al., do live and work. (All cities always have Russans!) Given the resources of the Peoria educational system the writer could develop reasonably accurate projections of the ethnic composition for Peoria; the same could be done for Paducah, Kentucky, or Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Why then the mystique about the manifold ethnic groups that comprise America? It appears that our ethnic directors are hiding and confusing issues. They are run by a system that relegated East Europeans. How negatively runs the cross-examination when an East European scholar seeks to get more considerations from librarians, curriculum directors, supervisors, administrators, editors, and other educators. Sooner or later the question emerges: How many Ukrainians (Czechs, Finns, et. al.) are then in Peoria? Yet these same specialists are able to calculate that there are certain numbers of Blacks and Spanish~speaking in their areas. How strange! The writer has heard this tactic so many times that he refuses to dignify such questions, presenting instead a general response that there are many Slavs, Finno-Ugrics, Baltics, etc., in a political sub-division, if such is the case. If the specialist is persistent in wanting to know the exact number of Czechs in Peoria, the writer usually asks .the specialist to secure �SLOVAKIA 115 that data for him, using the resources of people who should know. It is patently obvious that ethnic analysts do not want t o know how many East European-Americans live in various communities, as there is absolutely nothing stopping them from researching such data for East Europeans. The Texas Education Agency is to be commended for having produced an interesting curriculum guide: Czecho-Slovakia: Information Minimum. This booklet (71 pages) contains important facts about Czecho-Slovakia, especially as they relate to the history and culture of the United States. With its excellent maps, drawings, alphabets, data summaries, etc., it is the type of guide needed by more groups in more states. Unfortunately, of the 24 states that responded with materials, only Texas submitted any recognizable booklet doing justice to East Europeans. The catty Polish jokes seem to have nine lives. In years gone by the same tripe was slurred against Jews, Italians, and Irish. Yet the time length of the ethnic joke being in vogue was never so long. The Polish joke has been in circulation so long now that it is possible that a student my have entered kindergarten, completed grade school and junior high school, and have been graduated from high school while hearing no ethnic jokes other than the Polish variety. The tragedy of this attitude is supported by the extremely weak collection of literature available about East European peoples in American schools. This despite the fact that there are in America today some 35,000,000 Americans of East European ancestry. A stigma of the Polish joke is that some Americans who are not Poles also are labelled as Poles for purposes of jibing, e.g., the writer's daughter who as a third grade student was continually chided by her WASP classmates as being "Polish." "No need to explain that you are a Ukrainian-Slovak-American, Marcia! You're Polish! Ha! Ha! Ha!" (Marcia learned how to counter such diatribes by asking, "How many of you know Polish?" Response: "None of us." "How does it feel to be dumber than a Pole?") This is cited as the last Polish joke. That "Russian" studies receive top billing in American �116 SLOVAKIA schools goes without saying. Soviet Life is the most popular periodical in school libraries, so from such "reliable" sources students learn how the Germans killed 10,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, as an article early in 1971 indicated. After reading the Soviet account of how the Germans killed the Polish officers, the author wrote a letter to Soviet Life asking how accusations against the Russians can be disproved. Nicholai Zhiltsov, managing editor of Soviet Life, submitted the following reply on June 1, 1971: "Please excuse the delay in answering your letter which we have forwarded to our Moscow Editorial Board for their comments." Needless to say, by late 1973 a reply has not yet arrived. Barbara Mikulski, Polish-American and member of the City Council of Baltimore, spoke clearly and honestly about many situations when she stated, "When we ask for something, we are either put off, put out, or put down." Ask for books for the library and the librarian will write off your requests as "Not in Books in Print." Ask that East European specialists be invited to participate in social studies workshops, and your letter goes unanswered. Suggest that an Ethnic Library be started, with coverage for all ethnics, and again your letter is unanswered. Apply for a position in human relations and you are told that the emphasis is on black studies. Period. A frequently used dodge by curriculum formulators is the statement that they do not desire to approach East European studies, as, if they do, then it will be necessary to analyze all other ethnic groups in the United States. In a sense this attitude translates as "East Europeans don't burn, don't riot, don't act like rowdies ... so nobody pays any attention to them." That deceit shows through current ethnic analyses is obvious enough as in legal provisions for the teaching about ethnic studies in most states, no groups are expressly excluded. When prices in America continue to skyrocket as a result of expanded trade with East European nations, a need for better understanding about East Europeans is more imperative than ever. The current campaign by Jews in America to identify the lack of liberties accorded their brethre.n in the Soviet Union could in some ways be made �SLOVAKIA 117 to appear rather miniscule if injustices perpetrated against Slovaks, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, et. al., were similarly examined. Freedom still remains undebatable despite the economic strategems of government and big business. At home, one of principal educational problems may be that big business is too much in the saddle in influencing ethnic studies programs. No champions from business arose to exhort the cause of ethnics when the Schweiker ethnic studies bill was not approved for funding by tlie White House, yet industrial support was hardly lacking for both parties. Michael Novak in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics speaks of the possibility of Blacks and ethnics forming a coalition for mutual gain. It cannot be assumed that because Blacks have been afforded study programs and given some economic assistance, that power groups in America are genuinely interested in their welfare. Nobody volunteered any help to the Blacks and it can be reasonably assumed that nothing will be given East Europeans unless they demand considerations. One of the greatest problems confronting East Europeans is that textbook purchasers know too little about non-Russian-oriented publications; they buy primarily from the big, conventional publishing houses. East European publishers need to wage a campaign to bring their publications to the school systems throughout the country. The fact is that numerous administrators know as much about East Europeans as a dog knows about mathematics. An example: The late Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki, when at Marquette University, used to begin his classes with an anonymous quiz, one of the questions of which was: List the Slavic nationalities or peoples in Europe. The usual answer ran like this: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Turkey, Austria, Russians, Bavarians, Bolsheviks, "Lower Slobovia" (Li'l Abner's contribution) and "Carpathia" (Marilyn Monroe's contribution from the movie, "The Prince and the Showgirl"). On July 11, 1954, the New York Times altered geography of Europe with the following headline: Rising Danube Flood Hits Prague. The Baltimore Sun had an interesting article (some �118 SLOVAKIA reporters are more discerning than many of our educators) on December 4, 1935, written by R. P. Harriss, "All Others." Harriss states, "The official census for Baltimore is a curious intensely interesting document, both for what it reveals and for what it leaves out. It lists some 14,000 nonexistent Russians and contains vague hints of a polygenous percentage which it does not bother to define." True enough. In an article in the Baltimore Sun on February 13, 1967, a native of Kazan, Russia, is quoted: "There are probably not more than five or six families of true Russians in Baltimore." Yet the article speaks of Russians from Galicia, Byelorussia, Carpatho-Ukraine. Seems that census officials and educators have in America done a magician's job of creating 'Russians.' How some of the mysteries regarding census data will be clarified remains a monumental task for the artful dodgers who have compiled the data thus far. Quoting again the Harriss article of 1935: "Officially there are 1,637 Hungarians in Baltimore, 1,441 Ruman.ians, and no Ukrainians, no Serbs." Harriss was candid enough to realize that by 1935 there were three Ukrainian churches, plus other institutions, in the Baltimore area and he was smart enough to see that the census data was akin to ethnic studies programs of today. Surely nobody would suspect that the Russians built the Ukrainian churches! The situation in literary studies is not much better than in the social sciences. To be sure "Russian Literature" units are taught in many schools, yet in "World Literature" courses very little is presented to develop the genius of Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, et. al., writers. Likewise the study of art and music suffer from non-coverage and from misconceptions. Now is the time to clear the muddied waters. East Europeans must declare themselves. They need to write more, question more, educate P.T.A. groups, civic organizations, education councils (on which they are rarely represented), etc. The "education crisis" should be recognized immediately. Forget about token appointments and honorary ethnic banquets (which cost you $100) in Washington where ethnic foods and cultural items are displayed. Begin a program called "Operation Hometown." Organize East European �SLOVAKIA 119 festivals as was done at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York. Show films. Present books and audio-visual aids to libraries. Request relevant books at your public libraries. Have cultural groups perform at YMCA's, schools, colleges, charity events, etc. It is important that school book lists be examined and that books by and about East Europeans be added. Music departments should be exhorted to sound to the tunes of rhapsodies, mazurkas, kolomajykas, polkas. Home economic departments would win adherents by presenting samplings of pirohy, halusky, makovnik, etc. Courses of study need to be expanded to include information about the great contributions of East Europeans to America, as, in the words of Michael Novak, "America is becoming America." The name of the game for East Europeans is "catch-up." Don't wait for the artful dodgers to structure your ethnic studies as you are excluded from their terminology. In the words of Dickens " ... You must get up very early in the morning, to win against the Dodger." "Morning!" said Charley Bates; "you must put your boots on over-night, and have a telescope at each eye, and a opera-glass between your shoulders, if you want to come over him." The U.S. flight crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project visited Russia for two weeks in November 1973 to familiarize themselves with the Soyuz spacecraft system that will link up with their Apollo in 1975. Most of their activities were conducted in the J . A. Gagarin Center of Cosmonaut Training at Zvezdny Goroduk, or Star City, near Moscow. Making the trip were the three Apollo crewmen, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand and Donald K. Slayton; backup crewmen, Capt. Alan L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans and Maj. Jack R. Lousma; support crewmen, Lt. Col. Robert F. Overmyer and Lt. Col. Karol J. Bobko; and Capt. Eugene A. Ceman, Special Assistant to the U.S. ASTP Technical Director. Bobko and Cer:nan are Slovaks. � 112 SLOVAKIA The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs By Paul F e n c h a k In Dickens' novel Oliver Twist, Jack Dawkins, called the Artful Dodger, is a teacher - albeit one who taught the art of pickpocketing to innocent youngsters such as Oliver Twist. His motive: personal gain. The writer of this article is convinced that the counterparts of the Artful Dodger are today directing ethnic studies programs in the public schools of the United States. Seemingly they are no more altruistic towards needful ethnic groups in America than the Artful Dodger was toward the welfare of Oliver Twist. Formulators of ethnic studies programs dodge no small number of ethnic groups as they label "minority groups" to the Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and Orientals. Frequently space is also given to Jews, Germans, Italians, and Poles. Scholars who would talk of Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Rumanians, among others, are judged to be divining in some dark, mysterious regions, presided over by pagan gods who, midst Gog and Magog, are all agog in exotic studies about areas considered to be "powder kegs" and "tinderboxes" - "balkanized" beyond comprehension to sensible people. The powerful National Education Association boasts of having a "strong program to improve the lot of minority groups, including Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and other bi-lingual groups." Often Croatians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Finns, et al., are more bi-lingual than some groups cited by the NEA, yet the amount of coverage given East European-Americ ans is usually nil. In 1972 the writer wrote the State Superintendents of Schools of the fifty state education departments requesting copies of curriculum guides, brochures, bulletins, etc., �SLOVAKIA 113 dealing with racial, cultural, multi-cultural, inter-cultural, disadvantaged, etc., matters of ethnics in America. For sundry reasons the responses were not rapid in arriving. To date 24 of 50 state education departments have either forwarded materials or have indicated that materials will be forthcoming. In summary of the vast amount of ethnic studies promoted by state education departments, one conclusion can easily be made: East European ethnics do not exist in the United States. Even Pennsylvania, the most Slavic of the fifty states, with fraternal, religious, and educational institutions located throughout the commonwealth in large numbers, is guilty of producing ethnic materials that are absolutely ignominous to the mass of citizens of East European ancestry living within the state. In Pennsylvania one need just travel from town to town, stopping to examine the names of those who served and those who died for the United States in both World Wars, as registered on community Honor Rolls. Seemingly then, the non-sense of excluding East Europeans would end - and even the very productive efforts of these peoples in the mines, mills, and farms, in athletics, in scholarship, and in good citizenship would then be recognized. The map of Pennsylvania already recognizes these peoples: Mazeppa, Kossuth, Pulaski, Po1and Mines, Dalmatia, Zelienople, Gallitzin, Livonia, St. Petersburg, and Slovan, among others. The bulk of the state curriculum guides, with Texas being a noteworthy exception, on ethnic and racial/cultural studies focus on the groups cited by the National Education Association: Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-Americans. Orientals and Jews are reasonably well-covered as are Italians, Irish, English, Germans, and French. It is always interesting to observe how state and local education experts use the term "minority group." One county in Maryland that contains thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, et al., admits having "5,603 black students and another 706 pupils from various other minority groups." The thruth is that in most states the term "minority groups" as presented in curriculum guides excludes Americans of East European ancestry and consequently millions of Americans are being denied the �114 SLOVAKIA opportunity of studying their heritages. Likewise, they are being denied opportunity in employment quests and, worst of all, some Americans are being deprived of the opportunity of attaining optimum psychological and emotional growth. Whereas the successful guidance counselor can help students to correctly answer the important question, "Whom am I?," counselors rarely talk about, or know anything about, Slavic languages, Finno-Ugric languages, Baltic languages, etc. But it is ever so fashionable in American schools to talk about the pleasantries of French, Spanish, German, and Latin. Evidently one of the major problems in education re ethnics is that the artful dodgers are not honest enough to admit that they need re-trained in order to be able to properly assemble the American mosaic. How many Slavic-Americans live in Peoria, Illinois? Frankly, the writer doesn't know, yet he assumes that in an industrial area of ca. 150,000 some Croatians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Poles, et al., do live and work. (All cities always have Russans!) Given the resources of the Peoria educational system the writer could develop reasonably accurate projections of the ethnic composition for Peoria; the same could be done for Paducah, Kentucky, or Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Why then the mystique about the manifold ethnic groups that comprise America? It appears that our ethnic directors are hiding and confusing issues. They are run by a system that relegated East Europeans. How negatively runs the cross-examination when an East European scholar seeks to get more considerations from librarians, curriculum directors, supervisors, administrators, editors, and other educators. Sooner or later the question emerges: How many Ukrainians (Czechs, Finns, et. al.) are then in Peoria? Yet these same specialists are able to calculate that there are certain numbers of Blacks and Spanish~speaking in their areas. How strange! The writer has heard this tactic so many times that he refuses to dignify such questions, presenting instead a general response that there are many Slavs, Finno-Ugrics, Baltics, etc., in a political sub-division, if such is the case. If the specialist is persistent in wanting to know the exact number of Czechs in Peoria, the writer usually asks .the specialist to secure �SLOVAKIA 115 that data for him, using the resources of people who should know. It is patently obvious that ethnic analysts do not want t o know how many East European-Americans live in various communities, as there is absolutely nothing stopping them from researching such data for East Europeans. The Texas Education Agency is to be commended for having produced an interesting curriculum guide: Czecho-Slovakia: Information Minimum. This booklet (71 pages) contains important facts about Czecho-Slovakia, especially as they relate to the history and culture of the United States. With its excellent maps, drawings, alphabets, data summaries, etc., it is the type of guide needed by more groups in more states. Unfortunately, of the 24 states that responded with materials, only Texas submitted any recognizable booklet doing justice to East Europeans. The catty Polish jokes seem to have nine lives. In years gone by the same tripe was slurred against Jews, Italians, and Irish. Yet the time length of the ethnic joke being in vogue was never so long. The Polish joke has been in circulation so long now that it is possible that a student my have entered kindergarten, completed grade school and junior high school, and have been graduated from high school while hearing no ethnic jokes other than the Polish variety. The tragedy of this attitude is supported by the extremely weak collection of literature available about East European peoples in American schools. This despite the fact that there are in America today some 35,000,000 Americans of East European ancestry. A stigma of the Polish joke is that some Americans who are not Poles also are labelled as Poles for purposes of jibing, e.g., the writer's daughter who as a third grade student was continually chided by her WASP classmates as being "Polish." "No need to explain that you are a Ukrainian-Slovak-American, Marcia! You're Polish! Ha! Ha! Ha!" (Marcia learned how to counter such diatribes by asking, "How many of you know Polish?" Response: "None of us." "How does it feel to be dumber than a Pole?") This is cited as the last Polish joke. That "Russian" studies receive top billing in American �116 SLOVAKIA schools goes without saying. Soviet Life is the most popular periodical in school libraries, so from such "reliable" sources students learn how the Germans killed 10,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, as an article early in 1971 indicated. After reading the Soviet account of how the Germans killed the Polish officers, the author wrote a letter to Soviet Life asking how accusations against the Russians can be disproved. Nicholai Zhiltsov, managing editor of Soviet Life, submitted the following reply on June 1, 1971: "Please excuse the delay in answering your letter which we have forwarded to our Moscow Editorial Board for their comments." Needless to say, by late 1973 a reply has not yet arrived. Barbara Mikulski, Polish-American and member of the City Council of Baltimore, spoke clearly and honestly about many situations when she stated, "When we ask for something, we are either put off, put out, or put down." Ask for books for the library and the librarian will write off your requests as "Not in Books in Print." Ask that East European specialists be invited to participate in social studies workshops, and your letter goes unanswered. Suggest that an Ethnic Library be started, with coverage for all ethnics, and again your letter is unanswered. Apply for a position in human relations and you are told that the emphasis is on black studies. Period. A frequently used dodge by curriculum formulators is the statement that they do not desire to approach East European studies, as, if they do, then it will be necessary to analyze all other ethnic groups in the United States. In a sense this attitude translates as "East Europeans don't burn, don't riot, don't act like rowdies ... so nobody pays any attention to them." That deceit shows through current ethnic analyses is obvious enough as in legal provisions for the teaching about ethnic studies in most states, no groups are expressly excluded. When prices in America continue to skyrocket as a result of expanded trade with East European nations, a need for better understanding about East Europeans is more imperative than ever. The current campaign by Jews in America to identify the lack of liberties accorded their brethre.n in the Soviet Union could in some ways be made �SLOVAKIA 117 to appear rather miniscule if injustices perpetrated against Slovaks, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, et. al., were similarly examined. Freedom still remains undebatable despite the economic strategems of government and big business. At home, one of principal educational problems may be that big business is too much in the saddle in influencing ethnic studies programs. No champions from business arose to exhort the cause of ethnics when the Schweiker ethnic studies bill was not approved for funding by tlie White House, yet industrial support was hardly lacking for both parties. Michael Novak in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics speaks of the possibility of Blacks and ethnics forming a coalition for mutual gain. It cannot be assumed that because Blacks have been afforded study programs and given some economic assistance, that power groups in America are genuinely interested in their welfare. Nobody volunteered any help to the Blacks and it can be reasonably assumed that nothing will be given East Europeans unless they demand considerations. One of the greatest problems confronting East Europeans is that textbook purchasers know too little about non-Russian-oriented publications; they buy primarily from the big, conventional publishing houses. East European publishers need to wage a campaign to bring their publications to the school systems throughout the country. The fact is that numerous administrators know as much about East Europeans as a dog knows about mathematics. An example: The late Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki, when at Marquette University, used to begin his classes with an anonymous quiz, one of the questions of which was: List the Slavic nationalities or peoples in Europe. The usual answer ran like this: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Turkey, Austria, Russians, Bavarians, Bolsheviks, "Lower Slobovia" (Li'l Abner's contribution) and "Carpathia" (Marilyn Monroe's contribution from the movie, "The Prince and the Showgirl"). On July 11, 1954, the New York Times altered geography of Europe with the following headline: Rising Danube Flood Hits Prague. The Baltimore Sun had an interesting article (some �118 SLOVAKIA reporters are more discerning than many of our educators) on December 4, 1935, written by R. P. Harriss, "All Others." Harriss states, "The official census for Baltimore is a curious intensely interesting document, both for what it reveals and for what it leaves out. It lists some 14,000 nonexistent Russians and contains vague hints of a polygenous percentage which it does not bother to define." True enough. In an article in the Baltimore Sun on February 13, 1967, a native of Kazan, Russia, is quoted: "There are probably not more than five or six families of true Russians in Baltimore." Yet the article speaks of Russians from Galicia, Byelorussia, Carpatho-Ukraine. Seems that census officials and educators have in America done a magician's job of creating 'Russians.' How some of the mysteries regarding census data will be clarified remains a monumental task for the artful dodgers who have compiled the data thus far. Quoting again the Harriss article of 1935: "Officially there are 1,637 Hungarians in Baltimore, 1,441 Ruman.ians, and no Ukrainians, no Serbs." Harriss was candid enough to realize that by 1935 there were three Ukrainian churches, plus other institutions, in the Baltimore area and he was smart enough to see that the census data was akin to ethnic studies programs of today. Surely nobody would suspect that the Russians built the Ukrainian churches! The situation in literary studies is not much better than in the social sciences. To be sure "Russian Literature" units are taught in many schools, yet in "World Literature" courses very little is presented to develop the genius of Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, et. al., writers. Likewise the study of art and music suffer from non-coverage and from misconceptions. Now is the time to clear the muddied waters. East Europeans must declare themselves. They need to write more, question more, educate P.T.A. groups, civic organizations, education councils (on which they are rarely represented), etc. The "education crisis" should be recognized immediately. Forget about token appointments and honorary ethnic banquets (which cost you $100) in Washington where ethnic foods and cultural items are displayed. Begin a program called "Operation Hometown." Organize East European �SLOVAKIA 119 festivals as was done at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York. Show films. Present books and audio-visual aids to libraries. Request relevant books at your public libraries. Have cultural groups perform at YMCA's, schools, colleges, charity events, etc. It is important that school book lists be examined and that books by and about East Europeans be added. Music departments should be exhorted to sound to the tunes of rhapsodies, mazurkas, kolomajykas, polkas. Home economic departments would win adherents by presenting samplings of pirohy, halusky, makovnik, etc. Courses of study need to be expanded to include information about the great contributions of East Europeans to America, as, in the words of Michael Novak, "America is becoming America." The name of the game for East Europeans is "catch-up." Don't wait for the artful dodgers to structure your ethnic studies as you are excluded from their terminology. In the words of Dickens " ... You must get up very early in the morning, to win against the Dodger." "Morning!" said Charley Bates; "you must put your boots on over-night, and have a telescope at each eye, and a opera-glass between your shoulders, if you want to come over him." The U.S. flight crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project visited Russia for two weeks in November 1973 to familiarize themselves with the Soyuz spacecraft system that will link up with their Apollo in 1975. Most of their activities were conducted in the J . A. Gagarin Center of Cosmonaut Training at Zvezdny Goroduk, or Star City, near Moscow. Making the trip were the three Apollo crewmen, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand and Donald K. Slayton; backup crewmen, Capt. Alan L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans and Maj. Jack R. Lousma; support crewmen, Lt. Col. Robert F. Overmyer and Lt. Col. Karol J. Bobko; and Capt. Eugene A. Ceman, Special Assistant to the U.S. ASTP Technical Director. Bobko and Cer:nan are Slovaks. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1974, Vol. 24 Description An account of the resource Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 112 SLOVAKIA The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs By Paul F e n c h a k In Dickens' novel Oliver Twist, Jack Dawkins, called the Artful Dodger, is a teacher - albeit one who taught the art of pickpocketing to innocent youngsters such as Oliver Twist. His motive: personal gain. The writer of this article is convinced that the counterparts of the Artful Dodger are today directing ethnic studies programs in the public schools of the United States. Seemingly they are no more altruistic towards needful ethnic groups in America than the Artful Dodger was toward the welfare of Oliver Twist. Formulators of ethnic studies programs dodge no small number of ethnic groups as they label "minority groups" to the Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and Orientals. Frequently space is also given to Jews, Germans, Italians, and Poles. Scholars who would talk of Ukrainians, Slovaks, Croatians, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Rumanians, among others, are judged to be divining in some dark, mysterious regions, presided over by pagan gods who, midst Gog and Magog, are all agog in exotic studies about areas considered to be "powder kegs" and "tinderboxes" - "balkanized" beyond comprehension to sensible people. The powerful National Education Association boasts of having a "strong program to improve the lot of minority groups, including Blacks, Indians, Spanish Americans, and other bi-lingual groups." Often Croatians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Finns, et al., are more bi-lingual than some groups cited by the NEA, yet the amount of coverage given East European-Americ ans is usually nil. In 1972 the writer wrote the State Superintendents of Schools of the fifty state education departments requesting copies of curriculum guides, brochures, bulletins, etc., SLOVAKIA 113 dealing with racial, cultural, multi-cultural, inter-cultural, disadvantaged, etc., matters of ethnics in America. For sundry reasons the responses were not rapid in arriving. To date 24 of 50 state education departments have either forwarded materials or have indicated that materials will be forthcoming. In summary of the vast amount of ethnic studies promoted by state education departments, one conclusion can easily be made: East European ethnics do not exist in the United States. Even Pennsylvania, the most Slavic of the fifty states, with fraternal, religious, and educational institutions located throughout the commonwealth in large numbers, is guilty of producing ethnic materials that are absolutely ignominous to the mass of citizens of East European ancestry living within the state. In Pennsylvania one need just travel from town to town, stopping to examine the names of those who served and those who died for the United States in both World Wars, as registered on community Honor Rolls. Seemingly then, the non-sense of excluding East Europeans would end - and even the very productive efforts of these peoples in the mines, mills, and farms, in athletics, in scholarship, and in good citizenship would then be recognized. The map of Pennsylvania already recognizes these peoples: Mazeppa, Kossuth, Pulaski, Po1and Mines, Dalmatia, Zelienople, Gallitzin, Livonia, St. Petersburg, and Slovan, among others. The bulk of the state curriculum guides, with Texas being a noteworthy exception, on ethnic and racial/cultural studies focus on the groups cited by the National Education Association: Blacks, Indians, and Spanish-Americans. Orientals and Jews are reasonably well-covered as are Italians, Irish, English, Germans, and French. It is always interesting to observe how state and local education experts use the term "minority group." One county in Maryland that contains thousands of Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, et al., admits having "5,603 black students and another 706 pupils from various other minority groups." The thruth is that in most states the term "minority groups" as presented in curriculum guides excludes Americans of East European ancestry and consequently millions of Americans are being denied the 114 SLOVAKIA opportunity of studying their heritages. Likewise, they are being denied opportunity in employment quests and, worst of all, some Americans are being deprived of the opportunity of attaining optimum psychological and emotional growth. Whereas the successful guidance counselor can help students to correctly answer the important question, "Whom am I?," counselors rarely talk about, or know anything about, Slavic languages, Finno-Ugric languages, Baltic languages, etc. But it is ever so fashionable in American schools to talk about the pleasantries of French, Spanish, German, and Latin. Evidently one of the major problems in education re ethnics is that the artful dodgers are not honest enough to admit that they need re-trained in order to be able to properly assemble the American mosaic. How many Slavic-Americans live in Peoria, Illinois? Frankly, the writer doesn't know, yet he assumes that in an industrial area of ca. 150,000 some Croatians, Bulgarians, Czechs, Poles, et al., do live and work. (All cities always have Russans!) Given the resources of the Peoria educational system the writer could develop reasonably accurate projections of the ethnic composition for Peoria; the same could be done for Paducah, Kentucky, or Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania. Why then the mystique about the manifold ethnic groups that comprise America? It appears that our ethnic directors are hiding and confusing issues. They are run by a system that relegated East Europeans. How negatively runs the cross-examination when an East European scholar seeks to get more considerations from librarians, curriculum directors, supervisors, administrators, editors, and other educators. Sooner or later the question emerges: How many Ukrainians (Czechs, Finns, et. al.) are then in Peoria? Yet these same specialists are able to calculate that there are certain numbers of Blacks and Spanish~speaking in their areas. How strange! The writer has heard this tactic so many times that he refuses to dignify such questions, presenting instead a general response that there are many Slavs, Finno-Ugrics, Baltics, etc., in a political sub-division, if such is the case. If the specialist is persistent in wanting to know the exact number of Czechs in Peoria, the writer usually asks .the specialist to secure SLOVAKIA 115 that data for him, using the resources of people who should know. It is patently obvious that ethnic analysts do not want t o know how many East European-Americans live in various communities, as there is absolutely nothing stopping them from researching such data for East Europeans. The Texas Education Agency is to be commended for having produced an interesting curriculum guide: Czecho-Slovakia: Information Minimum. This booklet (71 pages) contains important facts about Czecho-Slovakia, especially as they relate to the history and culture of the United States. With its excellent maps, drawings, alphabets, data summaries, etc., it is the type of guide needed by more groups in more states. Unfortunately, of the 24 states that responded with materials, only Texas submitted any recognizable booklet doing justice to East Europeans. The catty Polish jokes seem to have nine lives. In years gone by the same tripe was slurred against Jews, Italians, and Irish. Yet the time length of the ethnic joke being in vogue was never so long. The Polish joke has been in circulation so long now that it is possible that a student my have entered kindergarten, completed grade school and junior high school, and have been graduated from high school while hearing no ethnic jokes other than the Polish variety. The tragedy of this attitude is supported by the extremely weak collection of literature available about East European peoples in American schools. This despite the fact that there are in America today some 35,000,000 Americans of East European ancestry. A stigma of the Polish joke is that some Americans who are not Poles also are labelled as Poles for purposes of jibing, e.g., the writer's daughter who as a third grade student was continually chided by her WASP classmates as being "Polish." "No need to explain that you are a Ukrainian-Slovak-American, Marcia! You're Polish! Ha! Ha! Ha!" (Marcia learned how to counter such diatribes by asking, "How many of you know Polish?" Response: "None of us." "How does it feel to be dumber than a Pole?") This is cited as the last Polish joke. That "Russian" studies receive top billing in American 116 SLOVAKIA schools goes without saying. Soviet Life is the most popular periodical in school libraries, so from such "reliable" sources students learn how the Germans killed 10,000 Polish army officers in the Katyn Forest, as an article early in 1971 indicated. After reading the Soviet account of how the Germans killed the Polish officers, the author wrote a letter to Soviet Life asking how accusations against the Russians can be disproved. Nicholai Zhiltsov, managing editor of Soviet Life, submitted the following reply on June 1, 1971: "Please excuse the delay in answering your letter which we have forwarded to our Moscow Editorial Board for their comments." Needless to say, by late 1973 a reply has not yet arrived. Barbara Mikulski, Polish-American and member of the City Council of Baltimore, spoke clearly and honestly about many situations when she stated, "When we ask for something, we are either put off, put out, or put down." Ask for books for the library and the librarian will write off your requests as "Not in Books in Print." Ask that East European specialists be invited to participate in social studies workshops, and your letter goes unanswered. Suggest that an Ethnic Library be started, with coverage for all ethnics, and again your letter is unanswered. Apply for a position in human relations and you are told that the emphasis is on black studies. Period. A frequently used dodge by curriculum formulators is the statement that they do not desire to approach East European studies, as, if they do, then it will be necessary to analyze all other ethnic groups in the United States. In a sense this attitude translates as "East Europeans don't burn, don't riot, don't act like rowdies ... so nobody pays any attention to them." That deceit shows through current ethnic analyses is obvious enough as in legal provisions for the teaching about ethnic studies in most states, no groups are expressly excluded. When prices in America continue to skyrocket as a result of expanded trade with East European nations, a need for better understanding about East Europeans is more imperative than ever. The current campaign by Jews in America to identify the lack of liberties accorded their brethre.n in the Soviet Union could in some ways be made SLOVAKIA 117 to appear rather miniscule if injustices perpetrated against Slovaks, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, et. al., were similarly examined. Freedom still remains undebatable despite the economic strategems of government and big business. At home, one of principal educational problems may be that big business is too much in the saddle in influencing ethnic studies programs. No champions from business arose to exhort the cause of ethnics when the Schweiker ethnic studies bill was not approved for funding by tlie White House, yet industrial support was hardly lacking for both parties. Michael Novak in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics speaks of the possibility of Blacks and ethnics forming a coalition for mutual gain. It cannot be assumed that because Blacks have been afforded study programs and given some economic assistance, that power groups in America are genuinely interested in their welfare. Nobody volunteered any help to the Blacks and it can be reasonably assumed that nothing will be given East Europeans unless they demand considerations. One of the greatest problems confronting East Europeans is that textbook purchasers know too little about non-Russian-oriented publications; they buy primarily from the big, conventional publishing houses. East European publishers need to wage a campaign to bring their publications to the school systems throughout the country. The fact is that numerous administrators know as much about East Europeans as a dog knows about mathematics. An example: The late Prof. Roman Smal-Stocki, when at Marquette University, used to begin his classes with an anonymous quiz, one of the questions of which was: List the Slavic nationalities or peoples in Europe. The usual answer ran like this: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Turkey, Austria, Russians, Bavarians, Bolsheviks, "Lower Slobovia" (Li'l Abner's contribution) and "Carpathia" (Marilyn Monroe's contribution from the movie, "The Prince and the Showgirl"). On July 11, 1954, the New York Times altered geography of Europe with the following headline: Rising Danube Flood Hits Prague. The Baltimore Sun had an interesting article (some 118 SLOVAKIA reporters are more discerning than many of our educators) on December 4, 1935, written by R. P. Harriss, "All Others." Harriss states, "The official census for Baltimore is a curious intensely interesting document, both for what it reveals and for what it leaves out. It lists some 14,000 nonexistent Russians and contains vague hints of a polygenous percentage which it does not bother to define." True enough. In an article in the Baltimore Sun on February 13, 1967, a native of Kazan, Russia, is quoted: "There are probably not more than five or six families of true Russians in Baltimore." Yet the article speaks of Russians from Galicia, Byelorussia, Carpatho-Ukraine. Seems that census officials and educators have in America done a magician's job of creating 'Russians.' How some of the mysteries regarding census data will be clarified remains a monumental task for the artful dodgers who have compiled the data thus far. Quoting again the Harriss article of 1935: "Officially there are 1,637 Hungarians in Baltimore, 1,441 Ruman.ians, and no Ukrainians, no Serbs." Harriss was candid enough to realize that by 1935 there were three Ukrainian churches, plus other institutions, in the Baltimore area and he was smart enough to see that the census data was akin to ethnic studies programs of today. Surely nobody would suspect that the Russians built the Ukrainian churches! The situation in literary studies is not much better than in the social sciences. To be sure "Russian Literature" units are taught in many schools, yet in "World Literature" courses very little is presented to develop the genius of Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Finnish, Polish, et. al., writers. Likewise the study of art and music suffer from non-coverage and from misconceptions. Now is the time to clear the muddied waters. East Europeans must declare themselves. They need to write more, question more, educate P.T.A. groups, civic organizations, education councils (on which they are rarely represented), etc. The "education crisis" should be recognized immediately. Forget about token appointments and honorary ethnic banquets (which cost you $100) in Washington where ethnic foods and cultural items are displayed. Begin a program called "Operation Hometown." Organize East European SLOVAKIA 119 festivals as was done at Harpur College in Binghamton, New York. Show films. Present books and audio-visual aids to libraries. Request relevant books at your public libraries. Have cultural groups perform at YMCA's, schools, colleges, charity events, etc. It is important that school book lists be examined and that books by and about East Europeans be added. Music departments should be exhorted to sound to the tunes of rhapsodies, mazurkas, kolomajykas, polkas. Home economic departments would win adherents by presenting samplings of pirohy, halusky, makovnik, etc. Courses of study need to be expanded to include information about the great contributions of East Europeans to America, as, in the words of Michael Novak, "America is becoming America." The name of the game for East Europeans is "catch-up." Don't wait for the artful dodgers to structure your ethnic studies as you are excluded from their terminology. In the words of Dickens " ... You must get up very early in the morning, to win against the Dodger." "Morning!" said Charley Bates; "you must put your boots on over-night, and have a telescope at each eye, and a opera-glass between your shoulders, if you want to come over him." The U.S. flight crew for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project visited Russia for two weeks in November 1973 to familiarize themselves with the Soyuz spacecraft system that will link up with their Apollo in 1975. Most of their activities were conducted in the J . A. Gagarin Center of Cosmonaut Training at Zvezdny Goroduk, or Star City, near Moscow. Making the trip were the three Apollo crewmen, Brig. Gen. Thomas P. Stafford, Vance D. Brand and Donald K. Slayton; backup crewmen, Capt. Alan L. Bean, Capt. Ronald E. Evans and Maj. Jack R. Lousma; support crewmen, Lt. Col. Robert F. Overmyer and Lt. Col. Karol J. Bobko; and Capt. Eugene A. Ceman, Special Assistant to the U.S. ASTP Technical Director. Bobko and Cer:nan are Slovaks.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Artful Dodgers: Directors of Ethnic Studies Programs Description An account of the resource Paul Fenchak Slovakia, Vol. 24 (No. 47), 1974 pp. 112-119 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fenchak, Paul Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/0f7ea0d68adb60108eeba5034ecba754.pdf d6ed17f3c3fa38eeff13fd95e7a89069 PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 195 Robert M Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, I 890-1945. Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2010 . 329pp. Notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa In this revised Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1998), Robert M. Zecker set out to prove that Slovaks who lived in six widely dispersed neighborhoods of Philadelphia in the 20 th century formed "translocal" (p. 19) communities based upon four parish churches and about a dozen fraternal-benefit societies. The author dug deeply into census records, city directories, parish and fraternal records, supplemented by oral history interviews and published histories of Philadelphia and other ethnic groups across the United States. He showed that, even though Slovaks in Philadelphia were widely dispersed and lived among other ethnic groups, in the first two generations they socialized mostly among themselves. Indeed, they travelled great distances to attend church services on Sundays as well as fraternal meetings, dances, plays, gymnastic events and other amusements. Not only did they form translocal "imagined communities" (p.160) but they were also transconfessional because Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutherans and Marxists attended each other's events and financially supported them. Zecker also pointed out that Slovaks in Philadelphia, and elsewhere, bought into American race ideology. Thus, they stressed their "whiteness," as did other ethnic groups, by staging minstrel shows in the 1930's and 1940's and resisted the building of public housing in their neighborhoods. When they lost this fight, they followed other Americans into the suburbs. Zecker concluded that Slovaks in Philadelphia, like other ethnic groups in America, did not form compact neighborhoods of residence, but were widely dispersed. Nevertheless, they stuck together in the first two generations by attending distant church services, fraternal meetings and a wide variety of social activities. With the arrival of the 1930's New Deal, the post-war automobile boom, and the advent of television in the 1940's, Slovaks, like other Americans, began to move into the suburbs. Although the second generation remained loyal to their parents' institutions, the third generation lost �196 SLOVAKIA interest and their community institutions began to decline and disappear. This is a phenomenon facing all "older" ethnic groups in America. Since Zecker is admittedly an "outsider" to the Slovak community (p . 214), this book, like others written by American-born and educated scholars, suffers from both linguistic and factual errors. Zecker had to learn Slovak from scratch and never mastered its nuances. Thus, he mistakenly identified "Hutoraks" (it should be hutoraci) as Slovaks who originated in the vicinity of the village of "Hutka" (p.27). Instead, "hutoraci" is a pjorative term used by Central and Western Slovaks for Eastern Slovaks who do not speak (hovoria), but, rather, "hutoria" in their own dialect. He mis-translates Slovak "zupy" as "provinces," when they were counties (p.31). He misspells "okres" (district) as "okra" (p.35) and "krnotor" (godfather) as "Kumoda" (p .102). Furthermore, he misspelled and mis-translated the phrase "tu baz [mas!] vzduch" as "There's too much air in here," when it should have been "Here 's some air" (p.183), and many more such mistakes, too numerous to be listed. In addition to the above, Zecker also made some factual errors. He mis-identified the social commentator Nicholas von Hoffman as Alexander von Hoffman (pages 16 and 219); he had Lutheran pastors celebrating "Mass" and dispensing "sacraments" (p.155)! He had "Hapsburg troops" firing upon a Slovak crowd in 1907 when Hungarian gendarmes did so (p.278); he identified the Rev. Andrej Hlinka as a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907 when the latter would not become a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament until 1919 (p.201 ); and he promoted brigadier-general Milan R. Stefanik into an air marshal (p.204)! The latter errors testified to Zecker' s weak knowledge of European history, which is typical of many scholars of American history. Indeed, when one searches for references to the works of scholars in Slovakia on the subject of immigration, one is disappointed. Even though Zecker went out of his way to detail the history of the tiny group of Slovak Marxists in Philadelphia, he never cited the many articles on this subject by the late Milos Gosiorovsky. Nor did he seem to be aware of the three-volume work on Slovak immigration compiled by Frantisek Bielik and others. Finally, even though Zecker presented an impressive bibliography at the end of the book, it was unorganized. Thus, he mixed up �SLOVAKIA 197 his primary sources (archives, censuses, minutes of fraternal-benefit societies, church records, etc), with secondary sources, largely on American ethnic groups and American history in general. Fortunately, he did list his oral history interviews separately but failed to identify his interviewees. While the author may have agreed with his informants not to list their full names, he never did identify the leaders of the various Slovak communities (except their priests). We are left wondering who some of the "movers and shakers" were who founded the churches and fraternal-benefit societies, the various businesses, community halls, savings and loan associations, bands, radio programs and so on. This is a weakness found in most American social histories, which stress the "common man" (and woman) but ignore the leaders. Thus, Zecker's story of the various Slovak communities in Philadelphis remains incomplete. In spite of these deficiencies, Zecker's history of Slovaks in Philadelphia is a welcome addition to the field. We now have professional histories of three Slovak communities in the United States Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, by the author of this review ( 1985); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by June Granatir Alexander (1987); and Philadelphia by Robert M. Zecker. May we soon have even more! Valerian Bystricky, Miroslav Michela, Michal Schvarc a kol., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historicke rejlexie zaniku Cesko-Slovenska. Bratislava: VEDA, 2010. 575 pp., notes, bibliography, English resume, index. STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM Department of International Studies York University, Glendon College This is an unusual volume. A title with a question mark implies an answer. However, to demand that thirty-three scholars from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland provide one is problematic, especially when each contributes a specialized examination of an issue, which may, or may not be related directly to the question. Secondly, the chapter breakdown is determined by the contributions rather than a thematic organization arising out of the title. �198 SLOVAKIA Thirdly, the book is bilingual (Slovak and Czech). Finally, all contributors share something in common, namely extensive and thorough research in archives, many hitherto inaccessible, and references to authoritative secondary sources, although, with one exception, the list is limited to Central European scholars. This review will highlight those contributions that are deemed worthy of comment either because of their interpretation, their contribution to scholarship, or their pertinence to the question in the title. In an effort to answer whether post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia (C-SR) was broken up or collapsed in 1939, the editors divided the book into five thematic chapters and an epilogue of two essays on Slovak historiography. In each chapter, different authors looked at particular issues apparently linked to the theme. The first deals with the C-SR, from October 1938 to March 1939. The focus is on foreign policy and its consequences on domestic politics, especially Slovak politics. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution by Emilia Hrabovec on the perceptions of the Holy See concerning the future of that state. In the Vatican archives she discovered how the Holy See followed with great interest and interpreted with prudence the domestic and foreign developments that led to the Slovak proclamation of independence in March of 1939 and why it gave diplomatic recognition to the first Slovak Republic. Equally interesting are the contributions by l:udovit Hallon on economic changes in Slovakia and the preponderant role played by Germany; and by Miloslav Caplovic on what happened to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces after Munich, especially the transfer of many divisions to Slovakia to protect the state against possible Hungarian and Polish military incursions. Caplovic also mentions the reorganisation that later resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces of the first Slovak Republic. Jozef Bystricky, in chapter four, offeres a detailed analysis of how this happened and also the state of the military forces that responded to Hungarian incursions after independence. The contribution by Valerian Bystricky on the foreign policy activities of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party stands out because of the absence of a contextual perspective. Bystricky bases his article on constitutional legalism to criticize the efforts of members of this party to establish foreign contacts in order to ensure the future of Slovakia when the international situation in Central Europe was deteriorating and the fate of the C-SR was uncertain. �SLOVAKIA 199 The second chapter, "Disliked by its neighbours," is on Germany and the C-SR; Slovakia and Ruthenia in the policies of Hungary and Poland; and the nationality question as a political instrument. The nine contributors provide an interesting analysis of Slovakia's relations with its neighbours at a time when its leaders sought to figure out its future and these neighbours were using the nationality question to achieve their objectives. Slovakia was not "disliked;" rather it was the object of revisionist (Hungary) or strategic policies (Germany and Poland). Most contributions, especially the one by Angela Hermann on German policy toward Slovakia, do indicate that Slovakia' s neighbours sought the break up of the C-SR. What is missing is an assessment on how the C-SR and Slovak politicians reacted to the political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvring that took place after October 1938. Hermann ' s contribution makes clear that Slovak leaders understood the realities of power in Central Europe, but also their own responsibility to their nation. The third chapter has eight contributions on "The March events of 1939." Half offer a study of external reactions to these events; the other half look at specific domestic events or attitudes around the 14 March proclamation. One can learn what the German press, British scholarship, or Americans of Czech and Slovak background thought of these events. The latter contribution by Frantisek Hanzlik is, however, very superficial , especially with regards to Slovak Americans. Regarding domestic events, Zlatica Zudova-Leskova ' s examination of the emergency measures of l O March is most atypical. Both in tone and content, it is a strident attack on those who do not see these measures as a legitimate response by C-SR authorities to protect the integrity of that state. In marked contrast, Robert Letz ' s study of the attitude of the Catholic Church and its episcopate in Slovakia toward the March events offers a sophisticated glimpse of the interplay of religion, politics, hierarchy, and the need for public order at a time of constitutional change and foreign political and ideological pressure. A limited sociological examination of the general Slovak reaction is found in the presentation by Martin Hetenyi on the Nitra region. "The beginnings of the Slovak State" constitutes the theme of the fourth chapter. It brings together contributions that deal with the formation of the political system; the independence of the judiciary as seen by the leading political party in Slovakia in 1938-1939; the formation of the Slovak Armed Forces; and the departure of Czech sol- �200 SLOVAKIA diers from Slovakia after independence. The first two contributions, especially the one by Igor Baka, focus on those elements in the political system emanating from the policies of the regime that, according to the two authors, show the creation of a totalitarian state in Slovakia after March 1939. That the first Slovak Republic became a one-party state is beyond dispute; to conclude, however, that it became totalitarian is to ignore the international and comparative context (with other states at that time or the later Communist one) and the essence of political life in Slovakia, whatever the constitutional or administrative system. Scholarship is not served by approaching this subject with a conceptual bias (i .e. if it was not democratic, then it had to be totalitarian), as these two contributions do. Finally, the two bibliographical contributions in the epilogue make a major contribution to Slovak historiography. Both outline the problems Slovak historiography has had and continues to have, which the essays in this volume reflect. The variety of views and the disparity of approaches in this book would have been better served with the title: Break-up and Collapse, a title, which the contributions underlie and with which every serious scholar specializing in the topic would concur. This volume contributes to a broader understanding of that period but does not help resolve the debates around it. Slovak scholarship still has a long way to go. Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, Zandar troch rei imov alebo Slovenske dejiny 20. storocia z ineho pohl'adu. Gustav Polcik a jeho slui ba v Prievidzi v rokoch 1942-1972. Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2011. xliv-334 pp. , notes, illustrations, bibliography, abbreviations, index. YESHA YAHU JELINEK Beer-Sheva, Israel Prievidza, the home-town of the hero of this monograph (and also of the author of this review), lies in the upper Nitra river valley. At the beginning of World War II, it had about 5,000 inhabitants. Industrialization and more intensive coal mining during the communist era boosted the population to about thirty thousand today. Since the �SLOVAKIA 201 days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prievidza boasted a Gendarme (police) station, which served about twenty villages and townships. Between five and ten Gendarmes served there, but came from elsewhere. A bachelor Gendarme was forbidden to marry for the first four years of his service, and especially not to a local woman. The Gendarme was expected to become closely acquainted with the locality, its people, and culture. However, he was also supposed to be neutral in political matters, and not to join any political parties. The latter regulation was changed during the communist era, when all Gendarmes were expected to join the Communist Party and to enforce its rule. As he related to the compilers of this book, Gustav Polcik arrived in Prievidza as a Gendarme in the summer of 1942. Four years later he married his village sweetheart and had two daughters with her. The family was apparently very proud of its Gendarme son, as the many photographs of him in his uniform attest. The job guaranteed him a good salary and respect. It was a major move up the social ladder for a village boy. When Polcik retired in 1972, he had reached the rank of major, which was testimony to a successful career in the service of his people in the city of Prievidza. It is not easy to review a perspective "from the other side," as the authors/editors of this book titled it. After all, Polcik served three ruling regimes. During the years of the Holocaust, Polcik carried out the official policies of the Slovak Republic, which was allied with Nazi Germany. One of them was to deport Slovak Jews to Poland, where they were exterminated by the Germans. Although Polcik claimed that, because he had arrived in Prievidza in the summer of 1942, the Jews had already been expelled (p.94), this is not credible. The last transport of Jews from that locality left in October of 1942. Nora Kellerman, a Prievidza friend and neighbour of the author of this review described the deportation of her father thus : "Suddenly, two men arrived, a Gendarme and a Hlinka Guard (the Hlinka Guard was a paramilitary force of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party), they gave father ten minutes to pack his belongings, he kissed us and they escorted him out. I was six years old and never saw my father again." Clearly, the Gendarmes executed the orders of the government in Bratislava. Polcik admitted throughout the book that he faithfully executed orders from above. All Gendarmes were trained to do this, even dur- �202 SLOVAKIA ing the first Czechoslovak Republic. During the communist period, even though he joined the Party, he sometimes sought to avoid enforcing unpleasant orders with various ruses. Often he convinced himself that the orders were wrong. He did admit that many times the orders gnawed at his conscience. In these instances he sought to avoid carrying them out, but without harm to himself. A good example of Polcik's reasoning and actions was when he was assigned to serve on the Italian front in 1944. He did not want to go and sought out the commander of the Gendarmerie in Slovakia, Colonel Timotheus lstok, who happened to come from his native village, and who was friendly with his parents. In spite of being received by lstok, the orders were not changed. Therefore, Polcik decided to desert to the local partisans (guerrillas), whom he knew, and had assisted in various ways. Ironically, the government bureaucracy continued to pay his wages while he was in active opposition to the regime! Once the war had ended, Polcik emerged as a resistance fighter and his career continued to blossom. When the Communists seized power in 1948, Polcik joined the Party and continued his climb upward. He even became head of the local Hunter's Association and assisted the Prievidza Communists, who were poorly-educated, to write their reports in his beautiful handwriting. He could also type and, thus, was privy to all the secret reports sent by the government in Bratislava. He always sought to help those whom he could, and to not make any enemies. He was also a non-drinker, which kept him out of trouble. When all is said and done, what we have here is the life history of an opportunistic public servant, interested above all in his advancement. Therefore, by being very careful, he was able to survive the frequently changing regimes and governments in his homeland. Polcik survived and advanced because he understood how to manage himself in every situation. This book gives us a good insight into the political life of Slovakia over thirty years and how some of the people, like the Gendarme Gustav Polcik, successfully adjusted to three very different political regimes. �SLOVAKIA 203 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov do ZSSR 1945-194 7. Bratislava: Goralinga, 2011. 340pp. appendices, charts, bibliography, resumes. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto At the close of World War II, world leaders seemed determined to try to create a new political order that, hopefully, would preclude catastrophic conflicts of the kind they had just experienced. Many statesmen felt that national minorities and the ideology of integral nationalism were among the main causes leading to World War II . Therefore, in an attempt to correct this situation, many governments set out to adjust ethnographic boundaries to state boundaries. There were several ways in which this might be achieved: a change in international borders; national assimilation of minority groups; physical extermination; or resettlement. Population resettlement became an acceptable and favored political solution at the time. The most monumental example of this approach was the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia to create the new states of India and Pakistan. Postwar Europe also engaged in population resettlement, the best known case being the expulsion in 1946-1947 of over six million Germans (3 .2 million from Poland and three million from Czechoslovakia) and their resettlement in the various occupation zones of postwar Germany. Smaller in scale and much less known were the population exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These took place in two phases. When, in June 1945 , Czechoslovakia formally ceded its pre-Munich eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus' to the Soviet Union, a protocol to the treaty provided for the right of persons of Slovak and Czech nationality resident in Subcarpathian Rus '/Transcarpathian Ukraine to resettle in postwar Czechoslovakia, and for the right of persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality in Czechoslovakia- specifically from "districts (okresy) in Slovakia"to resettle in the Soviet Union. Technically, these populations were being given "the right to opt" (prava opcie) for either Czechoslovak �204 SLOVAKIA or Soviet citizenship, a status which would allow them to resettle permanently in one or the other country. The second phase came as a result of an accord signed in October of 1946, according to which persons of Czech and Slovak nationality living in the Soviet Union (specifically the Volhynia region of Soviet Ukraine) were to be resettled to Czechoslovakia in exchange for persons of Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusan nationality in Czechoslovakia who were to be resettled in the Soviet Union. Despite the various nationalities listed in the treaty, in practice the populations in question were only two : Czechs, who in the nineteenth century had emigrated to what was then the province of Volhynia in the Russian Empire; and Carpatho-Rusyns (Rusnaks), who since their first appearance in the early Middle Ages inhabited relatively compact areas in northeastern Slovakia. The numbers in both phases were relatively small-about 25 ,000 persons to Czechoslovakia as a result of the 1945 treaty; followed by 40,000 persons to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the 1946 treaty. The latter exchange was known as the Volhynian Operation/Volynska akcia and was carried out in 1947. The story of the two Czechoslovak-Soviet population exchanges is the subject of this book by Michal Smigel, an associate professor of history at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, and Stefan Krusko, a writer and civic activist whose family had opted to go to Soviet Ukraine in 1947 and who later "re-opted" back to Czechoslovakia. Aside from the details of the actual resettlement process between 1945 and 1947, the authors devote the third and last chapter of their book to the fate of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyns from northeastern Slovakia who voluntarily opted for the Soviet Union. No sooner had the transports arrived in the Soviet Union in the spring of 194 7, than did the newcomers from Czechoslovakia realize they had made a mistake. Many wanted immediately to go back home, but there was no leaving the "Soviet paradise." The very thought of doing so could- and did- result in arrests and imprisonment during the height of Stalinist repressive rule. Thus began what turned out to be decades of struggle on the part of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyn "exiles" in Soviet Volhynia to return to their Carpathian homeland. In the interim, the children born "in exile" were educated in Ukrainian, while their parents proceeded to claim that they were "Slovaks" (and were generally described as such by local Ukraini- �SLOVAKIA 205 ans) in an effort to justify their legal right to return to Czechoslovakia. Beginning in the 1960s, a small but gradually increasing number of families managed to leave Volhynia, settling first in Soviet Transcarpathia, from where some managed to return to Czechoslovakia. The process of return was long and complicated, however, and it did not end until the 1990s, when ironically it was connected with the world's first prominently publicized nuclear disaster. Looking for an excuse to justify the entry for "immigrants" from the east, Slovakia passed a law which allowed for the return of its former citizens from what was described as "the zone [including Volhynia] affected by the Chornobyl nuclear disaster." The homecoming for the reoptanty (those who opted to return) was often far from ideal. Most did not return to their native villages, since local residents-and even family members- were suspicious of people who in 1947 had left for the Soviet east as "Rusnaks," who came back as "Slovaks," often speaking Ukrainian, and who consequently were viewed by their former neighbors as "Russians" (rusky), an epithet that in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was, to say the least, not a positive one. Nevertheless, the reoptanty, in particular children who left with their parents or who were born in Ukraine, eventually did well after their return to Czechoslovakia. Some found employment in the various Ukrainian minority cultural institutions in Presov that were liberally funded in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. Most, however, assimilated into Slovak society in a conscious effort to distance themselves from the East. Among the best known of the reoptanty was Peter Bondra. He was born in Soviet Ukraine to Carpatho-Rusyn parents, who in 1947 were settled in the Soviet Union, but who returned in the 1970s to Slovakia, where Peter was raised and where he learned a new skill- hockey. This allowed him later in life to "re-emigrate," this time to the United States, where he became a star in the National Hockey League. Smigel and Krusko have done an excellent job in describing the fascinating tale of one aspect of post-World War II demographic engineering in central and eastern Europe. The narrative is interspersed with statistical charts and historic photographs . Included as well are several appendices: the full texts of the 1945 and 1946 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties, accompanying protocols, and instructions for implementation; detailed charts with data on the 194 7 population �206 SLOVAKIA exchanges; an extensive bibliography of archival and secondary sources; and resumes in English and Russian. M. Mark Stolarik, compiler and editor, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Mundelein, Ill. : Bolchazy-Carducci, 2010 . xxxiv-305 pp ., notes, photos, index, hard and soft cover. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University Salisbury, Maryland This book is based on the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2008 . M. Mark Stolarik, who holds the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at that institution, organized the meeting, compiled and edited the papers, as well as contributed most of the photographs. He also wrote the Introduction in which he offered his personal reminiscences of those August days as he witnessed the invasion, the largest military action in Europe since the Second World War. His Introduction gives a brief overview of the subsequent papers and commentaries, and includes excellent footnotes providing first-rate bibliographic material covering the subject. He concludes the Introduction with an almost two-year chronology of the "Prague Spring," from October of 1967 to September of 1969, to better orient the reader. The authors of the papers and commentaries are a Who's Who of specialists on East Central Europe. Participants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact wrote the papers based largely on archival investigations: Mikhail V. Latysh (USSR), Jan Rychlik (Czech Republic), Slavomir Michalek and Stanislav Sikora (Slovakia), Lukasz Kaminski (Poland), Rudiger Wenzke (East Germany), Ivana Skalova (Bulgaria), Csaba Bekes (Hungary), and Drago~ Petrescu (Romania). Americans and Canadians who presented commentaries include: Matthew J. Ouimet (USSR), Michael Kraus (Czech Republic ), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Slovakia), Piotr Wrobel (Poland), Gary Bruce (East Germany), Mark Kramer (Bulgaria), Peter Pastor (Hungary), and Monica Ciobranu (Romania). At the end of the text, before the �SLOVAKIA 207 index, Stolarik included "Notes on Contributors," which gives basic biographical information on the participants. The reader will find many interesting and largely hitherto unknown facts available in the standard works on the subject. For example, at the last minute, the Soviet Union would not allow East Germany to participate in the invasion for fear that it would bring back horrifying memories of the Nazi dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Yet, until its dying days, the East German government, which wholeheartedly supported the invasion, and early on argued for its implementation, perpetuated the myth that it was an active participant. Another, perhaps more striking example, would be the claim by Soviet General G. Yashkin that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces , ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in early May of 1968, only to reverse his decision several minutes later. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhikov, uneasy over events in Czechoslovakia by early spring of 1968, insisted that he be present at the negotiations with Czechoslovakia and pressed for an early solution, despite the fact that Bulgaria had no common border with Czechoslovakia. Yet, after his fall from power, Zhivkov denied any wrongdoing, but instead insisted that he supported the reforms and reluctantly agreed to support the invasion. Whereas Bekes presents Hungarian leader Janos Kadar in a sympathetic light as a grand compromiser, Pastor sees him instead using double speak for domestic consumption. On a more humorous note, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, an early proponent for intervention, intensely disliked Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and consistently changed the "b" in his name to a "p", thereby rendering his surname in Polish to be an unmentionable part of the human anatomy in polite society. Constraints of space will not allow a discussion of the individual papers and commentaries. However, of particular note is the attention paid to Romania. This member of the Warsaw Pact neither participated in the discussions leading to nor took part in the invasion itself. Nonetheless, as most are aware, the Romanian regime outwardly supported the reforms and then vehemently attacked the invasion. Although Petrescu's piece is more of a political science approach than the other contributions, he makes a persuasive argument that the invasion provided legitimacy and popular support for Ceau~escu' s rise to power after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- �208 SLOVAKIA Dej. Ceau~escu would never be as popular as he was in August of 1968, when he unified and rallied the country. However, once firmly in control, he ended economic liberalization and ideological relaxation and became more autocratic, relying on his famil y members for support, which eventually led to his demise in 1989. The Soviets ultimately misjudged popular reaction to the 1968 invasion. Petrescu has included an excellent quote from the Romanian dictator that prophetically summed up the results of the invasion, "In my opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system and the international communist and workers movement occurred (252-53)." In short, the invasion mortally wounded the Eastern Bloc 's experiment with Communism. It showed that it could not be a viable alternative to liberal democracy and market economics. This volume is a fine addition to our knowledge of the events of the Prague Spring. Some of the information may be a bit too scholarly for the general reader, but, it is an up-to-date work based on research in archives and other sources opened after 1989. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA 195 Robert M Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, I 890-1945. Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2010 . 329pp. Notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa In this revised Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1998), Robert M. Zecker set out to prove that Slovaks who lived in six widely dispersed neighborhoods of Philadelphia in the 20 th century formed "translocal" (p. 19) communities based upon four parish churches and about a dozen fraternal-benefit societies. The author dug deeply into census records, city directories, parish and fraternal records, supplemented by oral history interviews and published histories of Philadelphia and other ethnic groups across the United States. He showed that, even though Slovaks in Philadelphia were widely dispersed and lived among other ethnic groups, in the first two generations they socialized mostly among themselves. Indeed, they travelled great distances to attend church services on Sundays as well as fraternal meetings, dances, plays, gymnastic events and other amusements. Not only did they form translocal "imagined communities" (p.160) but they were also transconfessional because Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutherans and Marxists attended each other's events and financially supported them. Zecker also pointed out that Slovaks in Philadelphia, and elsewhere, bought into American race ideology. Thus, they stressed their "whiteness," as did other ethnic groups, by staging minstrel shows in the 1930's and 1940's and resisted the building of public housing in their neighborhoods. When they lost this fight, they followed other Americans into the suburbs. Zecker concluded that Slovaks in Philadelphia, like other ethnic groups in America, did not form compact neighborhoods of residence, but were widely dispersed. Nevertheless, they stuck together in the first two generations by attending distant church services, fraternal meetings and a wide variety of social activities. With the arrival of the 1930's New Deal, the post-war automobile boom, and the advent of television in the 1940's, Slovaks, like other Americans, began to move into the suburbs. Although the second generation remained loyal to their parents' institutions, the third generation lost �196 SLOVAKIA interest and their community institutions began to decline and disappear. This is a phenomenon facing all "older" ethnic groups in America. Since Zecker is admittedly an "outsider" to the Slovak community (p . 214), this book, like others written by American-born and educated scholars, suffers from both linguistic and factual errors. Zecker had to learn Slovak from scratch and never mastered its nuances. Thus, he mistakenly identified "Hutoraks" (it should be hutoraci) as Slovaks who originated in the vicinity of the village of "Hutka" (p.27). Instead, "hutoraci" is a pjorative term used by Central and Western Slovaks for Eastern Slovaks who do not speak (hovoria), but, rather, "hutoria" in their own dialect. He mis-translates Slovak "zupy" as "provinces," when they were counties (p.31). He misspells "okres" (district) as "okra" (p.35) and "krnotor" (godfather) as "Kumoda" (p .102). Furthermore, he misspelled and mis-translated the phrase "tu baz [mas!] vzduch" as "There's too much air in here," when it should have been "Here 's some air" (p.183), and many more such mistakes, too numerous to be listed. In addition to the above, Zecker also made some factual errors. He mis-identified the social commentator Nicholas von Hoffman as Alexander von Hoffman (pages 16 and 219); he had Lutheran pastors celebrating "Mass" and dispensing "sacraments" (p.155)! He had "Hapsburg troops" firing upon a Slovak crowd in 1907 when Hungarian gendarmes did so (p.278); he identified the Rev. Andrej Hlinka as a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907 when the latter would not become a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament until 1919 (p.201 ); and he promoted brigadier-general Milan R. Stefanik into an air marshal (p.204)! The latter errors testified to Zecker' s weak knowledge of European history, which is typical of many scholars of American history. Indeed, when one searches for references to the works of scholars in Slovakia on the subject of immigration, one is disappointed. Even though Zecker went out of his way to detail the history of the tiny group of Slovak Marxists in Philadelphia, he never cited the many articles on this subject by the late Milos Gosiorovsky. Nor did he seem to be aware of the three-volume work on Slovak immigration compiled by Frantisek Bielik and others. Finally, even though Zecker presented an impressive bibliography at the end of the book, it was unorganized. Thus, he mixed up �SLOVAKIA 197 his primary sources (archives, censuses, minutes of fraternal-benefit societies, church records, etc), with secondary sources, largely on American ethnic groups and American history in general. Fortunately, he did list his oral history interviews separately but failed to identify his interviewees. While the author may have agreed with his informants not to list their full names, he never did identify the leaders of the various Slovak communities (except their priests). We are left wondering who some of the "movers and shakers" were who founded the churches and fraternal-benefit societies, the various businesses, community halls, savings and loan associations, bands, radio programs and so on. This is a weakness found in most American social histories, which stress the "common man" (and woman) but ignore the leaders. Thus, Zecker's story of the various Slovak communities in Philadelphis remains incomplete. In spite of these deficiencies, Zecker's history of Slovaks in Philadelphia is a welcome addition to the field. We now have professional histories of three Slovak communities in the United States Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, by the author of this review ( 1985); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by June Granatir Alexander (1987); and Philadelphia by Robert M. Zecker. May we soon have even more! Valerian Bystricky, Miroslav Michela, Michal Schvarc a kol., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historicke rejlexie zaniku Cesko-Slovenska. Bratislava: VEDA, 2010. 575 pp., notes, bibliography, English resume, index. STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM Department of International Studies York University, Glendon College This is an unusual volume. A title with a question mark implies an answer. However, to demand that thirty-three scholars from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland provide one is problematic, especially when each contributes a specialized examination of an issue, which may, or may not be related directly to the question. Secondly, the chapter breakdown is determined by the contributions rather than a thematic organization arising out of the title. �198 SLOVAKIA Thirdly, the book is bilingual (Slovak and Czech). Finally, all contributors share something in common, namely extensive and thorough research in archives, many hitherto inaccessible, and references to authoritative secondary sources, although, with one exception, the list is limited to Central European scholars. This review will highlight those contributions that are deemed worthy of comment either because of their interpretation, their contribution to scholarship, or their pertinence to the question in the title. In an effort to answer whether post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia (C-SR) was broken up or collapsed in 1939, the editors divided the book into five thematic chapters and an epilogue of two essays on Slovak historiography. In each chapter, different authors looked at particular issues apparently linked to the theme. The first deals with the C-SR, from October 1938 to March 1939. The focus is on foreign policy and its consequences on domestic politics, especially Slovak politics. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution by Emilia Hrabovec on the perceptions of the Holy See concerning the future of that state. In the Vatican archives she discovered how the Holy See followed with great interest and interpreted with prudence the domestic and foreign developments that led to the Slovak proclamation of independence in March of 1939 and why it gave diplomatic recognition to the first Slovak Republic. Equally interesting are the contributions by l:udovit Hallon on economic changes in Slovakia and the preponderant role played by Germany; and by Miloslav Caplovic on what happened to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces after Munich, especially the transfer of many divisions to Slovakia to protect the state against possible Hungarian and Polish military incursions. Caplovic also mentions the reorganisation that later resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces of the first Slovak Republic. Jozef Bystricky, in chapter four, offeres a detailed analysis of how this happened and also the state of the military forces that responded to Hungarian incursions after independence. The contribution by Valerian Bystricky on the foreign policy activities of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party stands out because of the absence of a contextual perspective. Bystricky bases his article on constitutional legalism to criticize the efforts of members of this party to establish foreign contacts in order to ensure the future of Slovakia when the international situation in Central Europe was deteriorating and the fate of the C-SR was uncertain. �SLOVAKIA 199 The second chapter, "Disliked by its neighbours," is on Germany and the C-SR; Slovakia and Ruthenia in the policies of Hungary and Poland; and the nationality question as a political instrument. The nine contributors provide an interesting analysis of Slovakia's relations with its neighbours at a time when its leaders sought to figure out its future and these neighbours were using the nationality question to achieve their objectives. Slovakia was not "disliked;" rather it was the object of revisionist (Hungary) or strategic policies (Germany and Poland). Most contributions, especially the one by Angela Hermann on German policy toward Slovakia, do indicate that Slovakia' s neighbours sought the break up of the C-SR. What is missing is an assessment on how the C-SR and Slovak politicians reacted to the political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvring that took place after October 1938. Hermann ' s contribution makes clear that Slovak leaders understood the realities of power in Central Europe, but also their own responsibility to their nation. The third chapter has eight contributions on "The March events of 1939." Half offer a study of external reactions to these events; the other half look at specific domestic events or attitudes around the 14 March proclamation. One can learn what the German press, British scholarship, or Americans of Czech and Slovak background thought of these events. The latter contribution by Frantisek Hanzlik is, however, very superficial , especially with regards to Slovak Americans. Regarding domestic events, Zlatica Zudova-Leskova ' s examination of the emergency measures of l O March is most atypical. Both in tone and content, it is a strident attack on those who do not see these measures as a legitimate response by C-SR authorities to protect the integrity of that state. In marked contrast, Robert Letz ' s study of the attitude of the Catholic Church and its episcopate in Slovakia toward the March events offers a sophisticated glimpse of the interplay of religion, politics, hierarchy, and the need for public order at a time of constitutional change and foreign political and ideological pressure. A limited sociological examination of the general Slovak reaction is found in the presentation by Martin Hetenyi on the Nitra region. "The beginnings of the Slovak State" constitutes the theme of the fourth chapter. It brings together contributions that deal with the formation of the political system; the independence of the judiciary as seen by the leading political party in Slovakia in 1938-1939; the formation of the Slovak Armed Forces; and the departure of Czech sol- �200 SLOVAKIA diers from Slovakia after independence. The first two contributions, especially the one by Igor Baka, focus on those elements in the political system emanating from the policies of the regime that, according to the two authors, show the creation of a totalitarian state in Slovakia after March 1939. That the first Slovak Republic became a one-party state is beyond dispute; to conclude, however, that it became totalitarian is to ignore the international and comparative context (with other states at that time or the later Communist one) and the essence of political life in Slovakia, whatever the constitutional or administrative system. Scholarship is not served by approaching this subject with a conceptual bias (i .e. if it was not democratic, then it had to be totalitarian), as these two contributions do. Finally, the two bibliographical contributions in the epilogue make a major contribution to Slovak historiography. Both outline the problems Slovak historiography has had and continues to have, which the essays in this volume reflect. The variety of views and the disparity of approaches in this book would have been better served with the title: Break-up and Collapse, a title, which the contributions underlie and with which every serious scholar specializing in the topic would concur. This volume contributes to a broader understanding of that period but does not help resolve the debates around it. Slovak scholarship still has a long way to go. Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, Zandar troch rei imov alebo Slovenske dejiny 20. storocia z ineho pohl'adu. Gustav Polcik a jeho slui ba v Prievidzi v rokoch 1942-1972. Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2011. xliv-334 pp. , notes, illustrations, bibliography, abbreviations, index. YESHA YAHU JELINEK Beer-Sheva, Israel Prievidza, the home-town of the hero of this monograph (and also of the author of this review), lies in the upper Nitra river valley. At the beginning of World War II, it had about 5,000 inhabitants. Industrialization and more intensive coal mining during the communist era boosted the population to about thirty thousand today. Since the �SLOVAKIA 201 days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prievidza boasted a Gendarme (police) station, which served about twenty villages and townships. Between five and ten Gendarmes served there, but came from elsewhere. A bachelor Gendarme was forbidden to marry for the first four years of his service, and especially not to a local woman. The Gendarme was expected to become closely acquainted with the locality, its people, and culture. However, he was also supposed to be neutral in political matters, and not to join any political parties. The latter regulation was changed during the communist era, when all Gendarmes were expected to join the Communist Party and to enforce its rule. As he related to the compilers of this book, Gustav Polcik arrived in Prievidza as a Gendarme in the summer of 1942. Four years later he married his village sweetheart and had two daughters with her. The family was apparently very proud of its Gendarme son, as the many photographs of him in his uniform attest. The job guaranteed him a good salary and respect. It was a major move up the social ladder for a village boy. When Polcik retired in 1972, he had reached the rank of major, which was testimony to a successful career in the service of his people in the city of Prievidza. It is not easy to review a perspective "from the other side," as the authors/editors of this book titled it. After all, Polcik served three ruling regimes. During the years of the Holocaust, Polcik carried out the official policies of the Slovak Republic, which was allied with Nazi Germany. One of them was to deport Slovak Jews to Poland, where they were exterminated by the Germans. Although Polcik claimed that, because he had arrived in Prievidza in the summer of 1942, the Jews had already been expelled (p.94), this is not credible. The last transport of Jews from that locality left in October of 1942. Nora Kellerman, a Prievidza friend and neighbour of the author of this review described the deportation of her father thus : "Suddenly, two men arrived, a Gendarme and a Hlinka Guard (the Hlinka Guard was a paramilitary force of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party), they gave father ten minutes to pack his belongings, he kissed us and they escorted him out. I was six years old and never saw my father again." Clearly, the Gendarmes executed the orders of the government in Bratislava. Polcik admitted throughout the book that he faithfully executed orders from above. All Gendarmes were trained to do this, even dur- �202 SLOVAKIA ing the first Czechoslovak Republic. During the communist period, even though he joined the Party, he sometimes sought to avoid enforcing unpleasant orders with various ruses. Often he convinced himself that the orders were wrong. He did admit that many times the orders gnawed at his conscience. In these instances he sought to avoid carrying them out, but without harm to himself. A good example of Polcik's reasoning and actions was when he was assigned to serve on the Italian front in 1944. He did not want to go and sought out the commander of the Gendarmerie in Slovakia, Colonel Timotheus lstok, who happened to come from his native village, and who was friendly with his parents. In spite of being received by lstok, the orders were not changed. Therefore, Polcik decided to desert to the local partisans (guerrillas), whom he knew, and had assisted in various ways. Ironically, the government bureaucracy continued to pay his wages while he was in active opposition to the regime! Once the war had ended, Polcik emerged as a resistance fighter and his career continued to blossom. When the Communists seized power in 1948, Polcik joined the Party and continued his climb upward. He even became head of the local Hunter's Association and assisted the Prievidza Communists, who were poorly-educated, to write their reports in his beautiful handwriting. He could also type and, thus, was privy to all the secret reports sent by the government in Bratislava. He always sought to help those whom he could, and to not make any enemies. He was also a non-drinker, which kept him out of trouble. When all is said and done, what we have here is the life history of an opportunistic public servant, interested above all in his advancement. Therefore, by being very careful, he was able to survive the frequently changing regimes and governments in his homeland. Polcik survived and advanced because he understood how to manage himself in every situation. This book gives us a good insight into the political life of Slovakia over thirty years and how some of the people, like the Gendarme Gustav Polcik, successfully adjusted to three very different political regimes. �SLOVAKIA 203 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov do ZSSR 1945-194 7. Bratislava: Goralinga, 2011. 340pp. appendices, charts, bibliography, resumes. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto At the close of World War II, world leaders seemed determined to try to create a new political order that, hopefully, would preclude catastrophic conflicts of the kind they had just experienced. Many statesmen felt that national minorities and the ideology of integral nationalism were among the main causes leading to World War II . Therefore, in an attempt to correct this situation, many governments set out to adjust ethnographic boundaries to state boundaries. There were several ways in which this might be achieved: a change in international borders; national assimilation of minority groups; physical extermination; or resettlement. Population resettlement became an acceptable and favored political solution at the time. The most monumental example of this approach was the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia to create the new states of India and Pakistan. Postwar Europe also engaged in population resettlement, the best known case being the expulsion in 1946-1947 of over six million Germans (3 .2 million from Poland and three million from Czechoslovakia) and their resettlement in the various occupation zones of postwar Germany. Smaller in scale and much less known were the population exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These took place in two phases. When, in June 1945 , Czechoslovakia formally ceded its pre-Munich eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus' to the Soviet Union, a protocol to the treaty provided for the right of persons of Slovak and Czech nationality resident in Subcarpathian Rus '/Transcarpathian Ukraine to resettle in postwar Czechoslovakia, and for the right of persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality in Czechoslovakia- specifically from "districts (okresy) in Slovakia"to resettle in the Soviet Union. Technically, these populations were being given "the right to opt" (prava opcie) for either Czechoslovak �204 SLOVAKIA or Soviet citizenship, a status which would allow them to resettle permanently in one or the other country. The second phase came as a result of an accord signed in October of 1946, according to which persons of Czech and Slovak nationality living in the Soviet Union (specifically the Volhynia region of Soviet Ukraine) were to be resettled to Czechoslovakia in exchange for persons of Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusan nationality in Czechoslovakia who were to be resettled in the Soviet Union. Despite the various nationalities listed in the treaty, in practice the populations in question were only two : Czechs, who in the nineteenth century had emigrated to what was then the province of Volhynia in the Russian Empire; and Carpatho-Rusyns (Rusnaks), who since their first appearance in the early Middle Ages inhabited relatively compact areas in northeastern Slovakia. The numbers in both phases were relatively small-about 25 ,000 persons to Czechoslovakia as a result of the 1945 treaty; followed by 40,000 persons to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the 1946 treaty. The latter exchange was known as the Volhynian Operation/Volynska akcia and was carried out in 1947. The story of the two Czechoslovak-Soviet population exchanges is the subject of this book by Michal Smigel, an associate professor of history at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, and Stefan Krusko, a writer and civic activist whose family had opted to go to Soviet Ukraine in 1947 and who later "re-opted" back to Czechoslovakia. Aside from the details of the actual resettlement process between 1945 and 1947, the authors devote the third and last chapter of their book to the fate of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyns from northeastern Slovakia who voluntarily opted for the Soviet Union. No sooner had the transports arrived in the Soviet Union in the spring of 194 7, than did the newcomers from Czechoslovakia realize they had made a mistake. Many wanted immediately to go back home, but there was no leaving the "Soviet paradise." The very thought of doing so could- and did- result in arrests and imprisonment during the height of Stalinist repressive rule. Thus began what turned out to be decades of struggle on the part of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyn "exiles" in Soviet Volhynia to return to their Carpathian homeland. In the interim, the children born "in exile" were educated in Ukrainian, while their parents proceeded to claim that they were "Slovaks" (and were generally described as such by local Ukraini- �SLOVAKIA 205 ans) in an effort to justify their legal right to return to Czechoslovakia. Beginning in the 1960s, a small but gradually increasing number of families managed to leave Volhynia, settling first in Soviet Transcarpathia, from where some managed to return to Czechoslovakia. The process of return was long and complicated, however, and it did not end until the 1990s, when ironically it was connected with the world's first prominently publicized nuclear disaster. Looking for an excuse to justify the entry for "immigrants" from the east, Slovakia passed a law which allowed for the return of its former citizens from what was described as "the zone [including Volhynia] affected by the Chornobyl nuclear disaster." The homecoming for the reoptanty (those who opted to return) was often far from ideal. Most did not return to their native villages, since local residents-and even family members- were suspicious of people who in 1947 had left for the Soviet east as "Rusnaks," who came back as "Slovaks," often speaking Ukrainian, and who consequently were viewed by their former neighbors as "Russians" (rusky), an epithet that in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was, to say the least, not a positive one. Nevertheless, the reoptanty, in particular children who left with their parents or who were born in Ukraine, eventually did well after their return to Czechoslovakia. Some found employment in the various Ukrainian minority cultural institutions in Presov that were liberally funded in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. Most, however, assimilated into Slovak society in a conscious effort to distance themselves from the East. Among the best known of the reoptanty was Peter Bondra. He was born in Soviet Ukraine to Carpatho-Rusyn parents, who in 1947 were settled in the Soviet Union, but who returned in the 1970s to Slovakia, where Peter was raised and where he learned a new skill- hockey. This allowed him later in life to "re-emigrate," this time to the United States, where he became a star in the National Hockey League. Smigel and Krusko have done an excellent job in describing the fascinating tale of one aspect of post-World War II demographic engineering in central and eastern Europe. The narrative is interspersed with statistical charts and historic photographs . Included as well are several appendices: the full texts of the 1945 and 1946 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties, accompanying protocols, and instructions for implementation; detailed charts with data on the 194 7 population �206 SLOVAKIA exchanges; an extensive bibliography of archival and secondary sources; and resumes in English and Russian. M. Mark Stolarik, compiler and editor, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Mundelein, Ill. : Bolchazy-Carducci, 2010 . xxxiv-305 pp ., notes, photos, index, hard and soft cover. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University Salisbury, Maryland This book is based on the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2008 . M. Mark Stolarik, who holds the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at that institution, organized the meeting, compiled and edited the papers, as well as contributed most of the photographs. He also wrote the Introduction in which he offered his personal reminiscences of those August days as he witnessed the invasion, the largest military action in Europe since the Second World War. His Introduction gives a brief overview of the subsequent papers and commentaries, and includes excellent footnotes providing first-rate bibliographic material covering the subject. He concludes the Introduction with an almost two-year chronology of the "Prague Spring," from October of 1967 to September of 1969, to better orient the reader. The authors of the papers and commentaries are a Who's Who of specialists on East Central Europe. Participants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact wrote the papers based largely on archival investigations: Mikhail V. Latysh (USSR), Jan Rychlik (Czech Republic), Slavomir Michalek and Stanislav Sikora (Slovakia), Lukasz Kaminski (Poland), Rudiger Wenzke (East Germany), Ivana Skalova (Bulgaria), Csaba Bekes (Hungary), and Drago~ Petrescu (Romania). Americans and Canadians who presented commentaries include: Matthew J. Ouimet (USSR), Michael Kraus (Czech Republic ), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Slovakia), Piotr Wrobel (Poland), Gary Bruce (East Germany), Mark Kramer (Bulgaria), Peter Pastor (Hungary), and Monica Ciobranu (Romania). At the end of the text, before the �SLOVAKIA 207 index, Stolarik included "Notes on Contributors," which gives basic biographical information on the participants. The reader will find many interesting and largely hitherto unknown facts available in the standard works on the subject. For example, at the last minute, the Soviet Union would not allow East Germany to participate in the invasion for fear that it would bring back horrifying memories of the Nazi dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Yet, until its dying days, the East German government, which wholeheartedly supported the invasion, and early on argued for its implementation, perpetuated the myth that it was an active participant. Another, perhaps more striking example, would be the claim by Soviet General G. Yashkin that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces , ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in early May of 1968, only to reverse his decision several minutes later. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhikov, uneasy over events in Czechoslovakia by early spring of 1968, insisted that he be present at the negotiations with Czechoslovakia and pressed for an early solution, despite the fact that Bulgaria had no common border with Czechoslovakia. Yet, after his fall from power, Zhivkov denied any wrongdoing, but instead insisted that he supported the reforms and reluctantly agreed to support the invasion. Whereas Bekes presents Hungarian leader Janos Kadar in a sympathetic light as a grand compromiser, Pastor sees him instead using double speak for domestic consumption. On a more humorous note, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, an early proponent for intervention, intensely disliked Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and consistently changed the "b" in his name to a "p", thereby rendering his surname in Polish to be an unmentionable part of the human anatomy in polite society. Constraints of space will not allow a discussion of the individual papers and commentaries. However, of particular note is the attention paid to Romania. This member of the Warsaw Pact neither participated in the discussions leading to nor took part in the invasion itself. Nonetheless, as most are aware, the Romanian regime outwardly supported the reforms and then vehemently attacked the invasion. Although Petrescu's piece is more of a political science approach than the other contributions, he makes a persuasive argument that the invasion provided legitimacy and popular support for Ceau~escu' s rise to power after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- �208 SLOVAKIA Dej. Ceau~escu would never be as popular as he was in August of 1968, when he unified and rallied the country. However, once firmly in control, he ended economic liberalization and ideological relaxation and became more autocratic, relying on his famil y members for support, which eventually led to his demise in 1989. The Soviets ultimately misjudged popular reaction to the 1968 invasion. Petrescu has included an excellent quote from the Romanian dictator that prophetically summed up the results of the invasion, "In my opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system and the international communist and workers movement occurred (252-53)." In short, the invasion mortally wounded the Eastern Bloc 's experiment with Communism. It showed that it could not be a viable alternative to liberal democracy and market economics. This volume is a fine addition to our knowledge of the events of the Prague Spring. Some of the information may be a bit too scholarly for the general reader, but, it is an up-to-date work based on research in archives and other sources opened after 1989. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA 195 Robert M Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, I 890-1945. Selingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2010 . 329pp. Notes, bibliography, index. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa In this revised Ph.D. dissertation (University of Pennsylvania, 1998), Robert M. Zecker set out to prove that Slovaks who lived in six widely dispersed neighborhoods of Philadelphia in the 20 th century formed "translocal" (p. 19) communities based upon four parish churches and about a dozen fraternal-benefit societies. The author dug deeply into census records, city directories, parish and fraternal records, supplemented by oral history interviews and published histories of Philadelphia and other ethnic groups across the United States. He showed that, even though Slovaks in Philadelphia were widely dispersed and lived among other ethnic groups, in the first two generations they socialized mostly among themselves. Indeed, they travelled great distances to attend church services on Sundays as well as fraternal meetings, dances, plays, gymnastic events and other amusements. Not only did they form translocal "imagined communities" (p.160) but they were also transconfessional because Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutherans and Marxists attended each other's events and financially supported them. Zecker also pointed out that Slovaks in Philadelphia, and elsewhere, bought into American race ideology. Thus, they stressed their "whiteness," as did other ethnic groups, by staging minstrel shows in the 1930's and 1940's and resisted the building of public housing in their neighborhoods. When they lost this fight, they followed other Americans into the suburbs. Zecker concluded that Slovaks in Philadelphia, like other ethnic groups in America, did not form compact neighborhoods of residence, but were widely dispersed. Nevertheless, they stuck together in the first two generations by attending distant church services, fraternal meetings and a wide variety of social activities. With the arrival of the 1930's New Deal, the post-war automobile boom, and the advent of television in the 1940's, Slovaks, like other Americans, began to move into the suburbs. Although the second generation remained loyal to their parents' institutions, the third generation lost 196 SLOVAKIA interest and their community institutions began to decline and disappear. This is a phenomenon facing all "older" ethnic groups in America. Since Zecker is admittedly an "outsider" to the Slovak community (p . 214), this book, like others written by American-born and educated scholars, suffers from both linguistic and factual errors. Zecker had to learn Slovak from scratch and never mastered its nuances. Thus, he mistakenly identified "Hutoraks" (it should be hutoraci) as Slovaks who originated in the vicinity of the village of "Hutka" (p.27). Instead, "hutoraci" is a pjorative term used by Central and Western Slovaks for Eastern Slovaks who do not speak (hovoria), but, rather, "hutoria" in their own dialect. He mis-translates Slovak "zupy" as "provinces," when they were counties (p.31). He misspells "okres" (district) as "okra" (p.35) and "krnotor" (godfather) as "Kumoda" (p .102). Furthermore, he misspelled and mis-translated the phrase "tu baz [mas!] vzduch" as "There's too much air in here," when it should have been "Here 's some air" (p.183), and many more such mistakes, too numerous to be listed. In addition to the above, Zecker also made some factual errors. He mis-identified the social commentator Nicholas von Hoffman as Alexander von Hoffman (pages 16 and 219); he had Lutheran pastors celebrating "Mass" and dispensing "sacraments" (p.155)! He had "Hapsburg troops" firing upon a Slovak crowd in 1907 when Hungarian gendarmes did so (p.278); he identified the Rev. Andrej Hlinka as a deputy in the Hungarian Parliament in 1907 when the latter would not become a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament until 1919 (p.201 ); and he promoted brigadier-general Milan R. Stefanik into an air marshal (p.204)! The latter errors testified to Zecker' s weak knowledge of European history, which is typical of many scholars of American history. Indeed, when one searches for references to the works of scholars in Slovakia on the subject of immigration, one is disappointed. Even though Zecker went out of his way to detail the history of the tiny group of Slovak Marxists in Philadelphia, he never cited the many articles on this subject by the late Milos Gosiorovsky. Nor did he seem to be aware of the three-volume work on Slovak immigration compiled by Frantisek Bielik and others. Finally, even though Zecker presented an impressive bibliography at the end of the book, it was unorganized. Thus, he mixed up SLOVAKIA 197 his primary sources (archives, censuses, minutes of fraternal-benefit societies, church records, etc), with secondary sources, largely on American ethnic groups and American history in general. Fortunately, he did list his oral history interviews separately but failed to identify his interviewees. While the author may have agreed with his informants not to list their full names, he never did identify the leaders of the various Slovak communities (except their priests). We are left wondering who some of the "movers and shakers" were who founded the churches and fraternal-benefit societies, the various businesses, community halls, savings and loan associations, bands, radio programs and so on. This is a weakness found in most American social histories, which stress the "common man" (and woman) but ignore the leaders. Thus, Zecker's story of the various Slovak communities in Philadelphis remains incomplete. In spite of these deficiencies, Zecker's history of Slovaks in Philadelphia is a welcome addition to the field. We now have professional histories of three Slovak communities in the United States Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, by the author of this review ( 1985); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, by June Granatir Alexander (1987); and Philadelphia by Robert M. Zecker. May we soon have even more! Valerian Bystricky, Miroslav Michela, Michal Schvarc a kol., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historicke rejlexie zaniku Cesko-Slovenska. Bratislava: VEDA, 2010. 575 pp., notes, bibliography, English resume, index. STANISLAV J. KIRSCHBAUM Department of International Studies York University, Glendon College This is an unusual volume. A title with a question mark implies an answer. However, to demand that thirty-three scholars from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland provide one is problematic, especially when each contributes a specialized examination of an issue, which may, or may not be related directly to the question. Secondly, the chapter breakdown is determined by the contributions rather than a thematic organization arising out of the title. 198 SLOVAKIA Thirdly, the book is bilingual (Slovak and Czech). Finally, all contributors share something in common, namely extensive and thorough research in archives, many hitherto inaccessible, and references to authoritative secondary sources, although, with one exception, the list is limited to Central European scholars. This review will highlight those contributions that are deemed worthy of comment either because of their interpretation, their contribution to scholarship, or their pertinence to the question in the title. In an effort to answer whether post-Munich Czecho-Slovakia (C-SR) was broken up or collapsed in 1939, the editors divided the book into five thematic chapters and an epilogue of two essays on Slovak historiography. In each chapter, different authors looked at particular issues apparently linked to the theme. The first deals with the C-SR, from October 1938 to March 1939. The focus is on foreign policy and its consequences on domestic politics, especially Slovak politics. Particularly noteworthy is the contribution by Emilia Hrabovec on the perceptions of the Holy See concerning the future of that state. In the Vatican archives she discovered how the Holy See followed with great interest and interpreted with prudence the domestic and foreign developments that led to the Slovak proclamation of independence in March of 1939 and why it gave diplomatic recognition to the first Slovak Republic. Equally interesting are the contributions by l:udovit Hallon on economic changes in Slovakia and the preponderant role played by Germany; and by Miloslav Caplovic on what happened to the Czechoslovak Armed Forces after Munich, especially the transfer of many divisions to Slovakia to protect the state against possible Hungarian and Polish military incursions. Caplovic also mentions the reorganisation that later resulted in the creation of the Armed Forces of the first Slovak Republic. Jozef Bystricky, in chapter four, offeres a detailed analysis of how this happened and also the state of the military forces that responded to Hungarian incursions after independence. The contribution by Valerian Bystricky on the foreign policy activities of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party stands out because of the absence of a contextual perspective. Bystricky bases his article on constitutional legalism to criticize the efforts of members of this party to establish foreign contacts in order to ensure the future of Slovakia when the international situation in Central Europe was deteriorating and the fate of the C-SR was uncertain. SLOVAKIA 199 The second chapter, "Disliked by its neighbours," is on Germany and the C-SR; Slovakia and Ruthenia in the policies of Hungary and Poland; and the nationality question as a political instrument. The nine contributors provide an interesting analysis of Slovakia's relations with its neighbours at a time when its leaders sought to figure out its future and these neighbours were using the nationality question to achieve their objectives. Slovakia was not "disliked;" rather it was the object of revisionist (Hungary) or strategic policies (Germany and Poland). Most contributions, especially the one by Angela Hermann on German policy toward Slovakia, do indicate that Slovakia' s neighbours sought the break up of the C-SR. What is missing is an assessment on how the C-SR and Slovak politicians reacted to the political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvring that took place after October 1938. Hermann ' s contribution makes clear that Slovak leaders understood the realities of power in Central Europe, but also their own responsibility to their nation. The third chapter has eight contributions on "The March events of 1939." Half offer a study of external reactions to these events; the other half look at specific domestic events or attitudes around the 14 March proclamation. One can learn what the German press, British scholarship, or Americans of Czech and Slovak background thought of these events. The latter contribution by Frantisek Hanzlik is, however, very superficial , especially with regards to Slovak Americans. Regarding domestic events, Zlatica Zudova-Leskova ' s examination of the emergency measures of l O March is most atypical. Both in tone and content, it is a strident attack on those who do not see these measures as a legitimate response by C-SR authorities to protect the integrity of that state. In marked contrast, Robert Letz ' s study of the attitude of the Catholic Church and its episcopate in Slovakia toward the March events offers a sophisticated glimpse of the interplay of religion, politics, hierarchy, and the need for public order at a time of constitutional change and foreign political and ideological pressure. A limited sociological examination of the general Slovak reaction is found in the presentation by Martin Hetenyi on the Nitra region. "The beginnings of the Slovak State" constitutes the theme of the fourth chapter. It brings together contributions that deal with the formation of the political system; the independence of the judiciary as seen by the leading political party in Slovakia in 1938-1939; the formation of the Slovak Armed Forces; and the departure of Czech sol- 200 SLOVAKIA diers from Slovakia after independence. The first two contributions, especially the one by Igor Baka, focus on those elements in the political system emanating from the policies of the regime that, according to the two authors, show the creation of a totalitarian state in Slovakia after March 1939. That the first Slovak Republic became a one-party state is beyond dispute; to conclude, however, that it became totalitarian is to ignore the international and comparative context (with other states at that time or the later Communist one) and the essence of political life in Slovakia, whatever the constitutional or administrative system. Scholarship is not served by approaching this subject with a conceptual bias (i .e. if it was not democratic, then it had to be totalitarian), as these two contributions do. Finally, the two bibliographical contributions in the epilogue make a major contribution to Slovak historiography. Both outline the problems Slovak historiography has had and continues to have, which the essays in this volume reflect. The variety of views and the disparity of approaches in this book would have been better served with the title: Break-up and Collapse, a title, which the contributions underlie and with which every serious scholar specializing in the topic would concur. This volume contributes to a broader understanding of that period but does not help resolve the debates around it. Slovak scholarship still has a long way to go. Martin Lacko a Jan Sabo, Zandar troch rei imov alebo Slovenske dejiny 20. storocia z ineho pohl'adu. Gustav Polcik a jeho slui ba v Prievidzi v rokoch 1942-1972. Bratislava: Ustav pamati naroda, 2011. xliv-334 pp. , notes, illustrations, bibliography, abbreviations, index. YESHA YAHU JELINEK Beer-Sheva, Israel Prievidza, the home-town of the hero of this monograph (and also of the author of this review), lies in the upper Nitra river valley. At the beginning of World War II, it had about 5,000 inhabitants. Industrialization and more intensive coal mining during the communist era boosted the population to about thirty thousand today. Since the SLOVAKIA 201 days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Prievidza boasted a Gendarme (police) station, which served about twenty villages and townships. Between five and ten Gendarmes served there, but came from elsewhere. A bachelor Gendarme was forbidden to marry for the first four years of his service, and especially not to a local woman. The Gendarme was expected to become closely acquainted with the locality, its people, and culture. However, he was also supposed to be neutral in political matters, and not to join any political parties. The latter regulation was changed during the communist era, when all Gendarmes were expected to join the Communist Party and to enforce its rule. As he related to the compilers of this book, Gustav Polcik arrived in Prievidza as a Gendarme in the summer of 1942. Four years later he married his village sweetheart and had two daughters with her. The family was apparently very proud of its Gendarme son, as the many photographs of him in his uniform attest. The job guaranteed him a good salary and respect. It was a major move up the social ladder for a village boy. When Polcik retired in 1972, he had reached the rank of major, which was testimony to a successful career in the service of his people in the city of Prievidza. It is not easy to review a perspective "from the other side," as the authors/editors of this book titled it. After all, Polcik served three ruling regimes. During the years of the Holocaust, Polcik carried out the official policies of the Slovak Republic, which was allied with Nazi Germany. One of them was to deport Slovak Jews to Poland, where they were exterminated by the Germans. Although Polcik claimed that, because he had arrived in Prievidza in the summer of 1942, the Jews had already been expelled (p.94), this is not credible. The last transport of Jews from that locality left in October of 1942. Nora Kellerman, a Prievidza friend and neighbour of the author of this review described the deportation of her father thus : "Suddenly, two men arrived, a Gendarme and a Hlinka Guard (the Hlinka Guard was a paramilitary force of the ruling Hlinka Slovak People's Party), they gave father ten minutes to pack his belongings, he kissed us and they escorted him out. I was six years old and never saw my father again." Clearly, the Gendarmes executed the orders of the government in Bratislava. Polcik admitted throughout the book that he faithfully executed orders from above. All Gendarmes were trained to do this, even dur- 202 SLOVAKIA ing the first Czechoslovak Republic. During the communist period, even though he joined the Party, he sometimes sought to avoid enforcing unpleasant orders with various ruses. Often he convinced himself that the orders were wrong. He did admit that many times the orders gnawed at his conscience. In these instances he sought to avoid carrying them out, but without harm to himself. A good example of Polcik's reasoning and actions was when he was assigned to serve on the Italian front in 1944. He did not want to go and sought out the commander of the Gendarmerie in Slovakia, Colonel Timotheus lstok, who happened to come from his native village, and who was friendly with his parents. In spite of being received by lstok, the orders were not changed. Therefore, Polcik decided to desert to the local partisans (guerrillas), whom he knew, and had assisted in various ways. Ironically, the government bureaucracy continued to pay his wages while he was in active opposition to the regime! Once the war had ended, Polcik emerged as a resistance fighter and his career continued to blossom. When the Communists seized power in 1948, Polcik joined the Party and continued his climb upward. He even became head of the local Hunter's Association and assisted the Prievidza Communists, who were poorly-educated, to write their reports in his beautiful handwriting. He could also type and, thus, was privy to all the secret reports sent by the government in Bratislava. He always sought to help those whom he could, and to not make any enemies. He was also a non-drinker, which kept him out of trouble. When all is said and done, what we have here is the life history of an opportunistic public servant, interested above all in his advancement. Therefore, by being very careful, he was able to survive the frequently changing regimes and governments in his homeland. Polcik survived and advanced because he understood how to manage himself in every situation. This book gives us a good insight into the political life of Slovakia over thirty years and how some of the people, like the Gendarme Gustav Polcik, successfully adjusted to three very different political regimes. SLOVAKIA 203 Michal Smigel a Stefan Krusko, Opcia a presidlenie Rusinov do ZSSR 1945-194 7. Bratislava: Goralinga, 2011. 340pp. appendices, charts, bibliography, resumes. PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI University of Toronto At the close of World War II, world leaders seemed determined to try to create a new political order that, hopefully, would preclude catastrophic conflicts of the kind they had just experienced. Many statesmen felt that national minorities and the ideology of integral nationalism were among the main causes leading to World War II . Therefore, in an attempt to correct this situation, many governments set out to adjust ethnographic boundaries to state boundaries. There were several ways in which this might be achieved: a change in international borders; national assimilation of minority groups; physical extermination; or resettlement. Population resettlement became an acceptable and favored political solution at the time. The most monumental example of this approach was the displacement of millions of Hindus and Muslims in South Asia to create the new states of India and Pakistan. Postwar Europe also engaged in population resettlement, the best known case being the expulsion in 1946-1947 of over six million Germans (3 .2 million from Poland and three million from Czechoslovakia) and their resettlement in the various occupation zones of postwar Germany. Smaller in scale and much less known were the population exchanges between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. These took place in two phases. When, in June 1945 , Czechoslovakia formally ceded its pre-Munich eastern province of Subcarpathian Rus' to the Soviet Union, a protocol to the treaty provided for the right of persons of Slovak and Czech nationality resident in Subcarpathian Rus '/Transcarpathian Ukraine to resettle in postwar Czechoslovakia, and for the right of persons of Ukrainian and Russian nationality in Czechoslovakia- specifically from "districts (okresy) in Slovakia"to resettle in the Soviet Union. Technically, these populations were being given "the right to opt" (prava opcie) for either Czechoslovak 204 SLOVAKIA or Soviet citizenship, a status which would allow them to resettle permanently in one or the other country. The second phase came as a result of an accord signed in October of 1946, according to which persons of Czech and Slovak nationality living in the Soviet Union (specifically the Volhynia region of Soviet Ukraine) were to be resettled to Czechoslovakia in exchange for persons of Ukrainian, Russian, and Belarusan nationality in Czechoslovakia who were to be resettled in the Soviet Union. Despite the various nationalities listed in the treaty, in practice the populations in question were only two : Czechs, who in the nineteenth century had emigrated to what was then the province of Volhynia in the Russian Empire; and Carpatho-Rusyns (Rusnaks), who since their first appearance in the early Middle Ages inhabited relatively compact areas in northeastern Slovakia. The numbers in both phases were relatively small-about 25 ,000 persons to Czechoslovakia as a result of the 1945 treaty; followed by 40,000 persons to Czechoslovakia and 12,000 to Soviet Ukraine as a result of the 1946 treaty. The latter exchange was known as the Volhynian Operation/Volynska akcia and was carried out in 1947. The story of the two Czechoslovak-Soviet population exchanges is the subject of this book by Michal Smigel, an associate professor of history at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica, and Stefan Krusko, a writer and civic activist whose family had opted to go to Soviet Ukraine in 1947 and who later "re-opted" back to Czechoslovakia. Aside from the details of the actual resettlement process between 1945 and 1947, the authors devote the third and last chapter of their book to the fate of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyns from northeastern Slovakia who voluntarily opted for the Soviet Union. No sooner had the transports arrived in the Soviet Union in the spring of 194 7, than did the newcomers from Czechoslovakia realize they had made a mistake. Many wanted immediately to go back home, but there was no leaving the "Soviet paradise." The very thought of doing so could- and did- result in arrests and imprisonment during the height of Stalinist repressive rule. Thus began what turned out to be decades of struggle on the part of the 12,000 Carpatho-Rusyn "exiles" in Soviet Volhynia to return to their Carpathian homeland. In the interim, the children born "in exile" were educated in Ukrainian, while their parents proceeded to claim that they were "Slovaks" (and were generally described as such by local Ukraini- SLOVAKIA 205 ans) in an effort to justify their legal right to return to Czechoslovakia. Beginning in the 1960s, a small but gradually increasing number of families managed to leave Volhynia, settling first in Soviet Transcarpathia, from where some managed to return to Czechoslovakia. The process of return was long and complicated, however, and it did not end until the 1990s, when ironically it was connected with the world's first prominently publicized nuclear disaster. Looking for an excuse to justify the entry for "immigrants" from the east, Slovakia passed a law which allowed for the return of its former citizens from what was described as "the zone [including Volhynia] affected by the Chornobyl nuclear disaster." The homecoming for the reoptanty (those who opted to return) was often far from ideal. Most did not return to their native villages, since local residents-and even family members- were suspicious of people who in 1947 had left for the Soviet east as "Rusnaks," who came back as "Slovaks," often speaking Ukrainian, and who consequently were viewed by their former neighbors as "Russians" (rusky), an epithet that in post-1968 Czechoslovakia was, to say the least, not a positive one. Nevertheless, the reoptanty, in particular children who left with their parents or who were born in Ukraine, eventually did well after their return to Czechoslovakia. Some found employment in the various Ukrainian minority cultural institutions in Presov that were liberally funded in Communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. Most, however, assimilated into Slovak society in a conscious effort to distance themselves from the East. Among the best known of the reoptanty was Peter Bondra. He was born in Soviet Ukraine to Carpatho-Rusyn parents, who in 1947 were settled in the Soviet Union, but who returned in the 1970s to Slovakia, where Peter was raised and where he learned a new skill- hockey. This allowed him later in life to "re-emigrate," this time to the United States, where he became a star in the National Hockey League. Smigel and Krusko have done an excellent job in describing the fascinating tale of one aspect of post-World War II demographic engineering in central and eastern Europe. The narrative is interspersed with statistical charts and historic photographs . Included as well are several appendices: the full texts of the 1945 and 1946 Czechoslovak-Soviet treaties, accompanying protocols, and instructions for implementation; detailed charts with data on the 194 7 population 206 SLOVAKIA exchanges; an extensive bibliography of archival and secondary sources; and resumes in English and Russian. M. Mark Stolarik, compiler and editor, The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later. Mundelein, Ill. : Bolchazy-Carducci, 2010 . xxxiv-305 pp ., notes, photos, index, hard and soft cover. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University Salisbury, Maryland This book is based on the proceedings of a conference held at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 2008 . M. Mark Stolarik, who holds the Chair in Slovak History and Culture at that institution, organized the meeting, compiled and edited the papers, as well as contributed most of the photographs. He also wrote the Introduction in which he offered his personal reminiscences of those August days as he witnessed the invasion, the largest military action in Europe since the Second World War. His Introduction gives a brief overview of the subsequent papers and commentaries, and includes excellent footnotes providing first-rate bibliographic material covering the subject. He concludes the Introduction with an almost two-year chronology of the "Prague Spring," from October of 1967 to September of 1969, to better orient the reader. The authors of the papers and commentaries are a Who's Who of specialists on East Central Europe. Participants from countries of the former Warsaw Pact wrote the papers based largely on archival investigations: Mikhail V. Latysh (USSR), Jan Rychlik (Czech Republic), Slavomir Michalek and Stanislav Sikora (Slovakia), Lukasz Kaminski (Poland), Rudiger Wenzke (East Germany), Ivana Skalova (Bulgaria), Csaba Bekes (Hungary), and Drago~ Petrescu (Romania). Americans and Canadians who presented commentaries include: Matthew J. Ouimet (USSR), Michael Kraus (Czech Republic ), Stanislav J. Kirschbaum (Slovakia), Piotr Wrobel (Poland), Gary Bruce (East Germany), Mark Kramer (Bulgaria), Peter Pastor (Hungary), and Monica Ciobranu (Romania). At the end of the text, before the SLOVAKIA 207 index, Stolarik included "Notes on Contributors," which gives basic biographical information on the participants. The reader will find many interesting and largely hitherto unknown facts available in the standard works on the subject. For example, at the last minute, the Soviet Union would not allow East Germany to participate in the invasion for fear that it would bring back horrifying memories of the Nazi dismemberment and occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939. Yet, until its dying days, the East German government, which wholeheartedly supported the invasion, and early on argued for its implementation, perpetuated the myth that it was an active participant. Another, perhaps more striking example, would be the claim by Soviet General G. Yashkin that Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces , ordered the invasion of Czechoslovakia in early May of 1968, only to reverse his decision several minutes later. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhikov, uneasy over events in Czechoslovakia by early spring of 1968, insisted that he be present at the negotiations with Czechoslovakia and pressed for an early solution, despite the fact that Bulgaria had no common border with Czechoslovakia. Yet, after his fall from power, Zhivkov denied any wrongdoing, but instead insisted that he supported the reforms and reluctantly agreed to support the invasion. Whereas Bekes presents Hungarian leader Janos Kadar in a sympathetic light as a grand compromiser, Pastor sees him instead using double speak for domestic consumption. On a more humorous note, Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, an early proponent for intervention, intensely disliked Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek and consistently changed the "b" in his name to a "p", thereby rendering his surname in Polish to be an unmentionable part of the human anatomy in polite society. Constraints of space will not allow a discussion of the individual papers and commentaries. However, of particular note is the attention paid to Romania. This member of the Warsaw Pact neither participated in the discussions leading to nor took part in the invasion itself. Nonetheless, as most are aware, the Romanian regime outwardly supported the reforms and then vehemently attacked the invasion. Although Petrescu's piece is more of a political science approach than the other contributions, he makes a persuasive argument that the invasion provided legitimacy and popular support for Ceau~escu' s rise to power after the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu- 208 SLOVAKIA Dej. Ceau~escu would never be as popular as he was in August of 1968, when he unified and rallied the country. However, once firmly in control, he ended economic liberalization and ideological relaxation and became more autocratic, relying on his famil y members for support, which eventually led to his demise in 1989. The Soviets ultimately misjudged popular reaction to the 1968 invasion. Petrescu has included an excellent quote from the Romanian dictator that prophetically summed up the results of the invasion, "In my opinion, a big and tragic mistake, with heavy consequences upon the fate of the unity of the socialist system and the international communist and workers movement occurred (252-53)." In short, the invasion mortally wounded the Eastern Bloc 's experiment with Communism. It showed that it could not be a viable alternative to liberal democracy and market economics. This volume is a fine addition to our knowledge of the events of the Prague Spring. Some of the information may be a bit too scholarly for the general reader, but, it is an up-to-date work based on research in archives and other sources opened after 1989. It is a must read for anyone interested in the topic.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Robert M. Zecker, Streetcar Parishes: Slovak Immigrants Build their Nonlocal Communities, 1890-1945 (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 195</li> <li>Valerián Bystrický et al., Rozbitie alebo rozpad? Historické reflexie zániku Česko-Slovenska (Stanislav J. Kirschbaum), p. 197</li> <li>Martin Lacko a Ján Sabo, Žandár troch režimov alebo Slovenské dejiny 20. storočia z iného pohľadu (Yeshayahu Jelinek), p. 200</li> <li>Michal Šmigel a Štefan Kruško, Opcia a presídlenie Rusínov do ZSSR 1945-1947 (Paul Robert Magocsi), p. 203</li> <li>M. Mark Stolarik, comp. and ed., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later (Gregory C. Ference), p. 206</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Jelinek, Yeshayahu A. Kirschbaum, Stanislav J., 1942- Magocsi, Paul Robert, 1945- Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7d59c0e980cfd192af1ffe71e144d812.pdf 78a07daefd810834c32c8dd959cd86aa PDF Text Text REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA-2017 151 Jozef Klempa. Moje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. Dennik ceskoslovenskeho legionara z rokov 1914-1920. Bratislava: Slovart, 2014. l 83pp. Afterword by Viera Meliskova. Maps. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a unique and fascinating diary of a Czechoslovak (Slovak) Legionnaire from the First World War. Jozef Klempa (18941980) was trained as a shoemaker who was drafted into the AustroHungarian Armed Forces when the Great War broke out in 1914. That same year he was captured by the Russians on the eastern front and, along with many other POW's shuttled from one Russian village to another, far from the front. Amazingly, the Russian authorities treated him and other POW's quite leniently, letting them wander into nearby villages to find odd jobs, earn some kopeks or rubles, and buy food and drink to supplement their meager rations. Klempa's training as a shoemaker stood him in good stead, as he repaired the boots of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of many villagers. Indeed, he found Russian civilians very friendly and hospitable and he quickly mastered the Russian language and Russian customs. In 1918, after Germany had defeated Russia on the battlefield and the Bolsheviks had seized power, the Czechoslovak Legions, established during the war by T.G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, who tried to disarm them. Jozef Klempa, and thousands of other Czech and Slovak PO W' s joined the Czechoslovak Legions, and while fighting off various attacks by the Red Army, they decided to flee Russia by seizing control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Ural Mountains all the way to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Klempa recorded, almost on a daily basis, his experiences in crossing Siberia twice, once to flee the Bolsheviks and the second time to fight and try to defeat them, at the urging of the Allied and Associated powers. Indeed, Klempa and some of his fellow-Legionnaires were captured by the Bolsheviks on one occasion, but managed to escape. Klempa described in great detail the good relations the Czechoslovak Legionnaires had with various Kozak armies in Siberia, but denounced Admiral Kolchak and his officers. Klempa concluded that the "Whites" lost the war against the Bolsheviks because of the arrogance and cruelty of Admiral Kol- �152 SLOVAKIA-2017 chak and his officers towards Russian peasants. Indeed, it took a visit by General Stefanik in the fall of 1918 to prevent many of the Czechs and Slovaks from joining the Bolsheviks, who treated this foreign army on Russian soil better than did Admiral Kolchak. And, while Klempa had good things to say about Chinese merchants in Siberia, he had nothing but contempt for the Japanese soldiers in Vladivostok, who treated the Czechoslovak Legionnaires very badly. Finally, in May of 1920, Klempa and 3,000 other Legionnaires boarded a British ship that took them to Vancouver in Canada. They then crossed Canada by rail to the eastern port of Halifax, where they boarded another ship that took them to the German port of Zugshaven from whence they were shipped by rail to the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic at the end of July. As many other Legionnaires, Klempa was then released from the military, given a medal for his service, and eventually found a job on the Czechoslovak railroad. Over the years he regaled his family with memories of his exploits in Siberia. His granddaughter Vierka Meliskova managed to gather together his recollections, based on a detailed diary that he kept while in Russia and on the way home, and published this memoir of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire. Historians will mine it for information on this glorious chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia for many years to come. Rebekah Klein-Pejsova .. Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 194 pp., index, maps, tables. JAN LANiCEK University of New South Wales, Australia In September of 1943 , members of the civic resistance in Slovakia, led by Vavro Srobar, a founding father of the united Czechoslovak state in 1918, prepared a report that provided insights into the political loyalties of individual groups in Slovakia. Although they believed that in the case of a plebiscite, a majority of the population would decide for Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the authors suggested, would likely support the re-annexation of the Slovak territory to �SLOVAKIA-2017 153 1 Hungary. This report confirmed a problematic perception of the Jews' political loyalties twenty-five years after the creation of the independent state. It was a prelude to the Jewish predicament in post1945 Slovakia, where the accusation of the Jews ' affiliation with the Hungarian (Magyar) culture figured prominently in the public discourse and complicated the Jews ' reintegration into Slovak society. 2 The question of Jewish loyalties in Slovakia is the main theme of thi s monograph . The author focuses on the interwar period and analyzes the transformation of the Jews' loyalties from those associated with the Hungarian political and cultural-linguistic stream before 1918, to a closer alignment with the liberal Czechoslovak political regime, in what she calls the formation of the 'Slovak Jewry'. KleinPejsova defines the 'S lovak Jewry ' as "a communal category binding loyalty to Czechoslovakia with Slovak territoriality rather than an expression of emotional attachment to or identification with the Slovak nation" (p. 92) . This was a complicated process, influenced by the legacies of Hungarian rule and revisionist policies, the rise and collapse of the centralized Czechoslovak state, the emergence of the Slovak national movement closely aligned with the Catholic Church, and internal disputes in the fragmented Jewish communities. Over 135,000 Jews lived in interwar Slovakia. During the 19 th Century, the Hungarian regime emancipated the Jews and allowed them rapid social and economic progress, which led to an overwhelmming acculturation, even assimilation into the Hungarian culture. This trend was deeply resented by the nascent Slovak national movement. Already in the first months after the emergence of the Czechoslovak state - and in an atmosphere filled with anti-Jewish riots 3 - Vavro Srobar, the first Czechoslovak minister responsible for Slovakia, called on the "one hundred percent Magyarized" Jewish communities in Slovakia to seek ""the right path" and abandon their affiliation with the Hungarians (very similar words were repeated by the liberal President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk) (pp.2 and 22). Klein1 Vilem Precan, ed. , Slovenske narodne povstanie: Dokum enty (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury 1965), 89. 2 Anna Cichopek-Gajraj , Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia (Cambridge : Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2014). 3 This subj ect has been recently comprehen sively addressed by Michal Frankl and Miloslav Szabo, Budovani statu bez antisemitismu. Nasili, diskurz loajality a vznik Ceskoslovenska (Praha : NLN, 20 I 6) . �154 SLOVAKIA-2017 Pejsova 's excellent book debates how the Jews responded to these new challenges . Jewish loyalties were constantly under investigation in the interwar period . Although Czechoslovakia accepted the protection of minorities imposed by the Paris Peace Conference (though the government rejected the inclusion of the articles that specifically reiterated the rights of the Jews), the state attempted to prove the dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in the country. The census became the main instrument by which to officially declare loyalties to the new state. The government used the declared "mother tongue" as the main determinant of nationality, and only the Jews were allowed to declare their belonging to the Jewish nationality, regardless of their mother tongue. Klein-Pejsova identifies two possible explanations for this concession: either a liberal vision which re-conceptualized nationality "as an internal conviction", or a less liberal vision, which granted this right to the Jews with the intention of weakening the territorial minorities in the state, namely the Germans and Hungarians. Regardless of the motivations, the number of 'Hungarians' among the Jews sharply decreased in the interwar era (also because of anti-Semitism in Hungary), which contributed to the Hungarians losing some minority rights in certain districts, including Bratislava. Henceforth Hungarians blamed the Jews for this lack of corporate cultural rights, in the same way that the Czechs blamed the Jews in other districts, where the German or Hungarian minority reached the 20% threshold and could use their language in public affairs. Both sides blamed the Jews. A large number of Jews in the country - Klein-Pejsova suggests - decided to follow their own path and declared Jewish nationality, demonstrating neutrality in the national conflict, but at the same time declaring their support for the Czechoslovak state. In 1930, 57% of the Jews across the republic chose this option, and their numbers were exceptionally high especially in the eastern territories, including Slovakia. This acceptance of Jewish nationality should not be confused with support for Jewish nationalism, in the modem sense, a point, which could have been stressed a bit more throughout the monograph. Large parts of the Orthodox and Hassidic communities declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish nationality in the census, but they overtly and consistently rejected modem Jewish nationalist politics. �SLOVAKIA-2017 155 Klein-Pejsova frequently compares the situation of the Jews in Slovakia to the Bohemian Lands, where the Jews largely acculturated into the Czech national stream. This comparative element could have developed differently if the author had focused on Moravia, where, especially in the major cities (Brno and Moravska Ostrava), the progress of cultural affiliation with the Czech nation was much slower and the German language dominated among the Jews until the end of the interwar period (though there was an increased effort to change the affiliation after 1933). Even here, the declaration of Jewish nationality offered a way out of the loyalty quandary for the Jews, who were affiliated with non-Slavic cultures. The Jews thus clearly aligned with the Czechoslovak political regime, at least in their public proclamations, though it is much more difficult to prove how the situation was perceived in daily contacts at the local level. Also, what did it mean for ordinary people - Jews and non-Jews alike - to declare a particular nationality in a decennial census? As Klein-Pejsova aptly concludes, '"'the tragic weakness of Jewish nationality lay in its illegibility", which opened it to interpretations (p.114). One can argue that ordinary people, but also state bureaucrats, were much more interested in the language that the Jews used in their daily contacts. Although the Jews believed that a declaration of Jewish nationality was sufficient proof of their loyalties, and continued to use the Hungarian language, this was an inadequate reorientation in the minds of Slovaks. The second problem was that the Jews tied their loyalties to the centralized Czechoslovak state and not the Slovak nation. The growing Slovak autonomous movement criticized the lack of Jewish support for their national ambitions, and the late 1930s witnessed new cases of anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia, with prominent Slovak politicians (Karol Sidor) even calling for the relocation of the Jews to the Soviet-Jewish Autonomous territory in Birobidzhan in the Far East. In November of 1938, shortly after gaining autonomy, but also after losing extensive territory to Hungary, the Slovak government organized one of the first mass deportations of the Jews in the pre-World War II period, when 7,500 'S lovak Jews ', blamed for the territorial losses, were chased across the new border to Hungary. This book makes a crucial contribution to the question of minority loyalties in Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. It points to a dramatic divergence of the constructions of loyalties �156 SLOVAKIA-2017 between the majority and minority populations. The question which remains is what was the ' right path' for the Jews in the interwar period which was filled with contradictory expectations from the Czechoslovak state, Slovak nation, Jewish nationalists, Jewish Orthodox, and Hungarian revisionists? It is possible to conclude that each path irreversibly led to a dead end. Paul Robert Magocsi. With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus '. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015 , 509 pp. including 34 maps, notes, bibliography and index plus a picture section. KEITH P. DYRUD Retired Professor Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota With Their Backs to the Mountains introduces the CarpathoRusyns and their homeland which the author calls Carpathian Rus ', the north and south slopes of the mountainous area between Poland, Slovakia and the region of Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Magocsi begins with a brief historical and geographical account of the land and people but provides more detail in the nineteenth century when a Ukrainian national movement started to develop with advocates who argued that Rus ' was the historical name for the Ukrainian people and their land. This argument would undercut Magocsi ' s thesis that Carpatho-Rusyns are a separate nationality. The other challenge to his thesis was posed by Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism . After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians (Magyars) adopted a policy of Magyarization, that is, the forcible assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities, including the Slovaks and Rusyns. Magocsi defines the Carpatho-Rusyn national identity as the culture expressed by the people originating in Carpathian Rus ' who followed Eastern Rite Christianity and spoke a unique language different from Ukrainian. Some emphasis is placed on "originating" in Carpathian Rus ' because as early as the mid-eighteenth century several thousand Carpatho-Rusyns were resettled in areas of Hungary, now parts of Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, which were lightly settled because of �SLOVAKIA-2017 157 the Ottoman retreat. To this day, these ex-Carpathians identify as Rusyns and, as part of Magocsi 's narrative, continue to maintain their unique culture and language. The emphasis on originating in Carpathian Rus ' justifies his inclusion of Rusyns also living in the United States and several South American countries. The Hungarian revolt in 1849 brought Russian armies through the Carpatho-Rusyns ' land and suggested to the the Rusyn intelligentsia that they could be Russians. Magocsi identifies the three decades that followed as the first national awakening. The options explored were uniting the Carpatho-Rusyns with the Galicians to the North, uniting only the Carpatho-Rusyns, or perhaps identifying themselves as a part of the Great Russian people. The Ukrainian option had a strong influence in Galicia and perhaps thwarted the Carpatho-Rusyn Galician option. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, an autonomous Hungary focused on Magyarizing its minorities. This movement had a major impact on the Carpatho-Rusyns as well as the Slovaks living within the Carpathian Rus ' area. The Lemkos on the North slope of the Carpathians were administratively in the Austrian province of Galicia and not subject to Magyarization. Here the Carpatho-Rusyn leaders lobbied to maintain their language in the schools where they were a majority of the village population. In Hungary the Rusyn effort was thwarted by the Greek Catholic Bishops who were often Magyarone Carpatho-Rusyns. Since World Wars I and II altered the map of Central Europe, Magocsi deals with each Carpathian Rus ' area separately. The second national awakening occurred during the interwar period and is covered in depth. Magocsi provides the names of Carpatho-Rusyn organizations, their publications and cultural activities and statistics on the school systems. Data is provided on how many schools used the local dialect and the percentage of the local populations that identified as Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, Magyar, or Slovak. The Lemkos are treated separately from the Carpatho-Rusyns to their south in the Presov region of Slovakia. The eastern portion of Carpathian Rus ' had several names in the twentieth century and is now called the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The CarpathoRusyns in Transcarpathia mostly identify as Ukrainians . In Table 1.1 Magocsi identifies 853 ,000 people who should be identified as Carpatho-Rusyns which includes 80,000 Lemkos forcibly resettled �158 SLOVAKIA-2017 there after WWII. Now only 10,100 of them self-identify as Carpatho-Rusyns. During World War II the Lemko region was made part of the Generalgouvernrnent of Nazi Germany and received better treatment than the other Carpatho-Rusyns. Shortly after the war ended, Poland disbursed over 80,000 Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine, leaving only 25 ,000 to 35,000 in their ancestral homeland. In the summer of 1947, the Polish army forcibly resettled about 35,000 Lemkos to the western areas of Poland recently cleared of Germans. Only about 7,300 Lemkos managed to avoid deportation. The final chapters of the book follow the Carpatho-Rusyns, wherever they settled, and describe their social, economic and political situations, and their third national awakening. In the final chapters, Magocsi is no longer describing the "shaping of a national identity" but rather documenting the shaping of a cultural identity. Magocsi himself has actively promoted establishing a literary language for each of the various Carpatho-Rusyn dialects. His effort has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian nationalists who insist that there is no Rusyn nationality, only various Ukrainian dialects and subcultures. Magocsi himself quotes one of many such detractors who call the movement "political Rusynism." "This nefarious phenomenon, so they said, was the work of a few ' intellectually misguided' or 'politically opportunistic' individuals 'paid' and, in some cases led by Carpatho-Rusyn 'protectors' in North America (especially the University of Toronto Professor Paul Robert Magocsi)." Valerian Bystricky. Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu 14. marca 1939. Bratislava: Veda, 2014, bibliography, name index, 464 pp. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University The Slovak historian Bystricky (born 1936), a member and former Director of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has a prodigious scholarly record with more than 120 works published at home and abroad. His latest book is very wellresearched, drawing upon contemporary newspaper articles, mem- �SLOVAKIA-2017 159 oirs, and archival materials from various countries. The author divided his seven-chapter monograph into numerous sub-chapters, making for easier navigation. Numerous footnotes also add information to help clarify the text. However, this is a dense volume that is not for everyday reading. Besides the myriad actors presented, a major flaw is that the author seems to want to include as much information as possible, resulting in many instances of repetition. Perhaps a more succinct volume would have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, this is an interesting book. It concentrates on how the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSCS) went from the struggle for autonomy, as outlined in the Pittsburgh Agreement, to the building of Slovak autonomy and a state within the framework of a federated Czecho-Slovakia after Munich. It also made preparations for the possibility of an independent country in the future, resulting in the unexpected proclamation of independence on March 14, 1939. When the HSCS did not get what it wanted from the Czechoslovak government in the late 1920's, it went into opposition . Slovak political parties prior to Slovak independence had little influence upon the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, although the democracy of the country gave Slovaks a desire to have a say in world affairs. With the exception of the Communists, no Slovak political parties had a clear-cut view of foreign policy. Foreign powers and enemies of Czechoslovakia would use Slovak rights and grievances to weaken the state. The members of the HSCS, or Cudaks, could not convince the Western Powers about the need to the transform the state into a federation , thereby causing the Cudaks to look for support elsewhere. The HSCS became the only Slovak political party to accept funds from abroad for its political program. The main threat to Czechoslovakia prior to 1936 remained irredentist Hungary. The rise of Hitler would prove to be a greater danger to the integrity of the state. At first the HSCS viewed the Nazis as non-threatening, then became reserved, while the younger generation of Cudaks began to admire Germany, causing democracy to weaken, both on the right and on the left. Slovakia was largely forgotten during the Munich Crisis, but it led to Slovakia receiving autonomy within a weakened CzechoSlovakia. With this autonomy, the HSCS quickly consolidated power by either banning or forcing the other national or Slovak political parties to merge with it, ending democracy and leading to an authori- �160 SLOVAKIA-2017 tarian regime with the Cudaks claiming to speak for all Slovaks, with independence becoming an eventual goal. Although the Cudaks initially looked to Poland as a possible ally and counterweight to Germany, they were disappointed by Poland ' s desire for Slovak territory and subsequent Czecho-Slovak territorial concessions to Poland. After the First Vienna Award in November of 1938, when Hungary annexed southern Slovakia, the HSCS realized its only friend and protector could be Germany. Radical Cudaks held numerous secret talks with various Nazis in the fall of I 938 and early 1939 without the knowledge of the moderates, including Slovak Premier Fr. Jozef Tiso. Except for Hitler, who felt he could not fight the Western Powers without first destroying CzechoSlovakia, no one knew what the future held for the country. The Nazis began to collaborate with the radical Cudaks to destabilize Czecho-Slovakia so that they could occupy Bohemia and Moravia without being labeled as aggressors. The key became Slovak independence, with the Nazis using the HSCS as their entry for the destruction of Czecho-S lovakia, but it had to be provoked by the Czechs. The so-called Homola putsch, when the Czecho-S lovak military occupied Slovakia on March 9, 1939 as a means to keep Slovakia in the republic, became a comedy of errors not only for Prague, but also for the Nazis . The dismissal of the autonomous Tiso government by Prague, and the ineffectual occupation led to the imprisonment of many Cudak radicals, upon whom the Germans had placed hopes for proclaiming independence during March 11-12. Although the Nazis had no advance knowledge of these Czech actions, they expected Karol Sidor, as the new Slovak premier and leader of the para-military Hlinka Guard, to do their bidding. The Polonophile Sidor refused. When bullying by a Nazi official produced no results, the Germans rebuffed "the soldier of Prague" Sidor as premier and turned to the only alternative, save military intervention, which would have shown Berlin to be the aggressor: Tiso, who no longer had any governmental authority. Like Sidor, Tiso refused to unilaterally proclaim independence, instead wanting to do so legally. Warned by Hitler that Hungary would swallow Slovakia unless independence was declared immediately, Tiso asked for and received the Slovak parliament' s approval on March 14, a few days later than the Nazis had wanted . This act gave the green light for �SLOVAKIA-2017 161 Germany to occupy Bohemia and Moravia the next day, claiming that Slovak independence came from the disintegration of CzechoSlovakia and that Germany had not destroyed it. Very few public manifestations greeted the new Slovak state while life went on as usual. Except for a handful of mostly radical l'.udaks, few Slovaks wanted an independent country in March, rather hoping for a gradual and evolutionary process than the unlawful revolutionary solution enacted. The bottom line and reoccurring theme of this work revolves around the fact that without Nazi support, Slovakia would not have gained independence in March of 1939. As such, Slovakia's fate was tied to German victory in the Second World War. Yet, as Bystricky notes, the Slovak government and its supporters largely underplayed and tried to ignore the Nazi connection to Slovak independence. Instead, the government presented Slovak independence as an act of the self-determination of nations, historic and natural rights, and the renewal of a long- ago medieval kingdom. This view persists among supporters of wartime Slovakia to this day. Pal'o Carnogursky. Suboj s komunizmom. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013 , 368 pp. Suboj s komunizmom 2. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Spolku slovenskych spisovatel'ov, 2015 , 367 pp. Jan Rychlik Charles University, Prague The well-known Latin expression habent sua fata libeli (books have their destinies) is true about the memoirs of the Catholic activist, politician, journalist and amateur historian Pavo) Carnogursky ( 1908-1992), which were posthumously published by his oldest son Ivan in two volumes in 2013 a 2015 under the title "Suboj s komunizmom" (The Duel with Communism). In the early 1970's Carnogursky wrote his memoirs on important events in modern Slovak history - the proclamation of Slovak autonomy on 6 October 1938 and the declaration of Slovakia' s independence on 14 March 1939. These materials were confiscated by State Security (Statna bezpecnost' - StB) in 1976 and returned only after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989. They were published by the Institute of History of the Slo- �162 SLOVAKIA-2017 vak Academy of Sciences in 1992 and 1993 .- In 1985-1986 Carnogursky, deprived of his personal notes, also tape-recorded his memoirs which, however, remained incomplete but were published posthumously by his younger son Jan in 1997 under the title Svedok cias (A Witness to the Times).- Now we have new, hitherto unknown, memoirs of Pavo) Carnogursky, which are an important testimony, not only about historical events and important personalities of Slovak political life, but also about the "soft" methods of persecution of political opponents during the regime of the so-called "normalization" ( 1969-1989). The texts presented in both volumes of Souboj s komunizmom were written between 1976 and1979, after Carnogursky's release from six weeks of custody (from November 8 to December 15, 1976). Carnogursky was imprisoned because he sent for publication to the West documents concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. He was accused of "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" according to article 112 of the Penal Code of 1961 (this article was frequently used against opponents of the regime if they published their materials abroad). Carnogursky faced up to three years in prison. Fortunately, this did not happen. He was released from custody, interrogated from time-to-time for two more years about his activities and contacts abroad, and finally - at the end of 1979 - the criminal proceedings were suspended. After each interrogation, Carnogursky described what had happened. He also made a detailed list of the documents which were confiscated from his personal archive and tried to restore them from memory. In describing the " lost" materials, he always added his personal testimony to the event or person. Because he was afraid that the notes and materials might be confiscated again, he decided to hide them. He did so with his relative Michal Skokan in Poprad. It is not clear why Pavo) Carnogursky did not claim his materials after the fall of Communism in November of 1989. Skokan's family probably forgot about them . The documents were returned to Carnogursky' s oldest son Ivan only in 2011, nine years after his father's death. In addition, in 2013 Pal'o Carogursky's comments on Gustav Husak's book Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani (1964) and his correspondence with Slovak Communist poet Laco Novomesky, were found in the Archive of the Office of the President in the Prague Castle among Gustav Husak's papers by the young Czech historian, Michal Machacek, a �SLOVAKIA-2017 163 postgraduate student of the author of this review. Machacek informed Carnogursky 's family about this through Slovak historian Pavo! Minarik (see Vol. 2, p. 364). Carnogursky 's comments were later added as an appendix to the second volume of memoirs. Unfortunately, the correspondence between Pavo! Carnogursky and Laco Novomesky was not published in extenso. To understand the memoires, it is necessary not only to know Slovak history of the 20 th Century, but also to know who was Pavo! Carnogursky. Originally a schoolteacher, young Carnogursky also studied law at the Charles University in Prague. From his youth he was an active member of the Slovak autonomist movement, closely associated with the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS), although officially (at least according to his memoirs) he never formally joined the party. He was the secretary of the Association of Catholic Youth and also a close collaborator of Karol Sidor (1901-1953), a leading figure of the HSCS and originally the designated successor to Andrej Hlinka. In autonomous Slovakia (1938-1939) Camogursky was a high official of the Ministry of Education. In December of 1938 he was elected to the Slovak autonomous Diet and, as a deputy of this law-making body, he voted on 14 March 1939 for Slovakia' s independence. Carnogursky, like his mentor Sidor, was a Polonophile and opposed the official proGerman orientation of Slovakia. Unlike Sidor, who, under German pressure was forced out of the Slovak government and sent as the Slovak minister to the Vatican, Carnogursky remained in Slovakia and took an active part in the political life of the wartime Slovak Republic. Unlike many other politicians of the Slovak Republic, Carnogursky did not flee the country in 1945 . He remained an adherent of independence for Slovakia but viewed it as unrealistic at the time. He accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as a matter of fact. As an editor of the weekly Katolicke noviny (1945-194 7) he again participated in Slovak political life. He collected money and hired lawyers to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso, former President of Slovakia, who was put on trial after the war. In 1946, Carnogursky helped negotiate the so-called April Agreement, a political pact between representatives of political Catholicism and the Protestant leaders of the Democratic Party. Due to this Agreement, the Democratic Party won the votes of the majority of Slovak Catholics and also the parliamentary �164 SLOVAKIA-2017 elections in Slovakia, which were held on May 26, 1946 . These elections were a political defeat for the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, the Democratic Party was not able - despite its electoral victory -- to stop the Communist takeover of power. For his anti-communist and pro-independence stance, Carnogursky was arrested several times: shortly in the summer of 1945 and 1946, and definitively in October of 194 7. After the communist takeover of February 25, I 948, he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for "anti-state conspiracy". More serious was his next arrest in January of 1951. After his release in I 953 , he lived in Bratislava and worked as a laborer. In the 1960s, during the period of liberalization, he started to cooperate with the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History of the Slovak Communist Party. He collected many materials dealing with modern Slovak history and published several articles. The period of the socalled "normalization," however, interrupted Carnogursky's cooperation with academic circles. After that he concentrated on the defence of religious freedom. His criticism of the anti-religious policy of the communist regime led to his last imprisonment and interrogation on November 8, 1976. Despite the fact that he was soon released and the proceedings were halted in 1979, he did not get back his personal archive, which was confiscated after his arrest. The confiscated documents were later handed over by the police to the Slovak State Central Archive (now the Slovak National Archives) and Carnogursky got them back in 1991 . It is very difficult to describe the contents of Pavo) Carnogursky's notes . He was a witness and often also a participant in many historical events. He also met many historical personalities and tried to describe them . The text is interesting and quite readable, despite the fact that the author often repeats himself. As always in memoirs, many of Carnogursky's standpoints are subjective and some explanations problematic and doubtful. Some of Carnogursky's conclusions contradict known facts . The main problem with the whole text is, however, the large number of factual errors. For example, in Volume 1, on page 4 7, in the summer of 1965 Gustav Husak was working as a researcher in the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak academy of Sciences (Ustav statu a prava SA V), not in Stavoindustria, as Carnogursky claims; on page 70, Vlado Clementis was executed on December 3, 1952, not on December 8; on page �SLOVAKIA-2017 165 231 - Milos Gosiorovsky sent his memorandum advocating the federalization of Czechoslovakia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on July 29, 1963 , not in the year 1955; on page 238 when the Slovak government stopped the deportations of Jews (on October 20, 1942), between 23 ,000 and 24,000 Jews remained in Slovakia, not 45 ,000 or even 50,000 (p.318); on page 242 - Andrej Hlinka died on August 16, 1938, not on August 15 ; on page 249 Stalin died on March 5, 1953, not on March 3rd; The Constitutional Law "On the Czechoslovak Federation" (No. 143/ 1968) was signed at Bratislava Castle on October 30, 1968 (on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin), not on October 23rd. In Vol. 2, on page 245 - the correct name of the provisional parliament in 1945-1946 was "Provisional National Assembly", not Revolutionary National Assembly (this was the name of the provisional parliament in 1918-1920). Camogursky also forgot many minor details, events or mixed them up. For example, in Volume 1, on page 33 the first name of Dr. Horakova, the hero of Czech anti-Nazi and antiCommunist resistance (and first woman sentenced to death and executed in modem Czech and Slovak history), was Milada, not Maria; In Vol. 2., page 124 - Camogursky mixed up "Slovenska obnova" with the daily "Narodna obroda", which was published by the Slovak National Council. Also in Vol. 2, page 194 - Frantisek Nemec, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government in exile and his staff settled in Carpathian Ruthenia in Chust, not in Sevl'us; Also in Vo. 2, on page 253 - Stefan Bast'ovansky did not commit suicide in prison in 1952. He committed suicide at home on 27 November, 1952, on the same day that the State Court in Prague sentenced to death eleven members of the "Rudolf Slansky anti-state group". These errors are perfectly understandable. Camogursky was describing events which happened several decades earlier and he did not have the opportunity to check the facts , either in published sources or in the archives. The editor or the publishing house should have hired a professional historian, who in the form of footnotes , would have corrected these obvious mistakes. In spite of these shortcomings, however, both volumes are a valuable contribution to modem Slovak history. �166 SLOVAKIA-2017 James Krapfl. Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, xxi-260 pp., figures, maps, tables, abbreviations, notes, chronology, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Bratislava This book examines the events that marked the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia and its transition to democracy from the fall of 1989 to the summer of 1992. As the classic expression goes, habent sua fata libelli - each book has a story behind it. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that the English edition of the book was preceded by its Slovak version, published in 2009, which usually happens the other way around. Krapfl provides an insightful, well-documented and convincing picture of the struggle of Czechoslovakia's citizens to find a new way for themselves and their future state. He suggests that what happened in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 was a true revolution from every angle. The book is based on very comprehensive research in Czechoslovakia and its sucessor states in the 1990s and 2000s. He searched primary sources , not only in the urban centers and major archives, but also in the regions. His sources included leaflets, pamphlets, internal reports and instructions issued by the newly-emerging political entities that had served as major agents of political transition in post-Communist Czechoslovakia -the Civic Forum in Prague (OF) and Public Against Violence in Bratislava (VPN)--along with their regional and local branches . Such sources are of crucial importance when examining the substance of any modem revolution, for they serve as the most authentic indicators of an atmosphere full of civic passion and enthusiasm that the replaced previous passivity and obedience to communist political authorities. The overall picture is broad, in some respects too broad. However, keeping in mind that the major protagonists of the story are not individuals, but communities and their little-known representatives, this does not constitute a problem. Krapfl' s deep faith in the humanness and civic spirit of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, who were determined to overcome all the dificulties that stemmed from a �SLOVAKIA-2017 167 political power-vacuum on the one hand, and uncertainty, as far as new institutional and constitutional designs were concerned, on the other hand, can be felt from beginning to end. Krapfl is perfectly aware of the sad fact that, two decades after the Velvet Revolution, skepticism by ordinary Slovaks and Czechs, and their displeasure with current political elites, is ubiquitous. More importantly, he has no doubt that the sudden rise of a civic movement in the fall of 1989 was authentic, spontaneous and true. Meanwhile, he avoids commenting on national conflict, which would otherwise lead to blaming either side or both for their mistakes on the thorny path to democracy. The first two chapters provide a theoretical framework of the civic movement in Czechoslovakia after the communist regime fell in November of 1989. As any other good book, this one culminates near its end. The central theme that shapes the book is a hearkening back to the reform movement of the 1960's in communist Czechoslovakia.. Krapfl is disciplined enough not to repeat variations of political and legal evolution of a joint state that was destined to fail since this subject had already been covered by prolific scholars such as Carol Skalnik Leff, Eric Stein, Shari J. Cohen, Abby Innes and Gil Eyal, to name just a few. Krapfl ' s analysis of the altercation between the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the almost exclusive representatives of their communities before the 1990 parliamentary elections belongs to the best discourses on the topic yet written by a western scholar on postCommunist Czechoslovakia. Two short observations are in order. In a future edition of the book the bibliography should be expanded to include new titles that emerged between its first Slovak and English editions. Also, to balance the period before the community of citizens began to fall apart, and their subsequent and inevitable transformation into political parties following the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and June 1992, more should have been written about the the period between the two elections. Due to Krapfl s masterly knowledge of the subject, thoughtful narrative, empathy for and respect toward the country and its peoples, his book represents a very informative and valuable contribution to the most recent scholarship on East Central Europe, not only from the perspective of cultural history, as the author �168 SLOVAKIA-2017 modestly claims, but also to sociology and political science. Today, when it seems that the glorious days of the Velvet Revolution and its legacy are numbered, as were the days of the French revolution (to which Krapfl in some aspects compares the former) , the importance of the book is significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the faith of the citizenry and civic movements have been substantially reduced, neglected or almost forgotten. � REVIEWS ��SLOVAKIA-2017 151 Jozef Klempa. Moje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. Dennik ceskoslovenskeho legionara z rokov 1914-1920. Bratislava: Slovart, 2014. l 83pp. Afterword by Viera Meliskova. Maps. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a unique and fascinating diary of a Czechoslovak (Slovak) Legionnaire from the First World War. Jozef Klempa (18941980) was trained as a shoemaker who was drafted into the AustroHungarian Armed Forces when the Great War broke out in 1914. That same year he was captured by the Russians on the eastern front and, along with many other POW's shuttled from one Russian village to another, far from the front. Amazingly, the Russian authorities treated him and other POW's quite leniently, letting them wander into nearby villages to find odd jobs, earn some kopeks or rubles, and buy food and drink to supplement their meager rations. Klempa's training as a shoemaker stood him in good stead, as he repaired the boots of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of many villagers. Indeed, he found Russian civilians very friendly and hospitable and he quickly mastered the Russian language and Russian customs. In 1918, after Germany had defeated Russia on the battlefield and the Bolsheviks had seized power, the Czechoslovak Legions, established during the war by T.G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, who tried to disarm them. Jozef Klempa, and thousands of other Czech and Slovak PO W' s joined the Czechoslovak Legions, and while fighting off various attacks by the Red Army, they decided to flee Russia by seizing control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Ural Mountains all the way to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Klempa recorded, almost on a daily basis, his experiences in crossing Siberia twice, once to flee the Bolsheviks and the second time to fight and try to defeat them, at the urging of the Allied and Associated powers. Indeed, Klempa and some of his fellow-Legionnaires were captured by the Bolsheviks on one occasion, but managed to escape. Klempa described in great detail the good relations the Czechoslovak Legionnaires had with various Kozak armies in Siberia, but denounced Admiral Kolchak and his officers. Klempa concluded that the "Whites" lost the war against the Bolsheviks because of the arrogance and cruelty of Admiral Kol- �152 SLOVAKIA-2017 chak and his officers towards Russian peasants. Indeed, it took a visit by General Stefanik in the fall of 1918 to prevent many of the Czechs and Slovaks from joining the Bolsheviks, who treated this foreign army on Russian soil better than did Admiral Kolchak. And, while Klempa had good things to say about Chinese merchants in Siberia, he had nothing but contempt for the Japanese soldiers in Vladivostok, who treated the Czechoslovak Legionnaires very badly. Finally, in May of 1920, Klempa and 3,000 other Legionnaires boarded a British ship that took them to Vancouver in Canada. They then crossed Canada by rail to the eastern port of Halifax, where they boarded another ship that took them to the German port of Zugshaven from whence they were shipped by rail to the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic at the end of July. As many other Legionnaires, Klempa was then released from the military, given a medal for his service, and eventually found a job on the Czechoslovak railroad. Over the years he regaled his family with memories of his exploits in Siberia. His granddaughter Vierka Meliskova managed to gather together his recollections, based on a detailed diary that he kept while in Russia and on the way home, and published this memoir of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire. Historians will mine it for information on this glorious chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia for many years to come. Rebekah Klein-Pejsova .. Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 194 pp., index, maps, tables. JAN LANiCEK University of New South Wales, Australia In September of 1943 , members of the civic resistance in Slovakia, led by Vavro Srobar, a founding father of the united Czechoslovak state in 1918, prepared a report that provided insights into the political loyalties of individual groups in Slovakia. Although they believed that in the case of a plebiscite, a majority of the population would decide for Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the authors suggested, would likely support the re-annexation of the Slovak territory to �SLOVAKIA-2017 153 1 Hungary. This report confirmed a problematic perception of the Jews' political loyalties twenty-five years after the creation of the independent state. It was a prelude to the Jewish predicament in post1945 Slovakia, where the accusation of the Jews ' affiliation with the Hungarian (Magyar) culture figured prominently in the public discourse and complicated the Jews ' reintegration into Slovak society. 2 The question of Jewish loyalties in Slovakia is the main theme of thi s monograph . The author focuses on the interwar period and analyzes the transformation of the Jews' loyalties from those associated with the Hungarian political and cultural-linguistic stream before 1918, to a closer alignment with the liberal Czechoslovak political regime, in what she calls the formation of the 'Slovak Jewry'. KleinPejsova defines the 'S lovak Jewry ' as "a communal category binding loyalty to Czechoslovakia with Slovak territoriality rather than an expression of emotional attachment to or identification with the Slovak nation" (p. 92) . This was a complicated process, influenced by the legacies of Hungarian rule and revisionist policies, the rise and collapse of the centralized Czechoslovak state, the emergence of the Slovak national movement closely aligned with the Catholic Church, and internal disputes in the fragmented Jewish communities. Over 135,000 Jews lived in interwar Slovakia. During the 19 th Century, the Hungarian regime emancipated the Jews and allowed them rapid social and economic progress, which led to an overwhelmming acculturation, even assimilation into the Hungarian culture. This trend was deeply resented by the nascent Slovak national movement. Already in the first months after the emergence of the Czechoslovak state - and in an atmosphere filled with anti-Jewish riots 3 - Vavro Srobar, the first Czechoslovak minister responsible for Slovakia, called on the "one hundred percent Magyarized" Jewish communities in Slovakia to seek ""the right path" and abandon their affiliation with the Hungarians (very similar words were repeated by the liberal President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk) (pp.2 and 22). Klein1 Vilem Precan, ed. , Slovenske narodne povstanie: Dokum enty (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury 1965), 89. 2 Anna Cichopek-Gajraj , Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia (Cambridge : Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2014). 3 This subj ect has been recently comprehen sively addressed by Michal Frankl and Miloslav Szabo, Budovani statu bez antisemitismu. Nasili, diskurz loajality a vznik Ceskoslovenska (Praha : NLN, 20 I 6) . �154 SLOVAKIA-2017 Pejsova 's excellent book debates how the Jews responded to these new challenges . Jewish loyalties were constantly under investigation in the interwar period . Although Czechoslovakia accepted the protection of minorities imposed by the Paris Peace Conference (though the government rejected the inclusion of the articles that specifically reiterated the rights of the Jews), the state attempted to prove the dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in the country. The census became the main instrument by which to officially declare loyalties to the new state. The government used the declared "mother tongue" as the main determinant of nationality, and only the Jews were allowed to declare their belonging to the Jewish nationality, regardless of their mother tongue. Klein-Pejsova identifies two possible explanations for this concession: either a liberal vision which re-conceptualized nationality "as an internal conviction", or a less liberal vision, which granted this right to the Jews with the intention of weakening the territorial minorities in the state, namely the Germans and Hungarians. Regardless of the motivations, the number of 'Hungarians' among the Jews sharply decreased in the interwar era (also because of anti-Semitism in Hungary), which contributed to the Hungarians losing some minority rights in certain districts, including Bratislava. Henceforth Hungarians blamed the Jews for this lack of corporate cultural rights, in the same way that the Czechs blamed the Jews in other districts, where the German or Hungarian minority reached the 20% threshold and could use their language in public affairs. Both sides blamed the Jews. A large number of Jews in the country - Klein-Pejsova suggests - decided to follow their own path and declared Jewish nationality, demonstrating neutrality in the national conflict, but at the same time declaring their support for the Czechoslovak state. In 1930, 57% of the Jews across the republic chose this option, and their numbers were exceptionally high especially in the eastern territories, including Slovakia. This acceptance of Jewish nationality should not be confused with support for Jewish nationalism, in the modem sense, a point, which could have been stressed a bit more throughout the monograph. Large parts of the Orthodox and Hassidic communities declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish nationality in the census, but they overtly and consistently rejected modem Jewish nationalist politics. �SLOVAKIA-2017 155 Klein-Pejsova frequently compares the situation of the Jews in Slovakia to the Bohemian Lands, where the Jews largely acculturated into the Czech national stream. This comparative element could have developed differently if the author had focused on Moravia, where, especially in the major cities (Brno and Moravska Ostrava), the progress of cultural affiliation with the Czech nation was much slower and the German language dominated among the Jews until the end of the interwar period (though there was an increased effort to change the affiliation after 1933). Even here, the declaration of Jewish nationality offered a way out of the loyalty quandary for the Jews, who were affiliated with non-Slavic cultures. The Jews thus clearly aligned with the Czechoslovak political regime, at least in their public proclamations, though it is much more difficult to prove how the situation was perceived in daily contacts at the local level. Also, what did it mean for ordinary people - Jews and non-Jews alike - to declare a particular nationality in a decennial census? As Klein-Pejsova aptly concludes, '"'the tragic weakness of Jewish nationality lay in its illegibility", which opened it to interpretations (p.114). One can argue that ordinary people, but also state bureaucrats, were much more interested in the language that the Jews used in their daily contacts. Although the Jews believed that a declaration of Jewish nationality was sufficient proof of their loyalties, and continued to use the Hungarian language, this was an inadequate reorientation in the minds of Slovaks. The second problem was that the Jews tied their loyalties to the centralized Czechoslovak state and not the Slovak nation. The growing Slovak autonomous movement criticized the lack of Jewish support for their national ambitions, and the late 1930s witnessed new cases of anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia, with prominent Slovak politicians (Karol Sidor) even calling for the relocation of the Jews to the Soviet-Jewish Autonomous territory in Birobidzhan in the Far East. In November of 1938, shortly after gaining autonomy, but also after losing extensive territory to Hungary, the Slovak government organized one of the first mass deportations of the Jews in the pre-World War II period, when 7,500 'S lovak Jews ', blamed for the territorial losses, were chased across the new border to Hungary. This book makes a crucial contribution to the question of minority loyalties in Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. It points to a dramatic divergence of the constructions of loyalties �156 SLOVAKIA-2017 between the majority and minority populations. The question which remains is what was the ' right path' for the Jews in the interwar period which was filled with contradictory expectations from the Czechoslovak state, Slovak nation, Jewish nationalists, Jewish Orthodox, and Hungarian revisionists? It is possible to conclude that each path irreversibly led to a dead end. Paul Robert Magocsi. With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus '. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015 , 509 pp. including 34 maps, notes, bibliography and index plus a picture section. KEITH P. DYRUD Retired Professor Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota With Their Backs to the Mountains introduces the CarpathoRusyns and their homeland which the author calls Carpathian Rus ', the north and south slopes of the mountainous area between Poland, Slovakia and the region of Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Magocsi begins with a brief historical and geographical account of the land and people but provides more detail in the nineteenth century when a Ukrainian national movement started to develop with advocates who argued that Rus ' was the historical name for the Ukrainian people and their land. This argument would undercut Magocsi ' s thesis that Carpatho-Rusyns are a separate nationality. The other challenge to his thesis was posed by Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism . After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians (Magyars) adopted a policy of Magyarization, that is, the forcible assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities, including the Slovaks and Rusyns. Magocsi defines the Carpatho-Rusyn national identity as the culture expressed by the people originating in Carpathian Rus ' who followed Eastern Rite Christianity and spoke a unique language different from Ukrainian. Some emphasis is placed on "originating" in Carpathian Rus ' because as early as the mid-eighteenth century several thousand Carpatho-Rusyns were resettled in areas of Hungary, now parts of Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, which were lightly settled because of �SLOVAKIA-2017 157 the Ottoman retreat. To this day, these ex-Carpathians identify as Rusyns and, as part of Magocsi 's narrative, continue to maintain their unique culture and language. The emphasis on originating in Carpathian Rus ' justifies his inclusion of Rusyns also living in the United States and several South American countries. The Hungarian revolt in 1849 brought Russian armies through the Carpatho-Rusyns ' land and suggested to the the Rusyn intelligentsia that they could be Russians. Magocsi identifies the three decades that followed as the first national awakening. The options explored were uniting the Carpatho-Rusyns with the Galicians to the North, uniting only the Carpatho-Rusyns, or perhaps identifying themselves as a part of the Great Russian people. The Ukrainian option had a strong influence in Galicia and perhaps thwarted the Carpatho-Rusyn Galician option. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, an autonomous Hungary focused on Magyarizing its minorities. This movement had a major impact on the Carpatho-Rusyns as well as the Slovaks living within the Carpathian Rus ' area. The Lemkos on the North slope of the Carpathians were administratively in the Austrian province of Galicia and not subject to Magyarization. Here the Carpatho-Rusyn leaders lobbied to maintain their language in the schools where they were a majority of the village population. In Hungary the Rusyn effort was thwarted by the Greek Catholic Bishops who were often Magyarone Carpatho-Rusyns. Since World Wars I and II altered the map of Central Europe, Magocsi deals with each Carpathian Rus ' area separately. The second national awakening occurred during the interwar period and is covered in depth. Magocsi provides the names of Carpatho-Rusyn organizations, their publications and cultural activities and statistics on the school systems. Data is provided on how many schools used the local dialect and the percentage of the local populations that identified as Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, Magyar, or Slovak. The Lemkos are treated separately from the Carpatho-Rusyns to their south in the Presov region of Slovakia. The eastern portion of Carpathian Rus ' had several names in the twentieth century and is now called the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The CarpathoRusyns in Transcarpathia mostly identify as Ukrainians . In Table 1.1 Magocsi identifies 853 ,000 people who should be identified as Carpatho-Rusyns which includes 80,000 Lemkos forcibly resettled �158 SLOVAKIA-2017 there after WWII. Now only 10,100 of them self-identify as Carpatho-Rusyns. During World War II the Lemko region was made part of the Generalgouvernrnent of Nazi Germany and received better treatment than the other Carpatho-Rusyns. Shortly after the war ended, Poland disbursed over 80,000 Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine, leaving only 25 ,000 to 35,000 in their ancestral homeland. In the summer of 1947, the Polish army forcibly resettled about 35,000 Lemkos to the western areas of Poland recently cleared of Germans. Only about 7,300 Lemkos managed to avoid deportation. The final chapters of the book follow the Carpatho-Rusyns, wherever they settled, and describe their social, economic and political situations, and their third national awakening. In the final chapters, Magocsi is no longer describing the "shaping of a national identity" but rather documenting the shaping of a cultural identity. Magocsi himself has actively promoted establishing a literary language for each of the various Carpatho-Rusyn dialects. His effort has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian nationalists who insist that there is no Rusyn nationality, only various Ukrainian dialects and subcultures. Magocsi himself quotes one of many such detractors who call the movement "political Rusynism." "This nefarious phenomenon, so they said, was the work of a few ' intellectually misguided' or 'politically opportunistic' individuals 'paid' and, in some cases led by Carpatho-Rusyn 'protectors' in North America (especially the University of Toronto Professor Paul Robert Magocsi)." Valerian Bystricky. Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu 14. marca 1939. Bratislava: Veda, 2014, bibliography, name index, 464 pp. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University The Slovak historian Bystricky (born 1936), a member and former Director of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has a prodigious scholarly record with more than 120 works published at home and abroad. His latest book is very wellresearched, drawing upon contemporary newspaper articles, mem- �SLOVAKIA-2017 159 oirs, and archival materials from various countries. The author divided his seven-chapter monograph into numerous sub-chapters, making for easier navigation. Numerous footnotes also add information to help clarify the text. However, this is a dense volume that is not for everyday reading. Besides the myriad actors presented, a major flaw is that the author seems to want to include as much information as possible, resulting in many instances of repetition. Perhaps a more succinct volume would have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, this is an interesting book. It concentrates on how the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSCS) went from the struggle for autonomy, as outlined in the Pittsburgh Agreement, to the building of Slovak autonomy and a state within the framework of a federated Czecho-Slovakia after Munich. It also made preparations for the possibility of an independent country in the future, resulting in the unexpected proclamation of independence on March 14, 1939. When the HSCS did not get what it wanted from the Czechoslovak government in the late 1920's, it went into opposition . Slovak political parties prior to Slovak independence had little influence upon the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, although the democracy of the country gave Slovaks a desire to have a say in world affairs. With the exception of the Communists, no Slovak political parties had a clear-cut view of foreign policy. Foreign powers and enemies of Czechoslovakia would use Slovak rights and grievances to weaken the state. The members of the HSCS, or Cudaks, could not convince the Western Powers about the need to the transform the state into a federation , thereby causing the Cudaks to look for support elsewhere. The HSCS became the only Slovak political party to accept funds from abroad for its political program. The main threat to Czechoslovakia prior to 1936 remained irredentist Hungary. The rise of Hitler would prove to be a greater danger to the integrity of the state. At first the HSCS viewed the Nazis as non-threatening, then became reserved, while the younger generation of Cudaks began to admire Germany, causing democracy to weaken, both on the right and on the left. Slovakia was largely forgotten during the Munich Crisis, but it led to Slovakia receiving autonomy within a weakened CzechoSlovakia. With this autonomy, the HSCS quickly consolidated power by either banning or forcing the other national or Slovak political parties to merge with it, ending democracy and leading to an authori- �160 SLOVAKIA-2017 tarian regime with the Cudaks claiming to speak for all Slovaks, with independence becoming an eventual goal. Although the Cudaks initially looked to Poland as a possible ally and counterweight to Germany, they were disappointed by Poland ' s desire for Slovak territory and subsequent Czecho-Slovak territorial concessions to Poland. After the First Vienna Award in November of 1938, when Hungary annexed southern Slovakia, the HSCS realized its only friend and protector could be Germany. Radical Cudaks held numerous secret talks with various Nazis in the fall of I 938 and early 1939 without the knowledge of the moderates, including Slovak Premier Fr. Jozef Tiso. Except for Hitler, who felt he could not fight the Western Powers without first destroying CzechoSlovakia, no one knew what the future held for the country. The Nazis began to collaborate with the radical Cudaks to destabilize Czecho-Slovakia so that they could occupy Bohemia and Moravia without being labeled as aggressors. The key became Slovak independence, with the Nazis using the HSCS as their entry for the destruction of Czecho-S lovakia, but it had to be provoked by the Czechs. The so-called Homola putsch, when the Czecho-S lovak military occupied Slovakia on March 9, 1939 as a means to keep Slovakia in the republic, became a comedy of errors not only for Prague, but also for the Nazis . The dismissal of the autonomous Tiso government by Prague, and the ineffectual occupation led to the imprisonment of many Cudak radicals, upon whom the Germans had placed hopes for proclaiming independence during March 11-12. Although the Nazis had no advance knowledge of these Czech actions, they expected Karol Sidor, as the new Slovak premier and leader of the para-military Hlinka Guard, to do their bidding. The Polonophile Sidor refused. When bullying by a Nazi official produced no results, the Germans rebuffed "the soldier of Prague" Sidor as premier and turned to the only alternative, save military intervention, which would have shown Berlin to be the aggressor: Tiso, who no longer had any governmental authority. Like Sidor, Tiso refused to unilaterally proclaim independence, instead wanting to do so legally. Warned by Hitler that Hungary would swallow Slovakia unless independence was declared immediately, Tiso asked for and received the Slovak parliament' s approval on March 14, a few days later than the Nazis had wanted . This act gave the green light for �SLOVAKIA-2017 161 Germany to occupy Bohemia and Moravia the next day, claiming that Slovak independence came from the disintegration of CzechoSlovakia and that Germany had not destroyed it. Very few public manifestations greeted the new Slovak state while life went on as usual. Except for a handful of mostly radical l'.udaks, few Slovaks wanted an independent country in March, rather hoping for a gradual and evolutionary process than the unlawful revolutionary solution enacted. The bottom line and reoccurring theme of this work revolves around the fact that without Nazi support, Slovakia would not have gained independence in March of 1939. As such, Slovakia's fate was tied to German victory in the Second World War. Yet, as Bystricky notes, the Slovak government and its supporters largely underplayed and tried to ignore the Nazi connection to Slovak independence. Instead, the government presented Slovak independence as an act of the self-determination of nations, historic and natural rights, and the renewal of a long- ago medieval kingdom. This view persists among supporters of wartime Slovakia to this day. Pal'o Carnogursky. Suboj s komunizmom. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013 , 368 pp. Suboj s komunizmom 2. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Spolku slovenskych spisovatel'ov, 2015 , 367 pp. Jan Rychlik Charles University, Prague The well-known Latin expression habent sua fata libeli (books have their destinies) is true about the memoirs of the Catholic activist, politician, journalist and amateur historian Pavo) Carnogursky ( 1908-1992), which were posthumously published by his oldest son Ivan in two volumes in 2013 a 2015 under the title "Suboj s komunizmom" (The Duel with Communism). In the early 1970's Carnogursky wrote his memoirs on important events in modern Slovak history - the proclamation of Slovak autonomy on 6 October 1938 and the declaration of Slovakia' s independence on 14 March 1939. These materials were confiscated by State Security (Statna bezpecnost' - StB) in 1976 and returned only after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989. They were published by the Institute of History of the Slo- �162 SLOVAKIA-2017 vak Academy of Sciences in 1992 and 1993 .- In 1985-1986 Carnogursky, deprived of his personal notes, also tape-recorded his memoirs which, however, remained incomplete but were published posthumously by his younger son Jan in 1997 under the title Svedok cias (A Witness to the Times).- Now we have new, hitherto unknown, memoirs of Pavo) Carnogursky, which are an important testimony, not only about historical events and important personalities of Slovak political life, but also about the "soft" methods of persecution of political opponents during the regime of the so-called "normalization" ( 1969-1989). The texts presented in both volumes of Souboj s komunizmom were written between 1976 and1979, after Carnogursky's release from six weeks of custody (from November 8 to December 15, 1976). Carnogursky was imprisoned because he sent for publication to the West documents concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. He was accused of "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" according to article 112 of the Penal Code of 1961 (this article was frequently used against opponents of the regime if they published their materials abroad). Carnogursky faced up to three years in prison. Fortunately, this did not happen. He was released from custody, interrogated from time-to-time for two more years about his activities and contacts abroad, and finally - at the end of 1979 - the criminal proceedings were suspended. After each interrogation, Carnogursky described what had happened. He also made a detailed list of the documents which were confiscated from his personal archive and tried to restore them from memory. In describing the " lost" materials, he always added his personal testimony to the event or person. Because he was afraid that the notes and materials might be confiscated again, he decided to hide them. He did so with his relative Michal Skokan in Poprad. It is not clear why Pavo) Carnogursky did not claim his materials after the fall of Communism in November of 1989. Skokan's family probably forgot about them . The documents were returned to Carnogursky' s oldest son Ivan only in 2011, nine years after his father's death. In addition, in 2013 Pal'o Carogursky's comments on Gustav Husak's book Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani (1964) and his correspondence with Slovak Communist poet Laco Novomesky, were found in the Archive of the Office of the President in the Prague Castle among Gustav Husak's papers by the young Czech historian, Michal Machacek, a �SLOVAKIA-2017 163 postgraduate student of the author of this review. Machacek informed Carnogursky 's family about this through Slovak historian Pavo! Minarik (see Vol. 2, p. 364). Carnogursky 's comments were later added as an appendix to the second volume of memoirs. Unfortunately, the correspondence between Pavo! Carnogursky and Laco Novomesky was not published in extenso. To understand the memoires, it is necessary not only to know Slovak history of the 20 th Century, but also to know who was Pavo! Carnogursky. Originally a schoolteacher, young Carnogursky also studied law at the Charles University in Prague. From his youth he was an active member of the Slovak autonomist movement, closely associated with the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS), although officially (at least according to his memoirs) he never formally joined the party. He was the secretary of the Association of Catholic Youth and also a close collaborator of Karol Sidor (1901-1953), a leading figure of the HSCS and originally the designated successor to Andrej Hlinka. In autonomous Slovakia (1938-1939) Camogursky was a high official of the Ministry of Education. In December of 1938 he was elected to the Slovak autonomous Diet and, as a deputy of this law-making body, he voted on 14 March 1939 for Slovakia' s independence. Carnogursky, like his mentor Sidor, was a Polonophile and opposed the official proGerman orientation of Slovakia. Unlike Sidor, who, under German pressure was forced out of the Slovak government and sent as the Slovak minister to the Vatican, Carnogursky remained in Slovakia and took an active part in the political life of the wartime Slovak Republic. Unlike many other politicians of the Slovak Republic, Carnogursky did not flee the country in 1945 . He remained an adherent of independence for Slovakia but viewed it as unrealistic at the time. He accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as a matter of fact. As an editor of the weekly Katolicke noviny (1945-194 7) he again participated in Slovak political life. He collected money and hired lawyers to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso, former President of Slovakia, who was put on trial after the war. In 1946, Carnogursky helped negotiate the so-called April Agreement, a political pact between representatives of political Catholicism and the Protestant leaders of the Democratic Party. Due to this Agreement, the Democratic Party won the votes of the majority of Slovak Catholics and also the parliamentary �164 SLOVAKIA-2017 elections in Slovakia, which were held on May 26, 1946 . These elections were a political defeat for the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, the Democratic Party was not able - despite its electoral victory -- to stop the Communist takeover of power. For his anti-communist and pro-independence stance, Carnogursky was arrested several times: shortly in the summer of 1945 and 1946, and definitively in October of 194 7. After the communist takeover of February 25, I 948, he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for "anti-state conspiracy". More serious was his next arrest in January of 1951. After his release in I 953 , he lived in Bratislava and worked as a laborer. In the 1960s, during the period of liberalization, he started to cooperate with the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History of the Slovak Communist Party. He collected many materials dealing with modern Slovak history and published several articles. The period of the socalled "normalization," however, interrupted Carnogursky's cooperation with academic circles. After that he concentrated on the defence of religious freedom. His criticism of the anti-religious policy of the communist regime led to his last imprisonment and interrogation on November 8, 1976. Despite the fact that he was soon released and the proceedings were halted in 1979, he did not get back his personal archive, which was confiscated after his arrest. The confiscated documents were later handed over by the police to the Slovak State Central Archive (now the Slovak National Archives) and Carnogursky got them back in 1991 . It is very difficult to describe the contents of Pavo) Carnogursky's notes . He was a witness and often also a participant in many historical events. He also met many historical personalities and tried to describe them . The text is interesting and quite readable, despite the fact that the author often repeats himself. As always in memoirs, many of Carnogursky's standpoints are subjective and some explanations problematic and doubtful. Some of Carnogursky's conclusions contradict known facts . The main problem with the whole text is, however, the large number of factual errors. For example, in Volume 1, on page 4 7, in the summer of 1965 Gustav Husak was working as a researcher in the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak academy of Sciences (Ustav statu a prava SA V), not in Stavoindustria, as Carnogursky claims; on page 70, Vlado Clementis was executed on December 3, 1952, not on December 8; on page �SLOVAKIA-2017 165 231 - Milos Gosiorovsky sent his memorandum advocating the federalization of Czechoslovakia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on July 29, 1963 , not in the year 1955; on page 238 when the Slovak government stopped the deportations of Jews (on October 20, 1942), between 23 ,000 and 24,000 Jews remained in Slovakia, not 45 ,000 or even 50,000 (p.318); on page 242 - Andrej Hlinka died on August 16, 1938, not on August 15 ; on page 249 Stalin died on March 5, 1953, not on March 3rd; The Constitutional Law "On the Czechoslovak Federation" (No. 143/ 1968) was signed at Bratislava Castle on October 30, 1968 (on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin), not on October 23rd. In Vol. 2, on page 245 - the correct name of the provisional parliament in 1945-1946 was "Provisional National Assembly", not Revolutionary National Assembly (this was the name of the provisional parliament in 1918-1920). Camogursky also forgot many minor details, events or mixed them up. For example, in Volume 1, on page 33 the first name of Dr. Horakova, the hero of Czech anti-Nazi and antiCommunist resistance (and first woman sentenced to death and executed in modem Czech and Slovak history), was Milada, not Maria; In Vol. 2., page 124 - Camogursky mixed up "Slovenska obnova" with the daily "Narodna obroda", which was published by the Slovak National Council. Also in Vol. 2, page 194 - Frantisek Nemec, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government in exile and his staff settled in Carpathian Ruthenia in Chust, not in Sevl'us; Also in Vo. 2, on page 253 - Stefan Bast'ovansky did not commit suicide in prison in 1952. He committed suicide at home on 27 November, 1952, on the same day that the State Court in Prague sentenced to death eleven members of the "Rudolf Slansky anti-state group". These errors are perfectly understandable. Camogursky was describing events which happened several decades earlier and he did not have the opportunity to check the facts , either in published sources or in the archives. The editor or the publishing house should have hired a professional historian, who in the form of footnotes , would have corrected these obvious mistakes. In spite of these shortcomings, however, both volumes are a valuable contribution to modem Slovak history. �166 SLOVAKIA-2017 James Krapfl. Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, xxi-260 pp., figures, maps, tables, abbreviations, notes, chronology, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Bratislava This book examines the events that marked the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia and its transition to democracy from the fall of 1989 to the summer of 1992. As the classic expression goes, habent sua fata libelli - each book has a story behind it. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that the English edition of the book was preceded by its Slovak version, published in 2009, which usually happens the other way around. Krapfl provides an insightful, well-documented and convincing picture of the struggle of Czechoslovakia's citizens to find a new way for themselves and their future state. He suggests that what happened in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 was a true revolution from every angle. The book is based on very comprehensive research in Czechoslovakia and its sucessor states in the 1990s and 2000s. He searched primary sources , not only in the urban centers and major archives, but also in the regions. His sources included leaflets, pamphlets, internal reports and instructions issued by the newly-emerging political entities that had served as major agents of political transition in post-Communist Czechoslovakia -the Civic Forum in Prague (OF) and Public Against Violence in Bratislava (VPN)--along with their regional and local branches . Such sources are of crucial importance when examining the substance of any modem revolution, for they serve as the most authentic indicators of an atmosphere full of civic passion and enthusiasm that the replaced previous passivity and obedience to communist political authorities. The overall picture is broad, in some respects too broad. However, keeping in mind that the major protagonists of the story are not individuals, but communities and their little-known representatives, this does not constitute a problem. Krapfl' s deep faith in the humanness and civic spirit of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, who were determined to overcome all the dificulties that stemmed from a �SLOVAKIA-2017 167 political power-vacuum on the one hand, and uncertainty, as far as new institutional and constitutional designs were concerned, on the other hand, can be felt from beginning to end. Krapfl is perfectly aware of the sad fact that, two decades after the Velvet Revolution, skepticism by ordinary Slovaks and Czechs, and their displeasure with current political elites, is ubiquitous. More importantly, he has no doubt that the sudden rise of a civic movement in the fall of 1989 was authentic, spontaneous and true. Meanwhile, he avoids commenting on national conflict, which would otherwise lead to blaming either side or both for their mistakes on the thorny path to democracy. The first two chapters provide a theoretical framework of the civic movement in Czechoslovakia after the communist regime fell in November of 1989. As any other good book, this one culminates near its end. The central theme that shapes the book is a hearkening back to the reform movement of the 1960's in communist Czechoslovakia.. Krapfl is disciplined enough not to repeat variations of political and legal evolution of a joint state that was destined to fail since this subject had already been covered by prolific scholars such as Carol Skalnik Leff, Eric Stein, Shari J. Cohen, Abby Innes and Gil Eyal, to name just a few. Krapfl ' s analysis of the altercation between the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the almost exclusive representatives of their communities before the 1990 parliamentary elections belongs to the best discourses on the topic yet written by a western scholar on postCommunist Czechoslovakia. Two short observations are in order. In a future edition of the book the bibliography should be expanded to include new titles that emerged between its first Slovak and English editions. Also, to balance the period before the community of citizens began to fall apart, and their subsequent and inevitable transformation into political parties following the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and June 1992, more should have been written about the the period between the two elections. Due to Krapfl s masterly knowledge of the subject, thoughtful narrative, empathy for and respect toward the country and its peoples, his book represents a very informative and valuable contribution to the most recent scholarship on East Central Europe, not only from the perspective of cultural history, as the author �168 SLOVAKIA-2017 modestly claims, but also to sociology and political science. Today, when it seems that the glorious days of the Velvet Revolution and its legacy are numbered, as were the days of the French revolution (to which Krapfl in some aspects compares the former) , the importance of the book is significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the faith of the citizenry and civic movements have been substantially reduced, neglected or almost forgotten. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2017, Vol. 43 Description An account of the resource Vol. 43 (No. 80-81), 2017. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document REVIEWS SLOVAKIA-2017 151 Jozef Klempa. Moje skusenosti za svetovej vojny. Dennik ceskoslovenskeho legionara z rokov 1914-1920. Bratislava: Slovart, 2014. l 83pp. Afterword by Viera Meliskova. Maps. M. MARK STOLARIK University of Ottawa This is a unique and fascinating diary of a Czechoslovak (Slovak) Legionnaire from the First World War. Jozef Klempa (18941980) was trained as a shoemaker who was drafted into the AustroHungarian Armed Forces when the Great War broke out in 1914. That same year he was captured by the Russians on the eastern front and, along with many other POW's shuttled from one Russian village to another, far from the front. Amazingly, the Russian authorities treated him and other POW's quite leniently, letting them wander into nearby villages to find odd jobs, earn some kopeks or rubles, and buy food and drink to supplement their meager rations. Klempa's training as a shoemaker stood him in good stead, as he repaired the boots of his fellow-soldiers as well as that of many villagers. Indeed, he found Russian civilians very friendly and hospitable and he quickly mastered the Russian language and Russian customs. In 1918, after Germany had defeated Russia on the battlefield and the Bolsheviks had seized power, the Czechoslovak Legions, established during the war by T.G. Masaryk and Milan R. Stefanik, rebelled against the Bolsheviks, who tried to disarm them. Jozef Klempa, and thousands of other Czech and Slovak PO W' s joined the Czechoslovak Legions, and while fighting off various attacks by the Red Army, they decided to flee Russia by seizing control of the Trans-Siberian Railroad from the Ural Mountains all the way to the Pacific port of Vladivostok. Klempa recorded, almost on a daily basis, his experiences in crossing Siberia twice, once to flee the Bolsheviks and the second time to fight and try to defeat them, at the urging of the Allied and Associated powers. Indeed, Klempa and some of his fellow-Legionnaires were captured by the Bolsheviks on one occasion, but managed to escape. Klempa described in great detail the good relations the Czechoslovak Legionnaires had with various Kozak armies in Siberia, but denounced Admiral Kolchak and his officers. Klempa concluded that the "Whites" lost the war against the Bolsheviks because of the arrogance and cruelty of Admiral Kol- 152 SLOVAKIA-2017 chak and his officers towards Russian peasants. Indeed, it took a visit by General Stefanik in the fall of 1918 to prevent many of the Czechs and Slovaks from joining the Bolsheviks, who treated this foreign army on Russian soil better than did Admiral Kolchak. And, while Klempa had good things to say about Chinese merchants in Siberia, he had nothing but contempt for the Japanese soldiers in Vladivostok, who treated the Czechoslovak Legionnaires very badly. Finally, in May of 1920, Klempa and 3,000 other Legionnaires boarded a British ship that took them to Vancouver in Canada. They then crossed Canada by rail to the eastern port of Halifax, where they boarded another ship that took them to the German port of Zugshaven from whence they were shipped by rail to the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic at the end of July. As many other Legionnaires, Klempa was then released from the military, given a medal for his service, and eventually found a job on the Czechoslovak railroad. Over the years he regaled his family with memories of his exploits in Siberia. His granddaughter Vierka Meliskova managed to gather together his recollections, based on a detailed diary that he kept while in Russia and on the way home, and published this memoir of a Czechoslovak Legionnaire. Historians will mine it for information on this glorious chapter in the history of Czechoslovakia for many years to come. Rebekah Klein-Pejsova .. Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015, 194 pp., index, maps, tables. JAN LANiCEK University of New South Wales, Australia In September of 1943 , members of the civic resistance in Slovakia, led by Vavro Srobar, a founding father of the united Czechoslovak state in 1918, prepared a report that provided insights into the political loyalties of individual groups in Slovakia. Although they believed that in the case of a plebiscite, a majority of the population would decide for Czechoslovakia, the Jews, the authors suggested, would likely support the re-annexation of the Slovak territory to SLOVAKIA-2017 153 1 Hungary. This report confirmed a problematic perception of the Jews' political loyalties twenty-five years after the creation of the independent state. It was a prelude to the Jewish predicament in post1945 Slovakia, where the accusation of the Jews ' affiliation with the Hungarian (Magyar) culture figured prominently in the public discourse and complicated the Jews ' reintegration into Slovak society. 2 The question of Jewish loyalties in Slovakia is the main theme of thi s monograph . The author focuses on the interwar period and analyzes the transformation of the Jews' loyalties from those associated with the Hungarian political and cultural-linguistic stream before 1918, to a closer alignment with the liberal Czechoslovak political regime, in what she calls the formation of the 'Slovak Jewry'. KleinPejsova defines the 'S lovak Jewry ' as "a communal category binding loyalty to Czechoslovakia with Slovak territoriality rather than an expression of emotional attachment to or identification with the Slovak nation" (p. 92) . This was a complicated process, influenced by the legacies of Hungarian rule and revisionist policies, the rise and collapse of the centralized Czechoslovak state, the emergence of the Slovak national movement closely aligned with the Catholic Church, and internal disputes in the fragmented Jewish communities. Over 135,000 Jews lived in interwar Slovakia. During the 19 th Century, the Hungarian regime emancipated the Jews and allowed them rapid social and economic progress, which led to an overwhelmming acculturation, even assimilation into the Hungarian culture. This trend was deeply resented by the nascent Slovak national movement. Already in the first months after the emergence of the Czechoslovak state - and in an atmosphere filled with anti-Jewish riots 3 - Vavro Srobar, the first Czechoslovak minister responsible for Slovakia, called on the "one hundred percent Magyarized" Jewish communities in Slovakia to seek ""the right path" and abandon their affiliation with the Hungarians (very similar words were repeated by the liberal President Tomas Garrigue Masaryk) (pp.2 and 22). Klein1 Vilem Precan, ed. , Slovenske narodne povstanie: Dokum enty (Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury 1965), 89. 2 Anna Cichopek-Gajraj , Beyond Violence: Jewish Survivors in Poland and Slovakia (Cambridge : Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2014). 3 This subj ect has been recently comprehen sively addressed by Michal Frankl and Miloslav Szabo, Budovani statu bez antisemitismu. Nasili, diskurz loajality a vznik Ceskoslovenska (Praha : NLN, 20 I 6) . 154 SLOVAKIA-2017 Pejsova 's excellent book debates how the Jews responded to these new challenges . Jewish loyalties were constantly under investigation in the interwar period . Although Czechoslovakia accepted the protection of minorities imposed by the Paris Peace Conference (though the government rejected the inclusion of the articles that specifically reiterated the rights of the Jews), the state attempted to prove the dominance of the 'Czechoslovak nation' in the country. The census became the main instrument by which to officially declare loyalties to the new state. The government used the declared "mother tongue" as the main determinant of nationality, and only the Jews were allowed to declare their belonging to the Jewish nationality, regardless of their mother tongue. Klein-Pejsova identifies two possible explanations for this concession: either a liberal vision which re-conceptualized nationality "as an internal conviction", or a less liberal vision, which granted this right to the Jews with the intention of weakening the territorial minorities in the state, namely the Germans and Hungarians. Regardless of the motivations, the number of 'Hungarians' among the Jews sharply decreased in the interwar era (also because of anti-Semitism in Hungary), which contributed to the Hungarians losing some minority rights in certain districts, including Bratislava. Henceforth Hungarians blamed the Jews for this lack of corporate cultural rights, in the same way that the Czechs blamed the Jews in other districts, where the German or Hungarian minority reached the 20% threshold and could use their language in public affairs. Both sides blamed the Jews. A large number of Jews in the country - Klein-Pejsova suggests - decided to follow their own path and declared Jewish nationality, demonstrating neutrality in the national conflict, but at the same time declaring their support for the Czechoslovak state. In 1930, 57% of the Jews across the republic chose this option, and their numbers were exceptionally high especially in the eastern territories, including Slovakia. This acceptance of Jewish nationality should not be confused with support for Jewish nationalism, in the modem sense, a point, which could have been stressed a bit more throughout the monograph. Large parts of the Orthodox and Hassidic communities declared themselves as belonging to the Jewish nationality in the census, but they overtly and consistently rejected modem Jewish nationalist politics. SLOVAKIA-2017 155 Klein-Pejsova frequently compares the situation of the Jews in Slovakia to the Bohemian Lands, where the Jews largely acculturated into the Czech national stream. This comparative element could have developed differently if the author had focused on Moravia, where, especially in the major cities (Brno and Moravska Ostrava), the progress of cultural affiliation with the Czech nation was much slower and the German language dominated among the Jews until the end of the interwar period (though there was an increased effort to change the affiliation after 1933). Even here, the declaration of Jewish nationality offered a way out of the loyalty quandary for the Jews, who were affiliated with non-Slavic cultures. The Jews thus clearly aligned with the Czechoslovak political regime, at least in their public proclamations, though it is much more difficult to prove how the situation was perceived in daily contacts at the local level. Also, what did it mean for ordinary people - Jews and non-Jews alike - to declare a particular nationality in a decennial census? As Klein-Pejsova aptly concludes, '"'the tragic weakness of Jewish nationality lay in its illegibility", which opened it to interpretations (p.114). One can argue that ordinary people, but also state bureaucrats, were much more interested in the language that the Jews used in their daily contacts. Although the Jews believed that a declaration of Jewish nationality was sufficient proof of their loyalties, and continued to use the Hungarian language, this was an inadequate reorientation in the minds of Slovaks. The second problem was that the Jews tied their loyalties to the centralized Czechoslovak state and not the Slovak nation. The growing Slovak autonomous movement criticized the lack of Jewish support for their national ambitions, and the late 1930s witnessed new cases of anti-Jewish violence in Slovakia, with prominent Slovak politicians (Karol Sidor) even calling for the relocation of the Jews to the Soviet-Jewish Autonomous territory in Birobidzhan in the Far East. In November of 1938, shortly after gaining autonomy, but also after losing extensive territory to Hungary, the Slovak government organized one of the first mass deportations of the Jews in the pre-World War II period, when 7,500 'S lovak Jews ', blamed for the territorial losses, were chased across the new border to Hungary. This book makes a crucial contribution to the question of minority loyalties in Central Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. It points to a dramatic divergence of the constructions of loyalties 156 SLOVAKIA-2017 between the majority and minority populations. The question which remains is what was the ' right path' for the Jews in the interwar period which was filled with contradictory expectations from the Czechoslovak state, Slovak nation, Jewish nationalists, Jewish Orthodox, and Hungarian revisionists? It is possible to conclude that each path irreversibly led to a dead end. Paul Robert Magocsi. With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus '. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2015 , 509 pp. including 34 maps, notes, bibliography and index plus a picture section. KEITH P. DYRUD Retired Professor Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota With Their Backs to the Mountains introduces the CarpathoRusyns and their homeland which the author calls Carpathian Rus ', the north and south slopes of the mountainous area between Poland, Slovakia and the region of Transcarpathia in Ukraine. Magocsi begins with a brief historical and geographical account of the land and people but provides more detail in the nineteenth century when a Ukrainian national movement started to develop with advocates who argued that Rus ' was the historical name for the Ukrainian people and their land. This argument would undercut Magocsi ' s thesis that Carpatho-Rusyns are a separate nationality. The other challenge to his thesis was posed by Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism . After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the Hungarians (Magyars) adopted a policy of Magyarization, that is, the forcible assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities, including the Slovaks and Rusyns. Magocsi defines the Carpatho-Rusyn national identity as the culture expressed by the people originating in Carpathian Rus ' who followed Eastern Rite Christianity and spoke a unique language different from Ukrainian. Some emphasis is placed on "originating" in Carpathian Rus ' because as early as the mid-eighteenth century several thousand Carpatho-Rusyns were resettled in areas of Hungary, now parts of Romania, Croatia, and Serbia, which were lightly settled because of SLOVAKIA-2017 157 the Ottoman retreat. To this day, these ex-Carpathians identify as Rusyns and, as part of Magocsi 's narrative, continue to maintain their unique culture and language. The emphasis on originating in Carpathian Rus ' justifies his inclusion of Rusyns also living in the United States and several South American countries. The Hungarian revolt in 1849 brought Russian armies through the Carpatho-Rusyns ' land and suggested to the the Rusyn intelligentsia that they could be Russians. Magocsi identifies the three decades that followed as the first national awakening. The options explored were uniting the Carpatho-Rusyns with the Galicians to the North, uniting only the Carpatho-Rusyns, or perhaps identifying themselves as a part of the Great Russian people. The Ukrainian option had a strong influence in Galicia and perhaps thwarted the Carpatho-Rusyn Galician option. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, an autonomous Hungary focused on Magyarizing its minorities. This movement had a major impact on the Carpatho-Rusyns as well as the Slovaks living within the Carpathian Rus ' area. The Lemkos on the North slope of the Carpathians were administratively in the Austrian province of Galicia and not subject to Magyarization. Here the Carpatho-Rusyn leaders lobbied to maintain their language in the schools where they were a majority of the village population. In Hungary the Rusyn effort was thwarted by the Greek Catholic Bishops who were often Magyarone Carpatho-Rusyns. Since World Wars I and II altered the map of Central Europe, Magocsi deals with each Carpathian Rus ' area separately. The second national awakening occurred during the interwar period and is covered in depth. Magocsi provides the names of Carpatho-Rusyn organizations, their publications and cultural activities and statistics on the school systems. Data is provided on how many schools used the local dialect and the percentage of the local populations that identified as Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, Magyar, or Slovak. The Lemkos are treated separately from the Carpatho-Rusyns to their south in the Presov region of Slovakia. The eastern portion of Carpathian Rus ' had several names in the twentieth century and is now called the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine. The CarpathoRusyns in Transcarpathia mostly identify as Ukrainians . In Table 1.1 Magocsi identifies 853 ,000 people who should be identified as Carpatho-Rusyns which includes 80,000 Lemkos forcibly resettled 158 SLOVAKIA-2017 there after WWII. Now only 10,100 of them self-identify as Carpatho-Rusyns. During World War II the Lemko region was made part of the Generalgouvernrnent of Nazi Germany and received better treatment than the other Carpatho-Rusyns. Shortly after the war ended, Poland disbursed over 80,000 Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine, leaving only 25 ,000 to 35,000 in their ancestral homeland. In the summer of 1947, the Polish army forcibly resettled about 35,000 Lemkos to the western areas of Poland recently cleared of Germans. Only about 7,300 Lemkos managed to avoid deportation. The final chapters of the book follow the Carpatho-Rusyns, wherever they settled, and describe their social, economic and political situations, and their third national awakening. In the final chapters, Magocsi is no longer describing the "shaping of a national identity" but rather documenting the shaping of a cultural identity. Magocsi himself has actively promoted establishing a literary language for each of the various Carpatho-Rusyn dialects. His effort has not gone unnoticed by Ukrainian nationalists who insist that there is no Rusyn nationality, only various Ukrainian dialects and subcultures. Magocsi himself quotes one of many such detractors who call the movement "political Rusynism." "This nefarious phenomenon, so they said, was the work of a few ' intellectually misguided' or 'politically opportunistic' individuals 'paid' and, in some cases led by Carpatho-Rusyn 'protectors' in North America (especially the University of Toronto Professor Paul Robert Magocsi)." Valerian Bystricky. Zahranicnopoliticke suvislosti vzniku Slovenskeho statu 14. marca 1939. Bratislava: Veda, 2014, bibliography, name index, 464 pp. GREGORY C. FERENCE Salisbury University The Slovak historian Bystricky (born 1936), a member and former Director of the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, has a prodigious scholarly record with more than 120 works published at home and abroad. His latest book is very wellresearched, drawing upon contemporary newspaper articles, mem- SLOVAKIA-2017 159 oirs, and archival materials from various countries. The author divided his seven-chapter monograph into numerous sub-chapters, making for easier navigation. Numerous footnotes also add information to help clarify the text. However, this is a dense volume that is not for everyday reading. Besides the myriad actors presented, a major flaw is that the author seems to want to include as much information as possible, resulting in many instances of repetition. Perhaps a more succinct volume would have been more appropriate. Nonetheless, this is an interesting book. It concentrates on how the Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSCS) went from the struggle for autonomy, as outlined in the Pittsburgh Agreement, to the building of Slovak autonomy and a state within the framework of a federated Czecho-Slovakia after Munich. It also made preparations for the possibility of an independent country in the future, resulting in the unexpected proclamation of independence on March 14, 1939. When the HSCS did not get what it wanted from the Czechoslovak government in the late 1920's, it went into opposition . Slovak political parties prior to Slovak independence had little influence upon the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, although the democracy of the country gave Slovaks a desire to have a say in world affairs. With the exception of the Communists, no Slovak political parties had a clear-cut view of foreign policy. Foreign powers and enemies of Czechoslovakia would use Slovak rights and grievances to weaken the state. The members of the HSCS, or Cudaks, could not convince the Western Powers about the need to the transform the state into a federation , thereby causing the Cudaks to look for support elsewhere. The HSCS became the only Slovak political party to accept funds from abroad for its political program. The main threat to Czechoslovakia prior to 1936 remained irredentist Hungary. The rise of Hitler would prove to be a greater danger to the integrity of the state. At first the HSCS viewed the Nazis as non-threatening, then became reserved, while the younger generation of Cudaks began to admire Germany, causing democracy to weaken, both on the right and on the left. Slovakia was largely forgotten during the Munich Crisis, but it led to Slovakia receiving autonomy within a weakened CzechoSlovakia. With this autonomy, the HSCS quickly consolidated power by either banning or forcing the other national or Slovak political parties to merge with it, ending democracy and leading to an authori- 160 SLOVAKIA-2017 tarian regime with the Cudaks claiming to speak for all Slovaks, with independence becoming an eventual goal. Although the Cudaks initially looked to Poland as a possible ally and counterweight to Germany, they were disappointed by Poland ' s desire for Slovak territory and subsequent Czecho-Slovak territorial concessions to Poland. After the First Vienna Award in November of 1938, when Hungary annexed southern Slovakia, the HSCS realized its only friend and protector could be Germany. Radical Cudaks held numerous secret talks with various Nazis in the fall of I 938 and early 1939 without the knowledge of the moderates, including Slovak Premier Fr. Jozef Tiso. Except for Hitler, who felt he could not fight the Western Powers without first destroying CzechoSlovakia, no one knew what the future held for the country. The Nazis began to collaborate with the radical Cudaks to destabilize Czecho-Slovakia so that they could occupy Bohemia and Moravia without being labeled as aggressors. The key became Slovak independence, with the Nazis using the HSCS as their entry for the destruction of Czecho-S lovakia, but it had to be provoked by the Czechs. The so-called Homola putsch, when the Czecho-S lovak military occupied Slovakia on March 9, 1939 as a means to keep Slovakia in the republic, became a comedy of errors not only for Prague, but also for the Nazis . The dismissal of the autonomous Tiso government by Prague, and the ineffectual occupation led to the imprisonment of many Cudak radicals, upon whom the Germans had placed hopes for proclaiming independence during March 11-12. Although the Nazis had no advance knowledge of these Czech actions, they expected Karol Sidor, as the new Slovak premier and leader of the para-military Hlinka Guard, to do their bidding. The Polonophile Sidor refused. When bullying by a Nazi official produced no results, the Germans rebuffed "the soldier of Prague" Sidor as premier and turned to the only alternative, save military intervention, which would have shown Berlin to be the aggressor: Tiso, who no longer had any governmental authority. Like Sidor, Tiso refused to unilaterally proclaim independence, instead wanting to do so legally. Warned by Hitler that Hungary would swallow Slovakia unless independence was declared immediately, Tiso asked for and received the Slovak parliament' s approval on March 14, a few days later than the Nazis had wanted . This act gave the green light for SLOVAKIA-2017 161 Germany to occupy Bohemia and Moravia the next day, claiming that Slovak independence came from the disintegration of CzechoSlovakia and that Germany had not destroyed it. Very few public manifestations greeted the new Slovak state while life went on as usual. Except for a handful of mostly radical l'.udaks, few Slovaks wanted an independent country in March, rather hoping for a gradual and evolutionary process than the unlawful revolutionary solution enacted. The bottom line and reoccurring theme of this work revolves around the fact that without Nazi support, Slovakia would not have gained independence in March of 1939. As such, Slovakia's fate was tied to German victory in the Second World War. Yet, as Bystricky notes, the Slovak government and its supporters largely underplayed and tried to ignore the Nazi connection to Slovak independence. Instead, the government presented Slovak independence as an act of the self-determination of nations, historic and natural rights, and the renewal of a long- ago medieval kingdom. This view persists among supporters of wartime Slovakia to this day. Pal'o Carnogursky. Suboj s komunizmom. Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013 , 368 pp. Suboj s komunizmom 2. Bratislava: Vydavatel'stvo Spolku slovenskych spisovatel'ov, 2015 , 367 pp. Jan Rychlik Charles University, Prague The well-known Latin expression habent sua fata libeli (books have their destinies) is true about the memoirs of the Catholic activist, politician, journalist and amateur historian Pavo) Carnogursky ( 1908-1992), which were posthumously published by his oldest son Ivan in two volumes in 2013 a 2015 under the title "Suboj s komunizmom" (The Duel with Communism). In the early 1970's Carnogursky wrote his memoirs on important events in modern Slovak history - the proclamation of Slovak autonomy on 6 October 1938 and the declaration of Slovakia' s independence on 14 March 1939. These materials were confiscated by State Security (Statna bezpecnost' - StB) in 1976 and returned only after the "Velvet Revolution" of 1989. They were published by the Institute of History of the Slo- 162 SLOVAKIA-2017 vak Academy of Sciences in 1992 and 1993 .- In 1985-1986 Carnogursky, deprived of his personal notes, also tape-recorded his memoirs which, however, remained incomplete but were published posthumously by his younger son Jan in 1997 under the title Svedok cias (A Witness to the Times).- Now we have new, hitherto unknown, memoirs of Pavo) Carnogursky, which are an important testimony, not only about historical events and important personalities of Slovak political life, but also about the "soft" methods of persecution of political opponents during the regime of the so-called "normalization" ( 1969-1989). The texts presented in both volumes of Souboj s komunizmom were written between 1976 and1979, after Carnogursky's release from six weeks of custody (from November 8 to December 15, 1976). Carnogursky was imprisoned because he sent for publication to the West documents concerning the persecution of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. He was accused of "harming the interests of the Republic abroad" according to article 112 of the Penal Code of 1961 (this article was frequently used against opponents of the regime if they published their materials abroad). Carnogursky faced up to three years in prison. Fortunately, this did not happen. He was released from custody, interrogated from time-to-time for two more years about his activities and contacts abroad, and finally - at the end of 1979 - the criminal proceedings were suspended. After each interrogation, Carnogursky described what had happened. He also made a detailed list of the documents which were confiscated from his personal archive and tried to restore them from memory. In describing the " lost" materials, he always added his personal testimony to the event or person. Because he was afraid that the notes and materials might be confiscated again, he decided to hide them. He did so with his relative Michal Skokan in Poprad. It is not clear why Pavo) Carnogursky did not claim his materials after the fall of Communism in November of 1989. Skokan's family probably forgot about them . The documents were returned to Carnogursky' s oldest son Ivan only in 2011, nine years after his father's death. In addition, in 2013 Pal'o Carogursky's comments on Gustav Husak's book Svedectvo o Slovenskom narodnom povstani (1964) and his correspondence with Slovak Communist poet Laco Novomesky, were found in the Archive of the Office of the President in the Prague Castle among Gustav Husak's papers by the young Czech historian, Michal Machacek, a SLOVAKIA-2017 163 postgraduate student of the author of this review. Machacek informed Carnogursky 's family about this through Slovak historian Pavo! Minarik (see Vol. 2, p. 364). Carnogursky 's comments were later added as an appendix to the second volume of memoirs. Unfortunately, the correspondence between Pavo! Carnogursky and Laco Novomesky was not published in extenso. To understand the memoires, it is necessary not only to know Slovak history of the 20 th Century, but also to know who was Pavo! Carnogursky. Originally a schoolteacher, young Carnogursky also studied law at the Charles University in Prague. From his youth he was an active member of the Slovak autonomist movement, closely associated with the Hlinka Slovak People 's Party (Hlinkova slovenska l'udova strana - HSCS), although officially (at least according to his memoirs) he never formally joined the party. He was the secretary of the Association of Catholic Youth and also a close collaborator of Karol Sidor (1901-1953), a leading figure of the HSCS and originally the designated successor to Andrej Hlinka. In autonomous Slovakia (1938-1939) Camogursky was a high official of the Ministry of Education. In December of 1938 he was elected to the Slovak autonomous Diet and, as a deputy of this law-making body, he voted on 14 March 1939 for Slovakia' s independence. Carnogursky, like his mentor Sidor, was a Polonophile and opposed the official proGerman orientation of Slovakia. Unlike Sidor, who, under German pressure was forced out of the Slovak government and sent as the Slovak minister to the Vatican, Carnogursky remained in Slovakia and took an active part in the political life of the wartime Slovak Republic. Unlike many other politicians of the Slovak Republic, Carnogursky did not flee the country in 1945 . He remained an adherent of independence for Slovakia but viewed it as unrealistic at the time. He accepted the restoration of Czechoslovakia as a matter of fact. As an editor of the weekly Katolicke noviny (1945-194 7) he again participated in Slovak political life. He collected money and hired lawyers to defend Dr. Jozef Tiso, former President of Slovakia, who was put on trial after the war. In 1946, Carnogursky helped negotiate the so-called April Agreement, a political pact between representatives of political Catholicism and the Protestant leaders of the Democratic Party. Due to this Agreement, the Democratic Party won the votes of the majority of Slovak Catholics and also the parliamentary 164 SLOVAKIA-2017 elections in Slovakia, which were held on May 26, 1946 . These elections were a political defeat for the Communist Party of Slovakia. However, the Democratic Party was not able - despite its electoral victory -- to stop the Communist takeover of power. For his anti-communist and pro-independence stance, Carnogursky was arrested several times: shortly in the summer of 1945 and 1946, and definitively in October of 194 7. After the communist takeover of February 25, I 948, he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for "anti-state conspiracy". More serious was his next arrest in January of 1951. After his release in I 953 , he lived in Bratislava and worked as a laborer. In the 1960s, during the period of liberalization, he started to cooperate with the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the Institute of History of the Slovak Communist Party. He collected many materials dealing with modern Slovak history and published several articles. The period of the socalled "normalization," however, interrupted Carnogursky's cooperation with academic circles. After that he concentrated on the defence of religious freedom. His criticism of the anti-religious policy of the communist regime led to his last imprisonment and interrogation on November 8, 1976. Despite the fact that he was soon released and the proceedings were halted in 1979, he did not get back his personal archive, which was confiscated after his arrest. The confiscated documents were later handed over by the police to the Slovak State Central Archive (now the Slovak National Archives) and Carnogursky got them back in 1991 . It is very difficult to describe the contents of Pavo) Carnogursky's notes . He was a witness and often also a participant in many historical events. He also met many historical personalities and tried to describe them . The text is interesting and quite readable, despite the fact that the author often repeats himself. As always in memoirs, many of Carnogursky's standpoints are subjective and some explanations problematic and doubtful. Some of Carnogursky's conclusions contradict known facts . The main problem with the whole text is, however, the large number of factual errors. For example, in Volume 1, on page 4 7, in the summer of 1965 Gustav Husak was working as a researcher in the Institute of State and Law at the Slovak academy of Sciences (Ustav statu a prava SA V), not in Stavoindustria, as Carnogursky claims; on page 70, Vlado Clementis was executed on December 3, 1952, not on December 8; on page SLOVAKIA-2017 165 231 - Milos Gosiorovsky sent his memorandum advocating the federalization of Czechoslovakia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on July 29, 1963 , not in the year 1955; on page 238 when the Slovak government stopped the deportations of Jews (on October 20, 1942), between 23 ,000 and 24,000 Jews remained in Slovakia, not 45 ,000 or even 50,000 (p.318); on page 242 - Andrej Hlinka died on August 16, 1938, not on August 15 ; on page 249 Stalin died on March 5, 1953, not on March 3rd; The Constitutional Law "On the Czechoslovak Federation" (No. 143/ 1968) was signed at Bratislava Castle on October 30, 1968 (on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration of Turciansky Sv. Martin), not on October 23rd. In Vol. 2, on page 245 - the correct name of the provisional parliament in 1945-1946 was "Provisional National Assembly", not Revolutionary National Assembly (this was the name of the provisional parliament in 1918-1920). Camogursky also forgot many minor details, events or mixed them up. For example, in Volume 1, on page 33 the first name of Dr. Horakova, the hero of Czech anti-Nazi and antiCommunist resistance (and first woman sentenced to death and executed in modem Czech and Slovak history), was Milada, not Maria; In Vol. 2., page 124 - Camogursky mixed up "Slovenska obnova" with the daily "Narodna obroda", which was published by the Slovak National Council. Also in Vol. 2, page 194 - Frantisek Nemec, the delegate of the Czechoslovak government in exile and his staff settled in Carpathian Ruthenia in Chust, not in Sevl'us; Also in Vo. 2, on page 253 - Stefan Bast'ovansky did not commit suicide in prison in 1952. He committed suicide at home on 27 November, 1952, on the same day that the State Court in Prague sentenced to death eleven members of the "Rudolf Slansky anti-state group". These errors are perfectly understandable. Camogursky was describing events which happened several decades earlier and he did not have the opportunity to check the facts , either in published sources or in the archives. The editor or the publishing house should have hired a professional historian, who in the form of footnotes , would have corrected these obvious mistakes. In spite of these shortcomings, however, both volumes are a valuable contribution to modem Slovak history. 166 SLOVAKIA-2017 James Krapfl. Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011, xxi-260 pp., figures, maps, tables, abbreviations, notes, chronology, bibliography, index. JURAJ HOCMAN Bratislava This book examines the events that marked the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia and its transition to democracy from the fall of 1989 to the summer of 1992. As the classic expression goes, habent sua fata libelli - each book has a story behind it. In this particular case it is worth mentioning that the English edition of the book was preceded by its Slovak version, published in 2009, which usually happens the other way around. Krapfl provides an insightful, well-documented and convincing picture of the struggle of Czechoslovakia's citizens to find a new way for themselves and their future state. He suggests that what happened in Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992 was a true revolution from every angle. The book is based on very comprehensive research in Czechoslovakia and its sucessor states in the 1990s and 2000s. He searched primary sources , not only in the urban centers and major archives, but also in the regions. His sources included leaflets, pamphlets, internal reports and instructions issued by the newly-emerging political entities that had served as major agents of political transition in post-Communist Czechoslovakia -the Civic Forum in Prague (OF) and Public Against Violence in Bratislava (VPN)--along with their regional and local branches . Such sources are of crucial importance when examining the substance of any modem revolution, for they serve as the most authentic indicators of an atmosphere full of civic passion and enthusiasm that the replaced previous passivity and obedience to communist political authorities. The overall picture is broad, in some respects too broad. However, keeping in mind that the major protagonists of the story are not individuals, but communities and their little-known representatives, this does not constitute a problem. Krapfl' s deep faith in the humanness and civic spirit of ordinary Czechs and Slovaks, who were determined to overcome all the dificulties that stemmed from a SLOVAKIA-2017 167 political power-vacuum on the one hand, and uncertainty, as far as new institutional and constitutional designs were concerned, on the other hand, can be felt from beginning to end. Krapfl is perfectly aware of the sad fact that, two decades after the Velvet Revolution, skepticism by ordinary Slovaks and Czechs, and their displeasure with current political elites, is ubiquitous. More importantly, he has no doubt that the sudden rise of a civic movement in the fall of 1989 was authentic, spontaneous and true. Meanwhile, he avoids commenting on national conflict, which would otherwise lead to blaming either side or both for their mistakes on the thorny path to democracy. The first two chapters provide a theoretical framework of the civic movement in Czechoslovakia after the communist regime fell in November of 1989. As any other good book, this one culminates near its end. The central theme that shapes the book is a hearkening back to the reform movement of the 1960's in communist Czechoslovakia.. Krapfl is disciplined enough not to repeat variations of political and legal evolution of a joint state that was destined to fail since this subject had already been covered by prolific scholars such as Carol Skalnik Leff, Eric Stein, Shari J. Cohen, Abby Innes and Gil Eyal, to name just a few. Krapfl ' s analysis of the altercation between the Civic Forum and the Public Against Violence as the almost exclusive representatives of their communities before the 1990 parliamentary elections belongs to the best discourses on the topic yet written by a western scholar on postCommunist Czechoslovakia. Two short observations are in order. In a future edition of the book the bibliography should be expanded to include new titles that emerged between its first Slovak and English editions. Also, to balance the period before the community of citizens began to fall apart, and their subsequent and inevitable transformation into political parties following the parliamentary elections of June 1990 and June 1992, more should have been written about the the period between the two elections. Due to Krapfl s masterly knowledge of the subject, thoughtful narrative, empathy for and respect toward the country and its peoples, his book represents a very informative and valuable contribution to the most recent scholarship on East Central Europe, not only from the perspective of cultural history, as the author 168 SLOVAKIA-2017 modestly claims, but also to sociology and political science. Today, when it seems that the glorious days of the Velvet Revolution and its legacy are numbered, as were the days of the French revolution (to which Krapfl in some aspects compares the former) , the importance of the book is significantly higher in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where the faith of the citizenry and civic movements have been substantially reduced, neglected or almost forgotten.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Book Reviews, Slovakia, Vol. 43 (No. 80-81) Description An account of the resource includes:<br /><ul><li>Jozef Klempa, Moje skúsenosti za svetovej voyny (M. Mark Stolarik), p. 151</li> <li>Rebekah Klein-Pejšová, Mapping Jewish Loyalties in Interwar Slovakia (Jan Lániček), p. 152</li> <li>Paul Robert Magosci, With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus' (Keith P. Dyrud), p. 156</li> <li>Valerián Bystrický, Zahraničnopolitické súvislosti vzniku Slovenského štátu 14. marca 1939 (Gregory C. Ference), p. 158</li> <li>Paľo Čarnogurský, Súboj s komunizmom (Jan Rychlík), p. 161</li> <li>James Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face: Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989-1992 (Juraj Hocman), p. 166</li> </ul> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ference, Gregory Curtis, 1957- Hocman, Juraj Láníček, Jan, 1986- Rychlík, Jan Stolarik, M. Mark, 1943- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2017 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/adf906e61f3a83e663e3fd6a469ac1eb.pdf 52d0cf32e36a3976846f12a2e8b270d9 PDF Text Text 160 SLOVAKIA WINNING ESSAYS Slovak League of America Scholarship Program I. HISTORY AND TRADITION OF WOODEN HOUSES OF SLOVAKIA Paul F i a l k O V i C Consciously or unconsciously, man looks with satisfaction upon that which is substantially and enduringly built. It is this sense of sheer structural value which makes us admire the Pyramids, the Temples of Greece, and the mighty Cathedrals of the thirteenth century. The same instinct communicates to every observer, even the most casual, the bluff and rugged strength of our old houses; and he who knows these ancient dwellings more intimately. Perhaps through having been fortunate enough to live in one of them, one is keenly and sensitively responsive ta the security and the abundance of strength which they embody . The houses are mighty frames of oaken timbers . These timbers, which measure 16 and even 18 inches, have stood unshaken for two centuries or more. By comparison, the frame house of today is built of 2 by 4 studs which must be sheathed with inch boards to impact to the framework the practicable modicum of rigidity. Today, architects are hired to design luxuriously constructed houses. Tradition carried down the knowledge of construction and building of their domain from father to son. The use of crude tools, knowledge, and materials of yesterday contribute to the Slovak pride given to us by our forefathers. Truth is the fundamental principle of Architecture . Of the many Architectural Styles, which have at one time or another achieved popularity, those memorable few which most creditably bear the test of time are precisely the ones which reflect, faithfully and without distortion, the eco - �SLOVAKIA 161 nomic and social conditions out of which they sprang. An Architectural Style, if it is to be true, vital, and enduring, must clearly and candidly exhibit the spirit of the time in which it flourished, the spirit which is implicit in all the characteristic transaction of the time, and which may almost be defined as the sum of its manners, customs, and mode of living. The early Architecture of Slovakia, judged by this criterion, was unmistakably pure and virile. The most superficial examination of the period is enough to prove that it was productive of a "true" style in Architecture. Its buildings are honest, straight forward, devoid of affectation and sham. It is wood that accompanies us from the cradle to the coffin in our daily life. Instruments, buildings, and boats are just a few things that can be manufactured from wood, especially where it predominates in nature and in mountainous regions covered mostly by forests. Well, Slovakia is such a country. Whole villages consisting of wooden cottages, halfmasoned and half log-made, were created by the highlanders in their settlements and on their sites surrounded by mountains. Such settlements primarily existed in the Orava region and in Central and Eastern Slovakia. If we were to go to these regions, we would still find these cottages standing, well preserved, in their own beauty of folk fancy carvings and decorative carvings. The ancient villages were formed by dense rows of streets characterized by having in the gable only two little windows one close to the other. Examples of such cottages could be found at Spisska Bela or in large miners' hous3s at Donovaly and at the spania Dolina. Lack of professional guidance and limited material (natural material) made it impossible for the owner to built a large house. The reason for this is that the wood lacked the strength needed to support weight at large spans. Just like a coin collector's are his coins, these people also had pride in the wood which they worked with. There was a warm relationship found between man and wood. The love they had working with this wood is shown by the folk carvings engraved in the wood by the owner. It �162 SLOVAKIA was an amazing accomplishment made by the owner to be able to carve this wood using such crude tools. The window frames were made out of wood because of the availability of trees; and sometimes plaster was also used. These windows found at the gabled end of the house brought a warm feeling of peace to match the scenic forest and mountains. Nature plays a very big role in the decision of how steep the pitch of the roof is. A typical roof slope is 40 to 50 degrees depending on its location. These houses which were located at the edge of the forest have low pitched roofs; but those located in the valley have a very steeply pitched roof because of the heavy snows which they are burdened with. The most significant aspect of these roofs is the handmade shingles which are cut and laid out by the owner. There were only two main areas in the house, the living room (first floor) and the attic. The attics were used for storage and sometimes a place for someone to bed down at night. The main floor was used for eating, sleeping, gatherings, and was also used for sheltering the livestock. In a house today, we would consider the living room, with the TV playing, as the focal point of the house. In the early houses of Slovakia, the stove served as the focal point . Besides being used for cooking food, the stove served as a place for gathering and exchanging of stories among family and friends. The stove was built from a mixture of clay, chaff, and straw, and smoothly finished to the desired shape by the owner. The floor along with the stove was made of this same mixture of clay. An interesting aspect of the interior is the number of times which they paint the interior walls in one year. This paint, being of lime mixture, served as a health factor to the family. They didn't have tile, or plaster, to cover the joists and rafters so they were always left exposed. There exposed joists served a very important role to the family. High above the floor the Bible was found nestled atop a joist with other valuable papers. Being tradition and also the safest place in the house, this is the reason for finding these articles in this place. Another reason for finding the Bible so high is as tradition says-the Bible should be set �SLOVAKIA 163 in the highest place of the household. Inside the Family Bible, there would be found an account of the family tree. Everything found in the interior of a house was made out of wood. Chairs, spoons, tables, and plates were made by the owner. Even the nails (pegs) which hold the beams were made out of wood. Why wood? Metal nails were too expensive and were only used by blacksmiths to repair the shoes on a horse . A wooden house asserts itself from the architectoral point of view expressively by its gabled front. In this way, aerial pictures of whole villages are thus presented. A beautiful example of this can be found in the upper Hron river district, primarily in Hel'pa and Pohorela. In such cases as the houses built at Hel'pa and Pohorela, the walls and partitions were constructed from rough wood beams interrupted only for window and door openings. The joints between the wooden beams were filled by moss and finished with a clay covering. After th9 finish coating of clay was applied, it was then painted with lime or left exposed. The combination of wood and clay material was a very healthy element because it balanced the humidity inside the house so it wasn't too wet or dry. The houses were made of wood only from the shelf which was made of stone. This shelf serving as a base to carry the loads of the house was approximately four feet deep. In Hron district a very characteristic element of the house was a wooden fence with a roof covering on top which reserved a private area. This area extended between the house and stable. This enclosure of public to private has an urbanistic importance. It creates a two house unit and space between them which is totally private. During the summer, these private spaces were used for social gatherings. The use of wood in the construction of houses was convenient but also dangerous-high flammability. In the past, there were many large fires which often destroyed the whole village. Once a large fire destroys a village, the houses are reconstructed the same way with the same style; but the name of the village is changed. An example of this is Pohorela which was destroyed by fire. �164 SLOVAKIA From time to time, the terrain in some places demands another solution, for instance gradated, corner-shaped or other configuration in space and form. These configurations of houses comparing whole settlements, facing streets, are types of exclusively Slovak settlements. Communities like Vysny Kubin, Jasenova, Fackov, Hubova, or Stankovany are today merely historical documents. Jasenova is different from other villages in the sense that the houses are oriented to the village square. The houses are enriched with additional covered open-space protected by rain. These covered open-spaces are porches. These porches are usually located on the second floor, which is the living area, while the first floor is used as a shelter for livestock. These porches are supported by two main cantilever beams, which are supported by two columns; and the columns in turn are supported by two more cantilevers. An important factor about these porches is the construction of the railing. It is a nice sight to sea how the railing is cut into folk carvings designed by the owner's own style. The owners then would actually compete against each other to see who had the best craftmanship. Today, we have faucets within the house with which we receive our source of water. In the Slovak villages, they had wells located outside the house from which they would draw up water in a bucket as their supply of water. A characteristic point of view about these wells is when they were constructed they took on similar features of the owner's house. The same wood, style, and pitched roof with shingles, shows the sense of pride the owner had for all his construction. The gable roof of these houses was also decorated with some sort of ornament. The houses used a cross or certain vertical siding as their decorative piece located at the gabled end of the roof. New York City has the Empire State Building - St. Louis has the Arch- and Slovak villages have a bell tower as their masterpiece. This bell tower wasn't only used for religious purposes but also for civil means of communication. Every village bell had a different tone so as not to get confused between two villages or more. This bell would sound in case of emergencies and also to notify the men �SLOVAKIA 165 and women working in the fields when it was lunch and supper time. Just like every other piece of construction the bell tower was also built out of wood. Various kinds of construction of the loghouses, their structure, their elevations of masonry at Liptov, roofing, roof corners, balconies, and filling between the timber can be seen enywhere in a great variety. Plastering of the timb3r is sometimes carried out for reasons of insulation. This is to preserve timber against the influence of rain, sometimes even cold or simply to veil poverty of the wooden house. The protection from rain is evidenced by plastering the log walls on the outside up to the height where the loghous2 is not protected by the overhanging gutter. For the s2me reasons, the timber and interstices are white-washed with lime especially in corner transverse sections of the logs . At cicmany, this ornamentics in lime culminate in rich spiral ornamentation and painting of the logs, reminding of embroidery stiches. Under this ornamentation, the buildings lose their wooden block-like character formed by the wooden block in which doors and windows are carved out. The beauty of these houses is such that cicmany is known as one of the most beautiful attractions of th3 world. Since nature is the survival of the Slovaks, the d2corated walls of the houses in this village represent the different symbols of nature. Flowers, trees, etc., are just a few of the decorative symbols found painted on the house walls. Every house is a magnificent figure of originality and beauty created by the owner . The decorated walls and carved wood are all reasons for competition among neighbors. The young women who live in cicmany today are employed by factories and offices outside their village. After they come home at night, they work decorating costumes with the same art work as on the houses so they may wear their costumes on weekends for the tourist entertainment. However, decorating the costumes for tourist entertainment is not the only reason for doing this. They decorated their costumes because of the love and pride they have for our forefathers tradition. On the log structure, there sit various regional roof peculiarities, primarily saddle roofs and more rarely curb roofs sloping down into four gutters. There are slightly �166 SLOVAKIA sloping roofs from the summit into the gable the construction of which was started at a later period especially in the environment of cadca. Changes of the latter roofs into gabled ones are very well discernible in the houses of cicmany. Roofs with the lower edge of the latter type are typical for the upper Hron river region. In all houses, the roofs considerably exceed the log structure so as to make possible to store them round the house fuelwood and let it dry for their winter use. Wooden houses are usually amply lined round the walls with wood for drying. Building logs are deposited outside the house to season in the sun, and branches are left in heaps in the back yard and used as fuel. Briefly, wood around the house smells of resin; and, for instance, at Liptovska Revuca, cierny Balog, Stankovany, but mainly in the villages of the Orava district, there is a considerable reserve of wood stored around the house. A rare peculiarity are the balconied and storied constructions in the Orava District at Jasenova, then at cicmany, in the vicinity of Kremnica and upper part of Turiec. In Slovakia, very ancient interiors with open fireplaces and ovens have been preserved. Many special studies have been written about their singularities and their Old Frankish and Slavonic origin. Greatest fullness and utilization of the esthetic taste could hardly have been exhausted by the building of dwellings. Feeling of beauty has mostly asserted itself in the building of sacral structures where it was necessary to erect for the Divine Power magnificent, decorated tabernaclesbuilding of wooden churches, belfries, steeples, and ceme tery crosses. The poor sculptors could not afford to erect churches from marble. They were unable to order cross-9s from polished basalt or granite. As everything else, these objects were constructed from wood. The art of building from wood can justly be considered the national and original expression of folk building and of building in general in Slovakia, since it developed directly from the natural conditions and from the oldest cultural folk strata. As far as wooden structures, cultural and sacral, in various religious rites (Catholic, Orthodox, Greek Catholic, �SLOVAKIA 167 and Protestant ), there have been preserved in Slovakia seventy of them. The most interesting are wooden churches in Eastern Slovakia. In the majority of cases, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches in Slovakia are the most numerous and can be divided into three types. The first type usually possesses a quadrangular high tower which is set in front of the main nave of the church and has its own belfry independent of the church. These churches are found in Slovakia at Hranicne and Matysova near Stara :Cubovna. Then, they continue westward of Bardejov with the church at Fricka and south of Bardejov at Venecia and Kozany. The second type of churches that have the same quadrangular tower, higher or lower, are connected with th2 main nave or directly set up on the roof of the main church but not directly built into the church. The third type is the most easterly one and is expressad by definite elements and character. There are the threa steeple-like terminations of the logrooms: The anteroom, the main nave and apsis which in its interior is separated from the main nave by iconostas. Each of these spaces culminates in a spire. The highest is the anterior part with a bulb-like cupola. The intermediate cupola is lower, quadrangular or octagonal with a log structure ceiling. Also, the smallest posterior part above the apsis terminates in a small spire. This type of church belongs to the most numerous ones. The densest networks of wooden churches is spread south below Dukla pass whether one approaches coming from Bardejov and Zborov to Svidnik or whether one i::; coming from Vranov to Svidnik and further to the east to Kruzlova, Ladomirova, Korejovce, Hunkovce, Nova Polianka (previously Mergeska), semetkovce, Mirol'a, Bodruzal, Vysny, and Nizny Komarnik, right to the pass. Finally, we have to mention the age of these wooden structures. On the territory of Slovakia, the oldest one is considered to be the wooden church at Trocany, 20 km. north of Presov, the origin of which is put in the 14th century. This is easy to explain since yew wood was used in its construction. Also, a building in Hervartov, and more �168 SLOVAKIA definitely so, originates in the end of the 15th century. Then follows the church at Zabrez. The Protestant churches generally come from the 17th and 18th centuries. Churches of the eastern rite are the youngest. They originated in the 18th and 19th centuries. Then, it has to be remembered that the tooth of tim2 and the woodworm enjoy with hearty appetite the wooden building memorials . It is the peak of time for us to preserve our eminent memorials in "scansens" beside museums or in other suitable sites in nature to save what still can be saved. (First place - College) REFERENCES Eugen Lazist'an and Jan Michalov, Drevene stavby na Slovensku, Frantisek Kalina, Bratislava, 1971. Emanuel Hruska, Stavba miest, Slovenska akademia vied, Bratislav.1, 1970. E. Lorad, Umelecko-historicke pamdtne kostoly na Slm; ens.1m, Spolo!( sv. Vojtecha, Trnava, 1957. Vladimir Wagner, Vyvin vytvarneho umenia na Slovensku, Slovenska akademia vied, Bratislava, 1948. Kalendar Jednota 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, Prva K-atoLcka Slovenska Jednota v USA, Middletown Pa. Mag:i.zine and periodicals: Jednota, Slovak v Amerike, Katolicky Sokol. Consultations with experts of Slovak art and architecture. II. MILAN RASTISLA V STEFANIK AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE SLOVAK PEOPLE Robert P o j e r During the late part of the nineteenth century, the seeds of nationalism had already been sown throughout the great empires of Europe. It would take the trauma of a world war before these nationalistic aspirations could be realized. In 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy made its appearance. Within this vast empire, there existed many peoples-the Austrians and the Magyars, of course; the Serbs, Croats, Ruthenes, Rumanians, Czechs, and Slovaks, to name just a few. Although on the surface, this Austro-Hungarian Empire � 160 SLOVAKIA WINNING ESSAYS Slovak League of America Scholarship Program I. HISTORY AND TRADITION OF WOODEN HOUSES OF SLOVAKIA Paul F i a l k O V i C Consciously or unconsciously, man looks with satisfaction upon that which is substantially and enduringly built. It is this sense of sheer structural value which makes us admire the Pyramids, the Temples of Greece, and the mighty Cathedrals of the thirteenth century. The same instinct communicates to every observer, even the most casual, the bluff and rugged strength of our old houses; and he who knows these ancient dwellings more intimately. Perhaps through having been fortunate enough to live in one of them, one is keenly and sensitively responsive ta the security and the abundance of strength which they embody . The houses are mighty frames of oaken timbers . These timbers, which measure 16 and even 18 inches, have stood unshaken for two centuries or more. By comparison, the frame house of today is built of 2 by 4 studs which must be sheathed with inch boards to impact to the framework the practicable modicum of rigidity. Today, architects are hired to design luxuriously constructed houses. Tradition carried down the knowledge of construction and building of their domain from father to son. The use of crude tools, knowledge, and materials of yesterday contribute to the Slovak pride given to us by our forefathers. Truth is the fundamental principle of Architecture . Of the many Architectural Styles, which have at one time or another achieved popularity, those memorable few which most creditably bear the test of time are precisely the ones which reflect, faithfully and without distortion, the eco - �SLOVAKIA 161 nomic and social conditions out of which they sprang. An Architectural Style, if it is to be true, vital, and enduring, must clearly and candidly exhibit the spirit of the time in which it flourished, the spirit which is implicit in all the characteristic transaction of the time, and which may almost be defined as the sum of its manners, customs, and mode of living. The early Architecture of Slovakia, judged by this criterion, was unmistakably pure and virile. The most superficial examination of the period is enough to prove that it was productive of a "true" style in Architecture. Its buildings are honest, straight forward, devoid of affectation and sham. It is wood that accompanies us from the cradle to the coffin in our daily life. Instruments, buildings, and boats are just a few things that can be manufactured from wood, especially where it predominates in nature and in mountainous regions covered mostly by forests. Well, Slovakia is such a country. Whole villages consisting of wooden cottages, halfmasoned and half log-made, were created by the highlanders in their settlements and on their sites surrounded by mountains. Such settlements primarily existed in the Orava region and in Central and Eastern Slovakia. If we were to go to these regions, we would still find these cottages standing, well preserved, in their own beauty of folk fancy carvings and decorative carvings. The ancient villages were formed by dense rows of streets characterized by having in the gable only two little windows one close to the other. Examples of such cottages could be found at Spisska Bela or in large miners' hous3s at Donovaly and at the spania Dolina. Lack of professional guidance and limited material (natural material) made it impossible for the owner to built a large house. The reason for this is that the wood lacked the strength needed to support weight at large spans. Just like a coin collector's are his coins, these people also had pride in the wood which they worked with. There was a warm relationship found between man and wood. The love they had working with this wood is shown by the folk carvings engraved in the wood by the owner. It �162 SLOVAKIA was an amazing accomplishment made by the owner to be able to carve this wood using such crude tools. The window frames were made out of wood because of the availability of trees; and sometimes plaster was also used. These windows found at the gabled end of the house brought a warm feeling of peace to match the scenic forest and mountains. Nature plays a very big role in the decision of how steep the pitch of the roof is. A typical roof slope is 40 to 50 degrees depending on its location. These houses which were located at the edge of the forest have low pitched roofs; but those located in the valley have a very steeply pitched roof because of the heavy snows which they are burdened with. The most significant aspect of these roofs is the handmade shingles which are cut and laid out by the owner. There were only two main areas in the house, the living room (first floor) and the attic. The attics were used for storage and sometimes a place for someone to bed down at night. The main floor was used for eating, sleeping, gatherings, and was also used for sheltering the livestock. In a house today, we would consider the living room, with the TV playing, as the focal point of the house. In the early houses of Slovakia, the stove served as the focal point . Besides being used for cooking food, the stove served as a place for gathering and exchanging of stories among family and friends. The stove was built from a mixture of clay, chaff, and straw, and smoothly finished to the desired shape by the owner. The floor along with the stove was made of this same mixture of clay. An interesting aspect of the interior is the number of times which they paint the interior walls in one year. This paint, being of lime mixture, served as a health factor to the family. They didn't have tile, or plaster, to cover the joists and rafters so they were always left exposed. There exposed joists served a very important role to the family. High above the floor the Bible was found nestled atop a joist with other valuable papers. Being tradition and also the safest place in the house, this is the reason for finding these articles in this place. Another reason for finding the Bible so high is as tradition says-the Bible should be set �SLOVAKIA 163 in the highest place of the household. Inside the Family Bible, there would be found an account of the family tree. Everything found in the interior of a house was made out of wood. Chairs, spoons, tables, and plates were made by the owner. Even the nails (pegs) which hold the beams were made out of wood. Why wood? Metal nails were too expensive and were only used by blacksmiths to repair the shoes on a horse . A wooden house asserts itself from the architectoral point of view expressively by its gabled front. In this way, aerial pictures of whole villages are thus presented. A beautiful example of this can be found in the upper Hron river district, primarily in Hel'pa and Pohorela. In such cases as the houses built at Hel'pa and Pohorela, the walls and partitions were constructed from rough wood beams interrupted only for window and door openings. The joints between the wooden beams were filled by moss and finished with a clay covering. After th9 finish coating of clay was applied, it was then painted with lime or left exposed. The combination of wood and clay material was a very healthy element because it balanced the humidity inside the house so it wasn't too wet or dry. The houses were made of wood only from the shelf which was made of stone. This shelf serving as a base to carry the loads of the house was approximately four feet deep. In Hron district a very characteristic element of the house was a wooden fence with a roof covering on top which reserved a private area. This area extended between the house and stable. This enclosure of public to private has an urbanistic importance. It creates a two house unit and space between them which is totally private. During the summer, these private spaces were used for social gatherings. The use of wood in the construction of houses was convenient but also dangerous-high flammability. In the past, there were many large fires which often destroyed the whole village. Once a large fire destroys a village, the houses are reconstructed the same way with the same style; but the name of the village is changed. An example of this is Pohorela which was destroyed by fire. �164 SLOVAKIA From time to time, the terrain in some places demands another solution, for instance gradated, corner-shaped or other configuration in space and form. These configurations of houses comparing whole settlements, facing streets, are types of exclusively Slovak settlements. Communities like Vysny Kubin, Jasenova, Fackov, Hubova, or Stankovany are today merely historical documents. Jasenova is different from other villages in the sense that the houses are oriented to the village square. The houses are enriched with additional covered open-space protected by rain. These covered open-spaces are porches. These porches are usually located on the second floor, which is the living area, while the first floor is used as a shelter for livestock. These porches are supported by two main cantilever beams, which are supported by two columns; and the columns in turn are supported by two more cantilevers. An important factor about these porches is the construction of the railing. It is a nice sight to sea how the railing is cut into folk carvings designed by the owner's own style. The owners then would actually compete against each other to see who had the best craftmanship. Today, we have faucets within the house with which we receive our source of water. In the Slovak villages, they had wells located outside the house from which they would draw up water in a bucket as their supply of water. A characteristic point of view about these wells is when they were constructed they took on similar features of the owner's house. The same wood, style, and pitched roof with shingles, shows the sense of pride the owner had for all his construction. The gable roof of these houses was also decorated with some sort of ornament. The houses used a cross or certain vertical siding as their decorative piece located at the gabled end of the roof. New York City has the Empire State Building - St. Louis has the Arch- and Slovak villages have a bell tower as their masterpiece. This bell tower wasn't only used for religious purposes but also for civil means of communication. Every village bell had a different tone so as not to get confused between two villages or more. This bell would sound in case of emergencies and also to notify the men �SLOVAKIA 165 and women working in the fields when it was lunch and supper time. Just like every other piece of construction the bell tower was also built out of wood. Various kinds of construction of the loghouses, their structure, their elevations of masonry at Liptov, roofing, roof corners, balconies, and filling between the timber can be seen enywhere in a great variety. Plastering of the timb3r is sometimes carried out for reasons of insulation. This is to preserve timber against the influence of rain, sometimes even cold or simply to veil poverty of the wooden house. The protection from rain is evidenced by plastering the log walls on the outside up to the height where the loghous2 is not protected by the overhanging gutter. For the s2me reasons, the timber and interstices are white-washed with lime especially in corner transverse sections of the logs . At cicmany, this ornamentics in lime culminate in rich spiral ornamentation and painting of the logs, reminding of embroidery stiches. Under this ornamentation, the buildings lose their wooden block-like character formed by the wooden block in which doors and windows are carved out. The beauty of these houses is such that cicmany is known as one of the most beautiful attractions of th3 world. Since nature is the survival of the Slovaks, the d2corated walls of the houses in this village represent the different symbols of nature. Flowers, trees, etc., are just a few of the decorative symbols found painted on the house walls. Every house is a magnificent figure of originality and beauty created by the owner . The decorated walls and carved wood are all reasons for competition among neighbors. The young women who live in cicmany today are employed by factories and offices outside their village. After they come home at night, they work decorating costumes with the same art work as on the houses so they may wear their costumes on weekends for the tourist entertainment. However, decorating the costumes for tourist entertainment is not the only reason for doing this. They decorated their costumes because of the love and pride they have for our forefathers tradition. On the log structure, there sit various regional roof peculiarities, primarily saddle roofs and more rarely curb roofs sloping down into four gutters. There are slightly �166 SLOVAKIA sloping roofs from the summit into the gable the construction of which was started at a later period especially in the environment of cadca. Changes of the latter roofs into gabled ones are very well discernible in the houses of cicmany. Roofs with the lower edge of the latter type are typical for the upper Hron river region. In all houses, the roofs considerably exceed the log structure so as to make possible to store them round the house fuelwood and let it dry for their winter use. Wooden houses are usually amply lined round the walls with wood for drying. Building logs are deposited outside the house to season in the sun, and branches are left in heaps in the back yard and used as fuel. Briefly, wood around the house smells of resin; and, for instance, at Liptovska Revuca, cierny Balog, Stankovany, but mainly in the villages of the Orava district, there is a considerable reserve of wood stored around the house. A rare peculiarity are the balconied and storied constructions in the Orava District at Jasenova, then at cicmany, in the vicinity of Kremnica and upper part of Turiec. In Slovakia, very ancient interiors with open fireplaces and ovens have been preserved. Many special studies have been written about their singularities and their Old Frankish and Slavonic origin. Greatest fullness and utilization of the esthetic taste could hardly have been exhausted by the building of dwellings. Feeling of beauty has mostly asserted itself in the building of sacral structures where it was necessary to erect for the Divine Power magnificent, decorated tabernaclesbuilding of wooden churches, belfries, steeples, and ceme tery crosses. The poor sculptors could not afford to erect churches from marble. They were unable to order cross-9s from polished basalt or granite. As everything else, these objects were constructed from wood. The art of building from wood can justly be considered the national and original expression of folk building and of building in general in Slovakia, since it developed directly from the natural conditions and from the oldest cultural folk strata. As far as wooden structures, cultural and sacral, in various religious rites (Catholic, Orthodox, Greek Catholic, �SLOVAKIA 167 and Protestant ), there have been preserved in Slovakia seventy of them. The most interesting are wooden churches in Eastern Slovakia. In the majority of cases, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches in Slovakia are the most numerous and can be divided into three types. The first type usually possesses a quadrangular high tower which is set in front of the main nave of the church and has its own belfry independent of the church. These churches are found in Slovakia at Hranicne and Matysova near Stara :Cubovna. Then, they continue westward of Bardejov with the church at Fricka and south of Bardejov at Venecia and Kozany. The second type of churches that have the same quadrangular tower, higher or lower, are connected with th2 main nave or directly set up on the roof of the main church but not directly built into the church. The third type is the most easterly one and is expressad by definite elements and character. There are the threa steeple-like terminations of the logrooms: The anteroom, the main nave and apsis which in its interior is separated from the main nave by iconostas. Each of these spaces culminates in a spire. The highest is the anterior part with a bulb-like cupola. The intermediate cupola is lower, quadrangular or octagonal with a log structure ceiling. Also, the smallest posterior part above the apsis terminates in a small spire. This type of church belongs to the most numerous ones. The densest networks of wooden churches is spread south below Dukla pass whether one approaches coming from Bardejov and Zborov to Svidnik or whether one i::; coming from Vranov to Svidnik and further to the east to Kruzlova, Ladomirova, Korejovce, Hunkovce, Nova Polianka (previously Mergeska), semetkovce, Mirol'a, Bodruzal, Vysny, and Nizny Komarnik, right to the pass. Finally, we have to mention the age of these wooden structures. On the territory of Slovakia, the oldest one is considered to be the wooden church at Trocany, 20 km. north of Presov, the origin of which is put in the 14th century. This is easy to explain since yew wood was used in its construction. Also, a building in Hervartov, and more �168 SLOVAKIA definitely so, originates in the end of the 15th century. Then follows the church at Zabrez. The Protestant churches generally come from the 17th and 18th centuries. Churches of the eastern rite are the youngest. They originated in the 18th and 19th centuries. Then, it has to be remembered that the tooth of tim2 and the woodworm enjoy with hearty appetite the wooden building memorials . It is the peak of time for us to preserve our eminent memorials in "scansens" beside museums or in other suitable sites in nature to save what still can be saved. (First place - College) REFERENCES Eugen Lazist'an and Jan Michalov, Drevene stavby na Slovensku, Frantisek Kalina, Bratislava, 1971. Emanuel Hruska, Stavba miest, Slovenska akademia vied, Bratislav.1, 1970. E. Lorad, Umelecko-historicke pamdtne kostoly na Slm; ens.1m, Spolo!( sv. Vojtecha, Trnava, 1957. Vladimir Wagner, Vyvin vytvarneho umenia na Slovensku, Slovenska akademia vied, Bratislava, 1948. Kalendar Jednota 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, Prva K-atoLcka Slovenska Jednota v USA, Middletown Pa. Mag:i.zine and periodicals: Jednota, Slovak v Amerike, Katolicky Sokol. Consultations with experts of Slovak art and architecture. II. MILAN RASTISLA V STEFANIK AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE SLOVAK PEOPLE Robert P o j e r During the late part of the nineteenth century, the seeds of nationalism had already been sown throughout the great empires of Europe. It would take the trauma of a world war before these nationalistic aspirations could be realized. In 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy made its appearance. Within this vast empire, there existed many peoples-the Austrians and the Magyars, of course; the Serbs, Croats, Ruthenes, Rumanians, Czechs, and Slovaks, to name just a few. Although on the surface, this Austro-Hungarian Empire � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 160 SLOVAKIA WINNING ESSAYS Slovak League of America Scholarship Program I. HISTORY AND TRADITION OF WOODEN HOUSES OF SLOVAKIA Paul F i a l k O V i C Consciously or unconsciously, man looks with satisfaction upon that which is substantially and enduringly built. It is this sense of sheer structural value which makes us admire the Pyramids, the Temples of Greece, and the mighty Cathedrals of the thirteenth century. The same instinct communicates to every observer, even the most casual, the bluff and rugged strength of our old houses; and he who knows these ancient dwellings more intimately. Perhaps through having been fortunate enough to live in one of them, one is keenly and sensitively responsive ta the security and the abundance of strength which they embody . The houses are mighty frames of oaken timbers . These timbers, which measure 16 and even 18 inches, have stood unshaken for two centuries or more. By comparison, the frame house of today is built of 2 by 4 studs which must be sheathed with inch boards to impact to the framework the practicable modicum of rigidity. Today, architects are hired to design luxuriously constructed houses. Tradition carried down the knowledge of construction and building of their domain from father to son. The use of crude tools, knowledge, and materials of yesterday contribute to the Slovak pride given to us by our forefathers. Truth is the fundamental principle of Architecture . Of the many Architectural Styles, which have at one time or another achieved popularity, those memorable few which most creditably bear the test of time are precisely the ones which reflect, faithfully and without distortion, the eco - SLOVAKIA 161 nomic and social conditions out of which they sprang. An Architectural Style, if it is to be true, vital, and enduring, must clearly and candidly exhibit the spirit of the time in which it flourished, the spirit which is implicit in all the characteristic transaction of the time, and which may almost be defined as the sum of its manners, customs, and mode of living. The early Architecture of Slovakia, judged by this criterion, was unmistakably pure and virile. The most superficial examination of the period is enough to prove that it was productive of a "true" style in Architecture. Its buildings are honest, straight forward, devoid of affectation and sham. It is wood that accompanies us from the cradle to the coffin in our daily life. Instruments, buildings, and boats are just a few things that can be manufactured from wood, especially where it predominates in nature and in mountainous regions covered mostly by forests. Well, Slovakia is such a country. Whole villages consisting of wooden cottages, halfmasoned and half log-made, were created by the highlanders in their settlements and on their sites surrounded by mountains. Such settlements primarily existed in the Orava region and in Central and Eastern Slovakia. If we were to go to these regions, we would still find these cottages standing, well preserved, in their own beauty of folk fancy carvings and decorative carvings. The ancient villages were formed by dense rows of streets characterized by having in the gable only two little windows one close to the other. Examples of such cottages could be found at Spisska Bela or in large miners' hous3s at Donovaly and at the spania Dolina. Lack of professional guidance and limited material (natural material) made it impossible for the owner to built a large house. The reason for this is that the wood lacked the strength needed to support weight at large spans. Just like a coin collector's are his coins, these people also had pride in the wood which they worked with. There was a warm relationship found between man and wood. The love they had working with this wood is shown by the folk carvings engraved in the wood by the owner. It 162 SLOVAKIA was an amazing accomplishment made by the owner to be able to carve this wood using such crude tools. The window frames were made out of wood because of the availability of trees; and sometimes plaster was also used. These windows found at the gabled end of the house brought a warm feeling of peace to match the scenic forest and mountains. Nature plays a very big role in the decision of how steep the pitch of the roof is. A typical roof slope is 40 to 50 degrees depending on its location. These houses which were located at the edge of the forest have low pitched roofs; but those located in the valley have a very steeply pitched roof because of the heavy snows which they are burdened with. The most significant aspect of these roofs is the handmade shingles which are cut and laid out by the owner. There were only two main areas in the house, the living room (first floor) and the attic. The attics were used for storage and sometimes a place for someone to bed down at night. The main floor was used for eating, sleeping, gatherings, and was also used for sheltering the livestock. In a house today, we would consider the living room, with the TV playing, as the focal point of the house. In the early houses of Slovakia, the stove served as the focal point . Besides being used for cooking food, the stove served as a place for gathering and exchanging of stories among family and friends. The stove was built from a mixture of clay, chaff, and straw, and smoothly finished to the desired shape by the owner. The floor along with the stove was made of this same mixture of clay. An interesting aspect of the interior is the number of times which they paint the interior walls in one year. This paint, being of lime mixture, served as a health factor to the family. They didn't have tile, or plaster, to cover the joists and rafters so they were always left exposed. There exposed joists served a very important role to the family. High above the floor the Bible was found nestled atop a joist with other valuable papers. Being tradition and also the safest place in the house, this is the reason for finding these articles in this place. Another reason for finding the Bible so high is as tradition says-the Bible should be set SLOVAKIA 163 in the highest place of the household. Inside the Family Bible, there would be found an account of the family tree. Everything found in the interior of a house was made out of wood. Chairs, spoons, tables, and plates were made by the owner. Even the nails (pegs) which hold the beams were made out of wood. Why wood? Metal nails were too expensive and were only used by blacksmiths to repair the shoes on a horse . A wooden house asserts itself from the architectoral point of view expressively by its gabled front. In this way, aerial pictures of whole villages are thus presented. A beautiful example of this can be found in the upper Hron river district, primarily in Hel'pa and Pohorela. In such cases as the houses built at Hel'pa and Pohorela, the walls and partitions were constructed from rough wood beams interrupted only for window and door openings. The joints between the wooden beams were filled by moss and finished with a clay covering. After th9 finish coating of clay was applied, it was then painted with lime or left exposed. The combination of wood and clay material was a very healthy element because it balanced the humidity inside the house so it wasn't too wet or dry. The houses were made of wood only from the shelf which was made of stone. This shelf serving as a base to carry the loads of the house was approximately four feet deep. In Hron district a very characteristic element of the house was a wooden fence with a roof covering on top which reserved a private area. This area extended between the house and stable. This enclosure of public to private has an urbanistic importance. It creates a two house unit and space between them which is totally private. During the summer, these private spaces were used for social gatherings. The use of wood in the construction of houses was convenient but also dangerous-high flammability. In the past, there were many large fires which often destroyed the whole village. Once a large fire destroys a village, the houses are reconstructed the same way with the same style; but the name of the village is changed. An example of this is Pohorela which was destroyed by fire. 164 SLOVAKIA From time to time, the terrain in some places demands another solution, for instance gradated, corner-shaped or other configuration in space and form. These configurations of houses comparing whole settlements, facing streets, are types of exclusively Slovak settlements. Communities like Vysny Kubin, Jasenova, Fackov, Hubova, or Stankovany are today merely historical documents. Jasenova is different from other villages in the sense that the houses are oriented to the village square. The houses are enriched with additional covered open-space protected by rain. These covered open-spaces are porches. These porches are usually located on the second floor, which is the living area, while the first floor is used as a shelter for livestock. These porches are supported by two main cantilever beams, which are supported by two columns; and the columns in turn are supported by two more cantilevers. An important factor about these porches is the construction of the railing. It is a nice sight to sea how the railing is cut into folk carvings designed by the owner's own style. The owners then would actually compete against each other to see who had the best craftmanship. Today, we have faucets within the house with which we receive our source of water. In the Slovak villages, they had wells located outside the house from which they would draw up water in a bucket as their supply of water. A characteristic point of view about these wells is when they were constructed they took on similar features of the owner's house. The same wood, style, and pitched roof with shingles, shows the sense of pride the owner had for all his construction. The gable roof of these houses was also decorated with some sort of ornament. The houses used a cross or certain vertical siding as their decorative piece located at the gabled end of the roof. New York City has the Empire State Building - St. Louis has the Arch- and Slovak villages have a bell tower as their masterpiece. This bell tower wasn't only used for religious purposes but also for civil means of communication. Every village bell had a different tone so as not to get confused between two villages or more. This bell would sound in case of emergencies and also to notify the men SLOVAKIA 165 and women working in the fields when it was lunch and supper time. Just like every other piece of construction the bell tower was also built out of wood. Various kinds of construction of the loghouses, their structure, their elevations of masonry at Liptov, roofing, roof corners, balconies, and filling between the timber can be seen enywhere in a great variety. Plastering of the timb3r is sometimes carried out for reasons of insulation. This is to preserve timber against the influence of rain, sometimes even cold or simply to veil poverty of the wooden house. The protection from rain is evidenced by plastering the log walls on the outside up to the height where the loghous2 is not protected by the overhanging gutter. For the s2me reasons, the timber and interstices are white-washed with lime especially in corner transverse sections of the logs . At cicmany, this ornamentics in lime culminate in rich spiral ornamentation and painting of the logs, reminding of embroidery stiches. Under this ornamentation, the buildings lose their wooden block-like character formed by the wooden block in which doors and windows are carved out. The beauty of these houses is such that cicmany is known as one of the most beautiful attractions of th3 world. Since nature is the survival of the Slovaks, the d2corated walls of the houses in this village represent the different symbols of nature. Flowers, trees, etc., are just a few of the decorative symbols found painted on the house walls. Every house is a magnificent figure of originality and beauty created by the owner . The decorated walls and carved wood are all reasons for competition among neighbors. The young women who live in cicmany today are employed by factories and offices outside their village. After they come home at night, they work decorating costumes with the same art work as on the houses so they may wear their costumes on weekends for the tourist entertainment. However, decorating the costumes for tourist entertainment is not the only reason for doing this. They decorated their costumes because of the love and pride they have for our forefathers tradition. On the log structure, there sit various regional roof peculiarities, primarily saddle roofs and more rarely curb roofs sloping down into four gutters. There are slightly 166 SLOVAKIA sloping roofs from the summit into the gable the construction of which was started at a later period especially in the environment of cadca. Changes of the latter roofs into gabled ones are very well discernible in the houses of cicmany. Roofs with the lower edge of the latter type are typical for the upper Hron river region. In all houses, the roofs considerably exceed the log structure so as to make possible to store them round the house fuelwood and let it dry for their winter use. Wooden houses are usually amply lined round the walls with wood for drying. Building logs are deposited outside the house to season in the sun, and branches are left in heaps in the back yard and used as fuel. Briefly, wood around the house smells of resin; and, for instance, at Liptovska Revuca, cierny Balog, Stankovany, but mainly in the villages of the Orava district, there is a considerable reserve of wood stored around the house. A rare peculiarity are the balconied and storied constructions in the Orava District at Jasenova, then at cicmany, in the vicinity of Kremnica and upper part of Turiec. In Slovakia, very ancient interiors with open fireplaces and ovens have been preserved. Many special studies have been written about their singularities and their Old Frankish and Slavonic origin. Greatest fullness and utilization of the esthetic taste could hardly have been exhausted by the building of dwellings. Feeling of beauty has mostly asserted itself in the building of sacral structures where it was necessary to erect for the Divine Power magnificent, decorated tabernaclesbuilding of wooden churches, belfries, steeples, and ceme tery crosses. The poor sculptors could not afford to erect churches from marble. They were unable to order cross-9s from polished basalt or granite. As everything else, these objects were constructed from wood. The art of building from wood can justly be considered the national and original expression of folk building and of building in general in Slovakia, since it developed directly from the natural conditions and from the oldest cultural folk strata. As far as wooden structures, cultural and sacral, in various religious rites (Catholic, Orthodox, Greek Catholic, SLOVAKIA 167 and Protestant ), there have been preserved in Slovakia seventy of them. The most interesting are wooden churches in Eastern Slovakia. In the majority of cases, the Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches in Slovakia are the most numerous and can be divided into three types. The first type usually possesses a quadrangular high tower which is set in front of the main nave of the church and has its own belfry independent of the church. These churches are found in Slovakia at Hranicne and Matysova near Stara :Cubovna. Then, they continue westward of Bardejov with the church at Fricka and south of Bardejov at Venecia and Kozany. The second type of churches that have the same quadrangular tower, higher or lower, are connected with th2 main nave or directly set up on the roof of the main church but not directly built into the church. The third type is the most easterly one and is expressad by definite elements and character. There are the threa steeple-like terminations of the logrooms: The anteroom, the main nave and apsis which in its interior is separated from the main nave by iconostas. Each of these spaces culminates in a spire. The highest is the anterior part with a bulb-like cupola. The intermediate cupola is lower, quadrangular or octagonal with a log structure ceiling. Also, the smallest posterior part above the apsis terminates in a small spire. This type of church belongs to the most numerous ones. The densest networks of wooden churches is spread south below Dukla pass whether one approaches coming from Bardejov and Zborov to Svidnik or whether one i::; coming from Vranov to Svidnik and further to the east to Kruzlova, Ladomirova, Korejovce, Hunkovce, Nova Polianka (previously Mergeska), semetkovce, Mirol'a, Bodruzal, Vysny, and Nizny Komarnik, right to the pass. Finally, we have to mention the age of these wooden structures. On the territory of Slovakia, the oldest one is considered to be the wooden church at Trocany, 20 km. north of Presov, the origin of which is put in the 14th century. This is easy to explain since yew wood was used in its construction. Also, a building in Hervartov, and more 168 SLOVAKIA definitely so, originates in the end of the 15th century. Then follows the church at Zabrez. The Protestant churches generally come from the 17th and 18th centuries. Churches of the eastern rite are the youngest. They originated in the 18th and 19th centuries. Then, it has to be remembered that the tooth of tim2 and the woodworm enjoy with hearty appetite the wooden building memorials . It is the peak of time for us to preserve our eminent memorials in "scansens" beside museums or in other suitable sites in nature to save what still can be saved. (First place - College) REFERENCES Eugen Lazist'an and Jan Michalov, Drevene stavby na Slovensku, Frantisek Kalina, Bratislava, 1971. Emanuel Hruska, Stavba miest, Slovenska akademia vied, Bratislav.1, 1970. E. Lorad, Umelecko-historicke pamdtne kostoly na Slm; ens.1m, Spolo!( sv. Vojtecha, Trnava, 1957. Vladimir Wagner, Vyvin vytvarneho umenia na Slovensku, Slovenska akademia vied, Bratislava, 1948. Kalendar Jednota 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, Prva K-atoLcka Slovenska Jednota v USA, Middletown Pa. Mag:i.zine and periodicals: Jednota, Slovak v Amerike, Katolicky Sokol. Consultations with experts of Slovak art and architecture. II. MILAN RASTISLA V STEFANIK AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE SLOVAK PEOPLE Robert P o j e r During the late part of the nineteenth century, the seeds of nationalism had already been sown throughout the great empires of Europe. It would take the trauma of a world war before these nationalistic aspirations could be realized. In 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy made its appearance. Within this vast empire, there existed many peoples-the Austrians and the Magyars, of course; the Serbs, Croats, Ruthenes, Rumanians, Czechs, and Slovaks, to name just a few. Although on the surface, this Austro-Hungarian Empire  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource History and Tradition of Wooden Houses of Slovakia Description An account of the resource Paul Fialkovic Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 160-168 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fialkovic, Paul Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6eddbebeec47d1c911b38343d3742daa.pdf 7ecf6c97b2c4f90f0758cc11e32c687b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 179 THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF MILAN R. STEFANIK IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CAUSE (BASED UPON DOCUMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES) Evgeny F. Firsov This paper focuses on Milan R. Stefanik's recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers for the Czechoslovak 1 national movement in Russia during the First World War. It is based upon original materials identified in the Russian archives in the Russian, Czech, Slovak and French languages, including from the Department of written sources of the State Historical Museum (then - OPI GIM). Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), Slovak by origin, naturalized in France, was undoubtedly one of the most visible and popular figures among Czechs and Slovaks abroad during the First World War. In one reference to the Czechoslovak diaspora and to prisoners of war in Russia, it was underlined that the success of the national movement was guaranteed by the activity of M. R. Stefanik. This document made the flattering assessment: You know who Stefanik is. He is from the Slovak Nitra region on the border with Moravia, once the center of the former Great Moravian Empire of Sviitopluk, which was the natural center of the Czechoslovak nation. He is a member and plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, the authorized representative of Prof Masaryk. A renowned scholar, a hero, who distinguished himself on the French, Italian and Serbian fronts, he is a first-class and influential diplomat.2 1 ln the Russian documents of that time Czecho-Slovak was written, as a rule, as one word. And Stefanik adhered to the Czechoslovak orientation. 2 OPT GIM, f. 151. N.F. Melnikova-Kedrova-Rivnac. Materialy J. Papouseka. Hektograf na cesskom jazyke. February, 14, I 917. See also Evgeni Firsov, ,, Hektograficke materialy a korespondence v propagande patriotickeho hnuti ceskych a slovenskych zajatcu v Rusku," Historie a vojenstvi 1 (Praha, 2003), 23-36. �180 SLOVAKIA In Soviet historiography before 1990, Stefanik was considered one of the initiators of foreign intervention in Russia and a supporter of Admiral Kolchak. Despite this, his name can be found in the Soviet Encyclop edia. Furthermore, in Soviet and other historiography, Stefanik appeared as an anti-hero, in spite of all his achievements in the national liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks. 3 Only in 2001 , on the initiative of Igor Furdik, Ambassador Extraordinary of Slovakia to Russia, and due to the efforts of a number of Russian historians (including the author of this article) and Slovak historian Joseph Husar, there appeared a really objective work: Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Novy) vzg/'ad [Milan Rastislav Stefanik. A New Approach] (Martin, 2001 ). It is remarkable that the book was published in Slovakia. As expressed by Ambassador Furdik, the new situation in Central Europe finally allowed a fair and balanced assessment of Milan R. Stefanik. 4 Stefanik's personality characteristics in Russian sources are generally very positive and sympathetic. They repeatedly illustrated his courage and sacrifice. Stefanik initially arrived in Russia in 1916 as an emissary of the French military and only later as a representative of the Czechoslovak National Council. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak sociologist Anton Stefanek pointed out that to Stefanik ... we owe the fact that no one can rule over the Slovaks and the Slovak language, and Slovak national traditions regained their freedom, something which everybody was dreaming of, and that our ancestors had been waiting for. Th e history of the Slovak p eople would apparently have developed quite differently had it not been for Stefanik. 5 Stefanik appeared as a stoic person, but he was in poor health. He was ready to go to the end of the world for T. G. Masaryk and to 3 Sovetskij enciklopedicheskij slovar' (Moskva, 1982), 15-17, "Stefanik"; L. Holotik, Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Bratislava, 1958). 4 Milan Rastislav Stefa nik. Novy) vzg/'ad (Martin, 2001 ), 9; Evgenij F. Firsov, ,. Bojovnik za narodnu slobodu. M.R.Stefanik vo svetle ruskych pramenov," in M R. Stefanik v zrkadle prameiiov a najnovsich poznatkov historiograjie (Bratislava, 20 I 0). For a bibliography of the proceedings of the author about the national movement of Czechs and Slovaks of this period, see Evgenij Firsov, Scholars of Bohemian, Czech and Czechoslovak History Studies I (A- I) (Prague, 2005), 262-68 . 5 Slovensky dennik, 7, 1924, p.102. �SLOVAKIA 181 carry out any mission in distant Russia. The correspondence between Masaryk and Edvard Benes (from the Prague archives) shows that neither one was initially in any hurry to go to Russia. Benes justified his unwillingness to go by teaching a course on Czech history and literature from the sociological aspect at the Paris Higher Institute of Oriental Languages 6 . Masaryk was engaged in similar activities in London. So it was necessary for Stefanik to go to Russia. On July 26, 1916, The French General Staff issued an order, signed by the deputy Chief of Staff General Pelle, authorizing a "special mission" to Russia. By this order, Lieutenant Stefanik (led by General Maurice Janin) would be to allowed by Russia to organize a group of Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality to serve in France in Russian units or in special units. These would be formed on the basis of an agreement between France and Russia.7 The Czech troops were supposed to serve on the French front, but not on the Russian, to ensure their future independence from Russia. The French Command believed that Stefanik's mission should be limited to the recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers in order to strengthen the military forces of France. 8 Long and difficult negotiations (and even "nervousness," as noted by contemporaries) during the summer of 1916 and the spring of 191 7, and again between November 1918 and January 1919, ensued. Stefanik had to deal with former Czech member of the Austrian Parliament Josef Durich and his followers and with the board of the Union of Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. He was assisted by Bohdan Pavlu and a group of Petrograd Czechs. Stefanik finally has managed to incline Slovak national groups in Russia to the proCzechoslovak and pro-French orientation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 9 Upon his arrival in Russia, Stefanik was able to make a most favorable impression upon the leaders of the diplomatic office of Stav6 TGM - EB. Korespondence (Praha, 2004), 192. Milan Rastislav Stefanik v archivnych dokumentoch Historickej slui by fran cuzskeho ministerstva obrany. Ed. Frederic Guelton a i. (Bratislava: Ministerstvo obrany SR, 2009), 55 . 8 Ibid., 58. 9 See more details see E. Firsov, ,,Boj za orientaciu ceskeho a slovenskeho narodnooslobodzovacieho hnutia v Rusku v rokoch 1915-1917," Historicky casopis 43 , no. I ( 1995), 47-68. 7 �182 SLOVAKIA ka (General Headquarters - E.F.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further - MF A). As the August 2, 1916 letter of Basili (the Chief of the Diplomatic office of Stavka) to A. Neratoff in MF A of stated: "In the middle of August Stefanik arrived, a Lieutenant in the French service, originally a Czech (! - E.F. ). General Alekseev (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander - E.F.), as well as I, were impressed by Stefanik as a sensible and intelligent man" 10 . Basili then continued: In my conversations, I repeated to him (Stefanik - E.F.) what I had to tell his countrymen, that the success of the Czech cause depended upon ending, as soon as possible, the disagreement among the Czechs working with us .... and that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechs, but of course expect them to keep in mind their natural duty primarily to Russia. Stefanik went from Stavka to Kiev, where he attended a meeting of Czech leaders. At his suggestion, they created the Association of Czechs in Russia. At the head of the new organization will be Durich, with a staff, elected in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council. 11 Stefanik showed much more useful activities with the organization of Czech troops, according to Basili. 12 Furthermore, Basili went on, The role played by Stefanik in concluding an agreement with Durich, and the latter's f ear of Stefanik, makes us want to turn him from the Czech cause in Russia, since he could be useful to us in military terms. From this point of view the commissioning of persons proposed to you by Stefanik is also undesirable because of their deliberate Masaryk coloring. JJ After this message of August 30, 1916, A. Neratoff informed Basili that: ... all negotiations on the Czech political system are concentrated in the hands of Masaryk. Durich 's activity is re10 11 12 13 AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 96. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 9606.-98. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93 . L. I 05 . AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 607. D. 93 . L. I 07. �SLOVAKIA 183 stricted to propaganda among the Czech prisoners of war in Russia, under the close supervision of Masaryk ' agents, the most important of which is Stefanik. 14 The main result of this exchange was the September, 1916 conclusion that it was necessary to make efforts to retain the main center of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. World War I would decide on the structure of Central Europe based upon new principles. Thus, we can conclude that the results of the first Stefanik mission to Russia almost did not depend on him (in spite of the fact that in historical literature it was judged a failure ). 15 This was especially true because at the beginning of August 1916, i.e. before Stefanik's arrival in Russia, the Council of Ministers had rejected a request by the French government to allow a significant number of prisoners of war to be transferred to France. Stefanik's mission led to the neutralization of Masaryk's competitor in Russia, Josef Diirich, and paved the way for T.G. Masaryk' s coming to Russia as the leader of the Czechoslovak national movement a few months after the February, 1917 revolution. The archival materials of Jaroslav Papousek, discovered by us, included letters to Bohdan Pavhl, a close colleague and authorized representative of M. R. Stefanik. They complete the history of the struggle for the recognition of the Masaryk program for the independent Czechoslovak State from the "Russian" colony of Czechs and Slovaks. They also cover the creation of the Council headed by Diirich, as well as the history of its collapse. With the strong support of Milan R. Stefanik, a decisive role in this was played by representatives of the so-called Petrograd opposition (B. Pavhl, J. Papousek, J. Klecanda, etc.). Supported by M. R. Stefanik, they carried out the decisions of Masaryk and his Council in Paris. In this regard, the literature on the Legionnaires, which alluded to the spontaneous connection of "Russian" Czechs and Slovaks to Masaryk's program, is unconvincing. 16 14 For more about this see E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam zarskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 41. 15 See for example, K. Pichlik , B. Klipa., J. Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti /egionafi (1914-1920) (Praha, 1996). 6 See, for example, JosefKudela, S nasim voj skem na Rusi (Praha, 1923). �184 SLOVAKIA Now we will present at least part of a letter, written by M. R. Stefanik in Petrograd in February of 1917, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It reads in part: Your Excellency, I have the honor hereby to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak National Council unanimously agreed to exclude the deputy J. Durich from membership in the National Council. I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency of the sad act which was forced upon the Czechoslovak National Council by Mr. Durich 's actions. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and deep devotion. Milan Stefanik, a member of the Czechoslovak National Council, in Petrograd, February 9, 1917. His Excellency Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs N. N. Pokrovsky 17 . Then followed a detailed explanation by Stefanik. The text consists of more than fourteen pages. On Stefanik' s letter there appears a hand-written notation : it was read by the Minister at a meeting on February 10, 1917. From these documents it is clear that Stefanik' s efforts as the representative of the Paris Czechoslovak National Council were ultimately aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical influence in Central Europe. We now proceed to the next arrival of M. R. Stefanik in Russia, this time in Siberia. This information is taken mainly from the Admiral Kolchak government reports (mostly from the collections of GARF) . It is not my intention to reproduce the history of Kolchak's government in the Siberian expanses of Russia, nor to give a detailed explanation of the relations between the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and the Czechoslovak Legions. For us it was more important to look at the general condition and spirit of the Czechoslovak troops on the eve of Stefanik' s arrival in Siberia through Vladivostok, and to reproduce for the first time important materials about Stefanik' s activities. 17 A VPRI, F. Osobyj politotdel. D., 224. �SLOVAKIA 185 The relationship between the Czechoslovak military units and the Provisional Siberian Government, according to the operative information of Stefanik, evolved quite favorably. In reports from the summer of 1918 it was noted that almost brotherly relations had been established with the Czechs and Slovaks, based on a community of mutual interests and goals. On behalf of the Allies, the French side gave official thanks to the Czechs and Slovaks for their actions and their willingness to contribute to the opening of a second front. 18 The first mention of Stefanik (who at this time was identified as a Czech) was found in a telegram of November 5, 1918, from the Siberian command headquarters in Omsk, that is, a few days before the Kolchak coup. It said that the Allies knew about the expansion of the Czechoslovak military units, and their rebelliousness was seen as a desire to leave Russia. It further stated: "General Janin, with Czech General Stefanik, arrived in Russia to command the Czechs and to arrange for help. The latter condemns the policy of the Czech National Council." 19 The documents further stated that the Omsk events (Kolchak's coup) were favorably received by the Allies. Stefanik arrived in Siberia in an emergency situation, especially with the intention of inspecting the situation. He was powerless to affect the general course of events. No less important, and quite a delicate task, was to quell a strong revolutionary and even proBolshevik unrest in the ranks of the Czech and Slovak troops. He also had to overcome the anti-Kolchak' spirit of the troops (spread immediately after the coup), and to persuade their leaders to cooperate with the new Siberian power, as the other Allies had already done. Those believed that the Czechoslovaks should not leave Russia until their presence was no longer necessary for intervention. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak army in Russia was also essential to Prague, as it was one of the guarantors of the projected boundaries of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. The binding of Czech and Slovak troops to the new government did not happen immediately. The operative information at the end of November, 1918 was that the Czechoslovak army had no sympathy 18 See E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti) ," in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 3556. 19 GARF. F. 162. �186 SLOVAKIA for the violent upheaval at Omsk and considered the crisis unfinished and looked forward to its resolution by legal means. Among the Czechoslovak Army Corps demands arose to send these military units home. The critical attitude of the Czechoslovak army during 1919 did not change. The Kolchak government failed to recruit it for the front. Its Council of Ministers even promised to reward the Czechoslovak army in the struggle for the revival of Russia by giving it the right to acquire real estate. The general condition of Czechoslovak forces was compared in the reports with the situation in the Russian army. It was noted that Czech and Slovak officers quickly became right-wing and the rankand-file left-wing, with a gap growing between them. After General Stefanik's arrival, Admiral Kolchak, in a telegram of December 20, 1918 to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, informed him that: "General Janin has arrived, whom we expected with impatience, hoping to resolve urgent problems of command together with him and Stefanik. .. 11 20 . In our view, many complications stemmed not only from the fact that the Czech and Slovak commanders often acted (according to Kolchak) quite independently, but also that the mass of the Czech and Slovak Legionaries saw in Kolchak's government the danger of the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order. It was no secret that the Legionnaires' political orientations were formed by the party of social revolutionaries. By tremendous persuasion General Stefanik managed to turn the Czech and Slovak troops into allies of Kolchak. In conversations with the Czech and Slovak troops, Stefanik set out to fulfill promises which were made to the Allies - to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, which the Legionnaires had captured, as well as the city of Omsk. He even had to struggle with cases of insubordination. His most radical step was to publish order Number 588 on January 16, 1919, which was announced after his departure. According to this order, the army and democracy were incompatible. Therefore, all elected committees of the Russian Army type were to be dissolved. A few days later Stefanik left Siberia, apparently due to ill health. 20 E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl 'ad (Martin, 200 I), 45-46. �SLOVAKIA 187 The most detailed archival materials on Stefanik's activities in Siberia are contained in the July 3, 1919 Department of State Protection report to Kolchak's government. It covers the long period from the fall of 1918 to the summer of 1919. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Russiyanov (some reports were signed by an agent nicknamed "Summer"), noted: While the Czechoslovaks had plenty of everything, and everyone was interested in them, when they felt that they were in charge, [they] did not feel homesick and forgot the drought at home. But when their position had deteriorated, and they receded into the background, discontent arose among them .. . Their commanders, wishing to suppress a rising discontent, and at the same time to constrain the demoralizing propagation of "Committees" among them, have welcomed to Russia General Stefanik, who is clothed with the authority of the Republic ... Stefanik informed them that, as of his arrival, the Czechoslovak army became a regular army of the Czechoslovak Republic. Stefanik promised that he would do everything in his power to alleviate the Czechoslovaks' situation in Siberia and to ensure their return home as soon as possible... "21 One of the representatives of Kolchak' Department of State Protection even declared that "almost without exception, all social classes have turned against the Czechoslovaks. Always it heard that the Czechoslovaks have undertaken not to work for them."22 What were the results of this Siberian tour? Almost a century later, contrary to the negative opinions regarding Stefanik's stay in Russia, 23 positive results are also evident. Stefanik helped to unite the Czechoslovak army, to increase its combat capability, and to make it a part of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. He persuaded the Legionaries to endure for a bit longer, even though they were so far from their native land. Russian sources also speak of Stefanik's merits and to his expulsion of the most Russophobe-minded members of the Czechoslovak National Council, who opposed Kolchak. 24 21 GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. L. 5806. 23 See for example, L. Holotik, "Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR" (Bratislava, 1958). 24 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 22 �188 SLOVAKIA Thanks to Stefanik, many Russian troops, earlier divided over the Czechoslovak army, went over to Kolchak. Stefanik helped to smooth the friction between French General Janin and Admiral Kolchak. With Stefanik' s sudden departure from Siberia, the relationship between the Allies and Kolchak deteriorated and latent plans were nurtured about the secret withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the zone of Kolchak' power. Thus the fate of the Siberian governor was sealed by the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies still continued to watch over Kolchak, for they were attracted by the Russian gold reserves 25 and an incredible desire to profit by them. They were not able to provide to the Russian government of Kolchak substantial military aid and the mission of Janin and the Allies turned from a military to a diplomatic one. In the words of G. K. Gins (whose work "Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak" has been published several times in Russia) "the consciousness of common Slavonic problems, the adherence to culture which was broken by Bolshevism - could it be understood by an ordinary Czech soldier?" 26 Stefanik was one of the few who perceived these problems and planted this understanding with another compatriot. The book of G.K. Gins, a former manager of the Kolchak government, contains the highest praise for Stefanik and his stay in Omsk. Gins concludes that the Czech Legionnaires' saga in Russia was not heroic in itself. It contributed nothing to the Slavic peoples, to Siberia or to Russia. The Czechs and Slovaks just wanted to go home. 27 In 2007 a book entitled "With Kolchak against Kolchak" appeared. This work leaves much to be desired. The section about Stefanik, for example, contains many mistakes. The name "Stefanik" on page 13 7 is distorted and the years of his life are not specified. Furthermore, it asserted that Stefanik was "ill in Siberia and moved to Czechoslovakia," and further in this book, " ... he came for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps, and on September 2, 1920 25 RGV A, f. 1198. Dokumental 'nyje materialy po istorii sozdanija cecho-slovackogo gosudarstva. Kollekcij a. CCXIII. General Janin E. Benesu. Omsk, 29.X.1919. The document in fiarticular says: «Je provoque mesures pour transferer reserve d' orn . 6 G.K Gins., Sibir ', sojuzniki i Kolcak (Moskva, 2008), 578. 27 Ibid., 574-75 . �SLOVAKIA 189 departed from Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia" 28 (but we know that Stefanik died on May 4, 1919). Most recently, valuable sources of the Russian State Military Archives (further - RGV A) relating to the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks in the First World War have become available. Of special interest are materials containing confidential correspondence (most often marked "urgent") by the Chief of Allied forces in Siberia, General Maurice Janin, with various authorities. They include numerous dispatches (intercepted by Kolchak's counterespionage) sent by Janin to the French command, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Benes. An exchange of telegrams was also conducted with the commander of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. More steadfast analysis of this considerable block of archival materials still needs to be carried out. The materials reveal a lot about the role of the Allies in Siberia, and especially characterize the relationship of the Allies, General Janin and the Czechoslovak army with Kolchak's government. The RGVA block also contains some interesting materials relating to Stefanik's stay in the camp of the Czechoslovak army and Kolchak's, and Stefanik's reports to Benes. And here one can draw a general conclusion that as a military commander and as a representative of the new Czechoslovak Republic, Stefanik enjoyed unprecedented respect and trust. Estimations of Stefanik contained in Janin's dispatches are positive and respectful. In summary, we will now underline the importance of Stefanik's military missions in Russia. During his first mission, Stefanik made the break which led to Diirich's downfall and this made things easier for T. G. Masaryk, who arrived after the February revolution in 1917. The second mission in Siberia and to the Far East, appears unfinished because Stefanik's health deteriorated. However, there was also a disagreement with Maurice Janin, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Entente. As a result, Stefanik abruptly left Siberia in order to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not officially included in the Czechoslovak delegation. He intended to use his abilities, his influence at the highest levels and his diplomatic skills to uphold Czechoslovak (and especially Slovak) affairs. The important question of the frontiers of the new state was 28 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. �190 SLOVAKIA solved. And the merits of Stefanik, judging by the memoirs of representatives of Great Britain, were recognized as considerable. 29 The arrival of Stefanik strengthened the Slovak component in the argument for an independent Czecho-Slovak state. At the Paris Conference Stefanik was named "the Czech Military Minister;" he left the impression of a mobile, and in contrast to the corpulent Karel Kramai', a "vigorous and imperious figure." Those who remembered Stefanik at the Conference considered his death an "essential loss, as by temperament Stefanik was sparkling champagne compared to the Czech spirit of heavy beer." 30 oan OIOflk 27 /x 1919 Qeneralu 'lffrcr,y Irtutak Situace na f rmU lpatna. LeT' lcl'idlo T plnea 11atup11. Stl'ed a pra,e lcl'idlo 118tupuje ponolna, ~llkytujice dosU tmoUjn;f odpor, Tiak nhledea k w,tupu lwfho kfidla msi tab ustuponti. Oeobd pro tentokraty neohoTa■ perne nada j i T UBj>lohu d jaU protiofendT:y. llyslli le T bnku ae 1aane e na- kusei o.Ji:a. Poehybuji le se Tlada T pl'1paU nakuaoe O..ka udrli. ProeiA pfilalllU sacboTat1 T Anla:la pa'h.dak.Zlollllram 0.Sl. ~dy naehuejioill ae jelti T o.ku daU patr16DII roskuy k e1'8ntuelni 91'llkuao1 Genenll JANI N. Illustration I . Instructions of General Janin to General Syrovy in connection with the planned evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Omsk (The source is from RGVA , Russia) 29 30 G. Nikolson, Kak delalsja mir v /919 g. (Moskva, 1945), 251 . Ibid. �191 SLOVAKIA OOIIII ExplldU d 'Omsk le 29 OctobN 1919. ioie franqaiae Co.wrlquer Docteur BEIIES. Retrai te continue la ga110he eat aur 1 • ICJ!Dl oo peo en annt Pl!'?ROPAil.OSKI le reete a pe11 pres de mi-chnin entre le11 2 rhieraa. Tro11pea sont tree ua4es, d4moralidee, lea r4eerres douteuses. J' 4proun Tina craintea au 11uj11t d • <IISK, qua partage je croia eal'oir l.e Comaand8J!llllt an Ohef. Je prol'oq'tll aesurea pour t r&Daf6rer r411erre d • or. Situation r6sllltant de 1· 11ffoudr81118nt du front, de 1 • 4Yacuati <11 dee ~nee et du d4sordra g4n4rali ■ d est bien diftlcile. General JANIN. Illustration 2. General Janin informs Edvard Benes about the measures taken on displacement of the Russian gold reserves (The source is from RGVA. Russia) �� SLOVAKIA 179 THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF MILAN R. STEFANIK IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CAUSE (BASED UPON DOCUMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES) Evgeny F. Firsov This paper focuses on Milan R. Stefanik's recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers for the Czechoslovak 1 national movement in Russia during the First World War. It is based upon original materials identified in the Russian archives in the Russian, Czech, Slovak and French languages, including from the Department of written sources of the State Historical Museum (then - OPI GIM). Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), Slovak by origin, naturalized in France, was undoubtedly one of the most visible and popular figures among Czechs and Slovaks abroad during the First World War. In one reference to the Czechoslovak diaspora and to prisoners of war in Russia, it was underlined that the success of the national movement was guaranteed by the activity of M. R. Stefanik. This document made the flattering assessment: You know who Stefanik is. He is from the Slovak Nitra region on the border with Moravia, once the center of the former Great Moravian Empire of Sviitopluk, which was the natural center of the Czechoslovak nation. He is a member and plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, the authorized representative of Prof Masaryk. A renowned scholar, a hero, who distinguished himself on the French, Italian and Serbian fronts, he is a first-class and influential diplomat.2 1 ln the Russian documents of that time Czecho-Slovak was written, as a rule, as one word. And Stefanik adhered to the Czechoslovak orientation. 2 OPT GIM, f. 151. N.F. Melnikova-Kedrova-Rivnac. Materialy J. Papouseka. Hektograf na cesskom jazyke. February, 14, I 917. See also Evgeni Firsov, ,, Hektograficke materialy a korespondence v propagande patriotickeho hnuti ceskych a slovenskych zajatcu v Rusku," Historie a vojenstvi 1 (Praha, 2003), 23-36. �180 SLOVAKIA In Soviet historiography before 1990, Stefanik was considered one of the initiators of foreign intervention in Russia and a supporter of Admiral Kolchak. Despite this, his name can be found in the Soviet Encyclop edia. Furthermore, in Soviet and other historiography, Stefanik appeared as an anti-hero, in spite of all his achievements in the national liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks. 3 Only in 2001 , on the initiative of Igor Furdik, Ambassador Extraordinary of Slovakia to Russia, and due to the efforts of a number of Russian historians (including the author of this article) and Slovak historian Joseph Husar, there appeared a really objective work: Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Novy) vzg/'ad [Milan Rastislav Stefanik. A New Approach] (Martin, 2001 ). It is remarkable that the book was published in Slovakia. As expressed by Ambassador Furdik, the new situation in Central Europe finally allowed a fair and balanced assessment of Milan R. Stefanik. 4 Stefanik's personality characteristics in Russian sources are generally very positive and sympathetic. They repeatedly illustrated his courage and sacrifice. Stefanik initially arrived in Russia in 1916 as an emissary of the French military and only later as a representative of the Czechoslovak National Council. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak sociologist Anton Stefanek pointed out that to Stefanik ... we owe the fact that no one can rule over the Slovaks and the Slovak language, and Slovak national traditions regained their freedom, something which everybody was dreaming of, and that our ancestors had been waiting for. Th e history of the Slovak p eople would apparently have developed quite differently had it not been for Stefanik. 5 Stefanik appeared as a stoic person, but he was in poor health. He was ready to go to the end of the world for T. G. Masaryk and to 3 Sovetskij enciklopedicheskij slovar' (Moskva, 1982), 15-17, "Stefanik"; L. Holotik, Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Bratislava, 1958). 4 Milan Rastislav Stefa nik. Novy) vzg/'ad (Martin, 2001 ), 9; Evgenij F. Firsov, ,. Bojovnik za narodnu slobodu. M.R.Stefanik vo svetle ruskych pramenov," in M R. Stefanik v zrkadle prameiiov a najnovsich poznatkov historiograjie (Bratislava, 20 I 0). For a bibliography of the proceedings of the author about the national movement of Czechs and Slovaks of this period, see Evgenij Firsov, Scholars of Bohemian, Czech and Czechoslovak History Studies I (A- I) (Prague, 2005), 262-68 . 5 Slovensky dennik, 7, 1924, p.102. �SLOVAKIA 181 carry out any mission in distant Russia. The correspondence between Masaryk and Edvard Benes (from the Prague archives) shows that neither one was initially in any hurry to go to Russia. Benes justified his unwillingness to go by teaching a course on Czech history and literature from the sociological aspect at the Paris Higher Institute of Oriental Languages 6 . Masaryk was engaged in similar activities in London. So it was necessary for Stefanik to go to Russia. On July 26, 1916, The French General Staff issued an order, signed by the deputy Chief of Staff General Pelle, authorizing a "special mission" to Russia. By this order, Lieutenant Stefanik (led by General Maurice Janin) would be to allowed by Russia to organize a group of Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality to serve in France in Russian units or in special units. These would be formed on the basis of an agreement between France and Russia.7 The Czech troops were supposed to serve on the French front, but not on the Russian, to ensure their future independence from Russia. The French Command believed that Stefanik's mission should be limited to the recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers in order to strengthen the military forces of France. 8 Long and difficult negotiations (and even "nervousness," as noted by contemporaries) during the summer of 1916 and the spring of 191 7, and again between November 1918 and January 1919, ensued. Stefanik had to deal with former Czech member of the Austrian Parliament Josef Durich and his followers and with the board of the Union of Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. He was assisted by Bohdan Pavlu and a group of Petrograd Czechs. Stefanik finally has managed to incline Slovak national groups in Russia to the proCzechoslovak and pro-French orientation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 9 Upon his arrival in Russia, Stefanik was able to make a most favorable impression upon the leaders of the diplomatic office of Stav6 TGM - EB. Korespondence (Praha, 2004), 192. Milan Rastislav Stefanik v archivnych dokumentoch Historickej slui by fran cuzskeho ministerstva obrany. Ed. Frederic Guelton a i. (Bratislava: Ministerstvo obrany SR, 2009), 55 . 8 Ibid., 58. 9 See more details see E. Firsov, ,,Boj za orientaciu ceskeho a slovenskeho narodnooslobodzovacieho hnutia v Rusku v rokoch 1915-1917," Historicky casopis 43 , no. I ( 1995), 47-68. 7 �182 SLOVAKIA ka (General Headquarters - E.F.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further - MF A). As the August 2, 1916 letter of Basili (the Chief of the Diplomatic office of Stavka) to A. Neratoff in MF A of stated: "In the middle of August Stefanik arrived, a Lieutenant in the French service, originally a Czech (! - E.F. ). General Alekseev (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander - E.F.), as well as I, were impressed by Stefanik as a sensible and intelligent man" 10 . Basili then continued: In my conversations, I repeated to him (Stefanik - E.F.) what I had to tell his countrymen, that the success of the Czech cause depended upon ending, as soon as possible, the disagreement among the Czechs working with us .... and that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechs, but of course expect them to keep in mind their natural duty primarily to Russia. Stefanik went from Stavka to Kiev, where he attended a meeting of Czech leaders. At his suggestion, they created the Association of Czechs in Russia. At the head of the new organization will be Durich, with a staff, elected in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council. 11 Stefanik showed much more useful activities with the organization of Czech troops, according to Basili. 12 Furthermore, Basili went on, The role played by Stefanik in concluding an agreement with Durich, and the latter's f ear of Stefanik, makes us want to turn him from the Czech cause in Russia, since he could be useful to us in military terms. From this point of view the commissioning of persons proposed to you by Stefanik is also undesirable because of their deliberate Masaryk coloring. JJ After this message of August 30, 1916, A. Neratoff informed Basili that: ... all negotiations on the Czech political system are concentrated in the hands of Masaryk. Durich 's activity is re10 11 12 13 AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 96. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 9606.-98. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93 . L. I 05 . AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 607. D. 93 . L. I 07. �SLOVAKIA 183 stricted to propaganda among the Czech prisoners of war in Russia, under the close supervision of Masaryk ' agents, the most important of which is Stefanik. 14 The main result of this exchange was the September, 1916 conclusion that it was necessary to make efforts to retain the main center of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. World War I would decide on the structure of Central Europe based upon new principles. Thus, we can conclude that the results of the first Stefanik mission to Russia almost did not depend on him (in spite of the fact that in historical literature it was judged a failure ). 15 This was especially true because at the beginning of August 1916, i.e. before Stefanik's arrival in Russia, the Council of Ministers had rejected a request by the French government to allow a significant number of prisoners of war to be transferred to France. Stefanik's mission led to the neutralization of Masaryk's competitor in Russia, Josef Diirich, and paved the way for T.G. Masaryk' s coming to Russia as the leader of the Czechoslovak national movement a few months after the February, 1917 revolution. The archival materials of Jaroslav Papousek, discovered by us, included letters to Bohdan Pavhl, a close colleague and authorized representative of M. R. Stefanik. They complete the history of the struggle for the recognition of the Masaryk program for the independent Czechoslovak State from the "Russian" colony of Czechs and Slovaks. They also cover the creation of the Council headed by Diirich, as well as the history of its collapse. With the strong support of Milan R. Stefanik, a decisive role in this was played by representatives of the so-called Petrograd opposition (B. Pavhl, J. Papousek, J. Klecanda, etc.). Supported by M. R. Stefanik, they carried out the decisions of Masaryk and his Council in Paris. In this regard, the literature on the Legionnaires, which alluded to the spontaneous connection of "Russian" Czechs and Slovaks to Masaryk's program, is unconvincing. 16 14 For more about this see E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam zarskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 41. 15 See for example, K. Pichlik , B. Klipa., J. Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti /egionafi (1914-1920) (Praha, 1996). 6 See, for example, JosefKudela, S nasim voj skem na Rusi (Praha, 1923). �184 SLOVAKIA Now we will present at least part of a letter, written by M. R. Stefanik in Petrograd in February of 1917, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It reads in part: Your Excellency, I have the honor hereby to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak National Council unanimously agreed to exclude the deputy J. Durich from membership in the National Council. I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency of the sad act which was forced upon the Czechoslovak National Council by Mr. Durich 's actions. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and deep devotion. Milan Stefanik, a member of the Czechoslovak National Council, in Petrograd, February 9, 1917. His Excellency Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs N. N. Pokrovsky 17 . Then followed a detailed explanation by Stefanik. The text consists of more than fourteen pages. On Stefanik' s letter there appears a hand-written notation : it was read by the Minister at a meeting on February 10, 1917. From these documents it is clear that Stefanik' s efforts as the representative of the Paris Czechoslovak National Council were ultimately aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical influence in Central Europe. We now proceed to the next arrival of M. R. Stefanik in Russia, this time in Siberia. This information is taken mainly from the Admiral Kolchak government reports (mostly from the collections of GARF) . It is not my intention to reproduce the history of Kolchak's government in the Siberian expanses of Russia, nor to give a detailed explanation of the relations between the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and the Czechoslovak Legions. For us it was more important to look at the general condition and spirit of the Czechoslovak troops on the eve of Stefanik' s arrival in Siberia through Vladivostok, and to reproduce for the first time important materials about Stefanik' s activities. 17 A VPRI, F. Osobyj politotdel. D., 224. �SLOVAKIA 185 The relationship between the Czechoslovak military units and the Provisional Siberian Government, according to the operative information of Stefanik, evolved quite favorably. In reports from the summer of 1918 it was noted that almost brotherly relations had been established with the Czechs and Slovaks, based on a community of mutual interests and goals. On behalf of the Allies, the French side gave official thanks to the Czechs and Slovaks for their actions and their willingness to contribute to the opening of a second front. 18 The first mention of Stefanik (who at this time was identified as a Czech) was found in a telegram of November 5, 1918, from the Siberian command headquarters in Omsk, that is, a few days before the Kolchak coup. It said that the Allies knew about the expansion of the Czechoslovak military units, and their rebelliousness was seen as a desire to leave Russia. It further stated: "General Janin, with Czech General Stefanik, arrived in Russia to command the Czechs and to arrange for help. The latter condemns the policy of the Czech National Council." 19 The documents further stated that the Omsk events (Kolchak's coup) were favorably received by the Allies. Stefanik arrived in Siberia in an emergency situation, especially with the intention of inspecting the situation. He was powerless to affect the general course of events. No less important, and quite a delicate task, was to quell a strong revolutionary and even proBolshevik unrest in the ranks of the Czech and Slovak troops. He also had to overcome the anti-Kolchak' spirit of the troops (spread immediately after the coup), and to persuade their leaders to cooperate with the new Siberian power, as the other Allies had already done. Those believed that the Czechoslovaks should not leave Russia until their presence was no longer necessary for intervention. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak army in Russia was also essential to Prague, as it was one of the guarantors of the projected boundaries of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. The binding of Czech and Slovak troops to the new government did not happen immediately. The operative information at the end of November, 1918 was that the Czechoslovak army had no sympathy 18 See E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti) ," in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 3556. 19 GARF. F. 162. �186 SLOVAKIA for the violent upheaval at Omsk and considered the crisis unfinished and looked forward to its resolution by legal means. Among the Czechoslovak Army Corps demands arose to send these military units home. The critical attitude of the Czechoslovak army during 1919 did not change. The Kolchak government failed to recruit it for the front. Its Council of Ministers even promised to reward the Czechoslovak army in the struggle for the revival of Russia by giving it the right to acquire real estate. The general condition of Czechoslovak forces was compared in the reports with the situation in the Russian army. It was noted that Czech and Slovak officers quickly became right-wing and the rankand-file left-wing, with a gap growing between them. After General Stefanik's arrival, Admiral Kolchak, in a telegram of December 20, 1918 to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, informed him that: "General Janin has arrived, whom we expected with impatience, hoping to resolve urgent problems of command together with him and Stefanik. .. 11 20 . In our view, many complications stemmed not only from the fact that the Czech and Slovak commanders often acted (according to Kolchak) quite independently, but also that the mass of the Czech and Slovak Legionaries saw in Kolchak's government the danger of the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order. It was no secret that the Legionnaires' political orientations were formed by the party of social revolutionaries. By tremendous persuasion General Stefanik managed to turn the Czech and Slovak troops into allies of Kolchak. In conversations with the Czech and Slovak troops, Stefanik set out to fulfill promises which were made to the Allies - to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, which the Legionnaires had captured, as well as the city of Omsk. He even had to struggle with cases of insubordination. His most radical step was to publish order Number 588 on January 16, 1919, which was announced after his departure. According to this order, the army and democracy were incompatible. Therefore, all elected committees of the Russian Army type were to be dissolved. A few days later Stefanik left Siberia, apparently due to ill health. 20 E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl 'ad (Martin, 200 I), 45-46. �SLOVAKIA 187 The most detailed archival materials on Stefanik's activities in Siberia are contained in the July 3, 1919 Department of State Protection report to Kolchak's government. It covers the long period from the fall of 1918 to the summer of 1919. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Russiyanov (some reports were signed by an agent nicknamed "Summer"), noted: While the Czechoslovaks had plenty of everything, and everyone was interested in them, when they felt that they were in charge, [they] did not feel homesick and forgot the drought at home. But when their position had deteriorated, and they receded into the background, discontent arose among them .. . Their commanders, wishing to suppress a rising discontent, and at the same time to constrain the demoralizing propagation of "Committees" among them, have welcomed to Russia General Stefanik, who is clothed with the authority of the Republic ... Stefanik informed them that, as of his arrival, the Czechoslovak army became a regular army of the Czechoslovak Republic. Stefanik promised that he would do everything in his power to alleviate the Czechoslovaks' situation in Siberia and to ensure their return home as soon as possible... "21 One of the representatives of Kolchak' Department of State Protection even declared that "almost without exception, all social classes have turned against the Czechoslovaks. Always it heard that the Czechoslovaks have undertaken not to work for them."22 What were the results of this Siberian tour? Almost a century later, contrary to the negative opinions regarding Stefanik's stay in Russia, 23 positive results are also evident. Stefanik helped to unite the Czechoslovak army, to increase its combat capability, and to make it a part of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. He persuaded the Legionaries to endure for a bit longer, even though they were so far from their native land. Russian sources also speak of Stefanik's merits and to his expulsion of the most Russophobe-minded members of the Czechoslovak National Council, who opposed Kolchak. 24 21 GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. L. 5806. 23 See for example, L. Holotik, "Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR" (Bratislava, 1958). 24 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 22 �188 SLOVAKIA Thanks to Stefanik, many Russian troops, earlier divided over the Czechoslovak army, went over to Kolchak. Stefanik helped to smooth the friction between French General Janin and Admiral Kolchak. With Stefanik' s sudden departure from Siberia, the relationship between the Allies and Kolchak deteriorated and latent plans were nurtured about the secret withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the zone of Kolchak' power. Thus the fate of the Siberian governor was sealed by the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies still continued to watch over Kolchak, for they were attracted by the Russian gold reserves 25 and an incredible desire to profit by them. They were not able to provide to the Russian government of Kolchak substantial military aid and the mission of Janin and the Allies turned from a military to a diplomatic one. In the words of G. K. Gins (whose work "Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak" has been published several times in Russia) "the consciousness of common Slavonic problems, the adherence to culture which was broken by Bolshevism - could it be understood by an ordinary Czech soldier?" 26 Stefanik was one of the few who perceived these problems and planted this understanding with another compatriot. The book of G.K. Gins, a former manager of the Kolchak government, contains the highest praise for Stefanik and his stay in Omsk. Gins concludes that the Czech Legionnaires' saga in Russia was not heroic in itself. It contributed nothing to the Slavic peoples, to Siberia or to Russia. The Czechs and Slovaks just wanted to go home. 27 In 2007 a book entitled "With Kolchak against Kolchak" appeared. This work leaves much to be desired. The section about Stefanik, for example, contains many mistakes. The name "Stefanik" on page 13 7 is distorted and the years of his life are not specified. Furthermore, it asserted that Stefanik was "ill in Siberia and moved to Czechoslovakia," and further in this book, " ... he came for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps, and on September 2, 1920 25 RGV A, f. 1198. Dokumental 'nyje materialy po istorii sozdanija cecho-slovackogo gosudarstva. Kollekcij a. CCXIII. General Janin E. Benesu. Omsk, 29.X.1919. The document in fiarticular says: «Je provoque mesures pour transferer reserve d' orn . 6 G.K Gins., Sibir ', sojuzniki i Kolcak (Moskva, 2008), 578. 27 Ibid., 574-75 . �SLOVAKIA 189 departed from Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia" 28 (but we know that Stefanik died on May 4, 1919). Most recently, valuable sources of the Russian State Military Archives (further - RGV A) relating to the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks in the First World War have become available. Of special interest are materials containing confidential correspondence (most often marked "urgent") by the Chief of Allied forces in Siberia, General Maurice Janin, with various authorities. They include numerous dispatches (intercepted by Kolchak's counterespionage) sent by Janin to the French command, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Benes. An exchange of telegrams was also conducted with the commander of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. More steadfast analysis of this considerable block of archival materials still needs to be carried out. The materials reveal a lot about the role of the Allies in Siberia, and especially characterize the relationship of the Allies, General Janin and the Czechoslovak army with Kolchak's government. The RGVA block also contains some interesting materials relating to Stefanik's stay in the camp of the Czechoslovak army and Kolchak's, and Stefanik's reports to Benes. And here one can draw a general conclusion that as a military commander and as a representative of the new Czechoslovak Republic, Stefanik enjoyed unprecedented respect and trust. Estimations of Stefanik contained in Janin's dispatches are positive and respectful. In summary, we will now underline the importance of Stefanik's military missions in Russia. During his first mission, Stefanik made the break which led to Diirich's downfall and this made things easier for T. G. Masaryk, who arrived after the February revolution in 1917. The second mission in Siberia and to the Far East, appears unfinished because Stefanik's health deteriorated. However, there was also a disagreement with Maurice Janin, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Entente. As a result, Stefanik abruptly left Siberia in order to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not officially included in the Czechoslovak delegation. He intended to use his abilities, his influence at the highest levels and his diplomatic skills to uphold Czechoslovak (and especially Slovak) affairs. The important question of the frontiers of the new state was 28 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. �190 SLOVAKIA solved. And the merits of Stefanik, judging by the memoirs of representatives of Great Britain, were recognized as considerable. 29 The arrival of Stefanik strengthened the Slovak component in the argument for an independent Czecho-Slovak state. At the Paris Conference Stefanik was named "the Czech Military Minister;" he left the impression of a mobile, and in contrast to the corpulent Karel Kramai', a "vigorous and imperious figure." Those who remembered Stefanik at the Conference considered his death an "essential loss, as by temperament Stefanik was sparkling champagne compared to the Czech spirit of heavy beer." 30 oan OIOflk 27 /x 1919 Qeneralu 'lffrcr,y Irtutak Situace na f rmU lpatna. LeT' lcl'idlo T plnea 11atup11. Stl'ed a pra,e lcl'idlo 118tupuje ponolna, ~llkytujice dosU tmoUjn;f odpor, Tiak nhledea k w,tupu lwfho kfidla msi tab ustuponti. Oeobd pro tentokraty neohoTa■ perne nada j i T UBj>lohu d jaU protiofendT:y. llyslli le T bnku ae 1aane e na- kusei o.Ji:a. Poehybuji le se Tlada T pl'1paU nakuaoe O..ka udrli. ProeiA pfilalllU sacboTat1 T Anla:la pa'h.dak.Zlollllram 0.Sl. ~dy naehuejioill ae jelti T o.ku daU patr16DII roskuy k e1'8ntuelni 91'llkuao1 Genenll JANI N. Illustration I . Instructions of General Janin to General Syrovy in connection with the planned evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Omsk (The source is from RGVA , Russia) 29 30 G. Nikolson, Kak delalsja mir v /919 g. (Moskva, 1945), 251 . Ibid. �191 SLOVAKIA OOIIII ExplldU d 'Omsk le 29 OctobN 1919. ioie franqaiae Co.wrlquer Docteur BEIIES. Retrai te continue la ga110he eat aur 1 • ICJ!Dl oo peo en annt Pl!'?ROPAil.OSKI le reete a pe11 pres de mi-chnin entre le11 2 rhieraa. Tro11pea sont tree ua4es, d4moralidee, lea r4eerres douteuses. J' 4proun Tina craintea au 11uj11t d • <IISK, qua partage je croia eal'oir l.e Comaand8J!llllt an Ohef. Je prol'oq'tll aesurea pour t r&Daf6rer r411erre d • or. Situation r6sllltant de 1· 11ffoudr81118nt du front, de 1 • 4Yacuati <11 dee ~nee et du d4sordra g4n4rali ■ d est bien diftlcile. General JANIN. Illustration 2. General Janin informs Edvard Benes about the measures taken on displacement of the Russian gold reserves (The source is from RGVA. Russia) �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 179 THE MILITARY MISSIONS OF MILAN R. STEFANIK IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CAUSE (BASED UPON DOCUMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES) Evgeny F. Firsov This paper focuses on Milan R. Stefanik's recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers for the Czechoslovak 1 national movement in Russia during the First World War. It is based upon original materials identified in the Russian archives in the Russian, Czech, Slovak and French languages, including from the Department of written sources of the State Historical Museum (then - OPI GIM). Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), Slovak by origin, naturalized in France, was undoubtedly one of the most visible and popular figures among Czechs and Slovaks abroad during the First World War. In one reference to the Czechoslovak diaspora and to prisoners of war in Russia, it was underlined that the success of the national movement was guaranteed by the activity of M. R. Stefanik. This document made the flattering assessment: You know who Stefanik is. He is from the Slovak Nitra region on the border with Moravia, once the center of the former Great Moravian Empire of Sviitopluk, which was the natural center of the Czechoslovak nation. He is a member and plenipotentiary of the Czechoslovak National Council, the authorized representative of Prof Masaryk. A renowned scholar, a hero, who distinguished himself on the French, Italian and Serbian fronts, he is a first-class and influential diplomat.2 1 ln the Russian documents of that time Czecho-Slovak was written, as a rule, as one word. And Stefanik adhered to the Czechoslovak orientation. 2 OPT GIM, f. 151. N.F. Melnikova-Kedrova-Rivnac. Materialy J. Papouseka. Hektograf na cesskom jazyke. February, 14, I 917. See also Evgeni Firsov, ,, Hektograficke materialy a korespondence v propagande patriotickeho hnuti ceskych a slovenskych zajatcu v Rusku," Historie a vojenstvi 1 (Praha, 2003), 23-36. 180 SLOVAKIA In Soviet historiography before 1990, Stefanik was considered one of the initiators of foreign intervention in Russia and a supporter of Admiral Kolchak. Despite this, his name can be found in the Soviet Encyclop edia. Furthermore, in Soviet and other historiography, Stefanik appeared as an anti-hero, in spite of all his achievements in the national liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks. 3 Only in 2001 , on the initiative of Igor Furdik, Ambassador Extraordinary of Slovakia to Russia, and due to the efforts of a number of Russian historians (including the author of this article) and Slovak historian Joseph Husar, there appeared a really objective work: Milan Rastislav Stefanik. Novy) vzg/'ad [Milan Rastislav Stefanik. A New Approach] (Martin, 2001 ). It is remarkable that the book was published in Slovakia. As expressed by Ambassador Furdik, the new situation in Central Europe finally allowed a fair and balanced assessment of Milan R. Stefanik. 4 Stefanik's personality characteristics in Russian sources are generally very positive and sympathetic. They repeatedly illustrated his courage and sacrifice. Stefanik initially arrived in Russia in 1916 as an emissary of the French military and only later as a representative of the Czechoslovak National Council. In Czechoslovakia, the Slovak sociologist Anton Stefanek pointed out that to Stefanik ... we owe the fact that no one can rule over the Slovaks and the Slovak language, and Slovak national traditions regained their freedom, something which everybody was dreaming of, and that our ancestors had been waiting for. Th e history of the Slovak p eople would apparently have developed quite differently had it not been for Stefanik. 5 Stefanik appeared as a stoic person, but he was in poor health. He was ready to go to the end of the world for T. G. Masaryk and to 3 Sovetskij enciklopedicheskij slovar' (Moskva, 1982), 15-17, "Stefanik"; L. Holotik, Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR (Bratislava, 1958). 4 Milan Rastislav Stefa nik. Novy) vzg/'ad (Martin, 2001 ), 9; Evgenij F. Firsov, ,. Bojovnik za narodnu slobodu. M.R.Stefanik vo svetle ruskych pramenov," in M R. Stefanik v zrkadle prameiiov a najnovsich poznatkov historiograjie (Bratislava, 20 I 0). For a bibliography of the proceedings of the author about the national movement of Czechs and Slovaks of this period, see Evgenij Firsov, Scholars of Bohemian, Czech and Czechoslovak History Studies I (A- I) (Prague, 2005), 262-68 . 5 Slovensky dennik, 7, 1924, p.102. SLOVAKIA 181 carry out any mission in distant Russia. The correspondence between Masaryk and Edvard Benes (from the Prague archives) shows that neither one was initially in any hurry to go to Russia. Benes justified his unwillingness to go by teaching a course on Czech history and literature from the sociological aspect at the Paris Higher Institute of Oriental Languages 6 . Masaryk was engaged in similar activities in London. So it was necessary for Stefanik to go to Russia. On July 26, 1916, The French General Staff issued an order, signed by the deputy Chief of Staff General Pelle, authorizing a "special mission" to Russia. By this order, Lieutenant Stefanik (led by General Maurice Janin) would be to allowed by Russia to organize a group of Austrian prisoners of war of Czech nationality to serve in France in Russian units or in special units. These would be formed on the basis of an agreement between France and Russia.7 The Czech troops were supposed to serve on the French front, but not on the Russian, to ensure their future independence from Russia. The French Command believed that Stefanik's mission should be limited to the recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers in order to strengthen the military forces of France. 8 Long and difficult negotiations (and even "nervousness," as noted by contemporaries) during the summer of 1916 and the spring of 191 7, and again between November 1918 and January 1919, ensued. Stefanik had to deal with former Czech member of the Austrian Parliament Josef Durich and his followers and with the board of the Union of Czech and Slovak Societies in Russia. He was assisted by Bohdan Pavlu and a group of Petrograd Czechs. Stefanik finally has managed to incline Slovak national groups in Russia to the proCzechoslovak and pro-French orientation of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 9 Upon his arrival in Russia, Stefanik was able to make a most favorable impression upon the leaders of the diplomatic office of Stav6 TGM - EB. Korespondence (Praha, 2004), 192. Milan Rastislav Stefanik v archivnych dokumentoch Historickej slui by fran cuzskeho ministerstva obrany. Ed. Frederic Guelton a i. (Bratislava: Ministerstvo obrany SR, 2009), 55 . 8 Ibid., 58. 9 See more details see E. Firsov, ,,Boj za orientaciu ceskeho a slovenskeho narodnooslobodzovacieho hnutia v Rusku v rokoch 1915-1917," Historicky casopis 43 , no. I ( 1995), 47-68. 7 182 SLOVAKIA ka (General Headquarters - E.F.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (further - MF A). As the August 2, 1916 letter of Basili (the Chief of the Diplomatic office of Stavka) to A. Neratoff in MF A of stated: "In the middle of August Stefanik arrived, a Lieutenant in the French service, originally a Czech (! - E.F. ). General Alekseev (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander - E.F.), as well as I, were impressed by Stefanik as a sensible and intelligent man" 10 . Basili then continued: In my conversations, I repeated to him (Stefanik - E.F.) what I had to tell his countrymen, that the success of the Czech cause depended upon ending, as soon as possible, the disagreement among the Czechs working with us .... and that we did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Czechs, but of course expect them to keep in mind their natural duty primarily to Russia. Stefanik went from Stavka to Kiev, where he attended a meeting of Czech leaders. At his suggestion, they created the Association of Czechs in Russia. At the head of the new organization will be Durich, with a staff, elected in agreement with the Czechoslovak National Council. 11 Stefanik showed much more useful activities with the organization of Czech troops, according to Basili. 12 Furthermore, Basili went on, The role played by Stefanik in concluding an agreement with Durich, and the latter's f ear of Stefanik, makes us want to turn him from the Czech cause in Russia, since he could be useful to us in military terms. From this point of view the commissioning of persons proposed to you by Stefanik is also undesirable because of their deliberate Masaryk coloring. JJ After this message of August 30, 1916, A. Neratoff informed Basili that: ... all negotiations on the Czech political system are concentrated in the hands of Masaryk. Durich 's activity is re10 11 12 13 AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 96. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93. L. 9606.-98. AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 61. D. 93 . L. I 05 . AVPRI, Dipkanceljarija. Op. 607. D. 93 . L. I 07. SLOVAKIA 183 stricted to propaganda among the Czech prisoners of war in Russia, under the close supervision of Masaryk ' agents, the most important of which is Stefanik. 14 The main result of this exchange was the September, 1916 conclusion that it was necessary to make efforts to retain the main center of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia. World War I would decide on the structure of Central Europe based upon new principles. Thus, we can conclude that the results of the first Stefanik mission to Russia almost did not depend on him (in spite of the fact that in historical literature it was judged a failure ). 15 This was especially true because at the beginning of August 1916, i.e. before Stefanik's arrival in Russia, the Council of Ministers had rejected a request by the French government to allow a significant number of prisoners of war to be transferred to France. Stefanik's mission led to the neutralization of Masaryk's competitor in Russia, Josef Diirich, and paved the way for T.G. Masaryk' s coming to Russia as the leader of the Czechoslovak national movement a few months after the February, 1917 revolution. The archival materials of Jaroslav Papousek, discovered by us, included letters to Bohdan Pavhl, a close colleague and authorized representative of M. R. Stefanik. They complete the history of the struggle for the recognition of the Masaryk program for the independent Czechoslovak State from the "Russian" colony of Czechs and Slovaks. They also cover the creation of the Council headed by Diirich, as well as the history of its collapse. With the strong support of Milan R. Stefanik, a decisive role in this was played by representatives of the so-called Petrograd opposition (B. Pavhl, J. Papousek, J. Klecanda, etc.). Supported by M. R. Stefanik, they carried out the decisions of Masaryk and his Council in Paris. In this regard, the literature on the Legionnaires, which alluded to the spontaneous connection of "Russian" Czechs and Slovaks to Masaryk's program, is unconvincing. 16 14 For more about this see E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam zarskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 41. 15 See for example, K. Pichlik , B. Klipa., J. Zabloudilova, Ceskoslovensti /egionafi (1914-1920) (Praha, 1996). 6 See, for example, JosefKudela, S nasim voj skem na Rusi (Praha, 1923). 184 SLOVAKIA Now we will present at least part of a letter, written by M. R. Stefanik in Petrograd in February of 1917, and addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It reads in part: Your Excellency, I have the honor hereby to inform Your Excellency that the Czechoslovak National Council unanimously agreed to exclude the deputy J. Durich from membership in the National Council. I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency of the sad act which was forced upon the Czechoslovak National Council by Mr. Durich 's actions. Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration and deep devotion. Milan Stefanik, a member of the Czechoslovak National Council, in Petrograd, February 9, 1917. His Excellency Mr. Minister of Foreign Affairs N. N. Pokrovsky 17 . Then followed a detailed explanation by Stefanik. The text consists of more than fourteen pages. On Stefanik' s letter there appears a hand-written notation : it was read by the Minister at a meeting on February 10, 1917. From these documents it is clear that Stefanik' s efforts as the representative of the Paris Czechoslovak National Council were ultimately aimed at weakening Russia's geopolitical influence in Central Europe. We now proceed to the next arrival of M. R. Stefanik in Russia, this time in Siberia. This information is taken mainly from the Admiral Kolchak government reports (mostly from the collections of GARF) . It is not my intention to reproduce the history of Kolchak's government in the Siberian expanses of Russia, nor to give a detailed explanation of the relations between the Siberian Provisional Government at Omsk and the Czechoslovak Legions. For us it was more important to look at the general condition and spirit of the Czechoslovak troops on the eve of Stefanik' s arrival in Siberia through Vladivostok, and to reproduce for the first time important materials about Stefanik' s activities. 17 A VPRI, F. Osobyj politotdel. D., 224. SLOVAKIA 185 The relationship between the Czechoslovak military units and the Provisional Siberian Government, according to the operative information of Stefanik, evolved quite favorably. In reports from the summer of 1918 it was noted that almost brotherly relations had been established with the Czechs and Slovaks, based on a community of mutual interests and goals. On behalf of the Allies, the French side gave official thanks to the Czechs and Slovaks for their actions and their willingness to contribute to the opening of a second front. 18 The first mention of Stefanik (who at this time was identified as a Czech) was found in a telegram of November 5, 1918, from the Siberian command headquarters in Omsk, that is, a few days before the Kolchak coup. It said that the Allies knew about the expansion of the Czechoslovak military units, and their rebelliousness was seen as a desire to leave Russia. It further stated: "General Janin, with Czech General Stefanik, arrived in Russia to command the Czechs and to arrange for help. The latter condemns the policy of the Czech National Council." 19 The documents further stated that the Omsk events (Kolchak's coup) were favorably received by the Allies. Stefanik arrived in Siberia in an emergency situation, especially with the intention of inspecting the situation. He was powerless to affect the general course of events. No less important, and quite a delicate task, was to quell a strong revolutionary and even proBolshevik unrest in the ranks of the Czech and Slovak troops. He also had to overcome the anti-Kolchak' spirit of the troops (spread immediately after the coup), and to persuade their leaders to cooperate with the new Siberian power, as the other Allies had already done. Those believed that the Czechoslovaks should not leave Russia until their presence was no longer necessary for intervention. Meanwhile, the Czechoslovak army in Russia was also essential to Prague, as it was one of the guarantors of the projected boundaries of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. The binding of Czech and Slovak troops to the new government did not happen immediately. The operative information at the end of November, 1918 was that the Czechoslovak army had no sympathy 18 See E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti) ," in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl'ad (Martin, 2001), 3556. 19 GARF. F. 162. 186 SLOVAKIA for the violent upheaval at Omsk and considered the crisis unfinished and looked forward to its resolution by legal means. Among the Czechoslovak Army Corps demands arose to send these military units home. The critical attitude of the Czechoslovak army during 1919 did not change. The Kolchak government failed to recruit it for the front. Its Council of Ministers even promised to reward the Czechoslovak army in the struggle for the revival of Russia by giving it the right to acquire real estate. The general condition of Czechoslovak forces was compared in the reports with the situation in the Russian army. It was noted that Czech and Slovak officers quickly became right-wing and the rankand-file left-wing, with a gap growing between them. After General Stefanik's arrival, Admiral Kolchak, in a telegram of December 20, 1918 to the Russian Ambassador in Paris, informed him that: "General Janin has arrived, whom we expected with impatience, hoping to resolve urgent problems of command together with him and Stefanik. .. 11 20 . In our view, many complications stemmed not only from the fact that the Czech and Slovak commanders often acted (according to Kolchak) quite independently, but also that the mass of the Czech and Slovak Legionaries saw in Kolchak's government the danger of the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order. It was no secret that the Legionnaires' political orientations were formed by the party of social revolutionaries. By tremendous persuasion General Stefanik managed to turn the Czech and Slovak troops into allies of Kolchak. In conversations with the Czech and Slovak troops, Stefanik set out to fulfill promises which were made to the Allies - to protect the Trans-Siberian Railway, which the Legionnaires had captured, as well as the city of Omsk. He even had to struggle with cases of insubordination. His most radical step was to publish order Number 588 on January 16, 1919, which was announced after his departure. According to this order, the army and democracy were incompatible. Therefore, all elected committees of the Russian Army type were to be dissolved. A few days later Stefanik left Siberia, apparently due to ill health. 20 E. Firsov, ,,Milan Rastislav Stefanik (po operativnym materialam carskoj i kolcakovskoj vlasti), " in Milan Rastislav Stefanik: novyj vzgl 'ad (Martin, 200 I), 45-46. SLOVAKIA 187 The most detailed archival materials on Stefanik's activities in Siberia are contained in the July 3, 1919 Department of State Protection report to Kolchak's government. It covers the long period from the fall of 1918 to the summer of 1919. This report, signed by Lieutenant Colonel Russiyanov (some reports were signed by an agent nicknamed "Summer"), noted: While the Czechoslovaks had plenty of everything, and everyone was interested in them, when they felt that they were in charge, [they] did not feel homesick and forgot the drought at home. But when their position had deteriorated, and they receded into the background, discontent arose among them .. . Their commanders, wishing to suppress a rising discontent, and at the same time to constrain the demoralizing propagation of "Committees" among them, have welcomed to Russia General Stefanik, who is clothed with the authority of the Republic ... Stefanik informed them that, as of his arrival, the Czechoslovak army became a regular army of the Czechoslovak Republic. Stefanik promised that he would do everything in his power to alleviate the Czechoslovaks' situation in Siberia and to ensure their return home as soon as possible... "21 One of the representatives of Kolchak' Department of State Protection even declared that "almost without exception, all social classes have turned against the Czechoslovaks. Always it heard that the Czechoslovaks have undertaken not to work for them."22 What were the results of this Siberian tour? Almost a century later, contrary to the negative opinions regarding Stefanik's stay in Russia, 23 positive results are also evident. Stefanik helped to unite the Czechoslovak army, to increase its combat capability, and to make it a part of the newly-created Czechoslovak Republic. He persuaded the Legionaries to endure for a bit longer, even though they were so far from their native land. Russian sources also speak of Stefanik's merits and to his expulsion of the most Russophobe-minded members of the Czechoslovak National Council, who opposed Kolchak. 24 21 GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. GARF. F. 147. Op. 8. D. 40. L. 5806. 23 See for example, L. Holotik, "Stefanikovska legenda a vznik CSR" (Bratislava, 1958). 24 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 22 188 SLOVAKIA Thanks to Stefanik, many Russian troops, earlier divided over the Czechoslovak army, went over to Kolchak. Stefanik helped to smooth the friction between French General Janin and Admiral Kolchak. With Stefanik' s sudden departure from Siberia, the relationship between the Allies and Kolchak deteriorated and latent plans were nurtured about the secret withdrawal of Czechoslovak troops from the zone of Kolchak' power. Thus the fate of the Siberian governor was sealed by the Allies. Nevertheless, the Allies still continued to watch over Kolchak, for they were attracted by the Russian gold reserves 25 and an incredible desire to profit by them. They were not able to provide to the Russian government of Kolchak substantial military aid and the mission of Janin and the Allies turned from a military to a diplomatic one. In the words of G. K. Gins (whose work "Siberia, the Allies and Kolchak" has been published several times in Russia) "the consciousness of common Slavonic problems, the adherence to culture which was broken by Bolshevism - could it be understood by an ordinary Czech soldier?" 26 Stefanik was one of the few who perceived these problems and planted this understanding with another compatriot. The book of G.K. Gins, a former manager of the Kolchak government, contains the highest praise for Stefanik and his stay in Omsk. Gins concludes that the Czech Legionnaires' saga in Russia was not heroic in itself. It contributed nothing to the Slavic peoples, to Siberia or to Russia. The Czechs and Slovaks just wanted to go home. 27 In 2007 a book entitled "With Kolchak against Kolchak" appeared. This work leaves much to be desired. The section about Stefanik, for example, contains many mistakes. The name "Stefanik" on page 13 7 is distorted and the years of his life are not specified. Furthermore, it asserted that Stefanik was "ill in Siberia and moved to Czechoslovakia," and further in this book, " ... he came for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps, and on September 2, 1920 25 RGV A, f. 1198. Dokumental 'nyje materialy po istorii sozdanija cecho-slovackogo gosudarstva. Kollekcij a. CCXIII. General Janin E. Benesu. Omsk, 29.X.1919. The document in fiarticular says: «Je provoque mesures pour transferer reserve d' orn . 6 G.K Gins., Sibir ', sojuzniki i Kolcak (Moskva, 2008), 578. 27 Ibid., 574-75 . SLOVAKIA 189 departed from Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia" 28 (but we know that Stefanik died on May 4, 1919). Most recently, valuable sources of the Russian State Military Archives (further - RGV A) relating to the national liberation struggle of Czechs and Slovaks in the First World War have become available. Of special interest are materials containing confidential correspondence (most often marked "urgent") by the Chief of Allied forces in Siberia, General Maurice Janin, with various authorities. They include numerous dispatches (intercepted by Kolchak's counterespionage) sent by Janin to the French command, and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic, Edvard Benes. An exchange of telegrams was also conducted with the commander of Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. More steadfast analysis of this considerable block of archival materials still needs to be carried out. The materials reveal a lot about the role of the Allies in Siberia, and especially characterize the relationship of the Allies, General Janin and the Czechoslovak army with Kolchak's government. The RGVA block also contains some interesting materials relating to Stefanik's stay in the camp of the Czechoslovak army and Kolchak's, and Stefanik's reports to Benes. And here one can draw a general conclusion that as a military commander and as a representative of the new Czechoslovak Republic, Stefanik enjoyed unprecedented respect and trust. Estimations of Stefanik contained in Janin's dispatches are positive and respectful. In summary, we will now underline the importance of Stefanik's military missions in Russia. During his first mission, Stefanik made the break which led to Diirich's downfall and this made things easier for T. G. Masaryk, who arrived after the February revolution in 1917. The second mission in Siberia and to the Far East, appears unfinished because Stefanik's health deteriorated. However, there was also a disagreement with Maurice Janin, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Entente. As a result, Stefanik abruptly left Siberia in order to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, even though he was not officially included in the Czechoslovak delegation. He intended to use his abilities, his influence at the highest levels and his diplomatic skills to uphold Czechoslovak (and especially Slovak) affairs. The important question of the frontiers of the new state was 28 S Kolcakom, protiv Kolcaka (Moskva, 2007), 137. 190 SLOVAKIA solved. And the merits of Stefanik, judging by the memoirs of representatives of Great Britain, were recognized as considerable. 29 The arrival of Stefanik strengthened the Slovak component in the argument for an independent Czecho-Slovak state. At the Paris Conference Stefanik was named "the Czech Military Minister;" he left the impression of a mobile, and in contrast to the corpulent Karel Kramai', a "vigorous and imperious figure." Those who remembered Stefanik at the Conference considered his death an "essential loss, as by temperament Stefanik was sparkling champagne compared to the Czech spirit of heavy beer." 30 oan OIOflk 27 /x 1919 Qeneralu 'lffrcr,y Irtutak Situace na f rmU lpatna. LeT' lcl'idlo T plnea 11atup11. Stl'ed a pra,e lcl'idlo 118tupuje ponolna, ~llkytujice dosU tmoUjn;f odpor, Tiak nhledea k w,tupu lwfho kfidla msi tab ustuponti. Oeobd pro tentokraty neohoTa■ perne nada j i T UBj>lohu d jaU protiofendT:y. llyslli le T bnku ae 1aane e na- kusei o.Ji:a. Poehybuji le se Tlada T pl'1paU nakuaoe O..ka udrli. ProeiA pfilalllU sacboTat1 T Anla:la pa'h.dak.Zlollllram 0.Sl. ~dy naehuejioill ae jelti T o.ku daU patr16DII roskuy k e1'8ntuelni 91'llkuao1 Genenll JANI N. Illustration I . Instructions of General Janin to General Syrovy in connection with the planned evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Omsk (The source is from RGVA , Russia) 29 30 G. Nikolson, Kak delalsja mir v /919 g. (Moskva, 1945), 251 . Ibid. 191 SLOVAKIA OOIIII ExplldU d 'Omsk le 29 OctobN 1919. ioie franqaiae Co.wrlquer Docteur BEIIES. Retrai te continue la ga110he eat aur 1 • ICJ!Dl oo peo en annt Pl!'?ROPAil.OSKI le reete a pe11 pres de mi-chnin entre le11 2 rhieraa. Tro11pea sont tree ua4es, d4moralidee, lea r4eerres douteuses. J' 4proun Tina craintea au 11uj11t d • <IISK, qua partage je croia eal'oir l.e Comaand8J!llllt an Ohef. Je prol'oq'tll aesurea pour t r&Daf6rer r411erre d • or. Situation r6sllltant de 1· 11ffoudr81118nt du front, de 1 • 4Yacuati <11 dee ~nee et du d4sordra g4n4rali ■ d est bien diftlcile. General JANIN. Illustration 2. General Janin informs Edvard Benes about the measures taken on displacement of the Russian gold reserves (The source is from RGVA. Russia)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Military Missions of Milan R. Štefánik in Russia on Behalf of the Czech and Slovak Cause Description An account of the resource Evgeny F. Firsov Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 179-191 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Firsov, E. F. (Evgeniĭ Fedorovich) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1b62d65dd649731e1634db4030fb37a9.pdf 9982b85f8258a9e4ad33b42d361d5457 PDF Text Text 40 SLOVAKIA BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF CZECHO-SWVAKIA John B. Fox The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned. Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared. Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the world, especially Europe, was quite limited. We set about with known American assiduousness to tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order to present real leadership we must know our allies, we commenced to accumulate information about the various nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations in this country. Though we have made tremendous progress in the above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started the job. To state a case where our Administration, mostly due to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia. The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948 was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to the West and gain admission to the League of Nations. Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc . 1 �SLOVAKIA il It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications statements expressing his stand on major political issues in chronoilogical order from 1914~1944. The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the date when they were made: 1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . . 1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . . H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed. In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events .... .AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our powe r . . . . 1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia. Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong moral position. 1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic, democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our whole policy. The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change. 1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as -possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and Europe. This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to our national independence. I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do not worry about our fate. �42 SLOVAKIA 1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . . 1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . . 1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would take up her position in Europe . . . . 1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag. gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente. 1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is proceeding along normal lines. . . . 1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia. 1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal affairs. A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was already late, became involved in its c ollective defense. 1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know that . . . . 1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences. Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . . 1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us. And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe. Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany, we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941, a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be an equil!b,rium of forces . . . . �SLOVAKIA 43 In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . . The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration. 1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians . They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace. Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . . -Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union, I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . . 1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together. Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other, are still recognized in some circles. Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze. cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia, which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars, was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia. It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World �44 SLOVAKIA Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire police power throughout the country was in Communist hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes. Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February, 19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article summed up the situation with the comment that "such is the fate of collaborators " Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_ slaivement oif their country! Today the whole democratic world is suffering from what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them. " • • • (JUTche.k $3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50 (the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00; "SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50. REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks" � 40 SLOVAKIA BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF CZECHO-SWVAKIA John B. Fox The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned. Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared. Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the world, especially Europe, was quite limited. We set about with known American assiduousness to tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order to present real leadership we must know our allies, we commenced to accumulate information about the various nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations in this country. Though we have made tremendous progress in the above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started the job. To state a case where our Administration, mostly due to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia. The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948 was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to the West and gain admission to the League of Nations. Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc . 1 �SLOVAKIA il It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications statements expressing his stand on major political issues in chronoilogical order from 1914~1944. The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the date when they were made: 1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . . 1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . . H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed. In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events .... .AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our powe r . . . . 1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia. Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong moral position. 1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic, democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our whole policy. The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change. 1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as -possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and Europe. This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to our national independence. I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do not worry about our fate. �42 SLOVAKIA 1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . . 1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . . 1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would take up her position in Europe . . . . 1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag. gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente. 1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is proceeding along normal lines. . . . 1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia. 1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal affairs. A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was already late, became involved in its c ollective defense. 1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know that . . . . 1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences. Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . . 1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us. And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe. Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany, we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941, a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be an equil!b,rium of forces . . . . �SLOVAKIA 43 In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . . The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration. 1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians . They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace. Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . . -Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union, I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . . 1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together. Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other, are still recognized in some circles. Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze. cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia, which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars, was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia. It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World �44 SLOVAKIA Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire police power throughout the country was in Communist hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes. Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February, 19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article summed up the situation with the comment that "such is the fate of collaborators " Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_ slaivement oif their country! Today the whole democratic world is suffering from what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them. " • • • (JUTche.k $3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50 (the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00; "SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50. REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks" � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1956, Vol. 6 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 18), March 1956.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 19), June 1956.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 20-21), September-December 1956.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1956 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 40 SLOVAKIA BENES AND THE COMMUNIZATION OF CZECHO-SWVAKIA John B. Fox The foreign policy of our country, from the Monroe Doctrine till the late nineteen-forties, was aimed at the greatest .possi1ble isolation. This was e specially true, because of the principles laid down in the mentioned Monroe Doctrine, as far as the Eastern hemisphere was concerned. Thus, afteir World War U, the call to leadership of the democratic world found us. in many respects unprepared. Suddenly we •l earned that our knowledge of the rest of the world, especially Europe, was quite limited. We set about with known American assiduousness to tackle the .great tasik thrust upon us. Realizing that in order to present real leadership we must know our allies, we commenced to accumulate information about the various nations, sea rching eJVery aspect of their national lives . In pursuing this, our leaders solicited the aid of exiled politicians and also that of the various n8Jti-onal organizations in this country. Though we have made tremendous progress in the above undertaking, in many instances, especially as far as some small nations are concerned, we have hardly started the job. To state a case where our Administration, mostly due to complexity of the situation, has hardly obtained a true picture, we mention Czecho-Slovakia. The foreign policy of Czecho-Slovakia from 1918-1948 was molded by Eduard Benes and his political aide s. During those thirty yea-rs !Benes was a virtual dictator a s far as the foreign affairs of his countr,y were concerned. In addition to that, he did more than any other politician outside the USSR to make the SOIViet Union acceptable to the West and gain admission to the League of Nations. Benes is now deceased, ibut his disciples, many of whom are in this country, carry ·on in his work. They are acting as consultants to our Administration, exercising influence on Radio Free Europe, Voice of America, Congress, etc . 1 SLOVAKIA il It seems worth-.while, therefore, to examine Benes's political relationship to the USSR. In doing so, we will not repeat Sir Winston Churchill's condemning opinion of Benes, stated in one of his present books, but will quote from a neat little boo'k published by the Czech-American National Alliance in 1944 entitled, "Eduard Benes in His Own Words." Therein friends of Mr. Benes did us a favor in selecting f,vom the mass of his speeches and publications statements expressing his stand on major political issues in chronoilogical order from 1914~1944. The following, then, are quotes from "Eduard Benes in His Own Words" pertaining to the USSR, giving the date when they were made: 1917: Our revolutionary action welcomed the Russian Revolution openly and sincerely . . . 1918: The Allies tried to use our soldiers in Russia for intervention, •but .this was o,pposed . . . H-.'.O: We refute t'he assertion that if decisive steps had been taken in time against the Bolsheviks, they could have been de.;;tl"'Oyed. In connection with Russia it was our (i.e., Czecho-SJovak) government, almost the only one in the whole of Europe, that understood the situation and foresaw corroctly the evolution of events .... .AIS to Russia, we must and shall help her, so far as it is in our powe r . . . . 1921: Our position on Russian problems, which we often det'ended with difficulty, but which our government executed, is today generally and fully ,accepted. The Allies and the whole European public opinion turned away from the idea of intervention in Russia. Our Republic has been following this policy honestly and consistently for more than three years and is therefore now in a strong moral position. 1922: In the future . . . it will be a struggle for a federalistic, democratic Russia. We believe in the future of this Russia. Our relations to the Russian .peo,ple are proved by our tra,dition and our whole policy. The Czecho-Slov,ak government feels sati'sfaction in having followed for five years a policy in Russian affairs that was fully justified even in the struggle for that policy in Geneva. We shall continue on this course ,also in the future without change. 1923: Our affection for and interest in Russia must be preserved and deepened. Without Russia, European politics and European peace are not imaginable; we have therefore tried, so far as -possible, to open the doors for the mutual contact of Russia and Europe. This Russia simply b:y its existence will be a. rea.l safeguard to our national independence. I have faith in this future democratic Russia and therefore do not worry about our fate. 42 SLOVAKIA 1924: The natural conclusion of this evolution is ,a defini.te de jure ,r ecognition of Russia by all states and the establishme1tt of normal relations with the Soviet Union . . . . 1925: Perhaps 1t will not be long before we shall achieve a second Locarno when the Whole of Europe comes to an understanding with Russia. This will be for the good and well-bein,g of Russia as well as of Europe. . . . 1926: Our policy toward Russia was always guided, by the b elief that we should be p.repared for the moment when Russia would take up her position in Europe . . . . 1933: . . . also the policy of Soviet Russia has displayed certain symptoms of changed orientation. Russia bas sihown great understanding of the needs of peace, having concluded pacts of non-ag. gression with her neighbors, Poland and the Little Entente. 1934: The return of Russia to European politics ,vm facilitate the creation of r eal equilibrium ,a mong the powers in Europe. The policy of rapprochement between ours elves and Soviet Russia is proceeding along normal lines. . . . 1935: Efforts for the strengthening of peace for the good of all the countries of Europe lay at the bottom of the cooperation between Russia .and Czecho-Slovakia. 1937: Soviet Russia is devoting herself more to her internal affairs. A great deficiency in the political systems of Europe after the last war was that that Soviet Un.ion had not been invited ,t o cooperate in its foundation and direction, but only in 1934, when it was already late, became involved in its c ollective defense. 1938: Russia remains faithful to us to the very last; I know that . . . . 1939: If -Soviet Russia were again excluded from the organization of Europe the new collaboration of the o,rganized ,political uni.ts would again lose their equilibrium. This would also inevitably lead to attempts to isoiate Soviet Europe from European influences. Geographically and politically European Russia belongs to Europe. This is an inescapable fact . . . . 1942: Russia is fighting not only for herself, but for all of us. And none of us can contemplate another two decades in which Soviet Russi.a would be isolated from the affairs of Europe. Immediaitely after .t he assault on the Soviet Union by Germany, we ente,red into official negotiations for the resumption of our old friendly and allied relations w.ith the Soviet Union, as they existed before Munich. These negotiations were proceeding without any difficulties and in the .spirit of our former friendship. On July 18, 1941, a treaty of alliance was signed, which contained a full recognition of us, without any reservations. [ wish to state objectively that our relations with the Soviet Union are really friendly and loyal; there is today between us the same rela;tion,s hip of alliance as was before Munich, ·a nd it is our conv.i-ction and wish this remain so after the war. II am certain the collaboration of Europe with the Soviet Union will again make for ,t he -cooperation of the Union with Europe, tJhat confidence and friendship will result and develop, that there will be an equil!b,rium of forces . . . . SLOVAKIA 43 In Czec-ho-Slovakia, we had for twenty years worked for collabo1-a,tion between the West and the East of Europe . . . . The 1United. Nations are determined today to ,c reate a new system of collective security in Europe s oon after the war . . . I suppor,t the conception of Anglo-American-Soviet collaboration. 1943: For my ·part I have a,n ,a;biding confidence in the Russians . They will fulfill scrupulously .t he Teheran decisions so as to safeguard future ipeace. Between the Soviet ,U nion and Czec,ho-Slovakia all fundamental and important questions relating .to their mutual relations have •b een settled. 'Ilhis fact has great political significance for the future . . . . -Much o,f what is now being appreciated about the Soviet Union, I saw during my fkst V\isit to Moscow in 1935; for this reason, I have trusted the Soviet Union in the present war. Certain modifications in the Soviet Union that have recently surprised the rest of the world are natural consequences, partly of the war ,a nd partly of the changes associated •w ith its world position (the a bolition of the Internation,al, the new attitude ,towards religion, intensified Soviet :patriotic feeling and the r ecent changes in the Soviet Constitution to the. ,adv,a n.tage of the F ederated Republics) . . I see in it the natumJ attitude of a successful evolution of the victorious revolution, that !has to be polHically stabiUzed and that is simply progresssing in accordance with its own laws. Hence, from 1922 on I strove for a rapprochement between Europe and the Soviets . . . . 1944: Lt seemed to me that if full unders.tandin,g were reached between ourselves and t'he Soviets, and if there were also complete and mutual trust among us, it would be possi ble to point to this very achievement as an example, even in ithe United States, and that the Allies, particularly the greater powers, would thereby be fundamentally drawn closer together. Thus Mr. Benes and his ipolitical co-workers preached to the world for thirty years. It is evident that this was not just a spell of fleeting enthusiasm for the seemingly humanitarian element in Soviet propaganda, but rather the life: wo.rk of po-liticians who, for some reason or other, are still recognized in some circles. Mr. Benes and hrs government-in-exile were granted asylum in England during World War ll. In 1945 Benes went to Moscow for instructions before returning to Cze. cho ..Stlorvakia. ,I n violation of the principles of the United Nations Declaration, somewhere in the shuffle, Ruthenia, which had b,een part of Czecho~Slovakia between the wars, was lost, apparently offered up as a token of good will to the iKremlin chieif. Certainly Benes made other major concessions a:bout which few were informed, so that he might retmn as "president" to Czecho-Slovakia. It is our contention thait Czecho-Slovakia after World 44 SLOVAKIA Wair JiI could hardly be considered a free agent. The entire police power throughout the country was in Communist hands from the very beginning. Still Mr. B enes decided to play his hand till the end. IH e, as "president," shortly after the "liberation," nationalized the greater part of Czecho..,Slovruk indust:r,y by mere presidential decree, thus paralyzing the oountry's, economy. And none of Stalin's agents did a better joib of eliminating all anti-Communists and anti-Socialistic elements from politics than did Benes. Afiter Benes and his co-wovkers had achieved their long-sought goal, the entrance of the Soviets into the Eurnpean political arena, they could not possibly be of any further sel'IVice to the Communists. Thus, when the latter took ()IVer complete control of Czecho-:S lovakia in February, 19·48, Benes was demoted from the presidency and Jan Masaryk, his foreign minister in despair killed himself by jumping from a window. Dorothy Thompson, on the margin of the Ozecho--Slovak disaster, in a magazine article summed up the situation with the comment that "such is the fate of collaborators " Today the co-wonkers of the same Benes, with a ounningness approaching that of a Talleyrand, are still presen ting themselves to our Administrntion as representatives of the Ozech and Slovak peoples. One can imagine how the Czechs and Sfovaks behind the 'Iron Curtaiin feel, when they hear the same ;voices which over a period of thirty years advocated the 'Soviet cause, now being broadcast over the waves of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe: the same politicians who contributed to the en_ slaivement oif their country! Today the whole democratic world is suffering from what Mr. Benes ·and his collaborato!'.s advocated and helped bring about. And the oppressed and persecuted Czechr:; and Sloivaks might turn to Shakespeare and utter with Mark Anthony: "the evil that men do lives after them. " • • • (JUTche.k $3.00; SWVAK FOR BEGINNERS" (Books I~) $1.50 (the set); "Hirobak's English-Sl01VaJk Dictionary" $4.00; "SLOVAK I...ESSONS" (IHrobak) $3.50. REOOMMENDED BOOKS: "The Slovaks"  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Beneš and the Communization of Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource John B. Fox Slovakia, Vol. 6, No. 3-4 (20-21), September-December 1956 pp. 40-44 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fox, John B. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September-December 1956 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c7aebf31e593b016ebcfff30a963df96.pdf 7c8e9ae006c5b22b862fe39c50c61eb8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Introduction Slovak Literature: What, Where From, and Whither? F . W. Galan If the nineteenth century was the age of grand (that is, imperial) unification, the twentieth century, by contrast, appears as the age of unceasing fragmentation. Nowadays everyone wants to be a master and very much a mistress too - of his or her house . The same situation prevails in literature . The idea of one supranational Weltliteratur is now a badly tarnished remnant of a bygone era. Comparative literature flounders as well. The only approach to literary study that is still effective to a degree is along national lines. The literature of Slovakia, though inspired by the rising tide of nationalism that swept Europe after the revolution of 1848, has not yet found its rightful place in world literature, its proper voice in the concert of nations. Seen in an international (particularly American) perspective, Slovak literature does not exist at all - not, I would submit, because of the poor quality of writing, but because of its minority status. Incontrovertibly, Slovak literature is a literature of a minority, indeed, of a minority of a minority. Even within the field of Slavic studies, literatures other than Russian suffer considerable neglect. Czech literatu re, mainly thanks to recent recognition of exiled writers, however, is beginning to gain ground . Unfortunately, contemporary Slovak literature has not produced any controversial political and literary figures, although it could boast a whole pleiade of distinguished writers, especially in so-called lyrical prose , between the two wars. Thus , even though the prospects of Slovak literature are problematic in the present-day social �SLOVAKIA 11 and literary context, it amply merits our attention on literary rather than merely "ethnic" grounds . The following studies should be assessed in these terms . Abstract of commentary presented in Pa nel 65 , " The Village in Slovak Literature ," a t th e AAASS convention in Asiloma r , California on 21 September 1981. � SLOVAKIA Introduction Slovak Literature: What, Where From, and Whither? F . W. Galan If the nineteenth century was the age of grand (that is, imperial) unification, the twentieth century, by contrast, appears as the age of unceasing fragmentation. Nowadays everyone wants to be a master and very much a mistress too - of his or her house . The same situation prevails in literature . The idea of one supranational Weltliteratur is now a badly tarnished remnant of a bygone era. Comparative literature flounders as well. The only approach to literary study that is still effective to a degree is along national lines. The literature of Slovakia, though inspired by the rising tide of nationalism that swept Europe after the revolution of 1848, has not yet found its rightful place in world literature, its proper voice in the concert of nations. Seen in an international (particularly American) perspective, Slovak literature does not exist at all - not, I would submit, because of the poor quality of writing, but because of its minority status. Incontrovertibly, Slovak literature is a literature of a minority, indeed, of a minority of a minority. Even within the field of Slavic studies, literatures other than Russian suffer considerable neglect. Czech literatu re, mainly thanks to recent recognition of exiled writers, however, is beginning to gain ground . Unfortunately, contemporary Slovak literature has not produced any controversial political and literary figures, although it could boast a whole pleiade of distinguished writers, especially in so-called lyrical prose , between the two wars. Thus , even though the prospects of Slovak literature are problematic in the present-day social �SLOVAKIA 11 and literary context, it amply merits our attention on literary rather than merely "ethnic" grounds . The following studies should be assessed in these terms . Abstract of commentary presented in Pa nel 65 , " The Village in Slovak Literature ," a t th e AAASS convention in Asiloma r , California on 21 September 1981. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1982-83, Vol. 30 Description An account of the resource Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Introduction Slovak Literature: What, Where From, and Whither? F . W. Galan If the nineteenth century was the age of grand (that is, imperial) unification, the twentieth century, by contrast, appears as the age of unceasing fragmentation. Nowadays everyone wants to be a master and very much a mistress too - of his or her house . The same situation prevails in literature . The idea of one supranational Weltliteratur is now a badly tarnished remnant of a bygone era. Comparative literature flounders as well. The only approach to literary study that is still effective to a degree is along national lines. The literature of Slovakia, though inspired by the rising tide of nationalism that swept Europe after the revolution of 1848, has not yet found its rightful place in world literature, its proper voice in the concert of nations. Seen in an international (particularly American) perspective, Slovak literature does not exist at all - not, I would submit, because of the poor quality of writing, but because of its minority status. Incontrovertibly, Slovak literature is a literature of a minority, indeed, of a minority of a minority. Even within the field of Slavic studies, literatures other than Russian suffer considerable neglect. Czech literatu re, mainly thanks to recent recognition of exiled writers, however, is beginning to gain ground . Unfortunately, contemporary Slovak literature has not produced any controversial political and literary figures, although it could boast a whole pleiade of distinguished writers, especially in so-called lyrical prose , between the two wars. Thus , even though the prospects of Slovak literature are problematic in the present-day social SLOVAKIA 11 and literary context, it amply merits our attention on literary rather than merely "ethnic" grounds . The following studies should be assessed in these terms . Abstract of commentary presented in Pa nel 65 , " The Village in Slovak Literature ," a t th e AAASS convention in Asiloma r , California on 21 September 1981.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Introduction - Slovak Literature: What, Where from, and Whither? Description An account of the resource F. W . Galan Slovakia, Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83 pp. 10-11 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Galan, F. W. (František William), 1947- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a6b5b447ac77a477ba858b0858c52bd7.pdf 36c06838ceb2978564eaacc8adb3cfa4 PDF Text Text 4 SLOVAKIA Paean to Integrity Who goes into battle in defense of truth, For the rights of people sacrifices youth: When oppression rages, who will mercy bring, Him my voice will honor and his glory sing. When the cannon thunder, when the eagles soar, Who will shed his lifeblood freedom to restore, Who will shield his nation from the Dragon's sting, Him my voice will honor and his glory sing. He who keeps his pledges though the heavens fall , Who regards his honor as the crown of all; Whom no threat can cower, bribe can never swing, Him my voice will honor and glory sing. Evil cannot conquer, God had cursed its part, As he built a Heaven for the noble heart; He who keeps His mandates, to His truth will cling, Him my voice will honor and glory sing. Karol Kuzmany's "Kto za pravdu hori" translated in 1943 by George A. Ga Ii k, in collaboration with his sister, Cecilia G. Kennedy. � 4 SLOVAKIA Paean to Integrity Who goes into battle in defense of truth, For the rights of people sacrifices youth: When oppression rages, who will mercy bring, Him my voice will honor and his glory sing. When the cannon thunder, when the eagles soar, Who will shed his lifeblood freedom to restore, Who will shield his nation from the Dragon's sting, Him my voice will honor and his glory sing. He who keeps his pledges though the heavens fall , Who regards his honor as the crown of all; Whom no threat can cower, bribe can never swing, Him my voice will honor and glory sing. Evil cannot conquer, God had cursed its part, As he built a Heaven for the noble heart; He who keeps His mandates, to His truth will cling, Him my voice will honor and glory sing. Karol Kuzmany's "Kto za pravdu hori" translated in 1943 by George A. Ga Ii k, in collaboration with his sister, Cecilia G. Kennedy. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 4 SLOVAKIA Paean to Integrity Who goes into battle in defense of truth, For the rights of people sacrifices youth: When oppression rages, who will mercy bring, Him my voice will honor and his glory sing. When the cannon thunder, when the eagles soar, Who will shed his lifeblood freedom to restore, Who will shield his nation from the Dragon's sting, Him my voice will honor and his glory sing. He who keeps his pledges though the heavens fall , Who regards his honor as the crown of all; Whom no threat can cower, bribe can never swing, Him my voice will honor and glory sing. Evil cannot conquer, God had cursed its part, As he built a Heaven for the noble heart; He who keeps His mandates, to His truth will cling, Him my voice will honor and glory sing. Karol Kuzmany's "Kto za pravdu hori" translated in 1943 by George A. Ga Ii k, in collaboration with his sister, Cecilia G. Kennedy.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Paean to Integrity (Kto za pravdu horí) Description An account of the resource Karol Kuzmány trans. George A. Galik Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 p. 4 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kuzmány, Karol, 1806-1866 Galik, George A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 LCNAF name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2a4b581b83da8681797032244a9d905a.pdf f600a8bd1e0dd9816cacfb5228783e47 PDF Text Text 136 SLOVAKIA Slovakia, the Land of Beauty Helena T. Gaydos Slovakia is surrounded by the Danube River on the South, the Carpathian Mountains on the North and West as natural frontiel'ls. The eastern frontier is marked by the north bank of the Tisa River, which becomes the Laborec. In the east, Slovakia borders upon the Soviet Union, in the south upon Hungary, in the north upon Poland, and in the Southwestern corner upon Austria. The area of Slovakia amounts to something around 19,000 square miles. There are approximately four and one half million people living in Slovakia. CLIMATE AND RAINFALL Slovakia is situated in the temperate zone. Because of its Central European position, maritime and continental climate mixes in the country. Owing to the great differences in altitudes above sea level, the average annual temperatures range from 25 to 50 degrees, and the average annual percipitation is from 2 to 8 inches. It rains primarily in spring and summer which is advantageous for agriculture. RIVERS AND LAKES Slovakia is a landlocked country and its rivers are important because they offer outlets to the Black and Baltic Seas. The western rivers, the Vah which is Slovakia's most important river, the Hron and the Nitra empty into the Danube, and thus indirectly flow into Black Sea. The eastern lowlands are drained by the Homad, Ondava and Laborec Rivers which empty into the Tisa and are indirect tributaries of the Black Sea. Slovakia is a country with a sufficient quantity of waterways, lakes and artificial water reservoirs; it excells, however, with its extremely numerous therapeutic mineral waters. �SLOVAKIA 137 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION Along the river valleys, between the mountain ridges run the main ways of communication of the country: the railway lines and the roads. In ancient days, the course of these streams determined the course of the road along which people migrated and commerce and culture £,lowed. Today we still find Slovakia at the junction of these roads which cross the Carpathian Mountains from the North and the South. Historically, two roads have been especially significant in deciding the fate of Slovakia, one along the Danube connecting the countries of western Europe with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate <this road crossed a second important highway, which started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the Danube, proceeded to the north against the current at the Morava River, and went as far north as the Baltic Coast.* AGRICULTURE The uplands, pastures and meadows support sheep grazing and cattle breeding. Wool, meat, and cheese are the major products. The fertile soils and mild climate of the lowlands produce wheat, barley, sugar beets, corn, clover, tobacco, green vegetables, paprika, melons, sunflowers, peckling herbs, vineyards and orchards including almond trees. The main industries are connected with agriculture, food processing, wine making, and agricultural machinery. FORESTS AND WCX)DWORK INDUSTRIES Forests cover 34 % of Slovakia, making it one of the most forested countries in Europe. The Upper Vah is noted for lumbering (spruce, pine, and birch), and woodwork industries are found at Ruzomberok, Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas. MINERALS AND RESOURCES The Rudohorie (Slovak Ore Mountains), located in the south-central Slovakia, play an important part in economy of the country. The Rudohorie are a source of high-grade iron ore, antimony ore, mercury, copper, magnesite, limestone, semi-precious stones-agates, amethysts and milky opals. Offshoots have gold, silver, and lead. Legnite deposits are worked at Handlova. * Ghlbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., Slovakia and Its People (New York : Robert Speller & Sons, 1960), p. 2. �138 SLOVAKIA CITIES Bratislava, with population of 290,000, the capital of Slovakia, is the natural trading center where railway and river traffic meet. It is also a manufacturing center which includes cable production, petroleum refining, chemicals, machinery, cloth, and leather goods. Bratislava has a colorful history. It was once the capital of Hungary and is famous for being the scene of the Treaty of Pressburg (1805) between Napoleon and Emperor Francis II of Austria. Kosice, with a population of 106,000, is the steel center of eastern Slovakia and its largest city. The city of ziar is important with its immense aluminum plant. Other important cities are Banska Bystrica, a mining town, Nitra, Trnava, and Trencin. Komarno is the second port on the Danube. TRADE AND ECONOMY Throughout the country the factories are turning out everything from television sets and textiles, from refrigererators and lumber to electric motors and pharmaceuticals. Foreign trade has been chiefly with the communist states; agriculture is completely collectivized; and the economy is socialized with practically no private enterprise. In its plans for the future economy, the greatest asset Slovakia has is the beauty of the country. Slovakia is a country of mountains and forests which makes it a natural tourist attraction. Edward J. Linehan in the National Geographic writes about travelling "to primeval Slovakian mountains of breathtaking beauty," which statement reinforces my view of Slovakia as a Garden of Eden. In the summer and fall the mountains excell in beauty and color. Slovakia is often referred to as an "Oasis of Silence." SKIING The High Tatras referred to as "Alps in miniature" are capped by the 8,711-foot Gerlach Peak is a skier's paradise. The 1970 world cross-country and jumping ski championships were held here. The Low Tatras and the Fatra Mountains also offer excellent ski resorts. The Little Carpathians are famous for its wines, the most famous, of course, is Malokarpatske Zlato (Little �SLOVAKIA 139 Carpathian Gold), Slivovica, which is a fiery, colorless plum brandy, is probably the most popular drink in Slovakia. HUNTING AND FISHING To satisfy the hunter, the principal game in Slovakia are : stag, deer, fallow deer, moufflon, chomois, boar, fox, wolf, lynx, bear, hare, pheasant, partridge, grouse, blackcock, quail, wild-goose, wild-duck, bustard. For the fisherman the rivers offer trout, pike, bass, carp, eel, and salmon. CAVES The caves of Slovakia are among the country's greatest attractions. Each one is different in its underground magic . The important ones are: the Cave of Liberty, a drippingstone cave; the Ice Cave of Dobsina is one of the greatest and most beautiful ice caves in the world; the Belanska, the Harmanec, the Jasov, and the Driny are stalactite caves. The one that interests me the most is the Domica cave which was inhabited by Neolithic man and its special attraction is underground boating on the Styx river . SPAS AND MINERAL WATERS Slovakia is a country with an extraordinary richness in the most different thermal spas, climatic-health resorts, and natural mineral waters. It is the general practice of the spas to indicate its specialty as to the type of malady treated. For example: The Trencianske Teplice will cure motoric apparatus; the Sliac is for circulatory problems; the Bojnice and Dudince claim cures for motoric and nervous apparatus; and the Bardejov and Korytnica will take care of problems with the digestive canal. CUISINE Among the cuisine pirohy (potato dumplings) filled with sauerkraut are served with pork and bacon. The sweet dumplings are filled with lekvar (plum butter) or cottage cheese with melted butter or sour cream poured over them. Another specialty is Slovak paprikas made from pork, mutton, beef or veal, pig's heart, paprika and tomatoes. Smoked sausages are a favorite, and crusty dark rye bread is a standard with every meal. Throughout its long history of domination the Slovaks have managed to maintain their . own language, their �140 SLOVAKIA religion, and their national identification. Perhaps it is only in this ability to maintain their distinctive characteristics that the Slovaks will ever realize their independence. Even more than geographical position, and greedy neighbors, these distinctive Slovak characteristics-described as easy-going, honest, idealistic, deeply religious, imaginative, open-hearted, soft-hearted, emotional, and music-loving-will equip them for the task of building a strong and independent nation in the midst of hard and cruel world. Tourist Trade of Slovakia George A. P o d h d j s k y Countries like Switzerland and Austria, which are endowed with exquisite beauty in their natural setting, devote considerable attention in terms of economic activity to the development of a high level of tourist trade. A significant proportion of their Gross National Product comes from the tourist trade, internal and especially foreign. For that purpose these two countries have steered their economic activity in such a way as to support an unprecedented development of their respective tourist trade industries. Of the Communist countries, Yugoslavia was particularly successful in developing a very attractive program for tourist trade, especially from foreign countries. A similar·potential for developing tourist trade also exists in the Slovak economy. The natural beauty of Slovak Tatra Mountains and the adjacent valleys which spread over most of the country, doubled with the proverbial hospitality of the Slovak people, are a good basis for the development of tourist trade in this country. Apart from this, there is an old tradition of internal and foreign tourism developed through the centuries. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the present situation of the Slovak tourist trade and its potential for future development. I. The following figures may sum up the state of tourist trade of Czecho-Slovakia for the years 1960-1964. 1 � 136 SLOVAKIA Slovakia, the Land of Beauty Helena T. Gaydos Slovakia is surrounded by the Danube River on the South, the Carpathian Mountains on the North and West as natural frontiel'ls. The eastern frontier is marked by the north bank of the Tisa River, which becomes the Laborec. In the east, Slovakia borders upon the Soviet Union, in the south upon Hungary, in the north upon Poland, and in the Southwestern corner upon Austria. The area of Slovakia amounts to something around 19,000 square miles. There are approximately four and one half million people living in Slovakia. CLIMATE AND RAINFALL Slovakia is situated in the temperate zone. Because of its Central European position, maritime and continental climate mixes in the country. Owing to the great differences in altitudes above sea level, the average annual temperatures range from 25 to 50 degrees, and the average annual percipitation is from 2 to 8 inches. It rains primarily in spring and summer which is advantageous for agriculture. RIVERS AND LAKES Slovakia is a landlocked country and its rivers are important because they offer outlets to the Black and Baltic Seas. The western rivers, the Vah which is Slovakia's most important river, the Hron and the Nitra empty into the Danube, and thus indirectly flow into Black Sea. The eastern lowlands are drained by the Homad, Ondava and Laborec Rivers which empty into the Tisa and are indirect tributaries of the Black Sea. Slovakia is a country with a sufficient quantity of waterways, lakes and artificial water reservoirs; it excells, however, with its extremely numerous therapeutic mineral waters. �SLOVAKIA 137 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION Along the river valleys, between the mountain ridges run the main ways of communication of the country: the railway lines and the roads. In ancient days, the course of these streams determined the course of the road along which people migrated and commerce and culture £,lowed. Today we still find Slovakia at the junction of these roads which cross the Carpathian Mountains from the North and the South. Historically, two roads have been especially significant in deciding the fate of Slovakia, one along the Danube connecting the countries of western Europe with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate <this road crossed a second important highway, which started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the Danube, proceeded to the north against the current at the Morava River, and went as far north as the Baltic Coast.* AGRICULTURE The uplands, pastures and meadows support sheep grazing and cattle breeding. Wool, meat, and cheese are the major products. The fertile soils and mild climate of the lowlands produce wheat, barley, sugar beets, corn, clover, tobacco, green vegetables, paprika, melons, sunflowers, peckling herbs, vineyards and orchards including almond trees. The main industries are connected with agriculture, food processing, wine making, and agricultural machinery. FORESTS AND WCX)DWORK INDUSTRIES Forests cover 34 % of Slovakia, making it one of the most forested countries in Europe. The Upper Vah is noted for lumbering (spruce, pine, and birch), and woodwork industries are found at Ruzomberok, Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas. MINERALS AND RESOURCES The Rudohorie (Slovak Ore Mountains), located in the south-central Slovakia, play an important part in economy of the country. The Rudohorie are a source of high-grade iron ore, antimony ore, mercury, copper, magnesite, limestone, semi-precious stones-agates, amethysts and milky opals. Offshoots have gold, silver, and lead. Legnite deposits are worked at Handlova. * Ghlbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., Slovakia and Its People (New York : Robert Speller & Sons, 1960), p. 2. �138 SLOVAKIA CITIES Bratislava, with population of 290,000, the capital of Slovakia, is the natural trading center where railway and river traffic meet. It is also a manufacturing center which includes cable production, petroleum refining, chemicals, machinery, cloth, and leather goods. Bratislava has a colorful history. It was once the capital of Hungary and is famous for being the scene of the Treaty of Pressburg (1805) between Napoleon and Emperor Francis II of Austria. Kosice, with a population of 106,000, is the steel center of eastern Slovakia and its largest city. The city of ziar is important with its immense aluminum plant. Other important cities are Banska Bystrica, a mining town, Nitra, Trnava, and Trencin. Komarno is the second port on the Danube. TRADE AND ECONOMY Throughout the country the factories are turning out everything from television sets and textiles, from refrigererators and lumber to electric motors and pharmaceuticals. Foreign trade has been chiefly with the communist states; agriculture is completely collectivized; and the economy is socialized with practically no private enterprise. In its plans for the future economy, the greatest asset Slovakia has is the beauty of the country. Slovakia is a country of mountains and forests which makes it a natural tourist attraction. Edward J. Linehan in the National Geographic writes about travelling "to primeval Slovakian mountains of breathtaking beauty," which statement reinforces my view of Slovakia as a Garden of Eden. In the summer and fall the mountains excell in beauty and color. Slovakia is often referred to as an "Oasis of Silence." SKIING The High Tatras referred to as "Alps in miniature" are capped by the 8,711-foot Gerlach Peak is a skier's paradise. The 1970 world cross-country and jumping ski championships were held here. The Low Tatras and the Fatra Mountains also offer excellent ski resorts. The Little Carpathians are famous for its wines, the most famous, of course, is Malokarpatske Zlato (Little �SLOVAKIA 139 Carpathian Gold), Slivovica, which is a fiery, colorless plum brandy, is probably the most popular drink in Slovakia. HUNTING AND FISHING To satisfy the hunter, the principal game in Slovakia are : stag, deer, fallow deer, moufflon, chomois, boar, fox, wolf, lynx, bear, hare, pheasant, partridge, grouse, blackcock, quail, wild-goose, wild-duck, bustard. For the fisherman the rivers offer trout, pike, bass, carp, eel, and salmon. CAVES The caves of Slovakia are among the country's greatest attractions. Each one is different in its underground magic . The important ones are: the Cave of Liberty, a drippingstone cave; the Ice Cave of Dobsina is one of the greatest and most beautiful ice caves in the world; the Belanska, the Harmanec, the Jasov, and the Driny are stalactite caves. The one that interests me the most is the Domica cave which was inhabited by Neolithic man and its special attraction is underground boating on the Styx river . SPAS AND MINERAL WATERS Slovakia is a country with an extraordinary richness in the most different thermal spas, climatic-health resorts, and natural mineral waters. It is the general practice of the spas to indicate its specialty as to the type of malady treated. For example: The Trencianske Teplice will cure motoric apparatus; the Sliac is for circulatory problems; the Bojnice and Dudince claim cures for motoric and nervous apparatus; and the Bardejov and Korytnica will take care of problems with the digestive canal. CUISINE Among the cuisine pirohy (potato dumplings) filled with sauerkraut are served with pork and bacon. The sweet dumplings are filled with lekvar (plum butter) or cottage cheese with melted butter or sour cream poured over them. Another specialty is Slovak paprikas made from pork, mutton, beef or veal, pig's heart, paprika and tomatoes. Smoked sausages are a favorite, and crusty dark rye bread is a standard with every meal. Throughout its long history of domination the Slovaks have managed to maintain their . own language, their �140 SLOVAKIA religion, and their national identification. Perhaps it is only in this ability to maintain their distinctive characteristics that the Slovaks will ever realize their independence. Even more than geographical position, and greedy neighbors, these distinctive Slovak characteristics-described as easy-going, honest, idealistic, deeply religious, imaginative, open-hearted, soft-hearted, emotional, and music-loving-will equip them for the task of building a strong and independent nation in the midst of hard and cruel world. Tourist Trade of Slovakia George A. P o d h d j s k y Countries like Switzerland and Austria, which are endowed with exquisite beauty in their natural setting, devote considerable attention in terms of economic activity to the development of a high level of tourist trade. A significant proportion of their Gross National Product comes from the tourist trade, internal and especially foreign. For that purpose these two countries have steered their economic activity in such a way as to support an unprecedented development of their respective tourist trade industries. Of the Communist countries, Yugoslavia was particularly successful in developing a very attractive program for tourist trade, especially from foreign countries. A similar·potential for developing tourist trade also exists in the Slovak economy. The natural beauty of Slovak Tatra Mountains and the adjacent valleys which spread over most of the country, doubled with the proverbial hospitality of the Slovak people, are a good basis for the development of tourist trade in this country. Apart from this, there is an old tradition of internal and foreign tourism developed through the centuries. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the present situation of the Slovak tourist trade and its potential for future development. I. The following figures may sum up the state of tourist trade of Czecho-Slovakia for the years 1960-1964. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1972, Vol. 22 Description An account of the resource Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 136 SLOVAKIA Slovakia, the Land of Beauty Helena T. Gaydos Slovakia is surrounded by the Danube River on the South, the Carpathian Mountains on the North and West as natural frontiel'ls. The eastern frontier is marked by the north bank of the Tisa River, which becomes the Laborec. In the east, Slovakia borders upon the Soviet Union, in the south upon Hungary, in the north upon Poland, and in the Southwestern corner upon Austria. The area of Slovakia amounts to something around 19,000 square miles. There are approximately four and one half million people living in Slovakia. CLIMATE AND RAINFALL Slovakia is situated in the temperate zone. Because of its Central European position, maritime and continental climate mixes in the country. Owing to the great differences in altitudes above sea level, the average annual temperatures range from 25 to 50 degrees, and the average annual percipitation is from 2 to 8 inches. It rains primarily in spring and summer which is advantageous for agriculture. RIVERS AND LAKES Slovakia is a landlocked country and its rivers are important because they offer outlets to the Black and Baltic Seas. The western rivers, the Vah which is Slovakia's most important river, the Hron and the Nitra empty into the Danube, and thus indirectly flow into Black Sea. The eastern lowlands are drained by the Homad, Ondava and Laborec Rivers which empty into the Tisa and are indirect tributaries of the Black Sea. Slovakia is a country with a sufficient quantity of waterways, lakes and artificial water reservoirs; it excells, however, with its extremely numerous therapeutic mineral waters. SLOVAKIA 137 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION Along the river valleys, between the mountain ridges run the main ways of communication of the country: the railway lines and the roads. In ancient days, the course of these streams determined the course of the road along which people migrated and commerce and culture £,lowed. Today we still find Slovakia at the junction of these roads which cross the Carpathian Mountains from the North and the South. Historically, two roads have been especially significant in deciding the fate of Slovakia, one along the Danube connecting the countries of western Europe with the eastern world. Near the Carpatho-Alpian gate <this road crossed a second important highway, which started from the coast of the Adriatic Sea, crossed the Danube, proceeded to the north against the current at the Morava River, and went as far north as the Baltic Coast.* AGRICULTURE The uplands, pastures and meadows support sheep grazing and cattle breeding. Wool, meat, and cheese are the major products. The fertile soils and mild climate of the lowlands produce wheat, barley, sugar beets, corn, clover, tobacco, green vegetables, paprika, melons, sunflowers, peckling herbs, vineyards and orchards including almond trees. The main industries are connected with agriculture, food processing, wine making, and agricultural machinery. FORESTS AND WCX)DWORK INDUSTRIES Forests cover 34 % of Slovakia, making it one of the most forested countries in Europe. The Upper Vah is noted for lumbering (spruce, pine, and birch), and woodwork industries are found at Ruzomberok, Liptovsky Svaty Mikulas. MINERALS AND RESOURCES The Rudohorie (Slovak Ore Mountains), located in the south-central Slovakia, play an important part in economy of the country. The Rudohorie are a source of high-grade iron ore, antimony ore, mercury, copper, magnesite, limestone, semi-precious stones-agates, amethysts and milky opals. Offshoots have gold, silver, and lead. Legnite deposits are worked at Handlova. * Ghlbert L. Oddo, Ph.D., Slovakia and Its People (New York : Robert Speller & Sons, 1960), p. 2. 138 SLOVAKIA CITIES Bratislava, with population of 290,000, the capital of Slovakia, is the natural trading center where railway and river traffic meet. It is also a manufacturing center which includes cable production, petroleum refining, chemicals, machinery, cloth, and leather goods. Bratislava has a colorful history. It was once the capital of Hungary and is famous for being the scene of the Treaty of Pressburg (1805) between Napoleon and Emperor Francis II of Austria. Kosice, with a population of 106,000, is the steel center of eastern Slovakia and its largest city. The city of ziar is important with its immense aluminum plant. Other important cities are Banska Bystrica, a mining town, Nitra, Trnava, and Trencin. Komarno is the second port on the Danube. TRADE AND ECONOMY Throughout the country the factories are turning out everything from television sets and textiles, from refrigererators and lumber to electric motors and pharmaceuticals. Foreign trade has been chiefly with the communist states; agriculture is completely collectivized; and the economy is socialized with practically no private enterprise. In its plans for the future economy, the greatest asset Slovakia has is the beauty of the country. Slovakia is a country of mountains and forests which makes it a natural tourist attraction. Edward J. Linehan in the National Geographic writes about travelling "to primeval Slovakian mountains of breathtaking beauty," which statement reinforces my view of Slovakia as a Garden of Eden. In the summer and fall the mountains excell in beauty and color. Slovakia is often referred to as an "Oasis of Silence." SKIING The High Tatras referred to as "Alps in miniature" are capped by the 8,711-foot Gerlach Peak is a skier's paradise. The 1970 world cross-country and jumping ski championships were held here. The Low Tatras and the Fatra Mountains also offer excellent ski resorts. The Little Carpathians are famous for its wines, the most famous, of course, is Malokarpatske Zlato (Little SLOVAKIA 139 Carpathian Gold), Slivovica, which is a fiery, colorless plum brandy, is probably the most popular drink in Slovakia. HUNTING AND FISHING To satisfy the hunter, the principal game in Slovakia are : stag, deer, fallow deer, moufflon, chomois, boar, fox, wolf, lynx, bear, hare, pheasant, partridge, grouse, blackcock, quail, wild-goose, wild-duck, bustard. For the fisherman the rivers offer trout, pike, bass, carp, eel, and salmon. CAVES The caves of Slovakia are among the country's greatest attractions. Each one is different in its underground magic . The important ones are: the Cave of Liberty, a drippingstone cave; the Ice Cave of Dobsina is one of the greatest and most beautiful ice caves in the world; the Belanska, the Harmanec, the Jasov, and the Driny are stalactite caves. The one that interests me the most is the Domica cave which was inhabited by Neolithic man and its special attraction is underground boating on the Styx river . SPAS AND MINERAL WATERS Slovakia is a country with an extraordinary richness in the most different thermal spas, climatic-health resorts, and natural mineral waters. It is the general practice of the spas to indicate its specialty as to the type of malady treated. For example: The Trencianske Teplice will cure motoric apparatus; the Sliac is for circulatory problems; the Bojnice and Dudince claim cures for motoric and nervous apparatus; and the Bardejov and Korytnica will take care of problems with the digestive canal. CUISINE Among the cuisine pirohy (potato dumplings) filled with sauerkraut are served with pork and bacon. The sweet dumplings are filled with lekvar (plum butter) or cottage cheese with melted butter or sour cream poured over them. Another specialty is Slovak paprikas made from pork, mutton, beef or veal, pig's heart, paprika and tomatoes. Smoked sausages are a favorite, and crusty dark rye bread is a standard with every meal. Throughout its long history of domination the Slovaks have managed to maintain their . own language, their 140 SLOVAKIA religion, and their national identification. Perhaps it is only in this ability to maintain their distinctive characteristics that the Slovaks will ever realize their independence. Even more than geographical position, and greedy neighbors, these distinctive Slovak characteristics-described as easy-going, honest, idealistic, deeply religious, imaginative, open-hearted, soft-hearted, emotional, and music-loving-will equip them for the task of building a strong and independent nation in the midst of hard and cruel world. Tourist Trade of Slovakia George A. P o d h d j s k y Countries like Switzerland and Austria, which are endowed with exquisite beauty in their natural setting, devote considerable attention in terms of economic activity to the development of a high level of tourist trade. A significant proportion of their Gross National Product comes from the tourist trade, internal and especially foreign. For that purpose these two countries have steered their economic activity in such a way as to support an unprecedented development of their respective tourist trade industries. Of the Communist countries, Yugoslavia was particularly successful in developing a very attractive program for tourist trade, especially from foreign countries. A similar·potential for developing tourist trade also exists in the Slovak economy. The natural beauty of Slovak Tatra Mountains and the adjacent valleys which spread over most of the country, doubled with the proverbial hospitality of the Slovak people, are a good basis for the development of tourist trade in this country. Apart from this, there is an old tradition of internal and foreign tourism developed through the centuries. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the present situation of the Slovak tourist trade and its potential for future development. I. The following figures may sum up the state of tourist trade of Czecho-Slovakia for the years 1960-1964. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia, the Land of Beauty Description An account of the resource Helena T. Gaydos Slovakia, Vol. 22 (No. 45), 1972 pp. 136-140 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gaydos, Helena T. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/c7b94e33444b94b1e95528aea4079592.pdf 5eabc43874f7bfa7f0a988807692c463 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 44 U. S. Information Agency (Voice of America), the Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe) and other American institutions still try to salvage them? Why insist that such 0 political dupes" ( ?) represent the political will of the Slovak nation? They never did and never shall! • RECOMMENDED $3.00; SWVAK FOR (the set); "Hirdbak's "S'IJOVAK LffiSSONS" • • BOOKS: "The Slovaks" (Jwrchak BEGINNERS" (Books I-III) $1.50 Eniglish-,Sl{)IVa;k Dictionary" $4.00; (iHrolbak) $3.50 . • • • NATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN SLOVAKIA Andrej Gemersky When Edward Benes signed the governmental decree in 1945 to nationalize '.key (heavy) indrustry, the Communists in Slovakia and the Czech lands became the masters of the economic situation. By signing that decree Benes sealed the fate not only of heaJVy industry, Wihich thereto was owned for the most part rb y share-holders' associations, 1b ut also the industry which was owned by indirviduals. Benes's decree nationali0ed all industrial enterprises which employed: more than 50 persons. For the time bemg, therefore, enterprises with u:p to 50 emptoyees were not affeded by the decree. Bwt only for a short time. The Co1mmunists are rk nown for their consistent stand on a!bolishing all rprivaJte ownership. They ibelieve in the prinrciple that man s'hould not exiploit man, that man must not be ex!ploited 'by the bourgeois, the capitalists, who. according to the Communists are represented by private OIWltlers withO'llt regard to the iltind and ~tent of prirvate ownership. The Communists, therefore, once they were in key positliooo in SlovaJki1a , sought to nationalilze every private enter.prise, large and small. I had said that enterprises with up to 50 employees were not nationalized at the outset (1945). These the �SLOVAKIA 45 Communists first ibegan to combine into larger productiive units, into so-called maniwfacturing and selling combines or cooperatives; they !began to co1lectilvi1ze production or manufacture. They said that collectiivization was a neces-sary an:d inevitruble degree of socialistic, progressiive undertaiking and, therefore, W'ihoeiver opposed co'.hlectiivization was not priogressive but reactionary, an enemy af socialism which spelled the "good and welfare" of the ,people. Such a person, of course, was an enemy of the State and, hence, coulq ,be ,punished accoroing to existing laws. TailoTs were o,r.garuzed in the cooperatiive called "Vw~ rodev" ; ha;berdashers, merchants with mixed merchandise in the "Jednorba" and "Buducnoof"; shoemrukers in the "V'zoro!buv," lbut s1hoesihops with three employees were not affected. The latter, however, were not allowed to make new shoes, lbut only to repair old ones; their shops had to carry the sign "iidrzbar." It was thus that all manufacturing plants and selling outlets in 1Sl01Vakia were oollectiivized. Later, larger cooperati<ves fbecame so-.called "national" enterprises; \but national entffil)rises are also State enter.prises, !because the profits belong to the Strute exclusicvely, that is, to the Communists. Former "priV1ate" enterprises were given a neiw name; original trade names, carrying the names of ipri-vate entrepreneurs and owners, had to go. Now, for example, we read ,t he names of "na;tional" enterprises, such as, "Teohnokov, Masin.a, Ob111Va, Popper, Mlieicne speciaJlity," etc. Ln a word all ,business is under State control. When the Communists :niationa:li'Zed or collectivized entenprises, they allowed the former prwate OIWillera to run them for the State as "managers." But they had one of their tried men in eiveiry business place, whose duty it was to learn all the triciks of the trade. In time the original owner-mam.ager lbecame unnecessary and W&S transferred to some other enter,prise ·a s a lruborer. His understudy, classed as "aJbsolutely reliable," took 01Ver the jdb of managing the business. In many in.stances, ,private owners opposed collecticvization. In such cases the Oomm'U.Ilists simply too:k amay �46 SLOVAKIA their business permits, or closed their shops as economically unnecessary. So a person practically had to join the Red cooperatives if he wanted to live and have a roof over his head. Most of the small operators ha<l their shops in their ho.mes and could easily be dispossessed in the "public interest" - meaning of course in the interest otf the Communist Party. In Slovakia the Communists did not collectivize all prilvate enterprises at one time. At first the Reds would call the owner to attend a trade meeting of this or that national oomimittee and try to conivince him how he would benefit by joining a cooperative. :tf he could not be convinced, they would tell him that they would have to review his trade permit and ascertain whether his shop was necessary to f wfill the economic plan. Miter the lboss, the Reds would tackle ,his employees to convince them that they are not very bright if they ,let ,prirvate owners, the bourgeois, to exploit them. Why should the wo'I1kers help the owners to wax richer at their expense, the Reds would easily say, when they can work in cooperative shops and get better pay? In many cases that is how the Communists operated in their own !benefit. IDm.iplo.yees quit their old employers to wonk in the cooperatives, where they actually receirved better pay. When the Reds had all producing enterprises nationalized aJnd collectirvired, they later introduced socalled rproductitve norms, which had to be met, if the workers were to, reiceirve the pay they were getting. These norms could never be met, so the workers actually got less pay than they did f,r,om prirvate owners. This, according to the Communists, is not exploitation of the wonkers, but a co111scientioU1S and patriotic building~up of socialism. Getting control of agricultural production caused the greates~ concern to, the Communists, !because all people therefore eiven those who lirve in the communistic "paradise" - have to eat. 'Ilhe Communists knew that a ,s carcity of food would not helip them COIIlSOlidate their power in the State; they also !knew that a hungry perso:n could not work and slave for them effectively. So tliey begMl to col- �SLOVAKIA 47 lectiv1ze aigricultural units, the fazms. That is how the socalled "Uniform A,gricultuiral Cooperatives" (Jednotne rofrofnicke druzstva - JRD) originated in :SlovaJdia. 1Slovaik farmers refused to jOlin the cooiperaUves (,kolchozes) and openly resisted the Communists. They told them ,b luntly that they did not want kolchozes like those in the USISR, !because they were not prosiperous agric'l.lltural mstitutions. Official pro;pagato,rs orf the [Red Party, however, exip1ained thaJt .t hey weire not concerned about kolcho:zes, but aJbout co~ra:Uve farming, which must meet Slwalk conditions and demands which are different than those existing in the USSR and, therefore, they said, the Slovalk farm cooperatives do not have and will not have anything in cOllllmO!n with the Soiviet kolchozes. It so h:aJppened that many Slovruk faTIIners let themselves be deceived by the Red lullaJbies of the Communist agitators and joined the cooperatiives. Soon after, they learned to thek .sorr,ow that the cooperatives were nothing else but Soiviet !kol'chozes, which depri,v ed the formers of 99 per cent of their property. No· longer were they masters of their own household, but slaves of t'he Communist Party. Of course, the Ooimmunists would haJVe forced their plans OIJ1 the Slovalk farmers even though all of them would have refused to join the ikolchoizes; they prolbaibly would harve kno clked tJhem afif one 1b y one, ivilla1ge by village, .b ecause they were the l31W, they were in po,weir. Natuirrully, the Slo1w1Jk farmers, true to their Christian democvatic tradition, struck !baic'.k, even though it meaJI1t persec:ultion, prison, or eiven deportation. They figured the Reds co'l.lld not :kill, imprison o;r depO!rt all oif them without starving themselves out. Just how the Slo;valk farmer felt about ,t he situation soon made itselif felt in the whole of Sloivakia: the faruners under the new system were producing much }ess than they did before the adrvent of the kolchozes. The Red lbos:ses cursed and threatened the farmers , but to no :wail ; a lbad year was followed by a worse year. Wor.kers everyiW'here complained loudly. After years of stubborn Slovak resistance, the Reds decided to change their tactics to improve the agricultur.a:l. �48 SLOVAKIA situ3ition in Slovaikia. and increase the amount of meat, flowr, vegetable.s, eitc. m 1003 they suddenly began to ,proclaim that no one wa;s swpposed. to be forced into the oooperativesi and anyone who wished to quit them could do so and begin to farm priivately on his OIWil ,p roperty. President Zapotooky himself annou:nred the new, surpristing course of the Communists in a speech in which he hypocritically condemned all iviolence and terro~tion of the farmers, saying that they were "violations olf a local character" for which the guilty parties shall bear the responsibility. This complete turnalbout -Of ,policy may hruve surprised many innocents, ,b ut it rwas really nothing new in Communist tactics and str.ategy. It was not the first time or the last .that they reversed their policies. '!'hey did it before and shall conrtinue to do it ·a s long as it serves their interests, the interests of ,t he Communist Party and the interests of the UISSIR. Those who do not understand Communist methods and their constant goals might see in this tarna:bout of the Oommunists, their weakne.ss. This, howe;ver, would be a fundamental error, which would aNenge itself in a brutal manner. We must remember that the very same thing haJppened even in the "exemplary" Soviet Union more than once. After the Communists seii-zed the government in Russia, even during the lifetime of Lenin, the Communists began to collecti~ on a grand scale, brutally persecuting every one who opposed them. After a time they found themselves in an economic crisis; the peaSlant fairmers quit ,p roducing the necessary quotas of farm products. It did not truke Len!in long to figure ·h is way out of the impending crisis. He proclaimed a "new economic pol,ircy" (Novaja NEP), which returned the Ekonomiceskaja Politika they might work them prithat o s , farms to the farmers vately. Five years later, however, Lenin ordered the dissolution orf NIDP in the UiSSiR and a general collectiviization of all farms. isovhozes and lk:olclwzes ,w ere ag,a in formed. Sovhiozes are state aigricultural properties in which pri¥ate ownership is completely exc1uded, while kolcll01Zes al1 �SLOVAKIA 49 low about 1 per cent ownership in a farm project, as mentioned a:oove in reference to JRD. After a complete turnaJbout af policy in Sl01Vrukia, in 1953, mruny farmers welcomed the chance to quit the JiRD and begin farming pri'Vately. Many see in this move, a wealkness of the Communists and are thus guilty Olf a serious er.ror, 1because the same thing is hO'Ulld to hruppen in Slovakia that haJppened in the lJISIS'R and wherever the Reds are in pOIWer: general collecti,vi,z ation is bound to come. It is unfortunate that so many people still do not understand how Communism woI"ks, the tactics 1:Jhe Communists use to attain their ends. In Slovakia, all the farmers who quit the 'kolchooes are m'3.11ked men. As soon as the economic situation improives and a surplus of farm products is lblri.lt up in Slo.vrukia, the farmers will be compelled to join the kolchooes and Sovhozes. Those who refuse to join will be lalbe-led "enemies" of the !State and dealt with accordingly . • • • SLOVAK FOLKLORE TI-IE MAN WHO NEVER SINNED In a certain village there once lived a poor but upright and devout man. Althoogh as gray as a pigeon, he had never, not even once, c<mmritted sin. He never hurt any one by word o:r deed, nor did he ever offend a siingle person in any way. This, Oif course, irritated the devil in hell, who said, scratching behind his ears : '"I1his is certainly exasperating with this man. Other persons, no matter how upright, render me a service at least once during their lifetime. This fellow, however, Slhall die today oir tomorro.w and as yet has not done my ibidding even Oll1Ce. But just wait, mister, I'll show you uip yet!" Not knowing of the trap the devil was setting for him, the poor man lirved ;peacefully in his shack, praying to God daily, never offending any one, CO'Veting not another's possessions, and conducting himself in an things according to God's commandments. � SLOVAKIA 44 U. S. Information Agency (Voice of America), the Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe) and other American institutions still try to salvage them? Why insist that such 0 political dupes" ( ?) represent the political will of the Slovak nation? They never did and never shall! • RECOMMENDED $3.00; SWVAK FOR (the set); "Hirdbak's "S'IJOVAK LffiSSONS" • • BOOKS: "The Slovaks" (Jwrchak BEGINNERS" (Books I-III) $1.50 Eniglish-,Sl{)IVa;k Dictionary" $4.00; (iHrolbak) $3.50 . • • • NATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN SLOVAKIA Andrej Gemersky When Edward Benes signed the governmental decree in 1945 to nationalize '.key (heavy) indrustry, the Communists in Slovakia and the Czech lands became the masters of the economic situation. By signing that decree Benes sealed the fate not only of heaJVy industry, Wihich thereto was owned for the most part rb y share-holders' associations, 1b ut also the industry which was owned by indirviduals. Benes's decree nationali0ed all industrial enterprises which employed: more than 50 persons. For the time bemg, therefore, enterprises with u:p to 50 emptoyees were not affeded by the decree. Bwt only for a short time. The Co1mmunists are rk nown for their consistent stand on a!bolishing all rprivaJte ownership. They ibelieve in the prinrciple that man s'hould not exiploit man, that man must not be ex!ploited 'by the bourgeois, the capitalists, who. according to the Communists are represented by private OIWltlers withO'llt regard to the iltind and ~tent of prirvate ownership. The Communists, therefore, once they were in key positliooo in SlovaJki1a , sought to nationalilze every private enter.prise, large and small. I had said that enterprises with up to 50 employees were not nationalized at the outset (1945). These the �SLOVAKIA 45 Communists first ibegan to combine into larger productiive units, into so-called maniwfacturing and selling combines or cooperatives; they !began to co1lectilvi1ze production or manufacture. They said that collectiivization was a neces-sary an:d inevitruble degree of socialistic, progressiive undertaiking and, therefore, W'ihoeiver opposed co'.hlectiivization was not priogressive but reactionary, an enemy af socialism which spelled the "good and welfare" of the ,people. Such a person, of course, was an enemy of the State and, hence, coulq ,be ,punished accoroing to existing laws. TailoTs were o,r.garuzed in the cooperatiive called "Vw~ rodev" ; ha;berdashers, merchants with mixed merchandise in the "Jednorba" and "Buducnoof"; shoemrukers in the "V'zoro!buv," lbut s1hoesihops with three employees were not affected. The latter, however, were not allowed to make new shoes, lbut only to repair old ones; their shops had to carry the sign "iidrzbar." It was thus that all manufacturing plants and selling outlets in 1Sl01Vakia were oollectiivized. Later, larger cooperati<ves fbecame so-.called "national" enterprises; \but national entffil)rises are also State enter.prises, !because the profits belong to the Strute exclusicvely, that is, to the Communists. Former "priV1ate" enterprises were given a neiw name; original trade names, carrying the names of ipri-vate entrepreneurs and owners, had to go. Now, for example, we read ,t he names of "na;tional" enterprises, such as, "Teohnokov, Masin.a, Ob111Va, Popper, Mlieicne speciaJlity," etc. Ln a word all ,business is under State control. When the Communists :niationa:li'Zed or collectivized entenprises, they allowed the former prwate OIWillera to run them for the State as "managers." But they had one of their tried men in eiveiry business place, whose duty it was to learn all the triciks of the trade. In time the original owner-mam.ager lbecame unnecessary and W&S transferred to some other enter,prise ·a s a lruborer. His understudy, classed as "aJbsolutely reliable," took 01Ver the jdb of managing the business. In many in.stances, ,private owners opposed collecticvization. In such cases the Oomm'U.Ilists simply too:k amay �46 SLOVAKIA their business permits, or closed their shops as economically unnecessary. So a person practically had to join the Red cooperatives if he wanted to live and have a roof over his head. Most of the small operators ha<l their shops in their ho.mes and could easily be dispossessed in the "public interest" - meaning of course in the interest otf the Communist Party. In Slovakia the Communists did not collectivize all prilvate enterprises at one time. At first the Reds would call the owner to attend a trade meeting of this or that national oomimittee and try to conivince him how he would benefit by joining a cooperative. :tf he could not be convinced, they would tell him that they would have to review his trade permit and ascertain whether his shop was necessary to f wfill the economic plan. Miter the lboss, the Reds would tackle ,his employees to convince them that they are not very bright if they ,let ,prirvate owners, the bourgeois, to exploit them. Why should the wo'I1kers help the owners to wax richer at their expense, the Reds would easily say, when they can work in cooperative shops and get better pay? In many cases that is how the Communists operated in their own !benefit. IDm.iplo.yees quit their old employers to wonk in the cooperatives, where they actually receirved better pay. When the Reds had all producing enterprises nationalized aJnd collectirvired, they later introduced socalled rproductitve norms, which had to be met, if the workers were to, reiceirve the pay they were getting. These norms could never be met, so the workers actually got less pay than they did f,r,om prirvate owners. This, according to the Communists, is not exploitation of the wonkers, but a co111scientioU1S and patriotic building~up of socialism. Getting control of agricultural production caused the greates~ concern to, the Communists, !because all people therefore eiven those who lirve in the communistic "paradise" - have to eat. 'Ilhe Communists knew that a ,s carcity of food would not helip them COIIlSOlidate their power in the State; they also !knew that a hungry perso:n could not work and slave for them effectively. So tliey begMl to col- �SLOVAKIA 47 lectiv1ze aigricultural units, the fazms. That is how the socalled "Uniform A,gricultuiral Cooperatives" (Jednotne rofrofnicke druzstva - JRD) originated in :SlovaJdia. 1Slovaik farmers refused to jOlin the cooiperaUves (,kolchozes) and openly resisted the Communists. They told them ,b luntly that they did not want kolchozes like those in the USISR, !because they were not prosiperous agric'l.lltural mstitutions. Official pro;pagato,rs orf the [Red Party, however, exip1ained thaJt .t hey weire not concerned about kolcho:zes, but aJbout co~ra:Uve farming, which must meet Slwalk conditions and demands which are different than those existing in the USSR and, therefore, they said, the Slovalk farm cooperatives do not have and will not have anything in cOllllmO!n with the Soiviet kolchozes. It so h:aJppened that many Slovruk faTIIners let themselves be deceived by the Red lullaJbies of the Communist agitators and joined the cooperatiives. Soon after, they learned to thek .sorr,ow that the cooperatives were nothing else but Soiviet !kol'chozes, which depri,v ed the formers of 99 per cent of their property. No· longer were they masters of their own household, but slaves of t'he Communist Party. Of course, the Ooimmunists would haJVe forced their plans OIJ1 the Slovalk farmers even though all of them would have refused to join the ikolchoizes; they prolbaibly would harve kno clked tJhem afif one 1b y one, ivilla1ge by village, .b ecause they were the l31W, they were in po,weir. Natuirrully, the Slo1w1Jk farmers, true to their Christian democvatic tradition, struck !baic'.k, even though it meaJI1t persec:ultion, prison, or eiven deportation. They figured the Reds co'l.lld not :kill, imprison o;r depO!rt all oif them without starving themselves out. Just how the Slo;valk farmer felt about ,t he situation soon made itselif felt in the whole of Sloivakia: the faruners under the new system were producing much }ess than they did before the adrvent of the kolchozes. The Red lbos:ses cursed and threatened the farmers , but to no :wail ; a lbad year was followed by a worse year. Wor.kers everyiW'here complained loudly. After years of stubborn Slovak resistance, the Reds decided to change their tactics to improve the agricultur.a:l. �48 SLOVAKIA situ3ition in Slovaikia. and increase the amount of meat, flowr, vegetable.s, eitc. m 1003 they suddenly began to ,proclaim that no one wa;s swpposed. to be forced into the oooperativesi and anyone who wished to quit them could do so and begin to farm priivately on his OIWil ,p roperty. President Zapotooky himself annou:nred the new, surpristing course of the Communists in a speech in which he hypocritically condemned all iviolence and terro~tion of the farmers, saying that they were "violations olf a local character" for which the guilty parties shall bear the responsibility. This complete turnalbout -Of ,policy may hruve surprised many innocents, ,b ut it rwas really nothing new in Communist tactics and str.ategy. It was not the first time or the last .that they reversed their policies. '!'hey did it before and shall conrtinue to do it ·a s long as it serves their interests, the interests of ,t he Communist Party and the interests of the UISSIR. Those who do not understand Communist methods and their constant goals might see in this tarna:bout of the Oommunists, their weakne.ss. This, howe;ver, would be a fundamental error, which would aNenge itself in a brutal manner. We must remember that the very same thing haJppened even in the "exemplary" Soviet Union more than once. After the Communists seii-zed the government in Russia, even during the lifetime of Lenin, the Communists began to collecti~ on a grand scale, brutally persecuting every one who opposed them. After a time they found themselves in an economic crisis; the peaSlant fairmers quit ,p roducing the necessary quotas of farm products. It did not truke Len!in long to figure ·h is way out of the impending crisis. He proclaimed a "new economic pol,ircy" (Novaja NEP), which returned the Ekonomiceskaja Politika they might work them prithat o s , farms to the farmers vately. Five years later, however, Lenin ordered the dissolution orf NIDP in the UiSSiR and a general collectiviization of all farms. isovhozes and lk:olclwzes ,w ere ag,a in formed. Sovhiozes are state aigricultural properties in which pri¥ate ownership is completely exc1uded, while kolcll01Zes al1 �SLOVAKIA 49 low about 1 per cent ownership in a farm project, as mentioned a:oove in reference to JRD. After a complete turnaJbout af policy in Sl01Vrukia, in 1953, mruny farmers welcomed the chance to quit the JiRD and begin farming pri'Vately. Many see in this move, a wealkness of the Communists and are thus guilty Olf a serious er.ror, 1because the same thing is hO'Ulld to hruppen in Slovakia that haJppened in the lJISIS'R and wherever the Reds are in pOIWer: general collecti,vi,z ation is bound to come. It is unfortunate that so many people still do not understand how Communism woI"ks, the tactics 1:Jhe Communists use to attain their ends. In Slovakia, all the farmers who quit the 'kolchooes are m'3.11ked men. As soon as the economic situation improives and a surplus of farm products is lblri.lt up in Slo.vrukia, the farmers will be compelled to join the kolchooes and Sovhozes. Those who refuse to join will be lalbe-led "enemies" of the !State and dealt with accordingly . • • • SLOVAK FOLKLORE TI-IE MAN WHO NEVER SINNED In a certain village there once lived a poor but upright and devout man. Althoogh as gray as a pigeon, he had never, not even once, c<mmritted sin. He never hurt any one by word o:r deed, nor did he ever offend a siingle person in any way. This, Oif course, irritated the devil in hell, who said, scratching behind his ears : '"I1his is certainly exasperating with this man. Other persons, no matter how upright, render me a service at least once during their lifetime. This fellow, however, Slhall die today oir tomorro.w and as yet has not done my ibidding even Oll1Ce. But just wait, mister, I'll show you uip yet!" Not knowing of the trap the devil was setting for him, the poor man lirved ;peacefully in his shack, praying to God daily, never offending any one, CO'Veting not another's possessions, and conducting himself in an things according to God's commandments. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 44 U. S. Information Agency (Voice of America), the Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe) and other American institutions still try to salvage them? Why insist that such 0 political dupes" ( ?) represent the political will of the Slovak nation? They never did and never shall! • RECOMMENDED $3.00; SWVAK FOR (the set); "Hirdbak's "S'IJOVAK LffiSSONS" • • BOOKS: "The Slovaks" (Jwrchak BEGINNERS" (Books I-III) $1.50 Eniglish-,Sl{)IVa;k Dictionary" $4.00; (iHrolbak) $3.50 . • • • NATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN SLOVAKIA Andrej Gemersky When Edward Benes signed the governmental decree in 1945 to nationalize '.key (heavy) indrustry, the Communists in Slovakia and the Czech lands became the masters of the economic situation. By signing that decree Benes sealed the fate not only of heaJVy industry, Wihich thereto was owned for the most part rb y share-holders' associations, 1b ut also the industry which was owned by indirviduals. Benes's decree nationali0ed all industrial enterprises which employed: more than 50 persons. For the time bemg, therefore, enterprises with u:p to 50 emptoyees were not affeded by the decree. Bwt only for a short time. The Co1mmunists are rk nown for their consistent stand on a!bolishing all rprivaJte ownership. They ibelieve in the prinrciple that man s'hould not exiploit man, that man must not be ex!ploited 'by the bourgeois, the capitalists, who. according to the Communists are represented by private OIWltlers withO'llt regard to the iltind and ~tent of prirvate ownership. The Communists, therefore, once they were in key positliooo in SlovaJki1a , sought to nationalilze every private enter.prise, large and small. I had said that enterprises with up to 50 employees were not nationalized at the outset (1945). These the SLOVAKIA 45 Communists first ibegan to combine into larger productiive units, into so-called maniwfacturing and selling combines or cooperatives; they !began to co1lectilvi1ze production or manufacture. They said that collectiivization was a neces-sary an:d inevitruble degree of socialistic, progressiive undertaiking and, therefore, W'ihoeiver opposed co'.hlectiivization was not priogressive but reactionary, an enemy af socialism which spelled the "good and welfare" of the ,people. Such a person, of course, was an enemy of the State and, hence, coulq ,be ,punished accoroing to existing laws. TailoTs were o,r.garuzed in the cooperatiive called "Vw~ rodev" ; ha;berdashers, merchants with mixed merchandise in the "Jednorba" and "Buducnoof"; shoemrukers in the "V'zoro!buv," lbut s1hoesihops with three employees were not affected. The latter, however, were not allowed to make new shoes, lbut only to repair old ones; their shops had to carry the sign "iidrzbar." It was thus that all manufacturing plants and selling outlets in 1Sl01Vakia were oollectiivized. Later, larger cooperati<ves fbecame so-.called "national" enterprises; \but national entffil)rises are also State enter.prises, !because the profits belong to the Strute exclusicvely, that is, to the Communists. Former "priV1ate" enterprises were given a neiw name; original trade names, carrying the names of ipri-vate entrepreneurs and owners, had to go. Now, for example, we read ,t he names of "na;tional" enterprises, such as, "Teohnokov, Masin.a, Ob111Va, Popper, Mlieicne speciaJlity," etc. Ln a word all ,business is under State control. When the Communists :niationa:li'Zed or collectivized entenprises, they allowed the former prwate OIWillera to run them for the State as "managers." But they had one of their tried men in eiveiry business place, whose duty it was to learn all the triciks of the trade. In time the original owner-mam.ager lbecame unnecessary and W&S transferred to some other enter,prise ·a s a lruborer. His understudy, classed as "aJbsolutely reliable," took 01Ver the jdb of managing the business. In many in.stances, ,private owners opposed collecticvization. In such cases the Oomm'U.Ilists simply too:k amay 46 SLOVAKIA their business permits, or closed their shops as economically unnecessary. So a person practically had to join the Red cooperatives if he wanted to live and have a roof over his head. Most of the small operators ha<l their shops in their ho.mes and could easily be dispossessed in the "public interest" - meaning of course in the interest otf the Communist Party. In Slovakia the Communists did not collectivize all prilvate enterprises at one time. At first the Reds would call the owner to attend a trade meeting of this or that national oomimittee and try to conivince him how he would benefit by joining a cooperative. :tf he could not be convinced, they would tell him that they would have to review his trade permit and ascertain whether his shop was necessary to f wfill the economic plan. Miter the lboss, the Reds would tackle ,his employees to convince them that they are not very bright if they ,let ,prirvate owners, the bourgeois, to exploit them. Why should the wo'I1kers help the owners to wax richer at their expense, the Reds would easily say, when they can work in cooperative shops and get better pay? In many cases that is how the Communists operated in their own !benefit. IDm.iplo.yees quit their old employers to wonk in the cooperatives, where they actually receirved better pay. When the Reds had all producing enterprises nationalized aJnd collectirvired, they later introduced socalled rproductitve norms, which had to be met, if the workers were to, reiceirve the pay they were getting. These norms could never be met, so the workers actually got less pay than they did f,r,om prirvate owners. This, according to the Communists, is not exploitation of the wonkers, but a co111scientioU1S and patriotic building~up of socialism. Getting control of agricultural production caused the greates~ concern to, the Communists, !because all people therefore eiven those who lirve in the communistic "paradise" - have to eat. 'Ilhe Communists knew that a ,s carcity of food would not helip them COIIlSOlidate their power in the State; they also !knew that a hungry perso:n could not work and slave for them effectively. So tliey begMl to col- SLOVAKIA 47 lectiv1ze aigricultural units, the fazms. That is how the socalled "Uniform A,gricultuiral Cooperatives" (Jednotne rofrofnicke druzstva - JRD) originated in :SlovaJdia. 1Slovaik farmers refused to jOlin the cooiperaUves (,kolchozes) and openly resisted the Communists. They told them ,b luntly that they did not want kolchozes like those in the USISR, !because they were not prosiperous agric'l.lltural mstitutions. Official pro;pagato,rs orf the [Red Party, however, exip1ained thaJt .t hey weire not concerned about kolcho:zes, but aJbout co~ra:Uve farming, which must meet Slwalk conditions and demands which are different than those existing in the USSR and, therefore, they said, the Slovalk farm cooperatives do not have and will not have anything in cOllllmO!n with the Soiviet kolchozes. It so h:aJppened that many Slovruk faTIIners let themselves be deceived by the Red lullaJbies of the Communist agitators and joined the cooperatiives. Soon after, they learned to thek .sorr,ow that the cooperatives were nothing else but Soiviet !kol'chozes, which depri,v ed the formers of 99 per cent of their property. No· longer were they masters of their own household, but slaves of t'he Communist Party. Of course, the Ooimmunists would haJVe forced their plans OIJ1 the Slovalk farmers even though all of them would have refused to join the ikolchoizes; they prolbaibly would harve kno clked tJhem afif one 1b y one, ivilla1ge by village, .b ecause they were the l31W, they were in po,weir. Natuirrully, the Slo1w1Jk farmers, true to their Christian democvatic tradition, struck !baic'.k, even though it meaJI1t persec:ultion, prison, or eiven deportation. They figured the Reds co'l.lld not :kill, imprison o;r depO!rt all oif them without starving themselves out. Just how the Slo;valk farmer felt about ,t he situation soon made itselif felt in the whole of Sloivakia: the faruners under the new system were producing much }ess than they did before the adrvent of the kolchozes. The Red lbos:ses cursed and threatened the farmers , but to no :wail ; a lbad year was followed by a worse year. Wor.kers everyiW'here complained loudly. After years of stubborn Slovak resistance, the Reds decided to change their tactics to improve the agricultur.a:l. 48 SLOVAKIA situ3ition in Slovaikia. and increase the amount of meat, flowr, vegetable.s, eitc. m 1003 they suddenly began to ,proclaim that no one wa;s swpposed. to be forced into the oooperativesi and anyone who wished to quit them could do so and begin to farm priivately on his OIWil ,p roperty. President Zapotooky himself annou:nred the new, surpristing course of the Communists in a speech in which he hypocritically condemned all iviolence and terro~tion of the farmers, saying that they were "violations olf a local character" for which the guilty parties shall bear the responsibility. This complete turnalbout -Of ,policy may hruve surprised many innocents, ,b ut it rwas really nothing new in Communist tactics and str.ategy. It was not the first time or the last .that they reversed their policies. '!'hey did it before and shall conrtinue to do it ·a s long as it serves their interests, the interests of ,t he Communist Party and the interests of the UISSIR. Those who do not understand Communist methods and their constant goals might see in this tarna:bout of the Oommunists, their weakne.ss. This, howe;ver, would be a fundamental error, which would aNenge itself in a brutal manner. We must remember that the very same thing haJppened even in the "exemplary" Soviet Union more than once. After the Communists seii-zed the government in Russia, even during the lifetime of Lenin, the Communists began to collecti~ on a grand scale, brutally persecuting every one who opposed them. After a time they found themselves in an economic crisis; the peaSlant fairmers quit ,p roducing the necessary quotas of farm products. It did not truke Len!in long to figure ·h is way out of the impending crisis. He proclaimed a "new economic pol,ircy" (Novaja NEP), which returned the Ekonomiceskaja Politika they might work them prithat o s , farms to the farmers vately. Five years later, however, Lenin ordered the dissolution orf NIDP in the UiSSiR and a general collectiviization of all farms. isovhozes and lk:olclwzes ,w ere ag,a in formed. Sovhiozes are state aigricultural properties in which pri¥ate ownership is completely exc1uded, while kolcll01Zes al1 SLOVAKIA 49 low about 1 per cent ownership in a farm project, as mentioned a:oove in reference to JRD. After a complete turnaJbout af policy in Sl01Vrukia, in 1953, mruny farmers welcomed the chance to quit the JiRD and begin farming pri'Vately. Many see in this move, a wealkness of the Communists and are thus guilty Olf a serious er.ror, 1because the same thing is hO'Ulld to hruppen in Slovakia that haJppened in the lJISIS'R and wherever the Reds are in pOIWer: general collecti,vi,z ation is bound to come. It is unfortunate that so many people still do not understand how Communism woI"ks, the tactics 1:Jhe Communists use to attain their ends. In Slovakia, all the farmers who quit the 'kolchooes are m'3.11ked men. As soon as the economic situation improives and a surplus of farm products is lblri.lt up in Slo.vrukia, the farmers will be compelled to join the kolchooes and Sovhozes. Those who refuse to join will be lalbe-led "enemies" of the !State and dealt with accordingly . • • • SLOVAK FOLKLORE TI-IE MAN WHO NEVER SINNED In a certain village there once lived a poor but upright and devout man. Althoogh as gray as a pigeon, he had never, not even once, c<mmritted sin. He never hurt any one by word o:r deed, nor did he ever offend a siingle person in any way. This, Oif course, irritated the devil in hell, who said, scratching behind his ears : '"I1his is certainly exasperating with this man. Other persons, no matter how upright, render me a service at least once during their lifetime. This fellow, however, Slhall die today oir tomorro.w and as yet has not done my ibidding even Oll1Ce. But just wait, mister, I'll show you uip yet!" Not knowing of the trap the devil was setting for him, the poor man lirved ;peacefully in his shack, praying to God daily, never offending any one, CO'Veting not another's possessions, and conducting himself in an things according to God's commandments.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Nationalization of Private Property in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Andrej Gemerský Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 44-49 Note from frontmatter: "Andrew Gemerský is the pseudonym of a Slovak who escaped from Slovakia just several months ago, ..." Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gemerský, Andrej Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 name pseudonym https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9300c821ed15a55b939dcfcb0256c321.pdf 77429f714a8fae10074b53a07fbd9aa0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we �shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence �SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · �SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, �iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the �ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the �SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, �32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- �SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon �SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). �SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. �36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- �S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47. � SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we �shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence �SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · �SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, �iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the �ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the �SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, �32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- �SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon �SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). �SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. �36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- �S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, 32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. 36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How Free is Radio Free Europe? Description An account of the resource Kurt Glasser Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 25-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/076c0becfb8ddb04f20fab1757680249.pdf 40dfe516a506f1adc73d3519afc189e2 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 17 OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY By Kurt Gl.a ser " Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944. "He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying. In this vital area, American policy has been built around a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from 1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never told us. When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who gained support for the idea at home only after they had sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919. Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu- �18 SLOVAKIA cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives) were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy. The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in 1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany. Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso, occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which the Slovaks neither requested or suggested. It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 19 repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over their country. Although President Benes, who had resigned after the Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in 1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact that the Czech population at home was not particularly anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they were actually distributed (which was not always the case in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and his followers were determined to pursue their policy of Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be executed with outside assistance, and the only government which could give effective support was that of the Soviet Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in 1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not changed their policies in the slightest. �20 SLOVAKIA The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from 1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the United States under State Department protection, was that of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book East and West (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak " service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken over by Communists; others worked for the Communist party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le. Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration �SLOVAKIA 21 involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us: "Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles. "Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of his Government would willing put their names." • The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as the Chicago professor of rthat name. The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the British Broadcasting Company, in which he said: " ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet peoples ... "Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality." The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those political parties which would join a United Front under Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948. �22 SLOVAKJA "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946. "Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party. "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G. Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?" Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947. "Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch. Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak ("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8. "In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka, writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48. Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people. They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia had been completed. After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States. �SLOVAKIA 23 The State Department received them as "democratic exiles" and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka, who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak" staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until 1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the "Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December 1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty. The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to reshape their history!" As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The �24 SLOVAKIA Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin, a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration. The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the "Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial murder. After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized '. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed, about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed. Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party" headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which �SLOVAKIA 25 non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux) received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as "anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia. The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians in the United States to re.turn to power with American assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the United States Government maintains its unholy alliance with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.) • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo· vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their Inherent right to free development and political independence will be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak, M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51) � SLOVAKIA 17 OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY By Kurt Gl.a ser " Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944. "He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying. In this vital area, American policy has been built around a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from 1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never told us. When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who gained support for the idea at home only after they had sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919. Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu- �18 SLOVAKIA cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives) were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy. The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in 1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany. Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso, occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which the Slovaks neither requested or suggested. It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 19 repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over their country. Although President Benes, who had resigned after the Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in 1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact that the Czech population at home was not particularly anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they were actually distributed (which was not always the case in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and his followers were determined to pursue their policy of Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be executed with outside assistance, and the only government which could give effective support was that of the Soviet Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in 1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not changed their policies in the slightest. �20 SLOVAKIA The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from 1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the United States under State Department protection, was that of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book East and West (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak " service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken over by Communists; others worked for the Communist party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le. Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration �SLOVAKIA 21 involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us: "Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles. "Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of his Government would willing put their names." • The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as the Chicago professor of rthat name. The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the British Broadcasting Company, in which he said: " ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet peoples ... "Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality." The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those political parties which would join a United Front under Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948. �22 SLOVAKJA "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946. "Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party. "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G. Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?" Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947. "Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch. Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak ("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8. "In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka, writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48. Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people. They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia had been completed. After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States. �SLOVAKIA 23 The State Department received them as "democratic exiles" and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka, who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak" staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until 1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the "Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December 1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty. The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to reshape their history!" As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The �24 SLOVAKIA Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin, a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration. The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the "Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial murder. After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized '. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed, about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed. Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party" headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which �SLOVAKIA 25 non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux) received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as "anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia. The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians in the United States to re.turn to power with American assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the United States Government maintains its unholy alliance with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.) • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo· vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their Inherent right to free development and political independence will be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak, M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 17 OUR BLUNDERING CZECHO-SLOVAH.IA POLICY By Kurt Gl.a ser " Dea·1 ing w.iith his Mos'Cow journey, Dr. Benes said it could be regarded in the future as t·h e logi cal culmination of an ancient policy." News Flashes from Czechoslovakia, Chicago, F e,b ruary 21, 1944. "He who rules Bohemia rules Europe" is an old saying. In this vital area, American policy has been built around a myth, spread by a public-relations program for which the Czecho-Slovak Government spent millions of dollars from 1918 to 1938. To understand what this myth has done to American interests, we must study the true story of Czecho-Slovakia, the story which the Administration has never told us. When founded in 1918 by Masaryk and Benes, who gained support for the idea at home only after they had sold it to the Allies, Czecho-Slovakia had six different nationalities. As of the end of World War II, there were six and one-half million Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, and three and one-half million Sudeten Germans, mostly in a crescent north, west and southwest of the Czech core, but with large German colonies in Prague, Bruenn and other centers. The Teschen district, predominantly Polish, had been ceded to Poland in 1938. Slovakia, to the east, had more than three million Slovaks, 700,000 Hungarians and some Germans. The extreme eastern province was Ruthenia, with a population of about 700,000, ceded to the U.S.S.R. in 1945. The Slovaks were induced to join with the Czechs by the so-called "Pittsburgh Agreement" which promised them absolute equality: Czecho-Slovakia would be "like Switzerland," as Benes put it. The Sudetens wanted to stay with Austria, but they were not asked, and Czech troops overthrew their elected provincial government in March 1919. Masaryk and Benes did not keep their promise of equal rights. Instead, they set up a centralized government in Prague, gave preference to Czechs in the civil service, in business and in finance, undertook to "Czechify" the edu- 18 SLOVAKIA cational system and refused to allow Slovak autonomy. Although the Sudeten region furnished the bulk of CzechoSlovak exports, Prague economic policies kept the area in a state of perpetual depression. It was inevitable that Slovaks, Sudetens and Hungarians should become increasingly anxious to "get out from under". All this time Czech professors and journalists in America, and Americans paid by them (Hitler had a list compiled from Czechs archives) were telling the wonders of "Czechoslovak" democracy. The original aim of Henlein's Sudeten-German Party was simply to gain equal rights for the Sudetens within Czecho-Slovakia. Only after 1935, when the Party won a majority in the German-speaking area, offered to cooperate with Benes and was rebuffed, did pro-Nazi elements become dominant. When the Czech-Sudeten crisis became acute in 1938, the British Government sent Lord Runciman to mediate. The refusal of Benes to make timely concessions led Lord Runciman to recommend cession of the Sudeten areas to Germany. Slovak pressure during and after the Munich crisis forced the Prague Government to grant autonomy to Slovakia on October 6, 1938. In March 1939, however, the Czech President Hacha deposed Slovak Prime Minister Tiso, occupied Bratislava with Czech troops and installed a new Slovak Government. This intervention was used by Hitler as an excuse for marching into Prague, an action which the Slovaks neither requested or suggested. It is true that Hitler seizure of Bohemia made possible the establishment of the Slovak Republic. But this did not make it a Nazi sta.te any more than German aid to Finland nazified that country. The Slovak Republic was what the Slovak people wanted, and it was recognized by 27 countries, including Great Britain, France and even the Soviet Union. In spite of intense Nazi pressure, President Tiso and the Slovak Government did their best to protect the Jews of Slovakia until 1944, when a "rebellion" organized by Communist parachutists led Hitler to install a reign of terror. Slovakia declared war on the Soviet Union in 1941, but it was never at war with the United States. Slovaks SLOVAKIA 19 repeatedly protected American airmen forced down over their country. Although President Benes, who had resigned after the Munich Agreement in 1938, had recognized his successor Hacha, he decided after the dismemberment of Czecho-Slovakia in 1939 to work toward a political come-back. He and his followers formed the Czechoslovakian Liberation Movement in Paris in 1939, and moved it to London in 1940, later securing Allied recognition as the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government." It was necessary to face the fact that the Czech population at home was not particularly anti-German. Of all the territories under Nazi control, the Czech Protectorate had the highest standard of living. Official rations were the same as in Germany, and since they were actually distributed (which was not always the case in the Reich) the Czechs actually had more to eat than the Germans. Czech industry gave adive support to the German war effort, and large numbers of Czechs volunteered for the German Army. As Kenneth de Courcey (Review of World Affairs, April 28, 1944) pointed out, there was "almost no resistance movement at all" so that it was necessary to parachute in territories to assasinate the Nazi Commissioner Heydrich and provoke the Lidice atrocity with which Hitler was stupid enough to oblige. Since Benes and his followers were determined to pursue their policy of Czech ultra-nationalism, it was evident that they could not count on Czech support at home, let alone the allegiance of the Slovaks. The anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans were willing to reach a settlement, but Benes decided instead to expel them from Czecho-Slovakia. This policy could only be executed with outside assistance, and the only government which could give effective support was that of the Soviet Union. The "Czechoslovakist" policy of Benes and his followers was, therefore, bound to make their government permanently dependent on Russia. The blunder of American policy is that we supported Soviet policy, recognized the Benes "Government" and even now (December 1952) accept those of Benes' followers who broke with Gottwald in 1948 as "democratic exiles" even though they have not changed their policies in the slightest. 20 SLOVAKIA The policy of the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," which supplied the "non-Commun ist" politicians in the "National Front" which governed Czecho-Slovakia from 1945 to 1948 and whose members are now mostly in the United States under State Department protection, was that of absolute adherence to the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenkl, today President of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" with headquarters in Washington, explained to the temporary parliament in November 1945: "The nationally conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in their own interest, as well as in international interests, permanent collaboration with the USSR is necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" Hubert Ripka, who in 1939 hid the Soviet agent SimonKatz from the French police, later became Minister of Information in the London "Government " and who is now a professor at the New School for Social Research in New York, summarizes the policy in more details in his book East and West (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impo,s sible to collaborate officially with the Sovielt Union, we ... did nothing which might prejudice or preven1t the renewal of co-operation at the earliest possible moment; I need only recall how strong ly OUT aJttitude contrasted with that of many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no inilerruption of the personal contacts and exchange of informrution between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paris, Washington and elsewhere." Apparently both the British and United States Governments were willing to accept as a "Czechoslovak democratic exile" anyone with a passport from the Czech "Governmentin-exile." The London "Czechoslovak s" took advantage of this fact to infiltrate a large number of Soviet agents, who were in the direct service of the Kremlin, into both the United Kingdom and the United States. The "Czech-Slovak " service of the British Broadcasting Company was taken over by Communists; others worked for the Communist party paper Daily Worker, the two staffs being for operating purposes interchangeab le. Douglas Hyde, a former Communist, relates in his book I Believe (London, 1951) a typical example of infiltration SLOVAKIA 21 involving one Ludwig Freund•, a German Communist masquerading as a Czech. Freund was assigned to the Daily Worker but his salary was paid by the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" with British funds. Hyde tells us: "Freund a.c hieved considera,ble standing with member.s of the Benes Government and was ruble to put us (the Communist Party) in touch with them at any time. He was able, also, of course, to keep us mfo.rmed of most of whwt was going on in Czech Government circles. "Freund in co-operation with members of our Editorial Foreign Departmerut would write articles Ito which -non-Communist members of his Government would willing put their names." • The Ludwig Freund mentioned here is not the s·aime person as the Chicago professor of rthat name. The effectiveness of this arrangement is suggested by Minister Ripka's speech of November 7, 1942, over the British Broadcasting Company, in which he said: " ... the Russian November Revolurtion not only increased the strength of the Russian Soviet State, it a,lso raised to greater heighrts than ever ,before the standard of -civilizalt.ion, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet peoples ... "Bolshevism is a supe,r -national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal which has kindled the mind·s of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today ... Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedOllll, so did the Russian Revolution try 1to reali'ze :the ideal of equality." The "non-Communist" politicians in London, whom the State Department has since 1948 undertaken to palm off on the American public as anti-Communists, planned with Stalin during the war to destroy the Slovak Republic and to expel the German-speaking minority. The price exacted by the Kremlin was the complete Sovietization of CzechoSlovakia, which became a Communist satellite in 1945, not in 1948. To assure that the sell-out would work, the "nonCommunists" agreed with the Kremlin to allow only those political parties which would join a United Front under Communist domination, a procedure which General Eisenhower rejected for the U. S. Zone of Germany as undemocratic (New York Times, October 17, 1945). Other parties were prohibited and their leaders thrown into concentration camps. The true policies of the "non-Communist" CzechoSlovak politicians can best be shown by their public statements made between 1945 and 1948. 22 SLOVAKJA "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy (applau se) . . . Our alliance with the Sovie;t Union gu arantees u s immediate he1p of Soviet armies in case of emergency." Dr. Ivo Duchacek, President of the Foreign Com:milbtee of the National Assembly, speech oif March 8, 1946. "Let us declare war against fear of bolshevi•sm and forbid , at the same time, the t'onm,a,tliolJ'l of an,y an1ti,Oommuntst front whaltever." Pravo lidu, organ of Social Democratic Party. "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed ... Centrifugal force,s are ,today eradicated and liquidaited." - Dr. Jozef Le ttri ch , writing in Cas, B rati slava, o. 130, 194G. Question: "Why does no opposition party ex,ist in Czecho-Slovakia ?" Answer: "The need for an opposition party in reality has not yet arisen in our coun1try." - Pavel Viboch at press conference in England, May 1947. "Never in hi sto ry was Russia so mighty, never were the forces of socialism so colossally forged together. This is a new historical epoch. Neve11theless some people think in a stick-in-the-mud fashion. It has not yet •been possible to convince everyone of the necessity of the oventhrow of capitalism ... " Ferdinand Peroutka, Tak nebo tak ("So or so"), Prague, 1947, p. 8. "In Ozech politics, in Czech .national life, it is urgent that we come to an understanding with the Commun ist Party. .. The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our p olitical scheme even a!ter the elections are over; and socialism shall remain t he foundation of our national life ... Coming to terms with the Oommunists is t h e golden theme of our political philosophy." - Ferdinand Peroutka, writing In Dnesek, Prague, February 9, rn48. Together with Communist "partisans," the "non-Communist" politicians of the National Front supervised the wholesale murder of more than 300,000 innocent people. They voted unanimously the Communist-drafted Kosice Program which wiped out private business, they set up a system of "People's Courts" on the Soviet model and in Slovakia they established forced labor camps, to which confinement could be imposed without trial for persons "who profess an ideology inimical to the State". And then one day Stalin and Gottwald decided they needed their "liberal allies no longer - because the Sovietization of Czecho-Slovakia had been completed. After the so-called "Gottwald Putsch" of 1948, the leading Communist collaborators and fellow-travellers - including all those quoted above - came to the United States. SLOVAKIA 23 The State Department received them as "democratic exiles" and set them up in the research business, partly with taxpayers' money. Mr. Duchacek, who once claimed credit for helping to negotiate the Czech-Soviet Treaty of 1943, was employed by the Voice of America. Ferdinand Peroutka, who had written as late as December 1947 that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in a war with the Soviet Union, was placed in charge of the "Czechoslovak" operations of Radio Free Europe, financed by the Crusade for Freedom. Two of his principal assistants were Pavel Tigrid and Joseph Kodicek, both forme:· members of the BBC's Communist-dominated "Czech-Slovak" staff. Tigrid was a member of the Communist Party until 1945, when he joined the "Catholic" Party headed by the "Red Monsignor" Sramek under circumstances which are to say the least equivocal. All the other Czecho-Slovak politicians favored by the State Department (up to December 1952) meet the same standard of (,pro-Soviet) loyalty. The "Council for Free Czechoslovakia," headed by Peter Zenkl, boasted in a pamphlet (In Search of Havens, Washington, 1950) that the State Department takes its advice on which Czech and Slovak refugees to admit to the United States and which to exclude. It is well known in Europe even though American newspapers maintaining correspondents in Germany have for some reason never seen fit to publish the facts - that pro-Communists and left-wing socialists get preference for immigration, whereas known anti-Communists are put on a blacklist. The attitude of those favored by the Council is illustrated by the f.arewell speech of one Rostislav Foukal, who before leaving for America told his comrades in Germany: "Every democraticthinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company ... We Czechoslovakian socialists ... will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to reshape their history!" As for Slovakia, the overwhelming majority of the nation was and remains today firmly anti-Communist. The 24 SLOVAKIA Slovaks hoped fervently that the end of World War II would not destroy their Republic, but would bring them liberation so that they could govern themselves without German, Russian or Czech interference. But the "Czechoslovak" Government in London had already made its deal with the Kremlin, a deal explicitly sanctioned by an American Administration. The Slovak Republic was liquidated. In spite of asylum granted to the Slovak Cabinet by General Walton H. Walker at Kremsmuenster, Austria, the State Department ordered the surrender of Father Tiso and his government to the "Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission" without even the formality of an extradiction hearing. The kangaroo trial of Father Tiso - conducted before a judge who had sworn in advance "I will hang Tiso!" - is a classic case of judicial murder. After the Slovak Republic had been wantonly destroyed by the Red Armies by pre-arrangement between the Kremlin and the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government," the Communist-dominated government of Dr. Benes mobilized '. 'people's courts" on the Soviet model for a drive against patriotic Slovaks. The Catholic Bishops John Vojtassak and Michael Buzalka were incarcerated, church institutions were nationalized and private and corporate property was confiscated arbitrarily. Up to 1948, during a period when Ambassador Steinhardt assured the American public that "there is definitely no iron curtain in Czechoslovakia" (New York Times, Febrµary 1, 1947), over 100,000 Slovaks were jailed, about 30,000 deported to Russia and over a hundred executed. Slovakia was placed under the joint rule of the Communist Party and the so-called "Slovak Democratic Party" headed by Dr. Joseph Lettrich, now a member of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia." The "Democratic Party" was created arbitrarily to provide an ostensibly "non-Communist" partner for the Bolshevists, since the Slovak parties with popular support refused to cooperate with the Communists and were therefore liquidated. Government positions were divided by the two parties on a 50-50 basis. In the May 1946 elections the Democratic Party (for which SLOVAKIA 25 non-Communists felt constrained to vote, fault de mieux) received 62 per cent of the votes, two minor parties 8 per cent and the Communist Party 30 per cent. The Communists continued, however, to enjoy key positions in the provincial government of Slovakia out of all proportion to their actual strength. Their collaborators and supporters, such as Messrs. Lettrich, Kvetko, Viboch, Slavik, Kocvara and Ferjencik, are all in the United States, where they pose as "anti-Communist democratic exiles" from Czecho-Slovakia. The tensions created by the brutal expropriation of the Sudeten Germans and by the rape of Slovakia are factors which perpetuate the Soviet Russian stranglehold on Czecho-Slovakia. It is the aim of the "Czechoslovak" politicians in the United States to re.turn to power with American assistance. But if they succeed, they will again be dependent on Russian support, since the majority of citizens of Czecho-Slovakia (including vast numbers of Czechs who object to socialism and were revolted by the atrocities and the police terror) are strongly opposed to them. As long as the United States Government maintains its unholy alliance with this group, it will never be able to pursue a firm or consistent anti-Communist policy in Central Europe. (Reprinted by permission from the author's "The Iron Curtain and American Policy," Public Affairs Press, 2153 Florida Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.) • • • WHO SAID IT? "THE SLOVAK PEOPLE is one of the great Christian nations of central Europe. History tells us that the forefathers of the Slovaks inhabited their present territory s ince about the fifth century. The Slo· vaks are a plain, humorous, intelligent, song-loving, industrious and religious peo,ple, devoted to the peaceful development of their national life and their national culture. They did not seek domination over other peoples, but only sought to safeguard their own national existence. No other nation of Europe suffered longer under alien domination than the Slovaks. The recognition and respect of their Inherent right to free development and political independence will be a corner stone of peace and coo peration among nations. It is necessary and right for Americans, including Americans of Slovak descent who wish all nationa of the earth as mu ch freedom and independence as they themselves enjoy in our blesesd Country, to show at least an equal amount of love and sympathy for the Slovak people in its long struggle for freedom and independence." (P. A. Hrobak, M!lwaukee, Wis., 10-28-51)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Our Blundering Czecho-Slovakia Policy Description An account of the resource Kurt Glaser Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 2 (7), July 1953 pp. 17-25 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a4e4be273902bd0b9c3f5c3e5061d44f.pdf 05780bcaf6956f5072fb1f0dd69a84c6 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 11 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. �32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is �SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- �SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full �SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. �36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism �SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do. � SLOVAKIA 11 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. �32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is �SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- �SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full �SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. �36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism �SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 31 THE "RUSSIA FIRST" BOYS IN RADIO FREE EUROPE By Kurt Glaser (Reprinted from the February, 1953, issue of the NATIONAL REPUBLIC by permission) If you are one of sixteen million Americans who have given to the "Crusade for Freedom" to "help lift the iron curtain," you are naturally interested in what's being done with your money. Even if you're just a taxpayer, you may be interested in an operation which is costing you and me plenty and possibly doing the United States more harm than good. The money collected by the "Crusade for Freedom" goes to the "National Committee for a Free Europe" in New York. With these funds plus a seven-figure subsidy from the Government, the Committee finances Radio Free Europe which broadcasts from Germany to countries behind the Iron Curtain. RFE is supposed to fight Communism and according to its own public relations department it does. Obviously an American propoganda agency should employ only proven antiCommunists who can speak from conviction. To do otherwise would endanger directly the security of the United States. Here are some facts about the principal Czechs and Slovaks who write, edit, produce and broadcast RFE's Czechoslovakian program: 1 They are no more anti-Communists than Mrs. O'Leary's cow was a giraffe: they themselves sold C?.echoslovakia down the river to the Communists. 2. The "intelligence" agency operated in Germany by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, to which the more important of these individuals belong, is infested with Communist agents and tips off anti-Communists in Czechoslovakia to Dictator Gottwald's secret police. 3. Their political line promotes hatred and rivalry between European peoples, thereby helping Stalin. 32 SLOVAKIA 4. With the help of State Department friends they have stacked immigration procedures to help left-wingers get to the United States and to keep out real anti-Communists. To get down to cases, the Czechs and Slovaks running the "Czechoslovak " section of RFE are all members of the "National Front" parties which governed Czechoslovakia, together with the Communists, from 1945 to 1948. The most important persons associated with this group are Jan Stransky (a leader in the Czech National Socialist Party) , Martin Kvetko and Pavel Viboch (members of parliament) and Ferdinand Peroutka and Pavel Tigrid (editors) , all of whom are or were until recently employed by RFE. Peroutka is the chief of the "Czechoslovak" section of RFE in New York; Tigrid was until October 1, 1952, chief of the broadcasting station in Munich. Not directly associated with RFE, but playing important background roles, are Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka (cabinet ministers), Jan Papanek (former Czechoslovak delegate to the U. N.), Josef Lettrich (National Councillor in Slovakia) and Andrew Valushek (editor of the New Yorksky Dennik). All these individuals (except Papanek and Valushek, who were already in the United States) left Czechoslovakia during or after the reorganization of February, 1948, sometimes reforred to incorrectly as the "Gottwald Putsch." The "National Front" politicians were accepted immediately by the State Department as "democratic exiles" and their organization in America, the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," was recognized as a quasi-official spokesman representing democratic Czechs and Slovaks. American officials were either unaware of or closed their eyes to the fact that the "non-Communist' parties of the "National Front" had begun to collaborate with the Communists as early as 1935, and had continued to do so until 1948. The National Front's "line" was expounded by Minister Zenkl in a speech to the Temporary National Assembly in November. 1945, in which he said: "The nationally conscious CzE;ehs and Slovaks have no doubt that ... permanent collaboration with the USSR is SLOVAKIA 33 necessary. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always at its side!" During World War II the National Front's forerunner, the "Czechoslovak Democratic Government" in London, planned its post-war policies in such a way that they could only be carried out with Soviet support. It would take too long to explain these policies here, but we may take the word of Dr. Ivo Duchacek (now working for the Voice of America) who said in 1946 that: "Our alliance with the Soviet Union is the main pillar of our foreign policy ... (It) guarantees us the immediate help of the Soviet armies in case of emergency." To compensate for Soviet support, the Czechoslovak Government in London issued passports to a number of Communist agents, and got them jobs on either the British Broadcasting Company's Czechoslovak section or the Communist Party's Daily Worker, the. two staffs being interchangeable for operating purposes. Other agents were infiltrated into . the United States, such as the Communists Bension Batt and Karel Leitner of the New Yorkske Listy (Czech-language paper), and Desider Benau, a subordinate of Valushek on the (Slovak-language) New Yorksky Dennik, now merged with the Listy. Batt, Leitner and Benau are now back in Communist Czechoslovakia, where they occupy important positions. After the liberation of Czechoslovakia in 1945 the National Front politicians continued to collaborate with the Communists. "Let us declare war on fear of bolshevism and forbid, at the same time. the formation of any anti-Communist front whatever!" declared the Social Democratic newspaper Pravo Lidu. On February 9, 1948, only a few weeks before the State Department took him over as a "democratic exile," RFE's Ferdinand Peroutka restated the "line" as follows: "In Czech politics, in Czech national life, it i,s urgent that we come to an understanding with the Communist Party.... The Communist Party shall remain the greatest force in our political scheme even after the elections are over, and socialism shall remain the foundation of our na- SLOVAKIA . tional life.... Coming to terms with the Communists is the golden theme of our political philosophy." ("What Do We Want of Them?" Dnesek, February 9, 1948.) Since arriving in the United States, the National Fronters have sold their wealthy backers and apparently the Government the myth that the Communists "took over" Czechoslovakia in 1948 despite their efforts to prevent it. The fact is: they themselves had sold Czechoslovakia down the river to the Communists long before 1948, and did nothing to prevent the "Gottwald Putsch." The first step was a secret treaty with the Soviets in 1941, followed by an open treaty in 1943, and a number of supplemental agreements which set up a Moscow-planned program for sovietizing Czechoslovakia. The main elements of this program were (1) the prohibition of political parties which would not go along with the Communists; (2) the "Kosice Program" of socialization which liquidated the anti-Communist middle class; and (3) the expulsion of the anti-Communist German-speaking minority, most of whom had had nothing to do with Nazi atrocities. To carry out this program there was established in 1945 (not 1948) a police state with socalled "People's Courts" on the Soviet model (Ripka and Stransky . signed the decree setting them up) and a Czech secret police under a Communist minister. In Slovakia it was not necessary to have a communist minister for police. The Slovak Democratic Party's Mikulas Ferjencik, an associate of Lettrich, jailed 130,000 Slovaks in 1945-47, and did such a good job of liquidating anti-Communists that the Communists thanked him for it. Lettrich applauded this action, writing: "Centrifugal forces shall be jailed. . . . Centrifugal forces are today eradicated and liquidated." RFE's Martin Kvetko backed up the action by issuing an "Executive Decree on Labor Camps" providing for confinement without trial, which Communist Gottwald liked so well he extended it later to the whole of Czechoslovakia. Lettrich's and Kvetko's Slovak "Democratic" Party passed a resolution in 1948 stating that: "The leaders of the Democratic Party .. . will give full SLOVAKIA 36 support to the Commissioner of the [nterior in all matters pertaining to obstructing any anti-State activity whatsoever . . . . We are in accord with a thorough purge of antiState elements." .. . . As for Commissioner Ferjencik, he later tried to enter the United States and was held on Ellis Island on complaints of Americans of Slovak descent. But Jan Papanek evidently pulled some wires in Washington and the decision of the Immigration Service was reversed by "higher authority." · The National Fronters supported unanimously all measures to carry out the Sovietization plan. It was useful for the Communists to have a majority of "non-Communists" in the Government, since this allayed the suspicions of the West. By February, 1948, the process of Sovietization was substantially completed, and Gottwald did not need the "non-Communists" any more. Whether the National Fronters made a secret deal with the Communists, as suggested by Robert Ingrim and other writers, is a moot point, but it is a fact that they could be much more useful to Gottwald in the United States (or in RFE Munich) than in Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that most of them got out of Czechoslovakia without the least interference by the Communists, some even driving their own cars. Having arrived in the United States, the National Front politicians organized the "Council for Free Czechoslovakia" and its sister organization, the "American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees." The Fund has big names such as Professor Shotwell of Columbia, Drew Pearson and Mrs. Roosevelt, but is actually run by Papanek and Valushek, who have also been active in the "American Slav Congress," cited by the Attorney General as "subversive and Communist" and by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as "a Moscow-inspired and directed federation of Communist-dominated organizations." The "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" boasts in one of its own leaflets that it convinced the State Department to let its agents in Germany pre-screen Czech and Slovak refugees who wanted to come to the United States. Among the screeners have been such individuals as Dr. Schenk, Dr. 36 SLOVAKIA Rebhahn and Dr. Jerabek, who are notorious in Germany for their open left-wing sympathies and associations. It is obvious that these gentlemen did their best to blackball any genuine anti-Communists who wanted a United States visa. Typical of those who did get in is one Rostislav Foukal, who shortly before his departure for America delivered himself of the following: Every democratic thinking person must recognize that the present economic system in America is rotten to the core, the workers are exploited by their employers and stifled by Taft and Company . . . . We Czechoslovakian socialists . . . . will help America to escape from the claws of the capitalists ... We will help the Americans to re-shape their history." As a communications channel between the "Council of Free Cze<!hoslovakia" and the "underground" remaining in that country, a message center was set up in Frankfurt, Germany, under the management of General Moravec, formerly head of the "Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service" in London This organization was heavily infiltrated with Communist agents, a numb.er of whom have been arrested as Gottwald spies by U. S. intelligence agencies. It is quite obvious that the "Moravec" organization contains other spies who have not yet been discovered. It managed to leak enough information to the Czech State Prosecutor to convict the most prominent members of the "underground" and it is considered by West German officials to be dangerously. subversive. Yet RFE, evidently with State Department approval, uses the "Moravec" outfit to gather some of the "intelligence" which it broadcasts. American agencies sometimes use it too; a recent case involved a "Moravec" reporl; on Czech fortifications, complete with diagrams, for which American officers paid a goodly sum. It was a fine report except for one thing - a further examination showed that the fortifications did not exist. The National Fronters have not, to my knowledge, recanted their pre-1948 policies. Peroutka, who late in 1947 wrote that it would be "unthinkable" to take the side of the United States in conflict with the Soviet Union, stated in 1949 that he would endeavor to remove from the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" all member opposed to socialism SLOVAKIA 17 (Navrat, Paris, July 15, 1949). The Tribuna, intellectual magazine of the National Front, declared ·in 1950 that "private illlitiative is a thing of the past," and in 1951 that "private possession of the means of . production ... is immoral, anti-social, unjust, inefficient and disadvantageous." By turning over an American-financed propaganda operation to the National Front, we are sabotaging our own "fight for freedom" in Europe. This is all the more so since RFE, although theo:r:etically private, is considered by most Europeans to be associated with the United States Government, which in fact it is. It is apparent that RFE tends to .undermine American popularity in Europe. To begin with,· .its policies and personnel are anathema to the Slovaks, of whom at least 80 per cent (as estimated by Dr. Kvetko, a N~tional Fronter) want an independent Slovak state. Among the Czechs, the strictly non-Communist organizations, such as General Prchala's Czech National Committee';. appear to be more popular than the left-wing National ·Front. Those Czechs who like the National Front's policy ·of advanced socialism bordering on Communism won't find· too much wrong with the Gottwald regime anyway. Finally, the rabid anti-German attitude taken by many of the National Front's politicians and writers - not so much over the air, where they have been subject to some censorship, but in their outside writings ~nd . speeches - has infuriated large sectors of the German public. The · net result is that RFE antagonizes exactly those people, on both sides of the iron curtain, whom it is vital to have on our side for our own security. Nor has it helped that the Chief and Personnel Director of the proposed American-financed Russian.. broadcasting station to parallel RFID, Yakovlev alias Nareikis, and Vasiliev alias Gottlieb alias Bogolyubov, are both long-time members of Stalin's MVD (secret police, formerly NKVD) who continued to work for that agency after they had left the Soviet Union and had theoretically joined Stalin's enemies. The American people have elected a new administration which has promised to proceed vigor.011s.ly against Communist dangers which threaten j,he _United States. It is Glear that in the sector just described there. is plenty to do.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The "Russia First" Boys in Radio Free Europe Description An account of the resource Kurt Glaser Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 1 (6), April 1953 pp. 31-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a8e4c120a965fe6fc5adad0f88bd8a57.pdf e138109b7e80df4f68854303cfc04b2d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 86 PROFILE ON AN EXILE POLITICIAN By Kurt Glaser The Communist strategy for seizing central IDurope after World War II was that of the "popular front." So Jong as suibstantial U. S. forces remained on the Continent an 3.4YI>arent shrure of power was allowed to "non-Communist liberals." The appearance of out-and-out Communist governments might haNe led the United States to reverse its policy of withdrawal and demobilization. As the time became riJpe, first in Rumania, then in Poland and Hungary and finally in Czecho-Slovakia, the "liberals" were eased out af oiffice. Those who fled to the U. S. Zone of Germany were girven asylum without too many questions asked. Politicians of rank were airlifted to Washington, where many are now unof.ficial or paid consultants in connection with various "rpsycihwar" operations One of the most active exiles from Czecho~Slovakia is Dr. Hulbert Ripka, former Minister of Foreign Trade, who came west in March 1948. In 1949, the State Department permitted him the leadiing role in choosing exile politicians to be flown from Pa11is at .American expense to fomn the "Council of Free Czechos1ovaoo.a." As a memlber of the Council's Executive Committee until recently, Ripka has received a monthly salrury from the Free Europe Committee, which dbtains m.ruch Olf its funds from Government sources. He is a!lso a professor at the New School of Social Research in New Y o!1k. He has spolken more than OI11Ce over Radio Free Eiuro1pe, and there is no douibt that his friends wield a potent influence in that broadcasting network. No comment is made or suggested concerning Dr. Ripka's attitude toward Communism. Instead, let us revie,w the facts of hris politica,,l career. Dr. Hulbert Riipka achieved some prominence as a journalist before the war. In 1935 he conducted a group of Czech newsmen in the Soviet Union. From then until 1938 he was assistant editor of the magazine Praha-Moskva, devoted to Czechoslovak-Sov iet :firiendship. After Hitler occupied Prague in March 1939, Ripka �86 SLOVAK~A went to Paris, where he became a spokesman of former President Benes, who was working toward a political comeback in exile. In November of that year, he took charge of the informatioo. program of the "Ozechoslovak National Committee" with headquarters at 50_.52 Avenue de la Bourdonnais. Ripka's personal secretary in Paris was the known Communist Mrs. Hilda Matouskova. One of his chief assistants was the Communist agent Otto Katz-1Suchy, alias Andre Simone, late of Hallywood, Prague and points east. After a while, ,t he F,rench police became interested in Katz-Simone, and he disappeared, to turn urp later in Mexico. Guenther Reinhardt (Crime Without Punishment) links Katz with the 1943 murder of the anti-Communist Carlo Tresca in New York. Pro-Soviet Policies During World War II The "Ozechoslovalk National Committee" and the "Czechoslovak DemocratiJC Government" in London which succeeded it followed a oonsistently pro-1Soviet policy. Describing this policy during the 1939-1941 .Soviet-Nazi collaboration, Ripka himself states : "Since, In the new &ituation, it was impossible to collaborate officially with the S oviet Un ion, we .. . did nothing which might prejudice or .p revent the ren eswal of cooperation at the earliest possible moment ; I need only recall how 11tron•g ly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Sovle!t-Finnish war. Moreover, even In that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchanges of information b eibween ourselves and Important Soviet representatives In London, P,a ris, Was'h lngton and elsewhere." ( East and West, Lo ndon 19 44 , p. 34) HaJVing joined Benes in London in 1940, Dr. Ripka became Minister of Information of the "Government" in exile. His Ministry had close world:n:g relations with the Ozecho ..SloV'aJk section of the British Broadcasting Company. This was headed by the Slovaik Communist Vavro Hajdu, another member being Oto Biheler, later expelled from the United States for espionage under cover of diplomatic immunity. Ripka often broaidcast over BBC. Here is what he said on Novem1ber 7, 1942 over that network: " . . . The >Russi an November Revolution not only Increased the �SLOVAKIA 87 strength of the Russian Sovdet staite, it also raised to greater heights than ever ,b efore the standard of civHiza,tion, culture and living or the wide masses of the Soviet peoples. . . "Bolshevism is •a super-national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, a.n idea.I whicll has kind1ed <the mind.8 of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today. . . Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedom, so did the Russian Revolution try to realiz-e the ideal of equality." Dr. Hubert Ripka was also Deputy Foreign Minister. Since Minister Jan Masaryk ran his ministry with a notoriously loose hand, Ripka really managed the foreign policy of the London "Government." This policy reached its climax in the Czechoslovak~SoV'iet Treaty of 1943, of which Ripka said: "The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty is the foundation of our country's external security and is a fundamental contribution to the unification of national forces. . . Thanks to the Treaty, Czechoslovakia's interests are receivin,g effective support." (BBC broadcast, December 14, 1944) Of the Soviet Union in generaf, Ripka wrote : "The Bolshev,i sm of Lenin and Stalin represents a creative synthesis of specifically Russian and certain Western elements." (East and West, p. 13) "We Czechoslovaks make no secret of our satisfaction that Soviet Russia is beginning to participate in European and world politics as a strong world power." (Ibid., P. 58) The most fateful step prepaired by the London "G()IVernment" and carried out by the 1945-48 "National Front" was the expulsion from Czech~Slovakia of more than 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans. During this operation, over 300,000 Germans were shot or beaten to death, died of rape, filth, stair.vation or exposure, or were shipped to Soviet slave la'bor camps. (For details, see Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, Munich 1953.) The expulsion knocked out the strongest anti ..Communist block in a population of 13,000,000, and tied the Czechs firmly into the Soviet orbit by creating a fear of German "revenge." In his recent book Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London 1950), Ripka admrits authorship of the plan to expel the Sudeten Germans. To work out the details, he maintained a secret section of his Foreign Office, run by a German, �88 SLOVAKIA Wolfgang von Putlitz, who later turned up as ipolitkal adviser in the East German Communist regime. Putlitz was a friend of the vanished British diplomats Burgess and McLean, as well as of the West German security chief Dr. Otto John, who deserted to the Communists in Jruly 1954. They were in contact in London in 1944 and became members of the same British-operated intelligence unit. Their assoc_iation. conrti.nued after Prutlitiz had taken up his activities in East Berlin and while John was (ostensilbly) working for the Bonn Government. The Politburo's Plot and the "National Front" During the latter years of the war, writes Ripka (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, Chapter Ill) , "the politlbureau in Moscow was completing a plot destined to permit the Communists to seize power immediately after the liberation." This plan, as outlined by R~pka, included Communistdominated "national committees" to replace constitutional local government, sruppression of the Czech Agrarian, Tradesmen's and National Democratic Parties and the S1ovaik Catholic Party, establishment of a "National Front" coalition with no opposition, and co.Uectivization of the economy. "Punishments striking at traitors, collaJborationists and fascists" enrubled the Communists, in Ripka's own words, "to intimidate or suppress their political adversaries." "In short," Ripka concludes, "in the political, economk, military and culturail. domains, Czechoslovakia must follow in the wruke of the UISSIR." Yet we find Rilpka's signature on the laws and decrees which put this program of bolshevization into execution, such as: The Kos ice Statute of Apri I 5, 1945: Es,ta,blishment of a Soexpulsion of Sudeten Germans and Hungaviet.type economy trial of "war criminals" in Soviet-tyipe "p.eopl e's courts" rians with convioted persons handed over to Soviet organs - aLJ members of the Protectorate and Slovak Governments declared guilty of suppr,ession of the Agrarian, hi,gh treason by legisla,t ive action Tradesmen's and Nation·a l Democratic Parties. Edict of the President of the Republic, May 19, 1945: Nationalization of property of Germans and Hungarians. "traitors anrl collaiborationists." Edict of the President of the Republic, June 19, 1945: The in- �SLOVAKIA 89 famous "Retributi-on Decree" def.ining "crimes against the Republic" ex-post-facto and providing dertai1'ed organization of the Sovietty,pe "people's courts." Of the "Retribution Decree" which Ripka signed, the Aliliance for Lilberation and Freedom in Czechoslovakia, a Czech organization, has this to say: " . . . The s,i mple fact thrut an active Communist or member of the National Front wanted to have a house, a b.us,ine.ss, a f.arm or a posl<tion held by an innocent citizen was sufficient to have the latter thrown in jail under a false accusation. '' . . . The decree .• . W\as pnimarily directed agaiilllst tlhose citizens who professed true democracy and opposed national ization. In general, the confiscation of property, and the intimidation of t.hose who still held -it, •became the avowed aims of this measure." (Fe.bruary 1954 Manifesto) Under the decree, there was no a,ppeal from the decision o;f a people's court. A death sentence when pronounced was to be executed within two hours. As an act of grace, one additional ho,ur might be granted. Benes and most of his Ministers entered Czecho-Slovaikia via Moscow, where they joined with the Communists in the "National Front" coalition. Ripka remained in London through Arpril 194:15. The New York Times of April 1'5 reports his farewell message to western journalists as fdllows: "London - Dr. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, told a fa'Dewell press conference here today thlllt he did not consider the western Allies' apprehensions that his country might become a vassal of the Soviet Union were grounded. He said it was natural that Cze.c hoslo.vakia should seek her security primarily in friendship with the Soviet Union." To his own coruntrymen, however, Ripka took a slightly different tone. In his book on Czechoslovakia in the New Europe, which has neiver been translated into English, he wrote: "All anti.;Soviet elements must necessarHy be eliminated from schools, educational instt.ltu<tions, and literature." (Ceskoslo. vensko v nove Evr-ope, London 194-5, p. 87) our In May 1945 Ripka returned to Prague as Minister of Foreign Trade. One of his first transactions was a deal, initiated in London, to turn over to the Soviet Union, fr.ee of charge, the uranium mines at J oachimsthal ( J achym()IV) in the Sudetenland. This is a principal source from which �90 SLOVAKIA the Soviets are now extracting atomic materials to bomb the United States. Ripka's political f,r iends, especiall.y his former secretary Duchacek (now with the Voice of America), blocked a parliamentary inJVestig,a tion of the uranium affair. A decree was issued maiking it "high treason" to mention the su!bject in public. Of the National Front's foreign tTade policy, Dr. Ripka wrote: ",Closer trade relations with the Soviet Un.ion were not dictated by the CommuniS1t Party. The stren•g thenlng of these relations was In the interests ot the Czechoslovak economy and part of our own policy. Alliance with the Soviet Union has been the most Important factor in tbls country's foreign policy." ( Bulletin of the BritishCzechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, London, 1947) Ripka Since February 1948 Dr. Ri,pka was one of twelve Ministers who resigned in Feb:mary 1949 in a dispute between the "il..ibeirals" and the Communist Party. Whether this was a genuine ideological struggle or an internal squaJbble over "who gets what" is a question which cannot be answered in this short space. The fact is, however, that after the reorganization of the 1g overnment under the Communist Premier Gottwald, Dr. Ripka found himself without a job. Ripka started his flight from Ozechoslova!kia in the company of two priests, Msgr. Sramek and Msgr. Hala, who had been Ministers in the National F,r ont. They hid in a small shack on an isolated airfield at Rakovnik, where a French airplane was to pick them up. The secret police got wind of the affaiT and placed its men on the field, whereupon the French pilot flew over the field without landing. Ripka left the shack and waliked right past the seer.et police into the woods. Msgr. Sramek and Msgr. Hala were arrested and sentenced to prison. A few days later the plane returned and picked u,p Ripka alone without any difficulty. After arriving in Paris, Dr. Ripka organized an exile group which developed into the Czechoslovak Foreign In- �SLOVAKIA 91 stitute. The institute i,ssued an ideological directive summarizing its political aims as follows: "The -transfer of the means of production in.to the hands of the workers is the only way leading to the increase of well-being and prosperity among the largest classes." The InstitUJte has "operating grouips" in various locations, which resemble structurally the cells of the Communist Party. The organizationa l directive has this to say: "Wllth this system we ho,pe to create a group democracy of an elite as opposed to the false conception of a democracy of the masses, which is es,p ecially prominent in exile. Thus we would strive to penetraite and dominate the political life as broadly as possible. "The Czechoslovak FOTelgn Institute is to create a group within groups. The anonymity of Its members ls to constitute its great strength, because it is not poa&ible to defeat an Invisible power." (emphasis in original) The financial part of the directiive provides for busines.s deals with Cammunist countries. For a while a group of Institute memtb ers lived in Switrerla.nd, where they sold ball bea•r ings, cadmium and other strategic materials to states in the Soviet 011bit. When the Swiss police interfered, several of the group moved to Munich, where they got jobs with Radio Free Europe. According to the direcmve, Ripka (under the code name "Maly'') assumed cha,rge of the Institute's central office in Paris. His associates at various times have included: Vladimir Bruza, member of the Communist-cont rolled "Central Working Committee for the Nationalization of Industry." After the 1948 " February Revolution,'' the Czech Communists sent Bruza to Moscow to make further arrangements for Soviet exploitation of the uranium mines. Bruz·a ls now _editor of the Institute's publication Tribuna, which had to move to Leiden, Holland, because of difficulties with the French police. Milos Vanek, a founder of the Czech Communls.t Party and now head of the economic section of Radio Free Europe in Munich. Professor Bohumil Cerny, field man for the Institute, who fled back to Czecho./Slovakia to escape arrest by the CIC in the U. S. Zone of Austria. Frantisek Kubal, repOTts editor for the Institute and on the staff of Tribuna. He ls now in a Frooch jail awaiting trial on charges of lllegally photographing U. S. military installations for the Prague Communist Government. Bohumil Lausman, former Minister of Industry, who sided with �92 SLOVAKIA the Communists in February 1948. He went into exile in 1949, but returned voluntanily to Czecho-Slova:kia in December 1953. He was employed secretly by Radio Free Europe. Since leaving Czecho-,Slova,kia, Dr. Ripka has advocated a poHcy of "co-existence" in the following terms: "Today more than ever I persist in bel ieving that a free and independent Cz·ecihoslov,a kia cannot exist except in a balanced Europe in which the Western Powers and Russia are trying to live on good terms. Even the events of February 1948 h ave not been able to shake this conviction, which remain s the keystone of my whole co nception of for eign policy." (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 1~50, p, 74) This is the record of an exile politician living in the United States and paid a salary from funds corntriihwted to fight Communism. It is for the reader to drnw hi:s own conclusions om the, /basis of this record. - (Overseas Research, Inc., Special Bulletin, Nov. 28, 1954, Washington, D. C.) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: 'JIHE OLD CASTLE ( Stary Hrad) The ruins of th£s ,o ld castle still .stand on a ,p recipitous rock aJbave the river Vah. The structure, named the Old Castle of Trencin (!Stary Hrad) 'belongs to the c1ass of fortresses which were lb:uilt ,prabaJbly during the time af tihe Great Mornvian EmpiTe. Tr,a,veli!ng against the current of the Vah, Stary Hlrad cam. be seen on the left side. We are told that it was once called Nez;budsky Oastle, which attests to -i ts antiquity. 01dest arvailaJble documents refer to it as the Old Castle ("Castmm Stargra,d"); they teU us that it was -gi,v en to Bohumir Seibaslarvorvilc aJbout 1250 for bravery displayed in -the battle against the Tatars neaT S·rujaiva. Stary Hrad is more ancient than Streicno. The structure itself suggests that it was !built ,3J'bout the same time as the Devin and Trencin castles,, i.e., during the Roman era. Bohumir ,w as lord of the castle until 1'266 ; Count Peter of Hont from 1 267 to the end of the thirteenth century, when the Balasa family gained ownership. Then iMatthew Calk, "Lord of the Vah and the Tatras," -besieged and sei'Zed it, hut did not keep it for long, because we learn that a certain Thomas Carpi exchanged it in 1'323 for his property 1 � SLOVAKIA 86 PROFILE ON AN EXILE POLITICIAN By Kurt Glaser The Communist strategy for seizing central IDurope after World War II was that of the "popular front." So Jong as suibstantial U. S. forces remained on the Continent an 3.4YI>arent shrure of power was allowed to "non-Communist liberals." The appearance of out-and-out Communist governments might haNe led the United States to reverse its policy of withdrawal and demobilization. As the time became riJpe, first in Rumania, then in Poland and Hungary and finally in Czecho-Slovakia, the "liberals" were eased out af oiffice. Those who fled to the U. S. Zone of Germany were girven asylum without too many questions asked. Politicians of rank were airlifted to Washington, where many are now unof.ficial or paid consultants in connection with various "rpsycihwar" operations One of the most active exiles from Czecho~Slovakia is Dr. Hulbert Ripka, former Minister of Foreign Trade, who came west in March 1948. In 1949, the State Department permitted him the leadiing role in choosing exile politicians to be flown from Pa11is at .American expense to fomn the "Council of Free Czechos1ovaoo.a." As a memlber of the Council's Executive Committee until recently, Ripka has received a monthly salrury from the Free Europe Committee, which dbtains m.ruch Olf its funds from Government sources. He is a!lso a professor at the New School of Social Research in New Y o!1k. He has spolken more than OI11Ce over Radio Free Eiuro1pe, and there is no douibt that his friends wield a potent influence in that broadcasting network. No comment is made or suggested concerning Dr. Ripka's attitude toward Communism. Instead, let us revie,w the facts of hris politica,,l career. Dr. Hulbert Riipka achieved some prominence as a journalist before the war. In 1935 he conducted a group of Czech newsmen in the Soviet Union. From then until 1938 he was assistant editor of the magazine Praha-Moskva, devoted to Czechoslovak-Sov iet :firiendship. After Hitler occupied Prague in March 1939, Ripka �86 SLOVAK~A went to Paris, where he became a spokesman of former President Benes, who was working toward a political comeback in exile. In November of that year, he took charge of the informatioo. program of the "Ozechoslovak National Committee" with headquarters at 50_.52 Avenue de la Bourdonnais. Ripka's personal secretary in Paris was the known Communist Mrs. Hilda Matouskova. One of his chief assistants was the Communist agent Otto Katz-1Suchy, alias Andre Simone, late of Hallywood, Prague and points east. After a while, ,t he F,rench police became interested in Katz-Simone, and he disappeared, to turn urp later in Mexico. Guenther Reinhardt (Crime Without Punishment) links Katz with the 1943 murder of the anti-Communist Carlo Tresca in New York. Pro-Soviet Policies During World War II The "Ozechoslovalk National Committee" and the "Czechoslovak DemocratiJC Government" in London which succeeded it followed a oonsistently pro-1Soviet policy. Describing this policy during the 1939-1941 .Soviet-Nazi collaboration, Ripka himself states : "Since, In the new &ituation, it was impossible to collaborate officially with the S oviet Un ion, we .. . did nothing which might prejudice or .p revent the ren eswal of cooperation at the earliest possible moment ; I need only recall how 11tron•g ly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Sovle!t-Finnish war. Moreover, even In that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchanges of information b eibween ourselves and Important Soviet representatives In London, P,a ris, Was'h lngton and elsewhere." ( East and West, Lo ndon 19 44 , p. 34) HaJVing joined Benes in London in 1940, Dr. Ripka became Minister of Information of the "Government" in exile. His Ministry had close world:n:g relations with the Ozecho ..SloV'aJk section of the British Broadcasting Company. This was headed by the Slovaik Communist Vavro Hajdu, another member being Oto Biheler, later expelled from the United States for espionage under cover of diplomatic immunity. Ripka often broaidcast over BBC. Here is what he said on Novem1ber 7, 1942 over that network: " . . . The >Russi an November Revolution not only Increased the �SLOVAKIA 87 strength of the Russian Sovdet staite, it also raised to greater heights than ever ,b efore the standard of civHiza,tion, culture and living or the wide masses of the Soviet peoples. . . "Bolshevism is •a super-national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, a.n idea.I whicll has kind1ed <the mind.8 of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today. . . Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedom, so did the Russian Revolution try to realiz-e the ideal of equality." Dr. Hubert Ripka was also Deputy Foreign Minister. Since Minister Jan Masaryk ran his ministry with a notoriously loose hand, Ripka really managed the foreign policy of the London "Government." This policy reached its climax in the Czechoslovak~SoV'iet Treaty of 1943, of which Ripka said: "The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty is the foundation of our country's external security and is a fundamental contribution to the unification of national forces. . . Thanks to the Treaty, Czechoslovakia's interests are receivin,g effective support." (BBC broadcast, December 14, 1944) Of the Soviet Union in generaf, Ripka wrote : "The Bolshev,i sm of Lenin and Stalin represents a creative synthesis of specifically Russian and certain Western elements." (East and West, p. 13) "We Czechoslovaks make no secret of our satisfaction that Soviet Russia is beginning to participate in European and world politics as a strong world power." (Ibid., P. 58) The most fateful step prepaired by the London "G()IVernment" and carried out by the 1945-48 "National Front" was the expulsion from Czech~Slovakia of more than 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans. During this operation, over 300,000 Germans were shot or beaten to death, died of rape, filth, stair.vation or exposure, or were shipped to Soviet slave la'bor camps. (For details, see Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, Munich 1953.) The expulsion knocked out the strongest anti ..Communist block in a population of 13,000,000, and tied the Czechs firmly into the Soviet orbit by creating a fear of German "revenge." In his recent book Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London 1950), Ripka admrits authorship of the plan to expel the Sudeten Germans. To work out the details, he maintained a secret section of his Foreign Office, run by a German, �88 SLOVAKIA Wolfgang von Putlitz, who later turned up as ipolitkal adviser in the East German Communist regime. Putlitz was a friend of the vanished British diplomats Burgess and McLean, as well as of the West German security chief Dr. Otto John, who deserted to the Communists in Jruly 1954. They were in contact in London in 1944 and became members of the same British-operated intelligence unit. Their assoc_iation. conrti.nued after Prutlitiz had taken up his activities in East Berlin and while John was (ostensilbly) working for the Bonn Government. The Politburo's Plot and the "National Front" During the latter years of the war, writes Ripka (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, Chapter Ill) , "the politlbureau in Moscow was completing a plot destined to permit the Communists to seize power immediately after the liberation." This plan, as outlined by R~pka, included Communistdominated "national committees" to replace constitutional local government, sruppression of the Czech Agrarian, Tradesmen's and National Democratic Parties and the S1ovaik Catholic Party, establishment of a "National Front" coalition with no opposition, and co.Uectivization of the economy. "Punishments striking at traitors, collaJborationists and fascists" enrubled the Communists, in Ripka's own words, "to intimidate or suppress their political adversaries." "In short," Ripka concludes, "in the political, economk, military and culturail. domains, Czechoslovakia must follow in the wruke of the UISSIR." Yet we find Rilpka's signature on the laws and decrees which put this program of bolshevization into execution, such as: The Kos ice Statute of Apri I 5, 1945: Es,ta,blishment of a Soexpulsion of Sudeten Germans and Hungaviet.type economy trial of "war criminals" in Soviet-tyipe "p.eopl e's courts" rians with convioted persons handed over to Soviet organs - aLJ members of the Protectorate and Slovak Governments declared guilty of suppr,ession of the Agrarian, hi,gh treason by legisla,t ive action Tradesmen's and Nation·a l Democratic Parties. Edict of the President of the Republic, May 19, 1945: Nationalization of property of Germans and Hungarians. "traitors anrl collaiborationists." Edict of the President of the Republic, June 19, 1945: The in- �SLOVAKIA 89 famous "Retributi-on Decree" def.ining "crimes against the Republic" ex-post-facto and providing dertai1'ed organization of the Sovietty,pe "people's courts." Of the "Retribution Decree" which Ripka signed, the Aliliance for Lilberation and Freedom in Czechoslovakia, a Czech organization, has this to say: " . . . The s,i mple fact thrut an active Communist or member of the National Front wanted to have a house, a b.us,ine.ss, a f.arm or a posl<tion held by an innocent citizen was sufficient to have the latter thrown in jail under a false accusation. '' . . . The decree .• . W\as pnimarily directed agaiilllst tlhose citizens who professed true democracy and opposed national ization. In general, the confiscation of property, and the intimidation of t.hose who still held -it, •became the avowed aims of this measure." (Fe.bruary 1954 Manifesto) Under the decree, there was no a,ppeal from the decision o;f a people's court. A death sentence when pronounced was to be executed within two hours. As an act of grace, one additional ho,ur might be granted. Benes and most of his Ministers entered Czecho-Slovaikia via Moscow, where they joined with the Communists in the "National Front" coalition. Ripka remained in London through Arpril 194:15. The New York Times of April 1'5 reports his farewell message to western journalists as fdllows: "London - Dr. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, told a fa'Dewell press conference here today thlllt he did not consider the western Allies' apprehensions that his country might become a vassal of the Soviet Union were grounded. He said it was natural that Cze.c hoslo.vakia should seek her security primarily in friendship with the Soviet Union." To his own coruntrymen, however, Ripka took a slightly different tone. In his book on Czechoslovakia in the New Europe, which has neiver been translated into English, he wrote: "All anti.;Soviet elements must necessarHy be eliminated from schools, educational instt.ltu<tions, and literature." (Ceskoslo. vensko v nove Evr-ope, London 194-5, p. 87) our In May 1945 Ripka returned to Prague as Minister of Foreign Trade. One of his first transactions was a deal, initiated in London, to turn over to the Soviet Union, fr.ee of charge, the uranium mines at J oachimsthal ( J achym()IV) in the Sudetenland. This is a principal source from which �90 SLOVAKIA the Soviets are now extracting atomic materials to bomb the United States. Ripka's political f,r iends, especiall.y his former secretary Duchacek (now with the Voice of America), blocked a parliamentary inJVestig,a tion of the uranium affair. A decree was issued maiking it "high treason" to mention the su!bject in public. Of the National Front's foreign tTade policy, Dr. Ripka wrote: ",Closer trade relations with the Soviet Un.ion were not dictated by the CommuniS1t Party. The stren•g thenlng of these relations was In the interests ot the Czechoslovak economy and part of our own policy. Alliance with the Soviet Union has been the most Important factor in tbls country's foreign policy." ( Bulletin of the BritishCzechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, London, 1947) Ripka Since February 1948 Dr. Ri,pka was one of twelve Ministers who resigned in Feb:mary 1949 in a dispute between the "il..ibeirals" and the Communist Party. Whether this was a genuine ideological struggle or an internal squaJbble over "who gets what" is a question which cannot be answered in this short space. The fact is, however, that after the reorganization of the 1g overnment under the Communist Premier Gottwald, Dr. Ripka found himself without a job. Ripka started his flight from Ozechoslova!kia in the company of two priests, Msgr. Sramek and Msgr. Hala, who had been Ministers in the National F,r ont. They hid in a small shack on an isolated airfield at Rakovnik, where a French airplane was to pick them up. The secret police got wind of the affaiT and placed its men on the field, whereupon the French pilot flew over the field without landing. Ripka left the shack and waliked right past the seer.et police into the woods. Msgr. Sramek and Msgr. Hala were arrested and sentenced to prison. A few days later the plane returned and picked u,p Ripka alone without any difficulty. After arriving in Paris, Dr. Ripka organized an exile group which developed into the Czechoslovak Foreign In- �SLOVAKIA 91 stitute. The institute i,ssued an ideological directive summarizing its political aims as follows: "The -transfer of the means of production in.to the hands of the workers is the only way leading to the increase of well-being and prosperity among the largest classes." The InstitUJte has "operating grouips" in various locations, which resemble structurally the cells of the Communist Party. The organizationa l directive has this to say: "Wllth this system we ho,pe to create a group democracy of an elite as opposed to the false conception of a democracy of the masses, which is es,p ecially prominent in exile. Thus we would strive to penetraite and dominate the political life as broadly as possible. "The Czechoslovak FOTelgn Institute is to create a group within groups. The anonymity of Its members ls to constitute its great strength, because it is not poa&ible to defeat an Invisible power." (emphasis in original) The financial part of the directiive provides for busines.s deals with Cammunist countries. For a while a group of Institute memtb ers lived in Switrerla.nd, where they sold ball bea•r ings, cadmium and other strategic materials to states in the Soviet 011bit. When the Swiss police interfered, several of the group moved to Munich, where they got jobs with Radio Free Europe. According to the direcmve, Ripka (under the code name "Maly'') assumed cha,rge of the Institute's central office in Paris. His associates at various times have included: Vladimir Bruza, member of the Communist-cont rolled "Central Working Committee for the Nationalization of Industry." After the 1948 " February Revolution,'' the Czech Communists sent Bruza to Moscow to make further arrangements for Soviet exploitation of the uranium mines. Bruz·a ls now _editor of the Institute's publication Tribuna, which had to move to Leiden, Holland, because of difficulties with the French police. Milos Vanek, a founder of the Czech Communls.t Party and now head of the economic section of Radio Free Europe in Munich. Professor Bohumil Cerny, field man for the Institute, who fled back to Czecho./Slovakia to escape arrest by the CIC in the U. S. Zone of Austria. Frantisek Kubal, repOTts editor for the Institute and on the staff of Tribuna. He ls now in a Frooch jail awaiting trial on charges of lllegally photographing U. S. military installations for the Prague Communist Government. Bohumil Lausman, former Minister of Industry, who sided with �92 SLOVAKIA the Communists in February 1948. He went into exile in 1949, but returned voluntanily to Czecho-Slova:kia in December 1953. He was employed secretly by Radio Free Europe. Since leaving Czecho-,Slova,kia, Dr. Ripka has advocated a poHcy of "co-existence" in the following terms: "Today more than ever I persist in bel ieving that a free and independent Cz·ecihoslov,a kia cannot exist except in a balanced Europe in which the Western Powers and Russia are trying to live on good terms. Even the events of February 1948 h ave not been able to shake this conviction, which remain s the keystone of my whole co nception of for eign policy." (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 1~50, p, 74) This is the record of an exile politician living in the United States and paid a salary from funds corntriihwted to fight Communism. It is for the reader to drnw hi:s own conclusions om the, /basis of this record. - (Overseas Research, Inc., Special Bulletin, Nov. 28, 1954, Washington, D. C.) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: 'JIHE OLD CASTLE ( Stary Hrad) The ruins of th£s ,o ld castle still .stand on a ,p recipitous rock aJbave the river Vah. The structure, named the Old Castle of Trencin (!Stary Hrad) 'belongs to the c1ass of fortresses which were lb:uilt ,prabaJbly during the time af tihe Great Mornvian EmpiTe. Tr,a,veli!ng against the current of the Vah, Stary Hlrad cam. be seen on the left side. We are told that it was once called Nez;budsky Oastle, which attests to -i ts antiquity. 01dest arvailaJble documents refer to it as the Old Castle ("Castmm Stargra,d"); they teU us that it was -gi,v en to Bohumir Seibaslarvorvilc aJbout 1250 for bravery displayed in -the battle against the Tatars neaT S·rujaiva. Stary Hrad is more ancient than Streicno. The structure itself suggests that it was !built ,3J'bout the same time as the Devin and Trencin castles,, i.e., during the Roman era. Bohumir ,w as lord of the castle until 1'266 ; Count Peter of Hont from 1 267 to the end of the thirteenth century, when the Balasa family gained ownership. Then iMatthew Calk, "Lord of the Vah and the Tatras," -besieged and sei'Zed it, hut did not keep it for long, because we learn that a certain Thomas Carpi exchanged it in 1'323 for his property 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 85 PROFILE ON AN EXILE POLITICIAN By Kurt Glaser The Communist strategy for seizing central IDurope after World War II was that of the "popular front." So Jong as suibstantial U. S. forces remained on the Continent an 3.4YI>arent shrure of power was allowed to "non-Communist liberals." The appearance of out-and-out Communist governments might haNe led the United States to reverse its policy of withdrawal and demobilization. As the time became riJpe, first in Rumania, then in Poland and Hungary and finally in Czecho-Slovakia, the "liberals" were eased out af oiffice. Those who fled to the U. S. Zone of Germany were girven asylum without too many questions asked. Politicians of rank were airlifted to Washington, where many are now unof.ficial or paid consultants in connection with various "rpsycihwar" operations One of the most active exiles from Czecho~Slovakia is Dr. Hulbert Ripka, former Minister of Foreign Trade, who came west in March 1948. In 1949, the State Department permitted him the leadiing role in choosing exile politicians to be flown from Pa11is at .American expense to fomn the "Council of Free Czechos1ovaoo.a." As a memlber of the Council's Executive Committee until recently, Ripka has received a monthly salrury from the Free Europe Committee, which dbtains m.ruch Olf its funds from Government sources. He is a!lso a professor at the New School of Social Research in New Y o!1k. He has spolken more than OI11Ce over Radio Free Eiuro1pe, and there is no douibt that his friends wield a potent influence in that broadcasting network. No comment is made or suggested concerning Dr. Ripka's attitude toward Communism. Instead, let us revie,w the facts of hris politica,,l career. Dr. Hulbert Riipka achieved some prominence as a journalist before the war. In 1935 he conducted a group of Czech newsmen in the Soviet Union. From then until 1938 he was assistant editor of the magazine Praha-Moskva, devoted to Czechoslovak-Sov iet :firiendship. After Hitler occupied Prague in March 1939, Ripka 86 SLOVAK~A went to Paris, where he became a spokesman of former President Benes, who was working toward a political comeback in exile. In November of that year, he took charge of the informatioo. program of the "Ozechoslovak National Committee" with headquarters at 50_.52 Avenue de la Bourdonnais. Ripka's personal secretary in Paris was the known Communist Mrs. Hilda Matouskova. One of his chief assistants was the Communist agent Otto Katz-1Suchy, alias Andre Simone, late of Hallywood, Prague and points east. After a while, ,t he F,rench police became interested in Katz-Simone, and he disappeared, to turn urp later in Mexico. Guenther Reinhardt (Crime Without Punishment) links Katz with the 1943 murder of the anti-Communist Carlo Tresca in New York. Pro-Soviet Policies During World War II The "Ozechoslovalk National Committee" and the "Czechoslovak DemocratiJC Government" in London which succeeded it followed a oonsistently pro-1Soviet policy. Describing this policy during the 1939-1941 .Soviet-Nazi collaboration, Ripka himself states : "Since, In the new &ituation, it was impossible to collaborate officially with the S oviet Un ion, we .. . did nothing which might prejudice or .p revent the ren eswal of cooperation at the earliest possible moment ; I need only recall how 11tron•g ly our attitude contrasted with that of many others during the Sovle!t-Finnish war. Moreover, even In that period, there was no interruption of the personal contacts and exchanges of information b eibween ourselves and Important Soviet representatives In London, P,a ris, Was'h lngton and elsewhere." ( East and West, Lo ndon 19 44 , p. 34) HaJVing joined Benes in London in 1940, Dr. Ripka became Minister of Information of the "Government" in exile. His Ministry had close world:n:g relations with the Ozecho ..SloV'aJk section of the British Broadcasting Company. This was headed by the Slovaik Communist Vavro Hajdu, another member being Oto Biheler, later expelled from the United States for espionage under cover of diplomatic immunity. Ripka often broaidcast over BBC. Here is what he said on Novem1ber 7, 1942 over that network: " . . . The >Russi an November Revolution not only Increased the SLOVAKIA 87 strength of the Russian Sovdet staite, it also raised to greater heights than ever ,b efore the standard of civHiza,tion, culture and living or the wide masses of the Soviet peoples. . . "Bolshevism is •a super-national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, a.n idea.I whicll has kind1ed <the mind.8 of the noblest of men from the time of Plato and through the Christian era, through the French Revolution and until today. . . Just as the French Revolution strove to realize the ideal of freedom, so did the Russian Revolution try to realiz-e the ideal of equality." Dr. Hubert Ripka was also Deputy Foreign Minister. Since Minister Jan Masaryk ran his ministry with a notoriously loose hand, Ripka really managed the foreign policy of the London "Government." This policy reached its climax in the Czechoslovak~SoV'iet Treaty of 1943, of which Ripka said: "The Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty is the foundation of our country's external security and is a fundamental contribution to the unification of national forces. . . Thanks to the Treaty, Czechoslovakia's interests are receivin,g effective support." (BBC broadcast, December 14, 1944) Of the Soviet Union in generaf, Ripka wrote : "The Bolshev,i sm of Lenin and Stalin represents a creative synthesis of specifically Russian and certain Western elements." (East and West, p. 13) "We Czechoslovaks make no secret of our satisfaction that Soviet Russia is beginning to participate in European and world politics as a strong world power." (Ibid., P. 58) The most fateful step prepaired by the London "G()IVernment" and carried out by the 1945-48 "National Front" was the expulsion from Czech~Slovakia of more than 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans. During this operation, over 300,000 Germans were shot or beaten to death, died of rape, filth, stair.vation or exposure, or were shipped to Soviet slave la'bor camps. (For details, see Documents on the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, Munich 1953.) The expulsion knocked out the strongest anti ..Communist block in a population of 13,000,000, and tied the Czechs firmly into the Soviet orbit by creating a fear of German "revenge." In his recent book Czechoslovakia Enslaved (London 1950), Ripka admrits authorship of the plan to expel the Sudeten Germans. To work out the details, he maintained a secret section of his Foreign Office, run by a German, 88 SLOVAKIA Wolfgang von Putlitz, who later turned up as ipolitkal adviser in the East German Communist regime. Putlitz was a friend of the vanished British diplomats Burgess and McLean, as well as of the West German security chief Dr. Otto John, who deserted to the Communists in Jruly 1954. They were in contact in London in 1944 and became members of the same British-operated intelligence unit. Their assoc_iation. conrti.nued after Prutlitiz had taken up his activities in East Berlin and while John was (ostensilbly) working for the Bonn Government. The Politburo's Plot and the "National Front" During the latter years of the war, writes Ripka (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, Chapter Ill) , "the politlbureau in Moscow was completing a plot destined to permit the Communists to seize power immediately after the liberation." This plan, as outlined by R~pka, included Communistdominated "national committees" to replace constitutional local government, sruppression of the Czech Agrarian, Tradesmen's and National Democratic Parties and the S1ovaik Catholic Party, establishment of a "National Front" coalition with no opposition, and co.Uectivization of the economy. "Punishments striking at traitors, collaJborationists and fascists" enrubled the Communists, in Ripka's own words, "to intimidate or suppress their political adversaries." "In short," Ripka concludes, "in the political, economk, military and culturail. domains, Czechoslovakia must follow in the wruke of the UISSIR." Yet we find Rilpka's signature on the laws and decrees which put this program of bolshevization into execution, such as: The Kos ice Statute of Apri I 5, 1945: Es,ta,blishment of a Soexpulsion of Sudeten Germans and Hungaviet.type economy trial of "war criminals" in Soviet-tyipe "p.eopl e's courts" rians with convioted persons handed over to Soviet organs - aLJ members of the Protectorate and Slovak Governments declared guilty of suppr,ession of the Agrarian, hi,gh treason by legisla,t ive action Tradesmen's and Nation·a l Democratic Parties. Edict of the President of the Republic, May 19, 1945: Nationalization of property of Germans and Hungarians. "traitors anrl collaiborationists." Edict of the President of the Republic, June 19, 1945: The in- SLOVAKIA 89 famous "Retributi-on Decree" def.ining "crimes against the Republic" ex-post-facto and providing dertai1'ed organization of the Sovietty,pe "people's courts." Of the "Retribution Decree" which Ripka signed, the Aliliance for Lilberation and Freedom in Czechoslovakia, a Czech organization, has this to say: " . . . The s,i mple fact thrut an active Communist or member of the National Front wanted to have a house, a b.us,ine.ss, a f.arm or a posl<tion held by an innocent citizen was sufficient to have the latter thrown in jail under a false accusation. '' . . . The decree .• . W\as pnimarily directed agaiilllst tlhose citizens who professed true democracy and opposed national ization. In general, the confiscation of property, and the intimidation of t.hose who still held -it, •became the avowed aims of this measure." (Fe.bruary 1954 Manifesto) Under the decree, there was no a,ppeal from the decision o;f a people's court. A death sentence when pronounced was to be executed within two hours. As an act of grace, one additional ho,ur might be granted. Benes and most of his Ministers entered Czecho-Slovaikia via Moscow, where they joined with the Communists in the "National Front" coalition. Ripka remained in London through Arpril 194:15. The New York Times of April 1'5 reports his farewell message to western journalists as fdllows: "London - Dr. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, told a fa'Dewell press conference here today thlllt he did not consider the western Allies' apprehensions that his country might become a vassal of the Soviet Union were grounded. He said it was natural that Cze.c hoslo.vakia should seek her security primarily in friendship with the Soviet Union." To his own coruntrymen, however, Ripka took a slightly different tone. In his book on Czechoslovakia in the New Europe, which has neiver been translated into English, he wrote: "All anti.;Soviet elements must necessarHy be eliminated from schools, educational instt.ltu<tions, and literature." (Ceskoslo. vensko v nove Evr-ope, London 194-5, p. 87) our In May 1945 Ripka returned to Prague as Minister of Foreign Trade. One of his first transactions was a deal, initiated in London, to turn over to the Soviet Union, fr.ee of charge, the uranium mines at J oachimsthal ( J achym()IV) in the Sudetenland. This is a principal source from which 90 SLOVAKIA the Soviets are now extracting atomic materials to bomb the United States. Ripka's political f,r iends, especiall.y his former secretary Duchacek (now with the Voice of America), blocked a parliamentary inJVestig,a tion of the uranium affair. A decree was issued maiking it "high treason" to mention the su!bject in public. Of the National Front's foreign tTade policy, Dr. Ripka wrote: ",Closer trade relations with the Soviet Un.ion were not dictated by the CommuniS1t Party. The stren•g thenlng of these relations was In the interests ot the Czechoslovak economy and part of our own policy. Alliance with the Soviet Union has been the most Important factor in tbls country's foreign policy." ( Bulletin of the BritishCzechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, London, 1947) Ripka Since February 1948 Dr. Ri,pka was one of twelve Ministers who resigned in Feb:mary 1949 in a dispute between the "il..ibeirals" and the Communist Party. Whether this was a genuine ideological struggle or an internal squaJbble over "who gets what" is a question which cannot be answered in this short space. The fact is, however, that after the reorganization of the 1g overnment under the Communist Premier Gottwald, Dr. Ripka found himself without a job. Ripka started his flight from Ozechoslova!kia in the company of two priests, Msgr. Sramek and Msgr. Hala, who had been Ministers in the National F,r ont. They hid in a small shack on an isolated airfield at Rakovnik, where a French airplane was to pick them up. The secret police got wind of the affaiT and placed its men on the field, whereupon the French pilot flew over the field without landing. Ripka left the shack and waliked right past the seer.et police into the woods. Msgr. Sramek and Msgr. Hala were arrested and sentenced to prison. A few days later the plane returned and picked u,p Ripka alone without any difficulty. After arriving in Paris, Dr. Ripka organized an exile group which developed into the Czechoslovak Foreign In- SLOVAKIA 91 stitute. The institute i,ssued an ideological directive summarizing its political aims as follows: "The -transfer of the means of production in.to the hands of the workers is the only way leading to the increase of well-being and prosperity among the largest classes." The InstitUJte has "operating grouips" in various locations, which resemble structurally the cells of the Communist Party. The organizationa l directive has this to say: "Wllth this system we ho,pe to create a group democracy of an elite as opposed to the false conception of a democracy of the masses, which is es,p ecially prominent in exile. Thus we would strive to penetraite and dominate the political life as broadly as possible. "The Czechoslovak FOTelgn Institute is to create a group within groups. The anonymity of Its members ls to constitute its great strength, because it is not poa&ible to defeat an Invisible power." (emphasis in original) The financial part of the directiive provides for busines.s deals with Cammunist countries. For a while a group of Institute memtb ers lived in Switrerla.nd, where they sold ball bea•r ings, cadmium and other strategic materials to states in the Soviet 011bit. When the Swiss police interfered, several of the group moved to Munich, where they got jobs with Radio Free Europe. According to the direcmve, Ripka (under the code name "Maly'') assumed cha,rge of the Institute's central office in Paris. His associates at various times have included: Vladimir Bruza, member of the Communist-cont rolled "Central Working Committee for the Nationalization of Industry." After the 1948 " February Revolution,'' the Czech Communists sent Bruza to Moscow to make further arrangements for Soviet exploitation of the uranium mines. Bruz·a ls now _editor of the Institute's publication Tribuna, which had to move to Leiden, Holland, because of difficulties with the French police. Milos Vanek, a founder of the Czech Communls.t Party and now head of the economic section of Radio Free Europe in Munich. Professor Bohumil Cerny, field man for the Institute, who fled back to Czecho./Slovakia to escape arrest by the CIC in the U. S. Zone of Austria. Frantisek Kubal, repOTts editor for the Institute and on the staff of Tribuna. He ls now in a Frooch jail awaiting trial on charges of lllegally photographing U. S. military installations for the Prague Communist Government. Bohumil Lausman, former Minister of Industry, who sided with 92 SLOVAKIA the Communists in February 1948. He went into exile in 1949, but returned voluntanily to Czecho-Slova:kia in December 1953. He was employed secretly by Radio Free Europe. Since leaving Czecho-,Slova,kia, Dr. Ripka has advocated a poHcy of "co-existence" in the following terms: "Today more than ever I persist in bel ieving that a free and independent Cz·ecihoslov,a kia cannot exist except in a balanced Europe in which the Western Powers and Russia are trying to live on good terms. Even the events of February 1948 h ave not been able to shake this conviction, which remain s the keystone of my whole co nception of for eign policy." (Czechoslovakia Enslaved, 1~50, p, 74) This is the record of an exile politician living in the United States and paid a salary from funds corntriihwted to fight Communism. It is for the reader to drnw hi:s own conclusions om the, /basis of this record. - (Overseas Research, Inc., Special Bulletin, Nov. 28, 1954, Washington, D. C.) • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: 'JIHE OLD CASTLE ( Stary Hrad) The ruins of th£s ,o ld castle still .stand on a ,p recipitous rock aJbave the river Vah. The structure, named the Old Castle of Trencin (!Stary Hrad) 'belongs to the c1ass of fortresses which were lb:uilt ,prabaJbly during the time af tihe Great Mornvian EmpiTe. Tr,a,veli!ng against the current of the Vah, Stary Hlrad cam. be seen on the left side. We are told that it was once called Nez;budsky Oastle, which attests to -i ts antiquity. 01dest arvailaJble documents refer to it as the Old Castle ("Castmm Stargra,d"); they teU us that it was -gi,v en to Bohumir Seibaslarvorvilc aJbout 1250 for bravery displayed in -the battle against the Tatars neaT S·rujaiva. Stary Hrad is more ancient than Streicno. The structure itself suggests that it was !built ,3J'bout the same time as the Devin and Trencin castles,, i.e., during the Roman era. Bohumir ,w as lord of the castle until 1'266 ; Count Peter of Hont from 1 267 to the end of the thirteenth century, when the Balasa family gained ownership. Then iMatthew Calk, "Lord of the Vah and the Tatras," -besieged and sei'Zed it, hut did not keep it for long, because we learn that a certain Thomas Carpi exchanged it in 1'323 for his property 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Profile of an Exile Politician Description An account of the resource Kurt Glaser Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 3-4 (12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954 pp. 85-92 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource Sept.-Dec. 1954 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a21d54db609ec35b652b11a433b72aa5.pdf a4cf2e12e8894cac1637514bfacdde6a PDF Text Text SLOVAKJA CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM JOHN F. GLEI MAN Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist• Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later, and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies. But what 1s the truth? Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes. 'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918. The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the Russlans, but that did not make them Russians. But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said, are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb trl be. True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called 1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh - Czech national imperlallsm. �61 SLOVAKIA Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime. Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products. They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks. The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated. Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939. The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks. Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as Czech romantlcism. The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism, have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the unalterable Joglc of h!story. Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter. • • • • WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S. S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944). � SLOVAKJA CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM JOHN F. GLEI MAN Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist• Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later, and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies. But what 1s the truth? Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes. 'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918. The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the Russlans, but that did not make them Russians. But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said, are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb trl be. True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called 1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh - Czech national imperlallsm. �61 SLOVAKIA Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime. Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products. They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks. The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated. Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939. The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks. Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as Czech romantlcism. The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism, have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the unalterable Joglc of h!story. Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter. • • • • WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S. S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKJA CZEOHOSWVAK ROMANTICISM JOHN F. GLEI MAN Modern propaganda has attalned great perfectlon. Applying the attalnment of mass psychology, falslfylng hlstory and statlstlcs, twist• Ing economlc theorles and other polltlcal sclences, modern psychology rs able to prove that black 1s whlte. That ls the propaganda that ls used especlally by the to talltarlan states. But even the "Czechoslovak democracy" of Masaryk and Beneš resorted to such propaganda, especlally wlth regard to the Slovak questlon. Little wonder that world dlplomacy, ignorant as it was about the Slovaks, believed it, nay, that some Slovaks were taken in by it. But truth will out sooner or later, and wh en misled people (Ind it out, they wlll discard false fictions and wlll follow the truth. The fiction a bout "Czečhoslovak unlty" -whether national or state union - is the product of the subtle propaganda machlne of Masaryk and Beneš. lt wrui born of the falslfication of hlstory and other "scientlfic" researches. The Czechoslovak republic 1s a structure bullt on lies. But what 1s the truth? Modern natlons developed fľom the cohabitation of many tribes. 'ľhe bistorlc fact is that during 1500 years of Slovak hlstory the Slovaks did not live in a common state wlth the Czechs until 1918. The fact that a Czech prince pald trlbute for several years to the ruler of Great Moravia has fallen into the sea or years wlthout a trace. The Ozechs lived for centuries in the Czech klngdom, in the Roman-Germanlc empire, and they lived in Austrla. The Slovaks llved their separate llves In Hungary. The fact that some Slovaks used the Czech language as a m edium of writing does not prove tbat Slovak is a dialect of tbe Czech. Tbe Serbs and Bulgarians used the old Slovanic cburcb language up to the 19th century just llke the Russlans, but that did not make them Russians. But a century ago, wben romanticism was in (lower, the Czecb publlclst Charles Havl!ček appeared on the scene with a typlcally romantic idea that tbe Slovaks really are Czechs. He himself openly revealed what had led him to that concluslon. The Czechs, he said, are surrounded on three sides by tbe Germans. So that Grmany would not strangle them, they needed a b ridge to the Slovanlc natlons and to international navigatlon on the Danube. But tbe only brldge Jed through Slovakia. So. cost what lt may, they needed Slovakla. To have some legal clalm to the !and of the Slovaks, he said - referring to tbe temporary literary assoclatlon - that the Slovaks are a CzP.cb trl be. True, t his fiction was discarded by the generation of Štúr, Daxuer and Hurban Vajanský. Even the Czecb generatlon of •Rleger discarded lt. But lt was revlved by Masaryk and then by hls understudy Beneš. Wben tbe Slovaks would not digest tbat story, they flrst called 1t "CzecbOBlovanic" (Czechoslavic); wben that dld not work out, tbey called 1t "Czecboslovak." No matter how tbey cbanged the name, the substance of lt always remalned tbe same. And that was utterly Czeťh - Czech national imperlallsm. 61 SLOVAKIA Industry was falrly well developed durlng Masaryk's llfetime. Bohemla became an Industria! country. Industria! countries were looking for raw matreials and markets for their Industria! products. They found these in their colonles. Because Bohemla 1s not a coastal s tate, Masaryk "dlscovered" Slovakla for Czech colonlzatlon. He took Havliček's romantic theory off the shelf, dusted lt off and peddled it to the world. He fooled qulte a few people, even some Slovaks. The Allies fell for the story at the Parls Conference in 1919. Thaťs how the Czechoslovak republic orlglnated. Americans or Slovak origin saw more clearly in•to ,the matter than thelr brethren in the old country and tried to guarantee a federative autonomy for Slovakia with the Cleveland and then the Plttsburgh Pact. But Masaryk, once he was in the driver's seat, proclalmed the bilateral agreements null and void, and proceeded to make Slovakia a Czech colony. Of course, the Slovaks did not relish that. They fought for their inherent and God•given rlghts for twenty years and then declared S lovakla Independent on March 14, 1939. The most unreal "realist" - Beneš - heated up this old romantlc soup or HavUook and Masaryk during World Waľ ii. When he saw that nobody had an appetite for sour soup, he hooked up wlth t he Communlsts so that he could keep the Czech hold on the Slovaks. Commun!.sm, whlch 1s also a creation of Hegelian romantlcism, readily understood Havlícek's and Masaryk's romanticism, lnterpreted by Beneš, and in 1943 they came to an agreement, especlally slnce the Communists knew how to " realize" romanticlsm. Tbey took thelr fishlng line and balted lt for the Slovaks with the "Program of Košice." Lettrich and his followers sn a.pped at the balt - hook, line and slnker. Since t hat time the Czechs are agaln explolting Slovakla and murderlng the Slovaks. But the bolsheviks also came into their own. They swallowed the whole Czechoslovak republic a11 well as Czech romantlcism. The period of romanticism 1s, bowever, inadvertently comlng to a close. Tbe by•products of politlcal romanticism, Fascism an<l Nazism, have already dlsappeared. The tlme is not far distant when romantlc socialism, Communism, too, shall dlsappear. Wlth lt shall go to the devll even Czech natlonalism, called Czechoslovakism. Tbat !s the unalterable Joglc of h!story. Tbe Slovak nation wants to live. It does not walllt to ,perish as the victlm of Czecboslovak romantlcism. Therefore, it shall go torward to meet the ideas or the future wlth all the strength of lts vitality to take over the place in the new rational order of the world that rlghtfully belongs to lt accordlng to God•glven natural right and accordlng to the Atlantlc Charter. • • • • WHO SAID IT ? - "The lmportance of our treaty wlth the U. S. S. R. ls selr-evldent. Soviet Russla 1s rapldly freelng Europe trom Nazl tyranny. Cloae tl ea have always exiated between Ruaala and Czechoalovakia, and they have now been atrengthened. We are proud to be an ally of that great power, whlch ls bound to play the leading ľole In Europe after the war." (Jan Masaryk to "Overseas News Agency," February 6, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czechoslovak Romanticism Description An account of the resource John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 60-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4faeb77e99e69680a9f2152513c74572.pdf 58bc32caec09d426b05f6f702ff94fcc PDF Text Text 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or 22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 20-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5cdb7dc5b3089c86bdf2fc64edf3c474.pdf b7cb540f4e2cb7bff8d9af15c5954ef3 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 19 SLOVAKIA IN FOREIGN LITERATURE Dr. Stefan Glejdura The struggle of the Slovaks for freedom and independence is not too well-known in the world at large, not even in the free western world. The true story of Slovakia has been either ignored, or distorted and falsified by its enemies and the misinformed, including the Czechs, who at the same time claim to be our "closest brethren!" Real friends have been few in the past and, for understandable reasons, their efforts to make known the truth about Slovakia and the Slovaks met with little success: T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes, operating with the cliche "truth prevails" with utter disregard for the truth in regard to the Slovaks, had absolute control of the State propaganda apparatus. Masaryk and Benes had declared: there is no Slovak noa tion ( an invention of the Magyars !) and the Slovak language is but a dialect of the Czechs. Most of the Czechs went along with that, because it did not pay to challenge the statements of Masaryk and Benes. The truth about Slovakia went begging. But just like murder, truth will out. Since 1938-,after Benes capitulated to Hitler at, Munich without consulting parliament and had fled to London aftGr resigning · the presidency the world at large is gradually le•arning the truth about Slovakia and its people, and about the political monstrosity that the Czecho-Slovakia of Masaryk and Benes actually was. Today, any one, who deals seriously with the problems of Central Europe, automatically reflects the existence of Slovakia •a nd the Slovak nation as a geographic (1), historical (2), legal (3), political ( 4), sociological and economical factor (5), even in cases where only a single country of that area is under consideration, as for emmple, Poland (6). E. Birke studied the development of French continental politics in the nineteenth century, from the ancien regime to 1897. In his studies he deals with the French Drang nach Osten at the time when France sought to. gain the Slovanic nations as friends and allies against Germany. Though Paris �20 SLOVAKIA regarded the Russian Empire as one of its chief enemies at the beginning of the 18th century, at the end of that century-particularly after the Prussian-French war of 1870-71-its policy resulted in a military alliance between Russia and France. The consequences of that alliance are keenly felt by Europe to this day, especially in the central zone which, after the Second World War, was forced to come under the sphere of influence of the Russians, in fact, becoming a colony of the Soviet Union. Today the SovietRussian Drang nach Westen created the conditions for solid Franco-German friendship within the framework of the economical and politioal integration of Europe. Today we are concerned with the forces, which conditioned the policy of power-balance among the great powers in Central Europe, which was threatened on the one hand by Russia (the Polish argument) and, on the other, by Gennany (the "Czech argument-please, not Czechoslovak" or even "Czecho-Slovak" argument, because the Slovaks never did and still do not determine policy!) . Political goals, however, have evoked contemporaneously a lively interest of French circles to better understand the nations which were supposed to become a tool of their plans to dominate the continent. French writers devote more attention to the Slovanic nations, drawing in the first place from the works of S•a farik, the Slovak Slavist (7). Surowiecki, the Pole, Kollar and Safarik, the Slovaks, and -P alacky, the Czech, headed the movement for national revival among the westem Slovans in the first half of the 19th century. Because a part of their literary efforts were published in German, their concepts easily took hold in the .non-Slovanic part of Europe (8). Herder's idealization of the Slovianic spirit evoked a great response in French literature, which in the course of time placed more stress on the political and anti-German tendencies of the Slovanicnations. This was quite evident in the incident which took place in Paris in the spring of 1848, where the Pese Choral Society happened to be at the time. Cyprian Robert, a Slovanophile and writer, whom the Magyars erroneously had taken for "a professor of Slovak," invited the members of the group, on March 28, to join the Societe de l'emancipa-- �SLOVAKIA 21 tion des nationalites slaves. Immediately after this incident, the Magyars declared: "Furious, we tried to make it clear to them (the French) that the Magyar people were no appendage of the Slovak nation and differ from it like fire and water . . . " (9). Of special significance is this work of Birke, but probably even more so are the sources he used to present in the most objective form the development of French continental policy of that epoch, the substance of which weighed in a combination of logical and mutually opposing factors in the struggle for national existence in Central and Eastern Europe. Professor Wierer actualizes the Central European problem with a study of federalistic conceptions in the Danubian area from 1848 to 1960 in order to point out the causes which led to the dissolution of Central Europe, as well as the forces which could lead to new social and political structures for the general good of all nations concerned. He does not limit himself to drawing proper consequences from the past, but gives attention also to the newest federalistic plans of Central European origin. In this connection, our feeling is that he could have more thoroughly analyzed the ideological substance especially of those plans which aim to harmonize the demands of the right of self-determination with the inevitability of renouncing certain adv,antages that emanate from the principle of national and state independence for the benefit of a supranational organization, which would unite the individual states built up on the foundation of right and justice (10). In the conclusion, the author (Wierer) touches upon the United States, and in the German Federal Republic with the intent to present them as an example of possible application to Central Europe. The question of nationalism continues to remain alive as a factor of political life. In fact, nationalism can be regarded as the greatest moving force in the emancipational process of the Asi•a tic and African countries, though its explosiveness, avoked by the emotional side of human nature, is directed by the need of broader unification of nations on a regional, continental, or even a universal basis. Sloviak nationalism never did lend itself to the extrem- �22 SLOVAKIA' istic tendencies that characterize the :rmtionalism of neighboring nations, becaus~ alongside the emotional side it always contained also elements . of reason. These were able to hold _it within the limits of its own national existential possH)ilities, · the realization of which it ·conditioned with principles of Christian world~perspective. Such is the nature the federalistic forms of state organization in Switzerland, of the works of Safarik and Kollar from the beginning of the 19th century (11). A purely defensive phenomenon is never imperialistic. An objective researcher learns that Slovak nationalism was and still is democratic. :· - . -"Economy · and Society in Southeastern Europe'' is a volume -on which twenty-one - authors collaborated on the study of the economical and social proces·s in the Czech lands, in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the countries of the southern Slovans, in Greece, Alban~a, Turkey and Poland bet w-een the two world wars, and especially from 1945 (12). Here we find paragraphs which deal independently with Slovakia or within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, or even the entire 1area (13). Of positive value are also works of a historical nature, such as the study of Pan-Slavism. We find references to Slovakia also in the work of Professor Markert of Tubingen (14). Especially the background of the Polish-Magyar intrigues at the expense of Siovakia in 1938-39 is described impartially, though we regret that even here Slovak independence means no more than "German protectorate" (15). The. Slovaks in the Past and Present Varsik deals with Slovak history, and his work (17) could be called a sociology of Slovak history, beginning with the fourth century B.C., that is from the Gauls through the German tribes, the advent of Slovak tribes, the organization and origin of Samo's State, and-the Great Moravian Empire, etc .. Garin-Michajlovskij defends Slovak independence (18), correctly .concluding that the rise of the Slovak St,ate was not an accident, but a historical inevitability in the development of Europe, resting on the will of the Slovaks expressed in harmony with the natural law. The existence of the �SLOVAKIA Slovak Republic was legal, he states categorically, and there can be no argument about it. The publication of V. Krajcovic, director of the Research Institute of the Slovak National Bank, deals with the economical life of the Slov,ak Republic (1939-1945). One of the burning questions of Slovak-Magyar relations is undoubtedly the problem of national minorities, a topic that has been heatedly discussed by Slovaks and nonSlovaks •a like, including the Magyars (20). After the Treaty of Trianon there were some 600,000 Magyars in Slovakia (according to the census of 1930-571,988 Magyars) and more than 200,000 Slovaks remained in Hungary (MragyarIand) . · With the Vienna Award (April 4, 1939), some 300,000 Slovaks were incorpor:ated into Hungary, so that in 1940 there were about 500,000 Slovaks there (21). After World War II, the reliations of the national minorities underw-e nt a substantial change in both countries. In 1958, the number of the Magyar minority in Slovakia was estimated at 393,390, while in the Czech lands the number was only 16,784; in other words, 10.2 per cent of the popul•a tion of Slovakia and only 0.2 per cent of the population of the Czech lands, that is, in the entire Czecho-Slovak Republic there were supposed to be 410,174 (3.1 per cent) Magyars (22)-200,000 less than in 1930. It appears that the nationality policy of Communist regimes in Central Europe is using the new forms of "majorization" which were initiated during Stalin's era. After the brutal expulsion of the Germans and the partial exchange of Slovak~ and Magyars, the Prague gover;ment, through the Communist Party of Czecho-:.Slov,akia, took new steps to realize "socialistic fraternal aid" for the Magyar minority in Slovakia. The first point of the new program makes the Magyars completely equal in all sectors of State life. The second point aims to sink the roots of the concept of proletarian internationalism and the feeling of "Czecho-Slovak patriotism" •a mong the Magyar worl~ing people. To be able to take on all the tasks, according to their ability, the Magyar workers are expected to · learn the State language, and so the study of Slovak is to be pushed in all Magyar schools (23). This means that the Magyar minority in Slovakia is to be Slovakicized. After that, or probably contemporane- �SLOVAKIA 24 ously with this process, they will arrive at the dialectical process of "socialistic togetherness" between Slovak and Czech in the direction of fraternizing the new language with Russian. Christian life in Slovakia is dealt with in two books of an informational character. The first (24) deals with the Christianization of the Slovaks by Sts. Cyril and Methoiius, who later had some influence on the Czechs. The story is presented quite accurately. The other by Schreiber, a native of Budapest, hardly deserves mention here, because of the many irresponsible and erroneous statements it contains, but then we do want people to know about it (25). The statement that Germany created the Slovak State and made a protectorate of it on March 15, 1939, or that Msgr. Joseph Tiso ,and the entire Slovak Hierarchy colla:borated to the very last day with the Nazis, is a verbal repetition of the malicious propaganda spread by chauvinistic Czechs, including Professor Heidler of Radio Free Europe. Such irresponsible statements may find a response with certain Christian circles with dubious intentions, but in no case with people who are seeking the truth (26). Furthermore, Schreiber's book harms the interests of the Central-European cause. The more so because in the biographical sketch on the back cover it is reported that Schreiber is one of those French reporters (a native of Budapest!) "who best knows the countries enjoying people's democracy" ! REFERENCES 1. E . Lend! : Der Donauraum Im geographischen GefUge Europas, Wien I, Der Donauraum 6. Jahrg., 3. Heft/1961, •P, 177-185. 2. E . Birke: Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert, KiiJn,Graz, 1960, Biihlau, XV-527 pp.; Das Nationalitatenproblem der Donaumonarchie in der Beurteilung der franzosischen sla• vophilen Publizistik 1840-1845, Bre slau, J,ahrblicher f. Kultur u . Geschichte der Slaven, N . F ., Bd. 10,1934. 3. R . Wierer : Der Foderalismus Im Donauraum, Graz- Koln, 19,60, Bohlau, 236 pp, 4. Hans Kohn: Historla del nacionalismo, Mexico-Buenos Aires, 1949, F'OE, 631 pp.-,this is a translation of the English original: The Idea of Nationalism, Macmillan, N ew York, 1944. The German edition: Die ldee des Natlonalismus, Ursprung u. Geschichte bis zur Franz. Revolution, Fran~furt/M., 1952, Fischer, 575 pp. 5. Vogel R . (publ.) : Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft SUdosteuropas, Gedenkschrift f. W. Glillich (first president of the Southeast �SLOVAKIA 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. JS. 19. 20. 21. .22. 25 European Society who knew Slovakia first-hand; died April 15, 1960). Mlinchen, 1961, Slidosteuropa-V~rlagsgesellschaft, Xl-600 pp. W. Markert (pub!.): Polen, Osteuropa-Handbuch, Namens der 1959, Arbeits.gemeinschaft f. Osteuropaforschung, Ktiln-Oraz, Btihlau, XXXffiI-'829 l)p. E. Birke, op . cit, pp. 39-48. Ibidem, pp. 51-53. I,b idem , p. 146; P. Boutelller: La Revolution Francaise de 1848 vue par les Hongrois, Paris, 1949, Colleotion Franco-Horugroise, I. Editee par l'Institut Francais en Hon,grie, BudapeSlt. Wierer, op. cit., pp. 12, 14-15, 19, 21, 27, 33, 35, 39, 50, 59, 64, 89, 116-117, 152-153, 157, 159, 179-182 ('!Iodza's Plan), 190-196 (19381945), 198-203 (Slovak plans) . Kohn, op. cit. pp., 462, 617; :r.. !§tur: Das XIX. Jahrhundert und der Madjarismus, Leipzig, 1843. Vogel, op. cit. Ibidem, p. 258, F. ·Rionneberger: Staatsverfassungstendenzen der SUdoststaaten seit 1945, pip. 217-277; W. Krallert: Die Verstadterung in SUdosteuropa und ihre sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, ,pp. 27'8-295; J . Mat•!: Der Panslawismus als politische ldee in SUdosteuropa Im 19. und 20. Jahrhund e rt, pp. 296-320 (Safarik is called a Czech!); F. H. Riedl: Bestand und Lage des Deutschtums in SUdosteuropa, Blick Uber vier Jahrzehnte, pp. 414-446. Markert, op. cit., pp. 65-67, 168, 545, 1731, 263, 294, 307. ,J bidem, pp. 136, 1;68. Ibidem, p. 545, f.n.4. B. Varsfk: Die Slowaken und ihr volkischer Lebensraum In der Vergangenheit, Bratislava-Pressburg, Die Slowakische Rundschau, p. 32 (1940-1942?). J. Garin-ll\1ich.ajlovskij: El nacimiento de la Republica Eslovaca como necesidad hist6rica de la evoluci6n de Europa, Madrid, 1945, G. Saez, 53 pp. Dr. V. Krajcovic: La estructura de la economia eslovaca, Madrid, 194,5, G. Saez, 85 pp. 0. R. Liess: Fraternisierungsparolen im Donauraum, Wien, Oesterreichische Ost-Hefte, 3. Jahrg., Heft 6. Nov. 1961, pp. 463469; A. Bohmann: Tschechen und Slowaken in der CSR, Stutt.gart, Aussenpolitik, 10. Jahrg., Hetft 10. 0kt. 1959, Deutsche Varlagsanstalt, pp . 676-682; H. Raschhofer: Die nationale Frage in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1928, Wien, DER DON.AJURIAUiM, 7. Jahrg, 2-3. Hef,t/1962, pp. 82-87. Erorterungen, 151-194. R. Wierer: Die nationale Frage in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1918, p,p. 88-89; P. Tijan: Crisis del liberalismo en la Europa Central, Madrid, 1958, Editora Nacional, 431 pp.-,the sub-title of this book is El mito Masaryk (The Myth About Ma•saryk); La Tchecoslovaquie his• torique, politique, economique et culturelle, Bruxelles, s ,YNTHElS1E S, Revue Intern1cionale, n. 188/janvier 1962, 208 pp. ; R. Urban: Marx und Engels Uber die tschechische Frage, DER DON<AUIR&UiM, 7. Jahrg., 1. Hef't/1962, pp. 21-33. Liess, op. cit. p. 465, quotes from B. Varsik's: Die slowakischmagyarische Grenze in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten, Schriften der Slow. Gelehr t en Ges., Bd. la, Bratislava, 1940, Universum . Liess, op. cit., p. 465 (according to Statisticka rocenka Republiky Ceskoslovenske 1959, p. 59). �26 SLOVAKIA Liess, op. cit., p. 466, quotes from Nepszabadsag (organ or the Magyar Soctal!st Workers Party, No. 163, July 1, 1961), but the original appeared in Uj sz6, Bratislava. 24. F. J. Montalban, S. J.: La Iglesia avanza, Manuia! de Historia de las Misiones, Pamplona, 1938, Secretariado de Misiones; ISegunda Parte: En la Edad Media, cap III. Mundo germanoslavo; par H . La conversion del mundo eslavo, pp. 197-198, 200-203. Sources used: Dvornik: Les slaves, Byzance et Rome, Paris, 1926; Descamps: H lstoire generale comparee des Missions, Lou vain, 1932; Hauck: Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Bande, Leipzig, 1922. 25. 'l'h. Schreiber: Le Christianisme en Europe Orienta le, Paris, 1961, Spes, 222 pp., esp. pp. 16, 19, 25, 27, 37-41, 54, 134, 211. 26. Ibidem, p . 16. 23. MEMORANDUM On October 7, 1963, the Slovak League of America issued the following Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: On July 14, 1963 in Youngstown, 0., at the gymnastic meet of the Slovak Catholic Sokol-a member organization of our Slovak League of America, the Attorney General of the United States, the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, declared as follows, among other things: "As a representative of the United States government the President has asked me to tell you that the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of all people in the world for independence and liberty-aspirations which the Slovaks share today with many other captive nations." We hail and welcome this assurance from our President and we request, Mr. Secretary of State, that you graciously recognize the fact that the Slovak League of America represents over 300,000 organized Americans of Slovak extraction and as such deems it its sacred duty to speak before the American Government in behalf of the Slovak nation which now lives under a Communist form of government and is unable to speak out for its rights and self-determination of its freedom and independence. We would be most pleased if our State Department would-in the spirit and according to the assurance of our Attorney General-show good will at least in the considera- � SLOVAKIA 19 SLOVAKIA IN FOREIGN LITERATURE Dr. Stefan Glejdura The struggle of the Slovaks for freedom and independence is not too well-known in the world at large, not even in the free western world. The true story of Slovakia has been either ignored, or distorted and falsified by its enemies and the misinformed, including the Czechs, who at the same time claim to be our "closest brethren!" Real friends have been few in the past and, for understandable reasons, their efforts to make known the truth about Slovakia and the Slovaks met with little success: T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes, operating with the cliche "truth prevails" with utter disregard for the truth in regard to the Slovaks, had absolute control of the State propaganda apparatus. Masaryk and Benes had declared: there is no Slovak noa tion ( an invention of the Magyars !) and the Slovak language is but a dialect of the Czechs. Most of the Czechs went along with that, because it did not pay to challenge the statements of Masaryk and Benes. The truth about Slovakia went begging. But just like murder, truth will out. Since 1938-,after Benes capitulated to Hitler at, Munich without consulting parliament and had fled to London aftGr resigning · the presidency the world at large is gradually le•arning the truth about Slovakia and its people, and about the political monstrosity that the Czecho-Slovakia of Masaryk and Benes actually was. Today, any one, who deals seriously with the problems of Central Europe, automatically reflects the existence of Slovakia •a nd the Slovak nation as a geographic (1), historical (2), legal (3), political ( 4), sociological and economical factor (5), even in cases where only a single country of that area is under consideration, as for emmple, Poland (6). E. Birke studied the development of French continental politics in the nineteenth century, from the ancien regime to 1897. In his studies he deals with the French Drang nach Osten at the time when France sought to. gain the Slovanic nations as friends and allies against Germany. Though Paris �20 SLOVAKIA regarded the Russian Empire as one of its chief enemies at the beginning of the 18th century, at the end of that century-particularly after the Prussian-French war of 1870-71-its policy resulted in a military alliance between Russia and France. The consequences of that alliance are keenly felt by Europe to this day, especially in the central zone which, after the Second World War, was forced to come under the sphere of influence of the Russians, in fact, becoming a colony of the Soviet Union. Today the SovietRussian Drang nach Westen created the conditions for solid Franco-German friendship within the framework of the economical and politioal integration of Europe. Today we are concerned with the forces, which conditioned the policy of power-balance among the great powers in Central Europe, which was threatened on the one hand by Russia (the Polish argument) and, on the other, by Gennany (the "Czech argument-please, not Czechoslovak" or even "Czecho-Slovak" argument, because the Slovaks never did and still do not determine policy!) . Political goals, however, have evoked contemporaneously a lively interest of French circles to better understand the nations which were supposed to become a tool of their plans to dominate the continent. French writers devote more attention to the Slovanic nations, drawing in the first place from the works of S•a farik, the Slovak Slavist (7). Surowiecki, the Pole, Kollar and Safarik, the Slovaks, and -P alacky, the Czech, headed the movement for national revival among the westem Slovans in the first half of the 19th century. Because a part of their literary efforts were published in German, their concepts easily took hold in the .non-Slovanic part of Europe (8). Herder's idealization of the Slovianic spirit evoked a great response in French literature, which in the course of time placed more stress on the political and anti-German tendencies of the Slovanicnations. This was quite evident in the incident which took place in Paris in the spring of 1848, where the Pese Choral Society happened to be at the time. Cyprian Robert, a Slovanophile and writer, whom the Magyars erroneously had taken for "a professor of Slovak," invited the members of the group, on March 28, to join the Societe de l'emancipa-- �SLOVAKIA 21 tion des nationalites slaves. Immediately after this incident, the Magyars declared: "Furious, we tried to make it clear to them (the French) that the Magyar people were no appendage of the Slovak nation and differ from it like fire and water . . . " (9). Of special significance is this work of Birke, but probably even more so are the sources he used to present in the most objective form the development of French continental policy of that epoch, the substance of which weighed in a combination of logical and mutually opposing factors in the struggle for national existence in Central and Eastern Europe. Professor Wierer actualizes the Central European problem with a study of federalistic conceptions in the Danubian area from 1848 to 1960 in order to point out the causes which led to the dissolution of Central Europe, as well as the forces which could lead to new social and political structures for the general good of all nations concerned. He does not limit himself to drawing proper consequences from the past, but gives attention also to the newest federalistic plans of Central European origin. In this connection, our feeling is that he could have more thoroughly analyzed the ideological substance especially of those plans which aim to harmonize the demands of the right of self-determination with the inevitability of renouncing certain adv,antages that emanate from the principle of national and state independence for the benefit of a supranational organization, which would unite the individual states built up on the foundation of right and justice (10). In the conclusion, the author (Wierer) touches upon the United States, and in the German Federal Republic with the intent to present them as an example of possible application to Central Europe. The question of nationalism continues to remain alive as a factor of political life. In fact, nationalism can be regarded as the greatest moving force in the emancipational process of the Asi•a tic and African countries, though its explosiveness, avoked by the emotional side of human nature, is directed by the need of broader unification of nations on a regional, continental, or even a universal basis. Sloviak nationalism never did lend itself to the extrem- �22 SLOVAKIA' istic tendencies that characterize the :rmtionalism of neighboring nations, becaus~ alongside the emotional side it always contained also elements . of reason. These were able to hold _it within the limits of its own national existential possH)ilities, · the realization of which it ·conditioned with principles of Christian world~perspective. Such is the nature the federalistic forms of state organization in Switzerland, of the works of Safarik and Kollar from the beginning of the 19th century (11). A purely defensive phenomenon is never imperialistic. An objective researcher learns that Slovak nationalism was and still is democratic. :· - . -"Economy · and Society in Southeastern Europe'' is a volume -on which twenty-one - authors collaborated on the study of the economical and social proces·s in the Czech lands, in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the countries of the southern Slovans, in Greece, Alban~a, Turkey and Poland bet w-een the two world wars, and especially from 1945 (12). Here we find paragraphs which deal independently with Slovakia or within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, or even the entire 1area (13). Of positive value are also works of a historical nature, such as the study of Pan-Slavism. We find references to Slovakia also in the work of Professor Markert of Tubingen (14). Especially the background of the Polish-Magyar intrigues at the expense of Siovakia in 1938-39 is described impartially, though we regret that even here Slovak independence means no more than "German protectorate" (15). The. Slovaks in the Past and Present Varsik deals with Slovak history, and his work (17) could be called a sociology of Slovak history, beginning with the fourth century B.C., that is from the Gauls through the German tribes, the advent of Slovak tribes, the organization and origin of Samo's State, and-the Great Moravian Empire, etc .. Garin-Michajlovskij defends Slovak independence (18), correctly .concluding that the rise of the Slovak St,ate was not an accident, but a historical inevitability in the development of Europe, resting on the will of the Slovaks expressed in harmony with the natural law. The existence of the �SLOVAKIA Slovak Republic was legal, he states categorically, and there can be no argument about it. The publication of V. Krajcovic, director of the Research Institute of the Slovak National Bank, deals with the economical life of the Slov,ak Republic (1939-1945). One of the burning questions of Slovak-Magyar relations is undoubtedly the problem of national minorities, a topic that has been heatedly discussed by Slovaks and nonSlovaks •a like, including the Magyars (20). After the Treaty of Trianon there were some 600,000 Magyars in Slovakia (according to the census of 1930-571,988 Magyars) and more than 200,000 Slovaks remained in Hungary (MragyarIand) . · With the Vienna Award (April 4, 1939), some 300,000 Slovaks were incorpor:ated into Hungary, so that in 1940 there were about 500,000 Slovaks there (21). After World War II, the reliations of the national minorities underw-e nt a substantial change in both countries. In 1958, the number of the Magyar minority in Slovakia was estimated at 393,390, while in the Czech lands the number was only 16,784; in other words, 10.2 per cent of the popul•a tion of Slovakia and only 0.2 per cent of the population of the Czech lands, that is, in the entire Czecho-Slovak Republic there were supposed to be 410,174 (3.1 per cent) Magyars (22)-200,000 less than in 1930. It appears that the nationality policy of Communist regimes in Central Europe is using the new forms of "majorization" which were initiated during Stalin's era. After the brutal expulsion of the Germans and the partial exchange of Slovak~ and Magyars, the Prague gover;ment, through the Communist Party of Czecho-:.Slov,akia, took new steps to realize "socialistic fraternal aid" for the Magyar minority in Slovakia. The first point of the new program makes the Magyars completely equal in all sectors of State life. The second point aims to sink the roots of the concept of proletarian internationalism and the feeling of "Czecho-Slovak patriotism" •a mong the Magyar worl~ing people. To be able to take on all the tasks, according to their ability, the Magyar workers are expected to · learn the State language, and so the study of Slovak is to be pushed in all Magyar schools (23). This means that the Magyar minority in Slovakia is to be Slovakicized. After that, or probably contemporane- �SLOVAKIA 24 ously with this process, they will arrive at the dialectical process of "socialistic togetherness" between Slovak and Czech in the direction of fraternizing the new language with Russian. Christian life in Slovakia is dealt with in two books of an informational character. The first (24) deals with the Christianization of the Slovaks by Sts. Cyril and Methoiius, who later had some influence on the Czechs. The story is presented quite accurately. The other by Schreiber, a native of Budapest, hardly deserves mention here, because of the many irresponsible and erroneous statements it contains, but then we do want people to know about it (25). The statement that Germany created the Slovak State and made a protectorate of it on March 15, 1939, or that Msgr. Joseph Tiso ,and the entire Slovak Hierarchy colla:borated to the very last day with the Nazis, is a verbal repetition of the malicious propaganda spread by chauvinistic Czechs, including Professor Heidler of Radio Free Europe. Such irresponsible statements may find a response with certain Christian circles with dubious intentions, but in no case with people who are seeking the truth (26). Furthermore, Schreiber's book harms the interests of the Central-European cause. The more so because in the biographical sketch on the back cover it is reported that Schreiber is one of those French reporters (a native of Budapest!) "who best knows the countries enjoying people's democracy" ! REFERENCES 1. E . Lend! : Der Donauraum Im geographischen GefUge Europas, Wien I, Der Donauraum 6. Jahrg., 3. Heft/1961, •P, 177-185. 2. E . Birke: Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert, KiiJn,Graz, 1960, Biihlau, XV-527 pp.; Das Nationalitatenproblem der Donaumonarchie in der Beurteilung der franzosischen sla• vophilen Publizistik 1840-1845, Bre slau, J,ahrblicher f. Kultur u . Geschichte der Slaven, N . F ., Bd. 10,1934. 3. R . Wierer : Der Foderalismus Im Donauraum, Graz- Koln, 19,60, Bohlau, 236 pp, 4. Hans Kohn: Historla del nacionalismo, Mexico-Buenos Aires, 1949, F'OE, 631 pp.-,this is a translation of the English original: The Idea of Nationalism, Macmillan, N ew York, 1944. The German edition: Die ldee des Natlonalismus, Ursprung u. Geschichte bis zur Franz. Revolution, Fran~furt/M., 1952, Fischer, 575 pp. 5. Vogel R . (publ.) : Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft SUdosteuropas, Gedenkschrift f. W. Glillich (first president of the Southeast �SLOVAKIA 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. JS. 19. 20. 21. .22. 25 European Society who knew Slovakia first-hand; died April 15, 1960). Mlinchen, 1961, Slidosteuropa-V~rlagsgesellschaft, Xl-600 pp. W. Markert (pub!.): Polen, Osteuropa-Handbuch, Namens der 1959, Arbeits.gemeinschaft f. Osteuropaforschung, Ktiln-Oraz, Btihlau, XXXffiI-'829 l)p. E. Birke, op . cit, pp. 39-48. Ibidem, pp. 51-53. I,b idem , p. 146; P. Boutelller: La Revolution Francaise de 1848 vue par les Hongrois, Paris, 1949, Colleotion Franco-Horugroise, I. Editee par l'Institut Francais en Hon,grie, BudapeSlt. Wierer, op. cit., pp. 12, 14-15, 19, 21, 27, 33, 35, 39, 50, 59, 64, 89, 116-117, 152-153, 157, 159, 179-182 ('!Iodza's Plan), 190-196 (19381945), 198-203 (Slovak plans) . Kohn, op. cit. pp., 462, 617; :r.. !§tur: Das XIX. Jahrhundert und der Madjarismus, Leipzig, 1843. Vogel, op. cit. Ibidem, p. 258, F. ·Rionneberger: Staatsverfassungstendenzen der SUdoststaaten seit 1945, pip. 217-277; W. Krallert: Die Verstadterung in SUdosteuropa und ihre sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, ,pp. 27'8-295; J . Mat•!: Der Panslawismus als politische ldee in SUdosteuropa Im 19. und 20. Jahrhund e rt, pp. 296-320 (Safarik is called a Czech!); F. H. Riedl: Bestand und Lage des Deutschtums in SUdosteuropa, Blick Uber vier Jahrzehnte, pp. 414-446. Markert, op. cit., pp. 65-67, 168, 545, 1731, 263, 294, 307. ,J bidem, pp. 136, 1;68. Ibidem, p. 545, f.n.4. B. Varsfk: Die Slowaken und ihr volkischer Lebensraum In der Vergangenheit, Bratislava-Pressburg, Die Slowakische Rundschau, p. 32 (1940-1942?). J. Garin-ll\1ich.ajlovskij: El nacimiento de la Republica Eslovaca como necesidad hist6rica de la evoluci6n de Europa, Madrid, 1945, G. Saez, 53 pp. Dr. V. Krajcovic: La estructura de la economia eslovaca, Madrid, 194,5, G. Saez, 85 pp. 0. R. Liess: Fraternisierungsparolen im Donauraum, Wien, Oesterreichische Ost-Hefte, 3. Jahrg., Heft 6. Nov. 1961, pp. 463469; A. Bohmann: Tschechen und Slowaken in der CSR, Stutt.gart, Aussenpolitik, 10. Jahrg., Hetft 10. 0kt. 1959, Deutsche Varlagsanstalt, pp . 676-682; H. Raschhofer: Die nationale Frage in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1928, Wien, DER DON.AJURIAUiM, 7. Jahrg, 2-3. Hef,t/1962, pp. 82-87. Erorterungen, 151-194. R. Wierer: Die nationale Frage in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1918, p,p. 88-89; P. Tijan: Crisis del liberalismo en la Europa Central, Madrid, 1958, Editora Nacional, 431 pp.-,the sub-title of this book is El mito Masaryk (The Myth About Ma•saryk); La Tchecoslovaquie his• torique, politique, economique et culturelle, Bruxelles, s ,YNTHElS1E S, Revue Intern1cionale, n. 188/janvier 1962, 208 pp. ; R. Urban: Marx und Engels Uber die tschechische Frage, DER DON<AUIR&UiM, 7. Jahrg., 1. Hef't/1962, pp. 21-33. Liess, op. cit. p. 465, quotes from B. Varsik's: Die slowakischmagyarische Grenze in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten, Schriften der Slow. Gelehr t en Ges., Bd. la, Bratislava, 1940, Universum . Liess, op. cit., p. 465 (according to Statisticka rocenka Republiky Ceskoslovenske 1959, p. 59). �26 SLOVAKIA Liess, op. cit., p. 466, quotes from Nepszabadsag (organ or the Magyar Soctal!st Workers Party, No. 163, July 1, 1961), but the original appeared in Uj sz6, Bratislava. 24. F. J. Montalban, S. J.: La Iglesia avanza, Manuia! de Historia de las Misiones, Pamplona, 1938, Secretariado de Misiones; ISegunda Parte: En la Edad Media, cap III. Mundo germanoslavo; par H . La conversion del mundo eslavo, pp. 197-198, 200-203. Sources used: Dvornik: Les slaves, Byzance et Rome, Paris, 1926; Descamps: H lstoire generale comparee des Missions, Lou vain, 1932; Hauck: Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Bande, Leipzig, 1922. 25. 'l'h. Schreiber: Le Christianisme en Europe Orienta le, Paris, 1961, Spes, 222 pp., esp. pp. 16, 19, 25, 27, 37-41, 54, 134, 211. 26. Ibidem, p . 16. 23. MEMORANDUM On October 7, 1963, the Slovak League of America issued the following Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: On July 14, 1963 in Youngstown, 0., at the gymnastic meet of the Slovak Catholic Sokol-a member organization of our Slovak League of America, the Attorney General of the United States, the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, declared as follows, among other things: "As a representative of the United States government the President has asked me to tell you that the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of all people in the world for independence and liberty-aspirations which the Slovaks share today with many other captive nations." We hail and welcome this assurance from our President and we request, Mr. Secretary of State, that you graciously recognize the fact that the Slovak League of America represents over 300,000 organized Americans of Slovak extraction and as such deems it its sacred duty to speak before the American Government in behalf of the Slovak nation which now lives under a Communist form of government and is unable to speak out for its rights and self-determination of its freedom and independence. We would be most pleased if our State Department would-in the spirit and according to the assurance of our Attorney General-show good will at least in the considera- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1964, Vol. 14 Description An account of the resource Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 19 SLOVAKIA IN FOREIGN LITERATURE Dr. Stefan Glejdura The struggle of the Slovaks for freedom and independence is not too well-known in the world at large, not even in the free western world. The true story of Slovakia has been either ignored, or distorted and falsified by its enemies and the misinformed, including the Czechs, who at the same time claim to be our "closest brethren!" Real friends have been few in the past and, for understandable reasons, their efforts to make known the truth about Slovakia and the Slovaks met with little success: T. G. Masaryk and Dr. Edward Benes, operating with the cliche "truth prevails" with utter disregard for the truth in regard to the Slovaks, had absolute control of the State propaganda apparatus. Masaryk and Benes had declared: there is no Slovak noa tion ( an invention of the Magyars !) and the Slovak language is but a dialect of the Czechs. Most of the Czechs went along with that, because it did not pay to challenge the statements of Masaryk and Benes. The truth about Slovakia went begging. But just like murder, truth will out. Since 1938-,after Benes capitulated to Hitler at, Munich without consulting parliament and had fled to London aftGr resigning · the presidency the world at large is gradually le•arning the truth about Slovakia and its people, and about the political monstrosity that the Czecho-Slovakia of Masaryk and Benes actually was. Today, any one, who deals seriously with the problems of Central Europe, automatically reflects the existence of Slovakia •a nd the Slovak nation as a geographic (1), historical (2), legal (3), political ( 4), sociological and economical factor (5), even in cases where only a single country of that area is under consideration, as for emmple, Poland (6). E. Birke studied the development of French continental politics in the nineteenth century, from the ancien regime to 1897. In his studies he deals with the French Drang nach Osten at the time when France sought to. gain the Slovanic nations as friends and allies against Germany. Though Paris 20 SLOVAKIA regarded the Russian Empire as one of its chief enemies at the beginning of the 18th century, at the end of that century-particularly after the Prussian-French war of 1870-71-its policy resulted in a military alliance between Russia and France. The consequences of that alliance are keenly felt by Europe to this day, especially in the central zone which, after the Second World War, was forced to come under the sphere of influence of the Russians, in fact, becoming a colony of the Soviet Union. Today the SovietRussian Drang nach Westen created the conditions for solid Franco-German friendship within the framework of the economical and politioal integration of Europe. Today we are concerned with the forces, which conditioned the policy of power-balance among the great powers in Central Europe, which was threatened on the one hand by Russia (the Polish argument) and, on the other, by Gennany (the "Czech argument-please, not Czechoslovak" or even "Czecho-Slovak" argument, because the Slovaks never did and still do not determine policy!) . Political goals, however, have evoked contemporaneously a lively interest of French circles to better understand the nations which were supposed to become a tool of their plans to dominate the continent. French writers devote more attention to the Slovanic nations, drawing in the first place from the works of S•a farik, the Slovak Slavist (7). Surowiecki, the Pole, Kollar and Safarik, the Slovaks, and -P alacky, the Czech, headed the movement for national revival among the westem Slovans in the first half of the 19th century. Because a part of their literary efforts were published in German, their concepts easily took hold in the .non-Slovanic part of Europe (8). Herder's idealization of the Slovianic spirit evoked a great response in French literature, which in the course of time placed more stress on the political and anti-German tendencies of the Slovanicnations. This was quite evident in the incident which took place in Paris in the spring of 1848, where the Pese Choral Society happened to be at the time. Cyprian Robert, a Slovanophile and writer, whom the Magyars erroneously had taken for "a professor of Slovak," invited the members of the group, on March 28, to join the Societe de l'emancipa-- SLOVAKIA 21 tion des nationalites slaves. Immediately after this incident, the Magyars declared: "Furious, we tried to make it clear to them (the French) that the Magyar people were no appendage of the Slovak nation and differ from it like fire and water . . . " (9). Of special significance is this work of Birke, but probably even more so are the sources he used to present in the most objective form the development of French continental policy of that epoch, the substance of which weighed in a combination of logical and mutually opposing factors in the struggle for national existence in Central and Eastern Europe. Professor Wierer actualizes the Central European problem with a study of federalistic conceptions in the Danubian area from 1848 to 1960 in order to point out the causes which led to the dissolution of Central Europe, as well as the forces which could lead to new social and political structures for the general good of all nations concerned. He does not limit himself to drawing proper consequences from the past, but gives attention also to the newest federalistic plans of Central European origin. In this connection, our feeling is that he could have more thoroughly analyzed the ideological substance especially of those plans which aim to harmonize the demands of the right of self-determination with the inevitability of renouncing certain adv,antages that emanate from the principle of national and state independence for the benefit of a supranational organization, which would unite the individual states built up on the foundation of right and justice (10). In the conclusion, the author (Wierer) touches upon the United States, and in the German Federal Republic with the intent to present them as an example of possible application to Central Europe. The question of nationalism continues to remain alive as a factor of political life. In fact, nationalism can be regarded as the greatest moving force in the emancipational process of the Asi•a tic and African countries, though its explosiveness, avoked by the emotional side of human nature, is directed by the need of broader unification of nations on a regional, continental, or even a universal basis. Sloviak nationalism never did lend itself to the extrem- 22 SLOVAKIA' istic tendencies that characterize the :rmtionalism of neighboring nations, becaus~ alongside the emotional side it always contained also elements . of reason. These were able to hold _it within the limits of its own national existential possH)ilities, · the realization of which it ·conditioned with principles of Christian world~perspective. Such is the nature the federalistic forms of state organization in Switzerland, of the works of Safarik and Kollar from the beginning of the 19th century (11). A purely defensive phenomenon is never imperialistic. An objective researcher learns that Slovak nationalism was and still is democratic. :· - . -"Economy · and Society in Southeastern Europe'' is a volume -on which twenty-one - authors collaborated on the study of the economical and social proces·s in the Czech lands, in Slovakia, Hungary, Rumania, the countries of the southern Slovans, in Greece, Alban~a, Turkey and Poland bet w-een the two world wars, and especially from 1945 (12). Here we find paragraphs which deal independently with Slovakia or within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, or even the entire 1area (13). Of positive value are also works of a historical nature, such as the study of Pan-Slavism. We find references to Slovakia also in the work of Professor Markert of Tubingen (14). Especially the background of the Polish-Magyar intrigues at the expense of Siovakia in 1938-39 is described impartially, though we regret that even here Slovak independence means no more than "German protectorate" (15). The. Slovaks in the Past and Present Varsik deals with Slovak history, and his work (17) could be called a sociology of Slovak history, beginning with the fourth century B.C., that is from the Gauls through the German tribes, the advent of Slovak tribes, the organization and origin of Samo's State, and-the Great Moravian Empire, etc .. Garin-Michajlovskij defends Slovak independence (18), correctly .concluding that the rise of the Slovak St,ate was not an accident, but a historical inevitability in the development of Europe, resting on the will of the Slovaks expressed in harmony with the natural law. The existence of the SLOVAKIA Slovak Republic was legal, he states categorically, and there can be no argument about it. The publication of V. Krajcovic, director of the Research Institute of the Slovak National Bank, deals with the economical life of the Slov,ak Republic (1939-1945). One of the burning questions of Slovak-Magyar relations is undoubtedly the problem of national minorities, a topic that has been heatedly discussed by Slovaks and nonSlovaks •a like, including the Magyars (20). After the Treaty of Trianon there were some 600,000 Magyars in Slovakia (according to the census of 1930-571,988 Magyars) and more than 200,000 Slovaks remained in Hungary (MragyarIand) . · With the Vienna Award (April 4, 1939), some 300,000 Slovaks were incorpor:ated into Hungary, so that in 1940 there were about 500,000 Slovaks there (21). After World War II, the reliations of the national minorities underw-e nt a substantial change in both countries. In 1958, the number of the Magyar minority in Slovakia was estimated at 393,390, while in the Czech lands the number was only 16,784; in other words, 10.2 per cent of the popul•a tion of Slovakia and only 0.2 per cent of the population of the Czech lands, that is, in the entire Czecho-Slovak Republic there were supposed to be 410,174 (3.1 per cent) Magyars (22)-200,000 less than in 1930. It appears that the nationality policy of Communist regimes in Central Europe is using the new forms of "majorization" which were initiated during Stalin's era. After the brutal expulsion of the Germans and the partial exchange of Slovak~ and Magyars, the Prague gover;ment, through the Communist Party of Czecho-:.Slov,akia, took new steps to realize "socialistic fraternal aid" for the Magyar minority in Slovakia. The first point of the new program makes the Magyars completely equal in all sectors of State life. The second point aims to sink the roots of the concept of proletarian internationalism and the feeling of "Czecho-Slovak patriotism" •a mong the Magyar worl~ing people. To be able to take on all the tasks, according to their ability, the Magyar workers are expected to · learn the State language, and so the study of Slovak is to be pushed in all Magyar schools (23). This means that the Magyar minority in Slovakia is to be Slovakicized. After that, or probably contemporane- SLOVAKIA 24 ously with this process, they will arrive at the dialectical process of "socialistic togetherness" between Slovak and Czech in the direction of fraternizing the new language with Russian. Christian life in Slovakia is dealt with in two books of an informational character. The first (24) deals with the Christianization of the Slovaks by Sts. Cyril and Methoiius, who later had some influence on the Czechs. The story is presented quite accurately. The other by Schreiber, a native of Budapest, hardly deserves mention here, because of the many irresponsible and erroneous statements it contains, but then we do want people to know about it (25). The statement that Germany created the Slovak State and made a protectorate of it on March 15, 1939, or that Msgr. Joseph Tiso ,and the entire Slovak Hierarchy colla:borated to the very last day with the Nazis, is a verbal repetition of the malicious propaganda spread by chauvinistic Czechs, including Professor Heidler of Radio Free Europe. Such irresponsible statements may find a response with certain Christian circles with dubious intentions, but in no case with people who are seeking the truth (26). Furthermore, Schreiber's book harms the interests of the Central-European cause. The more so because in the biographical sketch on the back cover it is reported that Schreiber is one of those French reporters (a native of Budapest!) "who best knows the countries enjoying people's democracy" ! REFERENCES 1. E . Lend! : Der Donauraum Im geographischen GefUge Europas, Wien I, Der Donauraum 6. Jahrg., 3. Heft/1961, •P, 177-185. 2. E . Birke: Frankreich und Ostmitteleuropa im 19. Jahrhundert, KiiJn,Graz, 1960, Biihlau, XV-527 pp.; Das Nationalitatenproblem der Donaumonarchie in der Beurteilung der franzosischen sla• vophilen Publizistik 1840-1845, Bre slau, J,ahrblicher f. Kultur u . Geschichte der Slaven, N . F ., Bd. 10,1934. 3. R . Wierer : Der Foderalismus Im Donauraum, Graz- Koln, 19,60, Bohlau, 236 pp, 4. Hans Kohn: Historla del nacionalismo, Mexico-Buenos Aires, 1949, F'OE, 631 pp.-,this is a translation of the English original: The Idea of Nationalism, Macmillan, N ew York, 1944. The German edition: Die ldee des Natlonalismus, Ursprung u. Geschichte bis zur Franz. Revolution, Fran~furt/M., 1952, Fischer, 575 pp. 5. Vogel R . (publ.) : Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft SUdosteuropas, Gedenkschrift f. W. Glillich (first president of the Southeast SLOVAKIA 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. JS. 19. 20. 21. .22. 25 European Society who knew Slovakia first-hand; died April 15, 1960). Mlinchen, 1961, Slidosteuropa-V~rlagsgesellschaft, Xl-600 pp. W. Markert (pub!.): Polen, Osteuropa-Handbuch, Namens der 1959, Arbeits.gemeinschaft f. Osteuropaforschung, Ktiln-Oraz, Btihlau, XXXffiI-'829 l)p. E. Birke, op . cit, pp. 39-48. Ibidem, pp. 51-53. I,b idem , p. 146; P. Boutelller: La Revolution Francaise de 1848 vue par les Hongrois, Paris, 1949, Colleotion Franco-Horugroise, I. Editee par l'Institut Francais en Hon,grie, BudapeSlt. Wierer, op. cit., pp. 12, 14-15, 19, 21, 27, 33, 35, 39, 50, 59, 64, 89, 116-117, 152-153, 157, 159, 179-182 ('!Iodza's Plan), 190-196 (19381945), 198-203 (Slovak plans) . Kohn, op. cit. pp., 462, 617; :r.. !§tur: Das XIX. Jahrhundert und der Madjarismus, Leipzig, 1843. Vogel, op. cit. Ibidem, p. 258, F. ·Rionneberger: Staatsverfassungstendenzen der SUdoststaaten seit 1945, pip. 217-277; W. Krallert: Die Verstadterung in SUdosteuropa und ihre sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, ,pp. 27'8-295; J . Mat•!: Der Panslawismus als politische ldee in SUdosteuropa Im 19. und 20. Jahrhund e rt, pp. 296-320 (Safarik is called a Czech!); F. H. Riedl: Bestand und Lage des Deutschtums in SUdosteuropa, Blick Uber vier Jahrzehnte, pp. 414-446. Markert, op. cit., pp. 65-67, 168, 545, 1731, 263, 294, 307. ,J bidem, pp. 136, 1;68. Ibidem, p. 545, f.n.4. B. Varsfk: Die Slowaken und ihr volkischer Lebensraum In der Vergangenheit, Bratislava-Pressburg, Die Slowakische Rundschau, p. 32 (1940-1942?). J. Garin-ll\1ich.ajlovskij: El nacimiento de la Republica Eslovaca como necesidad hist6rica de la evoluci6n de Europa, Madrid, 1945, G. Saez, 53 pp. Dr. V. Krajcovic: La estructura de la economia eslovaca, Madrid, 194,5, G. Saez, 85 pp. 0. R. Liess: Fraternisierungsparolen im Donauraum, Wien, Oesterreichische Ost-Hefte, 3. Jahrg., Heft 6. Nov. 1961, pp. 463469; A. Bohmann: Tschechen und Slowaken in der CSR, Stutt.gart, Aussenpolitik, 10. Jahrg., Hetft 10. 0kt. 1959, Deutsche Varlagsanstalt, pp . 676-682; H. Raschhofer: Die nationale Frage in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1928, Wien, DER DON.AJURIAUiM, 7. Jahrg, 2-3. Hef,t/1962, pp. 82-87. Erorterungen, 151-194. R. Wierer: Die nationale Frage in der Tschechoslowakei seit 1918, p,p. 88-89; P. Tijan: Crisis del liberalismo en la Europa Central, Madrid, 1958, Editora Nacional, 431 pp.-,the sub-title of this book is El mito Masaryk (The Myth About Ma•saryk); La Tchecoslovaquie his• torique, politique, economique et culturelle, Bruxelles, s ,YNTHElS1E S, Revue Intern1cionale, n. 188/janvier 1962, 208 pp. ; R. Urban: Marx und Engels Uber die tschechische Frage, DER DON<AUIR&UiM, 7. Jahrg., 1. Hef't/1962, pp. 21-33. Liess, op. cit. p. 465, quotes from B. Varsik's: Die slowakischmagyarische Grenze in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten, Schriften der Slow. Gelehr t en Ges., Bd. la, Bratislava, 1940, Universum . Liess, op. cit., p. 465 (according to Statisticka rocenka Republiky Ceskoslovenske 1959, p. 59). 26 SLOVAKIA Liess, op. cit., p. 466, quotes from Nepszabadsag (organ or the Magyar Soctal!st Workers Party, No. 163, July 1, 1961), but the original appeared in Uj sz6, Bratislava. 24. F. J. Montalban, S. J.: La Iglesia avanza, Manuia! de Historia de las Misiones, Pamplona, 1938, Secretariado de Misiones; ISegunda Parte: En la Edad Media, cap III. Mundo germanoslavo; par H . La conversion del mundo eslavo, pp. 197-198, 200-203. Sources used: Dvornik: Les slaves, Byzance et Rome, Paris, 1926; Descamps: H lstoire generale comparee des Missions, Lou vain, 1932; Hauck: Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, 5 Bande, Leipzig, 1922. 25. 'l'h. Schreiber: Le Christianisme en Europe Orienta le, Paris, 1961, Spes, 222 pp., esp. pp. 16, 19, 25, 27, 37-41, 54, 134, 211. 26. Ibidem, p . 16. 23. MEMORANDUM On October 7, 1963, the Slovak League of America issued the following Memorandum addressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk: On July 14, 1963 in Youngstown, 0., at the gymnastic meet of the Slovak Catholic Sokol-a member organization of our Slovak League of America, the Attorney General of the United States, the Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, declared as follows, among other things: "As a representative of the United States government the President has asked me to tell you that the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of all people in the world for independence and liberty-aspirations which the Slovaks share today with many other captive nations." We hail and welcome this assurance from our President and we request, Mr. Secretary of State, that you graciously recognize the fact that the Slovak League of America represents over 300,000 organized Americans of Slovak extraction and as such deems it its sacred duty to speak before the American Government in behalf of the Slovak nation which now lives under a Communist form of government and is unable to speak out for its rights and self-determination of its freedom and independence. We would be most pleased if our State Department would-in the spirit and according to the assurance of our Attorney General-show good will at least in the considera-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia in Foreign Literature Description An account of the resource Dr. Štefan Glejdura Slovakia, Vol. 14 (No. 37), 1964 pp. 19-26 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glejdura, Štefan Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1964 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/29df0575d66e8d9f4062768833e5c57d.pdf 81d244299cc14ebf8304bb9bf66fadb6 PDF Text Text 102 SLOVAKIA , ..., VLADIMIR MECIAR AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1992-1998 1 John A. Gould "A just privatization does not exist; we all know that the only criterion was loyalty. " - Vit'azoslav Morie, SNS honorary chair2 Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution put former Communist Party bureaucrats and industrial managers on the defensive. Associated with the communist past, many top managers were removed from their jobs while the middle managers that replaced them carried little political clout in broader debates over the design of economic reforms like privatization. As a result, Czechoslovak privatization architects had the freedom to offer average citizens a potential stake in state-owned companies. In return for a small administrative fee, citizens received coupons that would allow them to bid on company shares . Most participating citizens, however, chose to invest through new financial intermediaries, called investment privatization funds, which would concentrate citizens' small shares into larger stakes in privatized companies. By 1993, these intermediaries began to rival remaining communist-era managers for control of Czech and Slovak firms .3 1 This paper is adopted from John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 103-32. A full list of acknowledgments can be found on pp. vii-viii of that work, but the author would like to thank the following for their comments, assistance and support: Hilary Appel, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Sharon Fisher, Zsolt Gal, Simona Gould, Timothy Haughton, Cubomira Hromkova, Darina Malova, Mikael Olsson, Marek Ryhal', Sona Szomolanyi, James Thompson and Milada Anna Vachudova. The author is responsible for any errors in logic or fact. 2 Abigail Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 200 I), 263. 3 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby,"The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic," Europe-Asia Studies 48 :2 (1996), 285-303; Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: �SLOVAKIA 103 While the mass privatization program continued in the Czech Republic through 1995, Slovakia's industrial managers were able to derail it after independence on January 1, 1993 . They had initially suffered from the same liabilities as their Czech counterparts. 4 Yet, as debate over the sovereign status of Slovakia developed in 199192, Slovak managers found a resource in identity politics that their Czech counterparts largely lacked. 5 By fusing their interests to rising popular-nationalism, a select group gained influence with a number of Slovakia's nascent political parties, and most notably, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The following paper examines the politics of privatization in Slovakia after independence. Slovakia's battle over privatization and its aftermath was a nasty, occasionally dangerous affair with very high stakes. At the center of this battle, initially, were the efforts of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and various industrialists to stop the highly popular citizens' "voucher" privatization program that Slovakia had inherited from the federal republic. This had little to do with the voucher program 's evident flaws . Rather, Meciar's policies sought to reorient privatization away from the new financial intermediaries which largely supported his opponents. In its place, his government operated a direct sales program that would benefit those who would support him. Yet, by attempting to replace a program that rewarded a majority of Slovak citizens with a program that only rewarded a narrow group of industrial managers and political allies, Meciar embarked on a democratically difficult project. His early efforts to gain close personal control over the privatization process contributed to the alienation of many of the key players in the HZDS, including President of Slovakia Michal Kovac. The president briefly orchestrated Meciar's Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Central Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Peter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic," Telos 94 ( I 992), I 03-130; Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 56-68. 4 Interview wi th Jozef Uhrik, Commercial Director, Volkswagen Slovakia, Devinska Nova Yes, Slovakia, January 14, 1997 ; Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povai.ske strojarne, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, Slovakia, July, 22 I 998 . 5 Hilary Appel and John Gould, " Identi ty Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics," Europe-A sia Studies 52: I (2000), 111-31. �104 SLOVAKIA removal from power in March of 1994 after he made a speech criticizing a series of legally questionable privatization decisions. When Meciar regained power in November, he acted on the knowledge that his political and economic ambitions were incompatible with the democratic institutions he had inherited. The ensuing assault on democratic norms, rules and procedures, while not entirely directed at privatization, nevertheless gave his ruling coalition the freedom to privatize as it pleased. However, by the end of Meciar' s third term, Slovakia could no longer demonstrate its democratic credentials to the European Union or NATO . Both threatened to exclude Slovakia from their next rounds of expansion. Privileged access to government was not simply important to acquiring property. Under Meciar it also became increasingly useful for securing favorable economic policies such as the allocation of credit, the regulation of capital markets, government procurement, and taxation policies. Between 1996 and 1998, such largess undermined Slovakia' s economic recovery and threw the country into an economic crisis. By 1998, both Slovakia's long term economic recovery and its European future were in danger. Slovak voters responded with an 84.4 percent electoral turnout that left the ruling coalition no choice but to accept the vote and surrender power. Privatization should produce independent economic actors who seek a profit rather than a government handout. Yet, as the Slovak experience under Meciar reminds us, privatization is first and foremost a means of acquiring wealth and power. Where easy profits can easily be had through political connections, creating private property does not necessarily go hand in hand with market democracy. For privatization to be most effective, societies must first be willing and able to police the intersection of state policy and economic activity. Voucher Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1993. Privatization in Czechoslovakia was designed at the federal level, but it was largely carried out by the Czech and Slovak republiclevel governments. In Slovakia privatization began under the government of Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christiaq Democratic Movement-KDH) and his 30 year-old neo-liberal Minister of Privatiza- �SLOVAKIA 105 tion,6 Ivan Miklos. While there was room for administrative innovation to account for local differences, in practice, Miklos administered the voucher program in an almost identical fashion to his Czech counterparts. This was no small accomplishment. Following the collapse of support for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's first government in the spring 1991 , the new ruling coalition was deeply divided over privatization. The Carnogursky government included Jan Holcfk, and Jozef Belzak as Ministers of Industry and Economy, respectively. While both men favored a transition towards markets, both had industrial ties and favored a strong sectoral industrial policy in which firms would be restructured before privatization. In addition to Carnogursky 's ministers, industry had a strong friend in KDH member Viliam Oberhauser, a founding member of what Miklos claimed was industry's nomenklatura-controlled peak organization, the Federation of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZ). 7 Oberhauser was a key member of the nationalist wing of the KDH and had helped author a "gradualist" economic reform scenario, challenging the market-oriented federal economic reforms that had been in place since January of 1991. 8 This created difficulties for Miklos. In the final years of the 1980s, Miklos had studied market economics at the Austrian school of Friedrich Hayek. At the time of the Revolution, he had been an economics student and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Bratislava. Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak brought him into the government in 1990. 9 After, the launch of strong market-oriented 6 There were three privatization ministries- one in each republic, and one at the federal level to deal with federal state property. Their formal name at the republic level was the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Assets. For an explanation see, Petr Husak, Budovani kapitalismu v Cechach: Rozhovory s Tomasem Jeikem (Prague: Volvox Globatour, 1997), 111 ; John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 61. 7 lvan Miklos "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Slovak Political Science Association, 1997), 65. 8 Jvan Miklos recalls that the Ministries of Forest and Water, Agriculture and even the Environment - all run by KDH appointees - had strong gradualist leanings. Interview with Ivan Miklos, Consultant, M.E.S.A. I 0, Bratislava, April 2, 1997. 9 Miklos's first post was as Deputy Prime Minister, Jozef Kucerak's advisor, and Director of the Government's Section for Economic and Social Policy. Interview �106 SLOVAKIA reforms in January of 1991, however, Slovakia ' s economy suffered disproportionately more than the Czech Republic ' s economy. 10 Economic liberals like Kucerak increasingly became the target of colleagues seeking to distance themselves publicly from the growing pain of economic transformation. Market reforms would be managed better, they argued, if Slovak politicians were to have greater control over their own economic and political affairs where they could use state controls to moderate the pace of transition. 11 As the lead proponent of a federally brokered, rapid transformation towards a market economy, Kucerak was forced to step down after a vote of no-confidence in the spring of 1991 . Miklos was elevated to Minister of Privatization soon after and quickly replaced Kucerak as the most outspoken market liberal in the government and the strongest public supporter of federal reforms. He faced the brunt of attacks from both the opposition and the national wing of the ruling KDH. This included surviving several parliamentary votes of no-confidence. By the winter of 1991-92, it was increasingly clear that the KDH-led coalition would fare poorly in the upcoming June elections. Miklos feared that the next government would most likely slow privatization and delay the creation of private owners. He therefore sought to start the voucher program as quickly as possible- to create a fait accompli of new owners with a stake in continuing the rapid property transformation program. Miklos was responsible for convincing state-owned firms to put up shares for the voucher privatization program in Slovakia. He recalled that the threat of dismissal helped him to encourage most managers to include significant voucher components in their base privatization plans, but the pressure was bitterly resented. 12 Miklos with Ivan Miklos, Bratislava, October 1, 1996; Interview with Jozef Kucenik, Bratislava, January 13, 1997. 10 Slovakia was particularly handicapped by its reliance on heavy defense industries, among other things. See Gould, Politics of Privatization. 11 For details see Gould, Politics of Privatization , 73-79 . 12 In about sixty cases, managers called for direct sales exclusively to themselves. Assuming that the managers had failed to meet their obligations under the privatization act to make important data available to competitors, Miklos reopened the proposed submission process for an additional two months and pushed the firms to provide the necessary data to allow competitors to propose rival privatization plans for each firm, Miklos interview, October I, 1996; Ivan Miklos, "Corruption Risks in the Privatization Process: A Study of Privatization Developments in the Slovak Re- �SLOVAKIA 107 further alienated industrial elites by converting what they hoped would be a program of cheap, direct sales of enterprise shares to incumbent managers, into a transparent, competitive program in which price was the leading criterion. Prior to the June elections, the ministry sold shares in 189 firms for prices approximating and often exceeding their book value. 13 It would be another six years before the state would do as well financially in its direct sales of public property. Meanwhile, the first wave of voucher privatization began in October of 1991 with the registration of 2.59 million Slovak citizens, almost two-thirds of the adult population, through the federal Ministry of Finance. As in the Czech Republic, 14 registration for the program in Slovakia initially lagged until financial intermediaries (also referred to as investment privatization companies) began to offer a ten-fold or greater return on the voucher holder's initial registration fee within a year. Seventy-two percent of Slovak citizen-participants subsequently invested their voucher coupons with investment privatization funds in the first wave of privatization. Bidding on firms began in May of 1992 and closed in December. Shares were finally distributed to new owners in April of 1993 .15 Despite the efforts of industrial elites, the federal voucher privatization program had succeeded in providing the investment privatization funds stakes of up to forty percent in privatized firms. 16 Another wave of voucher privatization could allow fund owners to consolidate ownership of Slovakia's industrial assets. Over the next two years industrial managers, therefore, worked diligently through AZZZ to ensure a second wave of voucher privatization would not take place. 17 public," Bratislava, Klub Windsor, I 995; Interview with I.'.udovit Cemak, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 2, I 997. 13 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997; Mikael Olsson, Ownership, Reform and Corporate Governance: The Slovak Privatization Process in 1990-1996 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1999), 119. 14 For details, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, Chapter 5. 15 For more on the technical details of voucher privatization, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 63-8. 16 0Jsson, Ownership, Reform, 115-6, 219. 17 AZZZ (Federation of Employers Unions and Associations), "5. vyrocie AZZZ SR, 1991-1996," Spravodaj AZZZ Extra. Bratislava, March, 1996; Rudolf Lachovic, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie a kolektivneho investovania," Global Brokers, Bratislava, I 997, manuscript. �108 SLOVAKIA Meciar's Second Government, 1992-1994. Meciar's HZDS dominated the June 1992 elections. With the tacit support of the Slovak National Party (SNS), he became Slovak Prime Minister for the second time. In July negotiations with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Meciar failed in his bid to form a weak confederation with the Czech Republic. Unable to reconcile Meciar's concept of a weak confederation with Klaus' concept of a strong federation, the two agreed to replace the federal state with two sovereign, independent republics. After parliamentary approval in both republican assemblies, the countries split peacefully on January 1, 1993. 18 As in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization in Slovakia became one of the more popular aspects of the federal reform program. 19 This may help to explain why the Meciar government, elected in June of 1992, completed the first wave as its predecessor had planned. Nevertheless, Meciar's Minister of Privatization, I:ubomir Dolgos, promised a shakeup in the next round. One of the new govemment' s first decisions was to indefinitely postpone the demand that firms submit second round privatization plans to the Ministry of Privatization. This necessitated at least a delay in the second round of voucher privatization. In September of 1992, the government program declaration and an associated Ministry of Privatization document spelled out a new privatization philosophy based on a more gradual state-guided economic transformation. Rather than emphasize the rapid creation of new owners, the state would now single out "strategic fields" where it would intervene to protect the national interest through the state restructuring of enterprises before, or in place of, privatization. Industrial ministries would design and coordinate restructuring plans with the assistance of the state-controlled financial sector. 18 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Innes, Czechoslo vakia. 19 Miklo~ interview, April 2, 1997; Dusan Triska recalled being surprised at the strong support for the voucher scheme in Slovakia. Dusan Triska, "Privatization: Czechoslovakia" Eastern European Economics 26 (Fall, 1991 ); DusanTl'iska, "Political , Organizational, and Legislative Aspects of Mass Privatization-Czechoslovakia," in Marko Simonetti and Andreja Bohm, eds., Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe, 1991 . (Ljubljana: Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1991 ). Oldfich Dedek, The Break-up of Czechoslovakia (Aldershoot: Ave bury 1996), 201 . �SLOVAKIA 109 This concept also favored direct sales to incumbent managers over voucher privatization. Price was no longer the dominant criterion in evaluating bids on the company shares that were to sold. First installments were lowered from thirty percent of the price to ten to fifteen percent, and payment could be extended over fifteen years. Another round of voucher privatization would take place, but would only be used as a residual method.20 Similarly, the threat that a manager would be dismissed diminished under the new government. Miklos asserted that Meciar and his Minister of Economy, I:udovit Cernak, reappointed many of the communist-era managers that had been pushed out by Carnogursky's government. 21 Many of these had been forced out for having collaborated with the communist secret service before the Revolution-in a process called "lustration."22 Cemak himself related that Meciar frequently paid little attention to his appointees' lustration certificates in . personne l dec1s1ons. . . 23 h1s Little privatization occurred under Dolgos in the first six months of 1993. Rather, Meciar focused his energies on consolidating control over his cabinet- pushing out co-HZDS founder Milan Kiiazko (who was a marginal threat to Meciar for party control) and Minister of Economy, Cemak. As a Kiiazko protege, Dolgos soon found himself in constant conflict with Meciar-most notably over whether vouchers should have any role in the second round when it started. Meciar felt they should not, while Dolgos asserted that he sought to put aside about a third of corporate shares for voucher privatization. 20 Dolgos stressed that any efforts to set voucher privatization timelines or the volume of assets to be voucher privatized in advance, "would ... fail to serve a purpose." Dolgos's reformulated concept even "warned" industrial managers that if their second wave base privatization plans relied too heavily on the voucher method, they would be "subjected to particularly critical and thorough evaluation." There would also be a critical "assessment of the risks derived from concentration of ownership through privatization investment funds ." Instead, Dolgos emphasized "combined methods" in which management buyouts would play an "exceedingly important role." Ministry of Administration and Privatization, SR. , "Concept of the Continuing Process of Privatization in the Slovak Republic. " Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1992; Interview with Cubomir Dolgos, Faculty of Management, Economics University, Bratislava, March 20, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 119-20. 21 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997. 22 Marsina interview, July, 22 1998; Uhrik interview, January 14, 1997. 2 3<'.:emak interview, April 2, 1997. �110 SLOVAKIA On June 12, 1993, Dolgos lost an HZDS-engineered vote of no confidence and stepped down.24 The departures of independent personalities like Cernak, Kiiazko and Dolgos left Meciar in more solid control over the HZDS and the government, but it also made his parliamentary majority vulnerable to future defections. Nevertheless, Meciar stepped up his efforts to replace his former colleagues with his personal loyalists-particularly in the Ministry of Privatization and the Fund for National Property (FNM). 25 At that time, the privatization ministry coordinated the privatization decision-making process while the FNM was a fully state-owned joint stock company charged with distributing shares to their new private owners. FNM appointees also represented the state's interests as a shareholder at general assemblies of corporate shareholders. In 100% state-owned companies, the FNM was on paper, at least, in complete control of the firm. Control over the FNM would give the Prime Minister control over most unprivatized and many partially privatized firms. Attempts to gain direct governmental control over the privatezation ministry and the FNM brought Meciar into sharp conflict with President Michael Kovac, another co-founder of the HZDS .26 To replace Dolgos at the privatization ministry, Meciar chose a close associate, Ivan Lexa. Having backed Meciar in the dismissal of Kiiazko, Kovac now balked. Citing Lexa's inexperience and potential conflicts of interest with his father (a communist-era central planning agency bureaucrat, recently-turned entrepreneur), the president refused to approve the appointment. Meciar responded by giving Lexa the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Privatization (the highest ministerial position not requiring presidential approval) and assumed the responsibilities of Minister himself. One of Lexa's first privatization decisions as State Secretary in July of 1992 was to ap24 Dolgos interview, March 20, 1997; Cemak interview, April 2, 1997. Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 25 . 26 Slovakia 's President was constitutionally weak, making the need for a strong party system to check the Prime Minister's power all the more necessary. Executive power flowed from the Parliament, with limited presidential powers to check it. Kovac could and did veto legislation and appointees, but Parliament could override this with a simple majority. Later, when Parliament deadlocked over a new presidential candidate, presidenti al powers - including the power of a presidential amnesty transferred to the Prime Minister. 25 �SLOVAKIA 111 prove his father ' s participation in the privatization of Povazske mlyny a cestoviname, a.s., with a personal stake estimated at up to 1 billion Sk (then about US $30 million).27 While Meciar consolidated power over Slovakia' s privatization and property control mechanisms, financial intermediaries whose funds had done so well in the first round of privatization began to assert some clout in shareholder meetings. Enterprise managers had also established a few funds. 28 Slovakia' s largest company, Vychodoslovenske zeleziame, a.s (Eastern Slovak Steelworks- VSZ) had established Cassiovia Invest, which had the marketing clout to acquire more than ten percent of the vouchers. But most funds- and hence a large portion of corporate power- were in the hands of enterprise outsiders, a fact that was increasingly resented by the incumbent industrial managers.29 In the first wave of privatization, the funds had amassed a forty percent stake in privatized firms and from the perspective of incumbent managers, carried unwelcome clout. Battles soon emerged over which would be dominant in determining the overall strategy of the company, the shareholder-dominated Supervisory Boards or the management-controlled Boards of Directors.30 Meciar' s allies came to feel that the most influential funds were, as subsequent Fund for National Property President Stefan Gavomik put it, "owned by the opposition."31While not technically true, by the end of the year, industrial managers and fund-appointed board members began to run into sharp conflict over the day-to-day management and long-term strategy of "privatized" companies. Hoping to avoid a further erosion of corporate insider influence, AZZZ halted a 27 Anton Marcincin, Daniela Zemanovifova, and Lubos Vagac, "Privatization Methods and Development of Slovakia," Bratislava, Center for Economic Development, 1996, 17. 28 Another fi fty percent was spread across a wide range of funds and individual shareholders, leaving the FNM , with its residual 37.6 percent, effectively in charge. Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 223 . 29 AZZZ, "S.Vyrocie AZZZ SR, 199 1- 1996"; Miklos, "Corruption Risks," 64; Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 279, 283. 30 Slovak and Czech companies had a dual board structure consisting of a supervisory board that gave general strategic direction to the company and managerial oversight, and a management board- largely consisting of top corporate mana~ers- that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the firm. 1 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 11 8. �112 SLOVAKIA second round of voucher privatization. Meciar obligingly pushed back the start date for the next round of voucher privatization. In the fall of 1993, Meciar complimented his firm grasp of the Ministry of Privatization by putting personal loyalists on the board of the National Property Fund. Between December of 1993 and March of 1994, his indirect control over state shares of major firms allowed him to replace enterprise board members and managers of twentyone Slovak companies which, allegedly, failed to show sufficient loyalty to the HZDS. Meciar claimed that he was simply replacing opposition-linked managers from the VPN-KDH era with more independent managers . Indeed, he accused parliamentary opposition leaders "straight into the eye, in front of everyone, that each one of them is linked with one of the twenty-one major Slovak corporations in which we intervened. And this is the problem." 32 Meciar was possibly correct in his assessment. While in power, KDH ministers appointed people to the boards of leading Slovak state firms and other opposition leaders clearly had close industrial connections. However, it was unclear whether they were now being removed because they were acting as KDH clients or due to their reluctance to serve HZDS interests. Indeed, the KDH-era manager of the large oil refinery, Slovnaft, was allegedly replaced after he refused Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky's demands that he subcontract services to HZDS-linked firms. 33 By the winter of 1994, Meciar' s increasingly personal consoledation of party and governmental power had alienated many of his own party members. By February of 1994, a last remaining block of HZDS deputies, led by HZDS co-founder Jozef Moravcik, appeared ready to follow other former HZDS members and allies into opposition. The threat of losing power may have led to a subsequent wave of direct sales. Starting with the "midnight privatizations" of February 1, 2004, Lexa sold forty-four companies with a book value of $96 million for a final sale price of just $22 million. The decisions were notable for their lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and advantageous terms to the purchasers-many of whom had close ties to leading government officials. Thirteen were subsequently annulled 32 Specifically, Meciar was accusing Vojtech Sugar, Jan Carnogursky, Cudovit Cernak and Peter Wiess. "Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," T ASR-Slovakia (February 6, 1994). 33 Confidential interview, Slovnaft insider, Bratislava, February, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 113 by the successor government for contravening the Large Scale Privatization Act of February 1991 , but virtually all of the privatizations were suspect. The beneficiaries included a range of politically connected individuals-from the wife of the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to Meciar's own Minister of Finance, Julius T6th.34 A March 11 , 1994 report of a commission investigating the privatizations triggered the departure of the dissident-HZDS faction led by Jozef Moravcik and a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government. In his speech before parliament, HZDS co-founder and Slovak President Michael Kovac openly accused Meciar of a lack of transparency and clientalism in the privatization process, among oth. 35 er th mgs. Meciar's and Lexa's hurried attempts to reorient Slovakia's privatization framework to favor political and economic insiders had run afoul of the opposition's effective use of liberal democratic institutions and norms. When next he gained power, Meciar' s new parliamentary majority would attack these opposition resources directly. VSZ and the Slovak Way of Privatization. One of Meciar's last acts in the1992-1994 government helps illustrate both the zero-sum nature of privatization, as well as its growing politicization. In December of 1993, the state exercised its shareholder rights to remove President Zoltan Berghauer and other top managers from the executive management of the state-owned firm VSZ, Slovakia's largest commercial entity. Berghauer had cofounded the AZZZ and was the lead author of an industry antireform petition in early 1991. 36 Meciar claimed that the top management change was a technocratic decision-made through consulta- 34 Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 121. Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 25. 36 In February of 1991 , only a month after the start of market reforms, the Slovak and Czech industrial federations delivered a joint petition to the Federal Assembly demanding "help in solving the difficult economic and financial situation of industrial companies ... [resulting from] the ill-considered restrictive fiscal , credit and monetary policy of the Federal Government. " Reforms, the industrialists continued, threatened, "the collapse of the entire national economy" and a "declining living standard for all citizens of the state." Zoltan Bergauer et al. , "Petice svaz u pnlmyslu CR a SR Federilnimu shromizdeni CSFR," Hospodafske noviny, February 29, 1991 , p. 3. 35 �114 SLOVAKIA tions with high-ranking bank and industrial managers.37 Yet he did not hide the fact that the change was to reduce the "unwarranted influence" of "opposition parties" in Slovakia's largest enterprise. 38 Berghauer and other purged VSZ managers protested the move, citing a history of political manipulation and threats by the HZDS towards VSZ management. The source of the claim directly attacked Meciar's Minister of Finance, JuliusToth. Toth had been VSZ's Vice President of Finance until he had resigned to join Meciar's government. According to Berghauer, Toth allegedly become enraged when Berghauer and VSZ's management refused to accept an HZDS member on the VSZ Board of Directors. Toth allegedly responded by demanding that the two top VSZ officials resign due to their political support for the KDH and other political opponents of the HZDS. 39 Toth later asserted that the Berghauer team had been stripping assets from the company. Through control of both the VSZ and collaboration with an independent trading company, they allegedly could siphon cash from the VSZ to the trade company by overcharging for supplies and underpaying for products.40 Perhaps to cut these alleged sales out of the revenue loop, or maybe to cut his allies in, Toth's new management team set up a new VSZ-owned sales company to oversee sales responsible for eighty percent of VSZ revenues. 4 1 As Minister of Finance, Toth and Lexa orchestrated the purchase of a 9.52 percent share of VSZ stock through a new private company, Manager a.s., established by five VSZ board members, including prominent HZDS member Alexander Rezes. The purchase was ques37 "Strong in the Saddle," T ASR-Slovakia, February 11, 1994. "Meciar Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," TASRSlovakia, February 6, 1994. 39 "Former Members of VSZ Board Lodge Complaint," CTK Business News, March 21 , 1994. 40 Despite Toth's allegations against Berghauer, no charges were ever filed . 41 Anthony Robinson, "Survey of Slovakia," The Financial Times, December 16, 1994, p. iv. It is unlikely that Toth was genuinely outraged at the allegations of corruption at VSZ. In 1993 he had allegedly used his influence as Minister of Finance to give a trading company, VSZ Selecta, a state contract to sell sugar that the Indian government provided to the Slovak government in place of its cash debt. VSZ Selecta won the contract without the required tender and then sold the sugar on the world market in violation of its contract. Toth was a member of the company's board. "Report on "Sugar Affair" to be out in January," CTK News, December 5, 1993. 38 �SLOVAKIA 115 tionable for its unsightly conflicts of interest, advantageous terms and most of all, its timing. Again, in accordance with the government program, the shares were sold to domestic entrepreneurs at a substantial discount with a generous payment schedule. The discount on the current share value of the package was $36 million.42 After a ten percent down payment, Manager would pay the rest in yearly installments over five years. Manager's members each made their down payment with an interest-free $62,000 loan from the Kosice-based Priemyselna banka (Industrial Bank) whose controlling shareholder was, in turn, the VSZ-controlled fund, Cassiovia Invest. 43 Priemyselna banka, moreover, received these funds from Banka Slovakia (Bank Slovakia), which then served as the repository and investment arm of the FNM. In short, Manager borrowed FNM funds to buy shares from the FNM that in tum benefited close associates of its directors and the man responsible for their appointment, Vladimir Meciar.44 The timing was also controversial. The Meciar government received the proposal to privatize the VSZ shares to Manager on March 7 and the government approved the request on March 11- the day on which parliament finally passed a vote no-confidence in the Meciar cabinet. The FNM and Manager signed the agreement on March 14, the day the government fell. On March 17, VSZ held a general assembly at which the now former Minister of Finance and FNM Board member, JuliusT6th, was elected Chair of VSZ's Board of Directors. Rezes would become Minister of Transportation in 42 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 22 . 0lsson, Ownership, Reform , 223 , note 39. 44 "Approach to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Meciar attempted to establish Banka Slovakia as early as 1993 in his home region of Banska Bystrica as part of his effort to develop a regional banking center. The goal was to use the bank to recycle FNM funds and provide cheap credit for small to medium sized enterprises. After the VSZ deal, however, the opposition charged that it would be used as a means of providing the politically connected with cheap capital to make down payments for privatization deals. In April of 1994, the next government suspended the bank's license to operate. With Meciar's re-election in the fall, the government pushed the National Bank of Slovakia to grant the license. But, after building a costly and elaborate headquarters in Banska Bystrica and suffering from notoriously poor lending practices, the bank had significant difficulties with capitalization. The NBS finally approved a license to begin operating on June I, 1996, but the bank- like most Slovak banks-quickly developed a problem with non-performing loans. 43 �116 SLOVAKIA Meciar's next cabinet. Supporting the vote were VSZ's investment privatization fund, Cassiovia Invest and VUE Invest, the investment company of Vseobecna uverova banka (General Credit Bank-VUB) and Slovakia's largest state owned bank. Ironically, oversight responsibility for VUB had, until four days earlier, lain primarily with T6th's Ministry of Finance.45 Meciar's Opposition Takes Power, March-November, 1993. A five-party caretaker government under the leadership of HZDS defector Jozef Moravcik was formed in mid-March. It promised to restore transparency and accountability to the privatization process and to re-launch the voucher privatization process as soon as possible. This was to be done before the scheduled new elections at the end of September. The coalition fought, however, over how to restore confidence, transparency and speed to the privatization process. Nevertheless, Kevin Deegan-Krause demonstrated how the new coalition allowed itself to be held accountable to competitive political forces. 46 The recent experience with Meciar may have taught the government coalition partners a good lesson in the dangers of overconcentration of power-particularly in the areas of property management and privatization. Yet, the new five-party coalition was fractious and ideologically incoherent. This influenced privatization. On the one hand, the formerly communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDI:) sought to maintain direct sales as the primary method of privatization. On the other hand, the coalition partners accused it of intending to use direct sales to reward its own allies amongst Slovakia's ex-communist industrialists and bureaucrats. The Ministry of Privatization, however, was now led by Milan Janicina, a lawyer from the center-right Democratic Union (DU). He sought to ensure that any direct sales would be a rule-governed, multi-party competitive process, not something to be run exclusively by SDI: dictates. 47 The SDI: did, however, secure an agreement to sub- 45 "Approac h to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Toth also became deputy chairman of Priemyselna banka, Olsson Ownership, Reform, 223, note 39. 46 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 26. 47 Interviews with Milan Janicina, Commercial Lawyer, Bratislava, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 117 ordinate the importance of price in the sales to employment and future investment commitments. 48 Corruption may have been possible in the final sales, but the number of competing interests in the decision making process ensured that the foxes guarding the hen house would keep each other in line. 49 Still , the program was not unimpeachable. Most of the direct privatization sales of fifty-four Slovak enterprises occurred after the elections had delivered a strong plurality to the HZDS but before Meciar had formed a government. 50 The government also conducted a public tender for the government's 24.9 percent share in VSi, attracting interest from nine companies, including the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. The coalition lost power before it could resolve internal bickering over the final buyer. 51 Throughout the summer of 1994, citizens, center-right coalition parties, brokerage firms and investment privatization funds clamored for a second wave of voucher privatization. Janicina fought with SD~'s Minister of the Economy Peter Magvasi (also an AZZZ member) to ensure that there would be enough property offered to make the project worthwhile. In preparation, the Ministry of Finance issued voucher booklets to seventy-two percent of Slovak citizens (ninety percent of those eligible). This was a significantly higher participation rate than the first wave. Janicina secured assets valued at $1.96 billion for the voucher program- making each voucher booklet potentially worth $593.00. After another aggressive campaign from financial intermediaries, fifty-eight percent of voucher holders traded their points for shares in investment privatization funds. 52 If the second wave of voucher privatization was completed, managerial insiders would cede significant additional economic power to the funds. 53 48 OIsson, Ownership, Reform , 124. Anna Grzymala-Busse, " Beyond Clientelism : Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," Comparative Political Studies 41 :4/5 (2008), 638-73 . 50 Jnterview with Rudolf Filkus, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 15, 1997; Janicina interviews, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. 51 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 222 . 52 Tbid. , 124-5. 53 Janici na interview, April I, 1997. 49 �SLOVAKIA Privatization under Meciar's Third Government, 1994-1998. The Moravcik government was short-lived. The SD:C had secured early elections and in the ensuing campaign the center-right fragmented amongst a range of competing personalities. A number of opposition parties failed to cross the five percent threshold in the September-October 1994 vote. Moravcik's Democratic Union (DU) received 8.6 percent, the KDH won 10.l percent, SD:C got 10.4 percent and the ethnic Hungarian Coalition took 10.2 percent of the votes. The HZDS, meanwhile, won a thirty-five percent plurality. This was less than in 1992. However, since thirteen percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not pass the five percent threshold, the ideological weight of the next parliament shifted sharply back towards Meciar and his national-populism. After a month of negotiations, the HZDS formed an ideologically awkward coalition with the two smallest delegations in parliament-the extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS-5.4 percent) led by the garrulous Jan Slota,54 and the extreme left Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS-7.34 percent). 55 To discipline his junior coalition partners, Meciar could use the threat of an alternative coalition with the reformed communist party, the SD:C.56 Critics speculated that the "brown-red" wings of the new ruling coalition were held together only by the promise of privatization benefits. 57 The National-Populist Privatization Concept and its Implementation. Meciar's privatization policies formally settled the long-standing ideological battle between market reformers and gradualists over privatization policy, but in reality, this conflict had stood proxy for an underlying clash of interests between enterprise outsiders and incumbent firm management. Gradualist concepts were hijacked, to an extent, and combined with clientalism and xenophobic nationa54 1n the spring of 1993, Meciar had helped Jan Slota oust Cernak from control over the SNS. Cernak left (with Janicina) to form the Democratic Union. Cernak interview, April 2, 1997. 55 Grigorij Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Party System," in Soi\a Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation , 50. 56 Innes, Czechoslo vakia, 262. 57 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 64. �SLOVAKIA 119 !ism to benefit the governing coalition and its allies at, as we shall see, a growing cost to the public. The formal theory underlying the Meciar government's privatezation program echoed the Dolgos strategy of the fall of 1992. The government would work closely with incumbent industrial managers to achieve ownership patterns that would be most appropriate to a coordinated industrial policy. The state would integrate equity transfer, credit and other policies in ways that would boost the strength of Slovak national firms on world markets and minimize transformational pain at the enterprise level. The variety of capitalism officially envisioned was thus much closer to a continental-style state-coordinated market economy than a more hands-off liberal market economy. However, Slovak industrial leaders at AZZZ also invoked Asian development models to explain what they were trying to accomplish.58 Insiders Ascendant. In practice, Meciar's coalition privatized the privatization process. It also subordinated capital markets regulation to the needs of incumbent managers at the expense of enterprise outsiders. The main target was the funds that emerged through voucher privatization. 59 Meciar's new parliamentary majority began to work even before he formed a government. In an overnight session of parliament on November 3-4, 1994, his new coalition passed legislation that secured exclusive control and oversight of privatization, the state media and the secret service. 60 An amendment to the 1991 Large Scale Privati58 Interview with Frantisek Bruckrneyer, General Director, Federation of Employers' Unions and Associations (AZZZ), Bratislava, February 6, 1997. Prior to becoming Director of AZZZ, Bruckrneyer worked for the Czechoslovak federal government after the Warsaw Pact invasion (1970-1974) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow (1974-1980). In the 1980s, he directed the state-owned firm, Zdroj , before co-founding AZZZ in 1991 . Compiled from "Leaders.sk" database. Trend Holding Co. and The Slovak Spectator, Bratislava. http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=674 [accessed August 30, 2010). 59 Marcincin et al., "Privatization Methods"; Miklos, "Economic Transition,"; Ivan Miklos, "Privatizacia," in Martin Butora and Michal lvantysin, eds. Slovensko, 1997: Suhrn a sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1998. (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky, 1998). 60 Soi\a Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 10. �120 SLOVAKIA zation Act transferred the right to propose and decide direct sales from the privatization ministry to the relatively less transparent FNM (Act #369/1994). The majority then stacked the FNM's Presidium and Supervisory Board with coalition officials and cancelled Janicina's 54 direct post-election sales (Act #370/1994). In five cases, new property owners had already taken legal possession of their assets from the state. 61 This violated both international human rights law and the Slovak Constitution. 62 The transfer of power to the FNM had important implications. The Constitutional Court later ruled that, as a joint stock company, the FNM did not have to submit to government review or regulatory oversight. Hence, it was exempt from oversight by the supreme government control body that could oversee and audit state agencies. Even had it not been exempt from oversight, however, the November 3-4 "night of the long knives" removed opposition parliamentarians from the oversight committee. The ruling majority was now fully responsible for monitoring itself. 63 While extolling the virtues of a state-directed transformation, Meciar provided the new measures with a market reform cover story. He claimed that insulating the privatization process from opposition would allow the FNM to make decisions according to technocratic criteria, free from political influence. In 1998, when the damage had been done, this allowed him to claim that although he still agreed with his "concept" of privatization, he had not been responsible for its administration. 64 Meciar's "concept" ultimately excluded outsiders from privatization. He initially promised that the second wave of voucher privatization would go ahead as planned-although with less property than Janicina envisioned. In July of 1995, however, Parliament cancelled voucher privatization altogether (Act #190/1995). Voucher booklets 61 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 126. Both Article 17b of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 217 /1948) and Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1952) secure the right to possessions. 63 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. In the fall of 1997, Parliament finally gave into EU and opposition pressure and appointed Ivan Miklos to the supervisory board of the FNM. 64 CTK News, May 8, 1998. Meciar was never directly implicated in a privatization scandal while in power, Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist, (New York: Pal grave, 2006), 91. 62 �SLOVAKIA 121 could now be exchanged for a bond with a face value of l 0,000 Sk to be redeemable in 2001 or on the bearer's 65 th birthday and with an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). Proceeds to meet the bond obligations were to come from sales of state property- a promise that the FNM's new privatization policy of selling to domestic industrial managers at a deep discount made impossible to keep . In its public statements, AZZZ took full credit for the cancellation of vouchers.65 A Constitutional Court decision overturned parts of Act #190 in late 1996.66 By that time, however, the FNM had already privatized most of Slovakia's remaining "non-strategic" industrial enterprises. Even had the government wanted to re-launch the voucher program, it would now have had to renationalize private properties to find adequate assets to make the program work. An additional measure passed in July of 1995 enhanced the government's capabilities to coordinate a state-directed industrial policy through the Strategic Enterprises Act (# 175/ 1995). The purpose of the act was to preserve the "public interest" in crucial Slovak industries. First, twenty-nine firms would be exempt from privatization altogether. This included the fundamental sectors of the economy including telecommunications, energy and the defense-related engineering sector. The list of strategic companies, made public in the summer of 1996, also included some at least questionably "strategic" firms such as health spas. 67 All told, the Strategic Enterprises Act reduced the book value of assets remaining to be privatized by half. 68 A second, legally controversial provision of the act, forced an additional forty-five firms to transfer a "golden share" to the firm's founding ministry-in most cases, to Jan Ducky's Ministry of the Economy. The Constitutional Court overturned this prescription in April of 1996 as a clear violation of property rights, but tellingly, the owners of major pro-HZDS firms , like Slovnaft, had failed to give 65 Lachovit, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie". Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 164. 67 The administration may have legitimately feared that privatization would mean the services of the spas would no longer be readily available or affordable to average Slovaks through the health care system. 68 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 130. 66 �122 SLOVAKIA the state ownership rights over the golden share. Their reaction gave credence to the market reformers' expectations that privatizationeven via a highly politicized process-would produce independent agents with the potential, at least, to resist government policies that hurt their material interests. 69 In November of 1996, the Constitutional Court also annulled Parliament's transfer of privatization powers to the FNM (Act #370/1994). The court argued that the act had illegally abrogated the state's responsibility for the transformation of state property. The Court stopped short of retroactively annulling the FNM ' s actions, however. Stripped of its exclusive prerogative over direct sales, the HZDS-controlled FNM continued to serve its clients through public auctions of shares from the FNM portfolio. While share auctions are a relatively uncontroversial privatization mode, critics allege that the FNM often limited access about the time and location of the auction to all but the intended buyer. 70 Coalition Control over Direct Sales. Between January of 1994 and November of 1996, the FNM privatized at a furious pace. While Act #3 70/1994 removed privatezation from the government's portfolio of responsibilities, coalition officials and industrial insiders from AZZZ retained close control over the process. Two FNM officials, HZDS member and FNM Chairman Milan Rehak, and Co-Chair and Director of the Direct Sales Section, Jan Povraznik, were responsible for executing Presidium decisions . These were closely controlled by the ruling coalition. Junior coalition partner ZRS had formal responsibility for the privatization process . ZRS member Peter Bisak ran the Ministry of Privatization while ZRS vice-chairman Stefan Gavornik chaired the Presidium. Gavornik attested, however, that his influence was minimal: while the HZDS had no seats on the nine member Presidium, AZZZ members held six seats and hence a majority of the votesand they supported the HZDS .7 1 Understandably, now that AZZZ 69 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi , "Bridging Slovakia's Elite Chasm," Transitions, November, 1997. 70 Jnterview with Gabriel Palacka, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 18, 1997 ; Miklos, "Economic Transition," 67-8 . 71 Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Postcommunist Europe (London: Ashgate, 2005), 64. �SLOVAKIA 123 influence was secured, incumbent managers who had previously been skeptical about privatization became its strong advocates. 72 According to Sharon Fisher, regional committees of five coalition representatives determined properties to be sold and top coalition officials made final decisions at coalition meetings every Wednesday at 6:00pm. 73 Allegedly, the meetings rarely considered the business merits of the proposal-or even how the sale would further the official goal of coordinated industrial restructuring. As Gavomik recalled, "We were .... lobbying for those who were coming to us." Yet, Gavomik added, "not even a nail was sold without Meciar."74 Milan Cagala, a HZDS-appointed FNM presidium member, confirmed these allegations. 75 More broadly, members of the ruling coalition were open about clientalism. 76 As Minister of the Economy, Jan Ducky (HZDS) explained, "every government gives advantages to those groups that cooperate with them. This is not controversial." 77 Yet sales went beyond clientalism to open self-dealing-included sales to leading ruling coalition politicians and their family members. As Gavomik admitted, "Of course there are [politicians in the privatization process], and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all .. . every citizen has a right to take part in privatization." 78 Participants in the FNM's direct sales program typically received terms similar to the midnight privatizations of February 1994. Buyers-usually incumbent managers- would receive the company for 72 Ibid. , 35. Fisher, Political Change, 88-9. The regional meetings were an institutional mechanism for regionally based privatization groups to make their claims to property. In the eyes of observers, the groups became associated with leading HZDS officials and clients. For example, it was rumored that meetings in Kosice tended to be dominated by Rezes, those in Banska Bystrica by Meciar, and those in Tmava by Vladimir Poor. Interview with Valer Ostrovsky, CEO, Schultz and Ostrovsky, Bratislava, May 14, 1997. 74 Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic," Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 75 Ibid. 76 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 66-7. 77 Author's notes from "Slovak Spectator Live, Debates for Democracy Series: Brigita Schmognerova & Jan Ducky," Bratislava, 1996. An FNM spokesman shared this sentiment with the author. Interview with Oto Balogh, Press Spokesman, Fund for National Property, Bratislava, April 22, 1998. 78 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 277-8, note 26. 73 �124 SLOVAKIA as little as one third, one-fifth, or even less of its book value. In practice, the typical firm required a ten to fifteen percent down payment, often using money borrowed from a state-owned financial institution. Moreover, installments on the purchaser' s debt to the FNM were usually spread over ten years and deductible from the company' s tax bill. These terms and often the buyers themselves were also frequently kept secret. In the case of the illegal sale of the strategically listed and highly profitable oil extraction and storage company, Nafta Gbely a.s., the new owners of the company remained a matter of intense speculation among opposition politicians and the press. The official address of the purchasing company, Druha obchodna, a.s. was initially an abandoned building. Vladimir Poor, Trnava's HZDS chief and a member of the regional coalition privatization committee later admitted to being a primary beneficiary of the deal, along with a close Meciar aide.79 FNM President Gavornik later alleged that Poor was able to meet the company's 575 million Sk purchase price simply by raiding the company's 1,075 million Sk capital account. If Gavornik is right, Poor used the firm's bank account to buy the firm for himself. Prosecutors later unsuccessfully charged Poor with "tunneling" 300 million Sk out of the company, but dropped the charges. In the end, the circumstances of the company ' s privatization were never fully investigated, perhaps because Poor voluntarily returned the company to the state. 80 In another controversial case, the FNM sold a controlling stake of Slovnaft, Slovakia's oil refinery, to Slovintegra-a company owned by Slovnaft' s director, Slavomir Hatina and nineteen other managers. Hatina was a financial backer of the HZDS and bought thirty-nine percent of the company at an eighty percent discount over the currently traded price. The initial down payment, moreover, was only 1.56 percent of the sale value. The FNM soon reduced the sale price by an additional eighty-four percent to reward management for meeting its promised investment and employment targets.81 The privatization of Slovakia' s largest company, VSZ, also continued apace under Meciar's direct sales framework. In 1995, junior 79 Fisher, Political Change, 93-4; Marcincin et al. , "Privatization Methods. " Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic, Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 81 Marcincin et. al. , "Privatization Methods," 18. 80 �SLOVAKIA 125 coalition member ZRS engineered a sale of ten percent of VSZ shares to Hutnik, a company formally owned by VSZ's union members but strongly under the influence of Minister of Transport (until 1996), Alexander Rezes. Again the price was a fraction of the real value of the shares and payments were made on a generous installment plan. Hutnik then collaborated with Rezes to form Ferrimex, a company that purchased another 15.4 percent on extraordinarily generous terms.82 The deal cemented Rezes ' s control over VSZ. Rezes responded by essentially barring minority shareholder VUB kup6n (an investment company set up by Slovakia' s state-run savings bank) from receiving any information about the health and activities of the firm _sJ Nationalism in Privatization. The Meciar government employed popular economic nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric to justify its choice of a privatization program. Junior coalition partner SNS campaigned in 1994 on a promise to protect Slovakia from "impoverishment" at the hands of foreign investors.84 The subsequent 1995 government program declaration promised to privilege "domestic business subjects" over foreigners in the privatization process. National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar correctly predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization to foreigners. 85 In practice, Slovak government officials remained deeply suspicious of foreign direct investment and often sought to block foreign partnerships. "We just want to avoid them coming in and closing [the company]," remarked one FNM official in an interview with the author. "Investors only come to misuse companies and disappear." 86 One example is notable for its senselessness: a foreign advisor to the government related that he worked with an entrepreneur to acquire a strategic foreign partner to modernize and expand production of his product line for export abroad. While the entrepreneur was not explicitly prohibited from signing the deal, he received several telephone calls from top officials in one ministry warning that he would 82 01sson, Ownership, Reform, 223 -5. lbid., 182. 84 Fisher, Political Change, 89. 85 Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 65 . 86 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997. 83 �126 SLOVAKIA be held fully accountable if even one Slovak lost his job as a result of the investment. He lost his nerve and cancelled the contract. The enterprise thus remained in debt and was unable to raise the money on its own for modernization; nor was it able to make its own marketing contacts abroad. The advisor noted that this was typical of the Meciar government's attitude towards foreign joint-ventures. 87 The combination of national capitalism and knee-jerk nationalism cost Slovakia dearly. Joint ventures with multinational corporations were at that time leading the deep industrial restrucuring of Central Europe. They had the capital, marketing networks and technology to outperform domestically privatized companies and they were far outperforming firms that remained in state hands, measured in both production increases and productivity growth. 88 Despite this growing record of success, the ruling coalition sold a mere five companies to foreigners out of a total 347. 89 On a per capita basis, by 1998, Slovakia had received half the FDI of Poland, one-third the FDI of the Czech Republic and only a tenth of the FDI of Hungary.90 This was a lost opportunity. Over the next few years, new owners would effortlessly enrich themselves by "flipping" their cheaply acquired companies to international capital-realizing for themselves gains that should have gone into the FNM accounts to meet its new privatization bond obligations. 91 Insider-Controlled Capital Markets Regulation. Having gained control over the privatization process, incumbent managers pressured the government for a favorable capital markets policy. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, investment privatization companies had clashed with incumbent managers in company board rooms. As Michael Olsson relates, the managers wanted the new ow87 Confidential interview with a foreign financial service executive, Bratislava, October 20, 1996. Most of the foreign financial service executives and consultants I sroke with had similar stories. 8 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997), http: //www.ciaonet.org/book/gould/ [accessed February 23, 2012]. 89 Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 133. 90 Gould and Szomolinyi, "Elite Fragmentation," 58. 91 Fisher, Political Change, 94. �SLOVAKIA 127 ners to contribute capital while they continued to control the direction of the company. The new owners of the funds, by contrast, sought to pressure the incumbent managers into improving cost efficiency, technological and organizational restructuring, and developing new- often international- marketing arrangements. It did not help that the funds with diverse portfolios did not have sufficient expertise to cover all the firms in their portfolio. Fund representtatives were often barely out of university and entirely lacking in experience. A cultural clash thus developed between the older generation of industrial managers-most of whom had their start in Slovak industry in the 1960s and 70s-and the "young men from Bratislava_ ,,92 Government actions in 1995 wrested industrial control from the funds back to the industrial managers. Incumbent managers began to use the direct sales process to tum the tables at meetings of general shareholders. Olsson writes, "[M]anagers who acquired a large chunk of shares on soft terms from the FNM all of a sudden lost all respect for other minority shareholders .... funds could only sit by [as] ... managers or other domestic industrial groups took over." 93 The government also intervened in capital markets to further tilt the balance of power towards management. Legislation in 1995 reduced the maximum stake investment privatization companies could hold in a company from twenty to ten percent. It also prohibited investment privatization companies from placing officials on a company ' s Board of Directors. This weakened the ability of fund-dominated Supervisory Boards to monitor the day-to-day actions of company managers. Parliament also passed capital markets regulation in 1996 that reduced the transparency of capital markets transacttions and all but eliminated minority shareholder rights. President Kovac returned the legislation, demanding better protection for minority shareholders. Ironically, the funds were not necessarily in favor of a better regulated market. The Slovak capital market had few of the institutional safeguards to protect minority shareholder rights and prevent insider trading that we find in more developed equity markets. Controlling owners were often able to expropriate value from minority 92 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 182. 93 fbid. �128 SLOVAKIA shareholders without penalty. This meant, ironically, that the emergence of a dominant shareholder in a firm often would lead to a decline in the value of the firms' shares. 94 The result was a loss in equity market liquidity: when one lost control over a company, one would often be unable to sell one's shares at any price. Wise investors knew that the majority shareholders could tunnel the real value of the company elsewhere. Under such conditions, a passive portfolio stake in all but a few "blue chip" companies made little sense. Funds found they could best make money by secretly acquiring a controlling share of companies in unregistered, off market trades of physical paper shares and then selling them at a profit to a strategic investor. Given that a more transparent market would actually undermine this strategy, a number of funds were somewhat ambivalent about reforms that might make passive portfolio investment safer and profitable. 95 The ruling coalition made things even worse. It sought to limit the funds to a portfolio role even as it actively undermined their minority shareholder rights. Ministry of Finance capital markets regulator Jozef Magula testified on behalf of minority shareholder rights in front of Parliament--much to the disappointment of top AZZZ managers . A better law was passed in 1997 .96 Still, the new law continued to allow controlling shares to be bought anonymously in secret off-market trades. 97 Remarked one broker philosophically, "at least we have rules."98 94 Economist Joseph Stiglitz observed this phenomenon in the Czech equity market, but the problems were quite similar in Slovakia. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Comments on 'Czech Republic: Capital Market Review Report,"' Delivered at the Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, I 997 ; For details, see Gould, The Politics o[ Privatization, 81- 10 I. 9 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 184-5 . 96 Magula claims that, as a result of his parliamentary testimony, he came under AZZZ pressure to step down. He relented and moved to the central bank. Interview with Jozef Magula, Member of the Bank Board, General Relations Department, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 28, 1998. 97 Magula interview, July 28, 1998 ; Interview with Rudolf Lachovic, President, Association of Investment Managers and Investment Funds of the Slovak Republic, Brati slava, June I 6, 1997; for the early market regulatory climate, see Juris, I 994. 98 Ostrovsky interview, May 14, I 997. �SLOVAKIA 129 Meaningful portfolio investment disappeared under Meciar. In addition, led by Magula, the government destroyed a rapidly growing mutual fund industry in 1996. Unlike the privatization funds, the new mutual funds gathered people's savings and invested them in the market and other assets. The pioneer was Prva slovenska investicna skupina, a.s (First Slovak Investment Company-PSIS) an open-ended fund into which citizens could deposit and withdraw like a checking account. By early 1995, the PSIS's Sporofund had over $50 million in savings. 99 It was allegedly well-run and had done a reasonable job at building shareholder value within its portfolio. But in the fall of 1994, the PSIS used its savings to invest in citizen voucher booklets issued under the Moravcik government. Vouchers, the PSIS controversially argued, were a form of state security and hence a legal investment for the mutual fund. Over 750,000 Slovaks signed up for the PSIS voucher privatization funds . Had the second wave of voucher privatization gone forward as planned, PSIS would have become the second wave's largest owner of shares in Slovak enterpnses. However, PSIS owners were also strong contributors to the Democratic Union-the party of Janicina and Moravcik. Moreover, the PSIS had a stake in the independent daily newspaper SME. Both PSIS' s political orientation and its potential economic power were a threat to the ruling coalition and its industrial allies. In the spring of 1995, the Ministry of Finance revoked PSIS 's operating license. Courts found the measure illegal and ordered that the Ministry restore the license, but the Ministry simply revoked it again and transferred control of the company's Sporofund portfolio to Harvard Investment Company. In the face of a rapid withdrawal from the Sporofund, Harvard liquidated the fund and paid off savers about half of what they had put in. 100 The Coalition Assault on Democracy, 1995-1998. Meciar's coalition could not have achieved such close control over the privatization framework without a significant attack on democratic political and civic institutions. Hence, while Slovakia's 99 Interview with Vladimir Hoffman, Broker, Delta Securities, Prague, Czech Republic, July 25 , 1997. I0°Magula interview, July 28, 1998; Ostrovsky interview, May 14, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 187-90. �130 SLOVAKIA democratic decline from 1994 to 1998 was not exclusively caused by privatization, it was certainly linked to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that the ruling coalition and its allies would have fought so hard had the nation's most lucrative assets not been available for appropriation. After ad hoc encroachments on democratic norms in 1993-94, between late 1994 and 1998, Meciar' s parliamentary majority reduced Slovakia's formal democracy to an illiberal shell verging on soft authoritarianism. One permissive cause was the majoritarian nature of the Slovak Constitution. Led by a strong executive and unhindered by a weak presidency already on the defensive, the Meciar majority sought to override the remaining checks posed by the Constitutional Court, the political opposition, civil society and regional and municipal governments. This enabled a reorientation of the privatization framework towards political and economic insiders, but it also endangered "horizontal accountability"-the country' s internal balance of institutional power. 101 Meciar' s squabble with the president was the most visible aspect of this encroachment. Kovac ' s 1993 veto over Meciar's choice of Ivan Lexa to run the privatization ministry marked the beginning of a running battle between the government and the president. The conflict took on added intensity during Meciar's third government. Kovac did not have much institutional power to start with. His repeated vetoes of parliamentary acts were quickly overridden by a simple majority- entirely in line with the Constitution. Yet, Meciar sought to further weaken and discredit the president. An important player in this campaign was the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Slovakia ' s secret service. First, Meciar had to gain control over it. In the November 3-4, 1994 session of parliament, Meciar's majority excluded opposition parties from participating on the SIS oversight committee. In the spring of 1995, parliament transferred power to appoint the head of Slovakia's intelligence agency from President Kovac to Prime Minister Meciar. Meciar then appointed his trusted protege, Ivan Lexa, to head the service. 102 Over the next two and a half years, Lexa waged a war of "dirty tricks" against the president and harassed civil society and indepen10 1 Guillenno O' Donnell, "Delegati ve Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5: I ( 1994), 55-69; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities. 102 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. �SLOVAKIA 131 dent entrepreneurs. The war reached its climax in August of 1995 when someone- possibly Meciar, but more probably Lexa-ordered that the president' s son be kidnapped, drugged, and dumped in neighboring Austria. When Robert Remias, the confidant of an exSIS agent, implicated Lexa's SIS in discussions with the editor of the leading independent daily SME, Remias was assassinated. Meciar's government squashed the investigation into the assassinationreplacing three investigators before finding one who suspended the inquiry into the SIS link. The new investigator concealed evidence that 150-200 grams of Semtex had ignited the car's propane tank. Now on the defensive, the SIS launched a campaign to show that Kovac Jr. had arranged for his own kidnapping.103 The battle between Meciar and Kovac ended only after the president's term of office expired in 1997. As the government and opposition could not achieve the super majority needed to select a replacement under a clearly flawed constitutional provision, presidential powers fell to the Prime Minister. Meciar subsequently used his presidential powers to pardon anyone linked to the kidnapping and Remias's murder-despite the lack of any official finding that a crime had taken place. 104 The government also encroached on the rights and prerogatives of the opposition, the courts, civil society and the media. In addition to oversight of the secret service, the November 3-4, 1994 parliamentary session blocked opposition MPs from participation on all substantive committees except the environment committee. The coalition further revealed its hegemonic intentions by trying to have former Prime Minister Moravcik' s party, the Democratic Union (DU), banned from parliament and by charging President Kovac with treason. Both efforts failed. To safeguard against a repeat of the 1993-4 defections of Kovac, Moravcik, Filkus, Knazko and others, defectors from the HZDS were now treated with open disrespect for the constitution. After HZDS co-founder Frantisek Gaulider left the HZDS parliamentary club in 1996, the HZDS leadership produced a pre-signed letter of resignation that they had obtained in 1994 to ensure party discipline. The 103 Kieran Wiliams, "Slovakia Since 1993," in Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001 ), 130-140. 104 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 48-50. �132 SLOVAKIA parliamentary majority then stripped him of his parliamentary mandate, barred him from the building and replaced him in parliament with a HZDS loyalist. The Constitutional Court ruled these acts to be unconstitutional, but parliament did not reinstate him- another violation of Slovakia' s fragile system of checks and balances. Gaulider also received numerous threats to his life. 105 Media and civil society also came under intense legal and extralegal pressure from the government and allegedly the SIS. The HZDS attempted to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation by creating bureaucratic barriers to their legal operation and by establishing party-controlled interest groups that competed with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. 106 Similarly in the media, parliament' s November 1994 legislation excluded the opposition from any role in oversight over public broadcasting. The state-controlled mass media and sympathetic newspapers then justified the government's actions with a torrent of unbalanced coverage, nationalism, xenophobia, personal slurs and misdirection. 107 Things were also tough for the independent media. Following his reporting on the Kovac, Jr. case, the editor of SME found a dead cat nailed to his door and his car burned. An anonymous leafleting campaign accused two other critical journalists of pornography and pedophilia. A third journalist who looked too closely at the links between Alexander Rezes and the HZDS was beaten up in a Kosice restaurant. 108 Meanwhile, privatization beneficiaries frequently bought and attempted to control the editorial content of the independent media. When VSZ took over the business daily 105 Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation," 43 ; Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, "Preface," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 5. 06 ' Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Representation in Slovakia after 1989: From 'Transmission Belts' to ' Party-State Corporatism?"' in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 93113 . 07 ' The Helsinki Civic Assembly and the Association for the Support for Local Democracy survey concluded that state-run Slovak Television violated the principles of fa irness more often than any other public or private media outlet during the 1998 electoral campaign. It devoted seventy-five percent of its news programs to Met iar and the HZDS, RFEIRL News line, 2: 192 (October 5, 1998), Part II . 108 Innes, Czechoslovakia, 313 , note 139. �SLOVAKIA 133 Narodna obroda, for example, the new owners fired the newspaper's independent-minded editor. Overall, while the independent media functioned effectively, it faced numerous forms of petty harassment from various government agencies. 109 Independent news sources, however, did not reach the entire population. In much of the country, the state broadcast media was the primary source of information. After the November 3-4 session of parliament, government loyalists controlled the state media and state broadcasting reflected their views, even to the point of collaborating with the SIS to fabricate "investigative reports" slandering the president. Nor did the most important independent media source-the television station Markiza-initially have the coverage capacity or willingness to acquaint Slovaks with the details of privatization or other rule of law issues. Toward the end of the 1996-1998 period, however, TV Markiza did become a crucial source of alternative information in Slovakia. 11 0 As the Meciar government came into conflict with basic liberal institutions and freedoms , the EU, NA TO, European governments and the United States all registered their displeasure. The EU, in particular, issued a series of diplomatic demarches as part of its dialogue with applicant countries. 111 In 1996, Freedom House reduced Slovakia's political rights ranking from "free" to "partially free." 112 However, the nastiest rap to the government's knuckles came in July of 1997, after the government illegally cancelled a national referendum on NATO membership. The European Commission recommended that Slovakia be excluded from the first wave of EU membership negotiations. While Slovakia was a liberal democracy in 109 Andrej Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Post-Communist Transition of Slovakia" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 187-208. 110 Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media," 196. 111 Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovakia's International Alignment," in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 209-30; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, l everage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 11 2 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2007," Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2007 . �134 SLOVAKIA form, the Commission opined, it operated differently in practice. 113 NATO Followed suit and excluded Slovakia from its first round of • 114 expansion. The Meciar government dismissed these external critics by questioning the objectivity of their processes and critiquing the patriotism of domestic opponents who agreed with them . Yet, the blows hurt. Slovakia's young, urban and educated citizens were deeply concerned with proving the country's western credentials and desperately wished to join Europe 's most exclusive clubs. Thus, the EU and to a lesser extent NA TO, increasingly put the government in a bind: Meciar could not comply with their "conditions" and still retain his increasingly politicized and often illegal control over political and economic life. As Milada Vachudova pointed out, "political power depended on strategies that were incompatible with the EU's re~uirements of liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform." 15 With the September/October 1998 parliamentary elections approaching, the HZDS even appeared ready to jettison free and fair elections. Parliament amended the electoral law in ways that gave the Ministry of the Interior greater influence in counting the vote; and it put ambiguous and potentially expandable limitations on the ability of the private media to cover the election. New electoral rules also shackled the ability of small parties or coalitions to participate in the election. Finally, the HZDS had the courts review the leading opposition coalition 's eligibility to participate. Many worried that should the government apply a literal interpretation of its new laws, it could eliminate a number of important institutions of liberal democracy, including the right to contestation and participation as well as the right to alternative sources of information. Opponents feared a fullfledged authoritarian turn . 116 Privatization's Half-way Reform. Meciar's privatization program produced stakeholders in dysfun113 European Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Membership of the European Union , (Brussels: European Union, 1997), section I. 3. 114 Duleba, " Democratic Consolidation." 115 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 38. 11 6 1.M. Viersma, "Sprava docasnej pozorovatelskej misie na Slovensku," Euro Report, no. I 5, 1998, pp. 22-23. �SLOVAKIA 135 ctional economic policies. This was not necessarily pre-ordained. The first two Slovak governments retained the basic elements of the market reform program inherited from the federal government. An independent National Bank of Slovakia kept the Slovak currency strong, while the first two post-independence governments restricted their fiscal expenditures and preserved a liberalized trade environment. By 1995-6, Slovakia's firms were beginning to find new markets in Western Europe. Unemployment, still high at thirteen percent, was beginning to inch down. With so much slack in the labor market, inflationary pressures remained acceptable-reflecting a sustainable increase in demand as tradable products integrated into world markets. The major problem was the deliberate coalition policy of politicized reform. 1997-8 turned out to be challenging years in the global economy. Yet, the network of industry-state-party ties shaped by an insider privatization process and illiberal politics made Slovakia even more vulnerable to a downturn. 117 Missed tax payments, uncompetitive government procurement programs, significant new government financial obligations, delayed enterprise restructuring, low foreign direct investment and a troubled banking sector all contributed to an economic crisis that would cost Slovakia the next three years of growth. Manipulation of Debt. The Slovak Republic shows that a government's capacity to protect investor property rights and enforce debt contracts is crucial to the efficiency of privatization. 118 The Meciar government's policy of direct sales led to a rapid concentration of ownership, but it did not always produce more efficient behavior. According to interviews with Western financial services experts and equity market actors, Slovak owners often rejected enterprise restructuring and instead used their insider access to cash flows and assets from privatized 117 OECD, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Slovakia, (Paris: OECD, 1999), 29-30. 11 8 Olsson, Ownership, Reform; Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, "Privatization and Corporate Governance," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region. NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics, 12 (2001), 13-34. http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0l82 .pdf [accessed February 23, 2012]. �136 SLOVAKIA enterprises to get rich quickly-a process known as "rent seeking." Much of the reason relates to debt and the firms' low purchase prices. Slovak firms carried a large outstanding burden of debt which they were not necessarily pressured to honor. First, Slovakia's bankruptcy law privileged debtors over creditors, reinforcing a persistent problem with overdue liabiities. 11 9 Second, the administration of the first wave of voucher privatization in Slovakia led to an initial concentration of privatized property in the state-bank owned funds . These state-owned banks often transgressed the official firewall between their lending and equity management operations and forced firms to take on more loans than they needed. 120 The percentage of nonperforming loans in the portfolios of Slovakia's three state banks skyrocketed between 1996 and 1998 from twenty-five to thirty-seven percent. 121 Third, privatization in highly discounted client or management buyouts failed to bring in new cash or debt relief to Slovak companies. Despite the often-symbolic purchase prices and favorable repayment terms, politically connected buyers would often increase debt by borrowing from state banks to make their down payment to the FNM. Privatized firms also frequently stopped paying their taxes. Between 1995 and 1998, tax arrears of private firms in Slovakia tripled to about sixteen percent of total state expenditures. Fully paid, this would have been enough to eliminate the budget deficit. 122 The scarcity of cash in the economy did not bode well for restructuring. Many managers privatized their firms only to find themselves apparently condemned to eke out a living at the margins of solvency for years on end. Facing such choices, and given lucrative 11 9 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, p. 97 . Debt loading is the practice of pushing unnecessary loans on cash rich firms at high rates as a means of extracting their funds. According to Andrew Schwartz, it was a common practice among bank-owned privatization funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Since debt loading siphoned off cash that should have been shared with the enterprise ownership's minority shareholders, it was a form of tunneling. Andrew Schwartz, The Politics of Greed: How Privatization Structured Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 236-7; Appel, A New Capitalist Order, 64; Jarko Fidrmuc and Andreas Worgotter, "Czech Banking Sector: Reasons of Banking Crises and Prospects," Discussion Parer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1998. 21 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 79. 122 Ibid., 54-55 . 120 �SLOVAKIA 137 opportunities for cash assets elsewhere, 123 it actually made sense for new owners to strip their companies and return the shells to the FNM before making the first installment payment. Another option was to consume the company slowly-meeting its minimal obligations to the FNM and tax office, defaulting on inter-enterprise debt and siphoning off the extra cash. 124 Officially, the FNM was allowed to control major asset transfers in firms with FNM debt, but in practice, it was too over-stretched to monitor all transactions. 125 Meciar's HZDS- through the government- held the ends of the long strings of debt that permeated the economy. Ideally, given its commitment to state-led industrial restructuring, these debt obligetions should have been used by the government and the Ministries of Finance and Economy to coordinate restructuring efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy's official statement on industrial policy made it clear that control over liability networks was a crucial component of its effort to engage in industrial restructuring. The Ministry also aspired to promote the development of asset networks, "by supporting groupings of enterprises into holdings," to "pool investment resources." 126 The reality was that, due to coalition permeation by privileged 123 In one example of crowding out, the author interviewed an industrial manager who had recently signed a contract to produce copper pipes for a firm in Germany. When it came time to buy scrap metal to begin production, however, the cash he had reserved for the purpose had disappeared and he had to default on the contract. He soon learned that the owners had moved the funds to a short-term security with a return far greater than that offered by the copper pipe contract. Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povazske strojame, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, July, 22 1998. 124 Indeed, one EU sponsored consultant that I spoke with actually advised his clients to engage in a similar "triage" strategy of debt management. He advised managers facing illiquidity to delay paying those creditors who were no longer essential to the firm while using scarce cash to meet obligations to those creditors who were. The understanding was that the legal framework would favor the debtor. Confidential interview, foreign financial consultant, Bratislava, April, 1997. 125 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997 . Ironically, the politicization of credit and debt may have meant that the incentives to "rip off' stakeholders and minority shareholders were greater for owners who did not enjoy close contacts with the government. Unlike their well-connected competitors, they were less likely to win any dispensations from government creditors at the state-owned banks, the FNM or the tax officials. 126 Ministry of the Economy, SR, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update." Ministry of the Economy, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1997. �138 SLOVAKIA industrial interests, it was the governing coalition's industrial clients (as well as those firms that could "arrange" for ad hoc dispensations) that often pulled the strings of Slovak industrial and privatization policy. The result was that state-business networks were used to channel present and future tax revenues into the pockets of politically important industries and individuals. Ironically, after the Meciar government fell in 1998, the successor government picked up these long strings and used them to regain control of many enterprises. Revitalization and Industrial Policy. Even inter-enterprise debt and tax arrears provided opportunities for government manipulation. As noted, the bankruptcy framework privileged debtors over creditors. As most AZZZ members were debtors, there was little incentive for the industrial lobby to support a change in policy. Yet the government also passed a controversial Revitalization Act that granted chosen firms the right to enter into a state-sponsored debt relief program. 127 The Revitalization Act was designed in conjunction with Ducky's Ministry of the Economy on behalf of Slovakia's hard-hit engineering and machinery sectors. Based largely on tax relief, in practice its use was limited to the "restructured" companies owned by the quasi-private holding company, DMD Holdings a.s., as well as a number of agricultural firms. 128 DMD, run by Meciar's former Minister of Finance JuliusT6th, was an umbrella holding company for a network of former state-run defense manufacturing firms that were most severely hit by defense cutbacks at the end of the Cold War. In addition to restructuring, DMD profited from direct Ministry of Economy support- mostly in the form of encouragement and coordination-for the development of an indigenous automobile supply network. 129 While the effects of these direct attempts at industrial policy appeared to be generally well intentioned, they had little positive effect on restructuring the 127 Ministry of the Economy, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update," 18. The government also set up a state-run arms trading company, Armex. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, l 04-5 . 129 AZZZ 1996; Intervi ew with Ministry of Economy Plenipotentiary for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia, Alfred Richter in Samuel Bibza, "Yel'ke Plany," MOT, August, 1998, 4-8 . Interview with Jan Lesinsky, President, Slovak Society of Automoti ve Engineers, Bratis lava, August I 0, 1998 . 128 �SLOVAKIA 139 companies involved. 130 Indeed, the program virtually halted marginally successful earlier attempts at defense conversion. 131 Slovakia eventually got its automotive sector, but it took the defeat of Meciar, clear political compliance with the prerequisites of EU membership, macroeconomic stabilization and significant initial investment incentives to entice foreign automobile producers and supply companies to come to Slovakia. 132 Politicization of Bank Privatization. The FNM's insider privatization framework raised levels of conflict surrounding bank privatization. In early 1996, Meciar promised to privatize Slovakia's largest state banks to Slovakia' s leading enterprises, most notably VSZ and Slovnaft. 133 Observers quickly pointed out that the likely result of the privatizations would be to decapitalize the banks as owner-firms, like VSZ, wrote themselves checks. Hence, while opposition parties KDH, DS and DU, were officially in favor of privatizing the banks, they formed a one-time coalition with HZDS's far left wing governing partner, ZRS , to get the banks placed on the list of strategic enterprises that prevented their privatization. The ZRS had nothing against bank privatization per se, but it allegedly was upset that the HZDS had excluded ZRS clients from buying one of the banks. 134 While partially preventing the banks ' capture and potential mismanagement by industrial managers, the banks nevertheless remained undercapitalized. Deeply in need of capital, the VSZ nevertheless did secure control over Slovakia's third largest state bank, Investicna a rozvojova banka (Investment and Development Bank-IRB) through the support of the FNM at shareholder meetings. 135 IRB had a troubled portfolio 130 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 104-5 . Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 75 . 132 Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, "Slovakia's Neoliberal Tum," Europe-Asia Studies 59:6 (2007), 977-98. 133 If we include the third state owned financial institution, Slovenska sporitel'na, these three banks accounted for as much as 90% of all Slovak deposits and 60% of all loans. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, (Paris: OECD, 1998), 29; EilJ (Economist Intelligence Unit), Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, (London: Economist, 1998), 17. 134 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 258 . 135 OECD, Slo vak Country Report, 1997-8, p. 29; EilJ, Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, p. 17; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 158. 131 �140 SLOVAKIA which VSZ control did little to correct. The state had been using it to keep a nuclear power plant solvent and to provide subsidies to the construction industry to build apartments for young couples. In 1997, IRB liquidity problems worsened and the bank was forced to borrow internationally at rates driven up by the emerging global financial crisis . The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) directed the VSZ, as the primary owner, to provide a much-needed capital injection. The VSZ refused. The NBS later "suggested" that the bank's deterioration resulted from "serious illegal transgressions which negatively influenced the bank's activities ." To add to the crisis, junior coalition partner SNS refused to support a renewal of state support for the construction industry's subsidized apartment loan program. After more government infighting, the IRB failed to meet its depositors' demands, forcing the NBS to seize it in December of 1997. 136 The VSZ raid on Slovakia's financial sector was the logical culmination of insider privatization under illiberal political conditions. Tightly bound together by political necessity, Meciar's administration provided Rezes and his network of enterprises insider access to special deals in privatization, taxation, credit allocation (from state financial institutions) and almost every other area where the state intersects with economic activity. Moreover, Meciar did this despite open indications of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The final cost to other corporations, the taxpayers and VSZ's more than 25,000 employees was enormous. By the winter of 1998, VSZ Holdings had defaulted on its foreign obligations and was facing layoffs and bankruptcy. Meciar's successor government then used this crisis to regain control of the company and limit its growing debt. 137 In 2000, the successor government sold the VSZ to United States Steel Corporation. 136 OECD, Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, 77-8; EfU, Slovak Country Report, 1st Quarter I 998, 17. In the spring of 1998, the VSZ used its influence with the FNM and its direct and indirect shareholdings in the two other state financial institutions to provide the !RB with a costly capital injection. The VSZ again refused to contribute any cash of its own beyond the initial amount required by the NBS . Nor was there any real attempt by VSZ to find an adequate foreign buyer. Peter Laca, "Troubled !RB bank approves capital injection," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-21 , 1998. 137 "Vlada mimo hry," Pravda, November 17, I 998; See also Miklo§, 1997 . �SLOVAKIA 141 Abuse of State Property. Coalition misuse of property included firms that were not yet privatized. Perhaps the most notable case is former Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky' s abuse of the country's natural gas company, Slovensky plynarensky priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry-SPP). A key member of AZZZ and a former communist-era official, Ducky resigned his position with the government to oversee a systematic tunneling of SPP assets for personal and political use. This included financing FC Slovan- Slovakia' s most famous football team (and, ironically, the former Czechoslovak rival to Sparta Praha, a team purchased by VSZ's Alexander Rezes). Ducky would even hand out cash bonuses to reward players for stellar play. 138 The full extent of Ducky's tunneling only became clear after the government fell from power. Ducky died in a still unexplained assassination in 1999 three days after a probe was launched into his handling of the company.139 Slowing Macroeconomic Performance. It is ironic that, except for privatization, Meciar's second government largely left the federal reform package intact until 1996. 140 The resulting favorable entrepreneurial conditions and international demand produced a relatively strong recovery in 1994-1996, matching a regional trend. The tight monetary policy of the largely independent NBS was a crucial element in the strong macroeconomic performance of Slovakia. Yet, since NBS monetary discipline also signifycantly raised the cost of credit, maintained the real value of liabilities, and put constraints on fiscal policy, the NBS came under pressure from the Ministry of Finance to be "more cooperative" with Slovak industrial policy. According to Ivan Miklos, VSZ President Jan Smerek complained that the NBS's tight money policy was a form of "disliking VSZ and, apparently, disliking Slovakia's development." 14 1 Under intense industrial pressure, the NBS narrowly escaped an attempt by parliament to place it more directly under government control. 142 Heavy borrowing, low foreign investment and this attack on the NBS led major investment rating agencies to 138 Confidential interview with FC Slovan football player, Bratislava, July 1998. Fisher, Political Change, 94. 140 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 63. 141 Ibid., 71-2. 142 EIU, Slovak Country Report, r" Quarter 1998, 16-7. 139 �142 SLOVAKIA downgrade Slovak bonds to below investment-grade level in the spring of 1998. This further raised the cost of borrowing. 143 By the end of Meciar's third government, enterprise restructuring in Slovakia had also slowed. Firms that sought an injection of capital had to face among other things : poorly functioning equity markets rendering an initial public offering nearly impossible; a government that was suspicious and even hostile to foreign strategic investors; government decision-making and procurement processes that frequently violated the equal application of the rule of law; and finally , an increasingly profligate fiscal policy, capped by a costly infrastructure development program that crowded out private investment. By the spring of 1998, the Meciar government had to finance its cash-starved economy on European markets at the relatively costly rate of 3.5 percent above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. It also borrowed short term domestically at a nominal rate of twenty-eight percent. The high level of domestic borrowing aggravated the credit squeeze on Slovakia's already strapped enterprises. 144 Short term borrowing to meet long term debt obligations was the final nail in the Meciar government's economic coffin. By the summer of 1998 it was clear that the Slovak performance of the previous years had been financed by unsustainable fiscal spending and borrowing. Meciar's Electoral Defeat, October 1998. Parliamentary elections in late September of 1998 proved a satisfactory denouement to the regime's VSZ-led orgy of self-dealing. The government had put in place rules that looked as if it was equipping itself with the necessary tools for a full-fledged authoritarian seizure of power. No seizure occurred. It is possible that the HZDS did not even consider the possibility. Even if it had, concerted efforts from independent NGOs, regional governmental associations, and a united center-right coalition of parties and the SDI.; helped to mobilize 84.25 percent of the voting population. Many correctly interpreted the election as a test of Slovakia's Western European credentials. The HZDS won a marginal plurality, but the ZRS was in shambles 143 "Another Agency Downgrades Slovaki a's Risk Indicator," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-2 1, 1998, p. 5. 144 M. E.S.A I 0, Slovak Mo nthly Report, May 1998, p. 1-2; M. E. S.A I 0, Slovak Monthly Report, July 1998, p. 2. �SLOVAKIA 143 after its lamentable performance as a far left party in formal charge of creating capitalists from state assets. The HZDS tried, but was unable to lure the SDI: away from the opposition to form a coalition. The SDC then joined a coalition of parties (the Slovak Democratic Coalition-SOK), SMK and the new Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) to form a government united by little more than opposition to Meciar and a desire to get into the EU and NAT0. 145 Slovakia's privatization winners split deeply during the election. Most of the direct beneficiaries of Meciar's politicized economic policies remained close to the Prime Minister. Most notably, VSZ owner Alexander Rezes provided the HZDS with significant frnancial support and other perks, including flying the Prime Minister to campaign events in his private jet and even forcing his football team, Sparta Praha, to wear HZDS jerseys in a campaign-related friendly match. Rezes ' s empire was already hemorrhaging money despite having raided two of Slovakia' s leading frnancial institutions. The IRB had already been bailed out by the NBS at taxpayer expense. This was an indirect subsidy that allowed money to filter into the HZDS campaign. It must have been clear to Rezes that only continued "industrial collaboration" with his political patron would save his fortune. Yet, faced with the gathering strength of the opposition, other Meciar clients were more circumspect- even Tmava's Vladimir Poor hinted at his willingness to work with a new govemment. 146 The SOP, the new "Party of Civic Understanding" promoted itself as the voice of the independent entrepreneurial community. In interviews, its spokesman strongly critiqued the disastrous economic management of the government and promised to uphold the rule of law in economic and political dealings. It sought initially to establish a safe, pro-business middle ground between the polarized camps in Slovakia' s "Cold War. " Despite this, its founder, Rudolf Schuster, refused any prospect of cooperation with the HZDS. 147 Other entre145 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy, I0: I (I 999), 80-95 . 146 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence," in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield, 2000), 47-70. 147 Interview with Ferdinand Petrak, Vice Chairman, Party for Civic Understanding (SOP), Bratislava, July 28, 1998; Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities, 71. �144 SLOVAKIA preneurs continued to support the SDI:, and the newly united Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SKDU). 148 Conclusion. Having privatized their enterprises through political connections, Meciar's clients went on to privatize state policy. Rather than demand the rule of law, they corrupted politicians; rather than invest resources to restructure, they stripped and tunneled them; rather than act as national champions, they preyed on the country's financial stability. By 1998, the coalition government's economic model was no longer sustainable. As the economic price of clientalism grew, the politicization of economic policy became an important additional grievance in the opposition's political arsenal. Never completely unied, many of the coalition's economic allies sat on the fence or sought accommodation with the opposition. Others proved firm HZDS supporters-particularly Rezes's VSZ, who must have seen that VSZ's financial future was closely linked to government policy. On the whole, privatization in Slovakia did not produce "market democrats," but it did succeed in providing economic agents who responded to their own logic of action. These proved to be both a boon and a curse to Meciar during his moment of greatest political crisis. Privatization' s impact on Slovakia's political liberalization, in short, was at best neutral and at worst negative. Ultimately, it was a united opposition, strategically smart NGO's and a mass mobilezation of Slovakia's voters that established market democracy in Slovakia. 148 Gould and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence." � 102 SLOVAKIA , ..., VLADIMIR MECIAR AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1992-1998 1 John A. Gould "A just privatization does not exist; we all know that the only criterion was loyalty. " - Vit'azoslav Morie, SNS honorary chair2 Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution put former Communist Party bureaucrats and industrial managers on the defensive. Associated with the communist past, many top managers were removed from their jobs while the middle managers that replaced them carried little political clout in broader debates over the design of economic reforms like privatization. As a result, Czechoslovak privatization architects had the freedom to offer average citizens a potential stake in state-owned companies. In return for a small administrative fee, citizens received coupons that would allow them to bid on company shares . Most participating citizens, however, chose to invest through new financial intermediaries, called investment privatization funds, which would concentrate citizens' small shares into larger stakes in privatized companies. By 1993, these intermediaries began to rival remaining communist-era managers for control of Czech and Slovak firms .3 1 This paper is adopted from John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 103-32. A full list of acknowledgments can be found on pp. vii-viii of that work, but the author would like to thank the following for their comments, assistance and support: Hilary Appel, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Sharon Fisher, Zsolt Gal, Simona Gould, Timothy Haughton, Cubomira Hromkova, Darina Malova, Mikael Olsson, Marek Ryhal', Sona Szomolanyi, James Thompson and Milada Anna Vachudova. The author is responsible for any errors in logic or fact. 2 Abigail Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 200 I), 263. 3 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby,"The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic," Europe-Asia Studies 48 :2 (1996), 285-303; Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: �SLOVAKIA 103 While the mass privatization program continued in the Czech Republic through 1995, Slovakia's industrial managers were able to derail it after independence on January 1, 1993 . They had initially suffered from the same liabilities as their Czech counterparts. 4 Yet, as debate over the sovereign status of Slovakia developed in 199192, Slovak managers found a resource in identity politics that their Czech counterparts largely lacked. 5 By fusing their interests to rising popular-nationalism, a select group gained influence with a number of Slovakia's nascent political parties, and most notably, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The following paper examines the politics of privatization in Slovakia after independence. Slovakia's battle over privatization and its aftermath was a nasty, occasionally dangerous affair with very high stakes. At the center of this battle, initially, were the efforts of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and various industrialists to stop the highly popular citizens' "voucher" privatization program that Slovakia had inherited from the federal republic. This had little to do with the voucher program 's evident flaws . Rather, Meciar's policies sought to reorient privatization away from the new financial intermediaries which largely supported his opponents. In its place, his government operated a direct sales program that would benefit those who would support him. Yet, by attempting to replace a program that rewarded a majority of Slovak citizens with a program that only rewarded a narrow group of industrial managers and political allies, Meciar embarked on a democratically difficult project. His early efforts to gain close personal control over the privatization process contributed to the alienation of many of the key players in the HZDS, including President of Slovakia Michal Kovac. The president briefly orchestrated Meciar's Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Central Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Peter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic," Telos 94 ( I 992), I 03-130; Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 56-68. 4 Interview wi th Jozef Uhrik, Commercial Director, Volkswagen Slovakia, Devinska Nova Yes, Slovakia, January 14, 1997 ; Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povai.ske strojarne, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, Slovakia, July, 22 I 998 . 5 Hilary Appel and John Gould, " Identi ty Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics," Europe-A sia Studies 52: I (2000), 111-31. �104 SLOVAKIA removal from power in March of 1994 after he made a speech criticizing a series of legally questionable privatization decisions. When Meciar regained power in November, he acted on the knowledge that his political and economic ambitions were incompatible with the democratic institutions he had inherited. The ensuing assault on democratic norms, rules and procedures, while not entirely directed at privatization, nevertheless gave his ruling coalition the freedom to privatize as it pleased. However, by the end of Meciar' s third term, Slovakia could no longer demonstrate its democratic credentials to the European Union or NATO . Both threatened to exclude Slovakia from their next rounds of expansion. Privileged access to government was not simply important to acquiring property. Under Meciar it also became increasingly useful for securing favorable economic policies such as the allocation of credit, the regulation of capital markets, government procurement, and taxation policies. Between 1996 and 1998, such largess undermined Slovakia' s economic recovery and threw the country into an economic crisis. By 1998, both Slovakia's long term economic recovery and its European future were in danger. Slovak voters responded with an 84.4 percent electoral turnout that left the ruling coalition no choice but to accept the vote and surrender power. Privatization should produce independent economic actors who seek a profit rather than a government handout. Yet, as the Slovak experience under Meciar reminds us, privatization is first and foremost a means of acquiring wealth and power. Where easy profits can easily be had through political connections, creating private property does not necessarily go hand in hand with market democracy. For privatization to be most effective, societies must first be willing and able to police the intersection of state policy and economic activity. Voucher Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1993. Privatization in Czechoslovakia was designed at the federal level, but it was largely carried out by the Czech and Slovak republiclevel governments. In Slovakia privatization began under the government of Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christiaq Democratic Movement-KDH) and his 30 year-old neo-liberal Minister of Privatiza- �SLOVAKIA 105 tion,6 Ivan Miklos. While there was room for administrative innovation to account for local differences, in practice, Miklos administered the voucher program in an almost identical fashion to his Czech counterparts. This was no small accomplishment. Following the collapse of support for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's first government in the spring 1991 , the new ruling coalition was deeply divided over privatization. The Carnogursky government included Jan Holcfk, and Jozef Belzak as Ministers of Industry and Economy, respectively. While both men favored a transition towards markets, both had industrial ties and favored a strong sectoral industrial policy in which firms would be restructured before privatization. In addition to Carnogursky 's ministers, industry had a strong friend in KDH member Viliam Oberhauser, a founding member of what Miklos claimed was industry's nomenklatura-controlled peak organization, the Federation of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZ). 7 Oberhauser was a key member of the nationalist wing of the KDH and had helped author a "gradualist" economic reform scenario, challenging the market-oriented federal economic reforms that had been in place since January of 1991. 8 This created difficulties for Miklos. In the final years of the 1980s, Miklos had studied market economics at the Austrian school of Friedrich Hayek. At the time of the Revolution, he had been an economics student and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Bratislava. Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak brought him into the government in 1990. 9 After, the launch of strong market-oriented 6 There were three privatization ministries- one in each republic, and one at the federal level to deal with federal state property. Their formal name at the republic level was the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Assets. For an explanation see, Petr Husak, Budovani kapitalismu v Cechach: Rozhovory s Tomasem Jeikem (Prague: Volvox Globatour, 1997), 111 ; John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 61. 7 lvan Miklos "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Slovak Political Science Association, 1997), 65. 8 Jvan Miklos recalls that the Ministries of Forest and Water, Agriculture and even the Environment - all run by KDH appointees - had strong gradualist leanings. Interview with Ivan Miklos, Consultant, M.E.S.A. I 0, Bratislava, April 2, 1997. 9 Miklos's first post was as Deputy Prime Minister, Jozef Kucerak's advisor, and Director of the Government's Section for Economic and Social Policy. Interview �106 SLOVAKIA reforms in January of 1991, however, Slovakia ' s economy suffered disproportionately more than the Czech Republic ' s economy. 10 Economic liberals like Kucerak increasingly became the target of colleagues seeking to distance themselves publicly from the growing pain of economic transformation. Market reforms would be managed better, they argued, if Slovak politicians were to have greater control over their own economic and political affairs where they could use state controls to moderate the pace of transition. 11 As the lead proponent of a federally brokered, rapid transformation towards a market economy, Kucerak was forced to step down after a vote of no-confidence in the spring of 1991 . Miklos was elevated to Minister of Privatization soon after and quickly replaced Kucerak as the most outspoken market liberal in the government and the strongest public supporter of federal reforms. He faced the brunt of attacks from both the opposition and the national wing of the ruling KDH. This included surviving several parliamentary votes of no-confidence. By the winter of 1991-92, it was increasingly clear that the KDH-led coalition would fare poorly in the upcoming June elections. Miklos feared that the next government would most likely slow privatization and delay the creation of private owners. He therefore sought to start the voucher program as quickly as possible- to create a fait accompli of new owners with a stake in continuing the rapid property transformation program. Miklos was responsible for convincing state-owned firms to put up shares for the voucher privatization program in Slovakia. He recalled that the threat of dismissal helped him to encourage most managers to include significant voucher components in their base privatization plans, but the pressure was bitterly resented. 12 Miklos with Ivan Miklos, Bratislava, October 1, 1996; Interview with Jozef Kucenik, Bratislava, January 13, 1997. 10 Slovakia was particularly handicapped by its reliance on heavy defense industries, among other things. See Gould, Politics of Privatization. 11 For details see Gould, Politics of Privatization , 73-79 . 12 In about sixty cases, managers called for direct sales exclusively to themselves. Assuming that the managers had failed to meet their obligations under the privatization act to make important data available to competitors, Miklos reopened the proposed submission process for an additional two months and pushed the firms to provide the necessary data to allow competitors to propose rival privatization plans for each firm, Miklos interview, October I, 1996; Ivan Miklos, "Corruption Risks in the Privatization Process: A Study of Privatization Developments in the Slovak Re- �SLOVAKIA 107 further alienated industrial elites by converting what they hoped would be a program of cheap, direct sales of enterprise shares to incumbent managers, into a transparent, competitive program in which price was the leading criterion. Prior to the June elections, the ministry sold shares in 189 firms for prices approximating and often exceeding their book value. 13 It would be another six years before the state would do as well financially in its direct sales of public property. Meanwhile, the first wave of voucher privatization began in October of 1991 with the registration of 2.59 million Slovak citizens, almost two-thirds of the adult population, through the federal Ministry of Finance. As in the Czech Republic, 14 registration for the program in Slovakia initially lagged until financial intermediaries (also referred to as investment privatization companies) began to offer a ten-fold or greater return on the voucher holder's initial registration fee within a year. Seventy-two percent of Slovak citizen-participants subsequently invested their voucher coupons with investment privatization funds in the first wave of privatization. Bidding on firms began in May of 1992 and closed in December. Shares were finally distributed to new owners in April of 1993 .15 Despite the efforts of industrial elites, the federal voucher privatization program had succeeded in providing the investment privatization funds stakes of up to forty percent in privatized firms. 16 Another wave of voucher privatization could allow fund owners to consolidate ownership of Slovakia's industrial assets. Over the next two years industrial managers, therefore, worked diligently through AZZZ to ensure a second wave of voucher privatization would not take place. 17 public," Bratislava, Klub Windsor, I 995; Interview with I.'.udovit Cemak, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 2, I 997. 13 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997; Mikael Olsson, Ownership, Reform and Corporate Governance: The Slovak Privatization Process in 1990-1996 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1999), 119. 14 For details, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, Chapter 5. 15 For more on the technical details of voucher privatization, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 63-8. 16 0Jsson, Ownership, Reform, 115-6, 219. 17 AZZZ (Federation of Employers Unions and Associations), "5. vyrocie AZZZ SR, 1991-1996," Spravodaj AZZZ Extra. Bratislava, March, 1996; Rudolf Lachovic, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie a kolektivneho investovania," Global Brokers, Bratislava, I 997, manuscript. �108 SLOVAKIA Meciar's Second Government, 1992-1994. Meciar's HZDS dominated the June 1992 elections. With the tacit support of the Slovak National Party (SNS), he became Slovak Prime Minister for the second time. In July negotiations with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Meciar failed in his bid to form a weak confederation with the Czech Republic. Unable to reconcile Meciar's concept of a weak confederation with Klaus' concept of a strong federation, the two agreed to replace the federal state with two sovereign, independent republics. After parliamentary approval in both republican assemblies, the countries split peacefully on January 1, 1993. 18 As in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization in Slovakia became one of the more popular aspects of the federal reform program. 19 This may help to explain why the Meciar government, elected in June of 1992, completed the first wave as its predecessor had planned. Nevertheless, Meciar's Minister of Privatization, I:ubomir Dolgos, promised a shakeup in the next round. One of the new govemment' s first decisions was to indefinitely postpone the demand that firms submit second round privatization plans to the Ministry of Privatization. This necessitated at least a delay in the second round of voucher privatization. In September of 1992, the government program declaration and an associated Ministry of Privatization document spelled out a new privatization philosophy based on a more gradual state-guided economic transformation. Rather than emphasize the rapid creation of new owners, the state would now single out "strategic fields" where it would intervene to protect the national interest through the state restructuring of enterprises before, or in place of, privatization. Industrial ministries would design and coordinate restructuring plans with the assistance of the state-controlled financial sector. 18 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Innes, Czechoslo vakia. 19 Miklo~ interview, April 2, 1997; Dusan Triska recalled being surprised at the strong support for the voucher scheme in Slovakia. Dusan Triska, "Privatization: Czechoslovakia" Eastern European Economics 26 (Fall, 1991 ); DusanTl'iska, "Political , Organizational, and Legislative Aspects of Mass Privatization-Czechoslovakia," in Marko Simonetti and Andreja Bohm, eds., Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe, 1991 . (Ljubljana: Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1991 ). Oldfich Dedek, The Break-up of Czechoslovakia (Aldershoot: Ave bury 1996), 201 . �SLOVAKIA 109 This concept also favored direct sales to incumbent managers over voucher privatization. Price was no longer the dominant criterion in evaluating bids on the company shares that were to sold. First installments were lowered from thirty percent of the price to ten to fifteen percent, and payment could be extended over fifteen years. Another round of voucher privatization would take place, but would only be used as a residual method.20 Similarly, the threat that a manager would be dismissed diminished under the new government. Miklos asserted that Meciar and his Minister of Economy, I:udovit Cernak, reappointed many of the communist-era managers that had been pushed out by Carnogursky's government. 21 Many of these had been forced out for having collaborated with the communist secret service before the Revolution-in a process called "lustration."22 Cemak himself related that Meciar frequently paid little attention to his appointees' lustration certificates in . personne l dec1s1ons. . . 23 h1s Little privatization occurred under Dolgos in the first six months of 1993. Rather, Meciar focused his energies on consolidating control over his cabinet- pushing out co-HZDS founder Milan Kiiazko (who was a marginal threat to Meciar for party control) and Minister of Economy, Cemak. As a Kiiazko protege, Dolgos soon found himself in constant conflict with Meciar-most notably over whether vouchers should have any role in the second round when it started. Meciar felt they should not, while Dolgos asserted that he sought to put aside about a third of corporate shares for voucher privatization. 20 Dolgos stressed that any efforts to set voucher privatization timelines or the volume of assets to be voucher privatized in advance, "would ... fail to serve a purpose." Dolgos's reformulated concept even "warned" industrial managers that if their second wave base privatization plans relied too heavily on the voucher method, they would be "subjected to particularly critical and thorough evaluation." There would also be a critical "assessment of the risks derived from concentration of ownership through privatization investment funds ." Instead, Dolgos emphasized "combined methods" in which management buyouts would play an "exceedingly important role." Ministry of Administration and Privatization, SR. , "Concept of the Continuing Process of Privatization in the Slovak Republic. " Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1992; Interview with Cubomir Dolgos, Faculty of Management, Economics University, Bratislava, March 20, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 119-20. 21 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997. 22 Marsina interview, July, 22 1998; Uhrik interview, January 14, 1997. 2 3<'.:emak interview, April 2, 1997. �110 SLOVAKIA On June 12, 1993, Dolgos lost an HZDS-engineered vote of no confidence and stepped down.24 The departures of independent personalities like Cernak, Kiiazko and Dolgos left Meciar in more solid control over the HZDS and the government, but it also made his parliamentary majority vulnerable to future defections. Nevertheless, Meciar stepped up his efforts to replace his former colleagues with his personal loyalists-particularly in the Ministry of Privatization and the Fund for National Property (FNM). 25 At that time, the privatization ministry coordinated the privatization decision-making process while the FNM was a fully state-owned joint stock company charged with distributing shares to their new private owners. FNM appointees also represented the state's interests as a shareholder at general assemblies of corporate shareholders. In 100% state-owned companies, the FNM was on paper, at least, in complete control of the firm. Control over the FNM would give the Prime Minister control over most unprivatized and many partially privatized firms. Attempts to gain direct governmental control over the privatezation ministry and the FNM brought Meciar into sharp conflict with President Michael Kovac, another co-founder of the HZDS .26 To replace Dolgos at the privatization ministry, Meciar chose a close associate, Ivan Lexa. Having backed Meciar in the dismissal of Kiiazko, Kovac now balked. Citing Lexa's inexperience and potential conflicts of interest with his father (a communist-era central planning agency bureaucrat, recently-turned entrepreneur), the president refused to approve the appointment. Meciar responded by giving Lexa the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Privatization (the highest ministerial position not requiring presidential approval) and assumed the responsibilities of Minister himself. One of Lexa's first privatization decisions as State Secretary in July of 1992 was to ap24 Dolgos interview, March 20, 1997; Cemak interview, April 2, 1997. Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 25 . 26 Slovakia 's President was constitutionally weak, making the need for a strong party system to check the Prime Minister's power all the more necessary. Executive power flowed from the Parliament, with limited presidential powers to check it. Kovac could and did veto legislation and appointees, but Parliament could override this with a simple majority. Later, when Parliament deadlocked over a new presidential candidate, presidenti al powers - including the power of a presidential amnesty transferred to the Prime Minister. 25 �SLOVAKIA 111 prove his father ' s participation in the privatization of Povazske mlyny a cestoviname, a.s., with a personal stake estimated at up to 1 billion Sk (then about US $30 million).27 While Meciar consolidated power over Slovakia' s privatization and property control mechanisms, financial intermediaries whose funds had done so well in the first round of privatization began to assert some clout in shareholder meetings. Enterprise managers had also established a few funds. 28 Slovakia' s largest company, Vychodoslovenske zeleziame, a.s (Eastern Slovak Steelworks- VSZ) had established Cassiovia Invest, which had the marketing clout to acquire more than ten percent of the vouchers. But most funds- and hence a large portion of corporate power- were in the hands of enterprise outsiders, a fact that was increasingly resented by the incumbent industrial managers.29 In the first wave of privatization, the funds had amassed a forty percent stake in privatized firms and from the perspective of incumbent managers, carried unwelcome clout. Battles soon emerged over which would be dominant in determining the overall strategy of the company, the shareholder-dominated Supervisory Boards or the management-controlled Boards of Directors.30 Meciar' s allies came to feel that the most influential funds were, as subsequent Fund for National Property President Stefan Gavomik put it, "owned by the opposition."31While not technically true, by the end of the year, industrial managers and fund-appointed board members began to run into sharp conflict over the day-to-day management and long-term strategy of "privatized" companies. Hoping to avoid a further erosion of corporate insider influence, AZZZ halted a 27 Anton Marcincin, Daniela Zemanovifova, and Lubos Vagac, "Privatization Methods and Development of Slovakia," Bratislava, Center for Economic Development, 1996, 17. 28 Another fi fty percent was spread across a wide range of funds and individual shareholders, leaving the FNM , with its residual 37.6 percent, effectively in charge. Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 223 . 29 AZZZ, "S.Vyrocie AZZZ SR, 199 1- 1996"; Miklos, "Corruption Risks," 64; Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 279, 283. 30 Slovak and Czech companies had a dual board structure consisting of a supervisory board that gave general strategic direction to the company and managerial oversight, and a management board- largely consisting of top corporate mana~ers- that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the firm. 1 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 11 8. �112 SLOVAKIA second round of voucher privatization. Meciar obligingly pushed back the start date for the next round of voucher privatization. In the fall of 1993, Meciar complimented his firm grasp of the Ministry of Privatization by putting personal loyalists on the board of the National Property Fund. Between December of 1993 and March of 1994, his indirect control over state shares of major firms allowed him to replace enterprise board members and managers of twentyone Slovak companies which, allegedly, failed to show sufficient loyalty to the HZDS. Meciar claimed that he was simply replacing opposition-linked managers from the VPN-KDH era with more independent managers . Indeed, he accused parliamentary opposition leaders "straight into the eye, in front of everyone, that each one of them is linked with one of the twenty-one major Slovak corporations in which we intervened. And this is the problem." 32 Meciar was possibly correct in his assessment. While in power, KDH ministers appointed people to the boards of leading Slovak state firms and other opposition leaders clearly had close industrial connections. However, it was unclear whether they were now being removed because they were acting as KDH clients or due to their reluctance to serve HZDS interests. Indeed, the KDH-era manager of the large oil refinery, Slovnaft, was allegedly replaced after he refused Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky's demands that he subcontract services to HZDS-linked firms. 33 By the winter of 1994, Meciar' s increasingly personal consoledation of party and governmental power had alienated many of his own party members. By February of 1994, a last remaining block of HZDS deputies, led by HZDS co-founder Jozef Moravcik, appeared ready to follow other former HZDS members and allies into opposition. The threat of losing power may have led to a subsequent wave of direct sales. Starting with the "midnight privatizations" of February 1, 2004, Lexa sold forty-four companies with a book value of $96 million for a final sale price of just $22 million. The decisions were notable for their lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and advantageous terms to the purchasers-many of whom had close ties to leading government officials. Thirteen were subsequently annulled 32 Specifically, Meciar was accusing Vojtech Sugar, Jan Carnogursky, Cudovit Cernak and Peter Wiess. "Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," T ASR-Slovakia (February 6, 1994). 33 Confidential interview, Slovnaft insider, Bratislava, February, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 113 by the successor government for contravening the Large Scale Privatization Act of February 1991 , but virtually all of the privatizations were suspect. The beneficiaries included a range of politically connected individuals-from the wife of the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to Meciar's own Minister of Finance, Julius T6th.34 A March 11 , 1994 report of a commission investigating the privatizations triggered the departure of the dissident-HZDS faction led by Jozef Moravcik and a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government. In his speech before parliament, HZDS co-founder and Slovak President Michael Kovac openly accused Meciar of a lack of transparency and clientalism in the privatization process, among oth. 35 er th mgs. Meciar's and Lexa's hurried attempts to reorient Slovakia's privatization framework to favor political and economic insiders had run afoul of the opposition's effective use of liberal democratic institutions and norms. When next he gained power, Meciar' s new parliamentary majority would attack these opposition resources directly. VSZ and the Slovak Way of Privatization. One of Meciar's last acts in the1992-1994 government helps illustrate both the zero-sum nature of privatization, as well as its growing politicization. In December of 1993, the state exercised its shareholder rights to remove President Zoltan Berghauer and other top managers from the executive management of the state-owned firm VSZ, Slovakia's largest commercial entity. Berghauer had cofounded the AZZZ and was the lead author of an industry antireform petition in early 1991. 36 Meciar claimed that the top management change was a technocratic decision-made through consulta- 34 Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 121. Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 25. 36 In February of 1991 , only a month after the start of market reforms, the Slovak and Czech industrial federations delivered a joint petition to the Federal Assembly demanding "help in solving the difficult economic and financial situation of industrial companies ... [resulting from] the ill-considered restrictive fiscal , credit and monetary policy of the Federal Government. " Reforms, the industrialists continued, threatened, "the collapse of the entire national economy" and a "declining living standard for all citizens of the state." Zoltan Bergauer et al. , "Petice svaz u pnlmyslu CR a SR Federilnimu shromizdeni CSFR," Hospodafske noviny, February 29, 1991 , p. 3. 35 �114 SLOVAKIA tions with high-ranking bank and industrial managers.37 Yet he did not hide the fact that the change was to reduce the "unwarranted influence" of "opposition parties" in Slovakia's largest enterprise. 38 Berghauer and other purged VSZ managers protested the move, citing a history of political manipulation and threats by the HZDS towards VSZ management. The source of the claim directly attacked Meciar's Minister of Finance, JuliusToth. Toth had been VSZ's Vice President of Finance until he had resigned to join Meciar's government. According to Berghauer, Toth allegedly become enraged when Berghauer and VSZ's management refused to accept an HZDS member on the VSZ Board of Directors. Toth allegedly responded by demanding that the two top VSZ officials resign due to their political support for the KDH and other political opponents of the HZDS. 39 Toth later asserted that the Berghauer team had been stripping assets from the company. Through control of both the VSZ and collaboration with an independent trading company, they allegedly could siphon cash from the VSZ to the trade company by overcharging for supplies and underpaying for products.40 Perhaps to cut these alleged sales out of the revenue loop, or maybe to cut his allies in, Toth's new management team set up a new VSZ-owned sales company to oversee sales responsible for eighty percent of VSZ revenues. 4 1 As Minister of Finance, Toth and Lexa orchestrated the purchase of a 9.52 percent share of VSZ stock through a new private company, Manager a.s., established by five VSZ board members, including prominent HZDS member Alexander Rezes. The purchase was ques37 "Strong in the Saddle," T ASR-Slovakia, February 11, 1994. "Meciar Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," TASRSlovakia, February 6, 1994. 39 "Former Members of VSZ Board Lodge Complaint," CTK Business News, March 21 , 1994. 40 Despite Toth's allegations against Berghauer, no charges were ever filed . 41 Anthony Robinson, "Survey of Slovakia," The Financial Times, December 16, 1994, p. iv. It is unlikely that Toth was genuinely outraged at the allegations of corruption at VSZ. In 1993 he had allegedly used his influence as Minister of Finance to give a trading company, VSZ Selecta, a state contract to sell sugar that the Indian government provided to the Slovak government in place of its cash debt. VSZ Selecta won the contract without the required tender and then sold the sugar on the world market in violation of its contract. Toth was a member of the company's board. "Report on "Sugar Affair" to be out in January," CTK News, December 5, 1993. 38 �SLOVAKIA 115 tionable for its unsightly conflicts of interest, advantageous terms and most of all, its timing. Again, in accordance with the government program, the shares were sold to domestic entrepreneurs at a substantial discount with a generous payment schedule. The discount on the current share value of the package was $36 million.42 After a ten percent down payment, Manager would pay the rest in yearly installments over five years. Manager's members each made their down payment with an interest-free $62,000 loan from the Kosice-based Priemyselna banka (Industrial Bank) whose controlling shareholder was, in turn, the VSZ-controlled fund, Cassiovia Invest. 43 Priemyselna banka, moreover, received these funds from Banka Slovakia (Bank Slovakia), which then served as the repository and investment arm of the FNM. In short, Manager borrowed FNM funds to buy shares from the FNM that in tum benefited close associates of its directors and the man responsible for their appointment, Vladimir Meciar.44 The timing was also controversial. The Meciar government received the proposal to privatize the VSZ shares to Manager on March 7 and the government approved the request on March 11- the day on which parliament finally passed a vote no-confidence in the Meciar cabinet. The FNM and Manager signed the agreement on March 14, the day the government fell. On March 17, VSZ held a general assembly at which the now former Minister of Finance and FNM Board member, JuliusT6th, was elected Chair of VSZ's Board of Directors. Rezes would become Minister of Transportation in 42 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 22 . 0lsson, Ownership, Reform , 223 , note 39. 44 "Approach to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Meciar attempted to establish Banka Slovakia as early as 1993 in his home region of Banska Bystrica as part of his effort to develop a regional banking center. The goal was to use the bank to recycle FNM funds and provide cheap credit for small to medium sized enterprises. After the VSZ deal, however, the opposition charged that it would be used as a means of providing the politically connected with cheap capital to make down payments for privatization deals. In April of 1994, the next government suspended the bank's license to operate. With Meciar's re-election in the fall, the government pushed the National Bank of Slovakia to grant the license. But, after building a costly and elaborate headquarters in Banska Bystrica and suffering from notoriously poor lending practices, the bank had significant difficulties with capitalization. The NBS finally approved a license to begin operating on June I, 1996, but the bank- like most Slovak banks-quickly developed a problem with non-performing loans. 43 �116 SLOVAKIA Meciar's next cabinet. Supporting the vote were VSZ's investment privatization fund, Cassiovia Invest and VUE Invest, the investment company of Vseobecna uverova banka (General Credit Bank-VUB) and Slovakia's largest state owned bank. Ironically, oversight responsibility for VUB had, until four days earlier, lain primarily with T6th's Ministry of Finance.45 Meciar's Opposition Takes Power, March-November, 1993. A five-party caretaker government under the leadership of HZDS defector Jozef Moravcik was formed in mid-March. It promised to restore transparency and accountability to the privatization process and to re-launch the voucher privatization process as soon as possible. This was to be done before the scheduled new elections at the end of September. The coalition fought, however, over how to restore confidence, transparency and speed to the privatization process. Nevertheless, Kevin Deegan-Krause demonstrated how the new coalition allowed itself to be held accountable to competitive political forces. 46 The recent experience with Meciar may have taught the government coalition partners a good lesson in the dangers of overconcentration of power-particularly in the areas of property management and privatization. Yet, the new five-party coalition was fractious and ideologically incoherent. This influenced privatization. On the one hand, the formerly communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDI:) sought to maintain direct sales as the primary method of privatization. On the other hand, the coalition partners accused it of intending to use direct sales to reward its own allies amongst Slovakia's ex-communist industrialists and bureaucrats. The Ministry of Privatization, however, was now led by Milan Janicina, a lawyer from the center-right Democratic Union (DU). He sought to ensure that any direct sales would be a rule-governed, multi-party competitive process, not something to be run exclusively by SDI: dictates. 47 The SDI: did, however, secure an agreement to sub- 45 "Approac h to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Toth also became deputy chairman of Priemyselna banka, Olsson Ownership, Reform, 223, note 39. 46 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 26. 47 Interviews with Milan Janicina, Commercial Lawyer, Bratislava, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. �SLOVAKIA 117 ordinate the importance of price in the sales to employment and future investment commitments. 48 Corruption may have been possible in the final sales, but the number of competing interests in the decision making process ensured that the foxes guarding the hen house would keep each other in line. 49 Still , the program was not unimpeachable. Most of the direct privatization sales of fifty-four Slovak enterprises occurred after the elections had delivered a strong plurality to the HZDS but before Meciar had formed a government. 50 The government also conducted a public tender for the government's 24.9 percent share in VSi, attracting interest from nine companies, including the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. The coalition lost power before it could resolve internal bickering over the final buyer. 51 Throughout the summer of 1994, citizens, center-right coalition parties, brokerage firms and investment privatization funds clamored for a second wave of voucher privatization. Janicina fought with SD~'s Minister of the Economy Peter Magvasi (also an AZZZ member) to ensure that there would be enough property offered to make the project worthwhile. In preparation, the Ministry of Finance issued voucher booklets to seventy-two percent of Slovak citizens (ninety percent of those eligible). This was a significantly higher participation rate than the first wave. Janicina secured assets valued at $1.96 billion for the voucher program- making each voucher booklet potentially worth $593.00. After another aggressive campaign from financial intermediaries, fifty-eight percent of voucher holders traded their points for shares in investment privatization funds. 52 If the second wave of voucher privatization was completed, managerial insiders would cede significant additional economic power to the funds. 53 48 OIsson, Ownership, Reform , 124. Anna Grzymala-Busse, " Beyond Clientelism : Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," Comparative Political Studies 41 :4/5 (2008), 638-73 . 50 Jnterview with Rudolf Filkus, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 15, 1997; Janicina interviews, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. 51 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 222 . 52 Tbid. , 124-5. 53 Janici na interview, April I, 1997. 49 �SLOVAKIA Privatization under Meciar's Third Government, 1994-1998. The Moravcik government was short-lived. The SD:C had secured early elections and in the ensuing campaign the center-right fragmented amongst a range of competing personalities. A number of opposition parties failed to cross the five percent threshold in the September-October 1994 vote. Moravcik's Democratic Union (DU) received 8.6 percent, the KDH won 10.l percent, SD:C got 10.4 percent and the ethnic Hungarian Coalition took 10.2 percent of the votes. The HZDS, meanwhile, won a thirty-five percent plurality. This was less than in 1992. However, since thirteen percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not pass the five percent threshold, the ideological weight of the next parliament shifted sharply back towards Meciar and his national-populism. After a month of negotiations, the HZDS formed an ideologically awkward coalition with the two smallest delegations in parliament-the extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS-5.4 percent) led by the garrulous Jan Slota,54 and the extreme left Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS-7.34 percent). 55 To discipline his junior coalition partners, Meciar could use the threat of an alternative coalition with the reformed communist party, the SD:C.56 Critics speculated that the "brown-red" wings of the new ruling coalition were held together only by the promise of privatization benefits. 57 The National-Populist Privatization Concept and its Implementation. Meciar's privatization policies formally settled the long-standing ideological battle between market reformers and gradualists over privatization policy, but in reality, this conflict had stood proxy for an underlying clash of interests between enterprise outsiders and incumbent firm management. Gradualist concepts were hijacked, to an extent, and combined with clientalism and xenophobic nationa54 1n the spring of 1993, Meciar had helped Jan Slota oust Cernak from control over the SNS. Cernak left (with Janicina) to form the Democratic Union. Cernak interview, April 2, 1997. 55 Grigorij Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Party System," in Soi\a Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation , 50. 56 Innes, Czechoslo vakia, 262. 57 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 64. �SLOVAKIA 119 !ism to benefit the governing coalition and its allies at, as we shall see, a growing cost to the public. The formal theory underlying the Meciar government's privatezation program echoed the Dolgos strategy of the fall of 1992. The government would work closely with incumbent industrial managers to achieve ownership patterns that would be most appropriate to a coordinated industrial policy. The state would integrate equity transfer, credit and other policies in ways that would boost the strength of Slovak national firms on world markets and minimize transformational pain at the enterprise level. The variety of capitalism officially envisioned was thus much closer to a continental-style state-coordinated market economy than a more hands-off liberal market economy. However, Slovak industrial leaders at AZZZ also invoked Asian development models to explain what they were trying to accomplish.58 Insiders Ascendant. In practice, Meciar's coalition privatized the privatization process. It also subordinated capital markets regulation to the needs of incumbent managers at the expense of enterprise outsiders. The main target was the funds that emerged through voucher privatization. 59 Meciar's new parliamentary majority began to work even before he formed a government. In an overnight session of parliament on November 3-4, 1994, his new coalition passed legislation that secured exclusive control and oversight of privatization, the state media and the secret service. 60 An amendment to the 1991 Large Scale Privati58 Interview with Frantisek Bruckrneyer, General Director, Federation of Employers' Unions and Associations (AZZZ), Bratislava, February 6, 1997. Prior to becoming Director of AZZZ, Bruckrneyer worked for the Czechoslovak federal government after the Warsaw Pact invasion (1970-1974) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow (1974-1980). In the 1980s, he directed the state-owned firm, Zdroj , before co-founding AZZZ in 1991 . Compiled from "Leaders.sk" database. Trend Holding Co. and The Slovak Spectator, Bratislava. http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=674 [accessed August 30, 2010). 59 Marcincin et al., "Privatization Methods"; Miklos, "Economic Transition,"; Ivan Miklos, "Privatizacia," in Martin Butora and Michal lvantysin, eds. Slovensko, 1997: Suhrn a sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1998. (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky, 1998). 60 Soi\a Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 10. �120 SLOVAKIA zation Act transferred the right to propose and decide direct sales from the privatization ministry to the relatively less transparent FNM (Act #369/1994). The majority then stacked the FNM's Presidium and Supervisory Board with coalition officials and cancelled Janicina's 54 direct post-election sales (Act #370/1994). In five cases, new property owners had already taken legal possession of their assets from the state. 61 This violated both international human rights law and the Slovak Constitution. 62 The transfer of power to the FNM had important implications. The Constitutional Court later ruled that, as a joint stock company, the FNM did not have to submit to government review or regulatory oversight. Hence, it was exempt from oversight by the supreme government control body that could oversee and audit state agencies. Even had it not been exempt from oversight, however, the November 3-4 "night of the long knives" removed opposition parliamentarians from the oversight committee. The ruling majority was now fully responsible for monitoring itself. 63 While extolling the virtues of a state-directed transformation, Meciar provided the new measures with a market reform cover story. He claimed that insulating the privatization process from opposition would allow the FNM to make decisions according to technocratic criteria, free from political influence. In 1998, when the damage had been done, this allowed him to claim that although he still agreed with his "concept" of privatization, he had not been responsible for its administration. 64 Meciar's "concept" ultimately excluded outsiders from privatization. He initially promised that the second wave of voucher privatization would go ahead as planned-although with less property than Janicina envisioned. In July of 1995, however, Parliament cancelled voucher privatization altogether (Act #190/1995). Voucher booklets 61 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 126. Both Article 17b of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 217 /1948) and Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1952) secure the right to possessions. 63 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. In the fall of 1997, Parliament finally gave into EU and opposition pressure and appointed Ivan Miklos to the supervisory board of the FNM. 64 CTK News, May 8, 1998. Meciar was never directly implicated in a privatization scandal while in power, Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist, (New York: Pal grave, 2006), 91. 62 �SLOVAKIA 121 could now be exchanged for a bond with a face value of l 0,000 Sk to be redeemable in 2001 or on the bearer's 65 th birthday and with an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). Proceeds to meet the bond obligations were to come from sales of state property- a promise that the FNM's new privatization policy of selling to domestic industrial managers at a deep discount made impossible to keep . In its public statements, AZZZ took full credit for the cancellation of vouchers.65 A Constitutional Court decision overturned parts of Act #190 in late 1996.66 By that time, however, the FNM had already privatized most of Slovakia's remaining "non-strategic" industrial enterprises. Even had the government wanted to re-launch the voucher program, it would now have had to renationalize private properties to find adequate assets to make the program work. An additional measure passed in July of 1995 enhanced the government's capabilities to coordinate a state-directed industrial policy through the Strategic Enterprises Act (# 175/ 1995). The purpose of the act was to preserve the "public interest" in crucial Slovak industries. First, twenty-nine firms would be exempt from privatization altogether. This included the fundamental sectors of the economy including telecommunications, energy and the defense-related engineering sector. The list of strategic companies, made public in the summer of 1996, also included some at least questionably "strategic" firms such as health spas. 67 All told, the Strategic Enterprises Act reduced the book value of assets remaining to be privatized by half. 68 A second, legally controversial provision of the act, forced an additional forty-five firms to transfer a "golden share" to the firm's founding ministry-in most cases, to Jan Ducky's Ministry of the Economy. The Constitutional Court overturned this prescription in April of 1996 as a clear violation of property rights, but tellingly, the owners of major pro-HZDS firms , like Slovnaft, had failed to give 65 Lachovit, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie". Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 164. 67 The administration may have legitimately feared that privatization would mean the services of the spas would no longer be readily available or affordable to average Slovaks through the health care system. 68 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 130. 66 �122 SLOVAKIA the state ownership rights over the golden share. Their reaction gave credence to the market reformers' expectations that privatizationeven via a highly politicized process-would produce independent agents with the potential, at least, to resist government policies that hurt their material interests. 69 In November of 1996, the Constitutional Court also annulled Parliament's transfer of privatization powers to the FNM (Act #370/1994). The court argued that the act had illegally abrogated the state's responsibility for the transformation of state property. The Court stopped short of retroactively annulling the FNM ' s actions, however. Stripped of its exclusive prerogative over direct sales, the HZDS-controlled FNM continued to serve its clients through public auctions of shares from the FNM portfolio. While share auctions are a relatively uncontroversial privatization mode, critics allege that the FNM often limited access about the time and location of the auction to all but the intended buyer. 70 Coalition Control over Direct Sales. Between January of 1994 and November of 1996, the FNM privatized at a furious pace. While Act #3 70/1994 removed privatezation from the government's portfolio of responsibilities, coalition officials and industrial insiders from AZZZ retained close control over the process. Two FNM officials, HZDS member and FNM Chairman Milan Rehak, and Co-Chair and Director of the Direct Sales Section, Jan Povraznik, were responsible for executing Presidium decisions . These were closely controlled by the ruling coalition. Junior coalition partner ZRS had formal responsibility for the privatization process . ZRS member Peter Bisak ran the Ministry of Privatization while ZRS vice-chairman Stefan Gavornik chaired the Presidium. Gavornik attested, however, that his influence was minimal: while the HZDS had no seats on the nine member Presidium, AZZZ members held six seats and hence a majority of the votesand they supported the HZDS .7 1 Understandably, now that AZZZ 69 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi , "Bridging Slovakia's Elite Chasm," Transitions, November, 1997. 70 Jnterview with Gabriel Palacka, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 18, 1997 ; Miklos, "Economic Transition," 67-8 . 71 Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Postcommunist Europe (London: Ashgate, 2005), 64. �SLOVAKIA 123 influence was secured, incumbent managers who had previously been skeptical about privatization became its strong advocates. 72 According to Sharon Fisher, regional committees of five coalition representatives determined properties to be sold and top coalition officials made final decisions at coalition meetings every Wednesday at 6:00pm. 73 Allegedly, the meetings rarely considered the business merits of the proposal-or even how the sale would further the official goal of coordinated industrial restructuring. As Gavomik recalled, "We were .... lobbying for those who were coming to us." Yet, Gavomik added, "not even a nail was sold without Meciar."74 Milan Cagala, a HZDS-appointed FNM presidium member, confirmed these allegations. 75 More broadly, members of the ruling coalition were open about clientalism. 76 As Minister of the Economy, Jan Ducky (HZDS) explained, "every government gives advantages to those groups that cooperate with them. This is not controversial." 77 Yet sales went beyond clientalism to open self-dealing-included sales to leading ruling coalition politicians and their family members. As Gavomik admitted, "Of course there are [politicians in the privatization process], and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all .. . every citizen has a right to take part in privatization." 78 Participants in the FNM's direct sales program typically received terms similar to the midnight privatizations of February 1994. Buyers-usually incumbent managers- would receive the company for 72 Ibid. , 35. Fisher, Political Change, 88-9. The regional meetings were an institutional mechanism for regionally based privatization groups to make their claims to property. In the eyes of observers, the groups became associated with leading HZDS officials and clients. For example, it was rumored that meetings in Kosice tended to be dominated by Rezes, those in Banska Bystrica by Meciar, and those in Tmava by Vladimir Poor. Interview with Valer Ostrovsky, CEO, Schultz and Ostrovsky, Bratislava, May 14, 1997. 74 Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic," Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 75 Ibid. 76 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 66-7. 77 Author's notes from "Slovak Spectator Live, Debates for Democracy Series: Brigita Schmognerova & Jan Ducky," Bratislava, 1996. An FNM spokesman shared this sentiment with the author. Interview with Oto Balogh, Press Spokesman, Fund for National Property, Bratislava, April 22, 1998. 78 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 277-8, note 26. 73 �124 SLOVAKIA as little as one third, one-fifth, or even less of its book value. In practice, the typical firm required a ten to fifteen percent down payment, often using money borrowed from a state-owned financial institution. Moreover, installments on the purchaser' s debt to the FNM were usually spread over ten years and deductible from the company' s tax bill. These terms and often the buyers themselves were also frequently kept secret. In the case of the illegal sale of the strategically listed and highly profitable oil extraction and storage company, Nafta Gbely a.s., the new owners of the company remained a matter of intense speculation among opposition politicians and the press. The official address of the purchasing company, Druha obchodna, a.s. was initially an abandoned building. Vladimir Poor, Trnava's HZDS chief and a member of the regional coalition privatization committee later admitted to being a primary beneficiary of the deal, along with a close Meciar aide.79 FNM President Gavornik later alleged that Poor was able to meet the company's 575 million Sk purchase price simply by raiding the company's 1,075 million Sk capital account. If Gavornik is right, Poor used the firm's bank account to buy the firm for himself. Prosecutors later unsuccessfully charged Poor with "tunneling" 300 million Sk out of the company, but dropped the charges. In the end, the circumstances of the company ' s privatization were never fully investigated, perhaps because Poor voluntarily returned the company to the state. 80 In another controversial case, the FNM sold a controlling stake of Slovnaft, Slovakia's oil refinery, to Slovintegra-a company owned by Slovnaft' s director, Slavomir Hatina and nineteen other managers. Hatina was a financial backer of the HZDS and bought thirty-nine percent of the company at an eighty percent discount over the currently traded price. The initial down payment, moreover, was only 1.56 percent of the sale value. The FNM soon reduced the sale price by an additional eighty-four percent to reward management for meeting its promised investment and employment targets.81 The privatization of Slovakia' s largest company, VSZ, also continued apace under Meciar's direct sales framework. In 1995, junior 79 Fisher, Political Change, 93-4; Marcincin et al. , "Privatization Methods. " Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic, Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 81 Marcincin et. al. , "Privatization Methods," 18. 80 �SLOVAKIA 125 coalition member ZRS engineered a sale of ten percent of VSZ shares to Hutnik, a company formally owned by VSZ's union members but strongly under the influence of Minister of Transport (until 1996), Alexander Rezes. Again the price was a fraction of the real value of the shares and payments were made on a generous installment plan. Hutnik then collaborated with Rezes to form Ferrimex, a company that purchased another 15.4 percent on extraordinarily generous terms.82 The deal cemented Rezes ' s control over VSZ. Rezes responded by essentially barring minority shareholder VUB kup6n (an investment company set up by Slovakia' s state-run savings bank) from receiving any information about the health and activities of the firm _sJ Nationalism in Privatization. The Meciar government employed popular economic nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric to justify its choice of a privatization program. Junior coalition partner SNS campaigned in 1994 on a promise to protect Slovakia from "impoverishment" at the hands of foreign investors.84 The subsequent 1995 government program declaration promised to privilege "domestic business subjects" over foreigners in the privatization process. National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar correctly predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization to foreigners. 85 In practice, Slovak government officials remained deeply suspicious of foreign direct investment and often sought to block foreign partnerships. "We just want to avoid them coming in and closing [the company]," remarked one FNM official in an interview with the author. "Investors only come to misuse companies and disappear." 86 One example is notable for its senselessness: a foreign advisor to the government related that he worked with an entrepreneur to acquire a strategic foreign partner to modernize and expand production of his product line for export abroad. While the entrepreneur was not explicitly prohibited from signing the deal, he received several telephone calls from top officials in one ministry warning that he would 82 01sson, Ownership, Reform, 223 -5. lbid., 182. 84 Fisher, Political Change, 89. 85 Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 65 . 86 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997. 83 �126 SLOVAKIA be held fully accountable if even one Slovak lost his job as a result of the investment. He lost his nerve and cancelled the contract. The enterprise thus remained in debt and was unable to raise the money on its own for modernization; nor was it able to make its own marketing contacts abroad. The advisor noted that this was typical of the Meciar government's attitude towards foreign joint-ventures. 87 The combination of national capitalism and knee-jerk nationalism cost Slovakia dearly. Joint ventures with multinational corporations were at that time leading the deep industrial restrucuring of Central Europe. They had the capital, marketing networks and technology to outperform domestically privatized companies and they were far outperforming firms that remained in state hands, measured in both production increases and productivity growth. 88 Despite this growing record of success, the ruling coalition sold a mere five companies to foreigners out of a total 347. 89 On a per capita basis, by 1998, Slovakia had received half the FDI of Poland, one-third the FDI of the Czech Republic and only a tenth of the FDI of Hungary.90 This was a lost opportunity. Over the next few years, new owners would effortlessly enrich themselves by "flipping" their cheaply acquired companies to international capital-realizing for themselves gains that should have gone into the FNM accounts to meet its new privatization bond obligations. 91 Insider-Controlled Capital Markets Regulation. Having gained control over the privatization process, incumbent managers pressured the government for a favorable capital markets policy. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, investment privatization companies had clashed with incumbent managers in company board rooms. As Michael Olsson relates, the managers wanted the new ow87 Confidential interview with a foreign financial service executive, Bratislava, October 20, 1996. Most of the foreign financial service executives and consultants I sroke with had similar stories. 8 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997), http: //www.ciaonet.org/book/gould/ [accessed February 23, 2012]. 89 Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 133. 90 Gould and Szomolinyi, "Elite Fragmentation," 58. 91 Fisher, Political Change, 94. �SLOVAKIA 127 ners to contribute capital while they continued to control the direction of the company. The new owners of the funds, by contrast, sought to pressure the incumbent managers into improving cost efficiency, technological and organizational restructuring, and developing new- often international- marketing arrangements. It did not help that the funds with diverse portfolios did not have sufficient expertise to cover all the firms in their portfolio. Fund representtatives were often barely out of university and entirely lacking in experience. A cultural clash thus developed between the older generation of industrial managers-most of whom had their start in Slovak industry in the 1960s and 70s-and the "young men from Bratislava_ ,,92 Government actions in 1995 wrested industrial control from the funds back to the industrial managers. Incumbent managers began to use the direct sales process to tum the tables at meetings of general shareholders. Olsson writes, "[M]anagers who acquired a large chunk of shares on soft terms from the FNM all of a sudden lost all respect for other minority shareholders .... funds could only sit by [as] ... managers or other domestic industrial groups took over." 93 The government also intervened in capital markets to further tilt the balance of power towards management. Legislation in 1995 reduced the maximum stake investment privatization companies could hold in a company from twenty to ten percent. It also prohibited investment privatization companies from placing officials on a company ' s Board of Directors. This weakened the ability of fund-dominated Supervisory Boards to monitor the day-to-day actions of company managers. Parliament also passed capital markets regulation in 1996 that reduced the transparency of capital markets transacttions and all but eliminated minority shareholder rights. President Kovac returned the legislation, demanding better protection for minority shareholders. Ironically, the funds were not necessarily in favor of a better regulated market. The Slovak capital market had few of the institutional safeguards to protect minority shareholder rights and prevent insider trading that we find in more developed equity markets. Controlling owners were often able to expropriate value from minority 92 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 182. 93 fbid. �128 SLOVAKIA shareholders without penalty. This meant, ironically, that the emergence of a dominant shareholder in a firm often would lead to a decline in the value of the firms' shares. 94 The result was a loss in equity market liquidity: when one lost control over a company, one would often be unable to sell one's shares at any price. Wise investors knew that the majority shareholders could tunnel the real value of the company elsewhere. Under such conditions, a passive portfolio stake in all but a few "blue chip" companies made little sense. Funds found they could best make money by secretly acquiring a controlling share of companies in unregistered, off market trades of physical paper shares and then selling them at a profit to a strategic investor. Given that a more transparent market would actually undermine this strategy, a number of funds were somewhat ambivalent about reforms that might make passive portfolio investment safer and profitable. 95 The ruling coalition made things even worse. It sought to limit the funds to a portfolio role even as it actively undermined their minority shareholder rights. Ministry of Finance capital markets regulator Jozef Magula testified on behalf of minority shareholder rights in front of Parliament--much to the disappointment of top AZZZ managers . A better law was passed in 1997 .96 Still, the new law continued to allow controlling shares to be bought anonymously in secret off-market trades. 97 Remarked one broker philosophically, "at least we have rules."98 94 Economist Joseph Stiglitz observed this phenomenon in the Czech equity market, but the problems were quite similar in Slovakia. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Comments on 'Czech Republic: Capital Market Review Report,"' Delivered at the Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, I 997 ; For details, see Gould, The Politics o[ Privatization, 81- 10 I. 9 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 184-5 . 96 Magula claims that, as a result of his parliamentary testimony, he came under AZZZ pressure to step down. He relented and moved to the central bank. Interview with Jozef Magula, Member of the Bank Board, General Relations Department, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 28, 1998. 97 Magula interview, July 28, 1998 ; Interview with Rudolf Lachovic, President, Association of Investment Managers and Investment Funds of the Slovak Republic, Brati slava, June I 6, 1997; for the early market regulatory climate, see Juris, I 994. 98 Ostrovsky interview, May 14, I 997. �SLOVAKIA 129 Meaningful portfolio investment disappeared under Meciar. In addition, led by Magula, the government destroyed a rapidly growing mutual fund industry in 1996. Unlike the privatization funds, the new mutual funds gathered people's savings and invested them in the market and other assets. The pioneer was Prva slovenska investicna skupina, a.s (First Slovak Investment Company-PSIS) an open-ended fund into which citizens could deposit and withdraw like a checking account. By early 1995, the PSIS's Sporofund had over $50 million in savings. 99 It was allegedly well-run and had done a reasonable job at building shareholder value within its portfolio. But in the fall of 1994, the PSIS used its savings to invest in citizen voucher booklets issued under the Moravcik government. Vouchers, the PSIS controversially argued, were a form of state security and hence a legal investment for the mutual fund. Over 750,000 Slovaks signed up for the PSIS voucher privatization funds . Had the second wave of voucher privatization gone forward as planned, PSIS would have become the second wave's largest owner of shares in Slovak enterpnses. However, PSIS owners were also strong contributors to the Democratic Union-the party of Janicina and Moravcik. Moreover, the PSIS had a stake in the independent daily newspaper SME. Both PSIS' s political orientation and its potential economic power were a threat to the ruling coalition and its industrial allies. In the spring of 1995, the Ministry of Finance revoked PSIS 's operating license. Courts found the measure illegal and ordered that the Ministry restore the license, but the Ministry simply revoked it again and transferred control of the company's Sporofund portfolio to Harvard Investment Company. In the face of a rapid withdrawal from the Sporofund, Harvard liquidated the fund and paid off savers about half of what they had put in. 100 The Coalition Assault on Democracy, 1995-1998. Meciar's coalition could not have achieved such close control over the privatization framework without a significant attack on democratic political and civic institutions. Hence, while Slovakia's 99 Interview with Vladimir Hoffman, Broker, Delta Securities, Prague, Czech Republic, July 25 , 1997. I0°Magula interview, July 28, 1998; Ostrovsky interview, May 14, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 187-90. �130 SLOVAKIA democratic decline from 1994 to 1998 was not exclusively caused by privatization, it was certainly linked to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that the ruling coalition and its allies would have fought so hard had the nation's most lucrative assets not been available for appropriation. After ad hoc encroachments on democratic norms in 1993-94, between late 1994 and 1998, Meciar' s parliamentary majority reduced Slovakia's formal democracy to an illiberal shell verging on soft authoritarianism. One permissive cause was the majoritarian nature of the Slovak Constitution. Led by a strong executive and unhindered by a weak presidency already on the defensive, the Meciar majority sought to override the remaining checks posed by the Constitutional Court, the political opposition, civil society and regional and municipal governments. This enabled a reorientation of the privatization framework towards political and economic insiders, but it also endangered "horizontal accountability"-the country' s internal balance of institutional power. 101 Meciar' s squabble with the president was the most visible aspect of this encroachment. Kovac ' s 1993 veto over Meciar's choice of Ivan Lexa to run the privatization ministry marked the beginning of a running battle between the government and the president. The conflict took on added intensity during Meciar's third government. Kovac did not have much institutional power to start with. His repeated vetoes of parliamentary acts were quickly overridden by a simple majority- entirely in line with the Constitution. Yet, Meciar sought to further weaken and discredit the president. An important player in this campaign was the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Slovakia ' s secret service. First, Meciar had to gain control over it. In the November 3-4, 1994 session of parliament, Meciar's majority excluded opposition parties from participating on the SIS oversight committee. In the spring of 1995, parliament transferred power to appoint the head of Slovakia's intelligence agency from President Kovac to Prime Minister Meciar. Meciar then appointed his trusted protege, Ivan Lexa, to head the service. 102 Over the next two and a half years, Lexa waged a war of "dirty tricks" against the president and harassed civil society and indepen10 1 Guillenno O' Donnell, "Delegati ve Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5: I ( 1994), 55-69; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities. 102 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. �SLOVAKIA 131 dent entrepreneurs. The war reached its climax in August of 1995 when someone- possibly Meciar, but more probably Lexa-ordered that the president' s son be kidnapped, drugged, and dumped in neighboring Austria. When Robert Remias, the confidant of an exSIS agent, implicated Lexa's SIS in discussions with the editor of the leading independent daily SME, Remias was assassinated. Meciar's government squashed the investigation into the assassinationreplacing three investigators before finding one who suspended the inquiry into the SIS link. The new investigator concealed evidence that 150-200 grams of Semtex had ignited the car's propane tank. Now on the defensive, the SIS launched a campaign to show that Kovac Jr. had arranged for his own kidnapping.103 The battle between Meciar and Kovac ended only after the president's term of office expired in 1997. As the government and opposition could not achieve the super majority needed to select a replacement under a clearly flawed constitutional provision, presidential powers fell to the Prime Minister. Meciar subsequently used his presidential powers to pardon anyone linked to the kidnapping and Remias's murder-despite the lack of any official finding that a crime had taken place. 104 The government also encroached on the rights and prerogatives of the opposition, the courts, civil society and the media. In addition to oversight of the secret service, the November 3-4, 1994 parliamentary session blocked opposition MPs from participation on all substantive committees except the environment committee. The coalition further revealed its hegemonic intentions by trying to have former Prime Minister Moravcik' s party, the Democratic Union (DU), banned from parliament and by charging President Kovac with treason. Both efforts failed. To safeguard against a repeat of the 1993-4 defections of Kovac, Moravcik, Filkus, Knazko and others, defectors from the HZDS were now treated with open disrespect for the constitution. After HZDS co-founder Frantisek Gaulider left the HZDS parliamentary club in 1996, the HZDS leadership produced a pre-signed letter of resignation that they had obtained in 1994 to ensure party discipline. The 103 Kieran Wiliams, "Slovakia Since 1993," in Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001 ), 130-140. 104 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 48-50. �132 SLOVAKIA parliamentary majority then stripped him of his parliamentary mandate, barred him from the building and replaced him in parliament with a HZDS loyalist. The Constitutional Court ruled these acts to be unconstitutional, but parliament did not reinstate him- another violation of Slovakia' s fragile system of checks and balances. Gaulider also received numerous threats to his life. 105 Media and civil society also came under intense legal and extralegal pressure from the government and allegedly the SIS. The HZDS attempted to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation by creating bureaucratic barriers to their legal operation and by establishing party-controlled interest groups that competed with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. 106 Similarly in the media, parliament' s November 1994 legislation excluded the opposition from any role in oversight over public broadcasting. The state-controlled mass media and sympathetic newspapers then justified the government's actions with a torrent of unbalanced coverage, nationalism, xenophobia, personal slurs and misdirection. 107 Things were also tough for the independent media. Following his reporting on the Kovac, Jr. case, the editor of SME found a dead cat nailed to his door and his car burned. An anonymous leafleting campaign accused two other critical journalists of pornography and pedophilia. A third journalist who looked too closely at the links between Alexander Rezes and the HZDS was beaten up in a Kosice restaurant. 108 Meanwhile, privatization beneficiaries frequently bought and attempted to control the editorial content of the independent media. When VSZ took over the business daily 105 Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation," 43 ; Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, "Preface," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 5. 06 ' Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Representation in Slovakia after 1989: From 'Transmission Belts' to ' Party-State Corporatism?"' in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 93113 . 07 ' The Helsinki Civic Assembly and the Association for the Support for Local Democracy survey concluded that state-run Slovak Television violated the principles of fa irness more often than any other public or private media outlet during the 1998 electoral campaign. It devoted seventy-five percent of its news programs to Met iar and the HZDS, RFEIRL News line, 2: 192 (October 5, 1998), Part II . 108 Innes, Czechoslovakia, 313 , note 139. �SLOVAKIA 133 Narodna obroda, for example, the new owners fired the newspaper's independent-minded editor. Overall, while the independent media functioned effectively, it faced numerous forms of petty harassment from various government agencies. 109 Independent news sources, however, did not reach the entire population. In much of the country, the state broadcast media was the primary source of information. After the November 3-4 session of parliament, government loyalists controlled the state media and state broadcasting reflected their views, even to the point of collaborating with the SIS to fabricate "investigative reports" slandering the president. Nor did the most important independent media source-the television station Markiza-initially have the coverage capacity or willingness to acquaint Slovaks with the details of privatization or other rule of law issues. Toward the end of the 1996-1998 period, however, TV Markiza did become a crucial source of alternative information in Slovakia. 11 0 As the Meciar government came into conflict with basic liberal institutions and freedoms , the EU, NA TO, European governments and the United States all registered their displeasure. The EU, in particular, issued a series of diplomatic demarches as part of its dialogue with applicant countries. 111 In 1996, Freedom House reduced Slovakia's political rights ranking from "free" to "partially free." 112 However, the nastiest rap to the government's knuckles came in July of 1997, after the government illegally cancelled a national referendum on NATO membership. The European Commission recommended that Slovakia be excluded from the first wave of EU membership negotiations. While Slovakia was a liberal democracy in 109 Andrej Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Post-Communist Transition of Slovakia" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 187-208. 110 Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media," 196. 111 Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovakia's International Alignment," in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 209-30; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, l everage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 11 2 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2007," Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2007 . �134 SLOVAKIA form, the Commission opined, it operated differently in practice. 113 NATO Followed suit and excluded Slovakia from its first round of • 114 expansion. The Meciar government dismissed these external critics by questioning the objectivity of their processes and critiquing the patriotism of domestic opponents who agreed with them . Yet, the blows hurt. Slovakia's young, urban and educated citizens were deeply concerned with proving the country's western credentials and desperately wished to join Europe 's most exclusive clubs. Thus, the EU and to a lesser extent NA TO, increasingly put the government in a bind: Meciar could not comply with their "conditions" and still retain his increasingly politicized and often illegal control over political and economic life. As Milada Vachudova pointed out, "political power depended on strategies that were incompatible with the EU's re~uirements of liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform." 15 With the September/October 1998 parliamentary elections approaching, the HZDS even appeared ready to jettison free and fair elections. Parliament amended the electoral law in ways that gave the Ministry of the Interior greater influence in counting the vote; and it put ambiguous and potentially expandable limitations on the ability of the private media to cover the election. New electoral rules also shackled the ability of small parties or coalitions to participate in the election. Finally, the HZDS had the courts review the leading opposition coalition 's eligibility to participate. Many worried that should the government apply a literal interpretation of its new laws, it could eliminate a number of important institutions of liberal democracy, including the right to contestation and participation as well as the right to alternative sources of information. Opponents feared a fullfledged authoritarian turn . 116 Privatization's Half-way Reform. Meciar's privatization program produced stakeholders in dysfun113 European Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Membership of the European Union , (Brussels: European Union, 1997), section I. 3. 114 Duleba, " Democratic Consolidation." 115 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 38. 11 6 1.M. Viersma, "Sprava docasnej pozorovatelskej misie na Slovensku," Euro Report, no. I 5, 1998, pp. 22-23. �SLOVAKIA 135 ctional economic policies. This was not necessarily pre-ordained. The first two Slovak governments retained the basic elements of the market reform program inherited from the federal government. An independent National Bank of Slovakia kept the Slovak currency strong, while the first two post-independence governments restricted their fiscal expenditures and preserved a liberalized trade environment. By 1995-6, Slovakia's firms were beginning to find new markets in Western Europe. Unemployment, still high at thirteen percent, was beginning to inch down. With so much slack in the labor market, inflationary pressures remained acceptable-reflecting a sustainable increase in demand as tradable products integrated into world markets. The major problem was the deliberate coalition policy of politicized reform. 1997-8 turned out to be challenging years in the global economy. Yet, the network of industry-state-party ties shaped by an insider privatization process and illiberal politics made Slovakia even more vulnerable to a downturn. 117 Missed tax payments, uncompetitive government procurement programs, significant new government financial obligations, delayed enterprise restructuring, low foreign direct investment and a troubled banking sector all contributed to an economic crisis that would cost Slovakia the next three years of growth. Manipulation of Debt. The Slovak Republic shows that a government's capacity to protect investor property rights and enforce debt contracts is crucial to the efficiency of privatization. 118 The Meciar government's policy of direct sales led to a rapid concentration of ownership, but it did not always produce more efficient behavior. According to interviews with Western financial services experts and equity market actors, Slovak owners often rejected enterprise restructuring and instead used their insider access to cash flows and assets from privatized 117 OECD, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Slovakia, (Paris: OECD, 1999), 29-30. 11 8 Olsson, Ownership, Reform; Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, "Privatization and Corporate Governance," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region. NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics, 12 (2001), 13-34. http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0l82 .pdf [accessed February 23, 2012]. �136 SLOVAKIA enterprises to get rich quickly-a process known as "rent seeking." Much of the reason relates to debt and the firms' low purchase prices. Slovak firms carried a large outstanding burden of debt which they were not necessarily pressured to honor. First, Slovakia's bankruptcy law privileged debtors over creditors, reinforcing a persistent problem with overdue liabiities. 11 9 Second, the administration of the first wave of voucher privatization in Slovakia led to an initial concentration of privatized property in the state-bank owned funds . These state-owned banks often transgressed the official firewall between their lending and equity management operations and forced firms to take on more loans than they needed. 120 The percentage of nonperforming loans in the portfolios of Slovakia's three state banks skyrocketed between 1996 and 1998 from twenty-five to thirty-seven percent. 121 Third, privatization in highly discounted client or management buyouts failed to bring in new cash or debt relief to Slovak companies. Despite the often-symbolic purchase prices and favorable repayment terms, politically connected buyers would often increase debt by borrowing from state banks to make their down payment to the FNM. Privatized firms also frequently stopped paying their taxes. Between 1995 and 1998, tax arrears of private firms in Slovakia tripled to about sixteen percent of total state expenditures. Fully paid, this would have been enough to eliminate the budget deficit. 122 The scarcity of cash in the economy did not bode well for restructuring. Many managers privatized their firms only to find themselves apparently condemned to eke out a living at the margins of solvency for years on end. Facing such choices, and given lucrative 11 9 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, p. 97 . Debt loading is the practice of pushing unnecessary loans on cash rich firms at high rates as a means of extracting their funds. According to Andrew Schwartz, it was a common practice among bank-owned privatization funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Since debt loading siphoned off cash that should have been shared with the enterprise ownership's minority shareholders, it was a form of tunneling. Andrew Schwartz, The Politics of Greed: How Privatization Structured Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 236-7; Appel, A New Capitalist Order, 64; Jarko Fidrmuc and Andreas Worgotter, "Czech Banking Sector: Reasons of Banking Crises and Prospects," Discussion Parer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1998. 21 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 79. 122 Ibid., 54-55 . 120 �SLOVAKIA 137 opportunities for cash assets elsewhere, 123 it actually made sense for new owners to strip their companies and return the shells to the FNM before making the first installment payment. Another option was to consume the company slowly-meeting its minimal obligations to the FNM and tax office, defaulting on inter-enterprise debt and siphoning off the extra cash. 124 Officially, the FNM was allowed to control major asset transfers in firms with FNM debt, but in practice, it was too over-stretched to monitor all transactions. 125 Meciar's HZDS- through the government- held the ends of the long strings of debt that permeated the economy. Ideally, given its commitment to state-led industrial restructuring, these debt obligetions should have been used by the government and the Ministries of Finance and Economy to coordinate restructuring efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy's official statement on industrial policy made it clear that control over liability networks was a crucial component of its effort to engage in industrial restructuring. The Ministry also aspired to promote the development of asset networks, "by supporting groupings of enterprises into holdings," to "pool investment resources." 126 The reality was that, due to coalition permeation by privileged 123 In one example of crowding out, the author interviewed an industrial manager who had recently signed a contract to produce copper pipes for a firm in Germany. When it came time to buy scrap metal to begin production, however, the cash he had reserved for the purpose had disappeared and he had to default on the contract. He soon learned that the owners had moved the funds to a short-term security with a return far greater than that offered by the copper pipe contract. Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povazske strojame, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, July, 22 1998. 124 Indeed, one EU sponsored consultant that I spoke with actually advised his clients to engage in a similar "triage" strategy of debt management. He advised managers facing illiquidity to delay paying those creditors who were no longer essential to the firm while using scarce cash to meet obligations to those creditors who were. The understanding was that the legal framework would favor the debtor. Confidential interview, foreign financial consultant, Bratislava, April, 1997. 125 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997 . Ironically, the politicization of credit and debt may have meant that the incentives to "rip off' stakeholders and minority shareholders were greater for owners who did not enjoy close contacts with the government. Unlike their well-connected competitors, they were less likely to win any dispensations from government creditors at the state-owned banks, the FNM or the tax officials. 126 Ministry of the Economy, SR, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update." Ministry of the Economy, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1997. �138 SLOVAKIA industrial interests, it was the governing coalition's industrial clients (as well as those firms that could "arrange" for ad hoc dispensations) that often pulled the strings of Slovak industrial and privatization policy. The result was that state-business networks were used to channel present and future tax revenues into the pockets of politically important industries and individuals. Ironically, after the Meciar government fell in 1998, the successor government picked up these long strings and used them to regain control of many enterprises. Revitalization and Industrial Policy. Even inter-enterprise debt and tax arrears provided opportunities for government manipulation. As noted, the bankruptcy framework privileged debtors over creditors. As most AZZZ members were debtors, there was little incentive for the industrial lobby to support a change in policy. Yet the government also passed a controversial Revitalization Act that granted chosen firms the right to enter into a state-sponsored debt relief program. 127 The Revitalization Act was designed in conjunction with Ducky's Ministry of the Economy on behalf of Slovakia's hard-hit engineering and machinery sectors. Based largely on tax relief, in practice its use was limited to the "restructured" companies owned by the quasi-private holding company, DMD Holdings a.s., as well as a number of agricultural firms. 128 DMD, run by Meciar's former Minister of Finance JuliusT6th, was an umbrella holding company for a network of former state-run defense manufacturing firms that were most severely hit by defense cutbacks at the end of the Cold War. In addition to restructuring, DMD profited from direct Ministry of Economy support- mostly in the form of encouragement and coordination-for the development of an indigenous automobile supply network. 129 While the effects of these direct attempts at industrial policy appeared to be generally well intentioned, they had little positive effect on restructuring the 127 Ministry of the Economy, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update," 18. The government also set up a state-run arms trading company, Armex. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, l 04-5 . 129 AZZZ 1996; Intervi ew with Ministry of Economy Plenipotentiary for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia, Alfred Richter in Samuel Bibza, "Yel'ke Plany," MOT, August, 1998, 4-8 . Interview with Jan Lesinsky, President, Slovak Society of Automoti ve Engineers, Bratis lava, August I 0, 1998 . 128 �SLOVAKIA 139 companies involved. 130 Indeed, the program virtually halted marginally successful earlier attempts at defense conversion. 131 Slovakia eventually got its automotive sector, but it took the defeat of Meciar, clear political compliance with the prerequisites of EU membership, macroeconomic stabilization and significant initial investment incentives to entice foreign automobile producers and supply companies to come to Slovakia. 132 Politicization of Bank Privatization. The FNM's insider privatization framework raised levels of conflict surrounding bank privatization. In early 1996, Meciar promised to privatize Slovakia's largest state banks to Slovakia' s leading enterprises, most notably VSZ and Slovnaft. 133 Observers quickly pointed out that the likely result of the privatizations would be to decapitalize the banks as owner-firms, like VSZ, wrote themselves checks. Hence, while opposition parties KDH, DS and DU, were officially in favor of privatizing the banks, they formed a one-time coalition with HZDS's far left wing governing partner, ZRS , to get the banks placed on the list of strategic enterprises that prevented their privatization. The ZRS had nothing against bank privatization per se, but it allegedly was upset that the HZDS had excluded ZRS clients from buying one of the banks. 134 While partially preventing the banks ' capture and potential mismanagement by industrial managers, the banks nevertheless remained undercapitalized. Deeply in need of capital, the VSZ nevertheless did secure control over Slovakia's third largest state bank, Investicna a rozvojova banka (Investment and Development Bank-IRB) through the support of the FNM at shareholder meetings. 135 IRB had a troubled portfolio 130 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 104-5 . Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 75 . 132 Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, "Slovakia's Neoliberal Tum," Europe-Asia Studies 59:6 (2007), 977-98. 133 If we include the third state owned financial institution, Slovenska sporitel'na, these three banks accounted for as much as 90% of all Slovak deposits and 60% of all loans. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, (Paris: OECD, 1998), 29; EilJ (Economist Intelligence Unit), Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, (London: Economist, 1998), 17. 134 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 258 . 135 OECD, Slo vak Country Report, 1997-8, p. 29; EilJ, Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, p. 17; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 158. 131 �140 SLOVAKIA which VSZ control did little to correct. The state had been using it to keep a nuclear power plant solvent and to provide subsidies to the construction industry to build apartments for young couples. In 1997, IRB liquidity problems worsened and the bank was forced to borrow internationally at rates driven up by the emerging global financial crisis . The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) directed the VSZ, as the primary owner, to provide a much-needed capital injection. The VSZ refused. The NBS later "suggested" that the bank's deterioration resulted from "serious illegal transgressions which negatively influenced the bank's activities ." To add to the crisis, junior coalition partner SNS refused to support a renewal of state support for the construction industry's subsidized apartment loan program. After more government infighting, the IRB failed to meet its depositors' demands, forcing the NBS to seize it in December of 1997. 136 The VSZ raid on Slovakia's financial sector was the logical culmination of insider privatization under illiberal political conditions. Tightly bound together by political necessity, Meciar's administration provided Rezes and his network of enterprises insider access to special deals in privatization, taxation, credit allocation (from state financial institutions) and almost every other area where the state intersects with economic activity. Moreover, Meciar did this despite open indications of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The final cost to other corporations, the taxpayers and VSZ's more than 25,000 employees was enormous. By the winter of 1998, VSZ Holdings had defaulted on its foreign obligations and was facing layoffs and bankruptcy. Meciar's successor government then used this crisis to regain control of the company and limit its growing debt. 137 In 2000, the successor government sold the VSZ to United States Steel Corporation. 136 OECD, Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, 77-8; EfU, Slovak Country Report, 1st Quarter I 998, 17. In the spring of 1998, the VSZ used its influence with the FNM and its direct and indirect shareholdings in the two other state financial institutions to provide the !RB with a costly capital injection. The VSZ again refused to contribute any cash of its own beyond the initial amount required by the NBS . Nor was there any real attempt by VSZ to find an adequate foreign buyer. Peter Laca, "Troubled !RB bank approves capital injection," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-21 , 1998. 137 "Vlada mimo hry," Pravda, November 17, I 998; See also Miklo§, 1997 . �SLOVAKIA 141 Abuse of State Property. Coalition misuse of property included firms that were not yet privatized. Perhaps the most notable case is former Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky' s abuse of the country's natural gas company, Slovensky plynarensky priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry-SPP). A key member of AZZZ and a former communist-era official, Ducky resigned his position with the government to oversee a systematic tunneling of SPP assets for personal and political use. This included financing FC Slovan- Slovakia' s most famous football team (and, ironically, the former Czechoslovak rival to Sparta Praha, a team purchased by VSZ's Alexander Rezes). Ducky would even hand out cash bonuses to reward players for stellar play. 138 The full extent of Ducky's tunneling only became clear after the government fell from power. Ducky died in a still unexplained assassination in 1999 three days after a probe was launched into his handling of the company.139 Slowing Macroeconomic Performance. It is ironic that, except for privatization, Meciar's second government largely left the federal reform package intact until 1996. 140 The resulting favorable entrepreneurial conditions and international demand produced a relatively strong recovery in 1994-1996, matching a regional trend. The tight monetary policy of the largely independent NBS was a crucial element in the strong macroeconomic performance of Slovakia. Yet, since NBS monetary discipline also signifycantly raised the cost of credit, maintained the real value of liabilities, and put constraints on fiscal policy, the NBS came under pressure from the Ministry of Finance to be "more cooperative" with Slovak industrial policy. According to Ivan Miklos, VSZ President Jan Smerek complained that the NBS's tight money policy was a form of "disliking VSZ and, apparently, disliking Slovakia's development." 14 1 Under intense industrial pressure, the NBS narrowly escaped an attempt by parliament to place it more directly under government control. 142 Heavy borrowing, low foreign investment and this attack on the NBS led major investment rating agencies to 138 Confidential interview with FC Slovan football player, Bratislava, July 1998. Fisher, Political Change, 94. 140 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 63. 141 Ibid., 71-2. 142 EIU, Slovak Country Report, r" Quarter 1998, 16-7. 139 �142 SLOVAKIA downgrade Slovak bonds to below investment-grade level in the spring of 1998. This further raised the cost of borrowing. 143 By the end of Meciar's third government, enterprise restructuring in Slovakia had also slowed. Firms that sought an injection of capital had to face among other things : poorly functioning equity markets rendering an initial public offering nearly impossible; a government that was suspicious and even hostile to foreign strategic investors; government decision-making and procurement processes that frequently violated the equal application of the rule of law; and finally , an increasingly profligate fiscal policy, capped by a costly infrastructure development program that crowded out private investment. By the spring of 1998, the Meciar government had to finance its cash-starved economy on European markets at the relatively costly rate of 3.5 percent above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. It also borrowed short term domestically at a nominal rate of twenty-eight percent. The high level of domestic borrowing aggravated the credit squeeze on Slovakia's already strapped enterprises. 144 Short term borrowing to meet long term debt obligations was the final nail in the Meciar government's economic coffin. By the summer of 1998 it was clear that the Slovak performance of the previous years had been financed by unsustainable fiscal spending and borrowing. Meciar's Electoral Defeat, October 1998. Parliamentary elections in late September of 1998 proved a satisfactory denouement to the regime's VSZ-led orgy of self-dealing. The government had put in place rules that looked as if it was equipping itself with the necessary tools for a full-fledged authoritarian seizure of power. No seizure occurred. It is possible that the HZDS did not even consider the possibility. Even if it had, concerted efforts from independent NGOs, regional governmental associations, and a united center-right coalition of parties and the SDI.; helped to mobilize 84.25 percent of the voting population. Many correctly interpreted the election as a test of Slovakia's Western European credentials. The HZDS won a marginal plurality, but the ZRS was in shambles 143 "Another Agency Downgrades Slovaki a's Risk Indicator," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-2 1, 1998, p. 5. 144 M. E.S.A I 0, Slovak Mo nthly Report, May 1998, p. 1-2; M. E. S.A I 0, Slovak Monthly Report, July 1998, p. 2. �SLOVAKIA 143 after its lamentable performance as a far left party in formal charge of creating capitalists from state assets. The HZDS tried, but was unable to lure the SDI: away from the opposition to form a coalition. The SDC then joined a coalition of parties (the Slovak Democratic Coalition-SOK), SMK and the new Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) to form a government united by little more than opposition to Meciar and a desire to get into the EU and NAT0. 145 Slovakia's privatization winners split deeply during the election. Most of the direct beneficiaries of Meciar's politicized economic policies remained close to the Prime Minister. Most notably, VSZ owner Alexander Rezes provided the HZDS with significant frnancial support and other perks, including flying the Prime Minister to campaign events in his private jet and even forcing his football team, Sparta Praha, to wear HZDS jerseys in a campaign-related friendly match. Rezes ' s empire was already hemorrhaging money despite having raided two of Slovakia' s leading frnancial institutions. The IRB had already been bailed out by the NBS at taxpayer expense. This was an indirect subsidy that allowed money to filter into the HZDS campaign. It must have been clear to Rezes that only continued "industrial collaboration" with his political patron would save his fortune. Yet, faced with the gathering strength of the opposition, other Meciar clients were more circumspect- even Tmava's Vladimir Poor hinted at his willingness to work with a new govemment. 146 The SOP, the new "Party of Civic Understanding" promoted itself as the voice of the independent entrepreneurial community. In interviews, its spokesman strongly critiqued the disastrous economic management of the government and promised to uphold the rule of law in economic and political dealings. It sought initially to establish a safe, pro-business middle ground between the polarized camps in Slovakia' s "Cold War. " Despite this, its founder, Rudolf Schuster, refused any prospect of cooperation with the HZDS. 147 Other entre145 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy, I0: I (I 999), 80-95 . 146 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence," in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield, 2000), 47-70. 147 Interview with Ferdinand Petrak, Vice Chairman, Party for Civic Understanding (SOP), Bratislava, July 28, 1998; Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities, 71. �144 SLOVAKIA preneurs continued to support the SDI:, and the newly united Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SKDU). 148 Conclusion. Having privatized their enterprises through political connections, Meciar's clients went on to privatize state policy. Rather than demand the rule of law, they corrupted politicians; rather than invest resources to restructure, they stripped and tunneled them; rather than act as national champions, they preyed on the country's financial stability. By 1998, the coalition government's economic model was no longer sustainable. As the economic price of clientalism grew, the politicization of economic policy became an important additional grievance in the opposition's political arsenal. Never completely unied, many of the coalition's economic allies sat on the fence or sought accommodation with the opposition. Others proved firm HZDS supporters-particularly Rezes's VSZ, who must have seen that VSZ's financial future was closely linked to government policy. On the whole, privatization in Slovakia did not produce "market democrats," but it did succeed in providing economic agents who responded to their own logic of action. These proved to be both a boon and a curse to Meciar during his moment of greatest political crisis. Privatization' s impact on Slovakia's political liberalization, in short, was at best neutral and at worst negative. Ultimately, it was a united opposition, strategically smart NGO's and a mass mobilezation of Slovakia's voters that established market democracy in Slovakia. 148 Gould and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence." � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2013, Vol. 41 Description An account of the resource Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 102 SLOVAKIA , ..., VLADIMIR MECIAR AND THE POLITICS OF PRIVATIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1992-1998 1 John A. Gould "A just privatization does not exist; we all know that the only criterion was loyalty. " - Vit'azoslav Morie, SNS honorary chair2 Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution put former Communist Party bureaucrats and industrial managers on the defensive. Associated with the communist past, many top managers were removed from their jobs while the middle managers that replaced them carried little political clout in broader debates over the design of economic reforms like privatization. As a result, Czechoslovak privatization architects had the freedom to offer average citizens a potential stake in state-owned companies. In return for a small administrative fee, citizens received coupons that would allow them to bid on company shares . Most participating citizens, however, chose to invest through new financial intermediaries, called investment privatization funds, which would concentrate citizens' small shares into larger stakes in privatized companies. By 1993, these intermediaries began to rival remaining communist-era managers for control of Czech and Slovak firms .3 1 This paper is adopted from John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization: Wealth and Power in Postcommunist Europe (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011), 103-32. A full list of acknowledgments can be found on pp. vii-viii of that work, but the author would like to thank the following for their comments, assistance and support: Hilary Appel, Kevin Deegan-Krause, Sharon Fisher, Zsolt Gal, Simona Gould, Timothy Haughton, Cubomira Hromkova, Darina Malova, Mikael Olsson, Marek Ryhal', Sona Szomolanyi, James Thompson and Milada Anna Vachudova. The author is responsible for any errors in logic or fact. 2 Abigail Innes, Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 200 I), 263. 3 Ed Clark and Anna Soulsby,"The Re-formation of the Managerial Elite in the Czech Republic," Europe-Asia Studies 48 :2 (1996), 285-303; Mitchell Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Hilary Appel, A New Capitalist Order: SLOVAKIA 103 While the mass privatization program continued in the Czech Republic through 1995, Slovakia's industrial managers were able to derail it after independence on January 1, 1993 . They had initially suffered from the same liabilities as their Czech counterparts. 4 Yet, as debate over the sovereign status of Slovakia developed in 199192, Slovak managers found a resource in identity politics that their Czech counterparts largely lacked. 5 By fusing their interests to rising popular-nationalism, a select group gained influence with a number of Slovakia's nascent political parties, and most notably, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The following paper examines the politics of privatization in Slovakia after independence. Slovakia's battle over privatization and its aftermath was a nasty, occasionally dangerous affair with very high stakes. At the center of this battle, initially, were the efforts of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and various industrialists to stop the highly popular citizens' "voucher" privatization program that Slovakia had inherited from the federal republic. This had little to do with the voucher program 's evident flaws . Rather, Meciar's policies sought to reorient privatization away from the new financial intermediaries which largely supported his opponents. In its place, his government operated a direct sales program that would benefit those who would support him. Yet, by attempting to replace a program that rewarded a majority of Slovak citizens with a program that only rewarded a narrow group of industrial managers and political allies, Meciar embarked on a democratically difficult project. His early efforts to gain close personal control over the privatization process contributed to the alienation of many of the key players in the HZDS, including President of Slovakia Michal Kovac. The president briefly orchestrated Meciar's Privatization and Ideology in Russia and Central Europe (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004); Peter Rutland, "Thatcherism, Czech-Style: Transition to Capitalism in the Czech Republic," Telos 94 ( I 992), I 03-130; Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 56-68. 4 Interview wi th Jozef Uhrik, Commercial Director, Volkswagen Slovakia, Devinska Nova Yes, Slovakia, January 14, 1997 ; Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povai.ske strojarne, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, Slovakia, July, 22 I 998 . 5 Hilary Appel and John Gould, " Identi ty Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics," Europe-A sia Studies 52: I (2000), 111-31. 104 SLOVAKIA removal from power in March of 1994 after he made a speech criticizing a series of legally questionable privatization decisions. When Meciar regained power in November, he acted on the knowledge that his political and economic ambitions were incompatible with the democratic institutions he had inherited. The ensuing assault on democratic norms, rules and procedures, while not entirely directed at privatization, nevertheless gave his ruling coalition the freedom to privatize as it pleased. However, by the end of Meciar' s third term, Slovakia could no longer demonstrate its democratic credentials to the European Union or NATO . Both threatened to exclude Slovakia from their next rounds of expansion. Privileged access to government was not simply important to acquiring property. Under Meciar it also became increasingly useful for securing favorable economic policies such as the allocation of credit, the regulation of capital markets, government procurement, and taxation policies. Between 1996 and 1998, such largess undermined Slovakia' s economic recovery and threw the country into an economic crisis. By 1998, both Slovakia's long term economic recovery and its European future were in danger. Slovak voters responded with an 84.4 percent electoral turnout that left the ruling coalition no choice but to accept the vote and surrender power. Privatization should produce independent economic actors who seek a profit rather than a government handout. Yet, as the Slovak experience under Meciar reminds us, privatization is first and foremost a means of acquiring wealth and power. Where easy profits can easily be had through political connections, creating private property does not necessarily go hand in hand with market democracy. For privatization to be most effective, societies must first be willing and able to police the intersection of state policy and economic activity. Voucher Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1993. Privatization in Czechoslovakia was designed at the federal level, but it was largely carried out by the Czech and Slovak republiclevel governments. In Slovakia privatization began under the government of Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky (Christiaq Democratic Movement-KDH) and his 30 year-old neo-liberal Minister of Privatiza- SLOVAKIA 105 tion,6 Ivan Miklos. While there was room for administrative innovation to account for local differences, in practice, Miklos administered the voucher program in an almost identical fashion to his Czech counterparts. This was no small accomplishment. Following the collapse of support for Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's first government in the spring 1991 , the new ruling coalition was deeply divided over privatization. The Carnogursky government included Jan Holcfk, and Jozef Belzak as Ministers of Industry and Economy, respectively. While both men favored a transition towards markets, both had industrial ties and favored a strong sectoral industrial policy in which firms would be restructured before privatization. In addition to Carnogursky 's ministers, industry had a strong friend in KDH member Viliam Oberhauser, a founding member of what Miklos claimed was industry's nomenklatura-controlled peak organization, the Federation of Employers Unions and Associations (AZZZ). 7 Oberhauser was a key member of the nationalist wing of the KDH and had helped author a "gradualist" economic reform scenario, challenging the market-oriented federal economic reforms that had been in place since January of 1991. 8 This created difficulties for Miklos. In the final years of the 1980s, Miklos had studied market economics at the Austrian school of Friedrich Hayek. At the time of the Revolution, he had been an economics student and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics in Bratislava. Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak brought him into the government in 1990. 9 After, the launch of strong market-oriented 6 There were three privatization ministries- one in each republic, and one at the federal level to deal with federal state property. Their formal name at the republic level was the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Assets. For an explanation see, Petr Husak, Budovani kapitalismu v Cechach: Rozhovory s Tomasem Jeikem (Prague: Volvox Globatour, 1997), 111 ; John A. Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 61. 7 lvan Miklos "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/Slovak Political Science Association, 1997), 65. 8 Jvan Miklos recalls that the Ministries of Forest and Water, Agriculture and even the Environment - all run by KDH appointees - had strong gradualist leanings. Interview with Ivan Miklos, Consultant, M.E.S.A. I 0, Bratislava, April 2, 1997. 9 Miklos's first post was as Deputy Prime Minister, Jozef Kucerak's advisor, and Director of the Government's Section for Economic and Social Policy. Interview 106 SLOVAKIA reforms in January of 1991, however, Slovakia ' s economy suffered disproportionately more than the Czech Republic ' s economy. 10 Economic liberals like Kucerak increasingly became the target of colleagues seeking to distance themselves publicly from the growing pain of economic transformation. Market reforms would be managed better, they argued, if Slovak politicians were to have greater control over their own economic and political affairs where they could use state controls to moderate the pace of transition. 11 As the lead proponent of a federally brokered, rapid transformation towards a market economy, Kucerak was forced to step down after a vote of no-confidence in the spring of 1991 . Miklos was elevated to Minister of Privatization soon after and quickly replaced Kucerak as the most outspoken market liberal in the government and the strongest public supporter of federal reforms. He faced the brunt of attacks from both the opposition and the national wing of the ruling KDH. This included surviving several parliamentary votes of no-confidence. By the winter of 1991-92, it was increasingly clear that the KDH-led coalition would fare poorly in the upcoming June elections. Miklos feared that the next government would most likely slow privatization and delay the creation of private owners. He therefore sought to start the voucher program as quickly as possible- to create a fait accompli of new owners with a stake in continuing the rapid property transformation program. Miklos was responsible for convincing state-owned firms to put up shares for the voucher privatization program in Slovakia. He recalled that the threat of dismissal helped him to encourage most managers to include significant voucher components in their base privatization plans, but the pressure was bitterly resented. 12 Miklos with Ivan Miklos, Bratislava, October 1, 1996; Interview with Jozef Kucenik, Bratislava, January 13, 1997. 10 Slovakia was particularly handicapped by its reliance on heavy defense industries, among other things. See Gould, Politics of Privatization. 11 For details see Gould, Politics of Privatization , 73-79 . 12 In about sixty cases, managers called for direct sales exclusively to themselves. Assuming that the managers had failed to meet their obligations under the privatization act to make important data available to competitors, Miklos reopened the proposed submission process for an additional two months and pushed the firms to provide the necessary data to allow competitors to propose rival privatization plans for each firm, Miklos interview, October I, 1996; Ivan Miklos, "Corruption Risks in the Privatization Process: A Study of Privatization Developments in the Slovak Re- SLOVAKIA 107 further alienated industrial elites by converting what they hoped would be a program of cheap, direct sales of enterprise shares to incumbent managers, into a transparent, competitive program in which price was the leading criterion. Prior to the June elections, the ministry sold shares in 189 firms for prices approximating and often exceeding their book value. 13 It would be another six years before the state would do as well financially in its direct sales of public property. Meanwhile, the first wave of voucher privatization began in October of 1991 with the registration of 2.59 million Slovak citizens, almost two-thirds of the adult population, through the federal Ministry of Finance. As in the Czech Republic, 14 registration for the program in Slovakia initially lagged until financial intermediaries (also referred to as investment privatization companies) began to offer a ten-fold or greater return on the voucher holder's initial registration fee within a year. Seventy-two percent of Slovak citizen-participants subsequently invested their voucher coupons with investment privatization funds in the first wave of privatization. Bidding on firms began in May of 1992 and closed in December. Shares were finally distributed to new owners in April of 1993 .15 Despite the efforts of industrial elites, the federal voucher privatization program had succeeded in providing the investment privatization funds stakes of up to forty percent in privatized firms. 16 Another wave of voucher privatization could allow fund owners to consolidate ownership of Slovakia's industrial assets. Over the next two years industrial managers, therefore, worked diligently through AZZZ to ensure a second wave of voucher privatization would not take place. 17 public," Bratislava, Klub Windsor, I 995; Interview with I.'.udovit Cemak, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 2, I 997. 13 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997; Mikael Olsson, Ownership, Reform and Corporate Governance: The Slovak Privatization Process in 1990-1996 (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, 1999), 119. 14 For details, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, Chapter 5. 15 For more on the technical details of voucher privatization, see Gould, The Politics of Privatization, 63-8. 16 0Jsson, Ownership, Reform, 115-6, 219. 17 AZZZ (Federation of Employers Unions and Associations), "5. vyrocie AZZZ SR, 1991-1996," Spravodaj AZZZ Extra. Bratislava, March, 1996; Rudolf Lachovic, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie a kolektivneho investovania," Global Brokers, Bratislava, I 997, manuscript. 108 SLOVAKIA Meciar's Second Government, 1992-1994. Meciar's HZDS dominated the June 1992 elections. With the tacit support of the Slovak National Party (SNS), he became Slovak Prime Minister for the second time. In July negotiations with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, Meciar failed in his bid to form a weak confederation with the Czech Republic. Unable to reconcile Meciar's concept of a weak confederation with Klaus' concept of a strong federation, the two agreed to replace the federal state with two sovereign, independent republics. After parliamentary approval in both republican assemblies, the countries split peacefully on January 1, 1993. 18 As in the Czech Republic, voucher privatization in Slovakia became one of the more popular aspects of the federal reform program. 19 This may help to explain why the Meciar government, elected in June of 1992, completed the first wave as its predecessor had planned. Nevertheless, Meciar's Minister of Privatization, I:ubomir Dolgos, promised a shakeup in the next round. One of the new govemment' s first decisions was to indefinitely postpone the demand that firms submit second round privatization plans to the Ministry of Privatization. This necessitated at least a delay in the second round of voucher privatization. In September of 1992, the government program declaration and an associated Ministry of Privatization document spelled out a new privatization philosophy based on a more gradual state-guided economic transformation. Rather than emphasize the rapid creation of new owners, the state would now single out "strategic fields" where it would intervene to protect the national interest through the state restructuring of enterprises before, or in place of, privatization. Industrial ministries would design and coordinate restructuring plans with the assistance of the state-controlled financial sector. 18 Eric Stein, Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fissure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Innes, Czechoslo vakia. 19 Miklo~ interview, April 2, 1997; Dusan Triska recalled being surprised at the strong support for the voucher scheme in Slovakia. Dusan Triska, "Privatization: Czechoslovakia" Eastern European Economics 26 (Fall, 1991 ); DusanTl'iska, "Political , Organizational, and Legislative Aspects of Mass Privatization-Czechoslovakia," in Marko Simonetti and Andreja Bohm, eds., Privatization in Central & Eastern Europe, 1991 . (Ljubljana: Central and Eastern European Privatization Network, 1991 ). Oldfich Dedek, The Break-up of Czechoslovakia (Aldershoot: Ave bury 1996), 201 . SLOVAKIA 109 This concept also favored direct sales to incumbent managers over voucher privatization. Price was no longer the dominant criterion in evaluating bids on the company shares that were to sold. First installments were lowered from thirty percent of the price to ten to fifteen percent, and payment could be extended over fifteen years. Another round of voucher privatization would take place, but would only be used as a residual method.20 Similarly, the threat that a manager would be dismissed diminished under the new government. Miklos asserted that Meciar and his Minister of Economy, I:udovit Cernak, reappointed many of the communist-era managers that had been pushed out by Carnogursky's government. 21 Many of these had been forced out for having collaborated with the communist secret service before the Revolution-in a process called "lustration."22 Cemak himself related that Meciar frequently paid little attention to his appointees' lustration certificates in . personne l dec1s1ons. . . 23 h1s Little privatization occurred under Dolgos in the first six months of 1993. Rather, Meciar focused his energies on consolidating control over his cabinet- pushing out co-HZDS founder Milan Kiiazko (who was a marginal threat to Meciar for party control) and Minister of Economy, Cemak. As a Kiiazko protege, Dolgos soon found himself in constant conflict with Meciar-most notably over whether vouchers should have any role in the second round when it started. Meciar felt they should not, while Dolgos asserted that he sought to put aside about a third of corporate shares for voucher privatization. 20 Dolgos stressed that any efforts to set voucher privatization timelines or the volume of assets to be voucher privatized in advance, "would ... fail to serve a purpose." Dolgos's reformulated concept even "warned" industrial managers that if their second wave base privatization plans relied too heavily on the voucher method, they would be "subjected to particularly critical and thorough evaluation." There would also be a critical "assessment of the risks derived from concentration of ownership through privatization investment funds ." Instead, Dolgos emphasized "combined methods" in which management buyouts would play an "exceedingly important role." Ministry of Administration and Privatization, SR. , "Concept of the Continuing Process of Privatization in the Slovak Republic. " Ministry of Administration and Privatization of National Property of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1992; Interview with Cubomir Dolgos, Faculty of Management, Economics University, Bratislava, March 20, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 119-20. 21 Miklos interview, April 2, 1997. 22 Marsina interview, July, 22 1998; Uhrik interview, January 14, 1997. 2 3<'.:emak interview, April 2, 1997. 110 SLOVAKIA On June 12, 1993, Dolgos lost an HZDS-engineered vote of no confidence and stepped down.24 The departures of independent personalities like Cernak, Kiiazko and Dolgos left Meciar in more solid control over the HZDS and the government, but it also made his parliamentary majority vulnerable to future defections. Nevertheless, Meciar stepped up his efforts to replace his former colleagues with his personal loyalists-particularly in the Ministry of Privatization and the Fund for National Property (FNM). 25 At that time, the privatization ministry coordinated the privatization decision-making process while the FNM was a fully state-owned joint stock company charged with distributing shares to their new private owners. FNM appointees also represented the state's interests as a shareholder at general assemblies of corporate shareholders. In 100% state-owned companies, the FNM was on paper, at least, in complete control of the firm. Control over the FNM would give the Prime Minister control over most unprivatized and many partially privatized firms. Attempts to gain direct governmental control over the privatezation ministry and the FNM brought Meciar into sharp conflict with President Michael Kovac, another co-founder of the HZDS .26 To replace Dolgos at the privatization ministry, Meciar chose a close associate, Ivan Lexa. Having backed Meciar in the dismissal of Kiiazko, Kovac now balked. Citing Lexa's inexperience and potential conflicts of interest with his father (a communist-era central planning agency bureaucrat, recently-turned entrepreneur), the president refused to approve the appointment. Meciar responded by giving Lexa the post of State Secretary of the Ministry of Privatization (the highest ministerial position not requiring presidential approval) and assumed the responsibilities of Minister himself. One of Lexa's first privatization decisions as State Secretary in July of 1992 was to ap24 Dolgos interview, March 20, 1997; Cemak interview, April 2, 1997. Kevin Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities: Democracy and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 25 . 26 Slovakia 's President was constitutionally weak, making the need for a strong party system to check the Prime Minister's power all the more necessary. Executive power flowed from the Parliament, with limited presidential powers to check it. Kovac could and did veto legislation and appointees, but Parliament could override this with a simple majority. Later, when Parliament deadlocked over a new presidential candidate, presidenti al powers - including the power of a presidential amnesty transferred to the Prime Minister. 25 SLOVAKIA 111 prove his father ' s participation in the privatization of Povazske mlyny a cestoviname, a.s., with a personal stake estimated at up to 1 billion Sk (then about US $30 million).27 While Meciar consolidated power over Slovakia' s privatization and property control mechanisms, financial intermediaries whose funds had done so well in the first round of privatization began to assert some clout in shareholder meetings. Enterprise managers had also established a few funds. 28 Slovakia' s largest company, Vychodoslovenske zeleziame, a.s (Eastern Slovak Steelworks- VSZ) had established Cassiovia Invest, which had the marketing clout to acquire more than ten percent of the vouchers. But most funds- and hence a large portion of corporate power- were in the hands of enterprise outsiders, a fact that was increasingly resented by the incumbent industrial managers.29 In the first wave of privatization, the funds had amassed a forty percent stake in privatized firms and from the perspective of incumbent managers, carried unwelcome clout. Battles soon emerged over which would be dominant in determining the overall strategy of the company, the shareholder-dominated Supervisory Boards or the management-controlled Boards of Directors.30 Meciar' s allies came to feel that the most influential funds were, as subsequent Fund for National Property President Stefan Gavomik put it, "owned by the opposition."31While not technically true, by the end of the year, industrial managers and fund-appointed board members began to run into sharp conflict over the day-to-day management and long-term strategy of "privatized" companies. Hoping to avoid a further erosion of corporate insider influence, AZZZ halted a 27 Anton Marcincin, Daniela Zemanovifova, and Lubos Vagac, "Privatization Methods and Development of Slovakia," Bratislava, Center for Economic Development, 1996, 17. 28 Another fi fty percent was spread across a wide range of funds and individual shareholders, leaving the FNM , with its residual 37.6 percent, effectively in charge. Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 223 . 29 AZZZ, "S.Vyrocie AZZZ SR, 199 1- 1996"; Miklos, "Corruption Risks," 64; Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 279, 283. 30 Slovak and Czech companies had a dual board structure consisting of a supervisory board that gave general strategic direction to the company and managerial oversight, and a management board- largely consisting of top corporate mana~ers- that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the firm. 1 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 11 8. 112 SLOVAKIA second round of voucher privatization. Meciar obligingly pushed back the start date for the next round of voucher privatization. In the fall of 1993, Meciar complimented his firm grasp of the Ministry of Privatization by putting personal loyalists on the board of the National Property Fund. Between December of 1993 and March of 1994, his indirect control over state shares of major firms allowed him to replace enterprise board members and managers of twentyone Slovak companies which, allegedly, failed to show sufficient loyalty to the HZDS. Meciar claimed that he was simply replacing opposition-linked managers from the VPN-KDH era with more independent managers . Indeed, he accused parliamentary opposition leaders "straight into the eye, in front of everyone, that each one of them is linked with one of the twenty-one major Slovak corporations in which we intervened. And this is the problem." 32 Meciar was possibly correct in his assessment. While in power, KDH ministers appointed people to the boards of leading Slovak state firms and other opposition leaders clearly had close industrial connections. However, it was unclear whether they were now being removed because they were acting as KDH clients or due to their reluctance to serve HZDS interests. Indeed, the KDH-era manager of the large oil refinery, Slovnaft, was allegedly replaced after he refused Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky's demands that he subcontract services to HZDS-linked firms. 33 By the winter of 1994, Meciar' s increasingly personal consoledation of party and governmental power had alienated many of his own party members. By February of 1994, a last remaining block of HZDS deputies, led by HZDS co-founder Jozef Moravcik, appeared ready to follow other former HZDS members and allies into opposition. The threat of losing power may have led to a subsequent wave of direct sales. Starting with the "midnight privatizations" of February 1, 2004, Lexa sold forty-four companies with a book value of $96 million for a final sale price of just $22 million. The decisions were notable for their lack of transparency, conflicts of interest, and advantageous terms to the purchasers-many of whom had close ties to leading government officials. Thirteen were subsequently annulled 32 Specifically, Meciar was accusing Vojtech Sugar, Jan Carnogursky, Cudovit Cernak and Peter Wiess. "Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," T ASR-Slovakia (February 6, 1994). 33 Confidential interview, Slovnaft insider, Bratislava, February, 1997. SLOVAKIA 113 by the successor government for contravening the Large Scale Privatization Act of February 1991 , but virtually all of the privatizations were suspect. The beneficiaries included a range of politically connected individuals-from the wife of the leader of the Slovak National Party (SNS) to Meciar's own Minister of Finance, Julius T6th.34 A March 11 , 1994 report of a commission investigating the privatizations triggered the departure of the dissident-HZDS faction led by Jozef Moravcik and a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in the government. In his speech before parliament, HZDS co-founder and Slovak President Michael Kovac openly accused Meciar of a lack of transparency and clientalism in the privatization process, among oth. 35 er th mgs. Meciar's and Lexa's hurried attempts to reorient Slovakia's privatization framework to favor political and economic insiders had run afoul of the opposition's effective use of liberal democratic institutions and norms. When next he gained power, Meciar' s new parliamentary majority would attack these opposition resources directly. VSZ and the Slovak Way of Privatization. One of Meciar's last acts in the1992-1994 government helps illustrate both the zero-sum nature of privatization, as well as its growing politicization. In December of 1993, the state exercised its shareholder rights to remove President Zoltan Berghauer and other top managers from the executive management of the state-owned firm VSZ, Slovakia's largest commercial entity. Berghauer had cofounded the AZZZ and was the lead author of an industry antireform petition in early 1991. 36 Meciar claimed that the top management change was a technocratic decision-made through consulta- 34 Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 121. Marcincin et al. "Privatization Methods"; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 25. 36 In February of 1991 , only a month after the start of market reforms, the Slovak and Czech industrial federations delivered a joint petition to the Federal Assembly demanding "help in solving the difficult economic and financial situation of industrial companies ... [resulting from] the ill-considered restrictive fiscal , credit and monetary policy of the Federal Government. " Reforms, the industrialists continued, threatened, "the collapse of the entire national economy" and a "declining living standard for all citizens of the state." Zoltan Bergauer et al. , "Petice svaz u pnlmyslu CR a SR Federilnimu shromizdeni CSFR," Hospodafske noviny, February 29, 1991 , p. 3. 35 114 SLOVAKIA tions with high-ranking bank and industrial managers.37 Yet he did not hide the fact that the change was to reduce the "unwarranted influence" of "opposition parties" in Slovakia's largest enterprise. 38 Berghauer and other purged VSZ managers protested the move, citing a history of political manipulation and threats by the HZDS towards VSZ management. The source of the claim directly attacked Meciar's Minister of Finance, JuliusToth. Toth had been VSZ's Vice President of Finance until he had resigned to join Meciar's government. According to Berghauer, Toth allegedly become enraged when Berghauer and VSZ's management refused to accept an HZDS member on the VSZ Board of Directors. Toth allegedly responded by demanding that the two top VSZ officials resign due to their political support for the KDH and other political opponents of the HZDS. 39 Toth later asserted that the Berghauer team had been stripping assets from the company. Through control of both the VSZ and collaboration with an independent trading company, they allegedly could siphon cash from the VSZ to the trade company by overcharging for supplies and underpaying for products.40 Perhaps to cut these alleged sales out of the revenue loop, or maybe to cut his allies in, Toth's new management team set up a new VSZ-owned sales company to oversee sales responsible for eighty percent of VSZ revenues. 4 1 As Minister of Finance, Toth and Lexa orchestrated the purchase of a 9.52 percent share of VSZ stock through a new private company, Manager a.s., established by five VSZ board members, including prominent HZDS member Alexander Rezes. The purchase was ques37 "Strong in the Saddle," T ASR-Slovakia, February 11, 1994. "Meciar Accuses Opposition of Links with 21 Major Companies," TASRSlovakia, February 6, 1994. 39 "Former Members of VSZ Board Lodge Complaint," CTK Business News, March 21 , 1994. 40 Despite Toth's allegations against Berghauer, no charges were ever filed . 41 Anthony Robinson, "Survey of Slovakia," The Financial Times, December 16, 1994, p. iv. It is unlikely that Toth was genuinely outraged at the allegations of corruption at VSZ. In 1993 he had allegedly used his influence as Minister of Finance to give a trading company, VSZ Selecta, a state contract to sell sugar that the Indian government provided to the Slovak government in place of its cash debt. VSZ Selecta won the contract without the required tender and then sold the sugar on the world market in violation of its contract. Toth was a member of the company's board. "Report on "Sugar Affair" to be out in January," CTK News, December 5, 1993. 38 SLOVAKIA 115 tionable for its unsightly conflicts of interest, advantageous terms and most of all, its timing. Again, in accordance with the government program, the shares were sold to domestic entrepreneurs at a substantial discount with a generous payment schedule. The discount on the current share value of the package was $36 million.42 After a ten percent down payment, Manager would pay the rest in yearly installments over five years. Manager's members each made their down payment with an interest-free $62,000 loan from the Kosice-based Priemyselna banka (Industrial Bank) whose controlling shareholder was, in turn, the VSZ-controlled fund, Cassiovia Invest. 43 Priemyselna banka, moreover, received these funds from Banka Slovakia (Bank Slovakia), which then served as the repository and investment arm of the FNM. In short, Manager borrowed FNM funds to buy shares from the FNM that in tum benefited close associates of its directors and the man responsible for their appointment, Vladimir Meciar.44 The timing was also controversial. The Meciar government received the proposal to privatize the VSZ shares to Manager on March 7 and the government approved the request on March 11- the day on which parliament finally passed a vote no-confidence in the Meciar cabinet. The FNM and Manager signed the agreement on March 14, the day the government fell. On March 17, VSZ held a general assembly at which the now former Minister of Finance and FNM Board member, JuliusT6th, was elected Chair of VSZ's Board of Directors. Rezes would become Minister of Transportation in 42 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 22 . 0lsson, Ownership, Reform , 223 , note 39. 44 "Approach to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Meciar attempted to establish Banka Slovakia as early as 1993 in his home region of Banska Bystrica as part of his effort to develop a regional banking center. The goal was to use the bank to recycle FNM funds and provide cheap credit for small to medium sized enterprises. After the VSZ deal, however, the opposition charged that it would be used as a means of providing the politically connected with cheap capital to make down payments for privatization deals. In April of 1994, the next government suspended the bank's license to operate. With Meciar's re-election in the fall, the government pushed the National Bank of Slovakia to grant the license. But, after building a costly and elaborate headquarters in Banska Bystrica and suffering from notoriously poor lending practices, the bank had significant difficulties with capitalization. The NBS finally approved a license to begin operating on June I, 1996, but the bank- like most Slovak banks-quickly developed a problem with non-performing loans. 43 116 SLOVAKIA Meciar's next cabinet. Supporting the vote were VSZ's investment privatization fund, Cassiovia Invest and VUE Invest, the investment company of Vseobecna uverova banka (General Credit Bank-VUB) and Slovakia's largest state owned bank. Ironically, oversight responsibility for VUB had, until four days earlier, lain primarily with T6th's Ministry of Finance.45 Meciar's Opposition Takes Power, March-November, 1993. A five-party caretaker government under the leadership of HZDS defector Jozef Moravcik was formed in mid-March. It promised to restore transparency and accountability to the privatization process and to re-launch the voucher privatization process as soon as possible. This was to be done before the scheduled new elections at the end of September. The coalition fought, however, over how to restore confidence, transparency and speed to the privatization process. Nevertheless, Kevin Deegan-Krause demonstrated how the new coalition allowed itself to be held accountable to competitive political forces. 46 The recent experience with Meciar may have taught the government coalition partners a good lesson in the dangers of overconcentration of power-particularly in the areas of property management and privatization. Yet, the new five-party coalition was fractious and ideologically incoherent. This influenced privatization. On the one hand, the formerly communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDI:) sought to maintain direct sales as the primary method of privatization. On the other hand, the coalition partners accused it of intending to use direct sales to reward its own allies amongst Slovakia's ex-communist industrialists and bureaucrats. The Ministry of Privatization, however, was now led by Milan Janicina, a lawyer from the center-right Democratic Union (DU). He sought to ensure that any direct sales would be a rule-governed, multi-party competitive process, not something to be run exclusively by SDI: dictates. 47 The SDI: did, however, secure an agreement to sub- 45 "Approac h to VSZ Privatization ' Strange and Unusual,"' CTK Business News, May 3, 1994. Toth also became deputy chairman of Priemyselna banka, Olsson Ownership, Reform, 223, note 39. 46 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 26. 47 Interviews with Milan Janicina, Commercial Lawyer, Bratislava, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. SLOVAKIA 117 ordinate the importance of price in the sales to employment and future investment commitments. 48 Corruption may have been possible in the final sales, but the number of competing interests in the decision making process ensured that the foxes guarding the hen house would keep each other in line. 49 Still , the program was not unimpeachable. Most of the direct privatization sales of fifty-four Slovak enterprises occurred after the elections had delivered a strong plurality to the HZDS but before Meciar had formed a government. 50 The government also conducted a public tender for the government's 24.9 percent share in VSi, attracting interest from nine companies, including the Austrian bank Creditanstalt. The coalition lost power before it could resolve internal bickering over the final buyer. 51 Throughout the summer of 1994, citizens, center-right coalition parties, brokerage firms and investment privatization funds clamored for a second wave of voucher privatization. Janicina fought with SD~'s Minister of the Economy Peter Magvasi (also an AZZZ member) to ensure that there would be enough property offered to make the project worthwhile. In preparation, the Ministry of Finance issued voucher booklets to seventy-two percent of Slovak citizens (ninety percent of those eligible). This was a significantly higher participation rate than the first wave. Janicina secured assets valued at $1.96 billion for the voucher program- making each voucher booklet potentially worth $593.00. After another aggressive campaign from financial intermediaries, fifty-eight percent of voucher holders traded their points for shares in investment privatization funds. 52 If the second wave of voucher privatization was completed, managerial insiders would cede significant additional economic power to the funds. 53 48 OIsson, Ownership, Reform , 124. Anna Grzymala-Busse, " Beyond Clientelism : Incumbent State Capture and State Formation," Comparative Political Studies 41 :4/5 (2008), 638-73 . 50 Jnterview with Rudolf Filkus, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 15, 1997; Janicina interviews, March I 0, 1997; April I, 1997. 51 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 222 . 52 Tbid. , 124-5. 53 Janici na interview, April I, 1997. 49 SLOVAKIA Privatization under Meciar's Third Government, 1994-1998. The Moravcik government was short-lived. The SD:C had secured early elections and in the ensuing campaign the center-right fragmented amongst a range of competing personalities. A number of opposition parties failed to cross the five percent threshold in the September-October 1994 vote. Moravcik's Democratic Union (DU) received 8.6 percent, the KDH won 10.l percent, SD:C got 10.4 percent and the ethnic Hungarian Coalition took 10.2 percent of the votes. The HZDS, meanwhile, won a thirty-five percent plurality. This was less than in 1992. However, since thirteen percent of the electorate voted for parties that did not pass the five percent threshold, the ideological weight of the next parliament shifted sharply back towards Meciar and his national-populism. After a month of negotiations, the HZDS formed an ideologically awkward coalition with the two smallest delegations in parliament-the extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS-5.4 percent) led by the garrulous Jan Slota,54 and the extreme left Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS-7.34 percent). 55 To discipline his junior coalition partners, Meciar could use the threat of an alternative coalition with the reformed communist party, the SD:C.56 Critics speculated that the "brown-red" wings of the new ruling coalition were held together only by the promise of privatization benefits. 57 The National-Populist Privatization Concept and its Implementation. Meciar's privatization policies formally settled the long-standing ideological battle between market reformers and gradualists over privatization policy, but in reality, this conflict had stood proxy for an underlying clash of interests between enterprise outsiders and incumbent firm management. Gradualist concepts were hijacked, to an extent, and combined with clientalism and xenophobic nationa54 1n the spring of 1993, Meciar had helped Jan Slota oust Cernak from control over the SNS. Cernak left (with Janicina) to form the Democratic Union. Cernak interview, April 2, 1997. 55 Grigorij Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Party System," in Soi\a Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation , 50. 56 Innes, Czechoslo vakia, 262. 57 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 64. SLOVAKIA 119 !ism to benefit the governing coalition and its allies at, as we shall see, a growing cost to the public. The formal theory underlying the Meciar government's privatezation program echoed the Dolgos strategy of the fall of 1992. The government would work closely with incumbent industrial managers to achieve ownership patterns that would be most appropriate to a coordinated industrial policy. The state would integrate equity transfer, credit and other policies in ways that would boost the strength of Slovak national firms on world markets and minimize transformational pain at the enterprise level. The variety of capitalism officially envisioned was thus much closer to a continental-style state-coordinated market economy than a more hands-off liberal market economy. However, Slovak industrial leaders at AZZZ also invoked Asian development models to explain what they were trying to accomplish.58 Insiders Ascendant. In practice, Meciar's coalition privatized the privatization process. It also subordinated capital markets regulation to the needs of incumbent managers at the expense of enterprise outsiders. The main target was the funds that emerged through voucher privatization. 59 Meciar's new parliamentary majority began to work even before he formed a government. In an overnight session of parliament on November 3-4, 1994, his new coalition passed legislation that secured exclusive control and oversight of privatization, the state media and the secret service. 60 An amendment to the 1991 Large Scale Privati58 Interview with Frantisek Bruckrneyer, General Director, Federation of Employers' Unions and Associations (AZZZ), Bratislava, February 6, 1997. Prior to becoming Director of AZZZ, Bruckrneyer worked for the Czechoslovak federal government after the Warsaw Pact invasion (1970-1974) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow (1974-1980). In the 1980s, he directed the state-owned firm, Zdroj , before co-founding AZZZ in 1991 . Compiled from "Leaders.sk" database. Trend Holding Co. and The Slovak Spectator, Bratislava. http://www.leaders.sk/index.php?id=674 [accessed August 30, 2010). 59 Marcincin et al., "Privatization Methods"; Miklos, "Economic Transition,"; Ivan Miklos, "Privatizacia," in Martin Butora and Michal lvantysin, eds. Slovensko, 1997: Suhrn a sprava o stave spolocnosti a trendoch na rok 1998. (Bratislava: Institut pre verejne otazky, 1998). 60 Soi\a Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 10. 120 SLOVAKIA zation Act transferred the right to propose and decide direct sales from the privatization ministry to the relatively less transparent FNM (Act #369/1994). The majority then stacked the FNM's Presidium and Supervisory Board with coalition officials and cancelled Janicina's 54 direct post-election sales (Act #370/1994). In five cases, new property owners had already taken legal possession of their assets from the state. 61 This violated both international human rights law and the Slovak Constitution. 62 The transfer of power to the FNM had important implications. The Constitutional Court later ruled that, as a joint stock company, the FNM did not have to submit to government review or regulatory oversight. Hence, it was exempt from oversight by the supreme government control body that could oversee and audit state agencies. Even had it not been exempt from oversight, however, the November 3-4 "night of the long knives" removed opposition parliamentarians from the oversight committee. The ruling majority was now fully responsible for monitoring itself. 63 While extolling the virtues of a state-directed transformation, Meciar provided the new measures with a market reform cover story. He claimed that insulating the privatization process from opposition would allow the FNM to make decisions according to technocratic criteria, free from political influence. In 1998, when the damage had been done, this allowed him to claim that although he still agreed with his "concept" of privatization, he had not been responsible for its administration. 64 Meciar's "concept" ultimately excluded outsiders from privatization. He initially promised that the second wave of voucher privatization would go ahead as planned-although with less property than Janicina envisioned. In July of 1995, however, Parliament cancelled voucher privatization altogether (Act #190/1995). Voucher booklets 61 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 126. Both Article 17b of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly 217 /1948) and Protocol 1, Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1952) secure the right to possessions. 63 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. In the fall of 1997, Parliament finally gave into EU and opposition pressure and appointed Ivan Miklos to the supervisory board of the FNM. 64 CTK News, May 8, 1998. Meciar was never directly implicated in a privatization scandal while in power, Sharon Fisher, Political Change in Post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist, (New York: Pal grave, 2006), 91. 62 SLOVAKIA 121 could now be exchanged for a bond with a face value of l 0,000 Sk to be redeemable in 2001 or on the bearer's 65 th birthday and with an interest rate equal to the discount rate of the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS). Proceeds to meet the bond obligations were to come from sales of state property- a promise that the FNM's new privatization policy of selling to domestic industrial managers at a deep discount made impossible to keep . In its public statements, AZZZ took full credit for the cancellation of vouchers.65 A Constitutional Court decision overturned parts of Act #190 in late 1996.66 By that time, however, the FNM had already privatized most of Slovakia's remaining "non-strategic" industrial enterprises. Even had the government wanted to re-launch the voucher program, it would now have had to renationalize private properties to find adequate assets to make the program work. An additional measure passed in July of 1995 enhanced the government's capabilities to coordinate a state-directed industrial policy through the Strategic Enterprises Act (# 175/ 1995). The purpose of the act was to preserve the "public interest" in crucial Slovak industries. First, twenty-nine firms would be exempt from privatization altogether. This included the fundamental sectors of the economy including telecommunications, energy and the defense-related engineering sector. The list of strategic companies, made public in the summer of 1996, also included some at least questionably "strategic" firms such as health spas. 67 All told, the Strategic Enterprises Act reduced the book value of assets remaining to be privatized by half. 68 A second, legally controversial provision of the act, forced an additional forty-five firms to transfer a "golden share" to the firm's founding ministry-in most cases, to Jan Ducky's Ministry of the Economy. The Constitutional Court overturned this prescription in April of 1996 as a clear violation of property rights, but tellingly, the owners of major pro-HZDS firms , like Slovnaft, had failed to give 65 Lachovit, "Vzt'ah kup6novej met6dy privatizacie". Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 164. 67 The administration may have legitimately feared that privatization would mean the services of the spas would no longer be readily available or affordable to average Slovaks through the health care system. 68 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 130. 66 122 SLOVAKIA the state ownership rights over the golden share. Their reaction gave credence to the market reformers' expectations that privatizationeven via a highly politicized process-would produce independent agents with the potential, at least, to resist government policies that hurt their material interests. 69 In November of 1996, the Constitutional Court also annulled Parliament's transfer of privatization powers to the FNM (Act #370/1994). The court argued that the act had illegally abrogated the state's responsibility for the transformation of state property. The Court stopped short of retroactively annulling the FNM ' s actions, however. Stripped of its exclusive prerogative over direct sales, the HZDS-controlled FNM continued to serve its clients through public auctions of shares from the FNM portfolio. While share auctions are a relatively uncontroversial privatization mode, critics allege that the FNM often limited access about the time and location of the auction to all but the intended buyer. 70 Coalition Control over Direct Sales. Between January of 1994 and November of 1996, the FNM privatized at a furious pace. While Act #3 70/1994 removed privatezation from the government's portfolio of responsibilities, coalition officials and industrial insiders from AZZZ retained close control over the process. Two FNM officials, HZDS member and FNM Chairman Milan Rehak, and Co-Chair and Director of the Direct Sales Section, Jan Povraznik, were responsible for executing Presidium decisions . These were closely controlled by the ruling coalition. Junior coalition partner ZRS had formal responsibility for the privatization process . ZRS member Peter Bisak ran the Ministry of Privatization while ZRS vice-chairman Stefan Gavornik chaired the Presidium. Gavornik attested, however, that his influence was minimal: while the HZDS had no seats on the nine member Presidium, AZZZ members held six seats and hence a majority of the votesand they supported the HZDS .7 1 Understandably, now that AZZZ 69 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi , "Bridging Slovakia's Elite Chasm," Transitions, November, 1997. 70 Jnterview with Gabriel Palacka, Member of Parliament, Bratislava, April 18, 1997 ; Miklos, "Economic Transition," 67-8 . 71 Tim Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities of Leadership in Postcommunist Europe (London: Ashgate, 2005), 64. SLOVAKIA 123 influence was secured, incumbent managers who had previously been skeptical about privatization became its strong advocates. 72 According to Sharon Fisher, regional committees of five coalition representatives determined properties to be sold and top coalition officials made final decisions at coalition meetings every Wednesday at 6:00pm. 73 Allegedly, the meetings rarely considered the business merits of the proposal-or even how the sale would further the official goal of coordinated industrial restructuring. As Gavomik recalled, "We were .... lobbying for those who were coming to us." Yet, Gavomik added, "not even a nail was sold without Meciar."74 Milan Cagala, a HZDS-appointed FNM presidium member, confirmed these allegations. 75 More broadly, members of the ruling coalition were open about clientalism. 76 As Minister of the Economy, Jan Ducky (HZDS) explained, "every government gives advantages to those groups that cooperate with them. This is not controversial." 77 Yet sales went beyond clientalism to open self-dealing-included sales to leading ruling coalition politicians and their family members. As Gavomik admitted, "Of course there are [politicians in the privatization process], and I know about them, but I won't tell. After all .. . every citizen has a right to take part in privatization." 78 Participants in the FNM's direct sales program typically received terms similar to the midnight privatizations of February 1994. Buyers-usually incumbent managers- would receive the company for 72 Ibid. , 35. Fisher, Political Change, 88-9. The regional meetings were an institutional mechanism for regionally based privatization groups to make their claims to property. In the eyes of observers, the groups became associated with leading HZDS officials and clients. For example, it was rumored that meetings in Kosice tended to be dominated by Rezes, those in Banska Bystrica by Meciar, and those in Tmava by Vladimir Poor. Interview with Valer Ostrovsky, CEO, Schultz and Ostrovsky, Bratislava, May 14, 1997. 74 Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic," Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 75 Ibid. 76 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 66-7. 77 Author's notes from "Slovak Spectator Live, Debates for Democracy Series: Brigita Schmognerova & Jan Ducky," Bratislava, 1996. An FNM spokesman shared this sentiment with the author. Interview with Oto Balogh, Press Spokesman, Fund for National Property, Bratislava, April 22, 1998. 78 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 277-8, note 26. 73 124 SLOVAKIA as little as one third, one-fifth, or even less of its book value. In practice, the typical firm required a ten to fifteen percent down payment, often using money borrowed from a state-owned financial institution. Moreover, installments on the purchaser' s debt to the FNM were usually spread over ten years and deductible from the company' s tax bill. These terms and often the buyers themselves were also frequently kept secret. In the case of the illegal sale of the strategically listed and highly profitable oil extraction and storage company, Nafta Gbely a.s., the new owners of the company remained a matter of intense speculation among opposition politicians and the press. The official address of the purchasing company, Druha obchodna, a.s. was initially an abandoned building. Vladimir Poor, Trnava's HZDS chief and a member of the regional coalition privatization committee later admitted to being a primary beneficiary of the deal, along with a close Meciar aide.79 FNM President Gavornik later alleged that Poor was able to meet the company's 575 million Sk purchase price simply by raiding the company's 1,075 million Sk capital account. If Gavornik is right, Poor used the firm's bank account to buy the firm for himself. Prosecutors later unsuccessfully charged Poor with "tunneling" 300 million Sk out of the company, but dropped the charges. In the end, the circumstances of the company ' s privatization were never fully investigated, perhaps because Poor voluntarily returned the company to the state. 80 In another controversial case, the FNM sold a controlling stake of Slovnaft, Slovakia's oil refinery, to Slovintegra-a company owned by Slovnaft' s director, Slavomir Hatina and nineteen other managers. Hatina was a financial backer of the HZDS and bought thirty-nine percent of the company at an eighty percent discount over the currently traded price. The initial down payment, moreover, was only 1.56 percent of the sale value. The FNM soon reduced the sale price by an additional eighty-four percent to reward management for meeting its promised investment and employment targets.81 The privatization of Slovakia' s largest company, VSZ, also continued apace under Meciar's direct sales framework. In 1995, junior 79 Fisher, Political Change, 93-4; Marcincin et al. , "Privatization Methods. " Marek Vagovic, "Gavomik: Za privatizaciou Nafta Gbely stal Gasparovic, Sme, May 9, 2009, p. 3. 81 Marcincin et. al. , "Privatization Methods," 18. 80 SLOVAKIA 125 coalition member ZRS engineered a sale of ten percent of VSZ shares to Hutnik, a company formally owned by VSZ's union members but strongly under the influence of Minister of Transport (until 1996), Alexander Rezes. Again the price was a fraction of the real value of the shares and payments were made on a generous installment plan. Hutnik then collaborated with Rezes to form Ferrimex, a company that purchased another 15.4 percent on extraordinarily generous terms.82 The deal cemented Rezes ' s control over VSZ. Rezes responded by essentially barring minority shareholder VUB kup6n (an investment company set up by Slovakia' s state-run savings bank) from receiving any information about the health and activities of the firm _sJ Nationalism in Privatization. The Meciar government employed popular economic nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric to justify its choice of a privatization program. Junior coalition partner SNS campaigned in 1994 on a promise to protect Slovakia from "impoverishment" at the hands of foreign investors.84 The subsequent 1995 government program declaration promised to privilege "domestic business subjects" over foreigners in the privatization process. National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar correctly predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization to foreigners. 85 In practice, Slovak government officials remained deeply suspicious of foreign direct investment and often sought to block foreign partnerships. "We just want to avoid them coming in and closing [the company]," remarked one FNM official in an interview with the author. "Investors only come to misuse companies and disappear." 86 One example is notable for its senselessness: a foreign advisor to the government related that he worked with an entrepreneur to acquire a strategic foreign partner to modernize and expand production of his product line for export abroad. While the entrepreneur was not explicitly prohibited from signing the deal, he received several telephone calls from top officials in one ministry warning that he would 82 01sson, Ownership, Reform, 223 -5. lbid., 182. 84 Fisher, Political Change, 89. 85 Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 65 . 86 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997. 83 126 SLOVAKIA be held fully accountable if even one Slovak lost his job as a result of the investment. He lost his nerve and cancelled the contract. The enterprise thus remained in debt and was unable to raise the money on its own for modernization; nor was it able to make its own marketing contacts abroad. The advisor noted that this was typical of the Meciar government's attitude towards foreign joint-ventures. 87 The combination of national capitalism and knee-jerk nationalism cost Slovakia dearly. Joint ventures with multinational corporations were at that time leading the deep industrial restrucuring of Central Europe. They had the capital, marketing networks and technology to outperform domestically privatized companies and they were far outperforming firms that remained in state hands, measured in both production increases and productivity growth. 88 Despite this growing record of success, the ruling coalition sold a mere five companies to foreigners out of a total 347. 89 On a per capita basis, by 1998, Slovakia had received half the FDI of Poland, one-third the FDI of the Czech Republic and only a tenth of the FDI of Hungary.90 This was a lost opportunity. Over the next few years, new owners would effortlessly enrich themselves by "flipping" their cheaply acquired companies to international capital-realizing for themselves gains that should have gone into the FNM accounts to meet its new privatization bond obligations. 91 Insider-Controlled Capital Markets Regulation. Having gained control over the privatization process, incumbent managers pressured the government for a favorable capital markets policy. Throughout 1994 and into 1995, investment privatization companies had clashed with incumbent managers in company board rooms. As Michael Olsson relates, the managers wanted the new ow87 Confidential interview with a foreign financial service executive, Bratislava, October 20, 1996. Most of the foreign financial service executives and consultants I sroke with had similar stories. 8 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation (New York: Columbia International Affairs Online, 1997), http: //www.ciaonet.org/book/gould/ [accessed February 23, 2012]. 89 Olsson, Ownership, Reform , 133. 90 Gould and Szomolinyi, "Elite Fragmentation," 58. 91 Fisher, Political Change, 94. SLOVAKIA 127 ners to contribute capital while they continued to control the direction of the company. The new owners of the funds, by contrast, sought to pressure the incumbent managers into improving cost efficiency, technological and organizational restructuring, and developing new- often international- marketing arrangements. It did not help that the funds with diverse portfolios did not have sufficient expertise to cover all the firms in their portfolio. Fund representtatives were often barely out of university and entirely lacking in experience. A cultural clash thus developed between the older generation of industrial managers-most of whom had their start in Slovak industry in the 1960s and 70s-and the "young men from Bratislava_ ,,92 Government actions in 1995 wrested industrial control from the funds back to the industrial managers. Incumbent managers began to use the direct sales process to tum the tables at meetings of general shareholders. Olsson writes, "[M]anagers who acquired a large chunk of shares on soft terms from the FNM all of a sudden lost all respect for other minority shareholders .... funds could only sit by [as] ... managers or other domestic industrial groups took over." 93 The government also intervened in capital markets to further tilt the balance of power towards management. Legislation in 1995 reduced the maximum stake investment privatization companies could hold in a company from twenty to ten percent. It also prohibited investment privatization companies from placing officials on a company ' s Board of Directors. This weakened the ability of fund-dominated Supervisory Boards to monitor the day-to-day actions of company managers. Parliament also passed capital markets regulation in 1996 that reduced the transparency of capital markets transacttions and all but eliminated minority shareholder rights. President Kovac returned the legislation, demanding better protection for minority shareholders. Ironically, the funds were not necessarily in favor of a better regulated market. The Slovak capital market had few of the institutional safeguards to protect minority shareholder rights and prevent insider trading that we find in more developed equity markets. Controlling owners were often able to expropriate value from minority 92 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 182. 93 fbid. 128 SLOVAKIA shareholders without penalty. This meant, ironically, that the emergence of a dominant shareholder in a firm often would lead to a decline in the value of the firms' shares. 94 The result was a loss in equity market liquidity: when one lost control over a company, one would often be unable to sell one's shares at any price. Wise investors knew that the majority shareholders could tunnel the real value of the company elsewhere. Under such conditions, a passive portfolio stake in all but a few "blue chip" companies made little sense. Funds found they could best make money by secretly acquiring a controlling share of companies in unregistered, off market trades of physical paper shares and then selling them at a profit to a strategic investor. Given that a more transparent market would actually undermine this strategy, a number of funds were somewhat ambivalent about reforms that might make passive portfolio investment safer and profitable. 95 The ruling coalition made things even worse. It sought to limit the funds to a portfolio role even as it actively undermined their minority shareholder rights. Ministry of Finance capital markets regulator Jozef Magula testified on behalf of minority shareholder rights in front of Parliament--much to the disappointment of top AZZZ managers . A better law was passed in 1997 .96 Still, the new law continued to allow controlling shares to be bought anonymously in secret off-market trades. 97 Remarked one broker philosophically, "at least we have rules."98 94 Economist Joseph Stiglitz observed this phenomenon in the Czech equity market, but the problems were quite similar in Slovakia. Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Comments on 'Czech Republic: Capital Market Review Report,"' Delivered at the Ministry of Finance, Prague, Czech Republic, May 9, I 997 ; For details, see Gould, The Politics o[ Privatization, 81- 10 I. 9 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 184-5 . 96 Magula claims that, as a result of his parliamentary testimony, he came under AZZZ pressure to step down. He relented and moved to the central bank. Interview with Jozef Magula, Member of the Bank Board, General Relations Department, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, July 28, 1998. 97 Magula interview, July 28, 1998 ; Interview with Rudolf Lachovic, President, Association of Investment Managers and Investment Funds of the Slovak Republic, Brati slava, June I 6, 1997; for the early market regulatory climate, see Juris, I 994. 98 Ostrovsky interview, May 14, I 997. SLOVAKIA 129 Meaningful portfolio investment disappeared under Meciar. In addition, led by Magula, the government destroyed a rapidly growing mutual fund industry in 1996. Unlike the privatization funds, the new mutual funds gathered people's savings and invested them in the market and other assets. The pioneer was Prva slovenska investicna skupina, a.s (First Slovak Investment Company-PSIS) an open-ended fund into which citizens could deposit and withdraw like a checking account. By early 1995, the PSIS's Sporofund had over $50 million in savings. 99 It was allegedly well-run and had done a reasonable job at building shareholder value within its portfolio. But in the fall of 1994, the PSIS used its savings to invest in citizen voucher booklets issued under the Moravcik government. Vouchers, the PSIS controversially argued, were a form of state security and hence a legal investment for the mutual fund. Over 750,000 Slovaks signed up for the PSIS voucher privatization funds . Had the second wave of voucher privatization gone forward as planned, PSIS would have become the second wave's largest owner of shares in Slovak enterpnses. However, PSIS owners were also strong contributors to the Democratic Union-the party of Janicina and Moravcik. Moreover, the PSIS had a stake in the independent daily newspaper SME. Both PSIS' s political orientation and its potential economic power were a threat to the ruling coalition and its industrial allies. In the spring of 1995, the Ministry of Finance revoked PSIS 's operating license. Courts found the measure illegal and ordered that the Ministry restore the license, but the Ministry simply revoked it again and transferred control of the company's Sporofund portfolio to Harvard Investment Company. In the face of a rapid withdrawal from the Sporofund, Harvard liquidated the fund and paid off savers about half of what they had put in. 100 The Coalition Assault on Democracy, 1995-1998. Meciar's coalition could not have achieved such close control over the privatization framework without a significant attack on democratic political and civic institutions. Hence, while Slovakia's 99 Interview with Vladimir Hoffman, Broker, Delta Securities, Prague, Czech Republic, July 25 , 1997. I0°Magula interview, July 28, 1998; Ostrovsky interview, May 14, 1997; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 187-90. 130 SLOVAKIA democratic decline from 1994 to 1998 was not exclusively caused by privatization, it was certainly linked to it. Indeed, it is unlikely that the ruling coalition and its allies would have fought so hard had the nation's most lucrative assets not been available for appropriation. After ad hoc encroachments on democratic norms in 1993-94, between late 1994 and 1998, Meciar' s parliamentary majority reduced Slovakia's formal democracy to an illiberal shell verging on soft authoritarianism. One permissive cause was the majoritarian nature of the Slovak Constitution. Led by a strong executive and unhindered by a weak presidency already on the defensive, the Meciar majority sought to override the remaining checks posed by the Constitutional Court, the political opposition, civil society and regional and municipal governments. This enabled a reorientation of the privatization framework towards political and economic insiders, but it also endangered "horizontal accountability"-the country' s internal balance of institutional power. 101 Meciar' s squabble with the president was the most visible aspect of this encroachment. Kovac ' s 1993 veto over Meciar's choice of Ivan Lexa to run the privatization ministry marked the beginning of a running battle between the government and the president. The conflict took on added intensity during Meciar's third government. Kovac did not have much institutional power to start with. His repeated vetoes of parliamentary acts were quickly overridden by a simple majority- entirely in line with the Constitution. Yet, Meciar sought to further weaken and discredit the president. An important player in this campaign was the Slovak Information Service (SIS), Slovakia ' s secret service. First, Meciar had to gain control over it. In the November 3-4, 1994 session of parliament, Meciar's majority excluded opposition parties from participating on the SIS oversight committee. In the spring of 1995, parliament transferred power to appoint the head of Slovakia's intelligence agency from President Kovac to Prime Minister Meciar. Meciar then appointed his trusted protege, Ivan Lexa, to head the service. 102 Over the next two and a half years, Lexa waged a war of "dirty tricks" against the president and harassed civil society and indepen10 1 Guillenno O' Donnell, "Delegati ve Democracy," Journal of Democracy, 5: I ( 1994), 55-69; Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities. 102 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 29. SLOVAKIA 131 dent entrepreneurs. The war reached its climax in August of 1995 when someone- possibly Meciar, but more probably Lexa-ordered that the president' s son be kidnapped, drugged, and dumped in neighboring Austria. When Robert Remias, the confidant of an exSIS agent, implicated Lexa's SIS in discussions with the editor of the leading independent daily SME, Remias was assassinated. Meciar's government squashed the investigation into the assassinationreplacing three investigators before finding one who suspended the inquiry into the SIS link. The new investigator concealed evidence that 150-200 grams of Semtex had ignited the car's propane tank. Now on the defensive, the SIS launched a campaign to show that Kovac Jr. had arranged for his own kidnapping.103 The battle between Meciar and Kovac ended only after the president's term of office expired in 1997. As the government and opposition could not achieve the super majority needed to select a replacement under a clearly flawed constitutional provision, presidential powers fell to the Prime Minister. Meciar subsequently used his presidential powers to pardon anyone linked to the kidnapping and Remias's murder-despite the lack of any official finding that a crime had taken place. 104 The government also encroached on the rights and prerogatives of the opposition, the courts, civil society and the media. In addition to oversight of the secret service, the November 3-4, 1994 parliamentary session blocked opposition MPs from participation on all substantive committees except the environment committee. The coalition further revealed its hegemonic intentions by trying to have former Prime Minister Moravcik' s party, the Democratic Union (DU), banned from parliament and by charging President Kovac with treason. Both efforts failed. To safeguard against a repeat of the 1993-4 defections of Kovac, Moravcik, Filkus, Knazko and others, defectors from the HZDS were now treated with open disrespect for the constitution. After HZDS co-founder Frantisek Gaulider left the HZDS parliamentary club in 1996, the HZDS leadership produced a pre-signed letter of resignation that they had obtained in 1994 to ensure party discipline. The 103 Kieran Wiliams, "Slovakia Since 1993," in Kieran Williams and Dennis Deletant, eds., Security Intelligence Services in New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001 ), 130-140. 104 Deegan-Krause, Elected Affinities, 48-50. 132 SLOVAKIA parliamentary majority then stripped him of his parliamentary mandate, barred him from the building and replaced him in parliament with a HZDS loyalist. The Constitutional Court ruled these acts to be unconstitutional, but parliament did not reinstate him- another violation of Slovakia' s fragile system of checks and balances. Gaulider also received numerous threats to his life. 105 Media and civil society also came under intense legal and extralegal pressure from the government and allegedly the SIS. The HZDS attempted to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation by creating bureaucratic barriers to their legal operation and by establishing party-controlled interest groups that competed with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. 106 Similarly in the media, parliament' s November 1994 legislation excluded the opposition from any role in oversight over public broadcasting. The state-controlled mass media and sympathetic newspapers then justified the government's actions with a torrent of unbalanced coverage, nationalism, xenophobia, personal slurs and misdirection. 107 Things were also tough for the independent media. Following his reporting on the Kovac, Jr. case, the editor of SME found a dead cat nailed to his door and his car burned. An anonymous leafleting campaign accused two other critical journalists of pornography and pedophilia. A third journalist who looked too closely at the links between Alexander Rezes and the HZDS was beaten up in a Kosice restaurant. 108 Meanwhile, privatization beneficiaries frequently bought and attempted to control the editorial content of the independent media. When VSZ took over the business daily 105 Meseznikov, "The Open Ended Formation," 43 ; Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, "Preface," in Sona Szomolanyi and John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 5. 06 ' Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Representation in Slovakia after 1989: From 'Transmission Belts' to ' Party-State Corporatism?"' in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 93113 . 07 ' The Helsinki Civic Assembly and the Association for the Support for Local Democracy survey concluded that state-run Slovak Television violated the principles of fa irness more often than any other public or private media outlet during the 1998 electoral campaign. It devoted seventy-five percent of its news programs to Met iar and the HZDS, RFEIRL News line, 2: 192 (October 5, 1998), Part II . 108 Innes, Czechoslovakia, 313 , note 139. SLOVAKIA 133 Narodna obroda, for example, the new owners fired the newspaper's independent-minded editor. Overall, while the independent media functioned effectively, it faced numerous forms of petty harassment from various government agencies. 109 Independent news sources, however, did not reach the entire population. In much of the country, the state broadcast media was the primary source of information. After the November 3-4 session of parliament, government loyalists controlled the state media and state broadcasting reflected their views, even to the point of collaborating with the SIS to fabricate "investigative reports" slandering the president. Nor did the most important independent media source-the television station Markiza-initially have the coverage capacity or willingness to acquaint Slovaks with the details of privatization or other rule of law issues. Toward the end of the 1996-1998 period, however, TV Markiza did become a crucial source of alternative information in Slovakia. 11 0 As the Meciar government came into conflict with basic liberal institutions and freedoms , the EU, NA TO, European governments and the United States all registered their displeasure. The EU, in particular, issued a series of diplomatic demarches as part of its dialogue with applicant countries. 111 In 1996, Freedom House reduced Slovakia's political rights ranking from "free" to "partially free." 112 However, the nastiest rap to the government's knuckles came in July of 1997, after the government illegally cancelled a national referendum on NATO membership. The European Commission recommended that Slovakia be excluded from the first wave of EU membership negotiations. While Slovakia was a liberal democracy in 109 Andrej Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Post-Communist Transition of Slovakia" in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 187-208. 110 Skolkay, "The Role of the Mass Media," 196. 111 Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovakia's International Alignment," in Sona Szomolanyi and John A. Gould, eds., Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 209-30; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, l everage and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 11 2 Freedom House, "Freedom in the World, 2007," Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 2007 . 134 SLOVAKIA form, the Commission opined, it operated differently in practice. 113 NATO Followed suit and excluded Slovakia from its first round of • 114 expansion. The Meciar government dismissed these external critics by questioning the objectivity of their processes and critiquing the patriotism of domestic opponents who agreed with them . Yet, the blows hurt. Slovakia's young, urban and educated citizens were deeply concerned with proving the country's western credentials and desperately wished to join Europe 's most exclusive clubs. Thus, the EU and to a lesser extent NA TO, increasingly put the government in a bind: Meciar could not comply with their "conditions" and still retain his increasingly politicized and often illegal control over political and economic life. As Milada Vachudova pointed out, "political power depended on strategies that were incompatible with the EU's re~uirements of liberal democracy and comprehensive market reform." 15 With the September/October 1998 parliamentary elections approaching, the HZDS even appeared ready to jettison free and fair elections. Parliament amended the electoral law in ways that gave the Ministry of the Interior greater influence in counting the vote; and it put ambiguous and potentially expandable limitations on the ability of the private media to cover the election. New electoral rules also shackled the ability of small parties or coalitions to participate in the election. Finally, the HZDS had the courts review the leading opposition coalition 's eligibility to participate. Many worried that should the government apply a literal interpretation of its new laws, it could eliminate a number of important institutions of liberal democracy, including the right to contestation and participation as well as the right to alternative sources of information. Opponents feared a fullfledged authoritarian turn . 116 Privatization's Half-way Reform. Meciar's privatization program produced stakeholders in dysfun113 European Commission, Agenda 2000-Commission Opinion on Slovakia's Application for Membership of the European Union , (Brussels: European Union, 1997), section I. 3. 114 Duleba, " Democratic Consolidation." 115 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 38. 11 6 1.M. Viersma, "Sprava docasnej pozorovatelskej misie na Slovensku," Euro Report, no. I 5, 1998, pp. 22-23. SLOVAKIA 135 ctional economic policies. This was not necessarily pre-ordained. The first two Slovak governments retained the basic elements of the market reform program inherited from the federal government. An independent National Bank of Slovakia kept the Slovak currency strong, while the first two post-independence governments restricted their fiscal expenditures and preserved a liberalized trade environment. By 1995-6, Slovakia's firms were beginning to find new markets in Western Europe. Unemployment, still high at thirteen percent, was beginning to inch down. With so much slack in the labor market, inflationary pressures remained acceptable-reflecting a sustainable increase in demand as tradable products integrated into world markets. The major problem was the deliberate coalition policy of politicized reform. 1997-8 turned out to be challenging years in the global economy. Yet, the network of industry-state-party ties shaped by an insider privatization process and illiberal politics made Slovakia even more vulnerable to a downturn. 117 Missed tax payments, uncompetitive government procurement programs, significant new government financial obligations, delayed enterprise restructuring, low foreign direct investment and a troubled banking sector all contributed to an economic crisis that would cost Slovakia the next three years of growth. Manipulation of Debt. The Slovak Republic shows that a government's capacity to protect investor property rights and enforce debt contracts is crucial to the efficiency of privatization. 118 The Meciar government's policy of direct sales led to a rapid concentration of ownership, but it did not always produce more efficient behavior. According to interviews with Western financial services experts and equity market actors, Slovak owners often rejected enterprise restructuring and instead used their insider access to cash flows and assets from privatized 117 OECD, (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), OECD Economic Surveys, 1998-1999: Slovakia, (Paris: OECD, 1999), 29-30. 11 8 Olsson, Ownership, Reform; Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer, "Privatization and Corporate Governance," in Takatoshi Ito and Anne 0. Krueger, eds, Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region. NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics, 12 (2001), 13-34. http://www.nber.org/chapters/cl0l82 .pdf [accessed February 23, 2012]. 136 SLOVAKIA enterprises to get rich quickly-a process known as "rent seeking." Much of the reason relates to debt and the firms' low purchase prices. Slovak firms carried a large outstanding burden of debt which they were not necessarily pressured to honor. First, Slovakia's bankruptcy law privileged debtors over creditors, reinforcing a persistent problem with overdue liabiities. 11 9 Second, the administration of the first wave of voucher privatization in Slovakia led to an initial concentration of privatized property in the state-bank owned funds . These state-owned banks often transgressed the official firewall between their lending and equity management operations and forced firms to take on more loans than they needed. 120 The percentage of nonperforming loans in the portfolios of Slovakia's three state banks skyrocketed between 1996 and 1998 from twenty-five to thirty-seven percent. 121 Third, privatization in highly discounted client or management buyouts failed to bring in new cash or debt relief to Slovak companies. Despite the often-symbolic purchase prices and favorable repayment terms, politically connected buyers would often increase debt by borrowing from state banks to make their down payment to the FNM. Privatized firms also frequently stopped paying their taxes. Between 1995 and 1998, tax arrears of private firms in Slovakia tripled to about sixteen percent of total state expenditures. Fully paid, this would have been enough to eliminate the budget deficit. 122 The scarcity of cash in the economy did not bode well for restructuring. Many managers privatized their firms only to find themselves apparently condemned to eke out a living at the margins of solvency for years on end. Facing such choices, and given lucrative 11 9 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, p. 97 . Debt loading is the practice of pushing unnecessary loans on cash rich firms at high rates as a means of extracting their funds. According to Andrew Schwartz, it was a common practice among bank-owned privatization funds in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Since debt loading siphoned off cash that should have been shared with the enterprise ownership's minority shareholders, it was a form of tunneling. Andrew Schwartz, The Politics of Greed: How Privatization Structured Politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Lanham, MD : Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 236-7; Appel, A New Capitalist Order, 64; Jarko Fidrmuc and Andreas Worgotter, "Czech Banking Sector: Reasons of Banking Crises and Prospects," Discussion Parer, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1998. 21 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 79. 122 Ibid., 54-55 . 120 SLOVAKIA 137 opportunities for cash assets elsewhere, 123 it actually made sense for new owners to strip their companies and return the shells to the FNM before making the first installment payment. Another option was to consume the company slowly-meeting its minimal obligations to the FNM and tax office, defaulting on inter-enterprise debt and siphoning off the extra cash. 124 Officially, the FNM was allowed to control major asset transfers in firms with FNM debt, but in practice, it was too over-stretched to monitor all transactions. 125 Meciar's HZDS- through the government- held the ends of the long strings of debt that permeated the economy. Ideally, given its commitment to state-led industrial restructuring, these debt obligetions should have been used by the government and the Ministries of Finance and Economy to coordinate restructuring efforts. Indeed, the Ministry of the Economy's official statement on industrial policy made it clear that control over liability networks was a crucial component of its effort to engage in industrial restructuring. The Ministry also aspired to promote the development of asset networks, "by supporting groupings of enterprises into holdings," to "pool investment resources." 126 The reality was that, due to coalition permeation by privileged 123 In one example of crowding out, the author interviewed an industrial manager who had recently signed a contract to produce copper pipes for a firm in Germany. When it came time to buy scrap metal to begin production, however, the cash he had reserved for the purpose had disappeared and he had to default on the contract. He soon learned that the owners had moved the funds to a short-term security with a return far greater than that offered by the copper pipe contract. Interview with Stefan Marsina, Special Assistant to the General Director, Povazske strojame, a.s., Povazska Bystrica, July, 22 1998. 124 Indeed, one EU sponsored consultant that I spoke with actually advised his clients to engage in a similar "triage" strategy of debt management. He advised managers facing illiquidity to delay paying those creditors who were no longer essential to the firm while using scarce cash to meet obligations to those creditors who were. The understanding was that the legal framework would favor the debtor. Confidential interview, foreign financial consultant, Bratislava, April, 1997. 125 Balogh interview, April 22, 1997 . Ironically, the politicization of credit and debt may have meant that the incentives to "rip off' stakeholders and minority shareholders were greater for owners who did not enjoy close contacts with the government. Unlike their well-connected competitors, they were less likely to win any dispensations from government creditors at the state-owned banks, the FNM or the tax officials. 126 Ministry of the Economy, SR, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update." Ministry of the Economy, Slovak Republic, ministry document, 1997. 138 SLOVAKIA industrial interests, it was the governing coalition's industrial clients (as well as those firms that could "arrange" for ad hoc dispensations) that often pulled the strings of Slovak industrial and privatization policy. The result was that state-business networks were used to channel present and future tax revenues into the pockets of politically important industries and individuals. Ironically, after the Meciar government fell in 1998, the successor government picked up these long strings and used them to regain control of many enterprises. Revitalization and Industrial Policy. Even inter-enterprise debt and tax arrears provided opportunities for government manipulation. As noted, the bankruptcy framework privileged debtors over creditors. As most AZZZ members were debtors, there was little incentive for the industrial lobby to support a change in policy. Yet the government also passed a controversial Revitalization Act that granted chosen firms the right to enter into a state-sponsored debt relief program. 127 The Revitalization Act was designed in conjunction with Ducky's Ministry of the Economy on behalf of Slovakia's hard-hit engineering and machinery sectors. Based largely on tax relief, in practice its use was limited to the "restructured" companies owned by the quasi-private holding company, DMD Holdings a.s., as well as a number of agricultural firms. 128 DMD, run by Meciar's former Minister of Finance JuliusT6th, was an umbrella holding company for a network of former state-run defense manufacturing firms that were most severely hit by defense cutbacks at the end of the Cold War. In addition to restructuring, DMD profited from direct Ministry of Economy support- mostly in the form of encouragement and coordination-for the development of an indigenous automobile supply network. 129 While the effects of these direct attempts at industrial policy appeared to be generally well intentioned, they had little positive effect on restructuring the 127 Ministry of the Economy, "Slovakia's Industrial Policy Update," 18. The government also set up a state-run arms trading company, Armex. OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, l 04-5 . 129 AZZZ 1996; Intervi ew with Ministry of Economy Plenipotentiary for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia, Alfred Richter in Samuel Bibza, "Yel'ke Plany," MOT, August, 1998, 4-8 . Interview with Jan Lesinsky, President, Slovak Society of Automoti ve Engineers, Bratis lava, August I 0, 1998 . 128 SLOVAKIA 139 companies involved. 130 Indeed, the program virtually halted marginally successful earlier attempts at defense conversion. 131 Slovakia eventually got its automotive sector, but it took the defeat of Meciar, clear political compliance with the prerequisites of EU membership, macroeconomic stabilization and significant initial investment incentives to entice foreign automobile producers and supply companies to come to Slovakia. 132 Politicization of Bank Privatization. The FNM's insider privatization framework raised levels of conflict surrounding bank privatization. In early 1996, Meciar promised to privatize Slovakia's largest state banks to Slovakia' s leading enterprises, most notably VSZ and Slovnaft. 133 Observers quickly pointed out that the likely result of the privatizations would be to decapitalize the banks as owner-firms, like VSZ, wrote themselves checks. Hence, while opposition parties KDH, DS and DU, were officially in favor of privatizing the banks, they formed a one-time coalition with HZDS's far left wing governing partner, ZRS , to get the banks placed on the list of strategic enterprises that prevented their privatization. The ZRS had nothing against bank privatization per se, but it allegedly was upset that the HZDS had excluded ZRS clients from buying one of the banks. 134 While partially preventing the banks ' capture and potential mismanagement by industrial managers, the banks nevertheless remained undercapitalized. Deeply in need of capital, the VSZ nevertheless did secure control over Slovakia's third largest state bank, Investicna a rozvojova banka (Investment and Development Bank-IRB) through the support of the FNM at shareholder meetings. 135 IRB had a troubled portfolio 130 OECD, Economic Surveys, 1998-1999, 104-5 . Miklo~, "Economic Transition," 75 . 132 Sharon Fisher, John Gould and Tim Haughton, "Slovakia's Neoliberal Tum," Europe-Asia Studies 59:6 (2007), 977-98. 133 If we include the third state owned financial institution, Slovenska sporitel'na, these three banks accounted for as much as 90% of all Slovak deposits and 60% of all loans. OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, (Paris: OECD, 1998), 29; EilJ (Economist Intelligence Unit), Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, (London: Economist, 1998), 17. 134 Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 258 . 135 OECD, Slo vak Country Report, 1997-8, p. 29; EilJ, Slovak Country Report, I'' Quarter 1998, p. 17; Olsson, Ownership, Reform, 158. 131 140 SLOVAKIA which VSZ control did little to correct. The state had been using it to keep a nuclear power plant solvent and to provide subsidies to the construction industry to build apartments for young couples. In 1997, IRB liquidity problems worsened and the bank was forced to borrow internationally at rates driven up by the emerging global financial crisis . The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) directed the VSZ, as the primary owner, to provide a much-needed capital injection. The VSZ refused. The NBS later "suggested" that the bank's deterioration resulted from "serious illegal transgressions which negatively influenced the bank's activities ." To add to the crisis, junior coalition partner SNS refused to support a renewal of state support for the construction industry's subsidized apartment loan program. After more government infighting, the IRB failed to meet its depositors' demands, forcing the NBS to seize it in December of 1997. 136 The VSZ raid on Slovakia's financial sector was the logical culmination of insider privatization under illiberal political conditions. Tightly bound together by political necessity, Meciar's administration provided Rezes and his network of enterprises insider access to special deals in privatization, taxation, credit allocation (from state financial institutions) and almost every other area where the state intersects with economic activity. Moreover, Meciar did this despite open indications of nepotism, corruption and mismanagement. The final cost to other corporations, the taxpayers and VSZ's more than 25,000 employees was enormous. By the winter of 1998, VSZ Holdings had defaulted on its foreign obligations and was facing layoffs and bankruptcy. Meciar's successor government then used this crisis to regain control of the company and limit its growing debt. 137 In 2000, the successor government sold the VSZ to United States Steel Corporation. 136 OECD, Slovak Country Report, 1997-8, 77-8; EfU, Slovak Country Report, 1st Quarter I 998, 17. In the spring of 1998, the VSZ used its influence with the FNM and its direct and indirect shareholdings in the two other state financial institutions to provide the !RB with a costly capital injection. The VSZ again refused to contribute any cash of its own beyond the initial amount required by the NBS . Nor was there any real attempt by VSZ to find an adequate foreign buyer. Peter Laca, "Troubled !RB bank approves capital injection," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-21 , 1998. 137 "Vlada mimo hry," Pravda, November 17, I 998; See also Miklo§, 1997 . SLOVAKIA 141 Abuse of State Property. Coalition misuse of property included firms that were not yet privatized. Perhaps the most notable case is former Minister of the Economy Jan Ducky' s abuse of the country's natural gas company, Slovensky plynarensky priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry-SPP). A key member of AZZZ and a former communist-era official, Ducky resigned his position with the government to oversee a systematic tunneling of SPP assets for personal and political use. This included financing FC Slovan- Slovakia' s most famous football team (and, ironically, the former Czechoslovak rival to Sparta Praha, a team purchased by VSZ's Alexander Rezes). Ducky would even hand out cash bonuses to reward players for stellar play. 138 The full extent of Ducky's tunneling only became clear after the government fell from power. Ducky died in a still unexplained assassination in 1999 three days after a probe was launched into his handling of the company.139 Slowing Macroeconomic Performance. It is ironic that, except for privatization, Meciar's second government largely left the federal reform package intact until 1996. 140 The resulting favorable entrepreneurial conditions and international demand produced a relatively strong recovery in 1994-1996, matching a regional trend. The tight monetary policy of the largely independent NBS was a crucial element in the strong macroeconomic performance of Slovakia. Yet, since NBS monetary discipline also signifycantly raised the cost of credit, maintained the real value of liabilities, and put constraints on fiscal policy, the NBS came under pressure from the Ministry of Finance to be "more cooperative" with Slovak industrial policy. According to Ivan Miklos, VSZ President Jan Smerek complained that the NBS's tight money policy was a form of "disliking VSZ and, apparently, disliking Slovakia's development." 14 1 Under intense industrial pressure, the NBS narrowly escaped an attempt by parliament to place it more directly under government control. 142 Heavy borrowing, low foreign investment and this attack on the NBS led major investment rating agencies to 138 Confidential interview with FC Slovan football player, Bratislava, July 1998. Fisher, Political Change, 94. 140 Miklos, "Economic Transition," 63. 141 Ibid., 71-2. 142 EIU, Slovak Country Report, r" Quarter 1998, 16-7. 139 142 SLOVAKIA downgrade Slovak bonds to below investment-grade level in the spring of 1998. This further raised the cost of borrowing. 143 By the end of Meciar's third government, enterprise restructuring in Slovakia had also slowed. Firms that sought an injection of capital had to face among other things : poorly functioning equity markets rendering an initial public offering nearly impossible; a government that was suspicious and even hostile to foreign strategic investors; government decision-making and procurement processes that frequently violated the equal application of the rule of law; and finally , an increasingly profligate fiscal policy, capped by a costly infrastructure development program that crowded out private investment. By the spring of 1998, the Meciar government had to finance its cash-starved economy on European markets at the relatively costly rate of 3.5 percent above the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate. It also borrowed short term domestically at a nominal rate of twenty-eight percent. The high level of domestic borrowing aggravated the credit squeeze on Slovakia's already strapped enterprises. 144 Short term borrowing to meet long term debt obligations was the final nail in the Meciar government's economic coffin. By the summer of 1998 it was clear that the Slovak performance of the previous years had been financed by unsustainable fiscal spending and borrowing. Meciar's Electoral Defeat, October 1998. Parliamentary elections in late September of 1998 proved a satisfactory denouement to the regime's VSZ-led orgy of self-dealing. The government had put in place rules that looked as if it was equipping itself with the necessary tools for a full-fledged authoritarian seizure of power. No seizure occurred. It is possible that the HZDS did not even consider the possibility. Even if it had, concerted efforts from independent NGOs, regional governmental associations, and a united center-right coalition of parties and the SDI.; helped to mobilize 84.25 percent of the voting population. Many correctly interpreted the election as a test of Slovakia's Western European credentials. The HZDS won a marginal plurality, but the ZRS was in shambles 143 "Another Agency Downgrades Slovaki a's Risk Indicator," The Slovak Spectator, May 7-2 1, 1998, p. 5. 144 M. E.S.A I 0, Slovak Mo nthly Report, May 1998, p. 1-2; M. E. S.A I 0, Slovak Monthly Report, July 1998, p. 2. SLOVAKIA 143 after its lamentable performance as a far left party in formal charge of creating capitalists from state assets. The HZDS tried, but was unable to lure the SDI: away from the opposition to form a coalition. The SDC then joined a coalition of parties (the Slovak Democratic Coalition-SOK), SMK and the new Party of Civic Understanding (SOP) to form a government united by little more than opposition to Meciar and a desire to get into the EU and NAT0. 145 Slovakia's privatization winners split deeply during the election. Most of the direct beneficiaries of Meciar's politicized economic policies remained close to the Prime Minister. Most notably, VSZ owner Alexander Rezes provided the HZDS with significant frnancial support and other perks, including flying the Prime Minister to campaign events in his private jet and even forcing his football team, Sparta Praha, to wear HZDS jerseys in a campaign-related friendly match. Rezes ' s empire was already hemorrhaging money despite having raided two of Slovakia' s leading frnancial institutions. The IRB had already been bailed out by the NBS at taxpayer expense. This was an indirect subsidy that allowed money to filter into the HZDS campaign. It must have been clear to Rezes that only continued "industrial collaboration" with his political patron would save his fortune. Yet, faced with the gathering strength of the opposition, other Meciar clients were more circumspect- even Tmava's Vladimir Poor hinted at his willingness to work with a new govemment. 146 The SOP, the new "Party of Civic Understanding" promoted itself as the voice of the independent entrepreneurial community. In interviews, its spokesman strongly critiqued the disastrous economic management of the government and promised to uphold the rule of law in economic and political dealings. It sought initially to establish a safe, pro-business middle ground between the polarized camps in Slovakia' s "Cold War. " Despite this, its founder, Rudolf Schuster, refused any prospect of cooperation with the HZDS. 147 Other entre145 Martin Butora and Zora Butorova, "Slovakia's Democratic Awakening," Journal of Democracy, I0: I (I 999), 80-95 . 146 John A. Gould and Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence," in John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel, eds., Elites after State Socialism (Lanham: Rowm an and Littlefield, 2000), 47-70. 147 Interview with Ferdinand Petrak, Vice Chairman, Party for Civic Understanding (SOP), Bratislava, July 28, 1998; Haughton, Constraints and Opportunities, 71. 144 SLOVAKIA preneurs continued to support the SDI:, and the newly united Slovak Christian and Democratic Union (SKDU). 148 Conclusion. Having privatized their enterprises through political connections, Meciar's clients went on to privatize state policy. Rather than demand the rule of law, they corrupted politicians; rather than invest resources to restructure, they stripped and tunneled them; rather than act as national champions, they preyed on the country's financial stability. By 1998, the coalition government's economic model was no longer sustainable. As the economic price of clientalism grew, the politicization of economic policy became an important additional grievance in the opposition's political arsenal. Never completely unied, many of the coalition's economic allies sat on the fence or sought accommodation with the opposition. Others proved firm HZDS supporters-particularly Rezes's VSZ, who must have seen that VSZ's financial future was closely linked to government policy. On the whole, privatization in Slovakia did not produce "market democrats," but it did succeed in providing economic agents who responded to their own logic of action. These proved to be both a boon and a curse to Meciar during his moment of greatest political crisis. Privatization' s impact on Slovakia's political liberalization, in short, was at best neutral and at worst negative. Ultimately, it was a united opposition, strategically smart NGO's and a mass mobilezation of Slovakia's voters that established market democracy in Slovakia. 148 Gould and Szomolanyi, "Slovakia: Elite Disunity and Convergence."  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vladimír Mečiar and the Politics of Privatization in Slovakia, 1992-1998 Description An account of the resource John A. Gould Slovakia, Vol. 41 (No. 76-77), 2013 pp. 102-144 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gould, John A., 1962- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2013 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1029af3398a2c9fa89f1a6e4991ec2ca.pdf a632d718bcae98511576910a6922921c PDF Text Text 56 SLOVAKIA CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE DR. A . GRÉBERT Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland, Hungary and Germany. For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama• tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country. The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha, the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs o[ thls. When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved "the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326). True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light, whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts. Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu· atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia. The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to 1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain herself." (op. cit. pg. 332). Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit. lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo· macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars �SLOVAK.IA 67 and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr. Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t catastrophies that could have overtaken them. Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\ in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be interpreted to competent authorities." But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the Slovak State. The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt. That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states. And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International Communism. Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could not see thls. puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce recognitlon. On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs, he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See." Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war." Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war. To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe He �58 SLOVAKI.A Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican. Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally" under tbe care of the Nazi government! Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact" as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad• vantage of such contacts." Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!" Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy. Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later, on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London. In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora! condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla, wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn 1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand agalnst tbe present r egime." �fiLOVAKlA 69 That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc. No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only with more lies. To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of course, that made Beneš all the more furious. 1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much. Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord· ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism! • • • • WHO SAID IT? "We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order, for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1, 1943). • "Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor. respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for. eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October !10. l 946, 4th sess!on). � 56 SLOVAKIA CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE DR. A . GRÉBERT Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland, Hungary and Germany. For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama• tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country. The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha, the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs o[ thls. When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved "the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326). True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light, whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts. Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu· atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia. The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to 1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain herself." (op. cit. pg. 332). Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit. lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo· macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars �SLOVAK.IA 67 and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr. Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t catastrophies that could have overtaken them. Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\ in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be interpreted to competent authorities." But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the Slovak State. The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt. That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states. And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International Communism. Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could not see thls. puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce recognitlon. On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs, he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See." Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war." Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war. To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe He �58 SLOVAKI.A Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican. Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally" under tbe care of the Nazi government! Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact" as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad• vantage of such contacts." Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!" Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy. Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later, on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London. In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora! condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla, wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn 1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand agalnst tbe present r egime." �fiLOVAKlA 69 That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc. No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only with more lies. To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of course, that made Beneš all the more furious. 1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much. Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord· ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism! • • • • WHO SAID IT? "We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order, for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1, 1943). • "Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor. respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for. eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October !10. l 946, 4th sess!on). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1951, Vol. 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1951 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 1), May 1951.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 2), December 1951.</li> </ul> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <ul><li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s261hfmshm7</span></a></li> <li><a href="https://n2t.net/ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span>ark:/13960/s21tk2wkzj4</span></a></li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 56 SLOVAKIA CZ.ECH INTRIGUES AGAINST THE SWVAK STATE DR. A . GRÉBERT Slovakia was saved from a great catastrophe by proclaiming her independence: from the danger or belng partitloned between Poland, Hungary and Germany. For the Czech and Magyar imperialists, however, the proclama• tion of an independent Slovakia meant a fatal defeat. The Slovaks at last had a chance to prove to themselves and the world that they were able and capable of taklng care of themselves and thelr country. The Czechs on the other hand knew well that lt meant a na.II in the coffín of Czech imperlallsm In Slov.akta. That is why the Czech imperlallsts are f!ghtlng so furlously agalnst the Idea of Slovak state independence ror over thlrty years. In thls regard, the rightist Hacha, the lertist Flerllnger, and "me-always-president" Beneš spoke and acted allke. Czech post-war politlcal literature offers conclusive proofs o[ thls. When Hitler called Hacha to Berlin on March 15, 1949 - a day after the proclamatlon of the lndependence of Slovakia - the Czech presldent dld not fall to use the opportunity to lntrigue agalnst the Slovaks. In bis conversa.tlon wlth Hitler, he said that he belleved "the F Uhrer s hall not have too many favora ble experiences w ith the Slovaks." Furthermore Hacha sald that the Czechs always had "closer ties w ith Ge rmany than wlth Slovakia, wh ic h is more inclin ed t o Hungary" (vd.: Czechoslovakla and the Nuremberg Trials, pg. 326). True lt is that in the past the Czechs always felt ctoser to Germany than to Siovakla, but In the case referred to, Bacha was lnterested only In presentlng the Czechs in a most favorable light, whlle on the Slova.ks he cast the susplclon of sympathlzlng with Hungary, whom Hitler nelther llked nor trusted. Base dlplomatlc lntrigue was concerned. It was generally known that Hitler knew llttle about Slovakla; cleverly lnclted susplclon about the inclinatlon of the Slovaks toward the Magyars could have catastrophic results for the development of the Slovak state. And that certalnly would have been most pleaslng to Czech lmperlallsts. Magyar dlplomats In Berlin also never let up intriguing against Slovak state lndependence. Slova.kla certainly was In a dlfficult altu· atlon. · For example, on March 25, 1989, Hitler gave the tollowlng lnformation to the supreme commander of the German army regardlng bis stand toward Slovakla: "It 1s not certalu how long the Fiihrer shall feel hlmself bound by the agreement concluded wlth Slovakia. The supreme army commander thlnks that t he Fiihrer would want to 1id himself of the obligation at the flrst opportune moment and use Slovakla as a basis of negotiation between blmself, Poland and Hungary. In the meantlme, however, Hungary is supposed to restrain herself." (op. cit. pg. 332). Czech and Magyar lntrlgues bore fruit. lt took a Jot of dlplomatic cleverness and perseverance on the part of President Tlso, bis Minister of Forelgn Affalrs and Slovak diplo· macy to save Slovakia from the deadly danger lnclted by the Magyars SLOVAK.IA 67 and the Czechs. If foť nothlng else, then for avertlng this danger Dr. Tiso and bis government deserve the gratltude and respect of the Slovak na.tlon. Thus tbey saved the Slovak6 trom one of the great86t catastrophies that could have overtaken them. Czech politiclans and diplomats lntrigued even later and on otbeť fronts of tbe diplomatic battlefield against the Slovak state. In October 1939 the USSIR declded to recognize the Slovak Republic "de jure." At that tlme Zdenek Fierlinger, former Czech envoy, was stil\ in Moscow. H e dld everything possible to prevent the recognitlon. "I was very much concerned," writes Fierlinger in bis Memolrs, "to have the undeslrable psychologlcal effect of the recognltion of Slovakia a nd our deep disappolntment explained at the Commissariat of Interna) Affalrs. I demanded very emphatically that my o bjectlons be interpreted to competent authorities." But the USSR dld recognize the Slovak State "de jure" and Czech cliplomacy and Czech lntrlgues suffered a complete setback. The Czechs sought to weaken the political situatlon of the Slovak State internatlona.lly by having the USSR renounce recognl:tlon. But thelr dlplomatic guns backftred. Flerllnger himself states that sendlng a Soviet envoy to Bratislava only emphasized the lndependence of the Slovak State. The Soviets, like the Vatican, probably have the best information servlce in the world. They knew well how the Slovak people felt about the Slovak State: they knew that over 90 per cent were for lt. That i., wby the Sovlets did not hesltate to recognlze the Slovak State as a full-fledged member of the lnternational soclety of states. And it ls signlficant that even at the conclusion of the war the Sovlets offered to respect Slovak statehood. They changed thelr stand only after Dľ. Tlso refused resolutely to collaborate wlth International Communism. Beneš lntrlgued even at the Vatican. The Holy See was among the ftrst to recognlze the Slovak State. Slovakia had an ambassador at the Vatican, and the Vatican had one In Bratislava. Beneš could not see thls. puffed and he huffed to have the Vatlcan renounce recognitlon. On January 7, 1941, Beneš gave the apostolic representatlve .. ln Great Brttain, Msgr. W. Godfrey, a letter In wblch, among other thlngs, he stated that "the time has arrlved when we ought to come to establi.sh some sort of unofflcial contact between the new Czechoslovak government, resldlng now In London, and the ~oly See." Beneš knew that the existence of the Slovak State and its abllity to live were the greatest obstacles to his des!gns. That 1s why he tried to present Slovakla to the Roly See In the gloomiest colors: "Conditions In Slovak.la are very bad and the severity of the contemporary government of Tlso shall have a deep influence on the situatlon of the Catholic Church ln Slovakla after the war." Evidently Beneš threatened the Holy See to see things his way and recognlze hi.s government or else suffer the consequences for the Church In Slovakla once he got back lnto power af<ter the war. To aggravat-e the sltuation and tbe sta.tlu:& of the Slovak ambassa.dor a,t the Vatlcan, Beneš sa id In his letter that "the Slovak delegate at tbe He 58 SLOVAKI.A Holy See is a representative of a State that is entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." It is lnteresting on the one hand, to note that Beneš called tbe Slovak ambassador a "delegate" - even tbough be was recognlzed as an ambassador by the Vatlcan which had at lts dis posal men wbo were at least as well-versed in international law and polltics as were Deneš and his colleagues. On tbe other hand. however, Beneš wrote about a STATE and not about a "SO-CALLED" State: the latter terminology he reserved for the lnternal-polltical front and for his nalve admlrers. Beneš knew that he could talk about a "so-called" state before his agents, but not before the experlenced and educated diplomats or the Vatican. Beneš said t hat tbe Slovak government was ·•entirely in the hands of the Nazi government." However, wben he came to Košice in 1945 according to Pápanek's statement before the Security Council of tbe Uniled Nations in March 1948 - Beneš was completely under tbe surveillance of the Soviet army and it was even impossible for him to make contacts wlth the surroundlng countries. "\\'ell, tbe fact still remains that Dr. Tiso and bis government were never so "totally" under tbe care of the Nazi government! Tbe answer tbe Vatican gave Beneš was not the one that he had E>xpected. Tbe Vatican answered courteously, but clearly and empbatlcally that it will not "establish some form of unofficial contact" as Beneš desired. In the answer of the Vatican it says that " His Em!nence is conv!nced that Your Excellency w!l.J understand. how dellcate the contemporary situation ls and bow diCficult it would be In the present perlod to proffer the Czechoslovak people the ad• vantage of such contacts." Translated into plain language that mean t: "NO!" Evldently the Vatican gave priority to the diplomatic contacts with the Slovak natlon and not to tbose with "the Czechoslovak people" as Benel\ had wished. This was an apparent failure of and defeat for Beneš's diplomacy. Beneš was angered, but not overly discouraged. Two years later, on May 12, 1943, he sent the Vat!can a Memorandum in which he demanded establishing contacts between tbe Vatican and tbe Czechoslovak government in London. In it he told bis version of tbe "sad" conditions at horne: The Czechs he satd, are without exception for the Czecboslovak government in London and "the Slovak people in its greater majority bolds the same position. In Slovakia, polltical, social, economic and mora! condltlons are most sad. The majori ty of the Slovak nation regards the present regime in Bratislava gullty of thi& situaiion and as a trattor of the Slovak people and the Czechoslovak Republlc. Former governmental Slovak parties from tbe period before March 15, 1939, (Tbe Agrarians, Liberals, Sociallsts). are almost completely bebind the Czer hos lovak government and against the present regime in Slovakla, wb!le from tbe ranks of former Cathollc People's Party, which took over tbe rule of Slovak affairs from tbe hands of tbe Germans tn 1939, at least 60 per cent today - according to our reports - stand agalnst tbe present r egime." fiLOVAKlA 69 That statement contalns just about as many !les and hal!truths as it does words ! Beneš himself must have known that, because he further sald that "the Holy See mlght have other information about the situatlon in Slovak!a, but I consider lt my duty," etc. No doubt about lt: the Holy See dld have other information; it had the true plcture of Slovakla. The Vatlcan had lts representative in Bratislava! Beneš undoubtedly knew that he was lying, but the Czech cause was built on Jies and it was possible to defend it only with more lies. To glve the memorandum more weight, Beneš had lt sent through the Br!tlsh and American Government.s. Despite all thls, t he Vatican contlnued to recogn!ze the Slovak S.tate to the end of the war. Of course, that made Beneš all the more furious. 1t is interesting to note that Beneš did not have the courage to r,ubllsh the Vatican's reply i o his memorandum in hls Memoirs. It probably was not as nlce as that recelved in 1941. The stand of the Vatican through 1943-1944 at least indicates as much. Beneš Jived long enough to avenge himself: he had Dr. Tiso murdered, thousands upon thousands of Slovaks and Czechs - all his opponents - jailed, pauperized, disfranchised, beaten, maimed, and exlled to Siberia and Jachymov. He collaborated "totally" with Stalln and h!s Czechoslovak agents to sell out the Czech and Slovak nations to the scourge of communism. He had warned the Vatlcan, but was spurned. The Slovaks asked for it and so did the Vatican, accord· ing to Beneš, and both got what they deserved. Beneš had won again and gloated over bis victory. What a vlctory - for Communism! • • • • WHO SAID IT? "We believe that it is unconditionally necessary for RUSSI A to take a PE RMANENT part in European politlcs and that the present collaboratlon between the Britisb In the west and the Soviets In tbe east, together with the partlcipation of the United St·a tes, !s a fundamental condition of the permanence or a genuinely new world order, for the realizatlon of which WE are figbtlng. However, as far as tbe homeland 1s concerned, only the Czechoslovak people itself, through FREE expression of its will, will decide on how we are to arrange our homeland." - (Msgr. Ján Šrámek, Broadcast, London, Sept. 1, 1943). • "Our alliance with Russia was accepted UNAN IMOUSLY BY ALL OF US, not only by our Communists and Socialista, BUT BY AL L TH E PART( ES - and there are four of them in the government by Catholics and Protestants alike. . . . Any American or foreign cor. respondent will tell you that WE HAVE NO CE NSORSH IP on for. eign news from the leading world agencies, including the Associated Press and United Press. . . . WE are the ONLY Slav country which has diplomatic and friendly relations with the Vatican. 1 have an ambassador at the Holy See and there is a Nuncio In Prague." (Ján Masaryk, Address at the 15th Annua l New York Herald Tribune Forum on. Current Problems, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel , N. Y., October !10. l 946, 4th sess!on).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czech Intrigues Against the Slovak State Description An account of the resource Dr. A. Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2), December 1951 pp. 56-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1951 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8db9dd47a0cbc4f10cc1ef6b84edb23c.pdf 83131de0e65840790ccb5638a6cb6ae1 PDF Text Text 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• �SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the �60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in �SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly �SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk �63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. �64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.) � 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• �SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the �60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in �SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly �SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk �63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. �64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 58 SLOVA:KIA ARE TIIE SWVAKS AND CZECHS TWO "CWSELY RELATED'' NATIONS? DR. A . GRÉBERT Official propaganda of all Czech governments trom 1918 to 1938 (the era of T. G. Masaryk and Edward Beneš) stated cat&gorically that the Slovaks and the Czechs were "two very closely related" na· tiona. We say "Czech" governments advlsedly, because the Slovaks had llttle or no lnfluence In them; the wm o! the Slovak natlon was totally lgnored when lt came to policy and natlonal and lnternatlonal relationships. The "Czecho-Slovak" (wlth or wlthout the hyphen) admlnlstrations during that tlme were in reality "Czech" admlnlstratlons; "Czecho-Slovak" government was In fact a "Czech" govern· ment. Even the national "Czechoslovak" church was strlctly a "Czech" en terprise. During and immedlately after World War I, T. G. Masary'k and Edward Beneš had to offer some "loglcal" reasons for the creation of a joint political stalte for the Czechs and the Slovaks, because Presldent Wllson had insisted on the appllcation of the democratlc principle of the right of self-determinatlon to all natlons. So. T. G. Masaryk and Beneš set out to prove that the Slov,aks really were not a distinct nation, but only a branch of the Czech natlon, and that the Slovak language was but a dialect of the Czech language. 'l'he CzechoSlovak Republlc was bom of th'!s "big Ile" In 1918. Slnce that tlme, the "big !ie" was promoted constantly by the propaganda aP'l)aratus of the Czecbo·Slovak state. Many non-CZech politiclana, statesmen, hlstorlans and writers succumbed to lt. Among them were some who repudlated the concept ot a "common state," but still thought that the Slovaks and Czechs were, nevertheless, "two very closely related" nations. Among the factors which dec!de the Individuality of a nation, we find: the natural framework within which a nation Ilves, lts racia! composltlon, language, cultural !nfluences, llterature, rellglous develop. ment, social structure, economlc relations, etc. Now, how "very close-Jy related" are the Slovaks and the Czechs? IN THE BEGINNING THERE WERE TWO NATIONS The Slovaks and Czechs already at the beginnlng ot the!r recorded hlstor!es were not members of one natlon, or a common polltlcal state, as most Czech pol!tlcians, hlstorlans an<l writers - and many unlnformed non-Czech commE\lltators, writers, hlstor!ans and polit!· cians, lnfluenced by or in tbe pay ot Czech propaganda - would have the world believe. There !s nothlng in recorded blstory to ind!· cate that the Slovaks and tbe Cze-cbs dld not go separate ways. Thls hlstorlcal fact was upheld even by sueh a typlcal representatlve ot pol!tlcal and cultural "Czechoslovaklsm" as Dr. K. Krofta (Tchéques et Slovaques jusqu' á leur union polltlque," in the LE MONDE SLAVE, March·April, 1933, pg. 2). Chronlclers of the nlntb and tenth centurles clearly dlstlngulshed betwen the two natlons. Paul J. Šafárlk clted many examples to prove thls point In hls "Slawlsche Alterttimer" (Vo!. 2, pages 208, 458, 493). Tbe dlt!erentatlon between the Slovaks and tbe Czecbs, however, be• SLO:YAKIA 69 gan a Jong tíme ,be!ore that. 1t already began In their ancient, prehlstorlc, common Slovanic homeland. Later, In their new homelands, the indlvJduallty of both natloM became more pronounced. NATURE SEPARATED THEM The Slovak.s are a natlon whose core lives in mountains and hllls, whereas the c ore of the Czech people lnhabits plains. And molllltains and hllls generaJly breed an altogether d<ifferent type of man, psychologically and even physically, than do the Jowlands. Rivers of Czech lands empty lnto the North Sea, whereas the rlvers of Slovaltia, w1th ihe exceptlon of the Dunajec, flow lnto the Black Sea. Wlth the rlV'ers even Slovak !ife gravitated In a d.ifferent directlon from the llfe of úhe Czech nation. The Czech lands, on the one hand, and the Slovak lands, on the other, represent two very distlnct geographical environments, which tended to create two dlstlnct national in• dividualltles. In some Czech propaganda publlcations deslgned for the Engllsh-speaking world, it ls even admitted that after one crosses the Czech border lnto Slovakla "we have the impresslon that we have come to a different world. Nature ls different and the people, too, ls dlstinctly drnferent" (J. Czeoh-J. E. Mellon: "Czechoslovakla, Land of Dream and Enterprise," pg, 132). lf nothing else but nature separated the Slovaks from the Czechs, it undoubtedly would suffice to create and to preserve the dlstlnctly ;;,pecial lndlvlduality of the Slovak natlon. But the Slovaks were un!lke the Czechs In other respects as well. RACIAL COMPOSITION SEPARATE D THEM T•he Czech natlon, surrounded on three sldes as it !s by the German world, undoubtedly was open to racia! lnfluences of tha,t world. T he racia! structure of the Slovaks, on the other hand, was lnfluenced to some extent not only by the Germans, but also by the Slovanlc nat!ons (Poles, Ruthenes, Czechs) and -the U ralo-Alta:!c Magyars, A vars, Pechengs, Cumans, Turks, etc. The Avars ruled over the !and of the Slovaks almost 250 years (to bhe end of the 8th century) and, hence, certainly must have had s ome influence on the racia} structure of t-he Slovak popula,t!on, held in bondage. And hlstory tells u.s, too, that the Slovaks llved In a com• mon poli-tlcal state wlth the Magyars over 900 yeans; and close to the Turks, when they conquered most of Hungary, for some 150 years. And we know that the Poles ruled the Spiš reg.ion of Slovakla from 1412 to 1772. The racia! structure of the Czechs was not affected by the.se lnfluences. Hence, we are lnclined to agree with Podhradszky that raclal composltlon "sharply separates the Slovaks from all the nelghborlng nations and In a special manner deflnes thelr place among all other natlons of the unlverse" ( A t6toklata feldold politikai és kultúrgeo1 gráflája, pg. 53). THEY SPEAK DIFFERENT LANGUAGES Professor Louis Novák once wrote that the Slovak language was a "very ancient" llngual formatlon, one "whlch has had an orlglnal and independent evolutlon, Quite dlfferent from the Czech langua.ge." And he added that "the language ot centra! Slovakla today 1s the 60 SLOVAKIA direct organic contlnuation of the older centra! Slovak tongue, whlch in turn was the direct organlc con-tinuation o[ the respective pre-Slovanlc dialect" (Jazykovedné glosy k čsl. otázke, pg. 89). Pro[essor Henrich Bartek, noted Slovak philologist who ma.de an t'xhaustlve study of the Slovak and Czech languages, concluded that •·the Slovak language in many of its aspects had a different evolution than the Czech language and this fact guarantees it an independent place in the family of Slovanic languages" ( Príspevok k dejinám slovenčiny, pg. 117). 'l'he diHerences between the Slovak and Czech languages are greater than most people are aware of, especially people who have been confounded by Ozech propaganda, Czech schools and books. The Czech language belongs to the group of languages which have a preponderance of the higher vowels, and 1-t has sounds or vocala whlch are not to be found in Slovak. On the oúher hand, we flnd various vocals In Slovak that are foreign to the Czech tongue. The Slovak employs an abundance of diphthongs, while the Czech has only a few. The centra) dialect of Slovakia, the basis of llterary Slovak, has only one declenslon of adjectives, while the Czech has three. 'l'hey also d.tffer greatly in the matter of inflectlon of nouns and verbs. Rules of acc811t, syllable formation, rhythm, composition and syntax, and word formation are also different. The languages are dlfferent lexically, too. Miroslav Kálal, Czech lexicograpber, collected over 35,000 words in three years for hls differential dictionary whlch are not found In Czech, or which have an entirely different meaning ťha.n the corresponding Slovak words. 'l'he language ques'lion has been doolt with in great detail by Trnovský; if the reader is interested he mlght consult bis work "K rečovej otázke Slovákov" - especially pages 126-157 (published by the "Spolok sv. Vojtecha," Trnava, 1937). Little wonder then that M. Sečenský wrote a book (about 1700) for Slovaks "llving In Hungary" who wanted to learn Czech. The book, called "Swétlonos Cžeský," would teaoh talented and industrlous Slovaks how to read Czech correctly in a week and eventually how to dlst!nguish between words and ,nite correctly in Czech. Thls also proves that the Czecb language was a foreign language to Slovaks, wbo had to learn lt just as any other forelgn language, if they wanted to acqulre the use of lt. But even lf the Slovaks did speak the same language as the Czechs, would that be a valid argument for ~he formatlon of a "Czechoslovak" natlon, ethnically speaklng? Certainly not. And it is less valid as an argument for a joint state lJfe. We have German-speaklng Sw!ss, French-speaking Belgians, Engllsh.,speaklng Irlsh, South Americans speaking Spanish and Portuguese. When books are written in the same language, tbey often belong to dlstlnct llteratures. And the Slovaks are indlsput.ably distinct from tbe Czechs wibh thelr Independent Slovak llterature, whlch is the expre,ssion of Slovak cultural individuality. THE PAST SEPARATES THEM The Slovaks and Czechs neve-r formed a joint state up to 1918. True, Svätopluk annexed the Czecb lamds to tbe Slovak state and held them a few years, but these were politlcally completely autonomous under their own Czech princes. History tells us, too, tbat •the Czechs used the first opportunity that came thefr way to break away from the Slovak state with the help of tbe Germans. Whlle the Czechs l!ved in SLOVAKIA 61 the broad framework of the German empire, "the Roman Empi•re of the German nation," that is witl1in the framework of the Austrian Erop,ire, the Slovaks on the other hand, were within the framework of the Hungarian empire. T•hese were two distinct worlds, which could not remaln wil!hout influence on the political thought, cultural development, economlc cond,i tlons and social status of both these natlons. "We Czechs know well," wrote the "Narodní Listy" {Nationa l ~ews) at the end of the last centUľY, "that even the strongest movement, wh1ch stlrred our na,tion in all Czech lands from the lowest to <the hlghest strata, was halted at the Hungarian border. The entire past does not show even a single example that a,t home in Bohemia {Czechia), or again in Slovak-ia, t.here was evldent any desire for a political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, not even at the tlme when the Czech kindom was independen,t and the Czech na,tion the ruling element in it." The economic history of Slovakia was altogether different from that of the Cz.ech lands. W,hlle in l!he Cz.eoh lands, under the lnfluence of the indus,trlalization policy of the Habsburgs, capitallstic forms of economy b egan to talke root comparatively very early, In Slovakia the conserva,tive nobility, with the aid of the dominant posltion l<t held in the Hungarian s,tate, successfully defended feudalism until the middle of the nineteen,th century. In Czech Jands, capitallsm could thus begin muoh sooner to form t,he Czech person. while In Slovakia Lhe Slovak person still lived a long time back and worked and was influenced by the economic forms of feudalism. To thls very day •there have been preserved in the Slovaks and Czechs distinct traces of thls 1•ar!ed economic development. CZECH ORIENTATION SEPARATES THEM While the Czechs lived primarily under the cultural influence of the German world and looked out into the world through t,he medium of German windows, the Slovaks Jlved in an entirely different cultural environment. Medieval Hungary .gravltated more towards fäe culture of the Italian peninsula, to Roman culture. Besides that, Hungary on its southern and eastern borders was in contact w!th the culture of the Byzanit:ine,Slovanic world, Into all thls came the cult ure of an Aslatic nation w!tb its own particular flavor: the culture of tbe Magyar nation. F. Wollman, a Czech univers!,ty professor, pointed to the intenslty of Roman cultural influences on the '81ovaks. According to -bim, the Slovaks are In substance slmilarly Romanized as the Poles are. Wbile the Czechs represent a ty.pe of culture common to Germanlzed Slovana {'81avs), the Slovaks are a type of Romanized Slovana ("Východ, východnosť, východnictví," in Nová Svoboda, Feb. 20, 1924). RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS SEPARATE THEM While the Czech religious organizations were influenced by the German world, the Slovaks were in direct contact wlth Roman Christian!ty. While Huss'.itism, Protestantism and the Czedh Brethren Jeft deep traces in Czech religlous hlstory, the rellgious development of the Slovaks went in an entirely different d irect!on. It 1s very slgniflcant and most ,highly characterlstlc that Hu.ssltism, which ls perhaps the mos,t marked manifestat!on of Czech religious development, and one w·hloh took hold to some extent In southern Hungary, malnly SLOVAKIA among 1:he Rumanlans, evoked practlcally no response in the Slovaks, as wa.s demonstrated by Prof. Varsik in hls book " Husiti a reformácia na Slovensku" (Tbe Hussites and the Reformatlon In Slovak.ia) . Similarly -the movement of the so-called "Czechoslovak Chureh, ' whlch cost Czech Cathollclsm over a million souls, remained completely wlthout response In Slovakla. The national "Czechoslovak" churoh was strictly a Czech enterprise with notihing Slovak about it. The name, of course, was meant to confuse the little-informed and deceive the world in general. This holds for practically all things called "Czechoslovak." Whlle in Bohemia, In 1930, over 10 per cent or the populatlon was wlthout any religlous fa:lth, In Slovakia only 0.51 per cent belonged ,to that category - and tlie greatest part of this was made up of lmmigrant Czech officials, soldiers and police. Indlrectly, the dlsUnctness of rellgious traditions is also shown by the dJstln ct stand taken by the Czech collecUve toward Communism: the Czechs are less negative towards Jt than are the Slovaks. SOCIAL STRUCTURE SEPARATES THEM While in Czechia, In 1921, only 29 per cent of the lnhab itants was engaged in agriculture, in Slovalda 60 per cent of the inhab itants belonged to that category. In Czechia 46 per cent of the lnhabltants lived from industry and buslness, In Slovakia only 21 per cent. It 1s not necessary to stress that people and natlons living from agriculture, represent an altogetber different type of person and natlon tban peoples and nations engaged In buslness and industry. The varied social and economlc struoture of both these natlons and countries appears In other rubrics of statls-tics. The denslty ot the population in Bobemla 1s about 128 lnhabitanots per .square kilometer, while in Slovakia lt is only 62. The biological potentlal 1s different also: Jn 1932, 17.10 Jlving chlldren were bom for each 1000 Czechs In Bobemia, whlle in Slovakla 28.46 Slovak children were born. The Czechs belong to the group of biologically very weak nations, whlle the Slovaks be long to -the group of nations which are biologically strong. Whlle a large part of the Czech nation llves in small towns, the core of the Slovak nation lives in vlllages. Tbe dominant Czech type 1s the small4.owner and industria) worker, whlle the Slovak type is tbe agrlculturlst. ŠVEJK V ERSUS JÁNOŠÍK These actualitles engraved their own deep traces on booth natlon.s. Il dld not happen by chance that the ratlonal, materialistlc, calculatlng "small Czech fellow" found adequate expression for the most popular of his own people's hero In the figure of tbe legendary "good soldler "Švejk" (Shveyk). We find nothlng llke bim wltb. the Slo• va.ks, wbose most typical and most popular type of people's hero 1s tb& rebel Jánošík (Yabnowsheek), tbe romantlc, ldea!ISltlc, magnanimous and herolc Slovak Robin Hood. švejk flghts against Austrian begemony wltb a hunched ba.ek, wi-tb cunning and stealth, petty "sabotage." and wlth polsonous needles. Jánošik. on the other hand, goes lnto the mountalns, flghts herolcally and rallles the people untll he dles for bis idea!. Švejk 63 and J áno!!lk stand agalnst each other as two absolutely distlnct, special tlgures of popu\ar "reslslance" types of two absolutely dlslinot natlonal indlvlduallties. TWO DISTIN CT WORLD S There !s no doubt that the Slovak and Czech worlds are two substantlally dlstlnct worlds. "SlovakJa !s a component part of our Republlc," wrote the Czech newspaperma n Václav Kapllcký in the "Svobodný Zlti'ek" (Free Tomorrow) of July 24, 1947, "but it ls, nevertheless, still forelgn to us, unkuown; a dlfferent people llves there and there are there altogebher d!fferent condltlons of !1fe than In our country." Slmllarly, the French unlverslty professor Ancel, after a stay in Slovakla, declared that "the vila! form.s of the Slovak.s are just as dlstinct trom Czech llfe as they are from Magyar llfe" ( Lea frontierea slovaquea, pg. 28). A Swiss corresponden t, after studylng Jlfe In Slova.kla, wrote: "Only 800 kilometera separate Bratislava from Prague, but arrlvlng In Slovakia, you meet wlth the sounds of a dlfrerent language, a dlfferent ma.nner of llfe, a different manner of thlnklog, a dlfferent po\ltlcal atmosphere" (Journal de Geneve, Sep. tember 30, 1947). Today the Slova.ks and Czechs are more dlstant trom and more allen to each other than they were a thousand years ago, or than they were even In 1938. And as tlme goes on, these natlonal lndivlduallsts wlll be even more pronounced. Thls statement 1s based on the self-evldent soclologlcal development, whlch no one wlll be able to stop or alter. It wlll go on whetber any one likes lt or not. The so-called "<:zechO&lovaks," together wlth thelr Czeoh masters, are effect1vely speedlng thls process wlth thelr limited, short-slghted, un• realistlc pollcy. Once hi.Story undoubtedly wlll prove thls convlnclngly. We bave mentloned only tbe most Jmportaut actuaJltles, whlch &cted together ln tbe dlfferent formatlon of the Slovak nation anu the Czeoh natlon. Tbe narrow tramework ot this perlodlcal does not al\ow us to go lnto more detail. But the tact.s presented clearly lndlcate that the expresslcm referrlng to the Slovaks and Czechs as "two very closely related natlons" slmply wlll not stand up under the cr1tlcal eye of sclentlflc analysls. Conversely, it ls very strlklng that these two nelghborlng natlons have so llttle In common. TWO DIFFERENT MI SSIONS Not only tbe past and present separate the S\ovaks and Czechs, but the tuture as well. The mlsslon of the Slovak natlon 1s In substance altogether dlfferent from that of the Czech natlon. The geo1>olltlcal tunotlon of Slovakla ls dlstinct !rom the runctlon of the Czech lands. Wblle Slova.kla occuples the centra] locatlon In the defense o! the Central-Euro pean area, Czech terrltory occuples the border posltlon. Wblle the Czech lands have a defenslve role agal nst the pressure o! the German world In the Danube, Basin, Slova.kla la supposed to ,bave a coordlnatlng role, and that not only toward German pressure, but even toward lncldental Russlan pressure. After the flrst World War the vlctorlous power.s gave SlovakJa the role to be "a support or the Czechs agalnst German pressure. 64 SLOVAKIA. This conceptlon proved to be !neffective. T he Danube Basin, or Centra! E urope, can be defended only with joint forces. And that !.s possible only when Slovakia wlll not be the cause of any CzechoMagyar or Czecho-Polis h antagonis ms. That will be so only wh en Slovakia is independent. The n s he will be able to fuJflll the function of a consolidating and coord!natlng factor in the pol!t!cal atmosphere of Centra! Europe. • • • WHO SAI D IT? "It is difficul t, nay right impossible, in a short artlcle to no te even in slogan for m the things that are connected with h istor!c November 7, 1947, for the USSR, for us, for Europe, for the whole cultural world. But one thlng can be expre ssed and interpreted fully. And th at is the sincere, deep hearty and undying gratitude of all Czechs a nd Slova ks t o the Soviet Union, to its people, to its Army and to it s s kipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everyth ing they ha ve done and sti ll are doing for us. It is an unfalsified, selfless and clean feeling of friendshlp and sympathy, which we have for this great country that is so close to us and !s our ne!ghbor. l t is a pur e joy from the ,oys, the su ccesses and the progress of the USSR; !t !s the lnflexible hope that Slavdom, in its own new perception, w ill assure for itself and the world the deserved peace, in wh!ch all nations shall live a ccording to their manner, freely, without fears, democratically and w!th dign!ty, as well as in understanding, prosperity and happiness. In this s pirit, from my so ul I greet the jubileeing USSR, and congratulate lt from my heart for the results attained in peace and war. 1 wlsh it to continue to prosper, grow and become m ightier unto its own greatness, but a lso for the we lfa re of al l humanity. Long live the Soviet Un io n, and may its leader and ski pper, J . V. Stalin, live in fu ll health to see many more jubilees !" - (Dr. J oseph Lettrich, Pres!dent of the Slovak Democratic Party and the Slovak National Counc!I; ÔAS, ~ovember 7, 1947.) • • • • • • " Czechoslovakia a nd th e Uni on of Soviet Socialist Repub lics have united in the midst of fire a nd b lood - thls a lliance, the refore, is for eternity, as love and friendsh ip proven in affliction._,___, We are aware of th e fact that the USSR could sti ll exist w lthout us, but our free State certainly cou ld not exist without th e USS R .. .. Long live the victorlous Soviet Army ! Long live its Supreme Commande r, Gene ral issimo Stali n ! Long live the li berator of Bratislava, Marshal Ma• (ÔAS, the off!cial organ of Lettr!ch's Democratlc linovský !" Party. Apr!I 4. 19-17 ' "In parl!ament on November 7, 1935, when I spoke a bout the international sltuatlon, I s aid that it was my deep conviction that our contacts w ith t he Soviet Un io n shall be good and lasting, that Soviet Rus sia wi ll again beco me a powe rful Slova nic factor, a nd as the most powerfu l S lova n ic fact or would bri ng S lavdom muc h good. We are not c hang ing our stand - a nd th is is the permanent sta nd of the Demo(John U rsi ny, Vice-Premier of Czecho-Slovakla and c rati c Party." Vice-President of tbe Democ ratlr P arty. in Bratislava. February 22. 1947, according to ÔAS. offlclal orga n of tbe SDP, February 27, 1947.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Are the Slovaks and Czechs Two "Closely Related" Nations? Description An account of the resource Dr. A. Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 58-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4bf24b14b55c8c7c700a20bc2f0f46d7.pdf 9916fb9c6316cbdb4d95d65106f1cd09 PDF Text Text 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- �SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were �SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 �SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of �f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. �SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. �54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) . � 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- �SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were �SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 �SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of �f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. �SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. �54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. 54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Why the Slovaks Were Not Content in Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Dr. Arved Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 48-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/49499471653b0ae34bb29ad85de401a0.pdf 0b7385f1831145e9c99e09d87a7bbd09 PDF Text Text SEPT~MBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY? Dr. Arved Grebert The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe. From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came of it. In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2 1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter, in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was. The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~ sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech independence. As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a state which in suibstance became only a small and bad copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame 1 �2 SLOV.AKil u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination. The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- . mination of nations - the very principle which brought it into being. We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March 4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were 130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles. Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied �SLOVAKIA 3 practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000), M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000), Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as, for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo. So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these realities, we must recall that at that very same time when Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR (160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion. In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation (3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic. Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn devoid of content and foundation. A Dict.at.ed Constitution The foundations oif the political structure of every state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin- �SLOVAKIA ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans, not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia. In the twentieth century, when the solution or the granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated, it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations, because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament" there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore, there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly. And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech prison. 1 The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And Now" - ipg. 12). Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the 7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political, economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the �G SLOVAKIA Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they had created under Masa.ryik and Benes. Centralism vs. Federalism The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key political positions and all power rested in Czech hands. Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is, with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism. To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional or parliamentary manner. The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their �SLOVAKIA 7 right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later, in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way. Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No. 201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May 30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action; the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed 10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law. Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech centn1.lists. The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony . Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end, from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~ �SLOVAKIA tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the "CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling" Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the Reiplllblic. Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18 ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule "democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and ·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure. With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district, only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state �SLOVAKIA 9 nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in 1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more Il/UmerOUS. In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks, for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation." OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic; f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated �10 SLOVAKIA their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~ µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without the hyphen. · so Rights of Minorities Repudiated The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with ~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1 between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs: During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium. In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~ larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example, who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<}; ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s· only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service. �SLOVAKIA 11 In the central offices, ministries, the highest control offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations, but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at all costs. "Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy." .. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic. That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~ nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of �12 SLOVAKIA man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so general that many pruges would be needed to delineate only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who to<lay pose as champions of democracy. It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated "National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy. That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer S01Ineiwhere! • • • WHO SAID IT? The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~ worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of (T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No. 2, p. 33, Feib. 1951). � SEPT~MBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY? Dr. Arved Grebert The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe. From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came of it. In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2 1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter, in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was. The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~ sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech independence. As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a state which in suibstance became only a small and bad copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame 1 �2 SLOV.AKil u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination. The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- . mination of nations - the very principle which brought it into being. We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March 4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were 130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles. Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied �SLOVAKIA 3 practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000), M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000), Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as, for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo. So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these realities, we must recall that at that very same time when Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR (160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion. In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation (3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic. Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn devoid of content and foundation. A Dict.at.ed Constitution The foundations oif the political structure of every state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin- �SLOVAKIA ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans, not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia. In the twentieth century, when the solution or the granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated, it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations, because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak 1 �SLOVAKIA 5 peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament" there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore, there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly. And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech prison. 1 The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And Now" - ipg. 12). Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the 7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political, economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the �G SLOVAKIA Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they had created under Masa.ryik and Benes. Centralism vs. Federalism The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key political positions and all power rested in Czech hands. Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is, with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism. To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional or parliamentary manner. The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their �SLOVAKIA 7 right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later, in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way. Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No. 201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May 30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action; the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed 10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law. Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech centn1.lists. The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony . Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end, from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~ �SLOVAKIA tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the "CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling" Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the Reiplllblic. Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18 ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule "democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and ·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure. With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district, only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state �SLOVAKIA 9 nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in 1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more Il/UmerOUS. In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks, for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation." OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic; f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated �10 SLOVAKIA their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~ µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without the hyphen. · so Rights of Minorities Repudiated The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with ~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1 between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs: During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium. In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~ larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example, who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<}; ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s· only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service. �SLOVAKIA 11 In the central offices, ministries, the highest control offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations, but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at all costs. "Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy." .. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic. That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~ nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of �12 SLOVAKIA man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so general that many pruges would be needed to delineate only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who to<lay pose as champions of democracy. It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated "National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy. That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer S01Ineiwhere! • • • WHO SAID IT? The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~ worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of (T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No. 2, p. 33, Feib. 1951). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SEPT~MBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 WAS CZEOHO-SWVAK IA A DEMOCRACY? Dr. Arved Grebert The wo.r ld at large has become aiccustomed to regarding the first Ozecho..Slovruk Republic as an exemplary democratk state, a real "isle of democracy" in Central Europe. From the beginnmg o,f this state in 1918, official Czech propaganda exipended large SJUms of money to convince the world pulblic that such actually was the case. On the other hand, however, aibout a haiif of the total rpotpulation of Czecho~lovakia (The Slo1Vaiks, Germans, Po-les, Magyars, Ruthenians) continually protested this erroneous view and judgement oif conditions in the RepUlblic, ibut little came of it. In view Olf what has ha:pperned in Ozecho-iSlo,va)kia sinc 2 1938 - the ease with which it colla:psed in 1939 and laiter, in 1945, accepted the hegemony of communistic Moscow, it may be interesting to loo!k a .bit closer at the kind o.f democracy the: first Ozecho-'Sloivak Re.public actuaHy was. The Right of Self-Determinatlon and Czecho-Slovakia T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes set aJbout to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarichy during World War I in the nrume od: and with the aid of the right of self-determination of nations. They evoiked this basic principle con~ sistenUy and consitantliy. This is attested to .by the literature they pro,pagated, as well as the "Memoirs" they placed before the Peace Conference, wherein they -c laimed the right of self-detemnination of nations in the interests of Czech independence. As soon as the war ended, however, and AUJstria-Hungary lay in ashes, Masaryk and Benes very quickly and conveniently forgot 8J'bout the democratilc princilple oif the right of selif--detemnination of nations and labored to create a state which in suibstance became only a small and bad copy of the old monarehy they had helped to destroy. This newly created and artificial state, which never existed before that time, was first called ib;y the Czechs under Masaryk a.ind Benes "Ozeoho.;Slovrukia" - a synthetic n ame 1 2 SLOV.AKil u111kn0,wn in the history of either the Czech nation or the Slovak nation before World War . At the ,v ery outset, this synthetic State rol)bed approximately 4,500,000 (3,700,000 Germans, 800,000 Magyars and aJbout 100,000 Poles) of their basic democratic right, the right of self-determination. The Germans, Magyars and Poles were forced within the framework of this artificial State against their eX!pressed will. And three million S1ova:ks and aJbout a ha1f million SUJb-CaI"pathian Ukrainians (the Ruthenians) favored the State only conditionally, that is, on1y if they enjoyed full autonomy within the Repulblk ; when this condition remained unfulfilled they found themselves in opposition to the existence of this :State. A political state is supposed to be the exipression oif the free will of the peoiple the existence of a state is SUIPposed to be in accoro with the will of its inhaJbitants. But Ozecho-lSlova!kia was not such a state; the Prague government, once it was set Uip in ,power, repudiated the basic democratic ,principle of the right of self-deter- . mination of nations - the very principle which brought it into being. We must not forget that the occupation of non-Czech lands took place with wea:pons in hand against the will of the native ,p opulation. Manifestations for the realization of the right of self-determination were bloodily suppressed by the Ozech army. For examiple, in a. single day, on March 4, 1919, the Czech arm,y killed 57 Gemnans and wounded over 100 more, when they demonstrated in German towns for their right to self-determination. Uip to 1921 there were 130 GeI"mans killed during street demonstrations iby the Ozech occupation for,ces. The same situation prevailed in territories inhaJbited iby the Magyars and Poles. Aocording to 1923 statistics, the newly created Czech~lovaJkia was inhabited by some 6,400,000 Czechs and a!bout 7,000,000 non-Czechs. The latter felt that they we,r e roM>ed of their democratirc right to self-determination, when Masaryk and Benes repudiated the promises and agreements made 1b y them when the ReipUJblic was in a state of formation. This was all the more grave and momentous, since the principle of the right of self-determination was a,pplied SLOVAKIA 3 practkally in the case of Estonia (1,200,000 pop.), Lithuania (2,500,000), Latvia (2,000,000) Finland (3,800,000), M))ania (1,000,000), Nonway (3,000,000), Iceland (110,000), Denmark (3,800,000), etc. - states of wthich the entire popufation numbered less or 8Jpproximately the S3Jllle as, for example, there were Slovaks or Germans in the OzechoSlovaik Repulblfo. So that we might have some idea of the extent oif these realities, we must recall that at that very same time when Ozecho-iSlo1Vakia originated, there originated three small independent states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in a far more threatened territory, on the !b orders of the UISISR (160,000,000), without the protection of natural borders or synthetic fortiifreations; eaoh one of these states h!!Jd less inhaibitants than Ozecho-;Slo.vaJkia had Slovaiks or Germans who weTe .r obbed ()If their right to selif-.deternnination. And on the borders od' the Soviet colossus there originated Finland, which at that time had only alb out 4,000,000 inhabitants and, therefore, much less than the non-Ozech na tionalities of Ozecho.Slorvalkia who were deprived of their right to se.J.lf-deter.min•a tion. In the case of the A]banians, who inhabit the dangerous Balkan crossroads orf the interests of Italy, Greece and Yugoslaivia, their right to state independence was recognized an,d respected. But the Sudeten Germans were not permitted to join either Austria or Ge:rttnany in 11919, as they h!!Jd desired to, do. And the will of the Slovak nation (3,000,000) was not respected when it decided to join the Ozechs in a common state only on condition that it would enjoy full autonomy within the framework of the Republic. Once in ,p ower, the government of Masaryik and Benes also refosed -to respect the rights of the Ruthenians and the Polish and Magyar minorities. From this standpoint, "Czecho-Slovak" democraicy for the 7,000,000 inhaJbitants of that State was only an empty phrase, a propaganda tenn devoid of content and foundation. A Dict.at.ed Constitution The foundations oif the political structure of every state are represented iby its constitution. The basic prin- SLOVAKIA ci:ple of every genuine democratic state is that its constitution is the exipression oif the will o!f its inhaJbJ.tants. It is quite ohvious to asslli!lle, where a multinational state is concerned, that all strata of the population, all regions of the state, and all nationalities are properly and duly rep resented when the constitution is created. In Ozecho-.SlO!Vakia, however, the Constitution of Febmary 29, 1920, was exclusively a Czech product, and the Czechs under Masaryk and Benes simply dktated it and forced it upon the majority of the non-Czech population of the State In the so-called Constitutional National Assemibly there was not a single representative of the 3,700,000 Germans, not a single representative of the 800,000 Magyars, and not a single representative of the 100,000 Poles. And the representatives of the Slo,vak nation were not ele ~ted by the people, but simply ~pointed by Prague, and this was done in such a way that ,w ould ibest satisfy Prague: the overwhelming majority of them were proponents of "Czeohoslovalk ism" - the opponents of Slovak autonomy - even though the vast majority of Slo,vaiks were proiponents oif SloiVak autonomy within the framework of the OzechoS1ovak Repulblic. The representatives o.f Czech imperialism and "progressiveness" went so far as to name Czechs as re,presentatiives of Sl01VaJkia , as, for example, Dr. Edward Benes, Dr. Alice .Masaryk, Ing. Joseph Rotnagl, Dr. Aloysius Kolisek, and Ing. Joseph Zaruiba-,P:fofifermann. When Ozecho'-lSlo:vakia was ,b orn not more than 5000 Czechs lived in Slovakia, hence these, Ozechs could hardly be considered as repres enta.tilves of their pec;ple in Slc,v akia. In the twentieth century, when the solution or the granting od' sel!f..,manageiment or independence to some colonial nation of Africa or Asia is debated and negotiated, it is cus tomary that representatives oif the native population spealk in their name. Hut the Czech imperialists under Masaryk and Benes thought otherwise. They prolbaJbly regarded the Slo,vaJks as a nation beneath the level of colonial nations, because they named also five Czechs to, represent it on the Constitutional National Assembly Czechs who were practically ,unknown to the vast majority of the Slovak 1 SLOVAKIA 5 peoiple. For example, up to that time, Dr. Edward Benes had never been in Slovakia. In this ha:ndpi'oked "parliament" there were 204 Czech, but only 56 Sl()!Valk deputies, and this number included five :C zechs mentioned albo1Ve. Furthermore, there weTe only eight Slovak deputies from the autonomdst bloc in that ruppointed Constitutional National Assem1bly. And it was significant, indeed, that on the very day that the Prague parliament voted for this Constitution, the leader of the Slovak nation and undoubtedly the most eminent polit1cal figure o.f the Slov8!k struggle against Magyarism, Andrew Hlinlka, was beihind bars in a Ozech prison. 1 The Slo;vaik r€ipresentation in that assembly was so unjust that eiven such a notorious adherent of "Ozechoslovaikism" as Dr. Juraj Slavik - now a member of the socalloo "Council cd' Free Ozechoslovakia" which operates out of New Yo,I'lk and Washi.Il!gton - protested at that time that the Slovaks did not hav e sufficient and ,proper representation. The Ozechs reiplie-0. that an adjustment would be made, but nothing hrupipene<l. Because Mr . .SlaiVik did not continue protesting against the injustice, Prague rewarded him for it. In a very short time he ibe1came a minister in the Czech goivernment in Prague. Even Seton-Watson, a close a:nd loyal .friend of T. G. Mas,a,ryk, noted that Sl0vak seats in the legislative assembly were to a certain extent filled by arnitrary a,ppointments (Sloivakia Then And Now" - ipg. 12). Under sU!ch undemocratic conditions the Constitution that emerged enthroned: a regime of Oz~h hegemony in the Czecho-iSloivaJk State. The entire Ozecho-Slova>k politi,cal system rested on this Constitution which is dictated iby the Czechs . And since the Constituiton was diotated, therefore dicfated was also the entire system in its relationshi1p to the 7,000,000 non-CzeiCh citizens. Where a state is foriced on a half of its, ,poipulation, where a Constitution is dictated to half the ;poipulation and against its most elementary political, economic and ooltUTal interests, where 7,000,000 'people are overruled and made a minority od', there can be no serious talk aibout a democratic state. In Czecho-rS'lovakia the G SLOVAKIA Czechs sought to realize the very thing they had fought against so furiously in Austria. And realize it they did, even if eventually it did mean the utter ruin of the, State they had created under Masa.ryik and Benes. Centralism vs. Federalism The dictated Ozech Constitution installed a rugged centralistic sy,stem in Ozecho-Sloivakia; ,p ractically all key political positions and all power rested in Czech hands. Among the fundamental :principles of democratic states belongs tihe principle that multinational or multilingual states should .be origaruzed on a federalistic basis, that is, with the aid of aiutonomy of the indirvidrual minorities, since it is only in this manner that the ,p rinciples of . justice in a mutual relationshtp of the individual nationalities of the state can be realized in pra,,ctiice. But the great "Czech,oslovaJk Democrats" rapudiated this prin'Ciiple and instituted a strong centralistic regime. By so doing they not only failed to keep the -promises made and given the Slovaks and, Ruthenians and the minorities, but also instituted a regime which was in sulbstance a profanation and mookery of democracy. Behind the mask of democratic phrases they installed a regime of Ozech national imperialism. To safeguard their hegemony, the Czechs dictated into the Constitution paragrruphs which in practice prevented a change of the Constitution (the enactments about the- necessity of a 3/ 5 and 2/ 3 ,majority). Ozech hegemony was thus secured, because representatives of the non-Czech p01pulation could never attain this required majority in the Prag;ue Parliament without the Ozechs and, hence, could never uipset Czech hegemony in the State in constitutional or parliamentary manner. The dictated constitution and the Ozech hegemony emanating therefrom were then safeguarded by the notorious "law for the protection of the Republic" (No. 50) of March 23, 1923, which made the 7,000,000 non-Czech citizens of the various nationalities liaible to rprosecution on the grounds of anti...state a;ctivities, if they rpersisted in their rightful demands for the recognition of and respect for their SLOVAKIA 7 right to sehf-detemrination , the 1principle upon which the Republic was sU1pposed to ha,ve 'b een founded. The Czech Communists ,wsed this law to advantage when they got hold af the key .p ositions in the State in 1945 and, later, in 1948, had practically no trouible at all in seizing a1l power in the Reipulblitc in a "legal and constitutional" way. Another laJW, the law regarding political parties (No. 201 of Octolber 25, 1953) , provided for the outlawing and dissolution of any political ,p arty if its arctivity seriously endangered the "constitutional unity" - and "constitutional unity'' in practice simply :meant Ozech rule oiver the nonCzech citizens. On the basis of this law, the ,political demand for the territorial legislatiive autonomy of SlovaJkia the -c ondition under which the .Slovak,s decided to form a joint state with the Czechs - was cause for prooecution by the State. Dr. Ivan Derer, who sold his Slovak birthright for a mess Olf Ozech pottage, as Minister of Justice demanded on various occasions to use this law against the Hlin!ka Sloivak Poople's Party, because it persistently demanded the f.uilifillment olf the Pittsburgh ·P act of May 30, 1918 - that is, states, rights or foll aiutonoony for Slovakia. Prague, however, ordered Derer to withhold action; the centralists were not entirely ,bl.ind to the development olf the internationaJl situation, and the consequencoo of such action: the RepuibUc would have undoUibtedly collapsed 10\Il!g before 1939 if Derer was not overruled. Ozech centralism. pulled in its horns a little _and attempted to show the Slovaks that it favored them by not aipplying the law. Of course, the Slova;ks, by that time, .were wise to the Czech centn1.lists. The Anti-Democratic Regrme of Czech Hegemony . Czech hegemony was also protected b~ a whole series of la.ws and regulations which emanated from the undemocratic' Constitution which was forced on the non-Ozech popuiation. The Constitution, for example, "legalized" the notorious fiction - better said the international fraud oif the i•Ozechoslovak nation" in the political · and ethnic sense·, a nation which had never existed and, in the end, from the ·existence of which even its creators and propaga~ SLOVAKIA tors fled with their notorious Kosice .Agreement with the Communists in 1'946. With the he1p of this fraud, the fiction of a national state was ipromo.ted against the reality of a nationa,listic state. On this dictated Constituti:on rested also the language, law with its notorious monstrosity - the "CzechoslovaJk languruge" - which was legali1zed and given a special status even though no such tongue ever existed. In prad1ce this ructualliy meant the hegemony o;f the Ozech languruge on the territo,r.y oif the entire state, including the lands inhabited tby the 7,000,000 non-Ozech inhrubitants, a part o;f whom, for example the Sudeten Germans, had a higher level o;f culture and ciivili,z ation than the "ruling" Czech nation. While the o,ld Austrian Constitution issued from the prin:ciiple of language equality, the CZeiCiho~lovak language law introduced the iprindple oif the .p rivileged position od' the non-existent "Ozechoslovaik" language in the Reiplllblic. Regional, county and loca1 se1f-ad!Ininistration was maimed lby legal regulations, which gaive the Prague government the dght to ruppoint one~third of the members of these "se1f-administering" organs.. SinJCe the government nrumed 33 per cent of the officials, it only needed to gain 18 ver cent o;f the electorate so that it could continue to rule "democratically'' with the hel•p of such an artificial majority against the actual majority oif inhaibitants olf Slovakia, Ruthenia and the territories inhalbited by the Gemnans. In Slovakia this 18 .p er cent was not too difficult to attain, with the aid {)If Czech oifficia:ls under Prague, who :placed thousands of Ozechs in Slovakia in various capacities, and the help oif the entire iprnpaganda aipparatus of the state, and ·political corruption, as well as 1police pressure. With the helip of a bit o.f "political geometry" in the Czech lands, for example, in the Prague voting district, only about 22,000 voters were needed to elect one deputy to pM'liament, whereas in many SlovaJk, Magyar, Ruthenian and German districts almost 30,000 votes were needed for one minister. This evidently helped the Czech minority to attain a ma;jority in the Prag,ue parliament. Here we had an actual case where the "largest minority ruled as a state SLOVAKIA 9 nation over the other :minorities, which together numbered more adherents than the ruling nation" - as Dr. Hassinger of the university o;f Basel claimed. Czech bureaucratic officials censored the non-Czech press ruthlessly; .protests against the existing order were squashed. For examrple, in 1922 alone 1498 editions of newspapers were confiscated by the Ozech censor; instances of deletions of words, sentences, whole para,graphs and entire arUcles were more Il/UmerOUS. In harmony with the stmcture and the sipirit of this regime in so-called "Czechoslovak" governments, the Czechs as a rule held 7'5-------80 1per cent of the ministershirps and the maijority in parliament, so that the Ozech minority in the State, contrary to the most fundamental princiJples of democracy, US1Urt1ped ipractically al,l power of government and absolute control in the issuance of iaws. How the Slovaks, for example, regarded the "Slo1Va;k" ministers in the Prague Government, iwas prOibalbly best described. by d~uty Martin Ra:zus, a Protestant minister and the president of the Slovalk National Party, when on November 4, 1932, in the Prague ,p arliament, he said: "Yes, by obligation we do have two Slo1Vak ministers. But the sad .part aibout it is the fact we do have ministers; but these ministers, however, are not the ministers of the Slovak nation; they are the ministers of the present Herrenvolk, but not the ministers of the SlovaJk nation." OriginaHy, by the peace ~greements, the name of the country created lb y the Czechs and the Slovaks 1w,as spelled with a h~hen: Czecho-Slovakia. Therelby the federaUve character of that State was supposed to be stressed; also that the Ozechs and and the Slo,vaiks were regarded as equal partners in the administration of the joint Republic; f,urtheI1II1ore., it was SUIPP<>sed to indicate that the Czechs would rule in Czech lands and the Slovaks would rule in Slovakia, that is, states riights, of each would be fully enjoyed and respected by ·both nations. AU the ;peace agreements where:by this State was created designated the State in such a manner as a matter of principle; the hyphen prevailed. But as soon as the Czechs gained and consolidated 10 SLOVAKIA their hegemOilJY, the tetirn "Czecho,SlO!Vakia" was, changed to "Czechosl()IV'ahla." From 1923 the law declared thi.$ rup-pelation leg,a lly proper and correct, and any one using the hyiphen was lialble to ,p rosecution by the State. Thereby in a symbolic manner was SIUlppOsed to ,b e demonstrated the thesis rega'I'd:ing the fusion, or better said, the ~bsorption of the SlovaJks by the C?,eehs, so that Czech supremacy in the State could ibe guaranteed even numerically. Official statistics told the world how many Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians and Jews there were in Ozecho.SlovaJda, but not the nurmlber of Sloivaiks; how many seats were held _in parliament biy the Gernnans, Poles, Magyars and Ruthe~ µians, but not how many were h~d lby the SlOIVaJks. And it was with alil statistics. The Slovaks,. however,. stubborn.ly resisted the spelling of the name of the R~1mlbli:c without the hyphen. · so Rights of Minorities Repudiated The regime of Czech ,hegemony in the Repulblic had ruinous conseque~es not only for the ,Slo;vruks, .but the other nationalities as welt The Germans, Magyars, Poles and Ruthenians complained albout injustices as mlllch as the Slovaiks did. It was not on:ly Slo,vakia that was flooded .with ~ h officials and workers, but also the lands inhabited' by the Ruthenians, Poles, Mrugyars and Germans. ·F or example1 between 191·8 and 1938 there emigrated into Slova,kia more than 200,000 ~ h officials, businessmen and entrepreneurs: During that same time more than 200,000 Slovalks, lacking woy,king opportunities in their homeland, had to emigrate to. Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, the United States, Bra:zil, Franice and Belgium. In that same ,p eriod rupproximately 150,000 Czechs moved into the territoriy inhabited by the Germans. Simi~ larly, the territories of the Magyars, Po.les and ·Ruthenians were also flooded with Ozechs,. The Ge'.Mlails, for example, who represented 22.3 iper cent of the- population .o f the Republic, held on1y 12.2 per cent official posts on the railmads, 14.4 ,p er cent in the Post Office, in _the state :ii.<}; ministration only 13.1 per cent, and in the · Officers Coi,p·s· only 5.1 per cent were in ructive service. SLOVAKIA 11 In the central offices, ministries, the highest control offices, etc., the Slovaks represented only 1.3 rper cent of the o!fficials, ibut even these were subordinate and insignificant positions. All the citizens of the Repulblirc, regardless of their nationality, were bound by the same obligations, but the Czechs alone enjoyed special prirvileges and better opportunities. The centralisti'c Prague government was in the hands of Czeichs who regarded their nation as the ruling nation, their people as first-r.a te citizens, while the other nationalities were regarded. as ~ond..,rate. The Ozech government cried that Sl01Valkia ,w as just so. much economic ballast, but fought tooth and nail to keep it in hand at all costs. "Ozechosl01Va!k" democracy as propagandized by the Oooohs and ,p aid iProlfessional non..,Ozerch ipro.paga:.ndists was one thing, while the •b rand actually prevailing in Czecho-'Slovalkia something entirely different. A repetition of history: the Magyars, too, used to ,p roclaim iblatantl;y that the democratic system prevailed in Hungary, while at the same time they were ibr.uWly s,uppre.ssing and exploiting all non-Magyar elements in the country. In the light of these facts, any reference to "Ozechoslovak " democracy evoked a strong revulsion in the hearts of the millions of non-OLech inhabitants who were .burdened with it. They knew in their hearts that it was fraud, even though the Cz~hs presented it to. the world- as the ultimate in democratk systems. The non..,Czerch nationalities were burdened with the same civic obligations as the Czechs were, ibut they did not enjoy equal rights and ;privileges and, therei:fore, it is quite understandruble that at the first opportune moment - and that came in 1938-1939 - they did everything rpossi.lble to escape from the emlbrace of this "isle of, demorcracy." .. "Czechoslovak'! Democracy W.a s a Fraud In this !brief review o!f the "dettnocracy" that was Czecho-Slovakia, the reader will not find details of all the aspects oif the politics oif Czech hegemony in the Republic. That would require a voluminous wo:nk. And practical~ nothing was said regarding the conditions after 1945, inasmuch the trampling upon the most :fundamental rights of 12 SLOVAKIA man, carried out by the Benes-Communist coalition, was so general that many pruges would be needed to delineate only the most important of its aspocts. The mass deportation of millions Olf ,p eople from their homeland, the outlawing and prevention of politica,l ,parties, the limitation of the freedom of the 1press and assemlbly, tens of thousands of political ,p risoners, hundreds of the executed, the many unconstitutional decrees af Benes, etc. - all this had happened with the cooperation of the Czech 1p oliticians, who to<lay pose as champions of democracy. It is regrettable that some .p eople in the West even today do not IOOJke any noticeable effort to imonn themselves of the true nature otf so~called "Czechoslovalk dem<X:ra<cy" and its representatives. It is regrettruble, indeed, that responsible people otf western democracies stiU continue to recognize and favor the ipr~agators of "Czechoslovaikism" former members of the Communist-dominated "National Front" government oif Bene-s and Gottwald, who Slllpiported the proJSoviet poli:cy oif Benes and, hence, ·a re in a great measure responsible for the present terrible plight of the Czech and Slovaik nations. Ozecho-Slo:vakia was not a true democracy, but a fraud and a mockery orf democracy. That was proved by the inhaJbitants Olf the State when the first grea;t crisis struclc and Czecho-Slovakia colla_psed completely. No one, not even the Czechs themsel,ves, fired a single shot to preserve it. Why should any western democratic gcwernment endeawor to preseI1Ve it a;gainst the will of the Sl01Va;ks and others of ~ho-SlovaJkia who are kept in that .State only by force? There must be an answer S01Ineiwhere! • • • WHO SAID IT? The Czechs and .Slovaks had their .State but not for longer than .twenty years. What now remains is infinite!~ worse .than what existed before. . . The politic,a[ theories of (T. G.) Masaryk and Benes collapsed because they could not beair the pra<dtioal test of the times." (·S KUTECNOST, review of the Ozach refugees, London, Vot III, No. 2, p. 33, Feib. 1951).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Was Czecho-Slovakia a Democracy? Description An account of the resource Dr. Arvéd Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 1-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3e2582aad377e8e73aa9fb6c56175b31.pdf 4e52355547ccaa39f52cff3b901b588e PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more. I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y the peace and security of a great democratic country. • • • TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE Dr. Arved Grebert When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia. The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical aspirations and plans. "The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin" From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely even with a relatively small number of people and arms. �SLOVAKIA 25 The thi:ok forests provide excellent nests of resistance again.st an aggressor. SlovaJkia is an ideal natwral fort~; it is a "Gi!braltar of the Darmlbe Basin." From the most ancient times, the southern and southwestern regions of this natural fortress formed one of the most important strategic places orf Europe. These regions, especiaJlly the landis on both ·banks of the Danube, represented from time immemorial a part of the territory, which the Czech military theoreti~ian, Colonel E. Morruvec, charactenized as the "g,reatest strategic crossroads orf Central Europe ." On the ban:ks of the Danwbe, between the mouth of the Lpel Rirver and Vienna, there existed the territory from the ages where, on the one side, there met the imperialistic pressure of the German wo:rld, coming from the W~t, with the pressure of the Mongols, which came from the Russian steppes (thrrough the Uz Pass), and, on the other side, the pressure coming from the No!rlh through the Moravian Gate against the pressure of the Italian ipeninsula (The Romans) am.d the Balikans (Byzantium; the Turks). During fiive centuries, it was on the central Danube that the Romans defended ancient civiilization against the world orf "barbarians" ; it was there that the wild Huns to•r e into the heart olf Euroipe; it was there that the Flrruniks clashed with the .AJvars and, in the ninth centucy the German world with the Slovanic world; it was ,t here tl)at the nomaru.c Magyars and the Tatars attacked the Christian civilization of western Europe; and it was th,rowgh th~re that just recently one of the currents of Asiatic lbolshe:vism poured into IDurorpe. "Nowhere else was the land of Eurnpe so satwated with blood," wrote Colonel Moraivec, "as it wais in the lowlands which extend on iboth sides of the Danu'be. There most of the nations were. exchaniged, ,t here it was that the pressure was the greatest am.d !borders changed most frequently." This territory is reaUy "the crosS1road of pressure of the imperialistic forces of IDurope." (See: E. Moravec : La V aleur straregique de la Tchecoslovaquie pour fEurope Oooidentale; Prague, 1938; p. 10). From the aibove it follows that the Slovaks occupy a tet- �26 SLOVAKIA ritory whose strategic importiamce is far greater than its silZe and the numlber of its in:haibirtaints. We shall see that even more clearly id: we at least 1b riefly dndicate what the occupation of this territory means for its ne~ghbors. Why the Neighbors are Interested Whil.e the Slovruks are firmly propped against rvalleys and slopes of this natura!l mountam fortress , the Magyars, Poles rund Ozechs occupy the lowlands, which do not afford them ainy kind of natural protection agaiinst ipossilble attacks from their neighibors. It is, therefore, only natural, that Magyar, Czech and Po.lish imperialists saw and still see in Slovrukia an important defensive bastion, which could serve them well in the event of an enemy attack. For the Ozechs. the domination of Slovakia means rubove all else protection against the everlasting German pressll!I'e which is .s queezing them liike pincers from three sides. 'Dhe Magyars see in Slovrukia from the militrury standpoint a real defensirve wall against the constant pressure of the Slovanic world. For the Poles the domination of SlOIVakia would represent a real cover-uip for their baciks against possilble attaclks, which have come so often in their history from the East and the West, from Germany and Russia. For the Polish imperialists Slovaikia would aiso mean access to the Drunulbe, whi:ch in turn wol.l!ld mean increasing the influence of Poland in the Danulbe basin. Poland, held in the pincers of two colossi, the German and the Russli,an, only by coming into the DanUJbe region could become a real " European Great Power," whfoh is the open am'bition of the Polish adherents of this policy. From the economic standpoint, Slovakia means much for the surrounding nations. Not only as a market far their industry, but also as a source of ram materials. For the Magyars the forest wealth of Slovrulcia, the natural conditions for the development of industry (mineral wealth, wood, water power, coal) are a valuruble adjund to the agricultural regions of the Magyar lowlands. Slovrukia served as a market for Ozech industrial products, which annuailly "if we figure consei,vati'Vely" - to use the words of Dr. Kazwas "amounted to rupproximately 1100-1200 million Czecho-Slo1 �27 SLOVAKIA va,k Crowns ( 37 -40 million dollars) ." Slorv,aJkia meant more for the Owchs than Hungary (1005 million crowns), Poland (625 million crowns), Ru1mania (596 million crowns), Ita:ly ( 491 million crowns), etc. Ozecho-1Slovakia expovted more only to Germany, Austria, Y,u gosla,via and IDngla,nd (from the official statistics of 1930). From the stamdipoint of ,production of the Ozech lands, Slovakia was also a more important maI1ket than the foreign marlcets, ibecaUJSe it meant a market protected by a customs (tax) lb order, that is, a mrurlket which brings higher prices (see: Kanvas, ":Sjednocooi vyrdbnich podmin~ v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku," Pra;gue, 1933, pp. 80, 1'18). For Czech imperialists holding onto Slorvaik,i a meant a lso an access to the free Danulbe, in other words, not only an open door to the Danube Basin, ibut also· to the Balikans. In a free Europe the Danulbe is a free river, which means concretely that it opened the door for Ozeoh industria,l ;products directly not only into all the Danulbian states, but also to the coastal states of the Bla:ck Sea and the Mediterranean. For Poland, the domina,tioo of Slov-aJkfa from the economic standpoint would mean the same thing. F:rom the aibove facts -w hich represent only a few of the m~ interests of the neighlbors of Sfovaikia, it is obvious that the imperialistic linterests of the Ozechs, Poles and Magyars clash in Slovakia. 1 The Consequences of Dominating Slovakia The domination of Slova:kia .b y one of her neighbors, however, also presents a threat to the remainmg nations of this region. The domination oif SlOIVa.lkia by the Czechs is aga;inst the interests of Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Croatians, Ruthenians and Slovenes. Having the Ozeohs on the Danube meams a Czecho-Russian aHiance to the Poles, Orech canons only 35 kilometers f,r om Budaipest, a reviva!l orf Ozech imperurlism ,m the eyes of the Germans and a tool of other imperialisms, the daillger of cultural and economical Ozechlzation of Ruthenia, and indirectly the reviival of Sel'\bian imperfalism. in the eyes of the Croatians and Slovenes. The dominaition of SlovaJk,ia by the Magyars is aigainst the interests of the Ruma.mans, Czechs, Seoos, Ruthenians, Poles and �28 SLOVAKIA Germans-. 'It wouJd mean suppressing the Czechs into an interila.tioo.allry political provincialism, a strengthening of- Magyar pressure against the Rurrrania:ns, Croatians, Slovenes and Serl>s, bloclcinig the Polii.Sih penetration to the South. A Slova:kia doniinated hy Poland wouJd be rugainst the interests of the. Oze,chs, Magyars, Rutheniains and Germans. Harving the Poles on the DanuJbe would mean insignirficwnce and .political sUJppression of the Czechs and Magyars in the Danube Basin. Domination oif SlovakJa either 1b y ibhe Germans or the Russians wowld be directly against the vital interests of all other nations of this region. It would really mean the first step towrurd the domination of the whole of Central Europe by one of the great powers, the result of which would ,be the brealking up of the balance of power not only in this area, but also on the entire Euro1pean continent, together with fear-reaching consequences em~mating therefrom . And similarply even from the narrower viewpoint of the Central-European :firamework, judging what the domination of Slovakia by ariy of its neighibo;ios wo,uld mean, at first glance it is quite Olbvious that it would mean. :the dest.Tuction of the 'b alance of power in this area, which wou~d bear with itself the seeds of discontent, pressures and arguments, that it prepares the conditions for the insterference and influence oif power interests outside the area, which in the final restrlts are always harmful to all the nations of this region. SlOIV'rukia wouJd always be a too great and quite an indigestible ,prey whether in the stomach of the Czech, Maigyar, or Po~~ imiperialism. ·F orcefully dominating ,SlovaJkia would b'ting them · more dangers than advantages, especially in times· of crises. SlavaJkia in reality would be for them not a: defen:sd'Ve position, but a "Trodan horse" in the service of their . enemies. 'I'he events of March 1939 illustrated this clea'.il'ly to the Ozechs. The Real Interest of All iFfowevef, an independent Slovakia · is not against the just interests of any orf its neighlbors or any other state. Coruversely, an independent Slovakia is the reaJ interest of al!I · her neighbors. Imperialistic phantoms, no matter how ~nticirig; rciiily·-indicate· the road to ca:tastrophy, especially �SLOVAKIA 29: when · they are not supported by sufrficient power means. And this is doubly true for Ozeoh, Magya,r and Polish im-· peril:!lism, especially when we glance at the goopolitical sit... uation i~ wh'ich these nations liive. An i,n.depei:i,dent iSlov.a.kia ~eed not mean a hiindrance to c_zooh or Poli~!J, econoap.ic products on ~.µeir way to the free. apd internationa!l Danµibe. Ali these are questi<?ns whlyh cocld be solved to werybody's . satisfaction with good will .. And independen~ Sl01Vakia has just as much interest to .de-. fend .Central Euroipe against a,l,l outside imperialisti<: pres-. sll!I'e,· :W4ether it carnes from Germany or Russia, as to the rest of .the nations Oif. this ar~a. Conversely, as an independent state it is a far greater guarantee that it would not be use<l ~nd .a bused in the interest of foreign imipeTialistic plans than wh~ it is forced ~ainst its wiU into t_h e fI:~mework of op,e c;,f its neighibofiing. states. T,he ens1aved . ~nd ~uppressed always justify their right to "treason" and ~ to valid.a~· it at t.J?.e first QppOrt.une moment. A Slovalkia dOII'lll.nat.ed py t.µe ;Magyars, Czechs, or Poles will aa.ways increase ,t he numper p.f .their enemies. A free aJ?.,d ,i_n depe,ndent ~lova.}{ia, l:i,ow~ ever, _wouJd be a real friend. The Mission of the Slovak State · prer~ud.- An independ~f Slovakia is thus one .of the sites of the balance oif power in Central Euroipe, which means peace and tranquility _;_ 'we'1ifare and prosperity in 'this so ~eaivily tried area of Eur01pe. · fiom this ~ewpodnt the_.Slovadc State .sh8ilf have a signirficant and important mission m·the Centra;J ...Europea.n area: on its territory can be eliimiriated tme counter interests of Centro-IDu:ro,pean iinperiaJlisms, which it would be· pos~ible to replace W:ith cooipera,,tion anq. -m1,1tuw. understanding. The Slo~k State would par.a il~ ~e~l dang~o11s and poi&on<>us "srnali" imipema,,lasms jn this so im~ portant -area, which M,ter the .destruction of Soviet' impem~ a_1ism .:WQJtld again attain thek relati,ve impor~e }n.· this r egion. 'Vherefore, the .e,xiste.Q.<!~ -of an independent \Sl<wa.k State is not only in the interest of Central Europe, but also the whole of Europe. Under such circumstances Slovalkia couM be among the Poles, Czechs and Ma:gyars what Swit.zerland is ,bebween France, Germany and Italy. The relation �30 SLOVAKIA of forces is much more against the beneifilt of SW!ita:erland than it would be in the oase orf SlOIV'akia. The Slovruk State, therefore, has a signifiicant mission of consolidat'iing the Central~European Area to promote peace. An independent Slovak,iia womd neuitralirze P◊lish imperialism tenddng toward the south, Czech iimperialism tendill!g East and MaJgya,r imperia1ism tending North. In thls manner independent SlovaJkia wouJd be contributing in a great measuTe to the pacification, consolidation and star biHzation of the peace prereqwisites of this important region. At the same time its existence as such would be one of the fundam.ental piUars orf balance of power in this part of Europe. Sta,hllity, consolidation and ba:lance in relation among the small and larger nations between Germany and Russia are the conditions for the common defense of th~s especially imlportant area of Euro1p e by all these nations agamst any attempt to do1rninate them. Freedom and independence of this regfon is one of the fundamental oondi tions of European ba!lance of power and, hence, indirectly even balance of world power. And tlris area will oniliy then be aJble to defend itself when alJ the nations of thris area will be interested in defond!ing the 1:pol!i.tical system instalJed in this area. That will be olrty ,w hen atll shiaH be free and equal. The SlOIV'aks inhaJbit a territory that is so important strategically and geoipollitically that the .nations of this area cannot be indilfiferent aJbout defending it. The events of 1939 and 1944 proved thls clearly. The Slovaks wiH defend this area olrly if they are free and independent. Judging the question on the basis of the aJbove viewpomts, the exd.stence of the SlavaJk State is in the interest not Olltly of Cent:raJl Europe, but the whole of Europe as well. During the first World War, Professor A. Denis of the Unwe11Sity of Paris underatood this cwrectly, pointing out already 8Jt that time the European significance of the Slova:k question. • • • � SLOVAKIA Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more. I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y the peace and security of a great democratic country. • • • TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE Dr. Arved Grebert When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia. The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical aspirations and plans. "The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin" From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely even with a relatively small number of people and arms. �SLOVAKIA 25 The thi:ok forests provide excellent nests of resistance again.st an aggressor. SlovaJkia is an ideal natwral fort~; it is a "Gi!braltar of the Darmlbe Basin." From the most ancient times, the southern and southwestern regions of this natural fortress formed one of the most important strategic places orf Europe. These regions, especiaJlly the landis on both ·banks of the Danube, represented from time immemorial a part of the territory, which the Czech military theoreti~ian, Colonel E. Morruvec, charactenized as the "g,reatest strategic crossroads orf Central Europe ." On the ban:ks of the Danwbe, between the mouth of the Lpel Rirver and Vienna, there existed the territory from the ages where, on the one side, there met the imperialistic pressure of the German wo:rld, coming from the W~t, with the pressure of the Mongols, which came from the Russian steppes (thrrough the Uz Pass), and, on the other side, the pressure coming from the No!rlh through the Moravian Gate against the pressure of the Italian ipeninsula (The Romans) am.d the Balikans (Byzantium; the Turks). During fiive centuries, it was on the central Danube that the Romans defended ancient civiilization against the world orf "barbarians" ; it was there that the wild Huns to•r e into the heart olf Euroipe; it was there that the Flrruniks clashed with the .AJvars and, in the ninth centucy the German world with the Slovanic world; it was ,t here tl)at the nomaru.c Magyars and the Tatars attacked the Christian civilization of western Europe; and it was th,rowgh th~re that just recently one of the currents of Asiatic lbolshe:vism poured into IDurorpe. "Nowhere else was the land of Eurnpe so satwated with blood," wrote Colonel Moraivec, "as it wais in the lowlands which extend on iboth sides of the Danu'be. There most of the nations were. exchaniged, ,t here it was that the pressure was the greatest am.d !borders changed most frequently." This territory is reaUy "the crosS1road of pressure of the imperialistic forces of IDurope." (See: E. Moravec : La V aleur straregique de la Tchecoslovaquie pour fEurope Oooidentale; Prague, 1938; p. 10). From the aibove it follows that the Slovaks occupy a tet- �26 SLOVAKIA ritory whose strategic importiamce is far greater than its silZe and the numlber of its in:haibirtaints. We shall see that even more clearly id: we at least 1b riefly dndicate what the occupation of this territory means for its ne~ghbors. Why the Neighbors are Interested Whil.e the Slovruks are firmly propped against rvalleys and slopes of this natura!l mountam fortress , the Magyars, Poles rund Ozechs occupy the lowlands, which do not afford them ainy kind of natural protection agaiinst ipossilble attacks from their neighibors. It is, therefore, only natural, that Magyar, Czech and Po.lish imperialists saw and still see in Slovrukia an important defensive bastion, which could serve them well in the event of an enemy attack. For the Ozechs. the domination of Slovakia means rubove all else protection against the everlasting German pressll!I'e which is .s queezing them liike pincers from three sides. 'Dhe Magyars see in Slovrukia from the militrury standpoint a real defensirve wall against the constant pressure of the Slovanic world. For the Poles the domination of SlOIVakia would represent a real cover-uip for their baciks against possilble attaclks, which have come so often in their history from the East and the West, from Germany and Russia. For the Polish imperialists Slovaikia would aiso mean access to the Drunulbe, whi:ch in turn wol.l!ld mean increasing the influence of Poland in the Danulbe basin. Poland, held in the pincers of two colossi, the German and the Russli,an, only by coming into the DanUJbe region could become a real " European Great Power," whfoh is the open am'bition of the Polish adherents of this policy. From the economic standpoint, Slovakia means much for the surrounding nations. Not only as a market far their industry, but also as a source of ram materials. For the Magyars the forest wealth of Slovrulcia, the natural conditions for the development of industry (mineral wealth, wood, water power, coal) are a valuruble adjund to the agricultural regions of the Magyar lowlands. Slovrukia served as a market for Ozech industrial products, which annuailly "if we figure consei,vati'Vely" - to use the words of Dr. Kazwas "amounted to rupproximately 1100-1200 million Czecho-Slo1 �27 SLOVAKIA va,k Crowns ( 37 -40 million dollars) ." Slorv,aJkia meant more for the Owchs than Hungary (1005 million crowns), Poland (625 million crowns), Ru1mania (596 million crowns), Ita:ly ( 491 million crowns), etc. Ozecho-1Slovakia expovted more only to Germany, Austria, Y,u gosla,via and IDngla,nd (from the official statistics of 1930). From the stamdipoint of ,production of the Ozech lands, Slovakia was also a more important maI1ket than the foreign marlcets, ibecaUJSe it meant a market protected by a customs (tax) lb order, that is, a mrurlket which brings higher prices (see: Kanvas, ":Sjednocooi vyrdbnich podmin~ v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku," Pra;gue, 1933, pp. 80, 1'18). For Czech imperialists holding onto Slorvaik,i a meant a lso an access to the free Danulbe, in other words, not only an open door to the Danube Basin, ibut also· to the Balikans. In a free Europe the Danulbe is a free river, which means concretely that it opened the door for Ozeoh industria,l ;products directly not only into all the Danulbian states, but also to the coastal states of the Bla:ck Sea and the Mediterranean. For Poland, the domina,tioo of Slov-aJkfa from the economic standpoint would mean the same thing. F:rom the aibove facts -w hich represent only a few of the m~ interests of the neighlbors of Sfovaikia, it is obvious that the imperialistic linterests of the Ozechs, Poles and Magyars clash in Slovakia. 1 The Consequences of Dominating Slovakia The domination of Slova:kia .b y one of her neighbors, however, also presents a threat to the remainmg nations of this region. The domination oif SlOIVa.lkia by the Czechs is aga;inst the interests of Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Croatians, Ruthenians and Slovenes. Having the Ozeohs on the Danube meams a Czecho-Russian aHiance to the Poles, Orech canons only 35 kilometers f,r om Budaipest, a reviva!l orf Ozech imperurlism ,m the eyes of the Germans and a tool of other imperialisms, the daillger of cultural and economical Ozechlzation of Ruthenia, and indirectly the reviival of Sel'\bian imperfalism. in the eyes of the Croatians and Slovenes. The dominaition of SlovaJk,ia by the Magyars is aigainst the interests of the Ruma.mans, Czechs, Seoos, Ruthenians, Poles and �28 SLOVAKIA Germans-. 'It wouJd mean suppressing the Czechs into an interila.tioo.allry political provincialism, a strengthening of- Magyar pressure against the Rurrrania:ns, Croatians, Slovenes and Serl>s, bloclcinig the Polii.Sih penetration to the South. A Slova:kia doniinated hy Poland wouJd be rugainst the interests of the. Oze,chs, Magyars, Rutheniains and Germans. Harving the Poles on the DanuJbe would mean insignirficwnce and .political sUJppression of the Czechs and Magyars in the Danube Basin. Domination oif SlovakJa either 1b y ibhe Germans or the Russians wowld be directly against the vital interests of all other nations of this region. It would really mean the first step towrurd the domination of the whole of Central Europe by one of the great powers, the result of which would ,be the brealking up of the balance of power not only in this area, but also on the entire Euro1pean continent, together with fear-reaching consequences em~mating therefrom . And similarply even from the narrower viewpoint of the Central-European :firamework, judging what the domination of Slovakia by ariy of its neighibo;ios wo,uld mean, at first glance it is quite Olbvious that it would mean. :the dest.Tuction of the 'b alance of power in this area, which wou~d bear with itself the seeds of discontent, pressures and arguments, that it prepares the conditions for the insterference and influence oif power interests outside the area, which in the final restrlts are always harmful to all the nations of this region. SlOIV'rukia wouJd always be a too great and quite an indigestible ,prey whether in the stomach of the Czech, Maigyar, or Po~~ imiperialism. ·F orcefully dominating ,SlovaJkia would b'ting them · more dangers than advantages, especially in times· of crises. SlavaJkia in reality would be for them not a: defen:sd'Ve position, but a "Trodan horse" in the service of their . enemies. 'I'he events of March 1939 illustrated this clea'.il'ly to the Ozechs. The Real Interest of All iFfowevef, an independent Slovakia · is not against the just interests of any orf its neighlbors or any other state. Coruversely, an independent Slovakia is the reaJ interest of al!I · her neighbors. Imperialistic phantoms, no matter how ~nticirig; rciiily·-indicate· the road to ca:tastrophy, especially �SLOVAKIA 29: when · they are not supported by sufrficient power means. And this is doubly true for Ozeoh, Magya,r and Polish im-· peril:!lism, especially when we glance at the goopolitical sit... uation i~ wh'ich these nations liive. An i,n.depei:i,dent iSlov.a.kia ~eed not mean a hiindrance to c_zooh or Poli~!J, econoap.ic products on ~.µeir way to the free. apd internationa!l Danµibe. Ali these are questi<?ns whlyh cocld be solved to werybody's . satisfaction with good will .. And independen~ Sl01Vakia has just as much interest to .de-. fend .Central Euroipe against a,l,l outside imperialisti<: pres-. sll!I'e,· :W4ether it carnes from Germany or Russia, as to the rest of .the nations Oif. this ar~a. Conversely, as an independent state it is a far greater guarantee that it would not be use<l ~nd .a bused in the interest of foreign imipeTialistic plans than wh~ it is forced ~ainst its wiU into t_h e fI:~mework of op,e c;,f its neighibofiing. states. T,he ens1aved . ~nd ~uppressed always justify their right to "treason" and ~ to valid.a~· it at t.J?.e first QppOrt.une moment. A Slovalkia dOII'lll.nat.ed py t.µe ;Magyars, Czechs, or Poles will aa.ways increase ,t he numper p.f .their enemies. A free aJ?.,d ,i_n depe,ndent ~lova.}{ia, l:i,ow~ ever, _wouJd be a real friend. The Mission of the Slovak State · prer~ud.- An independ~f Slovakia is thus one .of the sites of the balance oif power in Central Euroipe, which means peace and tranquility _;_ 'we'1ifare and prosperity in 'this so ~eaivily tried area of Eur01pe. · fiom this ~ewpodnt the_.Slovadc State .sh8ilf have a signirficant and important mission m·the Centra;J ...Europea.n area: on its territory can be eliimiriated tme counter interests of Centro-IDu:ro,pean iinperiaJlisms, which it would be· pos~ible to replace W:ith cooipera,,tion anq. -m1,1tuw. understanding. The Slo~k State would par.a il~ ~e~l dang~o11s and poi&on<>us "srnali" imipema,,lasms jn this so im~ portant -area, which M,ter the .destruction of Soviet' impem~ a_1ism .:WQJtld again attain thek relati,ve impor~e }n.· this r egion. 'Vherefore, the .e,xiste.Q.<!~ -of an independent \Sl<wa.k State is not only in the interest of Central Europe, but also the whole of Europe. Under such circumstances Slovalkia couM be among the Poles, Czechs and Ma:gyars what Swit.zerland is ,bebween France, Germany and Italy. The relation �30 SLOVAKIA of forces is much more against the beneifilt of SW!ita:erland than it would be in the oase orf SlOIV'akia. The Slovruk State, therefore, has a signifiicant mission of consolidat'iing the Central~European Area to promote peace. An independent Slovak,iia womd neuitralirze P◊lish imperialism tenddng toward the south, Czech iimperialism tendill!g East and MaJgya,r imperia1ism tending North. In thls manner independent SlovaJkia wouJd be contributing in a great measuTe to the pacification, consolidation and star biHzation of the peace prereqwisites of this important region. At the same time its existence as such would be one of the fundam.ental piUars orf balance of power in this part of Europe. Sta,hllity, consolidation and ba:lance in relation among the small and larger nations between Germany and Russia are the conditions for the common defense of th~s especially imlportant area of Euro1p e by all these nations agamst any attempt to do1rninate them. Freedom and independence of this regfon is one of the fundamental oondi tions of European ba!lance of power and, hence, indirectly even balance of world power. And tlris area will oniliy then be aJble to defend itself when alJ the nations of thris area will be interested in defond!ing the 1:pol!i.tical system instalJed in this area. That will be olrty ,w hen atll shiaH be free and equal. The SlOIV'aks inhaJbit a territory that is so important strategically and geoipollitically that the .nations of this area cannot be indilfiferent aJbout defending it. The events of 1939 and 1944 proved thls clearly. The Slovaks wiH defend this area olrly if they are free and independent. Judging the question on the basis of the aJbove viewpomts, the exd.stence of the SlavaJk State is in the interest not Olltly of Cent:raJl Europe, but the whole of Europe as well. During the first World War, Professor A. Denis of the Unwe11Sity of Paris underatood this cwrectly, pointing out already 8Jt that time the European significance of the Slova:k question. • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1954, Vol. 4 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 10), March 1954.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 11), June 1954.</li> <li>Issue 3-4 (No. 12-13), Sept.-Dec. 1954.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1954 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA Living in Canada today, I am not an ofificer any more. I work as a helper on construction jobs and feel well ·and satisfied, though I cannot but he1p think of my children and re'latirves over there. And despite the hardships and . misfortunes which ibeset me some time ago, when I fost. aff I had gatined during my residence in Canada, I fee1 rich, because I .lmow thait, God willing, I'll ·b e up tomQII'rOW doing the same wo:r1k I was doing yesterday without a police guard. I can malke my plans for the future freely without fear that some one shall intenfere in my affairs. Today my only wish is that I might have my children with me to en'.i<)y the peace and security of a great democratic country. • • • TH~ SLOVAK STATE AND CENTRAL EUROPE Dr. Arved Grebert When judging the problem of the function of the Slovak State in the CootraJl-Ewropean area, it is necessary a.1bove all else to bear in. mind several faicts which ·emanate from the goopoliticaJl situation of the territOII'y of Slovakia. The territory of SlovaJlci.a occutpies am. important place in the Central-®uropean region. Its sfu-ategic significance, its mineral wealth, the ,p ower potential of its inhaJbitants, as weli as its economk produicti.Jvity represents values, always tempts its nerghl>ors, especially the Magyrurs, Ozechs and the Poles. The attempt to dominate Slovakia, or to gain influence over it, is, therefore, a natural part of their poHtical aspirations and plans. "The Gibraltar and the Danube Basin" From the military standpoint, Slovakia is one of the most natural stroo.gholds of Central Europe. Propped up against the migihty Car,pathian range of mountains, which represent its everlasting and natural 1borders on the north and · the west, and protected on the s01Uth /by the broad Danulbe, the second lamgest ri,yer on the Eurqpean continent, its territory presents an ideal terrain for military defense. Its valleys are narrowed and, therefore, easily defended. effoet.Nely even with a relatively small number of people and arms. SLOVAKIA 25 The thi:ok forests provide excellent nests of resistance again.st an aggressor. SlovaJkia is an ideal natwral fort~; it is a "Gi!braltar of the Darmlbe Basin." From the most ancient times, the southern and southwestern regions of this natural fortress formed one of the most important strategic places orf Europe. These regions, especiaJlly the landis on both ·banks of the Danube, represented from time immemorial a part of the territory, which the Czech military theoreti~ian, Colonel E. Morruvec, charactenized as the "g,reatest strategic crossroads orf Central Europe ." On the ban:ks of the Danwbe, between the mouth of the Lpel Rirver and Vienna, there existed the territory from the ages where, on the one side, there met the imperialistic pressure of the German wo:rld, coming from the W~t, with the pressure of the Mongols, which came from the Russian steppes (thrrough the Uz Pass), and, on the other side, the pressure coming from the No!rlh through the Moravian Gate against the pressure of the Italian ipeninsula (The Romans) am.d the Balikans (Byzantium; the Turks). During fiive centuries, it was on the central Danube that the Romans defended ancient civiilization against the world orf "barbarians" ; it was there that the wild Huns to•r e into the heart olf Euroipe; it was there that the Flrruniks clashed with the .AJvars and, in the ninth centucy the German world with the Slovanic world; it was ,t here tl)at the nomaru.c Magyars and the Tatars attacked the Christian civilization of western Europe; and it was th,rowgh th~re that just recently one of the currents of Asiatic lbolshe:vism poured into IDurorpe. "Nowhere else was the land of Eurnpe so satwated with blood," wrote Colonel Moraivec, "as it wais in the lowlands which extend on iboth sides of the Danu'be. There most of the nations were. exchaniged, ,t here it was that the pressure was the greatest am.d !borders changed most frequently." This territory is reaUy "the crosS1road of pressure of the imperialistic forces of IDurope." (See: E. Moravec : La V aleur straregique de la Tchecoslovaquie pour fEurope Oooidentale; Prague, 1938; p. 10). From the aibove it follows that the Slovaks occupy a tet- 26 SLOVAKIA ritory whose strategic importiamce is far greater than its silZe and the numlber of its in:haibirtaints. We shall see that even more clearly id: we at least 1b riefly dndicate what the occupation of this territory means for its ne~ghbors. Why the Neighbors are Interested Whil.e the Slovruks are firmly propped against rvalleys and slopes of this natura!l mountam fortress , the Magyars, Poles rund Ozechs occupy the lowlands, which do not afford them ainy kind of natural protection agaiinst ipossilble attacks from their neighibors. It is, therefore, only natural, that Magyar, Czech and Po.lish imperialists saw and still see in Slovrukia an important defensive bastion, which could serve them well in the event of an enemy attack. For the Ozechs. the domination of Slovakia means rubove all else protection against the everlasting German pressll!I'e which is .s queezing them liike pincers from three sides. 'Dhe Magyars see in Slovrukia from the militrury standpoint a real defensirve wall against the constant pressure of the Slovanic world. For the Poles the domination of SlOIVakia would represent a real cover-uip for their baciks against possilble attaclks, which have come so often in their history from the East and the West, from Germany and Russia. For the Polish imperialists Slovaikia would aiso mean access to the Drunulbe, whi:ch in turn wol.l!ld mean increasing the influence of Poland in the Danulbe basin. Poland, held in the pincers of two colossi, the German and the Russli,an, only by coming into the DanUJbe region could become a real " European Great Power," whfoh is the open am'bition of the Polish adherents of this policy. From the economic standpoint, Slovakia means much for the surrounding nations. Not only as a market far their industry, but also as a source of ram materials. For the Magyars the forest wealth of Slovrulcia, the natural conditions for the development of industry (mineral wealth, wood, water power, coal) are a valuruble adjund to the agricultural regions of the Magyar lowlands. Slovrukia served as a market for Ozech industrial products, which annuailly "if we figure consei,vati'Vely" - to use the words of Dr. Kazwas "amounted to rupproximately 1100-1200 million Czecho-Slo1 27 SLOVAKIA va,k Crowns ( 37 -40 million dollars) ." Slorv,aJkia meant more for the Owchs than Hungary (1005 million crowns), Poland (625 million crowns), Ru1mania (596 million crowns), Ita:ly ( 491 million crowns), etc. Ozecho-1Slovakia expovted more only to Germany, Austria, Y,u gosla,via and IDngla,nd (from the official statistics of 1930). From the stamdipoint of ,production of the Ozech lands, Slovakia was also a more important maI1ket than the foreign marlcets, ibecaUJSe it meant a market protected by a customs (tax) lb order, that is, a mrurlket which brings higher prices (see: Kanvas, ":Sjednocooi vyrdbnich podmin~ v zemi ceskych a na Slovensku," Pra;gue, 1933, pp. 80, 1'18). For Czech imperialists holding onto Slorvaik,i a meant a lso an access to the free Danulbe, in other words, not only an open door to the Danube Basin, ibut also· to the Balikans. In a free Europe the Danulbe is a free river, which means concretely that it opened the door for Ozeoh industria,l ;products directly not only into all the Danulbian states, but also to the coastal states of the Bla:ck Sea and the Mediterranean. For Poland, the domina,tioo of Slov-aJkfa from the economic standpoint would mean the same thing. F:rom the aibove facts -w hich represent only a few of the m~ interests of the neighlbors of Sfovaikia, it is obvious that the imperialistic linterests of the Ozechs, Poles and Magyars clash in Slovakia. 1 The Consequences of Dominating Slovakia The domination of Slova:kia .b y one of her neighbors, however, also presents a threat to the remainmg nations of this region. The domination oif SlOIVa.lkia by the Czechs is aga;inst the interests of Poland, Germany, Hungary, the Croatians, Ruthenians and Slovenes. Having the Ozeohs on the Danube meams a Czecho-Russian aHiance to the Poles, Orech canons only 35 kilometers f,r om Budaipest, a reviva!l orf Ozech imperurlism ,m the eyes of the Germans and a tool of other imperialisms, the daillger of cultural and economical Ozechlzation of Ruthenia, and indirectly the reviival of Sel'\bian imperfalism. in the eyes of the Croatians and Slovenes. The dominaition of SlovaJk,ia by the Magyars is aigainst the interests of the Ruma.mans, Czechs, Seoos, Ruthenians, Poles and 28 SLOVAKIA Germans-. 'It wouJd mean suppressing the Czechs into an interila.tioo.allry political provincialism, a strengthening of- Magyar pressure against the Rurrrania:ns, Croatians, Slovenes and Serl>s, bloclcinig the Polii.Sih penetration to the South. A Slova:kia doniinated hy Poland wouJd be rugainst the interests of the. Oze,chs, Magyars, Rutheniains and Germans. Harving the Poles on the DanuJbe would mean insignirficwnce and .political sUJppression of the Czechs and Magyars in the Danube Basin. Domination oif SlovakJa either 1b y ibhe Germans or the Russians wowld be directly against the vital interests of all other nations of this region. It would really mean the first step towrurd the domination of the whole of Central Europe by one of the great powers, the result of which would ,be the brealking up of the balance of power not only in this area, but also on the entire Euro1pean continent, together with fear-reaching consequences em~mating therefrom . And similarply even from the narrower viewpoint of the Central-European :firamework, judging what the domination of Slovakia by ariy of its neighibo;ios wo,uld mean, at first glance it is quite Olbvious that it would mean. :the dest.Tuction of the 'b alance of power in this area, which wou~d bear with itself the seeds of discontent, pressures and arguments, that it prepares the conditions for the insterference and influence oif power interests outside the area, which in the final restrlts are always harmful to all the nations of this region. SlOIV'rukia wouJd always be a too great and quite an indigestible ,prey whether in the stomach of the Czech, Maigyar, or Po~~ imiperialism. ·F orcefully dominating ,SlovaJkia would b'ting them · more dangers than advantages, especially in times· of crises. SlavaJkia in reality would be for them not a: defen:sd'Ve position, but a "Trodan horse" in the service of their . enemies. 'I'he events of March 1939 illustrated this clea'.il'ly to the Ozechs. The Real Interest of All iFfowevef, an independent Slovakia · is not against the just interests of any orf its neighlbors or any other state. Coruversely, an independent Slovakia is the reaJ interest of al!I · her neighbors. Imperialistic phantoms, no matter how ~nticirig; rciiily·-indicate· the road to ca:tastrophy, especially SLOVAKIA 29: when · they are not supported by sufrficient power means. And this is doubly true for Ozeoh, Magya,r and Polish im-· peril:!lism, especially when we glance at the goopolitical sit... uation i~ wh'ich these nations liive. An i,n.depei:i,dent iSlov.a.kia ~eed not mean a hiindrance to c_zooh or Poli~!J, econoap.ic products on ~.µeir way to the free. apd internationa!l Danµibe. Ali these are questi<?ns whlyh cocld be solved to werybody's . satisfaction with good will .. And independen~ Sl01Vakia has just as much interest to .de-. fend .Central Euroipe against a,l,l outside imperialisti<: pres-. sll!I'e,· :W4ether it carnes from Germany or Russia, as to the rest of .the nations Oif. this ar~a. Conversely, as an independent state it is a far greater guarantee that it would not be use<l ~nd .a bused in the interest of foreign imipeTialistic plans than wh~ it is forced ~ainst its wiU into t_h e fI:~mework of op,e c;,f its neighibofiing. states. T,he ens1aved . ~nd ~uppressed always justify their right to "treason" and ~ to valid.a~· it at t.J?.e first QppOrt.une moment. A Slovalkia dOII'lll.nat.ed py t.µe ;Magyars, Czechs, or Poles will aa.ways increase ,t he numper p.f .their enemies. A free aJ?.,d ,i_n depe,ndent ~lova.}{ia, l:i,ow~ ever, _wouJd be a real friend. The Mission of the Slovak State · prer~ud.- An independ~f Slovakia is thus one .of the sites of the balance oif power in Central Euroipe, which means peace and tranquility _;_ 'we'1ifare and prosperity in 'this so ~eaivily tried area of Eur01pe. · fiom this ~ewpodnt the_.Slovadc State .sh8ilf have a signirficant and important mission m·the Centra;J ...Europea.n area: on its territory can be eliimiriated tme counter interests of Centro-IDu:ro,pean iinperiaJlisms, which it would be· pos~ible to replace W:ith cooipera,,tion anq. -m1,1tuw. understanding. The Slo~k State would par.a il~ ~e~l dang~o11s and poi&on<>us "srnali" imipema,,lasms jn this so im~ portant -area, which M,ter the .destruction of Soviet' impem~ a_1ism .:WQJtld again attain thek relati,ve impor~e }n.· this r egion. 'Vherefore, the .e,xiste.Q.<!~ -of an independent \Sl<wa.k State is not only in the interest of Central Europe, but also the whole of Europe. Under such circumstances Slovalkia couM be among the Poles, Czechs and Ma:gyars what Swit.zerland is ,bebween France, Germany and Italy. The relation 30 SLOVAKIA of forces is much more against the beneifilt of SW!ita:erland than it would be in the oase orf SlOIV'akia. The Slovruk State, therefore, has a signifiicant mission of consolidat'iing the Central~European Area to promote peace. An independent Slovak,iia womd neuitralirze P◊lish imperialism tenddng toward the south, Czech iimperialism tendill!g East and MaJgya,r imperia1ism tending North. In thls manner independent SlovaJkia wouJd be contributing in a great measuTe to the pacification, consolidation and star biHzation of the peace prereqwisites of this important region. At the same time its existence as such would be one of the fundam.ental piUars orf balance of power in this part of Europe. Sta,hllity, consolidation and ba:lance in relation among the small and larger nations between Germany and Russia are the conditions for the common defense of th~s especially imlportant area of Euro1p e by all these nations agamst any attempt to do1rninate them. Freedom and independence of this regfon is one of the fundamental oondi tions of European ba!lance of power and, hence, indirectly even balance of world power. And tlris area will oniliy then be aJble to defend itself when alJ the nations of thris area will be interested in defond!ing the 1:pol!i.tical system instalJed in this area. That will be olrty ,w hen atll shiaH be free and equal. The SlOIV'aks inhaJbit a territory that is so important strategically and geoipollitically that the .nations of this area cannot be indilfiferent aJbout defending it. The events of 1939 and 1944 proved thls clearly. The Slovaks wiH defend this area olrly if they are free and independent. Judging the question on the basis of the aJbove viewpomts, the exd.stence of the SlavaJk State is in the interest not Olltly of Cent:raJl Europe, but the whole of Europe as well. During the first World War, Professor A. Denis of the Unwe11Sity of Paris underatood this cwrectly, pointing out already 8Jt that time the European significance of the Slova:k question. • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovak State and Central Europe Description An account of the resource Dr. Arvéd Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 4, No. 2 (10), June 1954 pp. 24-30 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 1954 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e7d58f0101dc3bc3c7cbd8a77d42cbea.pdf 7e88960ec02df715f56f9bffea6cd373 PDF Text Text SL OVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents By Dr. Arved Gr e b e rt Geneva, Switzerland L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican daily, published (April 27, 1974) an article by Robert A. Graham, S. J., an American Jesuit, on the policy of the Holy See in regard to anti-Jewish legislation during the second World War in Hitler-dominated Europe. (La Santa Sede e le vittime della guerra.) The author based his conclusions exclusively on material in a volume of diplomatic doc~ments published by the Vatican: Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la seconde guerre mondiale. The aforementioned article touches upon the stand taken by the Slovak government in regulations concerning the Jews which were implemented without exception in all the states that were in the GermanItalian orbit. As a matter of record, neither in Italy, the centuries-old bastion of Catholicism, nor in France, which was headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, a practical Catholic, was the Holy See able to halt discrimination that was officially prescribed by law. The author of the review merely noted the facts relating to the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia without taking into account existing circumstances, very often completely unknown to foreign readers. These were influenced by the geopolitical situation of Slovakia caught in the German-Magyar vise or web. Moreover, Hungary enjoyed a privileged position. At this period of history its policy-makers knew how to take advantage of its political anti-semitic regulations under the domination of the Third Reich. One must take into consideration, too, the overwhelming power pressure imposed upon Slovakia by Germany. No less important in this delicate situation was the fact that Bratislava, the Slovak capital and seat of the government, was located on the very borders of Germany. This was �6 SLOVAKIA a precarious position that could have toppled the Slovak government from power at any moment by a military invasion. Without weighing all these basic realities one cannot begin to understand the policy of President Tiso and the Slovak government in this problem of seeking a solution for the Jewish question during the second World War in Slovakia. It is not our intention on this occasion to discuss the circumstances that brought on anti-Jewish regulations by the government in Slovakia at this particular time. An analysis of this phase of the Slovak past will be the role of a free Slovak historical study which will have free access to and complete use of all existing documents on the basis of a comparative study of all the contemporary events in Europe and local circumstances. Things looked entirely different in Bratislava and at the Vatican, for example. And, likewise, the problems of President Tiso were judged quite differently at the Vatican and German headquarters ( and by Nazi reporters) in Berlin or Bratislava. It will not be out of place, therefore, to illustrate our point of view on this historical problem by citing official statements of a Nazi report of February, 1943, in Bratislava itself. This report on the situation in Slovakia together with a proposal for the future destiny of the Slovak nation in the sphere of Nazi Germany after the expected victorious end of the war was presented to the chief of the SS. bureau. It was top secret, dated February 16, 1943, and sent to the SS. Hauptamt headquarters, whose chief was G. Berger. The latter, in a letter to Heinrich Himler (February 19, 1943 ), the chief of SS. and the police in the Third Reich, informed him of the situation in Slovakia with a supplementary note that a detailed report was being sent to the third department of the main office of national security . The text of this communique appeared in a Slovak translation of the documents which Vilem Precan edited in Bratislava in 1965. (Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty. Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, pp . 45-54 ). We will quote only those paragraphs that refer to Dr. Jozef Tiso and his closest political associates . They quite clearly reflect the attitude of the German Nazis toward the Slovak Republic. In the introduction we read: President Dr. Tiso has ranged wid ely in his politics. According to �SLOVAKIA 7 law he is the leader of the nation and the party, and is the top man in the state. This powerful position was secured with the coop eTation of old associates, the strong support of the clergy and leaders of Catholic Action, and also with the aid of Sidor's followers, and apparently, too, by the backing of recruits from neutral or indifferent sources, such as those of Dr. Karvas. Tiso, a realist, declared himself in favor of the Reich. But internally he leans on elements that are fundamentally hosti1e to Germany and opposed to the ideas of the Third Reich. He is endeavoring to build up Slovakia on the principles of the Catholic Action group, and hence his ultimate objective is a Catholic state. In the beginning his intentions were hidden by a mask. Opportunistic references to national socialism seemed that he was favorably disposed to it, but lately he has thrown off the mask and a frontal attack on national socialism is underway. And a Nazi informer writes further: After Sidor's resignation Tiso and his associates have a free hand. Catholic Action and the clergy are in confrontation with the national guard (Hlinka Guards). Their allies are those who felt they had suffered losses as the result of the establishment of the Slovak state those who had lost rights or privileges, those who had always cooperated with the Jews and were dependent on them, and finally by all the Jews who remained in the country. The national guard obviously could not offer sufficient resistance to this •a lignment without outside help. The result was Salzburg, an agreement that Tiso regarded as foroed upon him and which he never respected. Attached to this offjcial report were addenda in the form of written observations about individual aspects of the Slovak problem in 1943. Supplement 6 was labeled: "State President Dr. Jozef Tiso, Bratislava, February 11, 1943." President Tiso's political profile is drawn and the views of his associates recorded. For example, Ravasz and Dr. Polyak ("another cleric-oriented ally of Dr. Tiso, a full fledged minister."). According to Semi-Goth, Polyak was a Jew and a friend of the Jews. cavojsky, Suroviak and Drobny are listed as Tiso's allies. Liberals Stano, Sokol and Sivak are in Tiso's camp as are Stefan Danihel and Dr. Turcek, industrialists, the report sp,id. "All these," the report continued, "on the basis of their life style and urban environment are opposed to the Reich. It is apparent that the clergy and all the forces of Catholic Action are behind Tiso. From 1941 Tiso won over the party affiliation of the erstwhile followers of Sidor." The Nazi informer continues: Three years ago in response to a radio talk by a Catholic priest, �8 SLOVAKIA R , who advocated social security, Tiso told bim that he was thinking of following the example of Salazar of Portugal in Slovakia. (Salazar was looked upon as a civilian Jesuit who leaned towards the idea of a Catholic state.) The book of a theologian (Dr. Polakovic), Tisov a ruiuka, reflects the views and plans of Tiso in bold outlines. They follow the Catholic idea of a state quite clearly as an objective of Catholic Action. The author upholds the absolute primacy of the Church over the state. Proof of Tiso's state-political views are clearly evidenced by hi.s philosophy of education, the establishment of organizations in support of Catholic Action, etc. A former Jesuit, Misik, is his close advisor. Tiso also actively supported the organization of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the initiator was Dr. Novak, a university professor and well known Pan Slav. Tiso's reaction to the Salzburg Agreement is manifested in his statement that he accepted it "with clenched teeth" because it was forced upon him. He said to Mach who handed in his resignation in December, 1942: "You know where I stand. They forced you upon me. Therefore, it will be better if you present your resignation where you received your appointment." This attitude towards the Salzburg Agreement is the inevitable result of Tiso's rejection of national socialism and German influence in general. There are many proofs of this. For example, in the fall of 1942 Tiso told Commander Kubicek of the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen du ring his visit at the president's residence (palace): "We do not need any form of national socialism. We have our own views." In May, 1942, the president received Dr. Elemer Fink from Zvolen, together with Dr. Kovac, Mayor of Bratislava, at which meeting Dr. E. Fink presented a petition in behalf of his brother, Dr. Zoltan Fink. Tiso promised him a position and economic privileges on condition that the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen ceases to demand the implementation of a program of national socialism. And Tiso stated that neither the Church nor the state would tolerate any form of national socialism, and added emphatically that it was in his power to prevent its establishment. At a party conference in the Pohronie region in December, 1942, Tiso declared: "We must strive by our work to achieve what we want. Our nation must manifest its maturity in every phase of life in order to prove that it is capable of self-government. In the future we will not need supervision (this he emphasized) . We must prove to the whole world we do not need enyone to subsidize us." Towards national socialism Tiso expressed his views. openly at a conference of leaders of the Hlinka Guard in Bojnice (July 1-31, 1942). Despite the fact that he was speaking to a number of avowed Slovak national socialists Tiso did not use the term, "national socialism," at all. As a matter of fact, he declared that the Hlinka Guard must not become involved in an ideological struggle. Reaction to his address in which he stated that the Slovaks were not working in the interests of the Germans or any alien nation but only in the interest of the �SLOVAKIA 9 Slovak nation was very much in evidence among the assembly of the Hlinka Guard. For the president, next to his alliance with the clergy, his strength lies in the solid support of the Academic youth (college and university students). On June 2, 1942, Tiso received a tremendous ovation for his speech in the university amphitheatre in Bratislava. The residents of the Lafranconi and Svoradov fraternity houses gave a public demonstration in which they voiced their anti-German but pro Pan Slav and Roman Catholic sympathy during the course of President Tiso's address. This compromised Tiso's policy and was a direct answer to Ambassador Ludin's earlier speech in Kezmarok. In this respect it is necessary to quote from Tiso's speech: "We have our own policies in regard to foreign states, particularly towards the great German Reich with which we are allied by a special agreement. But who could imagine that Germany should wish to direct Slovak politics? We have to direct our own political life under this agi,eement. No thinking German would expect a Slovak to conduct German politics in Slovakia. Frankly, every reasoning German would resent such an attitude. Let us, therefore, conduct our own politics in Slovakia." Furthe.r proof that Tiso does not absolutely follow the pro-German political line we deduce from the words of one of his loyal followers, namely, Father Izakovic. The latter in his speech in August, 1942, in Trnava to some 300 officers, said that it is imperative to adjust to the circumstances of the times, and that if a certain policy is being followed today is does not necessarily mean that it cannot be changed by new circumstances tomorrow. The speaker insisted he was repeating the views of Tiso with whom he had just had an interview. This, then, is the political profile of President Tiso as drawn by a German Nazi informer in his February 11, 1943, report from Bratislava. In reply to Father Graham, the American Jesuit, whose article appeared in the Osservatore Romano, it is enlightening to quote again from the official statement (Par. 7) under the title, "Influence of the Clergy, particularly the Jesuits and Catholic Action in Slovakia." It is dated February 11, 1943. We quote: The privileged position of the clergy in the Slovak nation may be explained on the basis of historical development. While the Slovaks were incorporated in Hungary they did not belong to the upper class. Magyarization was allied with the social oppression of the Slovak nation. Proof of this is in the large number of Magyar clergy and secular leaders of Slovak origin. The lower clergy remained united with the Slovak people. Thus, since the clergy in general was held in high esteem in the kingdom of Hungary and because there was no upper class in Slovakia, the Slovak clergy assumed the role of leadership in their own country rather automatically. Even the establishment of the Slovak Peoples Party at the beginning �10 SLOVAKIA of the 20th century was inspired and greatly influenced by the clergy. Prominent Slovak clergymen like Hlinka became involved with ecclesiastical authorities in a controversy on national issues. During the existence of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic after World War I the Slovak Peoples Party was in constant conflict with the centralistic regime ruling Slovakia from Prague. For Hlinka and Sidor and their adherents the Slovak nation's interests were dominant factors in their political program, the chief objective of which was the fulfillment of the promise of autonomy or self-government for the Slovaks in their own native land. One other vital factor in the relations of the Slovak Peoples Party and the central government of Masaryk and Benes in Prague was the attempt of the politicians in the Czech capital of Prague (most of whom were free-thinkers and opposed to the Church) to separate church and state and secularfae all schools in the country. In contrast to the privileged position of the clergy in Hungary and its endangered future this was a threat to their very existence in the new republic of CzechoSlovakia. This reality was very much in evidence by the fact that the Slovak Peoples Party was predominantly represented by the clergy in Prague. Thus, while Hlinka basically maintained an uncompromising stand towards the Czechs, Tiso and the clerical wing pursued a policy of tactical maneuvering and realistic consideration. Attempts of the Catholic Church after the first World War to adapt itself to the new revolutionary conditions of the times by a dynamic program of Catholic Action found fertile soil for its ideals among the religious Slovak populace. This enabled both th e clergy and the Church in Slovakia to maintain dominant influence. Sivak, Minister of education in the Slovak Republic, was, and is an outspoken party affiliate of Tiso and strongly pro-clerical. Under him the schools we11e re-organized on the basis of the Catholic and Lutheran Evangelical faiths. The local committees for national education are chiefly headed by the pastors of the region. In the denominational schools the chairman of the school-board ex officio is the pastor, who is also ex officio a member of the non-denominational school-board in his district. According to a secret directive the clergy is obligated by all mram possible to secure and maintain control over social life, and wield its influence in all business enterprises, organizations, labor and industry . Even today the largest land-owners in the state are the clergy, and they lead a very feudal life in their episcopal sees and in country parishes. Moreover, many pastors are representatives in parliament and are on various committees. The influence of the Jesuits is obviously wide. It was apparent during Magyar rule and later when Ledochowski, the Jesuit General, offered aid to Hlinka and his party. As it flows from the very substance of the Jesuit style of work, only seldom is one able to detect any signs of their activity. They exert their influence primarily through the clergy. The Jesuits have the training of clerical candidates in their hand s. At �SLOVAKIA 11 monthly meetings of diocesan priests, the Jesuits conducted the conferences mostly by ser,mons. They are also in charge of spiritual exercises for rthe clergy. The restoration of the Jesuit monastery in Ruzomberok is a further sign of the intensification of Jesuit activity. The Jesuits have a direct influence on Slovak politics. For example, in 1941 they had a religious conference for Slovak political leaders in Ruzomberok under the supervision of Father Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. According to reports, some of those present were given quite a going-over, but since these exercises required silence this prevented any open discussions or a request for any questions to be answered publicly. Anyone who had a question or problem could discuss it only privately with a Jesuit priest assigned for individual consultation. Besides, other means for their influence are readily available. For instance, two sisters of Ledochowski, the Jesuit provincial, live in Bratislava. For a time after the dedaration of the independence of the Slovak Republic Tiso resided in a Jesuit monastery where Father Mikus, former Jesuit provincial, was one of his closest advisers. There are Slovak Jesuits in the Vatican, too. Among them there is Father Javorka, director of the Russicum College, and Dr. Kralicek, Hlinka's grand-nephew who is a librarian at the Vatican. Sidor himself revealed in a radio speech on December 16, 1942, that Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, is a frequent guest at the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican. It is entirely unnecessary to point out that the Jesuit position is absolutely anti-German. As ·a n example, we will cite the case of a pastor who was suspended for his national-socialistic writings. During his talk with Mikus (the Jesuit provincial, who visited him) he was admonished and asked not to do anything that would sever his relations with his bishop. Mikus added that the situation would undoubtedly change in a year ar two. To the query he intimated that Germany would not win the war Mikus replied he not only surmised it but he was wholly convinced of it, -and even said that there were many others of the same opinion, evidence that he was voicing an opinion held in high places. Although the youngest group of the Jesuits is not numerically large, there are many among them with a high I.Q. Catholic Action has as its primary role a lay apostolate designated to support the activity of the clergy. Its influence and importance have grown perceptibly in the past few years. Its branches are found everywhere. Dr. Buzalka, director of the seminary in Braitislava, is also the director of Catholic Action. His anti-German sentiments are public knowledge. The press of the Catholic Action movement has great opportunities and is definitely anti-German. In addition to its own internal information service, Catholic Action has its own Catholic Press Bureau whose releases are used by the Catholic periodicals and party publications. Svoradov, the Catholic student center at the Slovak University in Bratislava, is a bulwark of Catholic Action, clericalism and a hotbed of anti-German views. Its director is Dr. Filkorn, a good friend of Tiso. Dr. Kirschbaum, a close follower of Sidor, was active for a long time as a Pan Slav and �12 SLOVAKIA German foe. He was with Sidor in Rome for a long time but was recently transierred to the Slovak Embassy in Switzerland. In his report on Sidor, the informant in Bratislava observes that he and his friends in Slovakia resist German influence. "Their attitude is known and manifests itself at ~very opportunity," he writes. As evidence of this the informer observes: Thus, for example, Culen fails to say one word about German 3id given in the founding of the Slovak state in his introduction to an article in the pictorial book of the Slovak Peoples Party which was published on the second anniversary of Slovak Independence Day (March 14, 1941). Not only does he fail to mention German assistance but he repeatedly claims that the creation of the Slovak state was accomplished by the Slovak nation alone! Then, too, as another glaring example, Carnogursky does not refer to German-Slovak cooperation during his lectures to party members, and at the funeral of Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, he openly expressed hi s pro-Polish sympathies. Sidor in his post at the Slovak Embassy in th e Vatican had every opportunity to renew old acquaintances. Through enemy representatives at th e Vatican there were many such occasions. Although he faithfully reported that he received several letters from Benes, Minister Mach, for one, is firmly convinced that Sidor replied either in writing or through oth er channels on his own. When we take into consideration the increasingly strong desire of the Catholic Church to have the Pope play a role as mediator, and possibly, a decisive role in terminating the present world conflict, and since the Slovak Catholic press in Slovakia constantly emphasizes this point of view, then it is perhaps not a mistake to assume that Sidor seeks to direct Slovak internal politics into other channels through Catholic Action. The mission of Kirschbaum, a fanatical follower of Sidor who has been transferred to the Embassy in Switzerland, means the strengthening of Sidor's position in his foreign political policy outside Slovakia. "The Jews in Slovakia" (under that caption or heading the informer continues): The Jews, 20,000 of them, still occupy positions in government and in various administrative posts and supervising positions, apparently permanent assignments. Jews, whom the Guard seized when they were trying to escape from the country, and who were put into concentration camps, reappeared in their homes soon after being released. These were given the protection of a presidential immunity card as wards of the state. They are more or less impertinent, depending on fluctuating changes in the war. To supplement his report, the Nazi informant adds that culen, a member of the Slovak parliament and trusted �SLOVAKIA 13 friend of President Jozef Tiso, has a half-Jewish wife, that Minister i'.>urcansky intervened for 200 Jews who were released at his command from transport ready to leave the country, that the Mayor of Nitra was the godfather of many Jewish children, that when Minister Mach wanted to remove the above Mayor from office, President Tiso intervened in his behalf, that Msgr. Filkorn spoke openly in parliament in protest against the unchristian methods of disposing of Jewish properties, and finally, that Minister Polyak was a half-Jew. Such was the context of the information supplied his government in Berlin by a Nazi agent living in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Nazis did not think that the communists or the "Czechoslovaks" in Slovakia were their dangerous foes, but, strangely enough, the people who were loyal to President Tiso, followers of Sidor, the Catholic clergy, the Jesuits and the majority of the Slovak Peoples Party were feared. From the German viewpoint only Premier Dr. Tuka, Minister Alexander Mach and the Hlinka Guards were their only trusted allies in the Slovak Republic. To comprehend fully and judge conditions in Slovakia during war time it is necessary to study these official German documents. That is what Robert A. Graham, S. J . should have done but failed to do. Many German documents are now available as official records of what transpired from the German point of view. Their policy, their views, reactions and their analysis of President Tiso are all there for anyone who wants to know the truth. Unquestionably, they confirm the negative stand of President Tiso to German national socialism and an appraisal of his realistic approach to the Third Reich in the interest of his own Slovak nation. In conclusion we will cite a part of the official report of SS. Haupsturmftihrer Dr. H. Barsch, chief of the department of III B of the central division security in Vienna. His report of October, 1943, almost a year before the so-called 'Slovak Revolt' was sent to Dr. E . Kaltenbrunner, Nazi chief of security police and safety. (This report appeared in the publication Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, Nemci a Slovensko, 1944, Dokumenty, Nakladatel'stvo Epocha, Bra- �14 SLOVAKIA tislava, 1970. Zostavil Vilem Precan, pp. 40-43.) Aside from other comments this is what the report has to say about Dr. Jozef Tiso's stand towards the Third Reich: Although there do not as yet exist any direct proofs of Tiso's duplicity in his suspected role of double-dealing, nevertheless, his personal politics in recent years have resulted in strengthening forces that are least sympathetic to the Reich. Since he was aware of the political past of these elements, and hence could have easily foreseen their future activity and behaviour towards the Reich, it seems that already then he was thinking of an orientation away from the pro-German position. Besides this, as it happened frequently, whenever German requests were not fulfilled and when there were other deviations from the German line, he could always defend himself by claiming these groups were to blame and thus was able to allay suspicions of personal disloyalty to the German Reich. A further argument in a careful evaluation of Tiso's stand is his position as a priest. In spite of many instances of self-will, Tiso maintains close contacts with higher authorities in the Church. Moreover, his most intimate co-workers are clerics: Msgr. Filkorn, Pastor Izakovic and Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. From this friendship one can conclude more than an indecisive stand on the Jewish question. From the German standpoint this may well be the decisive point that can prove the President's loyalty or disloyalty, the touchstone of his fidelity. Finally, his official appearance, especially in recent times, has not added anything significantly to warrant our trust of Tiso on the German side. Whenever Tiso claims that his speeches (e.g. in Nitra) are addressed to various groups, perhaps one cannot argue against this, for his dialectic is truly excellent. But one cannot overlook the fact that the President knows full well the caliber of his people, and consequently he must be aware of the fact that all political double-talk, even if having reference to other states with an interest in Slovakia, is understood by the populace as being aimed at the Reich, and finally, a keen observer can grasp what is going on in the highest positions of the state and confirm what he has long suspected, and that is the consequence of influence from the enemy side. It is, generally speaking, problematical to depend upon Tiso entirely. Consideration of the party as a factor in the internal political security of the country is a mistaken notion. The leading positions in the party are held by persons with anti-German sentiments. If, for the sake of argument, one considers these people generally without power, and therefore harmless to our cause, it must be noted that then they are not capable of insuring the defense of an internal front to the degree and measure demanded for the interests of the Reich. And even �SLOVAKIA 15 if we assume indifference, the interests of the Reich are not assured since German direction and control are possible under present conditions only with great difficulty. The Nazis were also well informed about the political views of Tiso's political aides. For example, in a detailed and extensive report of November 28, 1944, from Bratislava, addressed to the main office of security in the Reich, III B and III C, which was delivered to both SS-Standardftihrer Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Spengler in Berlin, among other items, there is reference to the relationship of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Hlinka Guards. The German reporter writes that "the Hlinka Guard considers itself national socialist and absolutely pro-German while the party advocates a form of Christian nationalism as a Slovak ideology, and that it looks upon Slovak-German cooperation and friendship as a temporary and not a permanent association, and this opportunism ( certainly not based on a bond of affection) the party spokesmen spread through the Slovak press." After the uprising (the so-called Slovak revolt of August-October, 1944) the Nazi informer writes: "The Party ideologically prepared propaganda favoring a Christian social world view, and Opustil, the general secretary, adopted this as part of his program for immediate implementation. Dr. Jozef Pauco, chief editor of the Slovak daily addressed the members of the 'Domobrana' (National Defense) on the problems of Slovak spiritual orientation and simultaneously declared clearly that for the Slovaks only the Christian national point of view is acceptable. Even more clearly did the member of parliament Cavojsky state this in his radio broadcast of November 8, 1944. He said, to quote : 'As an independent and Christian nation we want to live in freedom in our own free land. A good and selfconscious Slovak never desired a change of masters, he wanted to be master of his own destiny in his own country. In the same way we do not want an exchange of foreign ideologies because these are not for our national interest. As Christians we want to establish our own social, economic and cultural life on the basis of a Christian world view.' Dr. Korper's address had a Sophist tone, the reporter notes, when he said: 'Our agreement with Germany was precious and fundamental because it guaranteed the strong- �16 SLOVAKIA est and freest right for national life which, up to 1939, no other power on earth was willing to recognize as our right to national existence. If there had been another possibility the Slovaks most probably would have chosen to act otherwise.' Dr. Ferdinand t:>urcansky, former foreign minister, spoke in the same vein when he declared: 'I am not a Bolshevik but it is possible I may become one if I can thereby be of service to my nation.' cavojsky, member of the Slovak parliament, in his above mentioned radio address said: 'A bit of egoism in the life of nations is not harmful; in these times we must not forget that alien interests are not always identical with our own national interests.' In other words, he wanted to tell the Slovak people not to subscribe to any wartime party but to work for themselves and to wait for the outcome of events in the future. For the time being the young opposition, encouraged by Opustil, that is, the Mikula-Polakovic wing, the Nazi official informer notes: "Party discipline was imposed upon Mikula for his activity. In the event of this opposition, however, there is no hope of friendly aid to the Germans, but only in the interests of the young Slovak chauvinists who stand uncompromisingly for Slovak independence, and therefore are opposed to any kind of German interference in Slovak internal affairs. This opposition party, first of all, has adherents among university students and may be considered the successor of the former adherents of Ndstup from which emerged activistic elements led by Dr. t:>urcansky, former minister of foreign affairs in the Slovak Republic. By his resolute stand and frequent addresses to the university students, and his association with this opposition movement, Dr. f>urcansky considers this to be a bridge to new political action." German Nazis saw Slovak politicians surrounding President Tiso at the end of November, 1944, in this light. ( See the above mentioned publication, pp. 435-446). These documents, and others in the same way, including the well known Documents on German Foreign Policy published by the British, French and American governments, uniformly place the ·political activity of Dr. Joseph Tiso �SLOVAKIA 17 and his associates during the second World War in an objective light. This means in a practical sense the political rehabilitation of Slovak political policy during this era on the basis of ideological principles. Dr. Tiso was of the opinion that in Slovakia the ideological defense against Nazism and Bolshevist Stalinism can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of a Christian world view derived mainly from Catholicism. All this can be disputed, but Tiso's good intentions cannot be denied. Fundamentally, there is no proof to the contrary. Dr. Joseph Tiso was an extraordinary person. During the second World War his political life was surrounded by obstacles, threats and dangers such as very few statesmen had to face in this epoch. The unique Slovak situation increased and complicated his public life. His tragic death as a punishment for the declaration and successful realization of the independence of the Slovak state, and also as revenge for his opposition to the bolshevik invasion and its subsequent criminal Stalinist establishment of the communist regime in his country, all this forces one to evaluate perhaps even his political mistakes obviously from many different angles. Nevertheless, his political career was subject to criticism during wartime as it is today, and it was not infrequently marked by bitter partisan politics, prejudice, injustice and merciless condemnation. He was subject to hateful attacks by the communists, angry criticism by the Nazis, hatred on the part of those in the service of Czech imperialism, as well as by unjust accusations by contemporary historians and in many details unjustly condemned by the uninformed or highly prejudiced historical writers and journalists of our time. And now the Vatican newspaper! In spite of all this the memory of Dr. Joseph Tiso remains revered by the great majority of Slovaks living in their homeland and throughout the world. Few Slovak political leaders, living or dead, enjoy his stature as a statesman, his popularity and enduring fame among his own people. Dr. Joseph Tiso was undoubtedly a foremost political leader on the entire European scene. Lightning strikes only the tallest trees! � SL OVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents By Dr. Arved Gr e b e rt Geneva, Switzerland L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican daily, published (April 27, 1974) an article by Robert A. Graham, S. J., an American Jesuit, on the policy of the Holy See in regard to anti-Jewish legislation during the second World War in Hitler-dominated Europe. (La Santa Sede e le vittime della guerra.) The author based his conclusions exclusively on material in a volume of diplomatic doc~ments published by the Vatican: Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la seconde guerre mondiale. The aforementioned article touches upon the stand taken by the Slovak government in regulations concerning the Jews which were implemented without exception in all the states that were in the GermanItalian orbit. As a matter of record, neither in Italy, the centuries-old bastion of Catholicism, nor in France, which was headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, a practical Catholic, was the Holy See able to halt discrimination that was officially prescribed by law. The author of the review merely noted the facts relating to the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia without taking into account existing circumstances, very often completely unknown to foreign readers. These were influenced by the geopolitical situation of Slovakia caught in the German-Magyar vise or web. Moreover, Hungary enjoyed a privileged position. At this period of history its policy-makers knew how to take advantage of its political anti-semitic regulations under the domination of the Third Reich. One must take into consideration, too, the overwhelming power pressure imposed upon Slovakia by Germany. No less important in this delicate situation was the fact that Bratislava, the Slovak capital and seat of the government, was located on the very borders of Germany. This was �6 SLOVAKIA a precarious position that could have toppled the Slovak government from power at any moment by a military invasion. Without weighing all these basic realities one cannot begin to understand the policy of President Tiso and the Slovak government in this problem of seeking a solution for the Jewish question during the second World War in Slovakia. It is not our intention on this occasion to discuss the circumstances that brought on anti-Jewish regulations by the government in Slovakia at this particular time. An analysis of this phase of the Slovak past will be the role of a free Slovak historical study which will have free access to and complete use of all existing documents on the basis of a comparative study of all the contemporary events in Europe and local circumstances. Things looked entirely different in Bratislava and at the Vatican, for example. And, likewise, the problems of President Tiso were judged quite differently at the Vatican and German headquarters ( and by Nazi reporters) in Berlin or Bratislava. It will not be out of place, therefore, to illustrate our point of view on this historical problem by citing official statements of a Nazi report of February, 1943, in Bratislava itself. This report on the situation in Slovakia together with a proposal for the future destiny of the Slovak nation in the sphere of Nazi Germany after the expected victorious end of the war was presented to the chief of the SS. bureau. It was top secret, dated February 16, 1943, and sent to the SS. Hauptamt headquarters, whose chief was G. Berger. The latter, in a letter to Heinrich Himler (February 19, 1943 ), the chief of SS. and the police in the Third Reich, informed him of the situation in Slovakia with a supplementary note that a detailed report was being sent to the third department of the main office of national security . The text of this communique appeared in a Slovak translation of the documents which Vilem Precan edited in Bratislava in 1965. (Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty. Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, pp . 45-54 ). We will quote only those paragraphs that refer to Dr. Jozef Tiso and his closest political associates . They quite clearly reflect the attitude of the German Nazis toward the Slovak Republic. In the introduction we read: President Dr. Tiso has ranged wid ely in his politics. According to �SLOVAKIA 7 law he is the leader of the nation and the party, and is the top man in the state. This powerful position was secured with the coop eTation of old associates, the strong support of the clergy and leaders of Catholic Action, and also with the aid of Sidor's followers, and apparently, too, by the backing of recruits from neutral or indifferent sources, such as those of Dr. Karvas. Tiso, a realist, declared himself in favor of the Reich. But internally he leans on elements that are fundamentally hosti1e to Germany and opposed to the ideas of the Third Reich. He is endeavoring to build up Slovakia on the principles of the Catholic Action group, and hence his ultimate objective is a Catholic state. In the beginning his intentions were hidden by a mask. Opportunistic references to national socialism seemed that he was favorably disposed to it, but lately he has thrown off the mask and a frontal attack on national socialism is underway. And a Nazi informer writes further: After Sidor's resignation Tiso and his associates have a free hand. Catholic Action and the clergy are in confrontation with the national guard (Hlinka Guards). Their allies are those who felt they had suffered losses as the result of the establishment of the Slovak state those who had lost rights or privileges, those who had always cooperated with the Jews and were dependent on them, and finally by all the Jews who remained in the country. The national guard obviously could not offer sufficient resistance to this •a lignment without outside help. The result was Salzburg, an agreement that Tiso regarded as foroed upon him and which he never respected. Attached to this offjcial report were addenda in the form of written observations about individual aspects of the Slovak problem in 1943. Supplement 6 was labeled: "State President Dr. Jozef Tiso, Bratislava, February 11, 1943." President Tiso's political profile is drawn and the views of his associates recorded. For example, Ravasz and Dr. Polyak ("another cleric-oriented ally of Dr. Tiso, a full fledged minister."). According to Semi-Goth, Polyak was a Jew and a friend of the Jews. cavojsky, Suroviak and Drobny are listed as Tiso's allies. Liberals Stano, Sokol and Sivak are in Tiso's camp as are Stefan Danihel and Dr. Turcek, industrialists, the report sp,id. "All these," the report continued, "on the basis of their life style and urban environment are opposed to the Reich. It is apparent that the clergy and all the forces of Catholic Action are behind Tiso. From 1941 Tiso won over the party affiliation of the erstwhile followers of Sidor." The Nazi informer continues: Three years ago in response to a radio talk by a Catholic priest, �8 SLOVAKIA R , who advocated social security, Tiso told bim that he was thinking of following the example of Salazar of Portugal in Slovakia. (Salazar was looked upon as a civilian Jesuit who leaned towards the idea of a Catholic state.) The book of a theologian (Dr. Polakovic), Tisov a ruiuka, reflects the views and plans of Tiso in bold outlines. They follow the Catholic idea of a state quite clearly as an objective of Catholic Action. The author upholds the absolute primacy of the Church over the state. Proof of Tiso's state-political views are clearly evidenced by hi.s philosophy of education, the establishment of organizations in support of Catholic Action, etc. A former Jesuit, Misik, is his close advisor. Tiso also actively supported the organization of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the initiator was Dr. Novak, a university professor and well known Pan Slav. Tiso's reaction to the Salzburg Agreement is manifested in his statement that he accepted it "with clenched teeth" because it was forced upon him. He said to Mach who handed in his resignation in December, 1942: "You know where I stand. They forced you upon me. Therefore, it will be better if you present your resignation where you received your appointment." This attitude towards the Salzburg Agreement is the inevitable result of Tiso's rejection of national socialism and German influence in general. There are many proofs of this. For example, in the fall of 1942 Tiso told Commander Kubicek of the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen du ring his visit at the president's residence (palace): "We do not need any form of national socialism. We have our own views." In May, 1942, the president received Dr. Elemer Fink from Zvolen, together with Dr. Kovac, Mayor of Bratislava, at which meeting Dr. E. Fink presented a petition in behalf of his brother, Dr. Zoltan Fink. Tiso promised him a position and economic privileges on condition that the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen ceases to demand the implementation of a program of national socialism. And Tiso stated that neither the Church nor the state would tolerate any form of national socialism, and added emphatically that it was in his power to prevent its establishment. At a party conference in the Pohronie region in December, 1942, Tiso declared: "We must strive by our work to achieve what we want. Our nation must manifest its maturity in every phase of life in order to prove that it is capable of self-government. In the future we will not need supervision (this he emphasized) . We must prove to the whole world we do not need enyone to subsidize us." Towards national socialism Tiso expressed his views. openly at a conference of leaders of the Hlinka Guard in Bojnice (July 1-31, 1942). Despite the fact that he was speaking to a number of avowed Slovak national socialists Tiso did not use the term, "national socialism," at all. As a matter of fact, he declared that the Hlinka Guard must not become involved in an ideological struggle. Reaction to his address in which he stated that the Slovaks were not working in the interests of the Germans or any alien nation but only in the interest of the �SLOVAKIA 9 Slovak nation was very much in evidence among the assembly of the Hlinka Guard. For the president, next to his alliance with the clergy, his strength lies in the solid support of the Academic youth (college and university students). On June 2, 1942, Tiso received a tremendous ovation for his speech in the university amphitheatre in Bratislava. The residents of the Lafranconi and Svoradov fraternity houses gave a public demonstration in which they voiced their anti-German but pro Pan Slav and Roman Catholic sympathy during the course of President Tiso's address. This compromised Tiso's policy and was a direct answer to Ambassador Ludin's earlier speech in Kezmarok. In this respect it is necessary to quote from Tiso's speech: "We have our own policies in regard to foreign states, particularly towards the great German Reich with which we are allied by a special agreement. But who could imagine that Germany should wish to direct Slovak politics? We have to direct our own political life under this agi,eement. No thinking German would expect a Slovak to conduct German politics in Slovakia. Frankly, every reasoning German would resent such an attitude. Let us, therefore, conduct our own politics in Slovakia." Furthe.r proof that Tiso does not absolutely follow the pro-German political line we deduce from the words of one of his loyal followers, namely, Father Izakovic. The latter in his speech in August, 1942, in Trnava to some 300 officers, said that it is imperative to adjust to the circumstances of the times, and that if a certain policy is being followed today is does not necessarily mean that it cannot be changed by new circumstances tomorrow. The speaker insisted he was repeating the views of Tiso with whom he had just had an interview. This, then, is the political profile of President Tiso as drawn by a German Nazi informer in his February 11, 1943, report from Bratislava. In reply to Father Graham, the American Jesuit, whose article appeared in the Osservatore Romano, it is enlightening to quote again from the official statement (Par. 7) under the title, "Influence of the Clergy, particularly the Jesuits and Catholic Action in Slovakia." It is dated February 11, 1943. We quote: The privileged position of the clergy in the Slovak nation may be explained on the basis of historical development. While the Slovaks were incorporated in Hungary they did not belong to the upper class. Magyarization was allied with the social oppression of the Slovak nation. Proof of this is in the large number of Magyar clergy and secular leaders of Slovak origin. The lower clergy remained united with the Slovak people. Thus, since the clergy in general was held in high esteem in the kingdom of Hungary and because there was no upper class in Slovakia, the Slovak clergy assumed the role of leadership in their own country rather automatically. Even the establishment of the Slovak Peoples Party at the beginning �10 SLOVAKIA of the 20th century was inspired and greatly influenced by the clergy. Prominent Slovak clergymen like Hlinka became involved with ecclesiastical authorities in a controversy on national issues. During the existence of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic after World War I the Slovak Peoples Party was in constant conflict with the centralistic regime ruling Slovakia from Prague. For Hlinka and Sidor and their adherents the Slovak nation's interests were dominant factors in their political program, the chief objective of which was the fulfillment of the promise of autonomy or self-government for the Slovaks in their own native land. One other vital factor in the relations of the Slovak Peoples Party and the central government of Masaryk and Benes in Prague was the attempt of the politicians in the Czech capital of Prague (most of whom were free-thinkers and opposed to the Church) to separate church and state and secularfae all schools in the country. In contrast to the privileged position of the clergy in Hungary and its endangered future this was a threat to their very existence in the new republic of CzechoSlovakia. This reality was very much in evidence by the fact that the Slovak Peoples Party was predominantly represented by the clergy in Prague. Thus, while Hlinka basically maintained an uncompromising stand towards the Czechs, Tiso and the clerical wing pursued a policy of tactical maneuvering and realistic consideration. Attempts of the Catholic Church after the first World War to adapt itself to the new revolutionary conditions of the times by a dynamic program of Catholic Action found fertile soil for its ideals among the religious Slovak populace. This enabled both th e clergy and the Church in Slovakia to maintain dominant influence. Sivak, Minister of education in the Slovak Republic, was, and is an outspoken party affiliate of Tiso and strongly pro-clerical. Under him the schools we11e re-organized on the basis of the Catholic and Lutheran Evangelical faiths. The local committees for national education are chiefly headed by the pastors of the region. In the denominational schools the chairman of the school-board ex officio is the pastor, who is also ex officio a member of the non-denominational school-board in his district. According to a secret directive the clergy is obligated by all mram possible to secure and maintain control over social life, and wield its influence in all business enterprises, organizations, labor and industry . Even today the largest land-owners in the state are the clergy, and they lead a very feudal life in their episcopal sees and in country parishes. Moreover, many pastors are representatives in parliament and are on various committees. The influence of the Jesuits is obviously wide. It was apparent during Magyar rule and later when Ledochowski, the Jesuit General, offered aid to Hlinka and his party. As it flows from the very substance of the Jesuit style of work, only seldom is one able to detect any signs of their activity. They exert their influence primarily through the clergy. The Jesuits have the training of clerical candidates in their hand s. At �SLOVAKIA 11 monthly meetings of diocesan priests, the Jesuits conducted the conferences mostly by ser,mons. They are also in charge of spiritual exercises for rthe clergy. The restoration of the Jesuit monastery in Ruzomberok is a further sign of the intensification of Jesuit activity. The Jesuits have a direct influence on Slovak politics. For example, in 1941 they had a religious conference for Slovak political leaders in Ruzomberok under the supervision of Father Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. According to reports, some of those present were given quite a going-over, but since these exercises required silence this prevented any open discussions or a request for any questions to be answered publicly. Anyone who had a question or problem could discuss it only privately with a Jesuit priest assigned for individual consultation. Besides, other means for their influence are readily available. For instance, two sisters of Ledochowski, the Jesuit provincial, live in Bratislava. For a time after the dedaration of the independence of the Slovak Republic Tiso resided in a Jesuit monastery where Father Mikus, former Jesuit provincial, was one of his closest advisers. There are Slovak Jesuits in the Vatican, too. Among them there is Father Javorka, director of the Russicum College, and Dr. Kralicek, Hlinka's grand-nephew who is a librarian at the Vatican. Sidor himself revealed in a radio speech on December 16, 1942, that Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, is a frequent guest at the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican. It is entirely unnecessary to point out that the Jesuit position is absolutely anti-German. As ·a n example, we will cite the case of a pastor who was suspended for his national-socialistic writings. During his talk with Mikus (the Jesuit provincial, who visited him) he was admonished and asked not to do anything that would sever his relations with his bishop. Mikus added that the situation would undoubtedly change in a year ar two. To the query he intimated that Germany would not win the war Mikus replied he not only surmised it but he was wholly convinced of it, -and even said that there were many others of the same opinion, evidence that he was voicing an opinion held in high places. Although the youngest group of the Jesuits is not numerically large, there are many among them with a high I.Q. Catholic Action has as its primary role a lay apostolate designated to support the activity of the clergy. Its influence and importance have grown perceptibly in the past few years. Its branches are found everywhere. Dr. Buzalka, director of the seminary in Braitislava, is also the director of Catholic Action. His anti-German sentiments are public knowledge. The press of the Catholic Action movement has great opportunities and is definitely anti-German. In addition to its own internal information service, Catholic Action has its own Catholic Press Bureau whose releases are used by the Catholic periodicals and party publications. Svoradov, the Catholic student center at the Slovak University in Bratislava, is a bulwark of Catholic Action, clericalism and a hotbed of anti-German views. Its director is Dr. Filkorn, a good friend of Tiso. Dr. Kirschbaum, a close follower of Sidor, was active for a long time as a Pan Slav and �12 SLOVAKIA German foe. He was with Sidor in Rome for a long time but was recently transierred to the Slovak Embassy in Switzerland. In his report on Sidor, the informant in Bratislava observes that he and his friends in Slovakia resist German influence. "Their attitude is known and manifests itself at ~very opportunity," he writes. As evidence of this the informer observes: Thus, for example, Culen fails to say one word about German 3id given in the founding of the Slovak state in his introduction to an article in the pictorial book of the Slovak Peoples Party which was published on the second anniversary of Slovak Independence Day (March 14, 1941). Not only does he fail to mention German assistance but he repeatedly claims that the creation of the Slovak state was accomplished by the Slovak nation alone! Then, too, as another glaring example, Carnogursky does not refer to German-Slovak cooperation during his lectures to party members, and at the funeral of Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, he openly expressed hi s pro-Polish sympathies. Sidor in his post at the Slovak Embassy in th e Vatican had every opportunity to renew old acquaintances. Through enemy representatives at th e Vatican there were many such occasions. Although he faithfully reported that he received several letters from Benes, Minister Mach, for one, is firmly convinced that Sidor replied either in writing or through oth er channels on his own. When we take into consideration the increasingly strong desire of the Catholic Church to have the Pope play a role as mediator, and possibly, a decisive role in terminating the present world conflict, and since the Slovak Catholic press in Slovakia constantly emphasizes this point of view, then it is perhaps not a mistake to assume that Sidor seeks to direct Slovak internal politics into other channels through Catholic Action. The mission of Kirschbaum, a fanatical follower of Sidor who has been transferred to the Embassy in Switzerland, means the strengthening of Sidor's position in his foreign political policy outside Slovakia. "The Jews in Slovakia" (under that caption or heading the informer continues): The Jews, 20,000 of them, still occupy positions in government and in various administrative posts and supervising positions, apparently permanent assignments. Jews, whom the Guard seized when they were trying to escape from the country, and who were put into concentration camps, reappeared in their homes soon after being released. These were given the protection of a presidential immunity card as wards of the state. They are more or less impertinent, depending on fluctuating changes in the war. To supplement his report, the Nazi informant adds that culen, a member of the Slovak parliament and trusted �SLOVAKIA 13 friend of President Jozef Tiso, has a half-Jewish wife, that Minister i'.>urcansky intervened for 200 Jews who were released at his command from transport ready to leave the country, that the Mayor of Nitra was the godfather of many Jewish children, that when Minister Mach wanted to remove the above Mayor from office, President Tiso intervened in his behalf, that Msgr. Filkorn spoke openly in parliament in protest against the unchristian methods of disposing of Jewish properties, and finally, that Minister Polyak was a half-Jew. Such was the context of the information supplied his government in Berlin by a Nazi agent living in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Nazis did not think that the communists or the "Czechoslovaks" in Slovakia were their dangerous foes, but, strangely enough, the people who were loyal to President Tiso, followers of Sidor, the Catholic clergy, the Jesuits and the majority of the Slovak Peoples Party were feared. From the German viewpoint only Premier Dr. Tuka, Minister Alexander Mach and the Hlinka Guards were their only trusted allies in the Slovak Republic. To comprehend fully and judge conditions in Slovakia during war time it is necessary to study these official German documents. That is what Robert A. Graham, S. J . should have done but failed to do. Many German documents are now available as official records of what transpired from the German point of view. Their policy, their views, reactions and their analysis of President Tiso are all there for anyone who wants to know the truth. Unquestionably, they confirm the negative stand of President Tiso to German national socialism and an appraisal of his realistic approach to the Third Reich in the interest of his own Slovak nation. In conclusion we will cite a part of the official report of SS. Haupsturmftihrer Dr. H. Barsch, chief of the department of III B of the central division security in Vienna. His report of October, 1943, almost a year before the so-called 'Slovak Revolt' was sent to Dr. E . Kaltenbrunner, Nazi chief of security police and safety. (This report appeared in the publication Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, Nemci a Slovensko, 1944, Dokumenty, Nakladatel'stvo Epocha, Bra- �14 SLOVAKIA tislava, 1970. Zostavil Vilem Precan, pp. 40-43.) Aside from other comments this is what the report has to say about Dr. Jozef Tiso's stand towards the Third Reich: Although there do not as yet exist any direct proofs of Tiso's duplicity in his suspected role of double-dealing, nevertheless, his personal politics in recent years have resulted in strengthening forces that are least sympathetic to the Reich. Since he was aware of the political past of these elements, and hence could have easily foreseen their future activity and behaviour towards the Reich, it seems that already then he was thinking of an orientation away from the pro-German position. Besides this, as it happened frequently, whenever German requests were not fulfilled and when there were other deviations from the German line, he could always defend himself by claiming these groups were to blame and thus was able to allay suspicions of personal disloyalty to the German Reich. A further argument in a careful evaluation of Tiso's stand is his position as a priest. In spite of many instances of self-will, Tiso maintains close contacts with higher authorities in the Church. Moreover, his most intimate co-workers are clerics: Msgr. Filkorn, Pastor Izakovic and Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. From this friendship one can conclude more than an indecisive stand on the Jewish question. From the German standpoint this may well be the decisive point that can prove the President's loyalty or disloyalty, the touchstone of his fidelity. Finally, his official appearance, especially in recent times, has not added anything significantly to warrant our trust of Tiso on the German side. Whenever Tiso claims that his speeches (e.g. in Nitra) are addressed to various groups, perhaps one cannot argue against this, for his dialectic is truly excellent. But one cannot overlook the fact that the President knows full well the caliber of his people, and consequently he must be aware of the fact that all political double-talk, even if having reference to other states with an interest in Slovakia, is understood by the populace as being aimed at the Reich, and finally, a keen observer can grasp what is going on in the highest positions of the state and confirm what he has long suspected, and that is the consequence of influence from the enemy side. It is, generally speaking, problematical to depend upon Tiso entirely. Consideration of the party as a factor in the internal political security of the country is a mistaken notion. The leading positions in the party are held by persons with anti-German sentiments. If, for the sake of argument, one considers these people generally without power, and therefore harmless to our cause, it must be noted that then they are not capable of insuring the defense of an internal front to the degree and measure demanded for the interests of the Reich. And even �SLOVAKIA 15 if we assume indifference, the interests of the Reich are not assured since German direction and control are possible under present conditions only with great difficulty. The Nazis were also well informed about the political views of Tiso's political aides. For example, in a detailed and extensive report of November 28, 1944, from Bratislava, addressed to the main office of security in the Reich, III B and III C, which was delivered to both SS-Standardftihrer Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Spengler in Berlin, among other items, there is reference to the relationship of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Hlinka Guards. The German reporter writes that "the Hlinka Guard considers itself national socialist and absolutely pro-German while the party advocates a form of Christian nationalism as a Slovak ideology, and that it looks upon Slovak-German cooperation and friendship as a temporary and not a permanent association, and this opportunism ( certainly not based on a bond of affection) the party spokesmen spread through the Slovak press." After the uprising (the so-called Slovak revolt of August-October, 1944) the Nazi informer writes: "The Party ideologically prepared propaganda favoring a Christian social world view, and Opustil, the general secretary, adopted this as part of his program for immediate implementation. Dr. Jozef Pauco, chief editor of the Slovak daily addressed the members of the 'Domobrana' (National Defense) on the problems of Slovak spiritual orientation and simultaneously declared clearly that for the Slovaks only the Christian national point of view is acceptable. Even more clearly did the member of parliament Cavojsky state this in his radio broadcast of November 8, 1944. He said, to quote : 'As an independent and Christian nation we want to live in freedom in our own free land. A good and selfconscious Slovak never desired a change of masters, he wanted to be master of his own destiny in his own country. In the same way we do not want an exchange of foreign ideologies because these are not for our national interest. As Christians we want to establish our own social, economic and cultural life on the basis of a Christian world view.' Dr. Korper's address had a Sophist tone, the reporter notes, when he said: 'Our agreement with Germany was precious and fundamental because it guaranteed the strong- �16 SLOVAKIA est and freest right for national life which, up to 1939, no other power on earth was willing to recognize as our right to national existence. If there had been another possibility the Slovaks most probably would have chosen to act otherwise.' Dr. Ferdinand t:>urcansky, former foreign minister, spoke in the same vein when he declared: 'I am not a Bolshevik but it is possible I may become one if I can thereby be of service to my nation.' cavojsky, member of the Slovak parliament, in his above mentioned radio address said: 'A bit of egoism in the life of nations is not harmful; in these times we must not forget that alien interests are not always identical with our own national interests.' In other words, he wanted to tell the Slovak people not to subscribe to any wartime party but to work for themselves and to wait for the outcome of events in the future. For the time being the young opposition, encouraged by Opustil, that is, the Mikula-Polakovic wing, the Nazi official informer notes: "Party discipline was imposed upon Mikula for his activity. In the event of this opposition, however, there is no hope of friendly aid to the Germans, but only in the interests of the young Slovak chauvinists who stand uncompromisingly for Slovak independence, and therefore are opposed to any kind of German interference in Slovak internal affairs. This opposition party, first of all, has adherents among university students and may be considered the successor of the former adherents of Ndstup from which emerged activistic elements led by Dr. t:>urcansky, former minister of foreign affairs in the Slovak Republic. By his resolute stand and frequent addresses to the university students, and his association with this opposition movement, Dr. f>urcansky considers this to be a bridge to new political action." German Nazis saw Slovak politicians surrounding President Tiso at the end of November, 1944, in this light. ( See the above mentioned publication, pp. 435-446). These documents, and others in the same way, including the well known Documents on German Foreign Policy published by the British, French and American governments, uniformly place the ·political activity of Dr. Joseph Tiso �SLOVAKIA 17 and his associates during the second World War in an objective light. This means in a practical sense the political rehabilitation of Slovak political policy during this era on the basis of ideological principles. Dr. Tiso was of the opinion that in Slovakia the ideological defense against Nazism and Bolshevist Stalinism can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of a Christian world view derived mainly from Catholicism. All this can be disputed, but Tiso's good intentions cannot be denied. Fundamentally, there is no proof to the contrary. Dr. Joseph Tiso was an extraordinary person. During the second World War his political life was surrounded by obstacles, threats and dangers such as very few statesmen had to face in this epoch. The unique Slovak situation increased and complicated his public life. His tragic death as a punishment for the declaration and successful realization of the independence of the Slovak state, and also as revenge for his opposition to the bolshevik invasion and its subsequent criminal Stalinist establishment of the communist regime in his country, all this forces one to evaluate perhaps even his political mistakes obviously from many different angles. Nevertheless, his political career was subject to criticism during wartime as it is today, and it was not infrequently marked by bitter partisan politics, prejudice, injustice and merciless condemnation. He was subject to hateful attacks by the communists, angry criticism by the Nazis, hatred on the part of those in the service of Czech imperialism, as well as by unjust accusations by contemporary historians and in many details unjustly condemned by the uninformed or highly prejudiced historical writers and journalists of our time. And now the Vatican newspaper! In spite of all this the memory of Dr. Joseph Tiso remains revered by the great majority of Slovaks living in their homeland and throughout the world. Few Slovak political leaders, living or dead, enjoy his stature as a statesman, his popularity and enduring fame among his own people. Dr. Joseph Tiso was undoubtedly a foremost political leader on the entire European scene. Lightning strikes only the tallest trees! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1975, Vol. 25 Description An account of the resource Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SL OVAKIA 5 Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents By Dr. Arved Gr e b e rt Geneva, Switzerland L'Osservatore Romano, the Vatican daily, published (April 27, 1974) an article by Robert A. Graham, S. J., an American Jesuit, on the policy of the Holy See in regard to anti-Jewish legislation during the second World War in Hitler-dominated Europe. (La Santa Sede e le vittime della guerra.) The author based his conclusions exclusively on material in a volume of diplomatic doc~ments published by the Vatican: Actes et documents du Saint Siege relatifs a la seconde guerre mondiale. The aforementioned article touches upon the stand taken by the Slovak government in regulations concerning the Jews which were implemented without exception in all the states that were in the GermanItalian orbit. As a matter of record, neither in Italy, the centuries-old bastion of Catholicism, nor in France, which was headed by Marshal Philippe Petain, a practical Catholic, was the Holy See able to halt discrimination that was officially prescribed by law. The author of the review merely noted the facts relating to the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia without taking into account existing circumstances, very often completely unknown to foreign readers. These were influenced by the geopolitical situation of Slovakia caught in the German-Magyar vise or web. Moreover, Hungary enjoyed a privileged position. At this period of history its policy-makers knew how to take advantage of its political anti-semitic regulations under the domination of the Third Reich. One must take into consideration, too, the overwhelming power pressure imposed upon Slovakia by Germany. No less important in this delicate situation was the fact that Bratislava, the Slovak capital and seat of the government, was located on the very borders of Germany. This was 6 SLOVAKIA a precarious position that could have toppled the Slovak government from power at any moment by a military invasion. Without weighing all these basic realities one cannot begin to understand the policy of President Tiso and the Slovak government in this problem of seeking a solution for the Jewish question during the second World War in Slovakia. It is not our intention on this occasion to discuss the circumstances that brought on anti-Jewish regulations by the government in Slovakia at this particular time. An analysis of this phase of the Slovak past will be the role of a free Slovak historical study which will have free access to and complete use of all existing documents on the basis of a comparative study of all the contemporary events in Europe and local circumstances. Things looked entirely different in Bratislava and at the Vatican, for example. And, likewise, the problems of President Tiso were judged quite differently at the Vatican and German headquarters ( and by Nazi reporters) in Berlin or Bratislava. It will not be out of place, therefore, to illustrate our point of view on this historical problem by citing official statements of a Nazi report of February, 1943, in Bratislava itself. This report on the situation in Slovakia together with a proposal for the future destiny of the Slovak nation in the sphere of Nazi Germany after the expected victorious end of the war was presented to the chief of the SS. bureau. It was top secret, dated February 16, 1943, and sent to the SS. Hauptamt headquarters, whose chief was G. Berger. The latter, in a letter to Heinrich Himler (February 19, 1943 ), the chief of SS. and the police in the Third Reich, informed him of the situation in Slovakia with a supplementary note that a detailed report was being sent to the third department of the main office of national security . The text of this communique appeared in a Slovak translation of the documents which Vilem Precan edited in Bratislava in 1965. (Slovenske ndrodne povstanie. Dokumenty. Vydavatel'stvo politickej literatury, pp . 45-54 ). We will quote only those paragraphs that refer to Dr. Jozef Tiso and his closest political associates . They quite clearly reflect the attitude of the German Nazis toward the Slovak Republic. In the introduction we read: President Dr. Tiso has ranged wid ely in his politics. According to SLOVAKIA 7 law he is the leader of the nation and the party, and is the top man in the state. This powerful position was secured with the coop eTation of old associates, the strong support of the clergy and leaders of Catholic Action, and also with the aid of Sidor's followers, and apparently, too, by the backing of recruits from neutral or indifferent sources, such as those of Dr. Karvas. Tiso, a realist, declared himself in favor of the Reich. But internally he leans on elements that are fundamentally hosti1e to Germany and opposed to the ideas of the Third Reich. He is endeavoring to build up Slovakia on the principles of the Catholic Action group, and hence his ultimate objective is a Catholic state. In the beginning his intentions were hidden by a mask. Opportunistic references to national socialism seemed that he was favorably disposed to it, but lately he has thrown off the mask and a frontal attack on national socialism is underway. And a Nazi informer writes further: After Sidor's resignation Tiso and his associates have a free hand. Catholic Action and the clergy are in confrontation with the national guard (Hlinka Guards). Their allies are those who felt they had suffered losses as the result of the establishment of the Slovak state those who had lost rights or privileges, those who had always cooperated with the Jews and were dependent on them, and finally by all the Jews who remained in the country. The national guard obviously could not offer sufficient resistance to this •a lignment without outside help. The result was Salzburg, an agreement that Tiso regarded as foroed upon him and which he never respected. Attached to this offjcial report were addenda in the form of written observations about individual aspects of the Slovak problem in 1943. Supplement 6 was labeled: "State President Dr. Jozef Tiso, Bratislava, February 11, 1943." President Tiso's political profile is drawn and the views of his associates recorded. For example, Ravasz and Dr. Polyak ("another cleric-oriented ally of Dr. Tiso, a full fledged minister."). According to Semi-Goth, Polyak was a Jew and a friend of the Jews. cavojsky, Suroviak and Drobny are listed as Tiso's allies. Liberals Stano, Sokol and Sivak are in Tiso's camp as are Stefan Danihel and Dr. Turcek, industrialists, the report sp,id. "All these," the report continued, "on the basis of their life style and urban environment are opposed to the Reich. It is apparent that the clergy and all the forces of Catholic Action are behind Tiso. From 1941 Tiso won over the party affiliation of the erstwhile followers of Sidor." The Nazi informer continues: Three years ago in response to a radio talk by a Catholic priest, 8 SLOVAKIA R , who advocated social security, Tiso told bim that he was thinking of following the example of Salazar of Portugal in Slovakia. (Salazar was looked upon as a civilian Jesuit who leaned towards the idea of a Catholic state.) The book of a theologian (Dr. Polakovic), Tisov a ruiuka, reflects the views and plans of Tiso in bold outlines. They follow the Catholic idea of a state quite clearly as an objective of Catholic Action. The author upholds the absolute primacy of the Church over the state. Proof of Tiso's state-political views are clearly evidenced by hi.s philosophy of education, the establishment of organizations in support of Catholic Action, etc. A former Jesuit, Misik, is his close advisor. Tiso also actively supported the organization of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and the initiator was Dr. Novak, a university professor and well known Pan Slav. Tiso's reaction to the Salzburg Agreement is manifested in his statement that he accepted it "with clenched teeth" because it was forced upon him. He said to Mach who handed in his resignation in December, 1942: "You know where I stand. They forced you upon me. Therefore, it will be better if you present your resignation where you received your appointment." This attitude towards the Salzburg Agreement is the inevitable result of Tiso's rejection of national socialism and German influence in general. There are many proofs of this. For example, in the fall of 1942 Tiso told Commander Kubicek of the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen du ring his visit at the president's residence (palace): "We do not need any form of national socialism. We have our own views." In May, 1942, the president received Dr. Elemer Fink from Zvolen, together with Dr. Kovac, Mayor of Bratislava, at which meeting Dr. E. Fink presented a petition in behalf of his brother, Dr. Zoltan Fink. Tiso promised him a position and economic privileges on condition that the Hlinka Guard in Zvolen ceases to demand the implementation of a program of national socialism. And Tiso stated that neither the Church nor the state would tolerate any form of national socialism, and added emphatically that it was in his power to prevent its establishment. At a party conference in the Pohronie region in December, 1942, Tiso declared: "We must strive by our work to achieve what we want. Our nation must manifest its maturity in every phase of life in order to prove that it is capable of self-government. In the future we will not need supervision (this he emphasized) . We must prove to the whole world we do not need enyone to subsidize us." Towards national socialism Tiso expressed his views. openly at a conference of leaders of the Hlinka Guard in Bojnice (July 1-31, 1942). Despite the fact that he was speaking to a number of avowed Slovak national socialists Tiso did not use the term, "national socialism," at all. As a matter of fact, he declared that the Hlinka Guard must not become involved in an ideological struggle. Reaction to his address in which he stated that the Slovaks were not working in the interests of the Germans or any alien nation but only in the interest of the SLOVAKIA 9 Slovak nation was very much in evidence among the assembly of the Hlinka Guard. For the president, next to his alliance with the clergy, his strength lies in the solid support of the Academic youth (college and university students). On June 2, 1942, Tiso received a tremendous ovation for his speech in the university amphitheatre in Bratislava. The residents of the Lafranconi and Svoradov fraternity houses gave a public demonstration in which they voiced their anti-German but pro Pan Slav and Roman Catholic sympathy during the course of President Tiso's address. This compromised Tiso's policy and was a direct answer to Ambassador Ludin's earlier speech in Kezmarok. In this respect it is necessary to quote from Tiso's speech: "We have our own policies in regard to foreign states, particularly towards the great German Reich with which we are allied by a special agreement. But who could imagine that Germany should wish to direct Slovak politics? We have to direct our own political life under this agi,eement. No thinking German would expect a Slovak to conduct German politics in Slovakia. Frankly, every reasoning German would resent such an attitude. Let us, therefore, conduct our own politics in Slovakia." Furthe.r proof that Tiso does not absolutely follow the pro-German political line we deduce from the words of one of his loyal followers, namely, Father Izakovic. The latter in his speech in August, 1942, in Trnava to some 300 officers, said that it is imperative to adjust to the circumstances of the times, and that if a certain policy is being followed today is does not necessarily mean that it cannot be changed by new circumstances tomorrow. The speaker insisted he was repeating the views of Tiso with whom he had just had an interview. This, then, is the political profile of President Tiso as drawn by a German Nazi informer in his February 11, 1943, report from Bratislava. In reply to Father Graham, the American Jesuit, whose article appeared in the Osservatore Romano, it is enlightening to quote again from the official statement (Par. 7) under the title, "Influence of the Clergy, particularly the Jesuits and Catholic Action in Slovakia." It is dated February 11, 1943. We quote: The privileged position of the clergy in the Slovak nation may be explained on the basis of historical development. While the Slovaks were incorporated in Hungary they did not belong to the upper class. Magyarization was allied with the social oppression of the Slovak nation. Proof of this is in the large number of Magyar clergy and secular leaders of Slovak origin. The lower clergy remained united with the Slovak people. Thus, since the clergy in general was held in high esteem in the kingdom of Hungary and because there was no upper class in Slovakia, the Slovak clergy assumed the role of leadership in their own country rather automatically. Even the establishment of the Slovak Peoples Party at the beginning 10 SLOVAKIA of the 20th century was inspired and greatly influenced by the clergy. Prominent Slovak clergymen like Hlinka became involved with ecclesiastical authorities in a controversy on national issues. During the existence of the first Czecho-Slovak Republic after World War I the Slovak Peoples Party was in constant conflict with the centralistic regime ruling Slovakia from Prague. For Hlinka and Sidor and their adherents the Slovak nation's interests were dominant factors in their political program, the chief objective of which was the fulfillment of the promise of autonomy or self-government for the Slovaks in their own native land. One other vital factor in the relations of the Slovak Peoples Party and the central government of Masaryk and Benes in Prague was the attempt of the politicians in the Czech capital of Prague (most of whom were free-thinkers and opposed to the Church) to separate church and state and secularfae all schools in the country. In contrast to the privileged position of the clergy in Hungary and its endangered future this was a threat to their very existence in the new republic of CzechoSlovakia. This reality was very much in evidence by the fact that the Slovak Peoples Party was predominantly represented by the clergy in Prague. Thus, while Hlinka basically maintained an uncompromising stand towards the Czechs, Tiso and the clerical wing pursued a policy of tactical maneuvering and realistic consideration. Attempts of the Catholic Church after the first World War to adapt itself to the new revolutionary conditions of the times by a dynamic program of Catholic Action found fertile soil for its ideals among the religious Slovak populace. This enabled both th e clergy and the Church in Slovakia to maintain dominant influence. Sivak, Minister of education in the Slovak Republic, was, and is an outspoken party affiliate of Tiso and strongly pro-clerical. Under him the schools we11e re-organized on the basis of the Catholic and Lutheran Evangelical faiths. The local committees for national education are chiefly headed by the pastors of the region. In the denominational schools the chairman of the school-board ex officio is the pastor, who is also ex officio a member of the non-denominational school-board in his district. According to a secret directive the clergy is obligated by all mram possible to secure and maintain control over social life, and wield its influence in all business enterprises, organizations, labor and industry . Even today the largest land-owners in the state are the clergy, and they lead a very feudal life in their episcopal sees and in country parishes. Moreover, many pastors are representatives in parliament and are on various committees. The influence of the Jesuits is obviously wide. It was apparent during Magyar rule and later when Ledochowski, the Jesuit General, offered aid to Hlinka and his party. As it flows from the very substance of the Jesuit style of work, only seldom is one able to detect any signs of their activity. They exert their influence primarily through the clergy. The Jesuits have the training of clerical candidates in their hand s. At SLOVAKIA 11 monthly meetings of diocesan priests, the Jesuits conducted the conferences mostly by ser,mons. They are also in charge of spiritual exercises for rthe clergy. The restoration of the Jesuit monastery in Ruzomberok is a further sign of the intensification of Jesuit activity. The Jesuits have a direct influence on Slovak politics. For example, in 1941 they had a religious conference for Slovak political leaders in Ruzomberok under the supervision of Father Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. According to reports, some of those present were given quite a going-over, but since these exercises required silence this prevented any open discussions or a request for any questions to be answered publicly. Anyone who had a question or problem could discuss it only privately with a Jesuit priest assigned for individual consultation. Besides, other means for their influence are readily available. For instance, two sisters of Ledochowski, the Jesuit provincial, live in Bratislava. For a time after the dedaration of the independence of the Slovak Republic Tiso resided in a Jesuit monastery where Father Mikus, former Jesuit provincial, was one of his closest advisers. There are Slovak Jesuits in the Vatican, too. Among them there is Father Javorka, director of the Russicum College, and Dr. Kralicek, Hlinka's grand-nephew who is a librarian at the Vatican. Sidor himself revealed in a radio speech on December 16, 1942, that Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, is a frequent guest at the Slovak Embassy at the Vatican. It is entirely unnecessary to point out that the Jesuit position is absolutely anti-German. As ·a n example, we will cite the case of a pastor who was suspended for his national-socialistic writings. During his talk with Mikus (the Jesuit provincial, who visited him) he was admonished and asked not to do anything that would sever his relations with his bishop. Mikus added that the situation would undoubtedly change in a year ar two. To the query he intimated that Germany would not win the war Mikus replied he not only surmised it but he was wholly convinced of it, -and even said that there were many others of the same opinion, evidence that he was voicing an opinion held in high places. Although the youngest group of the Jesuits is not numerically large, there are many among them with a high I.Q. Catholic Action has as its primary role a lay apostolate designated to support the activity of the clergy. Its influence and importance have grown perceptibly in the past few years. Its branches are found everywhere. Dr. Buzalka, director of the seminary in Braitislava, is also the director of Catholic Action. His anti-German sentiments are public knowledge. The press of the Catholic Action movement has great opportunities and is definitely anti-German. In addition to its own internal information service, Catholic Action has its own Catholic Press Bureau whose releases are used by the Catholic periodicals and party publications. Svoradov, the Catholic student center at the Slovak University in Bratislava, is a bulwark of Catholic Action, clericalism and a hotbed of anti-German views. Its director is Dr. Filkorn, a good friend of Tiso. Dr. Kirschbaum, a close follower of Sidor, was active for a long time as a Pan Slav and 12 SLOVAKIA German foe. He was with Sidor in Rome for a long time but was recently transierred to the Slovak Embassy in Switzerland. In his report on Sidor, the informant in Bratislava observes that he and his friends in Slovakia resist German influence. "Their attitude is known and manifests itself at ~very opportunity," he writes. As evidence of this the informer observes: Thus, for example, Culen fails to say one word about German 3id given in the founding of the Slovak state in his introduction to an article in the pictorial book of the Slovak Peoples Party which was published on the second anniversary of Slovak Independence Day (March 14, 1941). Not only does he fail to mention German assistance but he repeatedly claims that the creation of the Slovak state was accomplished by the Slovak nation alone! Then, too, as another glaring example, Carnogursky does not refer to German-Slovak cooperation during his lectures to party members, and at the funeral of Ledochowski, the Jesuit general, he openly expressed hi s pro-Polish sympathies. Sidor in his post at the Slovak Embassy in th e Vatican had every opportunity to renew old acquaintances. Through enemy representatives at th e Vatican there were many such occasions. Although he faithfully reported that he received several letters from Benes, Minister Mach, for one, is firmly convinced that Sidor replied either in writing or through oth er channels on his own. When we take into consideration the increasingly strong desire of the Catholic Church to have the Pope play a role as mediator, and possibly, a decisive role in terminating the present world conflict, and since the Slovak Catholic press in Slovakia constantly emphasizes this point of view, then it is perhaps not a mistake to assume that Sidor seeks to direct Slovak internal politics into other channels through Catholic Action. The mission of Kirschbaum, a fanatical follower of Sidor who has been transferred to the Embassy in Switzerland, means the strengthening of Sidor's position in his foreign political policy outside Slovakia. "The Jews in Slovakia" (under that caption or heading the informer continues): The Jews, 20,000 of them, still occupy positions in government and in various administrative posts and supervising positions, apparently permanent assignments. Jews, whom the Guard seized when they were trying to escape from the country, and who were put into concentration camps, reappeared in their homes soon after being released. These were given the protection of a presidential immunity card as wards of the state. They are more or less impertinent, depending on fluctuating changes in the war. To supplement his report, the Nazi informant adds that culen, a member of the Slovak parliament and trusted SLOVAKIA 13 friend of President Jozef Tiso, has a half-Jewish wife, that Minister i'.>urcansky intervened for 200 Jews who were released at his command from transport ready to leave the country, that the Mayor of Nitra was the godfather of many Jewish children, that when Minister Mach wanted to remove the above Mayor from office, President Tiso intervened in his behalf, that Msgr. Filkorn spoke openly in parliament in protest against the unchristian methods of disposing of Jewish properties, and finally, that Minister Polyak was a half-Jew. Such was the context of the information supplied his government in Berlin by a Nazi agent living in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. It is, therefore, quite clear that the Nazis did not think that the communists or the "Czechoslovaks" in Slovakia were their dangerous foes, but, strangely enough, the people who were loyal to President Tiso, followers of Sidor, the Catholic clergy, the Jesuits and the majority of the Slovak Peoples Party were feared. From the German viewpoint only Premier Dr. Tuka, Minister Alexander Mach and the Hlinka Guards were their only trusted allies in the Slovak Republic. To comprehend fully and judge conditions in Slovakia during war time it is necessary to study these official German documents. That is what Robert A. Graham, S. J . should have done but failed to do. Many German documents are now available as official records of what transpired from the German point of view. Their policy, their views, reactions and their analysis of President Tiso are all there for anyone who wants to know the truth. Unquestionably, they confirm the negative stand of President Tiso to German national socialism and an appraisal of his realistic approach to the Third Reich in the interest of his own Slovak nation. In conclusion we will cite a part of the official report of SS. Haupsturmftihrer Dr. H. Barsch, chief of the department of III B of the central division security in Vienna. His report of October, 1943, almost a year before the so-called 'Slovak Revolt' was sent to Dr. E . Kaltenbrunner, Nazi chief of security police and safety. (This report appeared in the publication Slovenske ndrodne povstanie, Nemci a Slovensko, 1944, Dokumenty, Nakladatel'stvo Epocha, Bra- 14 SLOVAKIA tislava, 1970. Zostavil Vilem Precan, pp. 40-43.) Aside from other comments this is what the report has to say about Dr. Jozef Tiso's stand towards the Third Reich: Although there do not as yet exist any direct proofs of Tiso's duplicity in his suspected role of double-dealing, nevertheless, his personal politics in recent years have resulted in strengthening forces that are least sympathetic to the Reich. Since he was aware of the political past of these elements, and hence could have easily foreseen their future activity and behaviour towards the Reich, it seems that already then he was thinking of an orientation away from the pro-German position. Besides this, as it happened frequently, whenever German requests were not fulfilled and when there were other deviations from the German line, he could always defend himself by claiming these groups were to blame and thus was able to allay suspicions of personal disloyalty to the German Reich. A further argument in a careful evaluation of Tiso's stand is his position as a priest. In spite of many instances of self-will, Tiso maintains close contacts with higher authorities in the Church. Moreover, his most intimate co-workers are clerics: Msgr. Filkorn, Pastor Izakovic and Mikus, the Jesuit provincial. From this friendship one can conclude more than an indecisive stand on the Jewish question. From the German standpoint this may well be the decisive point that can prove the President's loyalty or disloyalty, the touchstone of his fidelity. Finally, his official appearance, especially in recent times, has not added anything significantly to warrant our trust of Tiso on the German side. Whenever Tiso claims that his speeches (e.g. in Nitra) are addressed to various groups, perhaps one cannot argue against this, for his dialectic is truly excellent. But one cannot overlook the fact that the President knows full well the caliber of his people, and consequently he must be aware of the fact that all political double-talk, even if having reference to other states with an interest in Slovakia, is understood by the populace as being aimed at the Reich, and finally, a keen observer can grasp what is going on in the highest positions of the state and confirm what he has long suspected, and that is the consequence of influence from the enemy side. It is, generally speaking, problematical to depend upon Tiso entirely. Consideration of the party as a factor in the internal political security of the country is a mistaken notion. The leading positions in the party are held by persons with anti-German sentiments. If, for the sake of argument, one considers these people generally without power, and therefore harmless to our cause, it must be noted that then they are not capable of insuring the defense of an internal front to the degree and measure demanded for the interests of the Reich. And even SLOVAKIA 15 if we assume indifference, the interests of the Reich are not assured since German direction and control are possible under present conditions only with great difficulty. The Nazis were also well informed about the political views of Tiso's political aides. For example, in a detailed and extensive report of November 28, 1944, from Bratislava, addressed to the main office of security in the Reich, III B and III C, which was delivered to both SS-Standardftihrer Dr. Ehrlich and Dr. Spengler in Berlin, among other items, there is reference to the relationship of Hlinka's Slovak Peoples Party and the Hlinka Guards. The German reporter writes that "the Hlinka Guard considers itself national socialist and absolutely pro-German while the party advocates a form of Christian nationalism as a Slovak ideology, and that it looks upon Slovak-German cooperation and friendship as a temporary and not a permanent association, and this opportunism ( certainly not based on a bond of affection) the party spokesmen spread through the Slovak press." After the uprising (the so-called Slovak revolt of August-October, 1944) the Nazi informer writes: "The Party ideologically prepared propaganda favoring a Christian social world view, and Opustil, the general secretary, adopted this as part of his program for immediate implementation. Dr. Jozef Pauco, chief editor of the Slovak daily addressed the members of the 'Domobrana' (National Defense) on the problems of Slovak spiritual orientation and simultaneously declared clearly that for the Slovaks only the Christian national point of view is acceptable. Even more clearly did the member of parliament Cavojsky state this in his radio broadcast of November 8, 1944. He said, to quote : 'As an independent and Christian nation we want to live in freedom in our own free land. A good and selfconscious Slovak never desired a change of masters, he wanted to be master of his own destiny in his own country. In the same way we do not want an exchange of foreign ideologies because these are not for our national interest. As Christians we want to establish our own social, economic and cultural life on the basis of a Christian world view.' Dr. Korper's address had a Sophist tone, the reporter notes, when he said: 'Our agreement with Germany was precious and fundamental because it guaranteed the strong- 16 SLOVAKIA est and freest right for national life which, up to 1939, no other power on earth was willing to recognize as our right to national existence. If there had been another possibility the Slovaks most probably would have chosen to act otherwise.' Dr. Ferdinand t:>urcansky, former foreign minister, spoke in the same vein when he declared: 'I am not a Bolshevik but it is possible I may become one if I can thereby be of service to my nation.' cavojsky, member of the Slovak parliament, in his above mentioned radio address said: 'A bit of egoism in the life of nations is not harmful; in these times we must not forget that alien interests are not always identical with our own national interests.' In other words, he wanted to tell the Slovak people not to subscribe to any wartime party but to work for themselves and to wait for the outcome of events in the future. For the time being the young opposition, encouraged by Opustil, that is, the Mikula-Polakovic wing, the Nazi official informer notes: "Party discipline was imposed upon Mikula for his activity. In the event of this opposition, however, there is no hope of friendly aid to the Germans, but only in the interests of the young Slovak chauvinists who stand uncompromisingly for Slovak independence, and therefore are opposed to any kind of German interference in Slovak internal affairs. This opposition party, first of all, has adherents among university students and may be considered the successor of the former adherents of Ndstup from which emerged activistic elements led by Dr. t:>urcansky, former minister of foreign affairs in the Slovak Republic. By his resolute stand and frequent addresses to the university students, and his association with this opposition movement, Dr. f>urcansky considers this to be a bridge to new political action." German Nazis saw Slovak politicians surrounding President Tiso at the end of November, 1944, in this light. ( See the above mentioned publication, pp. 435-446). These documents, and others in the same way, including the well known Documents on German Foreign Policy published by the British, French and American governments, uniformly place the ·political activity of Dr. Joseph Tiso SLOVAKIA 17 and his associates during the second World War in an objective light. This means in a practical sense the political rehabilitation of Slovak political policy during this era on the basis of ideological principles. Dr. Tiso was of the opinion that in Slovakia the ideological defense against Nazism and Bolshevist Stalinism can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of a Christian world view derived mainly from Catholicism. All this can be disputed, but Tiso's good intentions cannot be denied. Fundamentally, there is no proof to the contrary. Dr. Joseph Tiso was an extraordinary person. During the second World War his political life was surrounded by obstacles, threats and dangers such as very few statesmen had to face in this epoch. The unique Slovak situation increased and complicated his public life. His tragic death as a punishment for the declaration and successful realization of the independence of the Slovak state, and also as revenge for his opposition to the bolshevik invasion and its subsequent criminal Stalinist establishment of the communist regime in his country, all this forces one to evaluate perhaps even his political mistakes obviously from many different angles. Nevertheless, his political career was subject to criticism during wartime as it is today, and it was not infrequently marked by bitter partisan politics, prejudice, injustice and merciless condemnation. He was subject to hateful attacks by the communists, angry criticism by the Nazis, hatred on the part of those in the service of Czech imperialism, as well as by unjust accusations by contemporary historians and in many details unjustly condemned by the uninformed or highly prejudiced historical writers and journalists of our time. And now the Vatican newspaper! In spite of all this the memory of Dr. Joseph Tiso remains revered by the great majority of Slovaks living in their homeland and throughout the world. Few Slovak political leaders, living or dead, enjoy his stature as a statesman, his popularity and enduring fame among his own people. Dr. Joseph Tiso was undoubtedly a foremost political leader on the entire European scene. Lightning strikes only the tallest trees!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso in the Light of Nazi Documents Description An account of the resource Dr. Arvéd Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 25 (No. 48), 1975 pp. 5-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1975 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/029b05234f5a25049959a9fda8fc9c6b.pdf 230cc702cf86b348ecf193f160110b9a PDF Text Text 80 SLOVAKIA "SONS OF HUNKIES: MEN WITH A PAST?" A few years ago a book entitled The American Style appeared which attempted to analyze and define the cunent American temper. It was subtitled Essays in Value and Performance. Widely known scholars from a variety of fields, particularly history and anthropology, offered their impressions, or better, diagnoses of this nation's problems. While remedies varied, they all agreed that a general sickness had afflicted the American people. A feeling of uncertainty, loss of direction, and lack of purpose had controlled the behavior of the population for about the past decade. Agreeing in part with sociologist David Riesman, one of the participants, these students noted that the campaigns of old, the Armageddons of another day, the taming of the pioneer west, making the world safe for democracy in 1917, and the "Crusade in Europe", as General Eisenhower put it, had been won. In place of these challenges no new frontiers had appeared. America was trying to adjust to a new anxious era where old values were disappearing. Now the state was guaranteeing minimum security and abroad we were enduring a continual stalemate and compromise with our enemies. The exhilaration of clear victory was unattainable because there was no "solution" to our problems. Instead, as the discussants pointed to Korea and could well have done so later with Vietnam, our policy was not to vanquish our foes as before but merely contain them. The realization of this indecisive situation led to the present mood of confusion, frustration, and "drift." Even a commission begun to formulate and enunciate national goals under the Eisenhower administration was not able to dispell the agonizing transition; in fact, its ,e stablishment was evidence of it. Such a loss of commitment to ideals seems to apply particularly to descendants of this country's minority groups. Ethnic historians and sociologists can discern that same search for principles among our newer nationalities. As this writer sees it, present generation Slovak, Jewish, Italian and non-white Americans labor heavily not only under the general psychological malady but an additional, even more upsetting disability, an embarrassment over their past. Theirs is a history they are usually trying to dismiss, forget, and ignore. The few who do actively cultivate ethnic history really know �SLOVAKIA 81 only a small part, in any case a distorted and even fanciful version. The effect on the younger generation is unfortunate. Maturing East European Americans particularly are, as individuals, desperately striving to assimilate their way of life to the Anglo-American middle class stereotype. Such an overpowering acculturative urge is forcing far too rapid psychological changes for a well-balanced adjustment and instead has created a pervasive discomfort in the form of a massive inferiority. The feeling is entirely unwarranted as this paper will show. It is to this disturbed neurosis that trained nationality historians can supply a remedy-the needed measure of selfconfidence. While this therapeutic function of ethnic scholars will be stressed here, one should understand that the major task of historians of immigration and race is not sociological. They are not social workers. Immigration historians are generally concerned with analyzing American culture through its ,effects on its subgroups. Nevertheless, at the very same time that nationality group scholars are investigating our society, they will also assist in lifting the mental cross that minorities bear. By suggesting a sophisticated picture of subgroups' past, trained ethnic historians will offer a mo!'e comfortable position from which these people can base present life on past experience. Nevertheless, as of quite recently if history does not provide any foundation at all for what is, or supplies that very necessary continuity with the present, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, and especially Slovaks have not yet found it. Of course everyone of us has some idea of what has been as defective as our picture may be. No matter how much men try to forget yesterday, only the few amnesiacs can do it successfully and they, too, suffer psychologically. For the non-Anglo-American particularly the question of the past haunts his every activity. His recollections of foregoing generations are painful. To the modern descendant the status of the father or grandfather seems hardly one to ennoble progeny: the unskilled Slovak brutalized in the steel mill, coal mine, or slaughterhouse; the Italian ragpicker earning his bread by combing garbage dumps of our larger cities; the Jewish sweatshop worker slaving in an overcrowded, �82 SLOVAKIA filthy New York tenement fifteen hours a day; or the illiterate Negro sharecropper suffering from centuries of pellagra and persecution. Even if the present minority member has no first-hand contact with such figures, one can be sure that he knows them through images. Most Slovak Americans still live in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Gary, Chicago, Youngstown, Bridgeport, and Detroit where they can see the smokestack that ordered their for,ebears to their job. If by chance personal recollection does not create a sense of inadequacy, the little historical work that has been done on these groups will. Such written profiles for the most part make descendants extremely self-conscious of their heritage. The published studies are products either of well-meaning advocat,es who want to list the group's achievements in terms of "contributions" or of ingroup writers who concentrate their attention on pre-1800 American origins or the cultural connection with medieval Europe. In either case the result has been to intensify the inferiority. What does it mean to a grandson trying hard to obtain an education that his heritage stems from the grandeur of Rome or that he and Toscannini have something in common; or to a descendant of a Polish peasant that his countryman Kosciuszko helped Washington win the American Revolution; or to today's Negro that Phillis Wheatley was writing good poetry in 1760? Such "history" only reminds readers of the extraordinary distance which they have to travel to be accepted as just another American. In essence such nationality "personalities" have little real connection with or relevance to their own circumstance. In fact, many celebrities have not associated with their group at all although some have. Of all this country's minorities it is likely that the Slovak Americans have the greatest difficulty in orientation. For what is there available to dispel their ignorance and describe the aotivity of their father and grandfather when they left Spis to come to Pittsburgh? Unfortunately not a great deal of literature. Certainly with almost a million inhabitants tracing their heritage back to the foothills of the Carpathians, it is tragic that there is not one complete history of what the emigrants did which their descendants can read. Of course, there are publications on Slovaks in the United States but these ar,e usually inaccessible to the young as well as non- �SLOVAKIA 83 Slavs. The many parish histories give a part of the tale and most of the other works are either hidden away as university theses, like Rev. Zatlm's "Social History of the Slovaks in America" or Rev. Buc's "Slovak Nationalism" or they are in Slovak, as Rovnianek's autobiography, Dr. Hrusovsky's history of the Slovak religious orders, Culen's history of American Slovaks, Hrobak's edited notes of Furdek, or the most complete study of all, Dr. Pauco's jubilee history of Jednota. Thus the dilemma in having to live in two worlds remains. Minorities members are the "marginal men, " as E. V. Stonequist described them, attempting to adjust to a majority culture yet never able to divest themselves of what they believe a foreign, un-American family life. It is my point that such a transition need not be uncomfortable and irritating and in fact American historians are just now providing a solvent. Very recently scholarly interest in our sub-cultures has heightened. Starting in the 1920's among social workers and a rare professional historian and quickened by the recent pressure of non-whites for equality, investigators of our society have begun to recognize the necessity of including Catholics, Jews, and non-whites in any generalization about our past. Late publications on the Negroes, Greeks, and Jews; the formation of an Immigration History Group; and the success of an immigrant archival collection at the University of Minnesota are tangible manifestations of the growing recognition of the subject. If the trend continues, Americans of minority descent will be major beneficiaries. The tale of their own forebears, not Benovsky, Bernolak, or Stur as great as these men were, will take a place along side that of Anglo-American life as a fit subject for scholarship. The as yet literally unknown period of the recent, mass immigration after 1870 will be illuminated. And when it is, the insecurity of the minority member over his heritage will disappear. He need not cower at the imagined tale of the slum, poverty, ignorance, and demoralization. Such a tradition was his background but only a part of it. From preliminary research this writer has done on all Slavic Americans, he would emphasize rather the surprising viability and substance of their immigrant �84 SLOVAKIA community. These newcomers, so-called greenhorns, culturally deprived, largely unlettered masses traveled thousands of miles to a vastly different environment and fashioned a complete social life, including parishes, social centers, fraternals, newspapers, even dramatic and musical societies. Such institutions may not have equalled their American counterpart in support or quality but these associations certainly represented a significant economic and cultural advance from what they had in the Old Country. To help ease the lot of maturing Slovak Americans and assist students of American culture some steps have already been taken, as Jednota's scholarship awards and the agreements made with the University of Minnesota. This writer would like to make an additional proposal. Actually this suggestion is a renewal of an appeal made by Rev. Mlynarovic several decades ago, the formation of a Slovak American Historical Association. Such a cultural society would offer permanent encouragement to those interested in the history of Slovaks in America. At the start it could interest and assist students to gather, organize and publish materials on the nationality. Anyone who has visited the Institute, Middletown, Pittsburgh, and Chicago realizes the necessity of ordering and preserving annuals, newspapers and manuscript collections. The Association would also communicate with other nationality historical societies which have proven their own value and keep in contact with immigrant historians in general. The major drawback to such an organization is the same that has plagued Slovak Americans as a whole-factionalism. Slovaks are of many persuasions, from Protestants to Orthodox, and these subdivisions have confounded and retarded any all-inclusive body. But such an obstacle may well be overcome by including all Slovak groups in its formation and as a r,esult of the urgency of the situation. This writer would like to initiate action by suggesting a Slovak American Newsletter and he solicits advice from readers. This paper, has been both an analysis of the problem and a suggestion for solution. It sees a process whereby other minorities will grow in self-confidence but fears that Slovak Americans may not have a recognizable past for some time to come unless action is taken soon. The call, however, �SLOVAKIA 85 does not seek to instill ethnic pride in the hearts and minds of disillusioned descendants. This identity-attachment will result and expand when more of the entire past is exposed. Any research subject, whether sensitive or not, should be encouraged to help explain the reality of a group's adjustment. Certainly out of this academic pursuit, sons will sense a more substantial basis for knowing themselves. One need not guess at the profound satisfaction that all minorities will experience when they form societies that deal with academicians. The recognition of scholarship can do much to ease an inferiority. With such a relationship ethnic leaders must be cautioned that encouraging historical scholarship will not pr,e vent assimilation, "drowning in an Anglo-American sea," as some have termed it. Most sociologists agree that homogenization is inevitable and amalgamation appears as an American trend. But this process of change will be less demoralizing for group members who really are interested in honoring their past. Maria Mrazik will change her name to Mary More and even marry a Robert Smith but the transition will not necessarily indicate a rejection of her Slovak heritage. She still will likely support the examination of the internal and external problems which her forebears encountered in building their institutions. Nevertheless the minority member's trauma is still the order of the day. The pervasive and depressing syndrome can be observed most closely by first-hand testimony, the lament of a young Halian boy, named John Fante, who sought to erase his heritage. The nationality here is really irrelevant; he could just as well have been a Slovak or of any other minority. As he says, he takes solace in his name as he could be mistaken for a more American nationality. Yet he could not escape his family where conflict was constant and tragic. His confession appeared several decades ago in a 1933 article entitled, "The Odyssey of a Wop," but his discomfort typifies that of a Hunlde's son as well: I enter the . .. school with an awful fear that I a Wop. As soon as I find out why people have such names, I match my own against such typically ltalian Bianci, Borello, Pacelli-the names of other students. I relieved by the comparison. After all, I think, people French. will be called things as surcognomens as am pleasantly will say I am �86 SLOVAKIA Doesn't my name sound French? Sure! So thereafter, when people ask me my nationality, I tell them I am French. A few boys begin calling me Frenchy. I like that. It feels fine. Thus I begin to loathe my heritage. I avoid Italian boys and girls who try to be friendly. I thank God for · my light skin and hair, and I choose my companions by the Anglo-Saxon ring of their names. If a boy's name is Whitney, Browne, or Smythe, then he's my pal; but I'm always a little breathless when I am with him; he may find me out. At the lunch hour I huddle over my lunch pail, for my mother doesn't wrap my sandwiches in wax paper, ... she makes them too large and the lettuce leaves protrude. Worse, the bread is home-made; not bakery bread, not "American" bread. I make a great fuss because I can't have mayonnaise and other "American" things ... I am nervous when I bring friends to my house; the place looks so Italian. Here hangs a picture of Victor Emmanuel, and over there is one of the cathedral of Milan, and next to it, one of St. Peter's, and on the buffet stands a wine-pitcher of medieval design; it's forever brimming, forever red and brilliant with wine. These things are heirlooms belonging to my father, and no matter who may come to our house, he likes to stand under them and brag. So I begin to shout at him. I tell him to cut out being a Wop and to be an American once in a while . Immediately he gets his razor-strap and whales hell out of me, clouting me from room to room and finally out the back door. I go into the woodshed and puH down my pants and stretch my neck to examine the blue slices across my rump. A Wop! that's what my father is! Nowhere is there an American father who beats his son this way. Well, he's not going to get away with it; some day I'll get even with him ... My grandmother has taught me to speak her native tongue. By seven, I know it pretty well, and I always address her in it. But when friends are with me, when I am twelve and thirteen, I pretend to ignorance of what she says, and smirk stiffly; my friends daren't know that I can speak any language but English. Sometimes this infuriates her. She bristles, the loose skin at her throat knits hard, and she blasphemes with a mighty blasphemy.• As Fante said, he was always a little breathless for he may have been found out. With more professional attention given to his group's history, the time will come when he and all minority members will catch their breath and assume their composure. In the process both minority and majority may then discover a new sense of compatibility. The omnipresent "drift" and purposeless will vanish as together they strive to attain the so-called Amerioan Dream. Victor R. Greene Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas • The American Mercury, XXX (September, 1939), 91-93, quoted in Maurice Davie, World Immigration (New York, 1936), 279-279. � 80 SLOVAKIA "SONS OF HUNKIES: MEN WITH A PAST?" A few years ago a book entitled The American Style appeared which attempted to analyze and define the cunent American temper. It was subtitled Essays in Value and Performance. Widely known scholars from a variety of fields, particularly history and anthropology, offered their impressions, or better, diagnoses of this nation's problems. While remedies varied, they all agreed that a general sickness had afflicted the American people. A feeling of uncertainty, loss of direction, and lack of purpose had controlled the behavior of the population for about the past decade. Agreeing in part with sociologist David Riesman, one of the participants, these students noted that the campaigns of old, the Armageddons of another day, the taming of the pioneer west, making the world safe for democracy in 1917, and the "Crusade in Europe", as General Eisenhower put it, had been won. In place of these challenges no new frontiers had appeared. America was trying to adjust to a new anxious era where old values were disappearing. Now the state was guaranteeing minimum security and abroad we were enduring a continual stalemate and compromise with our enemies. The exhilaration of clear victory was unattainable because there was no "solution" to our problems. Instead, as the discussants pointed to Korea and could well have done so later with Vietnam, our policy was not to vanquish our foes as before but merely contain them. The realization of this indecisive situation led to the present mood of confusion, frustration, and "drift." Even a commission begun to formulate and enunciate national goals under the Eisenhower administration was not able to dispell the agonizing transition; in fact, its ,e stablishment was evidence of it. Such a loss of commitment to ideals seems to apply particularly to descendants of this country's minority groups. Ethnic historians and sociologists can discern that same search for principles among our newer nationalities. As this writer sees it, present generation Slovak, Jewish, Italian and non-white Americans labor heavily not only under the general psychological malady but an additional, even more upsetting disability, an embarrassment over their past. Theirs is a history they are usually trying to dismiss, forget, and ignore. The few who do actively cultivate ethnic history really know �SLOVAKIA 81 only a small part, in any case a distorted and even fanciful version. The effect on the younger generation is unfortunate. Maturing East European Americans particularly are, as individuals, desperately striving to assimilate their way of life to the Anglo-American middle class stereotype. Such an overpowering acculturative urge is forcing far too rapid psychological changes for a well-balanced adjustment and instead has created a pervasive discomfort in the form of a massive inferiority. The feeling is entirely unwarranted as this paper will show. It is to this disturbed neurosis that trained nationality historians can supply a remedy-the needed measure of selfconfidence. While this therapeutic function of ethnic scholars will be stressed here, one should understand that the major task of historians of immigration and race is not sociological. They are not social workers. Immigration historians are generally concerned with analyzing American culture through its ,effects on its subgroups. Nevertheless, at the very same time that nationality group scholars are investigating our society, they will also assist in lifting the mental cross that minorities bear. By suggesting a sophisticated picture of subgroups' past, trained ethnic historians will offer a mo!'e comfortable position from which these people can base present life on past experience. Nevertheless, as of quite recently if history does not provide any foundation at all for what is, or supplies that very necessary continuity with the present, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, and especially Slovaks have not yet found it. Of course everyone of us has some idea of what has been as defective as our picture may be. No matter how much men try to forget yesterday, only the few amnesiacs can do it successfully and they, too, suffer psychologically. For the non-Anglo-American particularly the question of the past haunts his every activity. His recollections of foregoing generations are painful. To the modern descendant the status of the father or grandfather seems hardly one to ennoble progeny: the unskilled Slovak brutalized in the steel mill, coal mine, or slaughterhouse; the Italian ragpicker earning his bread by combing garbage dumps of our larger cities; the Jewish sweatshop worker slaving in an overcrowded, �82 SLOVAKIA filthy New York tenement fifteen hours a day; or the illiterate Negro sharecropper suffering from centuries of pellagra and persecution. Even if the present minority member has no first-hand contact with such figures, one can be sure that he knows them through images. Most Slovak Americans still live in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Gary, Chicago, Youngstown, Bridgeport, and Detroit where they can see the smokestack that ordered their for,ebears to their job. If by chance personal recollection does not create a sense of inadequacy, the little historical work that has been done on these groups will. Such written profiles for the most part make descendants extremely self-conscious of their heritage. The published studies are products either of well-meaning advocat,es who want to list the group's achievements in terms of "contributions" or of ingroup writers who concentrate their attention on pre-1800 American origins or the cultural connection with medieval Europe. In either case the result has been to intensify the inferiority. What does it mean to a grandson trying hard to obtain an education that his heritage stems from the grandeur of Rome or that he and Toscannini have something in common; or to a descendant of a Polish peasant that his countryman Kosciuszko helped Washington win the American Revolution; or to today's Negro that Phillis Wheatley was writing good poetry in 1760? Such "history" only reminds readers of the extraordinary distance which they have to travel to be accepted as just another American. In essence such nationality "personalities" have little real connection with or relevance to their own circumstance. In fact, many celebrities have not associated with their group at all although some have. Of all this country's minorities it is likely that the Slovak Americans have the greatest difficulty in orientation. For what is there available to dispel their ignorance and describe the aotivity of their father and grandfather when they left Spis to come to Pittsburgh? Unfortunately not a great deal of literature. Certainly with almost a million inhabitants tracing their heritage back to the foothills of the Carpathians, it is tragic that there is not one complete history of what the emigrants did which their descendants can read. Of course, there are publications on Slovaks in the United States but these ar,e usually inaccessible to the young as well as non- �SLOVAKIA 83 Slavs. The many parish histories give a part of the tale and most of the other works are either hidden away as university theses, like Rev. Zatlm's "Social History of the Slovaks in America" or Rev. Buc's "Slovak Nationalism" or they are in Slovak, as Rovnianek's autobiography, Dr. Hrusovsky's history of the Slovak religious orders, Culen's history of American Slovaks, Hrobak's edited notes of Furdek, or the most complete study of all, Dr. Pauco's jubilee history of Jednota. Thus the dilemma in having to live in two worlds remains. Minorities members are the "marginal men, " as E. V. Stonequist described them, attempting to adjust to a majority culture yet never able to divest themselves of what they believe a foreign, un-American family life. It is my point that such a transition need not be uncomfortable and irritating and in fact American historians are just now providing a solvent. Very recently scholarly interest in our sub-cultures has heightened. Starting in the 1920's among social workers and a rare professional historian and quickened by the recent pressure of non-whites for equality, investigators of our society have begun to recognize the necessity of including Catholics, Jews, and non-whites in any generalization about our past. Late publications on the Negroes, Greeks, and Jews; the formation of an Immigration History Group; and the success of an immigrant archival collection at the University of Minnesota are tangible manifestations of the growing recognition of the subject. If the trend continues, Americans of minority descent will be major beneficiaries. The tale of their own forebears, not Benovsky, Bernolak, or Stur as great as these men were, will take a place along side that of Anglo-American life as a fit subject for scholarship. The as yet literally unknown period of the recent, mass immigration after 1870 will be illuminated. And when it is, the insecurity of the minority member over his heritage will disappear. He need not cower at the imagined tale of the slum, poverty, ignorance, and demoralization. Such a tradition was his background but only a part of it. From preliminary research this writer has done on all Slavic Americans, he would emphasize rather the surprising viability and substance of their immigrant �84 SLOVAKIA community. These newcomers, so-called greenhorns, culturally deprived, largely unlettered masses traveled thousands of miles to a vastly different environment and fashioned a complete social life, including parishes, social centers, fraternals, newspapers, even dramatic and musical societies. Such institutions may not have equalled their American counterpart in support or quality but these associations certainly represented a significant economic and cultural advance from what they had in the Old Country. To help ease the lot of maturing Slovak Americans and assist students of American culture some steps have already been taken, as Jednota's scholarship awards and the agreements made with the University of Minnesota. This writer would like to make an additional proposal. Actually this suggestion is a renewal of an appeal made by Rev. Mlynarovic several decades ago, the formation of a Slovak American Historical Association. Such a cultural society would offer permanent encouragement to those interested in the history of Slovaks in America. At the start it could interest and assist students to gather, organize and publish materials on the nationality. Anyone who has visited the Institute, Middletown, Pittsburgh, and Chicago realizes the necessity of ordering and preserving annuals, newspapers and manuscript collections. The Association would also communicate with other nationality historical societies which have proven their own value and keep in contact with immigrant historians in general. The major drawback to such an organization is the same that has plagued Slovak Americans as a whole-factionalism. Slovaks are of many persuasions, from Protestants to Orthodox, and these subdivisions have confounded and retarded any all-inclusive body. But such an obstacle may well be overcome by including all Slovak groups in its formation and as a r,esult of the urgency of the situation. This writer would like to initiate action by suggesting a Slovak American Newsletter and he solicits advice from readers. This paper, has been both an analysis of the problem and a suggestion for solution. It sees a process whereby other minorities will grow in self-confidence but fears that Slovak Americans may not have a recognizable past for some time to come unless action is taken soon. The call, however, �SLOVAKIA 85 does not seek to instill ethnic pride in the hearts and minds of disillusioned descendants. This identity-attachment will result and expand when more of the entire past is exposed. Any research subject, whether sensitive or not, should be encouraged to help explain the reality of a group's adjustment. Certainly out of this academic pursuit, sons will sense a more substantial basis for knowing themselves. One need not guess at the profound satisfaction that all minorities will experience when they form societies that deal with academicians. The recognition of scholarship can do much to ease an inferiority. With such a relationship ethnic leaders must be cautioned that encouraging historical scholarship will not pr,e vent assimilation, "drowning in an Anglo-American sea," as some have termed it. Most sociologists agree that homogenization is inevitable and amalgamation appears as an American trend. But this process of change will be less demoralizing for group members who really are interested in honoring their past. Maria Mrazik will change her name to Mary More and even marry a Robert Smith but the transition will not necessarily indicate a rejection of her Slovak heritage. She still will likely support the examination of the internal and external problems which her forebears encountered in building their institutions. Nevertheless the minority member's trauma is still the order of the day. The pervasive and depressing syndrome can be observed most closely by first-hand testimony, the lament of a young Halian boy, named John Fante, who sought to erase his heritage. The nationality here is really irrelevant; he could just as well have been a Slovak or of any other minority. As he says, he takes solace in his name as he could be mistaken for a more American nationality. Yet he could not escape his family where conflict was constant and tragic. His confession appeared several decades ago in a 1933 article entitled, "The Odyssey of a Wop," but his discomfort typifies that of a Hunlde's son as well: I enter the . .. school with an awful fear that I a Wop. As soon as I find out why people have such names, I match my own against such typically ltalian Bianci, Borello, Pacelli-the names of other students. I relieved by the comparison. After all, I think, people French. will be called things as surcognomens as am pleasantly will say I am �86 SLOVAKIA Doesn't my name sound French? Sure! So thereafter, when people ask me my nationality, I tell them I am French. A few boys begin calling me Frenchy. I like that. It feels fine. Thus I begin to loathe my heritage. I avoid Italian boys and girls who try to be friendly. I thank God for · my light skin and hair, and I choose my companions by the Anglo-Saxon ring of their names. If a boy's name is Whitney, Browne, or Smythe, then he's my pal; but I'm always a little breathless when I am with him; he may find me out. At the lunch hour I huddle over my lunch pail, for my mother doesn't wrap my sandwiches in wax paper, ... she makes them too large and the lettuce leaves protrude. Worse, the bread is home-made; not bakery bread, not "American" bread. I make a great fuss because I can't have mayonnaise and other "American" things ... I am nervous when I bring friends to my house; the place looks so Italian. Here hangs a picture of Victor Emmanuel, and over there is one of the cathedral of Milan, and next to it, one of St. Peter's, and on the buffet stands a wine-pitcher of medieval design; it's forever brimming, forever red and brilliant with wine. These things are heirlooms belonging to my father, and no matter who may come to our house, he likes to stand under them and brag. So I begin to shout at him. I tell him to cut out being a Wop and to be an American once in a while . Immediately he gets his razor-strap and whales hell out of me, clouting me from room to room and finally out the back door. I go into the woodshed and puH down my pants and stretch my neck to examine the blue slices across my rump. A Wop! that's what my father is! Nowhere is there an American father who beats his son this way. Well, he's not going to get away with it; some day I'll get even with him ... My grandmother has taught me to speak her native tongue. By seven, I know it pretty well, and I always address her in it. But when friends are with me, when I am twelve and thirteen, I pretend to ignorance of what she says, and smirk stiffly; my friends daren't know that I can speak any language but English. Sometimes this infuriates her. She bristles, the loose skin at her throat knits hard, and she blasphemes with a mighty blasphemy.• As Fante said, he was always a little breathless for he may have been found out. With more professional attention given to his group's history, the time will come when he and all minority members will catch their breath and assume their composure. In the process both minority and majority may then discover a new sense of compatibility. The omnipresent "drift" and purposeless will vanish as together they strive to attain the so-called Amerioan Dream. Victor R. Greene Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas • The American Mercury, XXX (September, 1939), 91-93, quoted in Maurice Davie, World Immigration (New York, 1936), 279-279. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1966, Vol. 16 Description An account of the resource Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 80 SLOVAKIA "SONS OF HUNKIES: MEN WITH A PAST?" A few years ago a book entitled The American Style appeared which attempted to analyze and define the cunent American temper. It was subtitled Essays in Value and Performance. Widely known scholars from a variety of fields, particularly history and anthropology, offered their impressions, or better, diagnoses of this nation's problems. While remedies varied, they all agreed that a general sickness had afflicted the American people. A feeling of uncertainty, loss of direction, and lack of purpose had controlled the behavior of the population for about the past decade. Agreeing in part with sociologist David Riesman, one of the participants, these students noted that the campaigns of old, the Armageddons of another day, the taming of the pioneer west, making the world safe for democracy in 1917, and the "Crusade in Europe", as General Eisenhower put it, had been won. In place of these challenges no new frontiers had appeared. America was trying to adjust to a new anxious era where old values were disappearing. Now the state was guaranteeing minimum security and abroad we were enduring a continual stalemate and compromise with our enemies. The exhilaration of clear victory was unattainable because there was no "solution" to our problems. Instead, as the discussants pointed to Korea and could well have done so later with Vietnam, our policy was not to vanquish our foes as before but merely contain them. The realization of this indecisive situation led to the present mood of confusion, frustration, and "drift." Even a commission begun to formulate and enunciate national goals under the Eisenhower administration was not able to dispell the agonizing transition; in fact, its ,e stablishment was evidence of it. Such a loss of commitment to ideals seems to apply particularly to descendants of this country's minority groups. Ethnic historians and sociologists can discern that same search for principles among our newer nationalities. As this writer sees it, present generation Slovak, Jewish, Italian and non-white Americans labor heavily not only under the general psychological malady but an additional, even more upsetting disability, an embarrassment over their past. Theirs is a history they are usually trying to dismiss, forget, and ignore. The few who do actively cultivate ethnic history really know SLOVAKIA 81 only a small part, in any case a distorted and even fanciful version. The effect on the younger generation is unfortunate. Maturing East European Americans particularly are, as individuals, desperately striving to assimilate their way of life to the Anglo-American middle class stereotype. Such an overpowering acculturative urge is forcing far too rapid psychological changes for a well-balanced adjustment and instead has created a pervasive discomfort in the form of a massive inferiority. The feeling is entirely unwarranted as this paper will show. It is to this disturbed neurosis that trained nationality historians can supply a remedy-the needed measure of selfconfidence. While this therapeutic function of ethnic scholars will be stressed here, one should understand that the major task of historians of immigration and race is not sociological. They are not social workers. Immigration historians are generally concerned with analyzing American culture through its ,effects on its subgroups. Nevertheless, at the very same time that nationality group scholars are investigating our society, they will also assist in lifting the mental cross that minorities bear. By suggesting a sophisticated picture of subgroups' past, trained ethnic historians will offer a mo!'e comfortable position from which these people can base present life on past experience. Nevertheless, as of quite recently if history does not provide any foundation at all for what is, or supplies that very necessary continuity with the present, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, and especially Slovaks have not yet found it. Of course everyone of us has some idea of what has been as defective as our picture may be. No matter how much men try to forget yesterday, only the few amnesiacs can do it successfully and they, too, suffer psychologically. For the non-Anglo-American particularly the question of the past haunts his every activity. His recollections of foregoing generations are painful. To the modern descendant the status of the father or grandfather seems hardly one to ennoble progeny: the unskilled Slovak brutalized in the steel mill, coal mine, or slaughterhouse; the Italian ragpicker earning his bread by combing garbage dumps of our larger cities; the Jewish sweatshop worker slaving in an overcrowded, 82 SLOVAKIA filthy New York tenement fifteen hours a day; or the illiterate Negro sharecropper suffering from centuries of pellagra and persecution. Even if the present minority member has no first-hand contact with such figures, one can be sure that he knows them through images. Most Slovak Americans still live in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Gary, Chicago, Youngstown, Bridgeport, and Detroit where they can see the smokestack that ordered their for,ebears to their job. If by chance personal recollection does not create a sense of inadequacy, the little historical work that has been done on these groups will. Such written profiles for the most part make descendants extremely self-conscious of their heritage. The published studies are products either of well-meaning advocat,es who want to list the group's achievements in terms of "contributions" or of ingroup writers who concentrate their attention on pre-1800 American origins or the cultural connection with medieval Europe. In either case the result has been to intensify the inferiority. What does it mean to a grandson trying hard to obtain an education that his heritage stems from the grandeur of Rome or that he and Toscannini have something in common; or to a descendant of a Polish peasant that his countryman Kosciuszko helped Washington win the American Revolution; or to today's Negro that Phillis Wheatley was writing good poetry in 1760? Such "history" only reminds readers of the extraordinary distance which they have to travel to be accepted as just another American. In essence such nationality "personalities" have little real connection with or relevance to their own circumstance. In fact, many celebrities have not associated with their group at all although some have. Of all this country's minorities it is likely that the Slovak Americans have the greatest difficulty in orientation. For what is there available to dispel their ignorance and describe the aotivity of their father and grandfather when they left Spis to come to Pittsburgh? Unfortunately not a great deal of literature. Certainly with almost a million inhabitants tracing their heritage back to the foothills of the Carpathians, it is tragic that there is not one complete history of what the emigrants did which their descendants can read. Of course, there are publications on Slovaks in the United States but these ar,e usually inaccessible to the young as well as non- SLOVAKIA 83 Slavs. The many parish histories give a part of the tale and most of the other works are either hidden away as university theses, like Rev. Zatlm's "Social History of the Slovaks in America" or Rev. Buc's "Slovak Nationalism" or they are in Slovak, as Rovnianek's autobiography, Dr. Hrusovsky's history of the Slovak religious orders, Culen's history of American Slovaks, Hrobak's edited notes of Furdek, or the most complete study of all, Dr. Pauco's jubilee history of Jednota. Thus the dilemma in having to live in two worlds remains. Minorities members are the "marginal men, " as E. V. Stonequist described them, attempting to adjust to a majority culture yet never able to divest themselves of what they believe a foreign, un-American family life. It is my point that such a transition need not be uncomfortable and irritating and in fact American historians are just now providing a solvent. Very recently scholarly interest in our sub-cultures has heightened. Starting in the 1920's among social workers and a rare professional historian and quickened by the recent pressure of non-whites for equality, investigators of our society have begun to recognize the necessity of including Catholics, Jews, and non-whites in any generalization about our past. Late publications on the Negroes, Greeks, and Jews; the formation of an Immigration History Group; and the success of an immigrant archival collection at the University of Minnesota are tangible manifestations of the growing recognition of the subject. If the trend continues, Americans of minority descent will be major beneficiaries. The tale of their own forebears, not Benovsky, Bernolak, or Stur as great as these men were, will take a place along side that of Anglo-American life as a fit subject for scholarship. The as yet literally unknown period of the recent, mass immigration after 1870 will be illuminated. And when it is, the insecurity of the minority member over his heritage will disappear. He need not cower at the imagined tale of the slum, poverty, ignorance, and demoralization. Such a tradition was his background but only a part of it. From preliminary research this writer has done on all Slavic Americans, he would emphasize rather the surprising viability and substance of their immigrant 84 SLOVAKIA community. These newcomers, so-called greenhorns, culturally deprived, largely unlettered masses traveled thousands of miles to a vastly different environment and fashioned a complete social life, including parishes, social centers, fraternals, newspapers, even dramatic and musical societies. Such institutions may not have equalled their American counterpart in support or quality but these associations certainly represented a significant economic and cultural advance from what they had in the Old Country. To help ease the lot of maturing Slovak Americans and assist students of American culture some steps have already been taken, as Jednota's scholarship awards and the agreements made with the University of Minnesota. This writer would like to make an additional proposal. Actually this suggestion is a renewal of an appeal made by Rev. Mlynarovic several decades ago, the formation of a Slovak American Historical Association. Such a cultural society would offer permanent encouragement to those interested in the history of Slovaks in America. At the start it could interest and assist students to gather, organize and publish materials on the nationality. Anyone who has visited the Institute, Middletown, Pittsburgh, and Chicago realizes the necessity of ordering and preserving annuals, newspapers and manuscript collections. The Association would also communicate with other nationality historical societies which have proven their own value and keep in contact with immigrant historians in general. The major drawback to such an organization is the same that has plagued Slovak Americans as a whole-factionalism. Slovaks are of many persuasions, from Protestants to Orthodox, and these subdivisions have confounded and retarded any all-inclusive body. But such an obstacle may well be overcome by including all Slovak groups in its formation and as a r,esult of the urgency of the situation. This writer would like to initiate action by suggesting a Slovak American Newsletter and he solicits advice from readers. This paper, has been both an analysis of the problem and a suggestion for solution. It sees a process whereby other minorities will grow in self-confidence but fears that Slovak Americans may not have a recognizable past for some time to come unless action is taken soon. The call, however, SLOVAKIA 85 does not seek to instill ethnic pride in the hearts and minds of disillusioned descendants. This identity-attachment will result and expand when more of the entire past is exposed. Any research subject, whether sensitive or not, should be encouraged to help explain the reality of a group's adjustment. Certainly out of this academic pursuit, sons will sense a more substantial basis for knowing themselves. One need not guess at the profound satisfaction that all minorities will experience when they form societies that deal with academicians. The recognition of scholarship can do much to ease an inferiority. With such a relationship ethnic leaders must be cautioned that encouraging historical scholarship will not pr,e vent assimilation, "drowning in an Anglo-American sea," as some have termed it. Most sociologists agree that homogenization is inevitable and amalgamation appears as an American trend. But this process of change will be less demoralizing for group members who really are interested in honoring their past. Maria Mrazik will change her name to Mary More and even marry a Robert Smith but the transition will not necessarily indicate a rejection of her Slovak heritage. She still will likely support the examination of the internal and external problems which her forebears encountered in building their institutions. Nevertheless the minority member's trauma is still the order of the day. The pervasive and depressing syndrome can be observed most closely by first-hand testimony, the lament of a young Halian boy, named John Fante, who sought to erase his heritage. The nationality here is really irrelevant; he could just as well have been a Slovak or of any other minority. As he says, he takes solace in his name as he could be mistaken for a more American nationality. Yet he could not escape his family where conflict was constant and tragic. His confession appeared several decades ago in a 1933 article entitled, "The Odyssey of a Wop," but his discomfort typifies that of a Hunlde's son as well: I enter the . .. school with an awful fear that I a Wop. As soon as I find out why people have such names, I match my own against such typically ltalian Bianci, Borello, Pacelli-the names of other students. I relieved by the comparison. After all, I think, people French. will be called things as surcognomens as am pleasantly will say I am 86 SLOVAKIA Doesn't my name sound French? Sure! So thereafter, when people ask me my nationality, I tell them I am French. A few boys begin calling me Frenchy. I like that. It feels fine. Thus I begin to loathe my heritage. I avoid Italian boys and girls who try to be friendly. I thank God for · my light skin and hair, and I choose my companions by the Anglo-Saxon ring of their names. If a boy's name is Whitney, Browne, or Smythe, then he's my pal; but I'm always a little breathless when I am with him; he may find me out. At the lunch hour I huddle over my lunch pail, for my mother doesn't wrap my sandwiches in wax paper, ... she makes them too large and the lettuce leaves protrude. Worse, the bread is home-made; not bakery bread, not "American" bread. I make a great fuss because I can't have mayonnaise and other "American" things ... I am nervous when I bring friends to my house; the place looks so Italian. Here hangs a picture of Victor Emmanuel, and over there is one of the cathedral of Milan, and next to it, one of St. Peter's, and on the buffet stands a wine-pitcher of medieval design; it's forever brimming, forever red and brilliant with wine. These things are heirlooms belonging to my father, and no matter who may come to our house, he likes to stand under them and brag. So I begin to shout at him. I tell him to cut out being a Wop and to be an American once in a while . Immediately he gets his razor-strap and whales hell out of me, clouting me from room to room and finally out the back door. I go into the woodshed and puH down my pants and stretch my neck to examine the blue slices across my rump. A Wop! that's what my father is! Nowhere is there an American father who beats his son this way. Well, he's not going to get away with it; some day I'll get even with him ... My grandmother has taught me to speak her native tongue. By seven, I know it pretty well, and I always address her in it. But when friends are with me, when I am twelve and thirteen, I pretend to ignorance of what she says, and smirk stiffly; my friends daren't know that I can speak any language but English. Sometimes this infuriates her. She bristles, the loose skin at her throat knits hard, and she blasphemes with a mighty blasphemy.• As Fante said, he was always a little breathless for he may have been found out. With more professional attention given to his group's history, the time will come when he and all minority members will catch their breath and assume their composure. In the process both minority and majority may then discover a new sense of compatibility. The omnipresent "drift" and purposeless will vanish as together they strive to attain the so-called Amerioan Dream. Victor R. Greene Kansas State University Manhattan, Kansas • The American Mercury, XXX (September, 1939), 91-93, quoted in Maurice Davie, World Immigration (New York, 1936), 279-279.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Sons of Hunkies: Men with a Past?" Description An account of the resource Victor R. Greene Slovakia, Vol. 16 (No. 39), 1966 pp. 80-86 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Greene, Victor R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/586cf8c56d88961f6a577dd62da5e0dc.pdf 11b2a87de41d7130d931b67c883c09b4 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 59 CZEOH GROUPS IN EXIl,E Fritz Peter Babel The history of Czecho-Slovak political groups in exile has unfortunately not yet been written. It would offer the world at large a fascinating story with the suspense and thrill of a good novel. There are actually three periods of exile: the first one from 1914 to 1918; the second and third periods between 1938 and 1945, and from 1945 to 1948. These latter periods are harder to delineate since they partially overlap. Two aspects, often mutually independent, monopolize the foreground: the actors in the drama, and the results attained. Who, in 1914, would have dreamed that four years later a Czecho~Slovak Republic would be among the vi.ctorious powers of the first world war? The titanic external political success was attributable to the exploitation by a few men of a number of favorable circumstances. At their head stood Thomas G. Masaryk, professor of philosophy, who - rightly or wrongly - is still today regarded as a wise statesman, benevolent philosopher and outstanding humanist. In the background, only known to the initiated, was a versatile actor on the political stage, playing a vital role. His name was Dr. Edward Benes. Twenty years later, due to circumstances that cannot be treated within the limited scope of this paper, the Czecho-Slovak Republic collapsed. This collapse appeared to be final, for the world at that time looked most critically upon the constructional defects of that State. Many reports have been preserved from which it is clearly evident that in 1938 Czecho-Slovakia was regarded as impossible of reconstruction in its pre-Munich status, even if Germany should lose the war. The second period of Czecho-Slovak exile began at this moral zero. At its head stood Dr. Benes, regarded by many as politically bankrupt but, at the same time, regarded by an ever-growing number of followers as a tragic and the first victim of Adolf Hitler. In any event Dr. �60 SLOVAKIA Benes succeeded, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances, not only in restoring Czecho-Slovakia, but also in making it an essentially Slavic State by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians (Magyars). The accoucheur of this "new" restored State was primarily Josef Stalin, who let his bailiff Klement Gottwald, present the bill in February 1948. Once again a Czecho-Slovak group , in exile seemingly succeeded in performing the impossible; once again the existence of a single widely recognized person was a prerequisite for this development. The third order of exile at no time couJd boast of a person of such caliber, and for this reason it could book no success at all. In fact, it remained to a large extent unknown. To be sure all the Czech, Slovak, and "Czechoslovak" politicians desire a Bohemian-Moravian-Slovakian region !~berated from Communism, and to this end various constitutional solutions have been proposed. At the same time any uniformity of their political thinking is virtually impossi'ble due to the Sudeten German question. More and more Czechs and Slovaks have with the passage of time , come to the conclusion that this problem was not "settled" by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, but that it is still awaiting a real solution. Nevertheless, again and again voices may be heard to the contrary. A so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," with headquarters in the USA, which has been dissolved several times only to be refounded again, advocates as part of its official policy not only the approval of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians (Magyars), but it has demanded of the Federal Republic of Germany that the act of expulsion be recognized as "a definitively settled matter." That was the situation as expressed in a memorandum issued by the Council in the summer of 1960. It is not within the scope and purpose of this paper to refer to the numerous half truths and untruths the memorandum contains. It is likewise not the purpose to call attention to the dangerous relationship between many of its theses and Communist slogans. Since it is an important condition of every fruitful controversy clearly to be aware �SLOVAKIA 61 of the viewpoint of the philosophical and political opponent, a question from the above-mentioned memorandum seems appropriate. After historic declarations and arguments in favor of the expulsion which is always referred to as the "transfer" it says: " ... The transfer was not considered to be an act of retaliation but a contdbution to the security of CzechoSlovakia from the German Drang nach Ost.en and a contribution to the protection of European peace . . . In their fight for return, the Sudeten Germans plead for recognition as a unique ethnic group. They forward this claim, although in 1938 they coined the slogan 'Heim ins Reich~ inasmuch as they declared themselves to be an ethnic segment of the larger German nation. No doubt considerable influence was lent to this Sudeten German claim by the thought that the peace conference acceded the right of self-determination solely to ethnic entirities and not to fragments of a people living on the territory of forei,gn States. By the demand for recognition as a special ethnic group, they hope to acquire the right of self-determination. This demand differs in no way from those which the Sudeten Germans pleaded for prior to the war. At that time when the advice and complete support of Hitler was granted them, the Sudeten Germans transferred the demand from that of autonomy and confederative reconstruction of Czecho-'Slovakia to one of separation of the border regions from Czecho-Slovakia and annexation to the German Reich. Today they understand by self-determination expressly the right to and power of disposition over that portion of the Czechoslovak territory in which they, intermingled with the Czech population, were settled up to the time of their deportation. After the experiences of 1938 that necessarily means, in the eyes of every "Czechoslovak," renewed destruction of Czecho-Slovakfa and the annihilation of the Republic ... " Thereupon follows a prediction for the future: " ... In case it should come to annexing the Czecho-Slovak border territory to Germany, Czecho-Slovakia would be economically and commercially just as mutilated as was the case �62 SLOVAKIA after Munich. The country's capacity to exist would be retarded and instead of being a contribution to free Europe it would be ballast, should it be a!ble to maintain itself as a State at all. Should the Sudeten Germans be allowed to return and to constitute themselves in a federative union in Czecho-Slovakia, 'lew nationality struggles, inseparable from heavy social and especially internatnonal repercus- , sions, would flare up anew. The Sudeten Germans would once again seek the aid of Germany against the Czechs and the Slovaks, thus disturbing Czecho-Slovak relations and becoming within Germany itself the support and lever of undemocratic, pan-Germaniically oriented elements. The troubled relations would mean a new threat to Czecho-Slovak independence. The satisfying of Sudeten German demands in this or that form would therefore be possible, in the final analysis, only at the price of Czecho-Slovakia's annihilation. One must also consider that in light of their historical development and their experiences, State independence is an indispensa'ble prerequisite for the CzechoSlovaks' national existence and growth. "For this very basic :reason it is a,bsolutely necessary that the West make no further change in its approval of the transfer and that it consider the Sudeten question settled. But for tactical reasons, too, the free world should resist the demands of the Sudeten Germans. Any manner of concessions would be interpreted by the Communist government as a sacrifice of Czecho-Slovak national interests in favor of German interests and would be regarded as a new threat to the national eX!istence of the Czech and Slovak peoples and would surely have a catastrophic effect on the spirit of resistance to and fight a·g ainst Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. It would compel the masses of Czechs and Slovaks to identify themselves with the Communist government against which they now stand resolutely opposed. "It is of no less importance to free Czecho-Slovaks than it is to the free world that Germany become a permanent member of the community of free peoples. This affiliation can only become effective and reliruble if Ger- �SLOVAKIA 63 many recognizes the rights of other peoples, especially of the peoples of Central Europe, to national independence and sovereignty, and does not allow different groups be they from the ranks of the original population or from the ranks of the expelled minorities - to impose a policy on Germany which would, in its consequences, lead to a negation of these rights. For then Germany would cut itself off from the community of free peoples and instead of being a co-determinant, would be a destroyer of the Europe of the future. Since the return of the expellees would have just such consequences, this means, in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, that Germany should recognize the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as a definitive settlement. "Such recognition will also serve as the firmest foundation for truly friendly relations between free Germany and free Czechoslovakia. Czecho.JSlovakia desires nothing more than to be an island of <!reative peace which introduces no tensions into the international order and gives no occasion for quarrels but contributes to a non-violent organization of the world." There are also other opinions with regard to GermanCzech relations. They can, for obvious reasons, be worded much more concisely. Here is the answer of the "Czech Christian Democratic Movement in Exile" to the above memorandum: "It is our opinion that ,i t should be the highest political principle of the various refugee groups that they resolve their own problems in a spirit of Christian understanding. The step taken by the 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia' seems to us to be determined by the opposite of that principle. To defend the eX'pulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the western provinces of Czecho-Slovakia a measure which a self-aJppointed government of that country executed in the year of 1945 - appears to us to spell approval of the reprehensible deeds of the Bolshevists; it proves a lack of desire to subordinate one's own petty feelings to the concept of a united and peaceful Europe ... No European nation - above all no small na- �SLOVAKIA 64 tion like ours - can find lasting peace in a divided Europe. Federalization is the only way to peace in Europe. The Czechs could scarcely participate in such a federation if they refused their German-speaking fellow-countrymen the right to their homeland, thus bringing about lasting tension between themselves and their big neighbor ... " In conclusion the Czech Christian Democrats renewed their approval of the Wiesbaden Agrement of Augus: 1950. Deriving from the spirit of this fairly well-known agreement, there has appeared in recent years a personality that may prove the dominant figure in the third period of Czechs and Slovaks in exile. On May 29, 1955, Army General Lev Prchala stated before the participants in _the mighty demonstration of Sudeten Germans at the 6th Sudeten Day in Nuremberg: "As a human being and as a European I condemn the crime that was committed against the Sudeten Germans in 1945. As a Czech and a Christian I feel myself obligated to ask the Sudeten German men and women for pardon." It is to be hoped that this seed will ripen. It is a good, fresh seed. Although an old man sowed it, it needs the cultivation of all true humanists who, from the mistakes of yesterday, via the adversities of today, believe in the dawning of a new tomorrow. P . Hletko, M.D., hooiorary president and former president of the League, was elected president. Philip A. Hrobak, president of the Lea,gue sin,ce Ma~, 1950, who favored the election Olf Dr. Hletk-0, now serves on the Executive Commitbce together with Monsignor Francis J. DlllboSlh, P.A. , Lakewood, Ohio, honorary president and former president of the League; Paul Jamrislm, Pittsburgh, Pa .; John A. ScJJ'bol, president of the First Catlho[ic Slovak Uinoion , Phoenixville, Pa., and Joseph G. 3€ 3€ 3€ Prusa, secretary of the Slov-a k CaThe Slovak League of America tholic Sokol. The next Oongress held its 36th Congress in Detroit, will be in Philadelphia, Pa. , in Mich., May 27-29, 1962. Dr. Peter 1-964. F.rano Stefunka, Slowik academic scu]Jptor, is working on, a memorial to Ja•n Kollar who was among the initiators of the cultural Pan-Slaivist'ic movement in S1<r vakia. 'Dhe Kollar creation is to be unveiled in Mosovce, Slovakia, on July 29, 1963, t'he 1'7oth anniversary of Kollar's birth. He is known particularly, for his ly,ric-e,pic poem "Slavy dcera" and his collection (4 volumes) of Slovak folksongs (Narodnie Zpievanky"). Kollar was born in Mosoivce, Slov.akia, on Jiuly 29, 1'7 93. 1 � SLOVAKIA 59 CZEOH GROUPS IN EXIl,E Fritz Peter Babel The history of Czecho-Slovak political groups in exile has unfortunately not yet been written. It would offer the world at large a fascinating story with the suspense and thrill of a good novel. There are actually three periods of exile: the first one from 1914 to 1918; the second and third periods between 1938 and 1945, and from 1945 to 1948. These latter periods are harder to delineate since they partially overlap. Two aspects, often mutually independent, monopolize the foreground: the actors in the drama, and the results attained. Who, in 1914, would have dreamed that four years later a Czecho~Slovak Republic would be among the vi.ctorious powers of the first world war? The titanic external political success was attributable to the exploitation by a few men of a number of favorable circumstances. At their head stood Thomas G. Masaryk, professor of philosophy, who - rightly or wrongly - is still today regarded as a wise statesman, benevolent philosopher and outstanding humanist. In the background, only known to the initiated, was a versatile actor on the political stage, playing a vital role. His name was Dr. Edward Benes. Twenty years later, due to circumstances that cannot be treated within the limited scope of this paper, the Czecho-Slovak Republic collapsed. This collapse appeared to be final, for the world at that time looked most critically upon the constructional defects of that State. Many reports have been preserved from which it is clearly evident that in 1938 Czecho-Slovakia was regarded as impossible of reconstruction in its pre-Munich status, even if Germany should lose the war. The second period of Czecho-Slovak exile began at this moral zero. At its head stood Dr. Benes, regarded by many as politically bankrupt but, at the same time, regarded by an ever-growing number of followers as a tragic and the first victim of Adolf Hitler. In any event Dr. �60 SLOVAKIA Benes succeeded, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances, not only in restoring Czecho-Slovakia, but also in making it an essentially Slavic State by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians (Magyars). The accoucheur of this "new" restored State was primarily Josef Stalin, who let his bailiff Klement Gottwald, present the bill in February 1948. Once again a Czecho-Slovak group , in exile seemingly succeeded in performing the impossible; once again the existence of a single widely recognized person was a prerequisite for this development. The third order of exile at no time couJd boast of a person of such caliber, and for this reason it could book no success at all. In fact, it remained to a large extent unknown. To be sure all the Czech, Slovak, and "Czechoslovak" politicians desire a Bohemian-Moravian-Slovakian region !~berated from Communism, and to this end various constitutional solutions have been proposed. At the same time any uniformity of their political thinking is virtually impossi'ble due to the Sudeten German question. More and more Czechs and Slovaks have with the passage of time , come to the conclusion that this problem was not "settled" by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, but that it is still awaiting a real solution. Nevertheless, again and again voices may be heard to the contrary. A so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," with headquarters in the USA, which has been dissolved several times only to be refounded again, advocates as part of its official policy not only the approval of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians (Magyars), but it has demanded of the Federal Republic of Germany that the act of expulsion be recognized as "a definitively settled matter." That was the situation as expressed in a memorandum issued by the Council in the summer of 1960. It is not within the scope and purpose of this paper to refer to the numerous half truths and untruths the memorandum contains. It is likewise not the purpose to call attention to the dangerous relationship between many of its theses and Communist slogans. Since it is an important condition of every fruitful controversy clearly to be aware �SLOVAKIA 61 of the viewpoint of the philosophical and political opponent, a question from the above-mentioned memorandum seems appropriate. After historic declarations and arguments in favor of the expulsion which is always referred to as the "transfer" it says: " ... The transfer was not considered to be an act of retaliation but a contdbution to the security of CzechoSlovakia from the German Drang nach Ost.en and a contribution to the protection of European peace . . . In their fight for return, the Sudeten Germans plead for recognition as a unique ethnic group. They forward this claim, although in 1938 they coined the slogan 'Heim ins Reich~ inasmuch as they declared themselves to be an ethnic segment of the larger German nation. No doubt considerable influence was lent to this Sudeten German claim by the thought that the peace conference acceded the right of self-determination solely to ethnic entirities and not to fragments of a people living on the territory of forei,gn States. By the demand for recognition as a special ethnic group, they hope to acquire the right of self-determination. This demand differs in no way from those which the Sudeten Germans pleaded for prior to the war. At that time when the advice and complete support of Hitler was granted them, the Sudeten Germans transferred the demand from that of autonomy and confederative reconstruction of Czecho-'Slovakia to one of separation of the border regions from Czecho-Slovakia and annexation to the German Reich. Today they understand by self-determination expressly the right to and power of disposition over that portion of the Czechoslovak territory in which they, intermingled with the Czech population, were settled up to the time of their deportation. After the experiences of 1938 that necessarily means, in the eyes of every "Czechoslovak," renewed destruction of Czecho-Slovakfa and the annihilation of the Republic ... " Thereupon follows a prediction for the future: " ... In case it should come to annexing the Czecho-Slovak border territory to Germany, Czecho-Slovakia would be economically and commercially just as mutilated as was the case �62 SLOVAKIA after Munich. The country's capacity to exist would be retarded and instead of being a contribution to free Europe it would be ballast, should it be a!ble to maintain itself as a State at all. Should the Sudeten Germans be allowed to return and to constitute themselves in a federative union in Czecho-Slovakia, 'lew nationality struggles, inseparable from heavy social and especially internatnonal repercus- , sions, would flare up anew. The Sudeten Germans would once again seek the aid of Germany against the Czechs and the Slovaks, thus disturbing Czecho-Slovak relations and becoming within Germany itself the support and lever of undemocratic, pan-Germaniically oriented elements. The troubled relations would mean a new threat to Czecho-Slovak independence. The satisfying of Sudeten German demands in this or that form would therefore be possible, in the final analysis, only at the price of Czecho-Slovakia's annihilation. One must also consider that in light of their historical development and their experiences, State independence is an indispensa'ble prerequisite for the CzechoSlovaks' national existence and growth. "For this very basic :reason it is a,bsolutely necessary that the West make no further change in its approval of the transfer and that it consider the Sudeten question settled. But for tactical reasons, too, the free world should resist the demands of the Sudeten Germans. Any manner of concessions would be interpreted by the Communist government as a sacrifice of Czecho-Slovak national interests in favor of German interests and would be regarded as a new threat to the national eX!istence of the Czech and Slovak peoples and would surely have a catastrophic effect on the spirit of resistance to and fight a·g ainst Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. It would compel the masses of Czechs and Slovaks to identify themselves with the Communist government against which they now stand resolutely opposed. "It is of no less importance to free Czecho-Slovaks than it is to the free world that Germany become a permanent member of the community of free peoples. This affiliation can only become effective and reliruble if Ger- �SLOVAKIA 63 many recognizes the rights of other peoples, especially of the peoples of Central Europe, to national independence and sovereignty, and does not allow different groups be they from the ranks of the original population or from the ranks of the expelled minorities - to impose a policy on Germany which would, in its consequences, lead to a negation of these rights. For then Germany would cut itself off from the community of free peoples and instead of being a co-determinant, would be a destroyer of the Europe of the future. Since the return of the expellees would have just such consequences, this means, in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, that Germany should recognize the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as a definitive settlement. "Such recognition will also serve as the firmest foundation for truly friendly relations between free Germany and free Czechoslovakia. Czecho.JSlovakia desires nothing more than to be an island of <!reative peace which introduces no tensions into the international order and gives no occasion for quarrels but contributes to a non-violent organization of the world." There are also other opinions with regard to GermanCzech relations. They can, for obvious reasons, be worded much more concisely. Here is the answer of the "Czech Christian Democratic Movement in Exile" to the above memorandum: "It is our opinion that ,i t should be the highest political principle of the various refugee groups that they resolve their own problems in a spirit of Christian understanding. The step taken by the 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia' seems to us to be determined by the opposite of that principle. To defend the eX'pulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the western provinces of Czecho-Slovakia a measure which a self-aJppointed government of that country executed in the year of 1945 - appears to us to spell approval of the reprehensible deeds of the Bolshevists; it proves a lack of desire to subordinate one's own petty feelings to the concept of a united and peaceful Europe ... No European nation - above all no small na- �SLOVAKIA 64 tion like ours - can find lasting peace in a divided Europe. Federalization is the only way to peace in Europe. The Czechs could scarcely participate in such a federation if they refused their German-speaking fellow-countrymen the right to their homeland, thus bringing about lasting tension between themselves and their big neighbor ... " In conclusion the Czech Christian Democrats renewed their approval of the Wiesbaden Agrement of Augus: 1950. Deriving from the spirit of this fairly well-known agreement, there has appeared in recent years a personality that may prove the dominant figure in the third period of Czechs and Slovaks in exile. On May 29, 1955, Army General Lev Prchala stated before the participants in _the mighty demonstration of Sudeten Germans at the 6th Sudeten Day in Nuremberg: "As a human being and as a European I condemn the crime that was committed against the Sudeten Germans in 1945. As a Czech and a Christian I feel myself obligated to ask the Sudeten German men and women for pardon." It is to be hoped that this seed will ripen. It is a good, fresh seed. Although an old man sowed it, it needs the cultivation of all true humanists who, from the mistakes of yesterday, via the adversities of today, believe in the dawning of a new tomorrow. P . Hletko, M.D., hooiorary president and former president of the League, was elected president. Philip A. Hrobak, president of the Lea,gue sin,ce Ma~, 1950, who favored the election Olf Dr. Hletk-0, now serves on the Executive Commitbce together with Monsignor Francis J. DlllboSlh, P.A. , Lakewood, Ohio, honorary president and former president of the League; Paul Jamrislm, Pittsburgh, Pa .; John A. ScJJ'bol, president of the First Catlho[ic Slovak Uinoion , Phoenixville, Pa., and Joseph G. 3€ 3€ 3€ Prusa, secretary of the Slov-a k CaThe Slovak League of America tholic Sokol. The next Oongress held its 36th Congress in Detroit, will be in Philadelphia, Pa. , in Mich., May 27-29, 1962. Dr. Peter 1-964. F.rano Stefunka, Slowik academic scu]Jptor, is working on, a memorial to Ja•n Kollar who was among the initiators of the cultural Pan-Slaivist'ic movement in S1<r vakia. 'Dhe Kollar creation is to be unveiled in Mosovce, Slovakia, on July 29, 1963, t'he 1'7oth anniversary of Kollar's birth. He is known particularly, for his ly,ric-e,pic poem "Slavy dcera" and his collection (4 volumes) of Slovak folksongs (Narodnie Zpievanky"). Kollar was born in Mosoivce, Slov.akia, on Jiuly 29, 1'7 93. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1962, Vol. 12 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 35), March-June 1962. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 59 CZEOH GROUPS IN EXIl,E Fritz Peter Babel The history of Czecho-Slovak political groups in exile has unfortunately not yet been written. It would offer the world at large a fascinating story with the suspense and thrill of a good novel. There are actually three periods of exile: the first one from 1914 to 1918; the second and third periods between 1938 and 1945, and from 1945 to 1948. These latter periods are harder to delineate since they partially overlap. Two aspects, often mutually independent, monopolize the foreground: the actors in the drama, and the results attained. Who, in 1914, would have dreamed that four years later a Czecho~Slovak Republic would be among the vi.ctorious powers of the first world war? The titanic external political success was attributable to the exploitation by a few men of a number of favorable circumstances. At their head stood Thomas G. Masaryk, professor of philosophy, who - rightly or wrongly - is still today regarded as a wise statesman, benevolent philosopher and outstanding humanist. In the background, only known to the initiated, was a versatile actor on the political stage, playing a vital role. His name was Dr. Edward Benes. Twenty years later, due to circumstances that cannot be treated within the limited scope of this paper, the Czecho-Slovak Republic collapsed. This collapse appeared to be final, for the world at that time looked most critically upon the constructional defects of that State. Many reports have been preserved from which it is clearly evident that in 1938 Czecho-Slovakia was regarded as impossible of reconstruction in its pre-Munich status, even if Germany should lose the war. The second period of Czecho-Slovak exile began at this moral zero. At its head stood Dr. Benes, regarded by many as politically bankrupt but, at the same time, regarded by an ever-growing number of followers as a tragic and the first victim of Adolf Hitler. In any event Dr. 60 SLOVAKIA Benes succeeded, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances, not only in restoring Czecho-Slovakia, but also in making it an essentially Slavic State by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians (Magyars). The accoucheur of this "new" restored State was primarily Josef Stalin, who let his bailiff Klement Gottwald, present the bill in February 1948. Once again a Czecho-Slovak group , in exile seemingly succeeded in performing the impossible; once again the existence of a single widely recognized person was a prerequisite for this development. The third order of exile at no time couJd boast of a person of such caliber, and for this reason it could book no success at all. In fact, it remained to a large extent unknown. To be sure all the Czech, Slovak, and "Czechoslovak" politicians desire a Bohemian-Moravian-Slovakian region !~berated from Communism, and to this end various constitutional solutions have been proposed. At the same time any uniformity of their political thinking is virtually impossi'ble due to the Sudeten German question. More and more Czechs and Slovaks have with the passage of time , come to the conclusion that this problem was not "settled" by the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, but that it is still awaiting a real solution. Nevertheless, again and again voices may be heard to the contrary. A so-called "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," with headquarters in the USA, which has been dissolved several times only to be refounded again, advocates as part of its official policy not only the approval of the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and Hungarians (Magyars), but it has demanded of the Federal Republic of Germany that the act of expulsion be recognized as "a definitively settled matter." That was the situation as expressed in a memorandum issued by the Council in the summer of 1960. It is not within the scope and purpose of this paper to refer to the numerous half truths and untruths the memorandum contains. It is likewise not the purpose to call attention to the dangerous relationship between many of its theses and Communist slogans. Since it is an important condition of every fruitful controversy clearly to be aware SLOVAKIA 61 of the viewpoint of the philosophical and political opponent, a question from the above-mentioned memorandum seems appropriate. After historic declarations and arguments in favor of the expulsion which is always referred to as the "transfer" it says: " ... The transfer was not considered to be an act of retaliation but a contdbution to the security of CzechoSlovakia from the German Drang nach Ost.en and a contribution to the protection of European peace . . . In their fight for return, the Sudeten Germans plead for recognition as a unique ethnic group. They forward this claim, although in 1938 they coined the slogan 'Heim ins Reich~ inasmuch as they declared themselves to be an ethnic segment of the larger German nation. No doubt considerable influence was lent to this Sudeten German claim by the thought that the peace conference acceded the right of self-determination solely to ethnic entirities and not to fragments of a people living on the territory of forei,gn States. By the demand for recognition as a special ethnic group, they hope to acquire the right of self-determination. This demand differs in no way from those which the Sudeten Germans pleaded for prior to the war. At that time when the advice and complete support of Hitler was granted them, the Sudeten Germans transferred the demand from that of autonomy and confederative reconstruction of Czecho-'Slovakia to one of separation of the border regions from Czecho-Slovakia and annexation to the German Reich. Today they understand by self-determination expressly the right to and power of disposition over that portion of the Czechoslovak territory in which they, intermingled with the Czech population, were settled up to the time of their deportation. After the experiences of 1938 that necessarily means, in the eyes of every "Czechoslovak," renewed destruction of Czecho-Slovakfa and the annihilation of the Republic ... " Thereupon follows a prediction for the future: " ... In case it should come to annexing the Czecho-Slovak border territory to Germany, Czecho-Slovakia would be economically and commercially just as mutilated as was the case 62 SLOVAKIA after Munich. The country's capacity to exist would be retarded and instead of being a contribution to free Europe it would be ballast, should it be a!ble to maintain itself as a State at all. Should the Sudeten Germans be allowed to return and to constitute themselves in a federative union in Czecho-Slovakia, 'lew nationality struggles, inseparable from heavy social and especially internatnonal repercus- , sions, would flare up anew. The Sudeten Germans would once again seek the aid of Germany against the Czechs and the Slovaks, thus disturbing Czecho-Slovak relations and becoming within Germany itself the support and lever of undemocratic, pan-Germaniically oriented elements. The troubled relations would mean a new threat to Czecho-Slovak independence. The satisfying of Sudeten German demands in this or that form would therefore be possible, in the final analysis, only at the price of Czecho-Slovakia's annihilation. One must also consider that in light of their historical development and their experiences, State independence is an indispensa'ble prerequisite for the CzechoSlovaks' national existence and growth. "For this very basic :reason it is a,bsolutely necessary that the West make no further change in its approval of the transfer and that it consider the Sudeten question settled. But for tactical reasons, too, the free world should resist the demands of the Sudeten Germans. Any manner of concessions would be interpreted by the Communist government as a sacrifice of Czecho-Slovak national interests in favor of German interests and would be regarded as a new threat to the national eX!istence of the Czech and Slovak peoples and would surely have a catastrophic effect on the spirit of resistance to and fight a·g ainst Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. It would compel the masses of Czechs and Slovaks to identify themselves with the Communist government against which they now stand resolutely opposed. "It is of no less importance to free Czecho-Slovaks than it is to the free world that Germany become a permanent member of the community of free peoples. This affiliation can only become effective and reliruble if Ger- SLOVAKIA 63 many recognizes the rights of other peoples, especially of the peoples of Central Europe, to national independence and sovereignty, and does not allow different groups be they from the ranks of the original population or from the ranks of the expelled minorities - to impose a policy on Germany which would, in its consequences, lead to a negation of these rights. For then Germany would cut itself off from the community of free peoples and instead of being a co-determinant, would be a destroyer of the Europe of the future. Since the return of the expellees would have just such consequences, this means, in the case of Czecho-Slovakia, that Germany should recognize the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as a definitive settlement. "Such recognition will also serve as the firmest foundation for truly friendly relations between free Germany and free Czechoslovakia. Czecho.JSlovakia desires nothing more than to be an island of <!reative peace which introduces no tensions into the international order and gives no occasion for quarrels but contributes to a non-violent organization of the world." There are also other opinions with regard to GermanCzech relations. They can, for obvious reasons, be worded much more concisely. Here is the answer of the "Czech Christian Democratic Movement in Exile" to the above memorandum: "It is our opinion that ,i t should be the highest political principle of the various refugee groups that they resolve their own problems in a spirit of Christian understanding. The step taken by the 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia' seems to us to be determined by the opposite of that principle. To defend the eX'pulsion of the Sudeten Germans from the western provinces of Czecho-Slovakia a measure which a self-aJppointed government of that country executed in the year of 1945 - appears to us to spell approval of the reprehensible deeds of the Bolshevists; it proves a lack of desire to subordinate one's own petty feelings to the concept of a united and peaceful Europe ... No European nation - above all no small na- SLOVAKIA 64 tion like ours - can find lasting peace in a divided Europe. Federalization is the only way to peace in Europe. The Czechs could scarcely participate in such a federation if they refused their German-speaking fellow-countrymen the right to their homeland, thus bringing about lasting tension between themselves and their big neighbor ... " In conclusion the Czech Christian Democrats renewed their approval of the Wiesbaden Agrement of Augus: 1950. Deriving from the spirit of this fairly well-known agreement, there has appeared in recent years a personality that may prove the dominant figure in the third period of Czechs and Slovaks in exile. On May 29, 1955, Army General Lev Prchala stated before the participants in _the mighty demonstration of Sudeten Germans at the 6th Sudeten Day in Nuremberg: "As a human being and as a European I condemn the crime that was committed against the Sudeten Germans in 1945. As a Czech and a Christian I feel myself obligated to ask the Sudeten German men and women for pardon." It is to be hoped that this seed will ripen. It is a good, fresh seed. Although an old man sowed it, it needs the cultivation of all true humanists who, from the mistakes of yesterday, via the adversities of today, believe in the dawning of a new tomorrow. P . Hletko, M.D., hooiorary president and former president of the League, was elected president. Philip A. Hrobak, president of the Lea,gue sin,ce Ma~, 1950, who favored the election Olf Dr. Hletk-0, now serves on the Executive Commitbce together with Monsignor Francis J. DlllboSlh, P.A. , Lakewood, Ohio, honorary president and former president of the League; Paul Jamrislm, Pittsburgh, Pa .; John A. ScJJ'bol, president of the First Catlho[ic Slovak Uinoion , Phoenixville, Pa., and Joseph G. 3€ 3€ 3€ Prusa, secretary of the Slov-a k CaThe Slovak League of America tholic Sokol. The next Oongress held its 36th Congress in Detroit, will be in Philadelphia, Pa. , in Mich., May 27-29, 1962. Dr. Peter 1-964. F.rano Stefunka, Slowik academic scu]Jptor, is working on, a memorial to Ja•n Kollar who was among the initiators of the cultural Pan-Slaivist'ic movement in S1<r vakia. 'Dhe Kollar creation is to be unveiled in Mosovce, Slovakia, on July 29, 1963, t'he 1'7oth anniversary of Kollar's birth. He is known particularly, for his ly,ric-e,pic poem "Slavy dcera" and his collection (4 volumes) of Slovak folksongs (Narodnie Zpievanky"). Kollar was born in Mosoivce, Slov.akia, on Jiuly 29, 1'7 93. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Czech Groups in Exile Description An account of the resource Fritz Peter Habel Slovakia, Vol. 12, No. 1 (35), March-June 1962 pp. 59-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Habel, Fritz Peter, 1931-2011 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1962 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4fdb5b8a3698d657769feb8089d33775.pdf ae6040e523fce94e9f61c6090ba446d6 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA EXPELLEES AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA BY OTTO VON HAIB,SBUiRG When Joseph Stalin seized upon the plan of Edward Benes to expel the Germans from the Bohemian lands, and when Communism expanded the idea to include the entire "Intermare" area between the Baltic and the Adriatic, his intention was not only to do his faithful vassals a favor. All political measures adopted by Communist politicians have their place in the great plan of world revolution. The expulsion of German ethnic groups from CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which is continued in the indirect but uninterrupted flight of Germans from the German Soviet Zone, was supposed to render more difficult the stabi1ization of West Germany and that of all Europe, if not hinder it altogether. It was supposed, furthermore, to pave the way for Communism. Moscow expected, as a consequence of the flooding of West Germany with expellees, that an "imminent revolutionary situation" would develop. It is perhaps Stalin's biggest disappointment after Potsdam that the hopes he pinned on the masses of pauperized and expropriated expellees were never realized. It is in fact the greatest "miracle" that has happened in West Germany - far greater and more meaningful than the "economic miracle" - that the expeHees did not become the reserve army of communism but, on the contrary, a constructive force and the bearers of constructive thinking for all of Europe. Moscow counted on it becoming impossible to integrate the expellees into the economy and society of West Germany. The West German State, it figured, or West German society would perhaps be incapable of adequately caring for the masses of expellees housed in vast barracks. Filled with resentment and bitterness, doubtful of a chance for return as well as of a new means of livelihood, overcome by camp psychoses and the will to destroy, the millions of expellees were expected in the eyes of the general staff of the world revolution, to become partisans and outriders of the Red offensive. �SLOVAKIA 19 While the West Germans were being bled white on the modest attempt to provide for these homeless persons or at least keeip them from starving to death, the victims themselves were expected, as social outcasts and expellees, to undermine legal security, prevent every form of political sta;bilization, burden the economy unendurably and thus succumb to the whi.sperings of Communist agents. The "solution" of the refugee problem in the Soviet occupied zone, where they wanted to create an example of Marxist social policy by "land reform" and the settling of expellees as "new settlers," was supposed to entice those expellees residing in the West likewise to become champions of Communism. Hatred of the Americans, who by their "betrayal of humanity" were the alleged cause of all the trouble, the rupture of national solidarity of the German people by an unbridgeaJble gap between old and new citizens, the hopelessness of a situation from which revolution seemed but the only way out, and the classic union of national or nationalist passions with social-revolutionary impulses to national Bolshevism - all that appeared i.n 1945 to be a guarantee that the Communist revolution would advance to the Rhine within a very short time, and soon would go beyond the Rhine. It seemed, too, that irts strongest pillars would be those who had caused their own misery. There was a catchword that e:xipressed everything the Communists expected from the expellees at thait time : Macedonians. Just as pro-Bulgarian elements within Macedonia, which had become Sel'lbian in 1913, not only fought against Serbian rule in the old homeland but became a constant revolutionary danger in their host counfu'y of Bulgaria, too, overthrowing governments, forming conspiracies, stirring up the people and trying to implicate the State in a policy fraught with risks, so the East Germans, the Sudetens, the Carpait·hians, Hungarian and Banat Germans were to have formed the e:x:plosive, with its fuse in Moscow, that would completely destroy Europe. Many are the reasons for things haviing turned out differently, motives that coincided to give developments a turn �20 SLOVAKIA unforeseen by Moscow. First of all was the lack of caution by Stalin, wh.o prematurely took off his mask in the Greek civil war; tJhen the Czech putsch of February 1948, followed by the blockade of Berlin, the Bolshevization CYf China, and, finally, with the invasion of Korea, in this way touching off America's reaction to his policy of permanent revolution by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the German currency reform and the re-estaiblishment of a German State. Nor should we forget either, the sober attitude of the American nation, which was prepared to revise dangerous mistakes just as radically as it had once succumbed to them, or the talents of the German people in the organizational, technical and economic field. The rapidly widening gap in the standard of living between people this side and the other side of the iron curtain was also important. All this and still more combined to cause Stalin's hopes to wither toward the end of his life, leading to a serious crisis of Communism between 1952 and 1956, which the West, however, did not know how to take proper advantage of. The ohief merit in the failure of the Benes-Stalin concept is to be attriibuted to the eX:pellees themselves, who, by remarkable self-discipline, moderation and objectivity, refrained from any policy of daring and revenge and, with minor exceptions, remained completely immune to Communist attempts at infiltration. They did not succumb for a minute to the danger of becoming the "Macedonians" of West Germany, but, instead, became the supporters of constructive European ideas. It is one of the most significant achievements of the expellees that t'hey have whetted the conscience of the free peoples and continually exhorted them to self-examination. International law, ever since the first world war, has increasingly fallen into decay, the concepts of riight and wrong have become confused ever since they were turned over to the propaganda apparatuses and the whim of mass passions to interpret them according to their own discretion and misuse them for the interests of power. In particular the motto of self-determination of peo- �SLOVAKIA ples, even during the interpretation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, was distorted beyond recognition and actually twisted to the opposite. 'Dhe expellees have not simply stanted at the po,i nt at which the concept was perverted and hence d~based. They related the demand for the right of self-determination to a large extent to a critical examination of German poLicy and to the political attitude of ethnic groups in the period prior to the first world war and in the thirties. They have seriously and in a thoroughgoing manner concerned themselves with the ethical motivation of the right to the homeland and have encouraged not only the experts on international and constitutional law in the free world, but, to an ever-growing degree, the t heologians to explore the right to the homeland in conjunction with the right to self-determination, self-government and self- administration, and to acquire, by so-doing, guiding principles for a new order in Europe. In the Charter of the Expellees we find the first results of that process of examination of conscience, of historic study, and of practical political consideraJt.ion of the possible and attainable. That was but the beginning. With the renouncing of revenge and retaliation, an ethical principle was anchored >in politics which had never before appeared with such clarity in the realm of international-legal considerations and in political aims. Today we can see in the Algerian issue that it was not just a question of problems touohing on East Germany and the Danubian area. It is a -suriprising fact, and may well fill with satisfaction those expellees W\ho come from old Austria, to know tihat the plans and proposals that were introduced by the French government toward a solut ion of the Algerian problem, approach those ideas that matured on Austrian soil between 1848 and 1918 and which were furtiher developed by the Sudeten Germans and could be matured in the struggle for the recognition of the right to the homeland. What formerly was a matter thaJt. concerned or appeared to concern only the Austrians and was understood by the peoples and ethnic groups of the Danubian Monarchy and of the German-Polish bovder area or the Baltic �22 SLOVAKIA States, today has become a question of the destiny of the free world and of Europe in particular. Africa, the Near East, India, and in Europe the regions in which there are still national issues this side of the iron curtain (South Tyrol), all need certain binding international-legal and constitutional-legal ideas and principles for solution and a new order, for satisfaobion and settlement. German e~pellees were the first to turn the attention of the free world to this vital problem and produced the first fruitful stimu~i. The contri'butions to thoughts on solving the nationalities problem made by Karl Renner and Ritter von Lodgman, Ignaz Seipel and Josef Redlich, Adolf Fisohhof and Franz Palacky, Aurel Popovici and Heinrich Lammasch, and, a:bove all, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his "workshop," are today acqui:r,ing world-wide importance. It was tJhe expellees who bridged the gap between past and present, between a territorially limited e:x!perimental station of co-living of various peoples in a State Community and the present global aspects of the question. As Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, stated at the Sudeten German Day in Munich, 1960, it is important not only to proclaim a right but to examine within wihat framework and within what higher legal order it can most ideally be reaHzed. At this very juncture the moderated conduct of the expellees proved a valua;ble maxim for all Europe. There are those who never tire of painting the expellee associations ·in Germany as disturber.s of the peace, "revengists," and nationalists. Only the reverse, however, is true. 'Dhe expellees were the first sizeable groups among the German people who displayed understanding for the integration policy of Adenauer and Sohuman, who supported it and ciharacterized the formation of supra-naJtional European arrangements as a condition for a new peaceful order for all Europe, in particular for East Central Europe. In the Eichstatt Declaration of 1949, in the Detmold Declaration, and in the rapidly ensuing resolutions and decisions of numerous associations - particularly the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in exile - there appeared for the first time propo- �SLOVAKIA 23 sals for a new European legal and State order within the framework of supra-State and supra-national organizations. And that is quite natural, too. The expellees bring from their homeland a rich storehouse of experiences and traditions which are directed to the necessity of international and supra-national agreements and organizations, to the dovetailing of autonomous, State and supra.:state faci'lities, to a common destiny and inseparability of vital communities in which different languages are spoken, with the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy, minority rights, and the complemenlting of territorial with personal selfadministration. In the areas where once the expellees had lived for centuries, the national.,State idea early proved to be problematical. The principal West European peoples looked upon the integral national State as an ideal ever since 1789, and retained their views into the 191:Jh Century. Whereas in France, Germany, and Italy tJhe ideas of the great Europeans met with tough opposition, since people simply could not imagine that portions of national sovereignty could and must be yielded, the expellees very quickly realized that this was a viltal condition for the realizaition of their claims to recognition of the right to the homeland and they unreservedly offered their services to the Europe of tomorrow. For them federalism was never a mere substrat-ificaition of the over-all State into bureaucratically administered areas of sovereignty, but was always linked to a maximum measure of self-administration and responsibility of the lower strata. From this treasury of experience they could and still can give Europe very much. In addition thereto are the temperament, spirit of enterprise, and economic adaptability of old pioneer and colonizing races. The German "economic miracle," particularly in its incipiency, needed certain attributes which the Germans from the East possessed to a high degree. Plus the fact, that they had nothing to lose and a new live1ihood to gain. Henice they were courageous enough to build a new economy from the ruins. The ambition to dispel the prejudices against those who arrived as "beggars," to �24 SLOVAKIA prove their ability, and not just to acquire formal political equality but the respeot of their fellow citizens as well all this contributed to the expellees' becoming a constructive European force in the economic sphere. Finally, one may point to their importance as conoisseurs of the Eastern peoples and political conditions of East European life. Thus in a certain sense one can speak of a re-colonizaJtion. IDight centuries ago the big trek began: Germans and Dutch colonists bore European civilizat ion eastwards. The progeny of these colonists came back to the West after 1945 as ex;pellees. They did not come as beneficiaries but brought with them as working people, politically active leaders and the bearers of a culture, tihe readiness to rebuild a new ·Europe. Tihey brought experience, skills, courage, and the concept of surpra..national legal order. One hundred years ago on Decemlber 12, 1861 - Btshop Stephen Moyses cxf Slovakia led a delegation, of Slovaks to Emperor Franois Jloseph to protest against Magyarization and the oppression of his Slovak people. The Memorandum presented the Emperor requested equa'l rights for the Slovaks and that the territory of the Slovaks becoone a separate adminisitrative unit, that is, tihalt it become autonoonous. anested again in 1950, and in the beginning of 11951 placed on trial with Bishops Vojtassak and Gojdic. The kalllgaroo court sentenced him to life imprisonment as ail• "enemy of the State." With amnesty in 1'961, Bi.shop Buzalka left prison to live under surveillance of the police at all times. Tihey found him dead, kneeling by his bed, hands clasped in prayer. Significant it is that even the "Katolicke Noviny" (The• Catholic ~ :IC :IC News) did not report the death Bishop Michael Buzalka, Auxili- of Bishop Buzal!ka, patriot amd ary of the Trnava Apostolic Ad- martyr for the cause of his Church ministrature, died on Dec. 7, 'liOOl, and his Slovak people. :IC :IC :IC according to a very belated report. Born in Sviity Anton, Slov,aBishop Joseph t arsky, Titular kia, Sept. 18, 11885, Bishop Buzal- Bishop of Tagora and apostolic adka was ordained priest July 14, ministr-ator for t he diocese of Ko1908, and consecrated Bishop in sice, Slovakia, died March 1•2, Riome on May '1'5, 1938. He was 1962, and was buried four days rector of the Bratislava Seminariy Iat,e r in the cathedral cr,yipt after and, during the war, Militazy Oir- appropriate religious servwes. Bidiir.iary for the Slovak Republic. shoip Carsky was born in G!bely, In 1•945, Bishop Buzalka was im- Slovakia, May 9, 1886, ordained prisoned, with two other Bishops priest Jiu}y 26, 1909, and named and many Slovak priests by ,t he bishop by the Vatican July 14, Reds, but later released. He was 1925. � 18 SLOVAKIA EXPELLEES AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA BY OTTO VON HAIB,SBUiRG When Joseph Stalin seized upon the plan of Edward Benes to expel the Germans from the Bohemian lands, and when Communism expanded the idea to include the entire "Intermare" area between the Baltic and the Adriatic, his intention was not only to do his faithful vassals a favor. All political measures adopted by Communist politicians have their place in the great plan of world revolution. The expulsion of German ethnic groups from CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which is continued in the indirect but uninterrupted flight of Germans from the German Soviet Zone, was supposed to render more difficult the stabi1ization of West Germany and that of all Europe, if not hinder it altogether. It was supposed, furthermore, to pave the way for Communism. Moscow expected, as a consequence of the flooding of West Germany with expellees, that an "imminent revolutionary situation" would develop. It is perhaps Stalin's biggest disappointment after Potsdam that the hopes he pinned on the masses of pauperized and expropriated expellees were never realized. It is in fact the greatest "miracle" that has happened in West Germany - far greater and more meaningful than the "economic miracle" - that the expeHees did not become the reserve army of communism but, on the contrary, a constructive force and the bearers of constructive thinking for all of Europe. Moscow counted on it becoming impossible to integrate the expellees into the economy and society of West Germany. The West German State, it figured, or West German society would perhaps be incapable of adequately caring for the masses of expellees housed in vast barracks. Filled with resentment and bitterness, doubtful of a chance for return as well as of a new means of livelihood, overcome by camp psychoses and the will to destroy, the millions of expellees were expected in the eyes of the general staff of the world revolution, to become partisans and outriders of the Red offensive. �SLOVAKIA 19 While the West Germans were being bled white on the modest attempt to provide for these homeless persons or at least keeip them from starving to death, the victims themselves were expected, as social outcasts and expellees, to undermine legal security, prevent every form of political sta;bilization, burden the economy unendurably and thus succumb to the whi.sperings of Communist agents. The "solution" of the refugee problem in the Soviet occupied zone, where they wanted to create an example of Marxist social policy by "land reform" and the settling of expellees as "new settlers," was supposed to entice those expellees residing in the West likewise to become champions of Communism. Hatred of the Americans, who by their "betrayal of humanity" were the alleged cause of all the trouble, the rupture of national solidarity of the German people by an unbridgeaJble gap between old and new citizens, the hopelessness of a situation from which revolution seemed but the only way out, and the classic union of national or nationalist passions with social-revolutionary impulses to national Bolshevism - all that appeared i.n 1945 to be a guarantee that the Communist revolution would advance to the Rhine within a very short time, and soon would go beyond the Rhine. It seemed, too, that irts strongest pillars would be those who had caused their own misery. There was a catchword that e:xipressed everything the Communists expected from the expellees at thait time : Macedonians. Just as pro-Bulgarian elements within Macedonia, which had become Sel'lbian in 1913, not only fought against Serbian rule in the old homeland but became a constant revolutionary danger in their host counfu'y of Bulgaria, too, overthrowing governments, forming conspiracies, stirring up the people and trying to implicate the State in a policy fraught with risks, so the East Germans, the Sudetens, the Carpait·hians, Hungarian and Banat Germans were to have formed the e:x:plosive, with its fuse in Moscow, that would completely destroy Europe. Many are the reasons for things haviing turned out differently, motives that coincided to give developments a turn �20 SLOVAKIA unforeseen by Moscow. First of all was the lack of caution by Stalin, wh.o prematurely took off his mask in the Greek civil war; tJhen the Czech putsch of February 1948, followed by the blockade of Berlin, the Bolshevization CYf China, and, finally, with the invasion of Korea, in this way touching off America's reaction to his policy of permanent revolution by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the German currency reform and the re-estaiblishment of a German State. Nor should we forget either, the sober attitude of the American nation, which was prepared to revise dangerous mistakes just as radically as it had once succumbed to them, or the talents of the German people in the organizational, technical and economic field. The rapidly widening gap in the standard of living between people this side and the other side of the iron curtain was also important. All this and still more combined to cause Stalin's hopes to wither toward the end of his life, leading to a serious crisis of Communism between 1952 and 1956, which the West, however, did not know how to take proper advantage of. The ohief merit in the failure of the Benes-Stalin concept is to be attriibuted to the eX:pellees themselves, who, by remarkable self-discipline, moderation and objectivity, refrained from any policy of daring and revenge and, with minor exceptions, remained completely immune to Communist attempts at infiltration. They did not succumb for a minute to the danger of becoming the "Macedonians" of West Germany, but, instead, became the supporters of constructive European ideas. It is one of the most significant achievements of the expellees that t'hey have whetted the conscience of the free peoples and continually exhorted them to self-examination. International law, ever since the first world war, has increasingly fallen into decay, the concepts of riight and wrong have become confused ever since they were turned over to the propaganda apparatuses and the whim of mass passions to interpret them according to their own discretion and misuse them for the interests of power. In particular the motto of self-determination of peo- �SLOVAKIA ples, even during the interpretation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, was distorted beyond recognition and actually twisted to the opposite. 'Dhe expellees have not simply stanted at the po,i nt at which the concept was perverted and hence d~based. They related the demand for the right of self-determination to a large extent to a critical examination of German poLicy and to the political attitude of ethnic groups in the period prior to the first world war and in the thirties. They have seriously and in a thoroughgoing manner concerned themselves with the ethical motivation of the right to the homeland and have encouraged not only the experts on international and constitutional law in the free world, but, to an ever-growing degree, the t heologians to explore the right to the homeland in conjunction with the right to self-determination, self-government and self- administration, and to acquire, by so-doing, guiding principles for a new order in Europe. In the Charter of the Expellees we find the first results of that process of examination of conscience, of historic study, and of practical political consideraJt.ion of the possible and attainable. That was but the beginning. With the renouncing of revenge and retaliation, an ethical principle was anchored >in politics which had never before appeared with such clarity in the realm of international-legal considerations and in political aims. Today we can see in the Algerian issue that it was not just a question of problems touohing on East Germany and the Danubian area. It is a -suriprising fact, and may well fill with satisfaction those expellees W\ho come from old Austria, to know tihat the plans and proposals that were introduced by the French government toward a solut ion of the Algerian problem, approach those ideas that matured on Austrian soil between 1848 and 1918 and which were furtiher developed by the Sudeten Germans and could be matured in the struggle for the recognition of the right to the homeland. What formerly was a matter thaJt. concerned or appeared to concern only the Austrians and was understood by the peoples and ethnic groups of the Danubian Monarchy and of the German-Polish bovder area or the Baltic �22 SLOVAKIA States, today has become a question of the destiny of the free world and of Europe in particular. Africa, the Near East, India, and in Europe the regions in which there are still national issues this side of the iron curtain (South Tyrol), all need certain binding international-legal and constitutional-legal ideas and principles for solution and a new order, for satisfaobion and settlement. German e~pellees were the first to turn the attention of the free world to this vital problem and produced the first fruitful stimu~i. The contri'butions to thoughts on solving the nationalities problem made by Karl Renner and Ritter von Lodgman, Ignaz Seipel and Josef Redlich, Adolf Fisohhof and Franz Palacky, Aurel Popovici and Heinrich Lammasch, and, a:bove all, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his "workshop," are today acqui:r,ing world-wide importance. It was tJhe expellees who bridged the gap between past and present, between a territorially limited e:x!perimental station of co-living of various peoples in a State Community and the present global aspects of the question. As Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, stated at the Sudeten German Day in Munich, 1960, it is important not only to proclaim a right but to examine within wihat framework and within what higher legal order it can most ideally be reaHzed. At this very juncture the moderated conduct of the expellees proved a valua;ble maxim for all Europe. There are those who never tire of painting the expellee associations ·in Germany as disturber.s of the peace, "revengists," and nationalists. Only the reverse, however, is true. 'Dhe expellees were the first sizeable groups among the German people who displayed understanding for the integration policy of Adenauer and Sohuman, who supported it and ciharacterized the formation of supra-naJtional European arrangements as a condition for a new peaceful order for all Europe, in particular for East Central Europe. In the Eichstatt Declaration of 1949, in the Detmold Declaration, and in the rapidly ensuing resolutions and decisions of numerous associations - particularly the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in exile - there appeared for the first time propo- �SLOVAKIA 23 sals for a new European legal and State order within the framework of supra-State and supra-national organizations. And that is quite natural, too. The expellees bring from their homeland a rich storehouse of experiences and traditions which are directed to the necessity of international and supra-national agreements and organizations, to the dovetailing of autonomous, State and supra.:state faci'lities, to a common destiny and inseparability of vital communities in which different languages are spoken, with the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy, minority rights, and the complemenlting of territorial with personal selfadministration. In the areas where once the expellees had lived for centuries, the national.,State idea early proved to be problematical. The principal West European peoples looked upon the integral national State as an ideal ever since 1789, and retained their views into the 191:Jh Century. Whereas in France, Germany, and Italy tJhe ideas of the great Europeans met with tough opposition, since people simply could not imagine that portions of national sovereignty could and must be yielded, the expellees very quickly realized that this was a viltal condition for the realizaition of their claims to recognition of the right to the homeland and they unreservedly offered their services to the Europe of tomorrow. For them federalism was never a mere substrat-ificaition of the over-all State into bureaucratically administered areas of sovereignty, but was always linked to a maximum measure of self-administration and responsibility of the lower strata. From this treasury of experience they could and still can give Europe very much. In addition thereto are the temperament, spirit of enterprise, and economic adaptability of old pioneer and colonizing races. The German "economic miracle," particularly in its incipiency, needed certain attributes which the Germans from the East possessed to a high degree. Plus the fact, that they had nothing to lose and a new live1ihood to gain. Henice they were courageous enough to build a new economy from the ruins. The ambition to dispel the prejudices against those who arrived as "beggars," to �24 SLOVAKIA prove their ability, and not just to acquire formal political equality but the respeot of their fellow citizens as well all this contributed to the expellees' becoming a constructive European force in the economic sphere. Finally, one may point to their importance as conoisseurs of the Eastern peoples and political conditions of East European life. Thus in a certain sense one can speak of a re-colonizaJtion. IDight centuries ago the big trek began: Germans and Dutch colonists bore European civilizat ion eastwards. The progeny of these colonists came back to the West after 1945 as ex;pellees. They did not come as beneficiaries but brought with them as working people, politically active leaders and the bearers of a culture, tihe readiness to rebuild a new ·Europe. Tihey brought experience, skills, courage, and the concept of surpra..national legal order. One hundred years ago on Decemlber 12, 1861 - Btshop Stephen Moyses cxf Slovakia led a delegation, of Slovaks to Emperor Franois Jloseph to protest against Magyarization and the oppression of his Slovak people. The Memorandum presented the Emperor requested equa'l rights for the Slovaks and that the territory of the Slovaks becoone a separate adminisitrative unit, that is, tihalt it become autonoonous. anested again in 1950, and in the beginning of 11951 placed on trial with Bishops Vojtassak and Gojdic. The kalllgaroo court sentenced him to life imprisonment as ail• "enemy of the State." With amnesty in 1'961, Bi.shop Buzalka left prison to live under surveillance of the police at all times. Tihey found him dead, kneeling by his bed, hands clasped in prayer. Significant it is that even the "Katolicke Noviny" (The• Catholic ~ :IC :IC News) did not report the death Bishop Michael Buzalka, Auxili- of Bishop Buzal!ka, patriot amd ary of the Trnava Apostolic Ad- martyr for the cause of his Church ministrature, died on Dec. 7, 'liOOl, and his Slovak people. :IC :IC :IC according to a very belated report. Born in Sviity Anton, Slov,aBishop Joseph t arsky, Titular kia, Sept. 18, 11885, Bishop Buzal- Bishop of Tagora and apostolic adka was ordained priest July 14, ministr-ator for t he diocese of Ko1908, and consecrated Bishop in sice, Slovakia, died March 1•2, Riome on May '1'5, 1938. He was 1962, and was buried four days rector of the Bratislava Seminariy Iat,e r in the cathedral cr,yipt after and, during the war, Militazy Oir- appropriate religious servwes. Bidiir.iary for the Slovak Republic. shoip Carsky was born in G!bely, In 1•945, Bishop Buzalka was im- Slovakia, May 9, 1886, ordained prisoned, with two other Bishops priest Jiu}y 26, 1909, and named and many Slovak priests by ,t he bishop by the Vatican July 14, Reds, but later released. He was 1925. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1962, Vol. 12 Description An account of the resource Issue 1 (No. 35), March-June 1962. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1962 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA EXPELLEES AND THE EUROPEAN IDEA BY OTTO VON HAIB,SBUiRG When Joseph Stalin seized upon the plan of Edward Benes to expel the Germans from the Bohemian lands, and when Communism expanded the idea to include the entire "Intermare" area between the Baltic and the Adriatic, his intention was not only to do his faithful vassals a favor. All political measures adopted by Communist politicians have their place in the great plan of world revolution. The expulsion of German ethnic groups from CzechoSlovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which is continued in the indirect but uninterrupted flight of Germans from the German Soviet Zone, was supposed to render more difficult the stabi1ization of West Germany and that of all Europe, if not hinder it altogether. It was supposed, furthermore, to pave the way for Communism. Moscow expected, as a consequence of the flooding of West Germany with expellees, that an "imminent revolutionary situation" would develop. It is perhaps Stalin's biggest disappointment after Potsdam that the hopes he pinned on the masses of pauperized and expropriated expellees were never realized. It is in fact the greatest "miracle" that has happened in West Germany - far greater and more meaningful than the "economic miracle" - that the expeHees did not become the reserve army of communism but, on the contrary, a constructive force and the bearers of constructive thinking for all of Europe. Moscow counted on it becoming impossible to integrate the expellees into the economy and society of West Germany. The West German State, it figured, or West German society would perhaps be incapable of adequately caring for the masses of expellees housed in vast barracks. Filled with resentment and bitterness, doubtful of a chance for return as well as of a new means of livelihood, overcome by camp psychoses and the will to destroy, the millions of expellees were expected in the eyes of the general staff of the world revolution, to become partisans and outriders of the Red offensive. SLOVAKIA 19 While the West Germans were being bled white on the modest attempt to provide for these homeless persons or at least keeip them from starving to death, the victims themselves were expected, as social outcasts and expellees, to undermine legal security, prevent every form of political sta;bilization, burden the economy unendurably and thus succumb to the whi.sperings of Communist agents. The "solution" of the refugee problem in the Soviet occupied zone, where they wanted to create an example of Marxist social policy by "land reform" and the settling of expellees as "new settlers," was supposed to entice those expellees residing in the West likewise to become champions of Communism. Hatred of the Americans, who by their "betrayal of humanity" were the alleged cause of all the trouble, the rupture of national solidarity of the German people by an unbridgeaJble gap between old and new citizens, the hopelessness of a situation from which revolution seemed but the only way out, and the classic union of national or nationalist passions with social-revolutionary impulses to national Bolshevism - all that appeared i.n 1945 to be a guarantee that the Communist revolution would advance to the Rhine within a very short time, and soon would go beyond the Rhine. It seemed, too, that irts strongest pillars would be those who had caused their own misery. There was a catchword that e:xipressed everything the Communists expected from the expellees at thait time : Macedonians. Just as pro-Bulgarian elements within Macedonia, which had become Sel'lbian in 1913, not only fought against Serbian rule in the old homeland but became a constant revolutionary danger in their host counfu'y of Bulgaria, too, overthrowing governments, forming conspiracies, stirring up the people and trying to implicate the State in a policy fraught with risks, so the East Germans, the Sudetens, the Carpait·hians, Hungarian and Banat Germans were to have formed the e:x:plosive, with its fuse in Moscow, that would completely destroy Europe. Many are the reasons for things haviing turned out differently, motives that coincided to give developments a turn 20 SLOVAKIA unforeseen by Moscow. First of all was the lack of caution by Stalin, wh.o prematurely took off his mask in the Greek civil war; tJhen the Czech putsch of February 1948, followed by the blockade of Berlin, the Bolshevization CYf China, and, finally, with the invasion of Korea, in this way touching off America's reaction to his policy of permanent revolution by the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the German currency reform and the re-estaiblishment of a German State. Nor should we forget either, the sober attitude of the American nation, which was prepared to revise dangerous mistakes just as radically as it had once succumbed to them, or the talents of the German people in the organizational, technical and economic field. The rapidly widening gap in the standard of living between people this side and the other side of the iron curtain was also important. All this and still more combined to cause Stalin's hopes to wither toward the end of his life, leading to a serious crisis of Communism between 1952 and 1956, which the West, however, did not know how to take proper advantage of. The ohief merit in the failure of the Benes-Stalin concept is to be attriibuted to the eX:pellees themselves, who, by remarkable self-discipline, moderation and objectivity, refrained from any policy of daring and revenge and, with minor exceptions, remained completely immune to Communist attempts at infiltration. They did not succumb for a minute to the danger of becoming the "Macedonians" of West Germany, but, instead, became the supporters of constructive European ideas. It is one of the most significant achievements of the expellees that t'hey have whetted the conscience of the free peoples and continually exhorted them to self-examination. International law, ever since the first world war, has increasingly fallen into decay, the concepts of riight and wrong have become confused ever since they were turned over to the propaganda apparatuses and the whim of mass passions to interpret them according to their own discretion and misuse them for the interests of power. In particular the motto of self-determination of peo- SLOVAKIA ples, even during the interpretation of the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, was distorted beyond recognition and actually twisted to the opposite. 'Dhe expellees have not simply stanted at the po,i nt at which the concept was perverted and hence d~based. They related the demand for the right of self-determination to a large extent to a critical examination of German poLicy and to the political attitude of ethnic groups in the period prior to the first world war and in the thirties. They have seriously and in a thoroughgoing manner concerned themselves with the ethical motivation of the right to the homeland and have encouraged not only the experts on international and constitutional law in the free world, but, to an ever-growing degree, the t heologians to explore the right to the homeland in conjunction with the right to self-determination, self-government and self- administration, and to acquire, by so-doing, guiding principles for a new order in Europe. In the Charter of the Expellees we find the first results of that process of examination of conscience, of historic study, and of practical political consideraJt.ion of the possible and attainable. That was but the beginning. With the renouncing of revenge and retaliation, an ethical principle was anchored >in politics which had never before appeared with such clarity in the realm of international-legal considerations and in political aims. Today we can see in the Algerian issue that it was not just a question of problems touohing on East Germany and the Danubian area. It is a -suriprising fact, and may well fill with satisfaction those expellees W\ho come from old Austria, to know tihat the plans and proposals that were introduced by the French government toward a solut ion of the Algerian problem, approach those ideas that matured on Austrian soil between 1848 and 1918 and which were furtiher developed by the Sudeten Germans and could be matured in the struggle for the recognition of the right to the homeland. What formerly was a matter thaJt. concerned or appeared to concern only the Austrians and was understood by the peoples and ethnic groups of the Danubian Monarchy and of the German-Polish bovder area or the Baltic 22 SLOVAKIA States, today has become a question of the destiny of the free world and of Europe in particular. Africa, the Near East, India, and in Europe the regions in which there are still national issues this side of the iron curtain (South Tyrol), all need certain binding international-legal and constitutional-legal ideas and principles for solution and a new order, for satisfaobion and settlement. German e~pellees were the first to turn the attention of the free world to this vital problem and produced the first fruitful stimu~i. The contri'butions to thoughts on solving the nationalities problem made by Karl Renner and Ritter von Lodgman, Ignaz Seipel and Josef Redlich, Adolf Fisohhof and Franz Palacky, Aurel Popovici and Heinrich Lammasch, and, a:bove all, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his "workshop," are today acqui:r,ing world-wide importance. It was tJhe expellees who bridged the gap between past and present, between a territorially limited e:x!perimental station of co-living of various peoples in a State Community and the present global aspects of the question. As Minister of Defense, Franz Josef Strauss, stated at the Sudeten German Day in Munich, 1960, it is important not only to proclaim a right but to examine within wihat framework and within what higher legal order it can most ideally be reaHzed. At this very juncture the moderated conduct of the expellees proved a valua;ble maxim for all Europe. There are those who never tire of painting the expellee associations ·in Germany as disturber.s of the peace, "revengists," and nationalists. Only the reverse, however, is true. 'Dhe expellees were the first sizeable groups among the German people who displayed understanding for the integration policy of Adenauer and Sohuman, who supported it and ciharacterized the formation of supra-naJtional European arrangements as a condition for a new peaceful order for all Europe, in particular for East Central Europe. In the Eichstatt Declaration of 1949, in the Detmold Declaration, and in the rapidly ensuing resolutions and decisions of numerous associations - particularly the Wiesbaden Agreement between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs in exile - there appeared for the first time propo- SLOVAKIA 23 sals for a new European legal and State order within the framework of supra-State and supra-national organizations. And that is quite natural, too. The expellees bring from their homeland a rich storehouse of experiences and traditions which are directed to the necessity of international and supra-national agreements and organizations, to the dovetailing of autonomous, State and supra.:state faci'lities, to a common destiny and inseparability of vital communities in which different languages are spoken, with the right to linguistic and cultural autonomy, minority rights, and the complemenlting of territorial with personal selfadministration. In the areas where once the expellees had lived for centuries, the national.,State idea early proved to be problematical. The principal West European peoples looked upon the integral national State as an ideal ever since 1789, and retained their views into the 191:Jh Century. Whereas in France, Germany, and Italy tJhe ideas of the great Europeans met with tough opposition, since people simply could not imagine that portions of national sovereignty could and must be yielded, the expellees very quickly realized that this was a viltal condition for the realizaition of their claims to recognition of the right to the homeland and they unreservedly offered their services to the Europe of tomorrow. For them federalism was never a mere substrat-ificaition of the over-all State into bureaucratically administered areas of sovereignty, but was always linked to a maximum measure of self-administration and responsibility of the lower strata. From this treasury of experience they could and still can give Europe very much. In addition thereto are the temperament, spirit of enterprise, and economic adaptability of old pioneer and colonizing races. The German "economic miracle," particularly in its incipiency, needed certain attributes which the Germans from the East possessed to a high degree. Plus the fact, that they had nothing to lose and a new live1ihood to gain. Henice they were courageous enough to build a new economy from the ruins. The ambition to dispel the prejudices against those who arrived as "beggars," to 24 SLOVAKIA prove their ability, and not just to acquire formal political equality but the respeot of their fellow citizens as well all this contributed to the expellees' becoming a constructive European force in the economic sphere. Finally, one may point to their importance as conoisseurs of the Eastern peoples and political conditions of East European life. Thus in a certain sense one can speak of a re-colonizaJtion. IDight centuries ago the big trek began: Germans and Dutch colonists bore European civilizat ion eastwards. The progeny of these colonists came back to the West after 1945 as ex;pellees. They did not come as beneficiaries but brought with them as working people, politically active leaders and the bearers of a culture, tihe readiness to rebuild a new ·Europe. Tihey brought experience, skills, courage, and the concept of surpra..national legal order. One hundred years ago on Decemlber 12, 1861 - Btshop Stephen Moyses cxf Slovakia led a delegation, of Slovaks to Emperor Franois Jloseph to protest against Magyarization and the oppression of his Slovak people. The Memorandum presented the Emperor requested equa'l rights for the Slovaks and that the territory of the Slovaks becoone a separate adminisitrative unit, that is, tihalt it become autonoonous. anested again in 1950, and in the beginning of 11951 placed on trial with Bishops Vojtassak and Gojdic. The kalllgaroo court sentenced him to life imprisonment as ail• "enemy of the State." With amnesty in 1'961, Bi.shop Buzalka left prison to live under surveillance of the police at all times. Tihey found him dead, kneeling by his bed, hands clasped in prayer. Significant it is that even the "Katolicke Noviny" (The• Catholic ~ :IC :IC News) did not report the death Bishop Michael Buzalka, Auxili- of Bishop Buzal!ka, patriot amd ary of the Trnava Apostolic Ad- martyr for the cause of his Church ministrature, died on Dec. 7, 'liOOl, and his Slovak people. :IC :IC :IC according to a very belated report. Born in Sviity Anton, Slov,aBishop Joseph t arsky, Titular kia, Sept. 18, 11885, Bishop Buzal- Bishop of Tagora and apostolic adka was ordained priest July 14, ministr-ator for t he diocese of Ko1908, and consecrated Bishop in sice, Slovakia, died March 1•2, Riome on May '1'5, 1938. He was 1962, and was buried four days rector of the Bratislava Seminariy Iat,e r in the cathedral cr,yipt after and, during the war, Militazy Oir- appropriate religious servwes. Bidiir.iary for the Slovak Republic. shoip Carsky was born in G!bely, In 1•945, Bishop Buzalka was im- Slovakia, May 9, 1886, ordained prisoned, with two other Bishops priest Jiu}y 26, 1909, and named and many Slovak priests by ,t he bishop by the Vatican July 14, Reds, but later released. He was 1925.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Expellees and the European Idea Description An account of the resource Otto von Habsburg Slovakia, Vol. 12, No. 1 (35), March-June 1962 pp. 18-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Habsburg, Otto von, 1912-2011 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March-June 1962 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/64c7484d3942d7f02a6a816065018048.pdf 08cc45405d9a6b4a5edd5b060d9e8483 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2021 53 RECONSIDERING SLOVAK-AMERICAN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: THOMAS BELL'S OUT OF THIS FURNACE IN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT Frederick Hale Introduction If any work of fiction deserves to be called " the great SlovakAmerican historical novel ," it is undoubtedly Thomas Bell 's Out of This Furnace. To be sure, the competition is nearly non-existent. 1 Nevertheless, since its initial publication in 1941 , thi s volume of more than 400 pages has offered readers a hi ghly readable and insightful view of immigrant laborers and their descendants, chiefly in the steel mill town s of western Pennsylvania where many Slovaks toiled. Their presence became woven into the multicolored ethni c fabric of that once-booming region. Though for many upward social mobility came at a snai l's pace, organized community li fe began early and remained vibrant, and the members of the group contributed mightily to the prosperity of the cities in which they sacrificed seemingly endless hours on the a ltars of an economy of wh ich they were far more the victims than the lords. Beg inning, apparently, as economically virtually powerless and thus wi lling to accept their su bservient lot in life, many gradua lly gained a bolder spirit through the labor movements in which they participated . In tandem with their inevitable assim ilation, Slovak-Americans eventuall y gained a greater voice in the direction of their working lives. These interrelated matters form much of the thematic warp and woof of Bell 's much-lauded novel , which traces three generations through their tribul ations to a more ass imilated 1 Michael ovak 's quasi-autobiogra phical The Tiber Was S ilver ( 1961) failed to make a perceptible splash in the waters of American literature, and hi s Naked I l eave ( 1970), whi ch was more widely rev iewed, was a lso criticall y interpreted as a fictional ized mirror of hi s transition from Roman Catho li c se minarian to journalist. These intensely personal works by a prominent Slovak-American inte llectua l whose life began in Jo hn stown , Pennsylvania, in 1933 are not w itho ut arti stic merit , but th ey belo ng to a sub-genre o f ficti o n quite different from Be ll 's realistic po rtraya l of th e ethni c g roup's hi story in th e late nin eteenth and ea rl y twenti eth centuri es. �54 SLOVAKIA 2021 status and to higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Mu tat is mutandis, the story it tells echoes that of numerous other immigrant groups in urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conceivably the eventual upward mobility-engendered in part by the labor movement- underlay the translation of this work into Slovak and its publication in 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when that country was to a great degree under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the chilliest days of the Cold War. Furthermore, owing to its pedagogical value for teaching American immigration and labor hi story, in 1976 the University of Pittsburgh reprinted Out of This Furnace in response to a proposal by Professor David P. Demarest of Carnegie Mellon University. It fitted this social activist's converging interests in workingclass literature and labor history hand-in-glove. The relative popularity of the book led to a fiftieth anniversary edition in 1991. Bell illuminated many facets of Slovak-American working-class life and did not hesitate to include in his narrati ve several less savory dimensions of it that less candid writers might have chosen to minimize or ignore entirely in the interests of presenting palatable impressions of their respective ethnic groups. As Professor David J. Goldberg noted in 20 IO when advocating the assignment of Out of This Furnace to university students, " Men get drunk in saloons. Weddings and funerals are occasions for arguments." 2 A Limited Tradition of Scholarly Consideration Out of This Furnace has been neither the beneficiary nor the victim of extensive scholarly criticism, but it has not been completely ignored. In hi s study of American writers of the 1930s, especially those on the political Left, Leo Gurko devoted a few paragraphs to Bell ' s authorship and commented on this novel. However, Gurko did not evince adequate familiarity with this novelist's oeuvre. He judged that the ideological positions taken by Bell's characters "end with trade-unionism and anti-fascism," a myopic observation that overlooks the central character in All Brides Are Beautiful. Turning specifically to the hi storical span of Out o_fThis Furnace, Gurko thought that 2 David J. Goldberg, "Thomas Bell's 0111 o_(This Furnace: An Evaluation and an Appreciation," Journal of American Ethnic History, XXIX, no. 2 (Winter 2010), p. 664 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 55 it covered two generations of Slovak-Americans, when in fact it dealt with three. 3 In 1975, i.e. a year before its republication by the University of Pittsburgh Press, John F. Berko contributed an article about Bell as a novelist to the journal Slovak Studies but devoted only one page to this particular novel. 4 Furthermore, after encouraging its republication Demarest wrote a moderately detailed Afterword in which he provided useful information without dissecting the text. The eminent historian of Slovak immigrants in North America Marian Mark Stolarik has credited Bell with describing Slovak-American life "very we ll" but lamented that he had "completely ignored the religiosity" of this ethnic group. 5 Stolarik's criticism at this point dovetails neatly with what he and other historians have repeatedly stated about the enthusiasm of Slovak-Americans for ecclesiastical life. In his article " Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," for example, published in the Slovak League of America's celebratory bicentennial volume in 1978, Daniel F. Tanzone could declare without reserve that "the most di stinctive characteristic of the Slovaks is their deep and abiding faith in God." The zeal they evinced in Central Europe, he emphasized, became transatlantic as immigrants from Slovakia " made great effort to hear the word of God preached to them in their native Slovak tongue." 6 The linkage between social and religious life has also been highlighted in the pertinent historiography. As Stolarik explained in the 1980s, upon settling in the United States Slovaks typically initiated this by founding "fraternal-benefit" societies to provide emotional and economic safety nets. These lodges usually reflected the discrete religious affiliations of individuals within the larger group and were identifiable as de facto Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. From the religious cohesion of such local societies formal , 3 Leo Gurko, The Angty Decade (New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947), 66-9. John F. Berko, "Thomas Bell ( 1903- 196 1) Slovak-Ameri can Novelist," Slovak S1udies, XV ( 1975), 143-58. 5 M. Mark Stolarik to Frederick Hale, 14 November 20 17 (electronic correspondence) . 6 Daniel F. Tanzone, "Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," in Slovaks in America: A Bicenlennial S!udy (Middletown, Pennsylvani a: The Slovak League of America, 1978), 57 . 4 �56 SLOVAKIA 2021 distinctly Slovak parishes sprang, often after a period of worshiping with, for example, Polish fellow immigrants.7 In his history of three generations of Slovak-Americans in the steel mill town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from the 1880s until the 1970s, Stolarik related in some detail how they were divided into three religious communities, chiefly Roman Catholic but also Greek Catholic and Lutheran . Church life among many of these people appears to have been vibrant, despite chronic financial hardship that, for example, protracted the amortization of mortgages. Church edifices began to appear at a very early stage. 8 He was thus not in doubt that " religion played a central role in the life of Bethlehem Slovaks."9 Of particular relevance to Out of This Furnace, Stolarik argued that on a national basis the "overwhelming loyalty" of Slovak-Americans to their religious life helped to immunize them from an early stage of their history to socialist movements which were drawing support from many other working-class immigrants well before the end of the nineteenth century. 10 More than two decades later, Stolarik published what may be the most up-to-date, albeit still brief, scholarly consideration of SlovakAmerican religious life. Writing in The Catholic Historical Review, he emphasized why the immigrants in question were divided into four denominations and how they adjusted to ecclesiastical circumstances in the United States of America and Canada, particularly the creation of specific ethnic parishes. Stolarik did not, however, deal with such matters as the non-affiliation of individuals with churches, anticlericalism, and hostility to or disagreement with religion as such. He judiciously acknowledged that much research remained to be done before historians could paint anything approaching a comprehensive portrait of the spiritual life of Slovak-Americans generally. 11 7 Marian Mark Stolarik , Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 18701918 (New York: AMS Press, Inc ., 1989), 82-3 . 8 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Genera/ions of Slovaks in Bethlehem. Pennsylvania. 1880-/9 76 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 44-62. 44. 10 Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization, 8 1. 11 M. Mark Stolarik, " Slovak Immigrants Come to Term s with Reli g ious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , no. I (January 20 I 0): 5684. 9 Ibid ., �SLOVAKIA 2021 57 The publication in 2012 of his lengthy Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/ 870-2010) gave Stolarik an opportunity to touch on aspects of Slovak immigrants ' religious life in North America. His seventh chapter, "Slovak Marxists Disagree" dealt with what he acknowledged were the "few Marxists" among the Slovaks in the United States and Canada. This minuscule segment established mutual benefit societies which competed on a minor scale with the churches for the loyalty of the immigrants and their descendants but, as Stolarik emphasized, "their number remained small." 12 He briefly traced a waning of the socialists ' initially strident criticism ofreligious life and concluded that by the 1940s the verbal warfare had ceased. 13 The di sagreements to which the chapter' s title refers were largely those among the socialists themselves, especially with regard to political developments in their homeland, not to disputes between these men of the left and the ecclesiastical traditions they had left behind. The empirically challenging question of the scope of general SlovakAmerican indifference to and non-participation in formal religious life thus remained essentially unanswered. Regarding participation in secular campaigns to improve working conditions in industrial America, it is difficult to ascertain how many of these newcomers and their descendants supported the more inclusive labor movement, which in the USA was only partly socialist. However, it is known that Bell himself was a man of the Left, albeit not in a consistently outspoken way. How unrepresentative of SlovakAmericans he was in that regard is an interesting question, though one that necessarily lies beyond the scope of the present article. At any rate, in Out o_f This Furnace Bell presented the labor movement in a positive manner and highlighted the participation of at least a small number of Slovak-Americans in it. This is probably significant to an understanding of the dispersed treatment of religion in this fictional construction. 12 M. Mark Stolarik, Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( / 87020 10) (Bern : Peter Lang AG, Internati onal Academi c Publishers, 201 2), p. 205. 13 Stolarik, Wh ere Is My Home?, pp. 2 12-2 13. �58 SLOVAKIA 2021 A Little-known Literary A rtist Bell ' s earl y li fe endowed him with an intimate know ledge of hi s subj ect. His parents were fro m the village of Ni zny Tvarozec in the Bardejov d istri ct of the Presov reg ion of northwestern Slovaki a. He was born in the mill tow n of Braddock, Penn sylvani a, j ust east of Pi ttsburgh, in 1903 . 14 That small c ity had a popul ati on of 15,654 in 1900, a fig ure whi ch rose to sli ghtly over 20,000 two decades later before a persistent dec line reduced it to a poverty-stri cken village in the late twentieth century. His origi nal name was Ada lbert Thomas Belejcak, a cu mbersome moniker whi ch he never used during hi s career as a nove li st. Leav ing schoo l as an ado lescent, he worked loca ll y from age fifteen as an electri c ian' s apprenti ce but in 1922 re located to New York and was vari ously empl oyed fo r approximate ly a decade as a merchant sea man, boo kstore clerk , and mechani c. Bell 's first nove l, The Breed of Bas il, appeared in 1930, and from 1933 onward he was a fu ll -time writer, th ough onl y fi ve of hi s nove ls were issued. Hi s All Brides Are Beautiful was the bas is of a motion picture starrin g Joa n Fonta ine and Mark Stevens, and Till! Come Back to You was dramati zed and produced on Broadway by Jed Harri s. In other noteworthy d imensions of his career w ith the pen, Be ll contri buted short stori es to such magazi nes as McCall 's and Ladies ' Home J ournal, and eventuall y worked as a Holl ywood screenwriter. After mov ing to Cali fo rni a in 1955 , he continued to write sporadi ca ll y whil e operating the East Side Gift and Stati onery Shop in Santa Cruz. His hea lth deteri orated in the late 1950s, and he di ed of cancer in 196 1. The fun era l was held in a mortuary chapel rather than a church, and Bell 's ashes were interred at the crematory of the Independent Order of Odd Fell ows . 15 The few sources of readil y ava il able info rmation about hi s li fe do not suggest th at he had any ex perience in Slovaki a, and nothin g in Out of This Furnace indi cates that he had noteworthy know ledge of that coun try apart fro m what may have been handed down ora ll y from hi s fo rebears. Bell appears to have reli ed almost exc lusive ly on ora l traditi on and memories of hi s childhood in western Penn sy lvani a when craftin g thi s nove l. 14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wikiff homas_ Bell_(nove list). Accessed 2 January 2020. For SC ovelist T homas Bell Set," Santa Cruz Sentinel, 17 January I 96 1, p. 12. 15 " Servi ces �SLOVAKIA 2021 59 Ideologically, Bell stood unabashedly on the left flank of the American political spectrum. This comes to the fore more vividly in his credible proletarian novel of 1936, All Brides Are Beautiful, which was the basis of the motion picture From This Day Forward, which premiered in 1946. Set in New York during the Depression of the 1930s, its principal protagonist is an Irish-American named Peter Cummings who, like many of his fellow citizens, suffers from underemployment and discrimination in the labor market. He reads a new book of British origin, The Nature of Capitalist Crisis, by John Strachey, a Labour Party politician who, despite his bourgeois origins (his father edited the Conservative-supporting periodical The Spectator) and privileged education at Eton College and the University of Oxford , was a communist sympathizer before turning against Communism in 1940. The narrative is peppered with references to inter alia the Workers Bookshop and the newspaper Daily Worker, published in New York by the Communist Party of the United States of America. In response to a query by another character, Cummings confirms his suspected political sympathies but qualifies this by assuring her, "I ' m not a very good Communist." 16 In the general scholarly literature about American literature (in which works by many individuals about immigrant groups are relatively well represented), Bell remains almost completely invisible. Never did an article about him appear in the hundreds of volumes in the nearly exhaustive reference work Contemporary Authors. As of 2020, the seemingly very inclusive Dictionary of Literary Biography, well over 300 volumes strong, has not included an essay about Bell. Rarely is he even mentioned in general surveys of the wider subject. Anyone searching for information about this fairly productive writer' s life and oeuvre will be fortunate to reap even a meager harvest of information . Contemporary reviews of his novels are a partial exception to this generalization, but even they are not particularly abundant. Out of This Furnace is a constructed family epic, and not even the later stages of the saga, which overlap with its author' s life, are quite autobiographical. In his Afterword in the 1976 edition, Demarest relied heavily on information gleaned from Bell's younger brother, 16 Thomas Bell , All Brides Are Beautiful (Boston: Linle, Brown, and Company, 1936), 21 6. �60 SLOVAKIA 2021 Anthony, to highlight certain fictional departures from the ostensible facts of the Belejcak family history . Plot Summary Out of This Furnace is structured in four parts. The first deals principally with George (or "Djuro") Kracha, who leaves his Slovak peasant life (and, temporarily, his young and pregnant wife in the care of his mother) in the autumn of 1881. After giving birth to a son a few months later, she joins him in Pennsylvania. They eke out a basic existence as George finds employment in a steel mill but his upward mobility is limited to operating a temporarily profitable butcher shop. There is no moral progression in this character. After his wife dies, he marries a fellow Slovak who emigrated simultaneous ly with him, but this frequently inebriated and cognitively unimpressive man is jailed for beating her. The second and third parts relate in much detail the lives of his daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mike Dobrejcak. These members of the second-generation toil arduously but receive scant reward for their labors. However, they are confident that their son, Dobie, can enjoy a materially better life than they have, a conviction this quite Americanized lad shares. He fulfills their expectations to a great degree. Having received several years' schooling, he speaks Eng li sh fluently and uses his rhetorical talent to advocate workers ' rights. In the fourth part, Dobie also toils in mills but plays a crucial role in the unionization of the labor force regionally and ventures to Washington to participate in labor negotiations. To a vastly greater degree than his immigrant grandfather, Dobie embodies an altrui stic spirit. He is a considerate husband and parent who is concerned not merely about his own welfare but a lso that of his descendants and of the working class in general. All in all , the saga of this family through three generations relates much about the initially glacial but gradual and inconsistent rise of Slovak-Americans during decades when the spoils of the labor and entrepreneurial spirit that transformed the United States into a massive industrial power were so unevenly distributed. In doing so, Bell's novel sheds much light on social relationships within the ethnic group, the partial retention of ethnic culture, and other related matters. �SLOVAKIA 2021 61 A Miscellany of Religious Motifs The narrative does not deal in nearly as much detail about the reli gious life of Slovak-Americans as historians of Christianity might wi sh. This theme plays second or third fiddle in an otherwise fairly well-deve loped fictional orchestration of immigrant hi story. How much Bell knew about that aspect of his family's story which forms the core of the construction is difficult to assess. According to his brother Anthony, who provided Demarest with information about the clan, their father was a very active layman " in the church and related organizations" whose involvement in them took him to meetings throughout Pennsylvania and in Ohio. 17 In one of the most didactic sections of Part Two, the narrator genera li zes about the characteristics of the ethnic group. " In the o ld country the Slovaks had been an oppressed minority from the beginning of time, a simple, religious, unwarlike people, a nation of peasants and shepherds whom the centuries had taught patience and humility," he declares, though without relating anything to substantiate this. "In America they were all this and more, foreigners in a strange land, ignorant of the land and customs, fearful of authority in whatever guise." 18 Churches exist in the depicted milieu, but much of the time they remain vague entities in the background. There is relatively little description of either individuals or Slovak-American families worshiping regularly or otherwise participating in ecc lesiastical life, and one finds only occasional hints of private religious devotion. (Certa in key exceptions are discussed below.) There are priests, of course, but one gets the impression that in Bell ' s fictional world some of the key characters interact with them only on special occasions, such as at weddings and funerals, or when they encounter a crisis and perceive a need for sacerdotal intervention . The first such instance occurs in the Old World. When Kracha elects to try his luck in America, he leaves his pregnant wife Elena in the care of his mother, an arrangement which proves inauspicious. The otherwise anonymous local priest who writes letters on behalf of these two presumably illiterate women informs Kracha that his a iling wife 17 18 Dav id P. Demarest, Jr. , " Afterword," in Bell , Ou! of This Furnace, 420. Bell , Ow of This Furnace, 123 . �62 SLOVAKIA 2021 and her mother-in-law are not fully compatible, especially when cohabiting in a one-room hut, and that he should do whatever is necessary to enable her relocation to America at the earliest opportunity. 19 Beyond that brief part, there is virtually nothing in Out of This Furnace about religious life in Slovakia. In the scattered comments about Slovak-American churches, one finds themes that reflect what one can read in nonfictional historical surveys. For example, new clusters of Slovak immigrants typically worshipped temporarily in the sanctuaries of non-Slovaks before founding their own parishes. Early in the narrative, a young Slovak immigrant couple have their nuptial mass in an Irish-American Roman Catholic church because there is not yet one of their own national heritage.20 When the number of Slovaks in individual locales increased to the point where they could organize their own parishes, they sometimes bought church edifices from Protestant congregations whose members were gradually moving to other communities. There are two occurrences of this in Out of This Furnace. In Braddock, Slovak Roman Catholics "took over" First Baptist Church and rededicated it as St. Michael's Church.2 1 Their ethnic fellows of Greek Catholi c loyalty followed suit shortly thereafter, purchasing what had been the First Presbyterian Church in an unappealing location a long the railroad tracks in the same small city. In its new denominational iteration, it had become St. Peter and St. Paul ' s. 22 Readers are not given nearly enough information about the ecclesiastica l life of the community to create a comprehensive portrait of that subject in general or the proportion of Slovaks who were active church members. There is no reason to believe that the dissolute Kracha is such an individual. On the other hand, after his sickly spouse Elena recovers sufficiently to leave the house, she begins to go to church every morning. However, this is described as the behavior of a mentally troubled soul who has largely withdrawn into herself, not as that of one with a normal socia l li fe . C lasping her rosary, Elena has " now more than ever a frightened , beaten look," perhaps owing to her 19 Bell , Bell , 21 Bell , 22 Bell , 20 0111 o( This Ou! of This Ou! of This 0111 of This Furnace, 14. Furnace, 19 . Furnace, 38. Furnace, 69. �SLOVAKIA 2021 63 inability to adapt to her difficult life as Kracha's wife in a dismal mill town. 23 The phenomenon of non-involvement in organized community religious life is dealt with only fleetingly . The most explicit example of this stems from Bell's critique of capitalist exploitation of the steelworkers. Kracha's colleague Joe Dubik is introduced as "a Rusnak, a Greek Catholic from Tvarosc in Sarisa." 24 Having preceded Kracha to Braddock, he welcomes his friend when the latter arrives and shows him around the town. Passing the Carnegie public library (endowed by the philanthropy of the Scottish immigrant steel magnate Andrew Carnegie), Dubik admits that he had never entered it. " When do I have the time for such things?" he explains wistfully. "Since they cut wages and put us on twelve hours l've even stopped going to church." 25 But some continue to attend mass. One is Mike Dobrejcak , the long-suffering son-in-law of Kracha, who rarely finds joy in life and is trapped in his career as a steelworker. In a paragraph of several hundred words, the narrator provides moving insight into the spiritual constitution of this second-generation Slovak-American and the personal significance of his religious life. He prefers to attend the evening mass in the Greek Catholic Church. In contrast to high mass, where God seems to be "the thundering, awe-inspiring Lord of the Universe in vestments of white and gold," for after sunset the deity seems to be "a friend whom one dropped in to visit, God still but God at ease, His shoes and trousers showing below His robes." This approachable deity is one to whom Mike can pray for his wife Mary, their children, and him self. He can do so confident that God is superior to steel corporations and their general superintendents. Moreover, and perhaps just as important to Mike, the church in which this relationship unfolds is a social leveler. In its sanctuary " he was not a check number of a Hunky laborer, but a man." God, he believes, cared not a whit about socioeconomic differences or ethnic strata in American society: " Here he was welcome, here he belonged . Here he spoke in his own tongue; and without fear, without awkwardness, he spoke of himself, hi s hopes, hi s troubles, hi s need of help. And God heard him out." The God of the church, and especially of evening mass, " knew him by name, knew 23 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 64. Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 10. 25 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 34. 24 �64 SLOVAKIA 2021 about Mary and the children understood how it was with all of them and had a pretty good idea what kind of person, behind his laborer's clothes and poor English, Mike really was. God , in short, liked him ." The psychological impact is subtle but real; "The world was always a less unfriendly place and he nearly always walked a little straighter, heartened, protected, when he came out." 26 Nor is Mike alone. The narrator acknowledges that more pews are empty than filled, but the congregation includes inter alia old parishioners who attended mass daily and twice on Sunday. Far more prevalent in the throng are young couples who also appreciated the subdued sociability of a vespers service. It gave them "an irreproachable excuse to be together and was cheaper than a trip to Kennywood," explains the narrator. 27 No single factor, in other words, expla ins why Slovak-Americans participate in the worship of their churches . Bell ' s fictional construction of Slovak participation in the unsuccessful 1919 Great Steel Strike gave him an opportunity to explore a dimension of the ro le of religious factors in a matter of immense personal interest. Hi s sympathy with the goals of the strike, which took place while he was sti ll a teenager in Braddock, is manifest. Bell included a paragraph listing the union's demands, among them such minimal conditions as an eight-hour day, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and one day off every week. 28 Against this background, the support of the long-serving priest in Braddock, Father Kazincy, for the campaign is understandable. Indeed, he has urged parishioners to join the union , and he allows an organizing committee to meet in the basement of his church. When "veiled threats" are made by an unidentified party to foreclose on the parish's mortgage, Kazincy replies that if that is done he will place a sign on the front of the building announcing: "Thi s Church of Christ c losed by the United States Steel Corporation ." He further show s his so lidari ty after mass at St. Michael's on the Sunday morning immediately before the beginning of the strike when a state trooper orders people who congregate outside the building to disperse: "Father Kazincy came out of the church and protested, a tall , gray-haired man in priestly robes standing 26 Bell , Out of This Furnace, 17 1. Bell, Out of This Furnace, 170. Launched in 1899 in West Miffin. southeast of Pittsburgh, Kenn ywood was an amusement park and picnic area th at attracted large numbers of workin g-cl ass people. 28 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 240. 27 �SLOVAKIA 2021 65 beside the trooper's restless horse, his face uplifted, alight with indignation." 29 This sympathy-inspiring partisanship is juxtaposed with less appealing conduct on the part of the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church . At its St. Brendan's Church " in the ' good ' part of town", the priest declares in his homily, "This strike is not being brought about by intelligent English-speaking workmen ... . You can't reason with these people. Don't reason with them." The appropriate response, he preached, was to "knock them down!" In Bell ' s narrative, this hostility meshed with the response of the diocesan hierarchy to the strike. A delegation of Catholic strikers call on the bishop of Pittsburgh (whom Bell calls "Bishop Canavan" but in fact was Regis Canevin from 1904 until 1921) imploring him to support the action, not least because a majority of the strikers are Catholics. But that prelate declines to do so. Underscoring the influence of the industrial magnates on religious life, "not long after that the Pittsburgh Catholic Charities received a check for twenty-five thousand dollars from the Carnegie Steel Company."30 An Atheist to the End Too little is known , and perhaps cannot be known , about Bell ' s low-profile life to trace whatever spiritual journey he may have had followed through his fifty-seven years. What is beyond dispute, however, is that the skepticism expressed in Out of This Furnace foreshadowed acknowledged atheism in his final book, In the Midst of life. This nonfictional volume, approximately 270 pages in length, was published a few months after his death in 1961 . It encompasses a miscellany of his thoughts and musings as a terminally ill cancer patient in Santa Cruz. Bell acknowledged in his first brief chapter that he was not on the same spiritual wavelength with many other people. "While others, in the old phrase, make their peace with God," he stated, "I must make mine with myself." 31 Bell noted that his beliefs differed markedly from those of one of his pious customers, a Mrs. Worth, who had sought to 29 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 241 . Out of This Furnace, 241 -2. 3 1Thomas Bell , In the Mid1·t a/Life (New York: Atheneum, 196 1), 5. 30 Bell, �66 SLOVAKIA 2021 encourage him at that critical stage of his life. He had even prayed to " Mrs. Worth 's God" in the privacy of a toilet at a hospital in Palo Alto, but his cancer had progressed unabated. Bell concluded that "belief in a supernatural god may disappear, and a good thing too," but in the same sentence he admitted that there were times "when one can only envy such people as Mrs. Worth. " 32 If his non credo of ca. 1960 represented his attitude towards the Christian faith two decades earlier, his willingness to write sympathetically, albeit briefly, about the religious life of his fictional characters at that time is all the more remarkable. Conclusion A juxtaposition of Out of This Furnace and the nonfictional texts cited in the present article highlights several problems that serious historians of religion encounter when they are seeking to gauge, even in an approximate way, the spiritual life of Slovak immigrants in North America. On the one hand, there are assertions about the group's devotion to Christianity in several of its denominational forms. These assurances are typically supported by reference to the hundreds of churches which Slovaks founded in the New World, usually in the early stages of their community life in surroundings still only partially familiar to them, and in many instances after unsatisfactory experiences in multi-ethnic parishes. On the other hand, when one reads Out of This Furnace as almost certainly the principal fictional reconstruction of Slovak-American history, one finds significantly less about religion than nonfictional literature might reasonably lead one to expect. Considered in isolation, Out a/This Furnace thus gives an impression that is difficult to harmoni ze with the large number of enduring Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and other sorts of parishes which these immigrants founded to serve as their spiritual homes. No doubt part of the answer inheres in accepting the fact that Slovak-Americans were by no means a monolithic entity, but a diverse segment of the Euro-American population which probably always included individuals with varying degrees of religious fervor and criticism thereof, different levels of moral development, and no uniformity of commitment to community life. Gauging the percentage of people 32 Bell, In the Mid1·1 a/Life, 8-9. �SLOVAKIA 2021 67 in any historic ethnic group who chose to affiliate with its religious institutions can be prohibitively difficult. Any calculations done in this regard would probably be estimates rather than precise statistics. Furthermore, such figures do not address the underlying problems of assessing personal commitment and spiritual life as opposed to nominal membership. Other dimensions of the phenomenon bedevil quantification . Historians must look carefully at how the character of their subject evolves over time. In this case, they would be compelled to examine, for instance, the religious commitment of the displaced people who formed the first generation in America and then their at least partly assimilated, Anglophone descendants. Did interest in ecclesiastical life vary diachronically? Was it consistent in large cities and small mill towns? Did it appear to be more vibrant in areas where the Slovaks constituted a relatively large percentage of the population than in those areas where they were but a small minority? Were married men more inclined than bachelors to participate in organized religious life? These and related questions are by no means limited to Slovaks or other Eastern and Central Europeans in North America and their descendants but are relevant to much of the ethnic panorama. A broad consideration of this obviously lies beyond the bounds of the present study, but two quite different kinds of examples illustrate the point. One stems from the present writer's extensive, multidenominational research on the history of the approximately 800,000 Norwegians who emigrated to the United States. Most of them were at least nominal members of the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in their homeland, although levels of participation in its sacraments, services, and so on varied greatly from region to region. Numerous " revival" movements, some of them led by lay preachers, had reinvigorated the spiritual life of the nation. Nonconformist denominations also sprouted in the nineteenth century, giving especially those Norwegians who lived in coastal towns some measure of churches from which to choose. At the same time, however, anticlerical critics emerged, sometimes in tandem with an incipient labor movement. After reaching the United States, large numbers of these Nordic newcomers formed many hundreds of Lutheran churches, chiefly in the Upper Midwest, with smaller numbers in other regions. They also founded several church-related undergraduate colleges, most of which continue to thrive in the twenty-first century, and several theological �68 SLOVAKIA 2021 seminaries for training new generations of pastors. All in all , denominational membership statistics clearly indicate that a higher percentage of Norwegian immigrants than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, to cite the most meaningful comparisons, were affiliated with what can be regarded as their birthright religious institutions. However, as I have demonstrated, this involvement varied immensely, and overall only about 30 percent of first-generation Norwegian-Americans became members of the ethnic Lutheran churches in which one might expect to find them .33 The evidence disconfirmed sweeping generalizations that historians of immigration had made for approximately two generations about the supposedly lofty level of religious loyalty among newcomers from Norway. Turning to a significantly different kind of example, in 1964 Rudolph J. Vecoli strongly challenged the generalized portrayal of immigrants in America which Oscar Handlin had presented in his Pulitzer Prize-winning popular history, The Uprooted, twelve years earlier. Writing about the tens of thousands of contadini (i.e. peasants) from southern Italy who had settled in Chicago, Vecoli declared that the noted Harvard historian 's theory that the process of adjusting to life on American shores had strengthened their religious li fe in an ali en environment. Not so, this Italian-American argued. "American priests were scandali zed by the indifference of the Italians to the Church . Even when Italian churches were provided by the Catholic hierarchy, the contadini seldom displayed any religious enthusiasm ." 34 Within the Slavic-American spectrum, the extent of Slovak detachment from organized religious life awaits detailed ana lysis. In 2005 sociologist Paul Froese published an article about the significantly differing levels of involvement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in recent decades. He attributed the higher degree among Slovaks to a historically different relationship between religion and nationalism . " In Slovakia," he concluded, "Roman Catholi cism and nationalism are conjoined in much the same way as they are in Poland." One consequence of thi s is greater loya lty to the Roman Catholi c 33 Frederi ck Ha le, No rwegian Religious Pluralism: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 34 Rudo lph J. Vecoli , "Contadini in Chi cago: A Critique of The Uprooted." The Journal of American History LI , no. 3 ( December 1964): 415. �SLOVAKIA 2021 69 Church in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.35 Froese did not, however, deal at all with the history of religious life among Slovaks who had been transplanted to a different environment in North America. Establishing the defensible perimeter of descriptions of SlovakAmerican religious life thus remains a difficult task, one which would have to take into account not only formal religious involvement and activity but also the extent to which an as yet indeterminate number of people chose not to become affiliated or who were directly critical of Christianity and its institutions. Moreover, the historical calculus would have to take into account changes over time. Out of This Furnace offers a stimulating if obviously truncated impression of Slovak religious life during the first few crucial decades of this group's history in industrial America. Indeed, when one considers Bell's personal separation from that important dimension of his ethnic heritage, it is arguably surprising how many aspects of it appear in this novel. One finds observations about inter a/ia priestly ministry, interaction with non-Slovak churches, efforts to raise children according to traditional religious values, prayer, community worship, and the relationship between religious institutions and the labor movement. To be sure, there is silence about significant historical matters, such as the Lutheran and other Protestant churches among Slovak immigrants. Far too little about these topics has been published in any genre. Will future litterateurs take up their pens and construct engaging fictional accounts that tell readers far more about the spiritual life of the group, thereby further enriching the colorful tapestry of ethnic historical fiction? To be sure, no amount of meticulous research could replace Bell ' s first-hand knowledge of Slovak immigrant life in Braddock, but many historical novelists have crafted credible works about topics which they did not experience. While we might be ill-advised to hold our breath, we can find comfort in Alexander Pope ' s oft-quoted words, " Hope springs eternal in the human breast." 35 Paul Froese, "Secular Czechs and Devout Slova ks: Ex ploring Religious Differences," Review of Religious Research XL VI , no. 3 (March 2005): 269, 280. � SLOVAKIA 2021 53 RECONSIDERING SLOVAK-AMERICAN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: THOMAS BELL'S OUT OF THIS FURNACE IN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT Frederick Hale Introduction If any work of fiction deserves to be called " the great SlovakAmerican historical novel ," it is undoubtedly Thomas Bell 's Out of This Furnace. To be sure, the competition is nearly non-existent. 1 Nevertheless, since its initial publication in 1941 , thi s volume of more than 400 pages has offered readers a hi ghly readable and insightful view of immigrant laborers and their descendants, chiefly in the steel mill town s of western Pennsylvania where many Slovaks toiled. Their presence became woven into the multicolored ethni c fabric of that once-booming region. Though for many upward social mobility came at a snai l's pace, organized community li fe began early and remained vibrant, and the members of the group contributed mightily to the prosperity of the cities in which they sacrificed seemingly endless hours on the a ltars of an economy of wh ich they were far more the victims than the lords. Beg inning, apparently, as economically virtually powerless and thus wi lling to accept their su bservient lot in life, many gradua lly gained a bolder spirit through the labor movements in which they participated . In tandem with their inevitable assim ilation, Slovak-Americans eventuall y gained a greater voice in the direction of their working lives. These interrelated matters form much of the thematic warp and woof of Bell 's much-lauded novel , which traces three generations through their tribul ations to a more ass imilated 1 Michael ovak 's quasi-autobiogra phical The Tiber Was S ilver ( 1961) failed to make a perceptible splash in the waters of American literature, and hi s Naked I l eave ( 1970), whi ch was more widely rev iewed, was a lso criticall y interpreted as a fictional ized mirror of hi s transition from Roman Catho li c se minarian to journalist. These intensely personal works by a prominent Slovak-American inte llectua l whose life began in Jo hn stown , Pennsylvania, in 1933 are not w itho ut arti stic merit , but th ey belo ng to a sub-genre o f ficti o n quite different from Be ll 's realistic po rtraya l of th e ethni c g roup's hi story in th e late nin eteenth and ea rl y twenti eth centuri es. �54 SLOVAKIA 2021 status and to higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Mu tat is mutandis, the story it tells echoes that of numerous other immigrant groups in urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conceivably the eventual upward mobility-engendered in part by the labor movement- underlay the translation of this work into Slovak and its publication in 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when that country was to a great degree under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the chilliest days of the Cold War. Furthermore, owing to its pedagogical value for teaching American immigration and labor hi story, in 1976 the University of Pittsburgh reprinted Out of This Furnace in response to a proposal by Professor David P. Demarest of Carnegie Mellon University. It fitted this social activist's converging interests in workingclass literature and labor history hand-in-glove. The relative popularity of the book led to a fiftieth anniversary edition in 1991. Bell illuminated many facets of Slovak-American working-class life and did not hesitate to include in his narrati ve several less savory dimensions of it that less candid writers might have chosen to minimize or ignore entirely in the interests of presenting palatable impressions of their respective ethnic groups. As Professor David J. Goldberg noted in 20 IO when advocating the assignment of Out of This Furnace to university students, " Men get drunk in saloons. Weddings and funerals are occasions for arguments." 2 A Limited Tradition of Scholarly Consideration Out of This Furnace has been neither the beneficiary nor the victim of extensive scholarly criticism, but it has not been completely ignored. In hi s study of American writers of the 1930s, especially those on the political Left, Leo Gurko devoted a few paragraphs to Bell ' s authorship and commented on this novel. However, Gurko did not evince adequate familiarity with this novelist's oeuvre. He judged that the ideological positions taken by Bell's characters "end with trade-unionism and anti-fascism," a myopic observation that overlooks the central character in All Brides Are Beautiful. Turning specifically to the hi storical span of Out o_fThis Furnace, Gurko thought that 2 David J. Goldberg, "Thomas Bell's 0111 o_(This Furnace: An Evaluation and an Appreciation," Journal of American Ethnic History, XXIX, no. 2 (Winter 2010), p. 664 . �SLOVAKIA 2021 55 it covered two generations of Slovak-Americans, when in fact it dealt with three. 3 In 1975, i.e. a year before its republication by the University of Pittsburgh Press, John F. Berko contributed an article about Bell as a novelist to the journal Slovak Studies but devoted only one page to this particular novel. 4 Furthermore, after encouraging its republication Demarest wrote a moderately detailed Afterword in which he provided useful information without dissecting the text. The eminent historian of Slovak immigrants in North America Marian Mark Stolarik has credited Bell with describing Slovak-American life "very we ll" but lamented that he had "completely ignored the religiosity" of this ethnic group. 5 Stolarik's criticism at this point dovetails neatly with what he and other historians have repeatedly stated about the enthusiasm of Slovak-Americans for ecclesiastical life. In his article " Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," for example, published in the Slovak League of America's celebratory bicentennial volume in 1978, Daniel F. Tanzone could declare without reserve that "the most di stinctive characteristic of the Slovaks is their deep and abiding faith in God." The zeal they evinced in Central Europe, he emphasized, became transatlantic as immigrants from Slovakia " made great effort to hear the word of God preached to them in their native Slovak tongue." 6 The linkage between social and religious life has also been highlighted in the pertinent historiography. As Stolarik explained in the 1980s, upon settling in the United States Slovaks typically initiated this by founding "fraternal-benefit" societies to provide emotional and economic safety nets. These lodges usually reflected the discrete religious affiliations of individuals within the larger group and were identifiable as de facto Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. From the religious cohesion of such local societies formal , 3 Leo Gurko, The Angty Decade (New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947), 66-9. John F. Berko, "Thomas Bell ( 1903- 196 1) Slovak-Ameri can Novelist," Slovak S1udies, XV ( 1975), 143-58. 5 M. Mark Stolarik to Frederick Hale, 14 November 20 17 (electronic correspondence) . 6 Daniel F. Tanzone, "Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," in Slovaks in America: A Bicenlennial S!udy (Middletown, Pennsylvani a: The Slovak League of America, 1978), 57 . 4 �56 SLOVAKIA 2021 distinctly Slovak parishes sprang, often after a period of worshiping with, for example, Polish fellow immigrants.7 In his history of three generations of Slovak-Americans in the steel mill town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from the 1880s until the 1970s, Stolarik related in some detail how they were divided into three religious communities, chiefly Roman Catholic but also Greek Catholic and Lutheran . Church life among many of these people appears to have been vibrant, despite chronic financial hardship that, for example, protracted the amortization of mortgages. Church edifices began to appear at a very early stage. 8 He was thus not in doubt that " religion played a central role in the life of Bethlehem Slovaks."9 Of particular relevance to Out of This Furnace, Stolarik argued that on a national basis the "overwhelming loyalty" of Slovak-Americans to their religious life helped to immunize them from an early stage of their history to socialist movements which were drawing support from many other working-class immigrants well before the end of the nineteenth century. 10 More than two decades later, Stolarik published what may be the most up-to-date, albeit still brief, scholarly consideration of SlovakAmerican religious life. Writing in The Catholic Historical Review, he emphasized why the immigrants in question were divided into four denominations and how they adjusted to ecclesiastical circumstances in the United States of America and Canada, particularly the creation of specific ethnic parishes. Stolarik did not, however, deal with such matters as the non-affiliation of individuals with churches, anticlericalism, and hostility to or disagreement with religion as such. He judiciously acknowledged that much research remained to be done before historians could paint anything approaching a comprehensive portrait of the spiritual life of Slovak-Americans generally. 11 7 Marian Mark Stolarik , Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 18701918 (New York: AMS Press, Inc ., 1989), 82-3 . 8 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Genera/ions of Slovaks in Bethlehem. Pennsylvania. 1880-/9 76 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 44-62. 44. 10 Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization, 8 1. 11 M. Mark Stolarik, " Slovak Immigrants Come to Term s with Reli g ious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , no. I (January 20 I 0): 5684. 9 Ibid ., �SLOVAKIA 2021 57 The publication in 2012 of his lengthy Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/ 870-2010) gave Stolarik an opportunity to touch on aspects of Slovak immigrants ' religious life in North America. His seventh chapter, "Slovak Marxists Disagree" dealt with what he acknowledged were the "few Marxists" among the Slovaks in the United States and Canada. This minuscule segment established mutual benefit societies which competed on a minor scale with the churches for the loyalty of the immigrants and their descendants but, as Stolarik emphasized, "their number remained small." 12 He briefly traced a waning of the socialists ' initially strident criticism ofreligious life and concluded that by the 1940s the verbal warfare had ceased. 13 The di sagreements to which the chapter' s title refers were largely those among the socialists themselves, especially with regard to political developments in their homeland, not to disputes between these men of the left and the ecclesiastical traditions they had left behind. The empirically challenging question of the scope of general SlovakAmerican indifference to and non-participation in formal religious life thus remained essentially unanswered. Regarding participation in secular campaigns to improve working conditions in industrial America, it is difficult to ascertain how many of these newcomers and their descendants supported the more inclusive labor movement, which in the USA was only partly socialist. However, it is known that Bell himself was a man of the Left, albeit not in a consistently outspoken way. How unrepresentative of SlovakAmericans he was in that regard is an interesting question, though one that necessarily lies beyond the scope of the present article. At any rate, in Out o_f This Furnace Bell presented the labor movement in a positive manner and highlighted the participation of at least a small number of Slovak-Americans in it. This is probably significant to an understanding of the dispersed treatment of religion in this fictional construction. 12 M. Mark Stolarik, Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( / 87020 10) (Bern : Peter Lang AG, Internati onal Academi c Publishers, 201 2), p. 205. 13 Stolarik, Wh ere Is My Home?, pp. 2 12-2 13. �58 SLOVAKIA 2021 A Little-known Literary A rtist Bell ' s earl y li fe endowed him with an intimate know ledge of hi s subj ect. His parents were fro m the village of Ni zny Tvarozec in the Bardejov d istri ct of the Presov reg ion of northwestern Slovaki a. He was born in the mill tow n of Braddock, Penn sylvani a, j ust east of Pi ttsburgh, in 1903 . 14 That small c ity had a popul ati on of 15,654 in 1900, a fig ure whi ch rose to sli ghtly over 20,000 two decades later before a persistent dec line reduced it to a poverty-stri cken village in the late twentieth century. His origi nal name was Ada lbert Thomas Belejcak, a cu mbersome moniker whi ch he never used during hi s career as a nove li st. Leav ing schoo l as an ado lescent, he worked loca ll y from age fifteen as an electri c ian' s apprenti ce but in 1922 re located to New York and was vari ously empl oyed fo r approximate ly a decade as a merchant sea man, boo kstore clerk , and mechani c. Bell 's first nove l, The Breed of Bas il, appeared in 1930, and from 1933 onward he was a fu ll -time writer, th ough onl y fi ve of hi s nove ls were issued. Hi s All Brides Are Beautiful was the bas is of a motion picture starrin g Joa n Fonta ine and Mark Stevens, and Till! Come Back to You was dramati zed and produced on Broadway by Jed Harri s. In other noteworthy d imensions of his career w ith the pen, Be ll contri buted short stori es to such magazi nes as McCall 's and Ladies ' Home J ournal, and eventuall y worked as a Holl ywood screenwriter. After mov ing to Cali fo rni a in 1955 , he continued to write sporadi ca ll y whil e operating the East Side Gift and Stati onery Shop in Santa Cruz. His hea lth deteri orated in the late 1950s, and he di ed of cancer in 196 1. The fun era l was held in a mortuary chapel rather than a church, and Bell 's ashes were interred at the crematory of the Independent Order of Odd Fell ows . 15 The few sources of readil y ava il able info rmation about hi s li fe do not suggest th at he had any ex perience in Slovaki a, and nothin g in Out of This Furnace indi cates that he had noteworthy know ledge of that coun try apart fro m what may have been handed down ora ll y from hi s fo rebears. Bell appears to have reli ed almost exc lusive ly on ora l traditi on and memories of hi s childhood in western Penn sy lvani a when craftin g thi s nove l. 14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wikiff homas_ Bell_(nove list). Accessed 2 January 2020. For SC ovelist T homas Bell Set," Santa Cruz Sentinel, 17 January I 96 1, p. 12. 15 " Servi ces �SLOVAKIA 2021 59 Ideologically, Bell stood unabashedly on the left flank of the American political spectrum. This comes to the fore more vividly in his credible proletarian novel of 1936, All Brides Are Beautiful, which was the basis of the motion picture From This Day Forward, which premiered in 1946. Set in New York during the Depression of the 1930s, its principal protagonist is an Irish-American named Peter Cummings who, like many of his fellow citizens, suffers from underemployment and discrimination in the labor market. He reads a new book of British origin, The Nature of Capitalist Crisis, by John Strachey, a Labour Party politician who, despite his bourgeois origins (his father edited the Conservative-supporting periodical The Spectator) and privileged education at Eton College and the University of Oxford , was a communist sympathizer before turning against Communism in 1940. The narrative is peppered with references to inter alia the Workers Bookshop and the newspaper Daily Worker, published in New York by the Communist Party of the United States of America. In response to a query by another character, Cummings confirms his suspected political sympathies but qualifies this by assuring her, "I ' m not a very good Communist." 16 In the general scholarly literature about American literature (in which works by many individuals about immigrant groups are relatively well represented), Bell remains almost completely invisible. Never did an article about him appear in the hundreds of volumes in the nearly exhaustive reference work Contemporary Authors. As of 2020, the seemingly very inclusive Dictionary of Literary Biography, well over 300 volumes strong, has not included an essay about Bell. Rarely is he even mentioned in general surveys of the wider subject. Anyone searching for information about this fairly productive writer' s life and oeuvre will be fortunate to reap even a meager harvest of information . Contemporary reviews of his novels are a partial exception to this generalization, but even they are not particularly abundant. Out of This Furnace is a constructed family epic, and not even the later stages of the saga, which overlap with its author' s life, are quite autobiographical. In his Afterword in the 1976 edition, Demarest relied heavily on information gleaned from Bell's younger brother, 16 Thomas Bell , All Brides Are Beautiful (Boston: Linle, Brown, and Company, 1936), 21 6. �60 SLOVAKIA 2021 Anthony, to highlight certain fictional departures from the ostensible facts of the Belejcak family history . Plot Summary Out of This Furnace is structured in four parts. The first deals principally with George (or "Djuro") Kracha, who leaves his Slovak peasant life (and, temporarily, his young and pregnant wife in the care of his mother) in the autumn of 1881. After giving birth to a son a few months later, she joins him in Pennsylvania. They eke out a basic existence as George finds employment in a steel mill but his upward mobility is limited to operating a temporarily profitable butcher shop. There is no moral progression in this character. After his wife dies, he marries a fellow Slovak who emigrated simultaneous ly with him, but this frequently inebriated and cognitively unimpressive man is jailed for beating her. The second and third parts relate in much detail the lives of his daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mike Dobrejcak. These members of the second-generation toil arduously but receive scant reward for their labors. However, they are confident that their son, Dobie, can enjoy a materially better life than they have, a conviction this quite Americanized lad shares. He fulfills their expectations to a great degree. Having received several years' schooling, he speaks Eng li sh fluently and uses his rhetorical talent to advocate workers ' rights. In the fourth part, Dobie also toils in mills but plays a crucial role in the unionization of the labor force regionally and ventures to Washington to participate in labor negotiations. To a vastly greater degree than his immigrant grandfather, Dobie embodies an altrui stic spirit. He is a considerate husband and parent who is concerned not merely about his own welfare but a lso that of his descendants and of the working class in general. All in all , the saga of this family through three generations relates much about the initially glacial but gradual and inconsistent rise of Slovak-Americans during decades when the spoils of the labor and entrepreneurial spirit that transformed the United States into a massive industrial power were so unevenly distributed. In doing so, Bell's novel sheds much light on social relationships within the ethnic group, the partial retention of ethnic culture, and other related matters. �SLOVAKIA 2021 61 A Miscellany of Religious Motifs The narrative does not deal in nearly as much detail about the reli gious life of Slovak-Americans as historians of Christianity might wi sh. This theme plays second or third fiddle in an otherwise fairly well-deve loped fictional orchestration of immigrant hi story. How much Bell knew about that aspect of his family's story which forms the core of the construction is difficult to assess. According to his brother Anthony, who provided Demarest with information about the clan, their father was a very active layman " in the church and related organizations" whose involvement in them took him to meetings throughout Pennsylvania and in Ohio. 17 In one of the most didactic sections of Part Two, the narrator genera li zes about the characteristics of the ethnic group. " In the o ld country the Slovaks had been an oppressed minority from the beginning of time, a simple, religious, unwarlike people, a nation of peasants and shepherds whom the centuries had taught patience and humility," he declares, though without relating anything to substantiate this. "In America they were all this and more, foreigners in a strange land, ignorant of the land and customs, fearful of authority in whatever guise." 18 Churches exist in the depicted milieu, but much of the time they remain vague entities in the background. There is relatively little description of either individuals or Slovak-American families worshiping regularly or otherwise participating in ecc lesiastical life, and one finds only occasional hints of private religious devotion. (Certa in key exceptions are discussed below.) There are priests, of course, but one gets the impression that in Bell ' s fictional world some of the key characters interact with them only on special occasions, such as at weddings and funerals, or when they encounter a crisis and perceive a need for sacerdotal intervention . The first such instance occurs in the Old World. When Kracha elects to try his luck in America, he leaves his pregnant wife Elena in the care of his mother, an arrangement which proves inauspicious. The otherwise anonymous local priest who writes letters on behalf of these two presumably illiterate women informs Kracha that his a iling wife 17 18 Dav id P. Demarest, Jr. , " Afterword," in Bell , Ou! of This Furnace, 420. Bell , Ow of This Furnace, 123 . �62 SLOVAKIA 2021 and her mother-in-law are not fully compatible, especially when cohabiting in a one-room hut, and that he should do whatever is necessary to enable her relocation to America at the earliest opportunity. 19 Beyond that brief part, there is virtually nothing in Out of This Furnace about religious life in Slovakia. In the scattered comments about Slovak-American churches, one finds themes that reflect what one can read in nonfictional historical surveys. For example, new clusters of Slovak immigrants typically worshipped temporarily in the sanctuaries of non-Slovaks before founding their own parishes. Early in the narrative, a young Slovak immigrant couple have their nuptial mass in an Irish-American Roman Catholic church because there is not yet one of their own national heritage.20 When the number of Slovaks in individual locales increased to the point where they could organize their own parishes, they sometimes bought church edifices from Protestant congregations whose members were gradually moving to other communities. There are two occurrences of this in Out of This Furnace. In Braddock, Slovak Roman Catholics "took over" First Baptist Church and rededicated it as St. Michael's Church.2 1 Their ethnic fellows of Greek Catholi c loyalty followed suit shortly thereafter, purchasing what had been the First Presbyterian Church in an unappealing location a long the railroad tracks in the same small city. In its new denominational iteration, it had become St. Peter and St. Paul ' s. 22 Readers are not given nearly enough information about the ecclesiastica l life of the community to create a comprehensive portrait of that subject in general or the proportion of Slovaks who were active church members. There is no reason to believe that the dissolute Kracha is such an individual. On the other hand, after his sickly spouse Elena recovers sufficiently to leave the house, she begins to go to church every morning. However, this is described as the behavior of a mentally troubled soul who has largely withdrawn into herself, not as that of one with a normal socia l li fe . C lasping her rosary, Elena has " now more than ever a frightened , beaten look," perhaps owing to her 19 Bell , Bell , 21 Bell , 22 Bell , 20 0111 o( This Ou! of This Ou! of This 0111 of This Furnace, 14. Furnace, 19 . Furnace, 38. Furnace, 69. �SLOVAKIA 2021 63 inability to adapt to her difficult life as Kracha's wife in a dismal mill town. 23 The phenomenon of non-involvement in organized community religious life is dealt with only fleetingly . The most explicit example of this stems from Bell's critique of capitalist exploitation of the steelworkers. Kracha's colleague Joe Dubik is introduced as "a Rusnak, a Greek Catholic from Tvarosc in Sarisa." 24 Having preceded Kracha to Braddock, he welcomes his friend when the latter arrives and shows him around the town. Passing the Carnegie public library (endowed by the philanthropy of the Scottish immigrant steel magnate Andrew Carnegie), Dubik admits that he had never entered it. " When do I have the time for such things?" he explains wistfully. "Since they cut wages and put us on twelve hours l've even stopped going to church." 25 But some continue to attend mass. One is Mike Dobrejcak , the long-suffering son-in-law of Kracha, who rarely finds joy in life and is trapped in his career as a steelworker. In a paragraph of several hundred words, the narrator provides moving insight into the spiritual constitution of this second-generation Slovak-American and the personal significance of his religious life. He prefers to attend the evening mass in the Greek Catholic Church. In contrast to high mass, where God seems to be "the thundering, awe-inspiring Lord of the Universe in vestments of white and gold," for after sunset the deity seems to be "a friend whom one dropped in to visit, God still but God at ease, His shoes and trousers showing below His robes." This approachable deity is one to whom Mike can pray for his wife Mary, their children, and him self. He can do so confident that God is superior to steel corporations and their general superintendents. Moreover, and perhaps just as important to Mike, the church in which this relationship unfolds is a social leveler. In its sanctuary " he was not a check number of a Hunky laborer, but a man." God, he believes, cared not a whit about socioeconomic differences or ethnic strata in American society: " Here he was welcome, here he belonged . Here he spoke in his own tongue; and without fear, without awkwardness, he spoke of himself, hi s hopes, hi s troubles, hi s need of help. And God heard him out." The God of the church, and especially of evening mass, " knew him by name, knew 23 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 64. Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 10. 25 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 34. 24 �64 SLOVAKIA 2021 about Mary and the children understood how it was with all of them and had a pretty good idea what kind of person, behind his laborer's clothes and poor English, Mike really was. God , in short, liked him ." The psychological impact is subtle but real; "The world was always a less unfriendly place and he nearly always walked a little straighter, heartened, protected, when he came out." 26 Nor is Mike alone. The narrator acknowledges that more pews are empty than filled, but the congregation includes inter alia old parishioners who attended mass daily and twice on Sunday. Far more prevalent in the throng are young couples who also appreciated the subdued sociability of a vespers service. It gave them "an irreproachable excuse to be together and was cheaper than a trip to Kennywood," explains the narrator. 27 No single factor, in other words, expla ins why Slovak-Americans participate in the worship of their churches . Bell ' s fictional construction of Slovak participation in the unsuccessful 1919 Great Steel Strike gave him an opportunity to explore a dimension of the ro le of religious factors in a matter of immense personal interest. Hi s sympathy with the goals of the strike, which took place while he was sti ll a teenager in Braddock, is manifest. Bell included a paragraph listing the union's demands, among them such minimal conditions as an eight-hour day, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and one day off every week. 28 Against this background, the support of the long-serving priest in Braddock, Father Kazincy, for the campaign is understandable. Indeed, he has urged parishioners to join the union , and he allows an organizing committee to meet in the basement of his church. When "veiled threats" are made by an unidentified party to foreclose on the parish's mortgage, Kazincy replies that if that is done he will place a sign on the front of the building announcing: "Thi s Church of Christ c losed by the United States Steel Corporation ." He further show s his so lidari ty after mass at St. Michael's on the Sunday morning immediately before the beginning of the strike when a state trooper orders people who congregate outside the building to disperse: "Father Kazincy came out of the church and protested, a tall , gray-haired man in priestly robes standing 26 Bell , Out of This Furnace, 17 1. Bell, Out of This Furnace, 170. Launched in 1899 in West Miffin. southeast of Pittsburgh, Kenn ywood was an amusement park and picnic area th at attracted large numbers of workin g-cl ass people. 28 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 240. 27 �SLOVAKIA 2021 65 beside the trooper's restless horse, his face uplifted, alight with indignation." 29 This sympathy-inspiring partisanship is juxtaposed with less appealing conduct on the part of the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church . At its St. Brendan's Church " in the ' good ' part of town", the priest declares in his homily, "This strike is not being brought about by intelligent English-speaking workmen ... . You can't reason with these people. Don't reason with them." The appropriate response, he preached, was to "knock them down!" In Bell ' s narrative, this hostility meshed with the response of the diocesan hierarchy to the strike. A delegation of Catholic strikers call on the bishop of Pittsburgh (whom Bell calls "Bishop Canavan" but in fact was Regis Canevin from 1904 until 1921) imploring him to support the action, not least because a majority of the strikers are Catholics. But that prelate declines to do so. Underscoring the influence of the industrial magnates on religious life, "not long after that the Pittsburgh Catholic Charities received a check for twenty-five thousand dollars from the Carnegie Steel Company."30 An Atheist to the End Too little is known , and perhaps cannot be known , about Bell ' s low-profile life to trace whatever spiritual journey he may have had followed through his fifty-seven years. What is beyond dispute, however, is that the skepticism expressed in Out of This Furnace foreshadowed acknowledged atheism in his final book, In the Midst of life. This nonfictional volume, approximately 270 pages in length, was published a few months after his death in 1961 . It encompasses a miscellany of his thoughts and musings as a terminally ill cancer patient in Santa Cruz. Bell acknowledged in his first brief chapter that he was not on the same spiritual wavelength with many other people. "While others, in the old phrase, make their peace with God," he stated, "I must make mine with myself." 31 Bell noted that his beliefs differed markedly from those of one of his pious customers, a Mrs. Worth, who had sought to 29 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 241 . Out of This Furnace, 241 -2. 3 1Thomas Bell , In the Mid1·t a/Life (New York: Atheneum, 196 1), 5. 30 Bell, �66 SLOVAKIA 2021 encourage him at that critical stage of his life. He had even prayed to " Mrs. Worth 's God" in the privacy of a toilet at a hospital in Palo Alto, but his cancer had progressed unabated. Bell concluded that "belief in a supernatural god may disappear, and a good thing too," but in the same sentence he admitted that there were times "when one can only envy such people as Mrs. Worth. " 32 If his non credo of ca. 1960 represented his attitude towards the Christian faith two decades earlier, his willingness to write sympathetically, albeit briefly, about the religious life of his fictional characters at that time is all the more remarkable. Conclusion A juxtaposition of Out of This Furnace and the nonfictional texts cited in the present article highlights several problems that serious historians of religion encounter when they are seeking to gauge, even in an approximate way, the spiritual life of Slovak immigrants in North America. On the one hand, there are assertions about the group's devotion to Christianity in several of its denominational forms. These assurances are typically supported by reference to the hundreds of churches which Slovaks founded in the New World, usually in the early stages of their community life in surroundings still only partially familiar to them, and in many instances after unsatisfactory experiences in multi-ethnic parishes. On the other hand, when one reads Out of This Furnace as almost certainly the principal fictional reconstruction of Slovak-American history, one finds significantly less about religion than nonfictional literature might reasonably lead one to expect. Considered in isolation, Out a/This Furnace thus gives an impression that is difficult to harmoni ze with the large number of enduring Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and other sorts of parishes which these immigrants founded to serve as their spiritual homes. No doubt part of the answer inheres in accepting the fact that Slovak-Americans were by no means a monolithic entity, but a diverse segment of the Euro-American population which probably always included individuals with varying degrees of religious fervor and criticism thereof, different levels of moral development, and no uniformity of commitment to community life. Gauging the percentage of people 32 Bell, In the Mid1·1 a/Life, 8-9. �SLOVAKIA 2021 67 in any historic ethnic group who chose to affiliate with its religious institutions can be prohibitively difficult. Any calculations done in this regard would probably be estimates rather than precise statistics. Furthermore, such figures do not address the underlying problems of assessing personal commitment and spiritual life as opposed to nominal membership. Other dimensions of the phenomenon bedevil quantification . Historians must look carefully at how the character of their subject evolves over time. In this case, they would be compelled to examine, for instance, the religious commitment of the displaced people who formed the first generation in America and then their at least partly assimilated, Anglophone descendants. Did interest in ecclesiastical life vary diachronically? Was it consistent in large cities and small mill towns? Did it appear to be more vibrant in areas where the Slovaks constituted a relatively large percentage of the population than in those areas where they were but a small minority? Were married men more inclined than bachelors to participate in organized religious life? These and related questions are by no means limited to Slovaks or other Eastern and Central Europeans in North America and their descendants but are relevant to much of the ethnic panorama. A broad consideration of this obviously lies beyond the bounds of the present study, but two quite different kinds of examples illustrate the point. One stems from the present writer's extensive, multidenominational research on the history of the approximately 800,000 Norwegians who emigrated to the United States. Most of them were at least nominal members of the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in their homeland, although levels of participation in its sacraments, services, and so on varied greatly from region to region. Numerous " revival" movements, some of them led by lay preachers, had reinvigorated the spiritual life of the nation. Nonconformist denominations also sprouted in the nineteenth century, giving especially those Norwegians who lived in coastal towns some measure of churches from which to choose. At the same time, however, anticlerical critics emerged, sometimes in tandem with an incipient labor movement. After reaching the United States, large numbers of these Nordic newcomers formed many hundreds of Lutheran churches, chiefly in the Upper Midwest, with smaller numbers in other regions. They also founded several church-related undergraduate colleges, most of which continue to thrive in the twenty-first century, and several theological �68 SLOVAKIA 2021 seminaries for training new generations of pastors. All in all , denominational membership statistics clearly indicate that a higher percentage of Norwegian immigrants than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, to cite the most meaningful comparisons, were affiliated with what can be regarded as their birthright religious institutions. However, as I have demonstrated, this involvement varied immensely, and overall only about 30 percent of first-generation Norwegian-Americans became members of the ethnic Lutheran churches in which one might expect to find them .33 The evidence disconfirmed sweeping generalizations that historians of immigration had made for approximately two generations about the supposedly lofty level of religious loyalty among newcomers from Norway. Turning to a significantly different kind of example, in 1964 Rudolph J. Vecoli strongly challenged the generalized portrayal of immigrants in America which Oscar Handlin had presented in his Pulitzer Prize-winning popular history, The Uprooted, twelve years earlier. Writing about the tens of thousands of contadini (i.e. peasants) from southern Italy who had settled in Chicago, Vecoli declared that the noted Harvard historian 's theory that the process of adjusting to life on American shores had strengthened their religious li fe in an ali en environment. Not so, this Italian-American argued. "American priests were scandali zed by the indifference of the Italians to the Church . Even when Italian churches were provided by the Catholic hierarchy, the contadini seldom displayed any religious enthusiasm ." 34 Within the Slavic-American spectrum, the extent of Slovak detachment from organized religious life awaits detailed ana lysis. In 2005 sociologist Paul Froese published an article about the significantly differing levels of involvement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in recent decades. He attributed the higher degree among Slovaks to a historically different relationship between religion and nationalism . " In Slovakia," he concluded, "Roman Catholi cism and nationalism are conjoined in much the same way as they are in Poland." One consequence of thi s is greater loya lty to the Roman Catholi c 33 Frederi ck Ha le, No rwegian Religious Pluralism: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 34 Rudo lph J. Vecoli , "Contadini in Chi cago: A Critique of The Uprooted." The Journal of American History LI , no. 3 ( December 1964): 415. �SLOVAKIA 2021 69 Church in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.35 Froese did not, however, deal at all with the history of religious life among Slovaks who had been transplanted to a different environment in North America. Establishing the defensible perimeter of descriptions of SlovakAmerican religious life thus remains a difficult task, one which would have to take into account not only formal religious involvement and activity but also the extent to which an as yet indeterminate number of people chose not to become affiliated or who were directly critical of Christianity and its institutions. Moreover, the historical calculus would have to take into account changes over time. Out of This Furnace offers a stimulating if obviously truncated impression of Slovak religious life during the first few crucial decades of this group's history in industrial America. Indeed, when one considers Bell's personal separation from that important dimension of his ethnic heritage, it is arguably surprising how many aspects of it appear in this novel. One finds observations about inter a/ia priestly ministry, interaction with non-Slovak churches, efforts to raise children according to traditional religious values, prayer, community worship, and the relationship between religious institutions and the labor movement. To be sure, there is silence about significant historical matters, such as the Lutheran and other Protestant churches among Slovak immigrants. Far too little about these topics has been published in any genre. Will future litterateurs take up their pens and construct engaging fictional accounts that tell readers far more about the spiritual life of the group, thereby further enriching the colorful tapestry of ethnic historical fiction? To be sure, no amount of meticulous research could replace Bell ' s first-hand knowledge of Slovak immigrant life in Braddock, but many historical novelists have crafted credible works about topics which they did not experience. While we might be ill-advised to hold our breath, we can find comfort in Alexander Pope ' s oft-quoted words, " Hope springs eternal in the human breast." 35 Paul Froese, "Secular Czechs and Devout Slova ks: Ex ploring Religious Differences," Review of Religious Research XL VI , no. 3 (March 2005): 269, 280. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2021, Vol. 45 Description An account of the resource Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2021 53 RECONSIDERING SLOVAK-AMERICAN RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT: THOMAS BELL'S OUT OF THIS FURNACE IN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT Frederick Hale Introduction If any work of fiction deserves to be called " the great SlovakAmerican historical novel ," it is undoubtedly Thomas Bell 's Out of This Furnace. To be sure, the competition is nearly non-existent. 1 Nevertheless, since its initial publication in 1941 , thi s volume of more than 400 pages has offered readers a hi ghly readable and insightful view of immigrant laborers and their descendants, chiefly in the steel mill town s of western Pennsylvania where many Slovaks toiled. Their presence became woven into the multicolored ethni c fabric of that once-booming region. Though for many upward social mobility came at a snai l's pace, organized community li fe began early and remained vibrant, and the members of the group contributed mightily to the prosperity of the cities in which they sacrificed seemingly endless hours on the a ltars of an economy of wh ich they were far more the victims than the lords. Beg inning, apparently, as economically virtually powerless and thus wi lling to accept their su bservient lot in life, many gradua lly gained a bolder spirit through the labor movements in which they participated . In tandem with their inevitable assim ilation, Slovak-Americans eventuall y gained a greater voice in the direction of their working lives. These interrelated matters form much of the thematic warp and woof of Bell 's much-lauded novel , which traces three generations through their tribul ations to a more ass imilated 1 Michael ovak 's quasi-autobiogra phical The Tiber Was S ilver ( 1961) failed to make a perceptible splash in the waters of American literature, and hi s Naked I l eave ( 1970), whi ch was more widely rev iewed, was a lso criticall y interpreted as a fictional ized mirror of hi s transition from Roman Catho li c se minarian to journalist. These intensely personal works by a prominent Slovak-American inte llectua l whose life began in Jo hn stown , Pennsylvania, in 1933 are not w itho ut arti stic merit , but th ey belo ng to a sub-genre o f ficti o n quite different from Be ll 's realistic po rtraya l of th e ethni c g roup's hi story in th e late nin eteenth and ea rl y twenti eth centuri es. 54 SLOVAKIA 2021 status and to higher rungs of the socio-economic ladder. Mu tat is mutandis, the story it tells echoes that of numerous other immigrant groups in urban America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conceivably the eventual upward mobility-engendered in part by the labor movement- underlay the translation of this work into Slovak and its publication in 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when that country was to a great degree under the hegemony of the Soviet Union during the chilliest days of the Cold War. Furthermore, owing to its pedagogical value for teaching American immigration and labor hi story, in 1976 the University of Pittsburgh reprinted Out of This Furnace in response to a proposal by Professor David P. Demarest of Carnegie Mellon University. It fitted this social activist's converging interests in workingclass literature and labor history hand-in-glove. The relative popularity of the book led to a fiftieth anniversary edition in 1991. Bell illuminated many facets of Slovak-American working-class life and did not hesitate to include in his narrati ve several less savory dimensions of it that less candid writers might have chosen to minimize or ignore entirely in the interests of presenting palatable impressions of their respective ethnic groups. As Professor David J. Goldberg noted in 20 IO when advocating the assignment of Out of This Furnace to university students, " Men get drunk in saloons. Weddings and funerals are occasions for arguments." 2 A Limited Tradition of Scholarly Consideration Out of This Furnace has been neither the beneficiary nor the victim of extensive scholarly criticism, but it has not been completely ignored. In hi s study of American writers of the 1930s, especially those on the political Left, Leo Gurko devoted a few paragraphs to Bell ' s authorship and commented on this novel. However, Gurko did not evince adequate familiarity with this novelist's oeuvre. He judged that the ideological positions taken by Bell's characters "end with trade-unionism and anti-fascism," a myopic observation that overlooks the central character in All Brides Are Beautiful. Turning specifically to the hi storical span of Out o_fThis Furnace, Gurko thought that 2 David J. Goldberg, "Thomas Bell's 0111 o_(This Furnace: An Evaluation and an Appreciation," Journal of American Ethnic History, XXIX, no. 2 (Winter 2010), p. 664 . SLOVAKIA 2021 55 it covered two generations of Slovak-Americans, when in fact it dealt with three. 3 In 1975, i.e. a year before its republication by the University of Pittsburgh Press, John F. Berko contributed an article about Bell as a novelist to the journal Slovak Studies but devoted only one page to this particular novel. 4 Furthermore, after encouraging its republication Demarest wrote a moderately detailed Afterword in which he provided useful information without dissecting the text. The eminent historian of Slovak immigrants in North America Marian Mark Stolarik has credited Bell with describing Slovak-American life "very we ll" but lamented that he had "completely ignored the religiosity" of this ethnic group. 5 Stolarik's criticism at this point dovetails neatly with what he and other historians have repeatedly stated about the enthusiasm of Slovak-Americans for ecclesiastical life. In his article " Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," for example, published in the Slovak League of America's celebratory bicentennial volume in 1978, Daniel F. Tanzone could declare without reserve that "the most di stinctive characteristic of the Slovaks is their deep and abiding faith in God." The zeal they evinced in Central Europe, he emphasized, became transatlantic as immigrants from Slovakia " made great effort to hear the word of God preached to them in their native Slovak tongue." 6 The linkage between social and religious life has also been highlighted in the pertinent historiography. As Stolarik explained in the 1980s, upon settling in the United States Slovaks typically initiated this by founding "fraternal-benefit" societies to provide emotional and economic safety nets. These lodges usually reflected the discrete religious affiliations of individuals within the larger group and were identifiable as de facto Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. From the religious cohesion of such local societies formal , 3 Leo Gurko, The Angty Decade (New York : Dodd, Mead and Company, 1947), 66-9. John F. Berko, "Thomas Bell ( 1903- 196 1) Slovak-Ameri can Novelist," Slovak S1udies, XV ( 1975), 143-58. 5 M. Mark Stolarik to Frederick Hale, 14 November 20 17 (electronic correspondence) . 6 Daniel F. Tanzone, "Religious Developments Among the Slovaks in America," in Slovaks in America: A Bicenlennial S!udy (Middletown, Pennsylvani a: The Slovak League of America, 1978), 57 . 4 56 SLOVAKIA 2021 distinctly Slovak parishes sprang, often after a period of worshiping with, for example, Polish fellow immigrants.7 In his history of three generations of Slovak-Americans in the steel mill town of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, from the 1880s until the 1970s, Stolarik related in some detail how they were divided into three religious communities, chiefly Roman Catholic but also Greek Catholic and Lutheran . Church life among many of these people appears to have been vibrant, despite chronic financial hardship that, for example, protracted the amortization of mortgages. Church edifices began to appear at a very early stage. 8 He was thus not in doubt that " religion played a central role in the life of Bethlehem Slovaks."9 Of particular relevance to Out of This Furnace, Stolarik argued that on a national basis the "overwhelming loyalty" of Slovak-Americans to their religious life helped to immunize them from an early stage of their history to socialist movements which were drawing support from many other working-class immigrants well before the end of the nineteenth century. 10 More than two decades later, Stolarik published what may be the most up-to-date, albeit still brief, scholarly consideration of SlovakAmerican religious life. Writing in The Catholic Historical Review, he emphasized why the immigrants in question were divided into four denominations and how they adjusted to ecclesiastical circumstances in the United States of America and Canada, particularly the creation of specific ethnic parishes. Stolarik did not, however, deal with such matters as the non-affiliation of individuals with churches, anticlericalism, and hostility to or disagreement with religion as such. He judiciously acknowledged that much research remained to be done before historians could paint anything approaching a comprehensive portrait of the spiritual life of Slovak-Americans generally. 11 7 Marian Mark Stolarik , Immigration and Urbanization: The Slovak Experience, 18701918 (New York: AMS Press, Inc ., 1989), 82-3 . 8 M. Mark Stolarik, Growing Up on the South Side: Three Genera/ions of Slovaks in Bethlehem. Pennsylvania. 1880-/9 76 (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Bucknell University Press, 1985), 44-62. 44. 10 Stolarik, Immigration and Urbanization, 8 1. 11 M. Mark Stolarik, " Slovak Immigrants Come to Term s with Reli g ious Diversity in North America," The Catholic Historical Review, XCVI , no. I (January 20 I 0): 5684. 9 Ibid ., SLOVAKIA 2021 57 The publication in 2012 of his lengthy Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America (/ 870-2010) gave Stolarik an opportunity to touch on aspects of Slovak immigrants ' religious life in North America. His seventh chapter, "Slovak Marxists Disagree" dealt with what he acknowledged were the "few Marxists" among the Slovaks in the United States and Canada. This minuscule segment established mutual benefit societies which competed on a minor scale with the churches for the loyalty of the immigrants and their descendants but, as Stolarik emphasized, "their number remained small." 12 He briefly traced a waning of the socialists ' initially strident criticism ofreligious life and concluded that by the 1940s the verbal warfare had ceased. 13 The di sagreements to which the chapter' s title refers were largely those among the socialists themselves, especially with regard to political developments in their homeland, not to disputes between these men of the left and the ecclesiastical traditions they had left behind. The empirically challenging question of the scope of general SlovakAmerican indifference to and non-participation in formal religious life thus remained essentially unanswered. Regarding participation in secular campaigns to improve working conditions in industrial America, it is difficult to ascertain how many of these newcomers and their descendants supported the more inclusive labor movement, which in the USA was only partly socialist. However, it is known that Bell himself was a man of the Left, albeit not in a consistently outspoken way. How unrepresentative of SlovakAmericans he was in that regard is an interesting question, though one that necessarily lies beyond the scope of the present article. At any rate, in Out o_f This Furnace Bell presented the labor movement in a positive manner and highlighted the participation of at least a small number of Slovak-Americans in it. This is probably significant to an understanding of the dispersed treatment of religion in this fictional construction. 12 M. Mark Stolarik, Where Is My Home? Slovak Immigration to North America ( / 87020 10) (Bern : Peter Lang AG, Internati onal Academi c Publishers, 201 2), p. 205. 13 Stolarik, Wh ere Is My Home?, pp. 2 12-2 13. 58 SLOVAKIA 2021 A Little-known Literary A rtist Bell ' s earl y li fe endowed him with an intimate know ledge of hi s subj ect. His parents were fro m the village of Ni zny Tvarozec in the Bardejov d istri ct of the Presov reg ion of northwestern Slovaki a. He was born in the mill tow n of Braddock, Penn sylvani a, j ust east of Pi ttsburgh, in 1903 . 14 That small c ity had a popul ati on of 15,654 in 1900, a fig ure whi ch rose to sli ghtly over 20,000 two decades later before a persistent dec line reduced it to a poverty-stri cken village in the late twentieth century. His origi nal name was Ada lbert Thomas Belejcak, a cu mbersome moniker whi ch he never used during hi s career as a nove li st. Leav ing schoo l as an ado lescent, he worked loca ll y from age fifteen as an electri c ian' s apprenti ce but in 1922 re located to New York and was vari ously empl oyed fo r approximate ly a decade as a merchant sea man, boo kstore clerk , and mechani c. Bell 's first nove l, The Breed of Bas il, appeared in 1930, and from 1933 onward he was a fu ll -time writer, th ough onl y fi ve of hi s nove ls were issued. Hi s All Brides Are Beautiful was the bas is of a motion picture starrin g Joa n Fonta ine and Mark Stevens, and Till! Come Back to You was dramati zed and produced on Broadway by Jed Harri s. In other noteworthy d imensions of his career w ith the pen, Be ll contri buted short stori es to such magazi nes as McCall 's and Ladies ' Home J ournal, and eventuall y worked as a Holl ywood screenwriter. After mov ing to Cali fo rni a in 1955 , he continued to write sporadi ca ll y whil e operating the East Side Gift and Stati onery Shop in Santa Cruz. His hea lth deteri orated in the late 1950s, and he di ed of cancer in 196 1. The fun era l was held in a mortuary chapel rather than a church, and Bell 's ashes were interred at the crematory of the Independent Order of Odd Fell ows . 15 The few sources of readil y ava il able info rmation about hi s li fe do not suggest th at he had any ex perience in Slovaki a, and nothin g in Out of This Furnace indi cates that he had noteworthy know ledge of that coun try apart fro m what may have been handed down ora ll y from hi s fo rebears. Bell appears to have reli ed almost exc lusive ly on ora l traditi on and memories of hi s childhood in western Penn sy lvani a when craftin g thi s nove l. 14 https://en.wikipedia.org/wikiff homas_ Bell_(nove list). Accessed 2 January 2020. For SC ovelist T homas Bell Set," Santa Cruz Sentinel, 17 January I 96 1, p. 12. 15 " Servi ces SLOVAKIA 2021 59 Ideologically, Bell stood unabashedly on the left flank of the American political spectrum. This comes to the fore more vividly in his credible proletarian novel of 1936, All Brides Are Beautiful, which was the basis of the motion picture From This Day Forward, which premiered in 1946. Set in New York during the Depression of the 1930s, its principal protagonist is an Irish-American named Peter Cummings who, like many of his fellow citizens, suffers from underemployment and discrimination in the labor market. He reads a new book of British origin, The Nature of Capitalist Crisis, by John Strachey, a Labour Party politician who, despite his bourgeois origins (his father edited the Conservative-supporting periodical The Spectator) and privileged education at Eton College and the University of Oxford , was a communist sympathizer before turning against Communism in 1940. The narrative is peppered with references to inter alia the Workers Bookshop and the newspaper Daily Worker, published in New York by the Communist Party of the United States of America. In response to a query by another character, Cummings confirms his suspected political sympathies but qualifies this by assuring her, "I ' m not a very good Communist." 16 In the general scholarly literature about American literature (in which works by many individuals about immigrant groups are relatively well represented), Bell remains almost completely invisible. Never did an article about him appear in the hundreds of volumes in the nearly exhaustive reference work Contemporary Authors. As of 2020, the seemingly very inclusive Dictionary of Literary Biography, well over 300 volumes strong, has not included an essay about Bell. Rarely is he even mentioned in general surveys of the wider subject. Anyone searching for information about this fairly productive writer' s life and oeuvre will be fortunate to reap even a meager harvest of information . Contemporary reviews of his novels are a partial exception to this generalization, but even they are not particularly abundant. Out of This Furnace is a constructed family epic, and not even the later stages of the saga, which overlap with its author' s life, are quite autobiographical. In his Afterword in the 1976 edition, Demarest relied heavily on information gleaned from Bell's younger brother, 16 Thomas Bell , All Brides Are Beautiful (Boston: Linle, Brown, and Company, 1936), 21 6. 60 SLOVAKIA 2021 Anthony, to highlight certain fictional departures from the ostensible facts of the Belejcak family history . Plot Summary Out of This Furnace is structured in four parts. The first deals principally with George (or "Djuro") Kracha, who leaves his Slovak peasant life (and, temporarily, his young and pregnant wife in the care of his mother) in the autumn of 1881. After giving birth to a son a few months later, she joins him in Pennsylvania. They eke out a basic existence as George finds employment in a steel mill but his upward mobility is limited to operating a temporarily profitable butcher shop. There is no moral progression in this character. After his wife dies, he marries a fellow Slovak who emigrated simultaneous ly with him, but this frequently inebriated and cognitively unimpressive man is jailed for beating her. The second and third parts relate in much detail the lives of his daughter, Mary, and her husband, Mike Dobrejcak. These members of the second-generation toil arduously but receive scant reward for their labors. However, they are confident that their son, Dobie, can enjoy a materially better life than they have, a conviction this quite Americanized lad shares. He fulfills their expectations to a great degree. Having received several years' schooling, he speaks Eng li sh fluently and uses his rhetorical talent to advocate workers ' rights. In the fourth part, Dobie also toils in mills but plays a crucial role in the unionization of the labor force regionally and ventures to Washington to participate in labor negotiations. To a vastly greater degree than his immigrant grandfather, Dobie embodies an altrui stic spirit. He is a considerate husband and parent who is concerned not merely about his own welfare but a lso that of his descendants and of the working class in general. All in all , the saga of this family through three generations relates much about the initially glacial but gradual and inconsistent rise of Slovak-Americans during decades when the spoils of the labor and entrepreneurial spirit that transformed the United States into a massive industrial power were so unevenly distributed. In doing so, Bell's novel sheds much light on social relationships within the ethnic group, the partial retention of ethnic culture, and other related matters. SLOVAKIA 2021 61 A Miscellany of Religious Motifs The narrative does not deal in nearly as much detail about the reli gious life of Slovak-Americans as historians of Christianity might wi sh. This theme plays second or third fiddle in an otherwise fairly well-deve loped fictional orchestration of immigrant hi story. How much Bell knew about that aspect of his family's story which forms the core of the construction is difficult to assess. According to his brother Anthony, who provided Demarest with information about the clan, their father was a very active layman " in the church and related organizations" whose involvement in them took him to meetings throughout Pennsylvania and in Ohio. 17 In one of the most didactic sections of Part Two, the narrator genera li zes about the characteristics of the ethnic group. " In the o ld country the Slovaks had been an oppressed minority from the beginning of time, a simple, religious, unwarlike people, a nation of peasants and shepherds whom the centuries had taught patience and humility," he declares, though without relating anything to substantiate this. "In America they were all this and more, foreigners in a strange land, ignorant of the land and customs, fearful of authority in whatever guise." 18 Churches exist in the depicted milieu, but much of the time they remain vague entities in the background. There is relatively little description of either individuals or Slovak-American families worshiping regularly or otherwise participating in ecc lesiastical life, and one finds only occasional hints of private religious devotion. (Certa in key exceptions are discussed below.) There are priests, of course, but one gets the impression that in Bell ' s fictional world some of the key characters interact with them only on special occasions, such as at weddings and funerals, or when they encounter a crisis and perceive a need for sacerdotal intervention . The first such instance occurs in the Old World. When Kracha elects to try his luck in America, he leaves his pregnant wife Elena in the care of his mother, an arrangement which proves inauspicious. The otherwise anonymous local priest who writes letters on behalf of these two presumably illiterate women informs Kracha that his a iling wife 17 18 Dav id P. Demarest, Jr. , " Afterword," in Bell , Ou! of This Furnace, 420. Bell , Ow of This Furnace, 123 . 62 SLOVAKIA 2021 and her mother-in-law are not fully compatible, especially when cohabiting in a one-room hut, and that he should do whatever is necessary to enable her relocation to America at the earliest opportunity. 19 Beyond that brief part, there is virtually nothing in Out of This Furnace about religious life in Slovakia. In the scattered comments about Slovak-American churches, one finds themes that reflect what one can read in nonfictional historical surveys. For example, new clusters of Slovak immigrants typically worshipped temporarily in the sanctuaries of non-Slovaks before founding their own parishes. Early in the narrative, a young Slovak immigrant couple have their nuptial mass in an Irish-American Roman Catholic church because there is not yet one of their own national heritage.20 When the number of Slovaks in individual locales increased to the point where they could organize their own parishes, they sometimes bought church edifices from Protestant congregations whose members were gradually moving to other communities. There are two occurrences of this in Out of This Furnace. In Braddock, Slovak Roman Catholics "took over" First Baptist Church and rededicated it as St. Michael's Church.2 1 Their ethnic fellows of Greek Catholi c loyalty followed suit shortly thereafter, purchasing what had been the First Presbyterian Church in an unappealing location a long the railroad tracks in the same small city. In its new denominational iteration, it had become St. Peter and St. Paul ' s. 22 Readers are not given nearly enough information about the ecclesiastica l life of the community to create a comprehensive portrait of that subject in general or the proportion of Slovaks who were active church members. There is no reason to believe that the dissolute Kracha is such an individual. On the other hand, after his sickly spouse Elena recovers sufficiently to leave the house, she begins to go to church every morning. However, this is described as the behavior of a mentally troubled soul who has largely withdrawn into herself, not as that of one with a normal socia l li fe . C lasping her rosary, Elena has " now more than ever a frightened , beaten look," perhaps owing to her 19 Bell , Bell , 21 Bell , 22 Bell , 20 0111 o( This Ou! of This Ou! of This 0111 of This Furnace, 14. Furnace, 19 . Furnace, 38. Furnace, 69. SLOVAKIA 2021 63 inability to adapt to her difficult life as Kracha's wife in a dismal mill town. 23 The phenomenon of non-involvement in organized community religious life is dealt with only fleetingly . The most explicit example of this stems from Bell's critique of capitalist exploitation of the steelworkers. Kracha's colleague Joe Dubik is introduced as "a Rusnak, a Greek Catholic from Tvarosc in Sarisa." 24 Having preceded Kracha to Braddock, he welcomes his friend when the latter arrives and shows him around the town. Passing the Carnegie public library (endowed by the philanthropy of the Scottish immigrant steel magnate Andrew Carnegie), Dubik admits that he had never entered it. " When do I have the time for such things?" he explains wistfully. "Since they cut wages and put us on twelve hours l've even stopped going to church." 25 But some continue to attend mass. One is Mike Dobrejcak , the long-suffering son-in-law of Kracha, who rarely finds joy in life and is trapped in his career as a steelworker. In a paragraph of several hundred words, the narrator provides moving insight into the spiritual constitution of this second-generation Slovak-American and the personal significance of his religious life. He prefers to attend the evening mass in the Greek Catholic Church. In contrast to high mass, where God seems to be "the thundering, awe-inspiring Lord of the Universe in vestments of white and gold," for after sunset the deity seems to be "a friend whom one dropped in to visit, God still but God at ease, His shoes and trousers showing below His robes." This approachable deity is one to whom Mike can pray for his wife Mary, their children, and him self. He can do so confident that God is superior to steel corporations and their general superintendents. Moreover, and perhaps just as important to Mike, the church in which this relationship unfolds is a social leveler. In its sanctuary " he was not a check number of a Hunky laborer, but a man." God, he believes, cared not a whit about socioeconomic differences or ethnic strata in American society: " Here he was welcome, here he belonged . Here he spoke in his own tongue; and without fear, without awkwardness, he spoke of himself, hi s hopes, hi s troubles, hi s need of help. And God heard him out." The God of the church, and especially of evening mass, " knew him by name, knew 23 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 64. Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 10. 25 Bell , Out a/This Furnace, 34. 24 64 SLOVAKIA 2021 about Mary and the children understood how it was with all of them and had a pretty good idea what kind of person, behind his laborer's clothes and poor English, Mike really was. God , in short, liked him ." The psychological impact is subtle but real; "The world was always a less unfriendly place and he nearly always walked a little straighter, heartened, protected, when he came out." 26 Nor is Mike alone. The narrator acknowledges that more pews are empty than filled, but the congregation includes inter alia old parishioners who attended mass daily and twice on Sunday. Far more prevalent in the throng are young couples who also appreciated the subdued sociability of a vespers service. It gave them "an irreproachable excuse to be together and was cheaper than a trip to Kennywood," explains the narrator. 27 No single factor, in other words, expla ins why Slovak-Americans participate in the worship of their churches . Bell ' s fictional construction of Slovak participation in the unsuccessful 1919 Great Steel Strike gave him an opportunity to explore a dimension of the ro le of religious factors in a matter of immense personal interest. Hi s sympathy with the goals of the strike, which took place while he was sti ll a teenager in Braddock, is manifest. Bell included a paragraph listing the union's demands, among them such minimal conditions as an eight-hour day, the right of workers to bargain collectively, and one day off every week. 28 Against this background, the support of the long-serving priest in Braddock, Father Kazincy, for the campaign is understandable. Indeed, he has urged parishioners to join the union , and he allows an organizing committee to meet in the basement of his church. When "veiled threats" are made by an unidentified party to foreclose on the parish's mortgage, Kazincy replies that if that is done he will place a sign on the front of the building announcing: "Thi s Church of Christ c losed by the United States Steel Corporation ." He further show s his so lidari ty after mass at St. Michael's on the Sunday morning immediately before the beginning of the strike when a state trooper orders people who congregate outside the building to disperse: "Father Kazincy came out of the church and protested, a tall , gray-haired man in priestly robes standing 26 Bell , Out of This Furnace, 17 1. Bell, Out of This Furnace, 170. Launched in 1899 in West Miffin. southeast of Pittsburgh, Kenn ywood was an amusement park and picnic area th at attracted large numbers of workin g-cl ass people. 28 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 240. 27 SLOVAKIA 2021 65 beside the trooper's restless horse, his face uplifted, alight with indignation." 29 This sympathy-inspiring partisanship is juxtaposed with less appealing conduct on the part of the Irish-dominated Roman Catholic Church . At its St. Brendan's Church " in the ' good ' part of town", the priest declares in his homily, "This strike is not being brought about by intelligent English-speaking workmen ... . You can't reason with these people. Don't reason with them." The appropriate response, he preached, was to "knock them down!" In Bell ' s narrative, this hostility meshed with the response of the diocesan hierarchy to the strike. A delegation of Catholic strikers call on the bishop of Pittsburgh (whom Bell calls "Bishop Canavan" but in fact was Regis Canevin from 1904 until 1921) imploring him to support the action, not least because a majority of the strikers are Catholics. But that prelate declines to do so. Underscoring the influence of the industrial magnates on religious life, "not long after that the Pittsburgh Catholic Charities received a check for twenty-five thousand dollars from the Carnegie Steel Company."30 An Atheist to the End Too little is known , and perhaps cannot be known , about Bell ' s low-profile life to trace whatever spiritual journey he may have had followed through his fifty-seven years. What is beyond dispute, however, is that the skepticism expressed in Out of This Furnace foreshadowed acknowledged atheism in his final book, In the Midst of life. This nonfictional volume, approximately 270 pages in length, was published a few months after his death in 1961 . It encompasses a miscellany of his thoughts and musings as a terminally ill cancer patient in Santa Cruz. Bell acknowledged in his first brief chapter that he was not on the same spiritual wavelength with many other people. "While others, in the old phrase, make their peace with God," he stated, "I must make mine with myself." 31 Bell noted that his beliefs differed markedly from those of one of his pious customers, a Mrs. Worth, who had sought to 29 Bell, Out of This Furnace, 241 . Out of This Furnace, 241 -2. 3 1Thomas Bell , In the Mid1·t a/Life (New York: Atheneum, 196 1), 5. 30 Bell, 66 SLOVAKIA 2021 encourage him at that critical stage of his life. He had even prayed to " Mrs. Worth 's God" in the privacy of a toilet at a hospital in Palo Alto, but his cancer had progressed unabated. Bell concluded that "belief in a supernatural god may disappear, and a good thing too," but in the same sentence he admitted that there were times "when one can only envy such people as Mrs. Worth. " 32 If his non credo of ca. 1960 represented his attitude towards the Christian faith two decades earlier, his willingness to write sympathetically, albeit briefly, about the religious life of his fictional characters at that time is all the more remarkable. Conclusion A juxtaposition of Out of This Furnace and the nonfictional texts cited in the present article highlights several problems that serious historians of religion encounter when they are seeking to gauge, even in an approximate way, the spiritual life of Slovak immigrants in North America. On the one hand, there are assertions about the group's devotion to Christianity in several of its denominational forms. These assurances are typically supported by reference to the hundreds of churches which Slovaks founded in the New World, usually in the early stages of their community life in surroundings still only partially familiar to them, and in many instances after unsatisfactory experiences in multi-ethnic parishes. On the other hand, when one reads Out of This Furnace as almost certainly the principal fictional reconstruction of Slovak-American history, one finds significantly less about religion than nonfictional literature might reasonably lead one to expect. Considered in isolation, Out a/This Furnace thus gives an impression that is difficult to harmoni ze with the large number of enduring Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and other sorts of parishes which these immigrants founded to serve as their spiritual homes. No doubt part of the answer inheres in accepting the fact that Slovak-Americans were by no means a monolithic entity, but a diverse segment of the Euro-American population which probably always included individuals with varying degrees of religious fervor and criticism thereof, different levels of moral development, and no uniformity of commitment to community life. Gauging the percentage of people 32 Bell, In the Mid1·1 a/Life, 8-9. SLOVAKIA 2021 67 in any historic ethnic group who chose to affiliate with its religious institutions can be prohibitively difficult. Any calculations done in this regard would probably be estimates rather than precise statistics. Furthermore, such figures do not address the underlying problems of assessing personal commitment and spiritual life as opposed to nominal membership. Other dimensions of the phenomenon bedevil quantification . Historians must look carefully at how the character of their subject evolves over time. In this case, they would be compelled to examine, for instance, the religious commitment of the displaced people who formed the first generation in America and then their at least partly assimilated, Anglophone descendants. Did interest in ecclesiastical life vary diachronically? Was it consistent in large cities and small mill towns? Did it appear to be more vibrant in areas where the Slovaks constituted a relatively large percentage of the population than in those areas where they were but a small minority? Were married men more inclined than bachelors to participate in organized religious life? These and related questions are by no means limited to Slovaks or other Eastern and Central Europeans in North America and their descendants but are relevant to much of the ethnic panorama. A broad consideration of this obviously lies beyond the bounds of the present study, but two quite different kinds of examples illustrate the point. One stems from the present writer's extensive, multidenominational research on the history of the approximately 800,000 Norwegians who emigrated to the United States. Most of them were at least nominal members of the established Evangelical Lutheran Church in their homeland, although levels of participation in its sacraments, services, and so on varied greatly from region to region. Numerous " revival" movements, some of them led by lay preachers, had reinvigorated the spiritual life of the nation. Nonconformist denominations also sprouted in the nineteenth century, giving especially those Norwegians who lived in coastal towns some measure of churches from which to choose. At the same time, however, anticlerical critics emerged, sometimes in tandem with an incipient labor movement. After reaching the United States, large numbers of these Nordic newcomers formed many hundreds of Lutheran churches, chiefly in the Upper Midwest, with smaller numbers in other regions. They also founded several church-related undergraduate colleges, most of which continue to thrive in the twenty-first century, and several theological 68 SLOVAKIA 2021 seminaries for training new generations of pastors. All in all , denominational membership statistics clearly indicate that a higher percentage of Norwegian immigrants than their Swedish and Danish counterparts, to cite the most meaningful comparisons, were affiliated with what can be regarded as their birthright religious institutions. However, as I have demonstrated, this involvement varied immensely, and overall only about 30 percent of first-generation Norwegian-Americans became members of the ethnic Lutheran churches in which one might expect to find them .33 The evidence disconfirmed sweeping generalizations that historians of immigration had made for approximately two generations about the supposedly lofty level of religious loyalty among newcomers from Norway. Turning to a significantly different kind of example, in 1964 Rudolph J. Vecoli strongly challenged the generalized portrayal of immigrants in America which Oscar Handlin had presented in his Pulitzer Prize-winning popular history, The Uprooted, twelve years earlier. Writing about the tens of thousands of contadini (i.e. peasants) from southern Italy who had settled in Chicago, Vecoli declared that the noted Harvard historian 's theory that the process of adjusting to life on American shores had strengthened their religious li fe in an ali en environment. Not so, this Italian-American argued. "American priests were scandali zed by the indifference of the Italians to the Church . Even when Italian churches were provided by the Catholic hierarchy, the contadini seldom displayed any religious enthusiasm ." 34 Within the Slavic-American spectrum, the extent of Slovak detachment from organized religious life awaits detailed ana lysis. In 2005 sociologist Paul Froese published an article about the significantly differing levels of involvement in Slovakia and the Czech Republic in recent decades. He attributed the higher degree among Slovaks to a historically different relationship between religion and nationalism . " In Slovakia," he concluded, "Roman Catholi cism and nationalism are conjoined in much the same way as they are in Poland." One consequence of thi s is greater loya lty to the Roman Catholi c 33 Frederi ck Ha le, No rwegian Religious Pluralism: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992). 34 Rudo lph J. Vecoli , "Contadini in Chi cago: A Critique of The Uprooted." The Journal of American History LI , no. 3 ( December 1964): 415. SLOVAKIA 2021 69 Church in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.35 Froese did not, however, deal at all with the history of religious life among Slovaks who had been transplanted to a different environment in North America. Establishing the defensible perimeter of descriptions of SlovakAmerican religious life thus remains a difficult task, one which would have to take into account not only formal religious involvement and activity but also the extent to which an as yet indeterminate number of people chose not to become affiliated or who were directly critical of Christianity and its institutions. Moreover, the historical calculus would have to take into account changes over time. Out of This Furnace offers a stimulating if obviously truncated impression of Slovak religious life during the first few crucial decades of this group's history in industrial America. Indeed, when one considers Bell's personal separation from that important dimension of his ethnic heritage, it is arguably surprising how many aspects of it appear in this novel. One finds observations about inter a/ia priestly ministry, interaction with non-Slovak churches, efforts to raise children according to traditional religious values, prayer, community worship, and the relationship between religious institutions and the labor movement. To be sure, there is silence about significant historical matters, such as the Lutheran and other Protestant churches among Slovak immigrants. Far too little about these topics has been published in any genre. Will future litterateurs take up their pens and construct engaging fictional accounts that tell readers far more about the spiritual life of the group, thereby further enriching the colorful tapestry of ethnic historical fiction? To be sure, no amount of meticulous research could replace Bell ' s first-hand knowledge of Slovak immigrant life in Braddock, but many historical novelists have crafted credible works about topics which they did not experience. While we might be ill-advised to hold our breath, we can find comfort in Alexander Pope ' s oft-quoted words, " Hope springs eternal in the human breast." 35 Paul Froese, "Secular Czechs and Devout Slova ks: Ex ploring Religious Differences," Review of Religious Research XL VI , no. 3 (March 2005): 269, 280.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Reconsidering Slovak-American Religious Commitment: Thomas Bell's Out of this Furnace in Historiographical Context Description An account of the resource Frederick Hale Slovakia, Vol. 45 (No. 84-85), 2021 pp. 53-69 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hale, Frederick, 1948- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2021 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5f1697592b297d8afb0e81d218226c76.pdf d8bdc781fc0df688e5c586e5835f96fb PDF Text Text 92 SLOVAKIA Vajansky and Turgenev Willia m E. H a rkin s It h as bee n said th a t literature feeds on lite rature m o re tha n it d oes on life, b y which it is m eant th a t a writer finds it m o re diffi cult to work directl y from life a nd tran sla te living expe rience directly into verbal a rt. Whe n o ne's source s a re them selves wo rd s a nd verb al fo rms, no act of tra n sla tion is required. The new " intertex tu al " approach to the semiotic stud y of literature wo uld seem to co nfirm this t ruth. It is a truism of Slovak literary history tha t the writer Svetozar Hurba n V aj a nsky was stro n gly influ en ced b y Ru ssian literature, a nd in parti cul a r b y Turgen ev. 1 Hurba n V aj a n sky st ands in th at nin eteen th- century Slovak ideological traditio n which turned its back on the W est , a nd specifically on the C zechs, a nd sou ght instead to find a n ideological base in Ru ss ian cul ture a nd Ru ssia n lite rature . T hi s pa per is inte nded to explore the questio n o f the exte nt o f Hurba n V aj a n sky's d epe nde nce o n Turge nev a nd to ve ntu re a n expla n a tio n of why Turge nev's le gacy was a suita ble bas is for V aj a n sky's w ritin gs . I will analyze V ajan sky' s most famous and probably his greatest novel , Su ch a. ratolest'(T he Dry B ranch , 1884) , as well as several o f his co untry sketches from the collectio n N a Basna.rovom kopci a ine crty (On Basnarov Hill a nd Other Sketche s, 1880-1 883) . At first sight it would seem that Tu rge nev wo uld h ave had ve ry little to o ffer the Slovak writer. V aj a n sk y was a n aggressive , d etermined a nd zealou s fi ghte r in the Slovak n atio n al cau se, him self witho u t hesita tio n a nd w ithout the intellectu al rese rvatio n s so typi cal of Tu rge nev's heroes. The them e o f n at io na lism is weak in Ru ss ia n Lite ra ture , pa rtl y becau se write rs did not iden ti fy th em selves with the R ussia n tsarist regim e, pa rtly b ecau se Ru ssia n n a tion a lism and na tio nal independence co uld be taken for gr a nted . T he sam e thing is tru e, of co urse, for En gli sh , Ame rican , o r Fre nch liter a ture, in which na tio na li st a nd p atriotic the m es a re no rmally weak , a nd in which a nti-na tion alist w riters are even kn ow n (Celine , M a ile r , etc.). Bu t in Ru ssia n li terature th e them e of natio n alism is alm os t pathologicall y weaken ed ; the reaso ns fo r this pheno m eno n mu st be sou gh t in Ru ssia 's unique spiritual and id eological develop ment . The a mbivalence of Turgenev's heroes would likewise seem �SLOVAKIA 93 to offer little to Vajansky, who was in part see kin g to create p rototyp es for n a tional lead ership. Th e search for a lead e r is a Turge n evan the me , o f course, but in Turgenev would-be lead er after lead e r goes d own to d efeat: Rudin , L avreckij , ln sarov , Bazarov, Nezdanov. I will return to these points presently , but first let us look at Vajansky ' s n ovel, Sucha ratolest'. The h ero of the novel is Stani slav Rudopol'sky, the la ndless heir of a n ancient n oble family o f la ndowne rs . Stanislav's father, impoverished, h ad turned from the ancient noble ways to foll ow a middle -class ex iste n ce as a governm en t official. Through indu stry a nd sob riety he accumul ated a con siderable fo rtune, which h e left to his son Stani slav , a youn g m a n with arti st ic inclin ations and tale nts and n ow e ndowed with e n ough wealth to cultivate these. H e return s h o m e to dwell in his an cestral m ansion in the provin cial town of Rudopolie . H e re he vacillates between two women: one the wife of his b est friend a nd the model for a great spiritualized portrait h e is p ainting which m ay vaguel y symbolize the Slovak people a nd its aspirations ; the o ther, a flirt a tiou s widow. The n ovel fin ally resolves the conflict b y transmittin g his affect io n for hi s friend's wife into spiritu al love a nd a rtistic creativ ity , thus leaving him to the wi dow , w h o turns out , in spite of h e r initi al capriciousness, to b e full y worthy of him . At first Stanislav is indiffere nt to the Slovak nation al cau se, which h e regards as a historical blind alley, but h e is ultimately brou ght through his frie ndship with Slovak p atriots to a tru e sense of the value and significan ce o f that cau se. Thus h e becomes what must h ave been a historical rarity: a zeman (squire) who is pro-Slovak and anti-Magyar. But we must remember that h e is landl ess and th at h e belongs essentially to th e middle class rath er t h an to th e gentry: in this Vajansky seems to be say in g th at the future hope of Slovakia lay in the middl e-class intelli ge ntsia and in the towns. Stanislav fight s a duel with the local leader of th e Magyar nationalist party: this is purely symbolic; in the duel he is n early k illed but a lso su cceeds in wounding hi s antagonist. Finally h e is nursed back to h ealth by the widow, and the novel ends w ith an opti mi stic, up-beat conclus io n . The title phrase, "Such a ratolest', " " dry branch," is applied to Stan islav , both by other ch aracters a nd by h imself. I t impli es his roo tlessness and purposel essness , qualiti es wh ich he feels strongly; at the e nd of the novel he would see m , however , to have transcended these qualities . Still, the novel has usu a ll y been taken as an ev idence th a t the �94 SLOVAKIA zemans had nothing to contribute to the Slovak nationalist cause (just as the Russian critic Dobroljubov took the novel Oblomov as a concrete evidence that the Russian gentry could not supply national leadership). The point remains ambiguous, and we must note here that this kind of ambiguity is quite typical of Turgenev ' s heroes. Rudin talks like a leader but is incapable of acting; Lavreckij too talks nobly but never acts; Insarov is killed off before he has an opportunity to lead ; Bazarov is a born leader but has no cause to lead, and he too is killed off to make doubly certain that the revolution will not come in hi s time. Just so Stanislav, or Stano as the author usually calls him , has a personal spiritual developme nt which is said to be fruitful, but that development seems to imply only fruitlessness for the national cause: the true ~ovak patriots and leaders in the novel are Stano's friends and not Stano. The point is furth er obscured in Vajansky' s romantic treatment of Stano as a painter: his activity is entirely idealized and spiritualized as artistic creation . We can read this as symbolic, but still the novel is too realistic (it co ntains an entire chapter describing an election, for instance), to permit us really to identify Stano ' s art as a symbol of the national struggle. Indeed , there is much in Stano which we could identify as "superfluity, " in the Russian tradition of the lisnij celovek or superfluous man . Essentially good, Stano is also fruitless and without purpose. H e vacillates in his love life. He almost gets killed in a duel. Only his art enables him to transcend lisnost' or superfluity. But is Vajansky's novel really so dependent on Turgenev as the critics have thought? Some general features do seem to resemble Turgenev: the treatment of landscape ( though Vajansky' s countryside is brighter and less somber than Turgenev's); the theme of a stranger returning home to the country to live there (Lavreckij, Bazarov); the theme of superfluity and the ambigu ity in its treatment; last perhaps, the theme of art, though actually it is not so typical of Turgenev as we might have supposed. Finally Vajansky , most unfortunately , e nded his novel with a virtual paraphase of the endi ng of Turgenev's Fathers and Children: the description of the cemetery in which Bazarov rests (in Sucha ratolest' the dead woman is Anna, one of the novel's three h eroines). But in fact Vajansky was not really very d ependent on Turgenev. Before discussing the novel 's independence, however, we should attend to several aspects that recall Pushkin rather than Turgenev. First, the �SLOVAKIA 95 trait of superfluity is as typical for Pu shkin as it is for Turgen ev, though in Pushkin it is d epicted with considerably less ambiguity . The theme of art is also Pushkinian , thou gh it must be said that Pushkin does not romanticize it the way Turgenev and Vajansky do . Several motifs involving Stano and the young orphan girl Anna recall Pushkin's Eugene On egin. As in On egin , a cultivated stranger comes to dwell in the countryside and makes a strong impression on a rathe r n aive native girl. As in On egin , the girl 's naivete is brought out throu gh the fact that she lacks discrimination in her choice of reading matter; specifically , the use of a library and books to assess character recalls Pushkin , though he used these for Onegin himself, for the hero , not the hero in e . There is a scene in which Anna , unable to sleep , gazes at the moon , as Tatyana does in Pushkin 's novel in verse. Finally, the duel in Vajansky's novel is som ewhat cl oser to the duel in On egin than it is to Bazarov' s duel wi th Pavel Kirsanov. But even in these d etails V aj a nsky shows great independence. Anna is impressed by Stano , but in the end she realizes his weakness and ambivalence a nd is repell ed by him , a nd the great bulk ofVajansky's novel is indepe nde nt both of Pushkin a nd Turgenev . If we look first of all at the n ovel 's st ructure, we a re impressed almost staggered - by V aj a n sky's originality. H e shows a freed om of con struction th at is truly amazing : without transitions he m oves from scene to scene, character to character, episode to episode. Events occur for which we are totally unprepared . Compared with Turgen ev, or Pushkin , his structure seems wild , formless , a rtl ess. These writers organize their materi al into tight structural units which themselves ha ve beginnings, middles and endi n gs. They operate with a restricted group of ch aracters in th e la te stages of their works. Vaj ansky can introdu ce a n ew ch aracter anyw here or at any time he wishes , nor does h e feel an obli gation to carry all hi s characters - even the importa nt ones - right down to the novel 's end. It would not be correct to say that Vajan sky' s novel is plotless it has a pl ot which, if less in scope than that of Pushkin 's Onegin could probably be compa red with T urge n ev's Smoke , or even Rudin . But in a certain sense, nothing h a ppens in Vajansky's novel with but one except ion: symbolic events occu r. Stano transcend s his attraction to his fri e nd 's wife. H e fi ghts a duel. Th e orphan Anna goes blind a nd dies. To a ttempt a more precise definition: th e realistic side of Vajan- �96 SLOVAKIA sky's novel lacks a plot stru cture . A second kind of event can occur which is radically unTurgenevan : this is the action of social groups: tavern brawls, demonstrations , election s held under conditions of corrupt ion. There is a far deeper sense of society in Vajansky' s fiction than in either Pushkin or Turgenev, and in this he was more of a realist. Presumabl y he had undergo ne the influ en ce of positivist philosophy, which turned its a ttent ion to society and created the new scien ce of sociology. Vajansky's "formlessn ess " would hardly have appealed to cultivated nineteenth-century readers . They would have preferred the powerful sense of form of a Pushkin , or the delicate understatement of a Turgenev. But to o ur times Vajansky's impatience with the constraints of form seems origin al and refreshing. I t h as often been said that Vajansky depicted a Slovak society that never ex isted, that is idealized. Yet in Sucha ratolest' that Slovak society hardl y appears a s idealized: it is dru nken , given to brawling, easily corrupted by bribes and drink. What Vajansky seems to intend here is a kind of dialectic opposition : ideal leaders will lead the people, brutalized by the Magyar oppress io n , to liberty . It is in suffi cient to say, then, that Vaj a nsky idealized Slovak society : in fact he gives us invaluable glimpses of life in a small Slovak country town of the day . The chapter depicting the elections is a masterly portrait that recalls, in its sordidness a nd detail , an American election of the ninetee nth or even twentieth century. Drink, arbitra ry challenges to the voters , repeat votin g - the familiar techniques of election control are all vividl y described. Thus Vajansky' s novel vacillates amb iguously be tween realism and id ealism . But the ambiguity is artistically fruitful and creative. In the years 1880- 1883 Vaj a n sky published a few sketch es of peasant a nd country life. The se sketch es, republish ed la ter in coll ected form unde r the titl e o f Na Basnarovom k opci a in e crty (On Basna rov Hill a nd Oth e r Ske tches), a re a m o n g hi s strongest a nd m os t ori ginal works, and it can o nly be re gretted th at he did not produ ce mo re exampl es of th e genre . T he form o fV ajan sky's sketch d e ri ves, o f co urse, from Turgenev , whose Sportsman ·s Sketches, pu bli shed in 1852, a re perh aps th a t writer 's stron ges t work. Lik e Turge nev , V ajan sky se ts hi s sketches in th e countrys id e, a nd th ey d ispl a y a stron gly im agisti c tre nd in th e d epi cti o n bo th of la nd scape a nd th e p easant cha racter s who pop ul a te it . In the sketches o f bo th w riters a n a rrator a ppears as a pe rce iver, a nd the di stan ce be- �SLOVAKIA 97 tween his perceiving eye and the peasants he views creates a subtle irony, one that does not , however , undercut the warm lyricism of the style and m anner. T u rgenev ' s narrator is a gentleman proprietor and hunter ; Vaj an sky's is (presum a bly) a middle-class intellectual turning his attention to the life of the Slovak peasantry. The ideological point of this is never m ade specific, bu t it was pa tently implicit in the political logic of the times: the Slovak intellectu als were waitin g for the d awn of political consciou sness am ong the peasantry. In the first of these sketches, " On Basna rov Hill ," the ideological mom ent is most incisive , though its intrusiveness detracts from the sketch artisti cally. A peasant m other and her younger son lam ent the cruelty of the elder son who has cast the widowed m other out with out provision for support. In her conversation she turns to attack Slovak officials , whom as a peasan t she di stru sts . V aj an sky, overhearing her , interrupts to de fend those offi cials who are Slovak nationalists. But the distinction is los t on the old woman , who has little political or national consciousness. She simply tu rns her back on his appeal. T hi s argum en t is of course quite un-Turgenevan ; Turgenev the hun ter m ay speak to the peasants, but he d oes not harran gu e them ; indeed , Tu rge nev is a master of understa tem en t and this q u ality Vajansky was perha ps un a ble to ass imila te, as we have already seen in the case of Su cha ra tolest'. But V ajan sky is capa ble o f creating im ages as powe rful and movin g as those of T u rgenev . P erh a ps the fines t of his sketcties is the one called " Hlasnik " (The Night W atchman): a movin g im agistic portrayal of a peasan t watchm an 's round s at nigh t, in te rtwined with hi s service to a dead m an fo r whom he digs a grave and whose bod y he later visits. With vivid depict ion of both the m ovem ent of the watchma n ' s round s and hi s calls th rough the night on his horn , the piece is a m asterpiece of mood im agery th at recall s the fin est sketches of Tu rgen ev such as "The Singe rs" or " Bezin M eadow," but d oes not imi tate them except in th e m ost ge neral way . In fac t , none of Vajansky' s ind ividual sketches recalls an y specific sketch b y T urgenev. Vaj an sky's land scape is too differe nt , a nd Slovak society too d ist inct. Vajan sky has perfectly ad apted th e Turgenevan ske tch and u sed it in the cause of Slovak li terature and Slovak ideology. We are now in a better pos ition to answer the ques tion we posed at the ou tset : what qu a:ities in T urgenev appealed to Vajansky and per- �98 SLOVAKIA suaded him to use elements taken from Turgenev 's work? The question should be asked in the light of the almost total difference we have found between the two writers, in personality, artistic temperament , psychology of character creation and development, optimism and pessimism, artistic structure. Still, there was something in Turgenev 's work, whether Vajansky realized it consciously or not, which Vajansky found of creative use . I suggest that this was that very ambiguity of treatment of ideological heroes by Turgenev which attracted Vajansky to his work. This in spite ofVajansky's much greater aggressiveness, his nationalism, his greater optimism . For tl;ie fact was that the Slovak cause was going nowhere in the 1880's. Though it might well have been that eventually it would go somewhere , it seemed bogged down - and this is the view Vajansky embodies in Sucha ratolest' in his chapter on the elections. Hence it was necessary to create characters who were "superfluous," who could achieve nothing in the present, yet characters capable of success, at least in an idealized dimension projected into the future . Turgenev had done the same thing: Bazarov is a born leader capable of reforming Russia, yet he is a leader without real followers and he comes at a time that is premature . The other common feature between Turgenev's writings and those of Vajansky is that of a passive human mass, the peasantry, needing to be awakened and educated . This is perhaps the only point where Turgenev's ideology acquires a nationalist tinge: Russia's peasantry holds her back, prevents her proper development : hence , it is necessary to educate the peasantry. In Vajansky the peasantry, and to some extent the town masses, play a similar role . It is necessary to win these masses over if the Slovak cause is to succeed. Following their leader l:.udovft Stur, the Slovak patriots turned to Russia because they perceived the West, including the Czechs , as decadent. They were influenced in this by Herder's prophecy of the future greatness of the Slavs, a prophecy Herder had specially made for the Eastern Slavs on the basis of his stay in Riga. Stur also noted that the closeness of kinship and family ties, so important to the Slovaks, was duplicated among the Eastern Slavs but not among the Czechs. 1 This began a Slovak turn toward Russia and Russian culture that was beneficial for the development of the nascent Slovak literature , if it was probably harmful to the development of the Slovak national ideology. �SLOVAKIA 99 It is perhaps ironic that , motivated by considerations such as warmth of emotionality and closeness of kinship ties, V ajansky should have turned to writers like Pushkin and Turgenev, who, among Russians, were to be regarded as Westerners. Curiously, the Slovak leaders hardly knew the Russian Slavophiles, and their influence was perceptible only later. Yet, clearly the Slovak writers were seeking something they could use, and the precise source was not important. It is remarkable that when artists such as Edouard Manet or Vincent van Gogh or Mary Cassat turned to Japanese art for inspiration , they found woodblock prints of grim acin g actors and simpering courtesans , rather than the infinitely more subtle and more sophisticated art of such J a panese schools as the Rimp a or Shijo schools. Yet apparently Manet, Van Gogh , or Mary Cassat kn ew what they were looking for, and they rejected what they could not use; thus they succeeded in making that Japanese influence fruitful and not pernicious . In a similar way, Turgenev was a writer in many ways not con genial to Vajansky. But Vajansky had his own individuality and was a great enough artist to take from Turgenev what he needed . And he incorporated that something into his own distinct art. NOTES See, e. g., Jan V . Novak and Arne Novak, Pfehledn e dejin y literatury ceske (Olomouc, 1936-39), p. 82 1; Andrej Mraz , Dejiny slovensk ej literatury, Slovenska vlastiveda , Vol. 1, Literatura a jazyk (Bra tislava: Sloven ska Akademia vied a umenf, 1948), p . 214; Slovenska Akademia Vied, Ustav slovenskej li te ra tury, D ejin y slovenskej literatury, III (Bra tislava, 1965), 630-31 a nd passim . ' See Ludovft Stur , 0 narodnich pisnich a povestech plemen slovanskych (Prague , 1853). I Presented in Panel 65, "The Village in Slovak Literature ," at the AAASS convention in Asilomar, California on 21 September 1981. � 92 SLOVAKIA Vajansky and Turgenev Willia m E. H a rkin s It h as bee n said th a t literature feeds on lite rature m o re tha n it d oes on life, b y which it is m eant th a t a writer finds it m o re diffi cult to work directl y from life a nd tran sla te living expe rience directly into verbal a rt. Whe n o ne's source s a re them selves wo rd s a nd verb al fo rms, no act of tra n sla tion is required. The new " intertex tu al " approach to the semiotic stud y of literature wo uld seem to co nfirm this t ruth. It is a truism of Slovak literary history tha t the writer Svetozar Hurba n V aj a nsky was stro n gly influ en ced b y Ru ssian literature, a nd in parti cul a r b y Turgen ev. 1 Hurba n V aj a n sky st ands in th at nin eteen th- century Slovak ideological traditio n which turned its back on the W est , a nd specifically on the C zechs, a nd sou ght instead to find a n ideological base in Ru ss ian cul ture a nd Ru ssia n lite rature . T hi s pa per is inte nded to explore the questio n o f the exte nt o f Hurba n V aj a n sky's d epe nde nce o n Turge nev a nd to ve ntu re a n expla n a tio n of why Turge nev's le gacy was a suita ble bas is for V aj a n sky's w ritin gs . I will analyze V ajan sky' s most famous and probably his greatest novel , Su ch a. ratolest'(T he Dry B ranch , 1884) , as well as several o f his co untry sketches from the collectio n N a Basna.rovom kopci a ine crty (On Basnarov Hill a nd Other Sketche s, 1880-1 883) . At first sight it would seem that Tu rge nev wo uld h ave had ve ry little to o ffer the Slovak writer. V aj a n sk y was a n aggressive , d etermined a nd zealou s fi ghte r in the Slovak n atio n al cau se, him self witho u t hesita tio n a nd w ithout the intellectu al rese rvatio n s so typi cal of Tu rge nev's heroes. The them e o f n at io na lism is weak in Ru ss ia n Lite ra ture , pa rtl y becau se write rs did not iden ti fy th em selves with the R ussia n tsarist regim e, pa rtly b ecau se Ru ssia n n a tion a lism and na tio nal independence co uld be taken for gr a nted . T he sam e thing is tru e, of co urse, for En gli sh , Ame rican , o r Fre nch liter a ture, in which na tio na li st a nd p atriotic the m es a re no rmally weak , a nd in which a nti-na tion alist w riters are even kn ow n (Celine , M a ile r , etc.). Bu t in Ru ssia n li terature th e them e of natio n alism is alm os t pathologicall y weaken ed ; the reaso ns fo r this pheno m eno n mu st be sou gh t in Ru ssia 's unique spiritual and id eological develop ment . The a mbivalence of Turgenev's heroes would likewise seem �SLOVAKIA 93 to offer little to Vajansky, who was in part see kin g to create p rototyp es for n a tional lead ership. Th e search for a lead e r is a Turge n evan the me , o f course, but in Turgenev would-be lead er after lead e r goes d own to d efeat: Rudin , L avreckij , ln sarov , Bazarov, Nezdanov. I will return to these points presently , but first let us look at Vajansky ' s n ovel, Sucha ratolest'. The h ero of the novel is Stani slav Rudopol'sky, the la ndless heir of a n ancient n oble family o f la ndowne rs . Stanislav's father, impoverished, h ad turned from the ancient noble ways to foll ow a middle -class ex iste n ce as a governm en t official. Through indu stry a nd sob riety he accumul ated a con siderable fo rtune, which h e left to his son Stani slav , a youn g m a n with arti st ic inclin ations and tale nts and n ow e ndowed with e n ough wealth to cultivate these. H e return s h o m e to dwell in his an cestral m ansion in the provin cial town of Rudopolie . H e re he vacillates between two women: one the wife of his b est friend a nd the model for a great spiritualized portrait h e is p ainting which m ay vaguel y symbolize the Slovak people a nd its aspirations ; the o ther, a flirt a tiou s widow. The n ovel fin ally resolves the conflict b y transmittin g his affect io n for hi s friend's wife into spiritu al love a nd a rtistic creativ ity , thus leaving him to the wi dow , w h o turns out , in spite of h e r initi al capriciousness, to b e full y worthy of him . At first Stanislav is indiffere nt to the Slovak nation al cau se, which h e regards as a historical blind alley, but h e is ultimately brou ght through his frie ndship with Slovak p atriots to a tru e sense of the value and significan ce o f that cau se. Thus h e becomes what must h ave been a historical rarity: a zeman (squire) who is pro-Slovak and anti-Magyar. But we must remember that h e is landl ess and th at h e belongs essentially to th e middle class rath er t h an to th e gentry: in this Vajansky seems to be say in g th at the future hope of Slovakia lay in the middl e-class intelli ge ntsia and in the towns. Stanislav fight s a duel with the local leader of th e Magyar nationalist party: this is purely symbolic; in the duel he is n early k illed but a lso su cceeds in wounding hi s antagonist. Finally h e is nursed back to h ealth by the widow, and the novel ends w ith an opti mi stic, up-beat conclus io n . The title phrase, "Such a ratolest', " " dry branch," is applied to Stan islav , both by other ch aracters a nd by h imself. I t impli es his roo tlessness and purposel essness , qualiti es wh ich he feels strongly; at the e nd of the novel he would see m , however , to have transcended these qualities . Still, the novel has usu a ll y been taken as an ev idence th a t the �94 SLOVAKIA zemans had nothing to contribute to the Slovak nationalist cause (just as the Russian critic Dobroljubov took the novel Oblomov as a concrete evidence that the Russian gentry could not supply national leadership). The point remains ambiguous, and we must note here that this kind of ambiguity is quite typical of Turgenev ' s heroes. Rudin talks like a leader but is incapable of acting; Lavreckij too talks nobly but never acts; Insarov is killed off before he has an opportunity to lead ; Bazarov is a born leader but has no cause to lead, and he too is killed off to make doubly certain that the revolution will not come in hi s time. Just so Stanislav, or Stano as the author usually calls him , has a personal spiritual developme nt which is said to be fruitful, but that development seems to imply only fruitlessness for the national cause: the true ~ovak patriots and leaders in the novel are Stano's friends and not Stano. The point is furth er obscured in Vajansky' s romantic treatment of Stano as a painter: his activity is entirely idealized and spiritualized as artistic creation . We can read this as symbolic, but still the novel is too realistic (it co ntains an entire chapter describing an election, for instance), to permit us really to identify Stano ' s art as a symbol of the national struggle. Indeed , there is much in Stano which we could identify as "superfluity, " in the Russian tradition of the lisnij celovek or superfluous man . Essentially good, Stano is also fruitless and without purpose. H e vacillates in his love life. He almost gets killed in a duel. Only his art enables him to transcend lisnost' or superfluity. But is Vajansky's novel really so dependent on Turgenev as the critics have thought? Some general features do seem to resemble Turgenev: the treatment of landscape ( though Vajansky' s countryside is brighter and less somber than Turgenev's); the theme of a stranger returning home to the country to live there (Lavreckij, Bazarov); the theme of superfluity and the ambigu ity in its treatment; last perhaps, the theme of art, though actually it is not so typical of Turgenev as we might have supposed. Finally Vajansky , most unfortunately , e nded his novel with a virtual paraphase of the endi ng of Turgenev's Fathers and Children: the description of the cemetery in which Bazarov rests (in Sucha ratolest' the dead woman is Anna, one of the novel's three h eroines). But in fact Vajansky was not really very d ependent on Turgenev. Before discussing the novel 's independence, however, we should attend to several aspects that recall Pushkin rather than Turgenev. First, the �SLOVAKIA 95 trait of superfluity is as typical for Pu shkin as it is for Turgen ev, though in Pushkin it is d epicted with considerably less ambiguity . The theme of art is also Pushkinian , thou gh it must be said that Pushkin does not romanticize it the way Turgenev and Vajansky do . Several motifs involving Stano and the young orphan girl Anna recall Pushkin's Eugene On egin. As in On egin , a cultivated stranger comes to dwell in the countryside and makes a strong impression on a rathe r n aive native girl. As in On egin , the girl 's naivete is brought out throu gh the fact that she lacks discrimination in her choice of reading matter; specifically , the use of a library and books to assess character recalls Pushkin , though he used these for Onegin himself, for the hero , not the hero in e . There is a scene in which Anna , unable to sleep , gazes at the moon , as Tatyana does in Pushkin 's novel in verse. Finally, the duel in Vajansky's novel is som ewhat cl oser to the duel in On egin than it is to Bazarov' s duel wi th Pavel Kirsanov. But even in these d etails V aj a nsky shows great independence. Anna is impressed by Stano , but in the end she realizes his weakness and ambivalence a nd is repell ed by him , a nd the great bulk ofVajansky's novel is indepe nde nt both of Pushkin a nd Turgenev . If we look first of all at the n ovel 's st ructure, we a re impressed almost staggered - by V aj a n sky's originality. H e shows a freed om of con struction th at is truly amazing : without transitions he m oves from scene to scene, character to character, episode to episode. Events occur for which we are totally unprepared . Compared with Turgen ev, or Pushkin , his structure seems wild , formless , a rtl ess. These writers organize their materi al into tight structural units which themselves ha ve beginnings, middles and endi n gs. They operate with a restricted group of ch aracters in th e la te stages of their works. Vaj ansky can introdu ce a n ew ch aracter anyw here or at any time he wishes , nor does h e feel an obli gation to carry all hi s characters - even the importa nt ones - right down to the novel 's end. It would not be correct to say that Vajan sky' s novel is plotless it has a pl ot which, if less in scope than that of Pushkin 's Onegin could probably be compa red with T urge n ev's Smoke , or even Rudin . But in a certain sense, nothing h a ppens in Vajansky's novel with but one except ion: symbolic events occu r. Stano transcend s his attraction to his fri e nd 's wife. H e fi ghts a duel. Th e orphan Anna goes blind a nd dies. To a ttempt a more precise definition: th e realistic side of Vajan- �96 SLOVAKIA sky's novel lacks a plot stru cture . A second kind of event can occur which is radically unTurgenevan : this is the action of social groups: tavern brawls, demonstrations , election s held under conditions of corrupt ion. There is a far deeper sense of society in Vajansky' s fiction than in either Pushkin or Turgenev, and in this he was more of a realist. Presumabl y he had undergo ne the influ en ce of positivist philosophy, which turned its a ttent ion to society and created the new scien ce of sociology. Vajansky's "formlessn ess " would hardly have appealed to cultivated nineteenth-century readers . They would have preferred the powerful sense of form of a Pushkin , or the delicate understatement of a Turgenev. But to o ur times Vajansky's impatience with the constraints of form seems origin al and refreshing. I t h as often been said that Vajansky depicted a Slovak society that never ex isted, that is idealized. Yet in Sucha ratolest' that Slovak society hardl y appears a s idealized: it is dru nken , given to brawling, easily corrupted by bribes and drink. What Vajansky seems to intend here is a kind of dialectic opposition : ideal leaders will lead the people, brutalized by the Magyar oppress io n , to liberty . It is in suffi cient to say, then, that Vaj a nsky idealized Slovak society : in fact he gives us invaluable glimpses of life in a small Slovak country town of the day . The chapter depicting the elections is a masterly portrait that recalls, in its sordidness a nd detail , an American election of the ninetee nth or even twentieth century. Drink, arbitra ry challenges to the voters , repeat votin g - the familiar techniques of election control are all vividl y described. Thus Vajansky' s novel vacillates amb iguously be tween realism and id ealism . But the ambiguity is artistically fruitful and creative. In the years 1880- 1883 Vaj a n sky published a few sketch es of peasant a nd country life. The se sketch es, republish ed la ter in coll ected form unde r the titl e o f Na Basnarovom k opci a in e crty (On Basna rov Hill a nd Oth e r Ske tches), a re a m o n g hi s strongest a nd m os t ori ginal works, and it can o nly be re gretted th at he did not produ ce mo re exampl es of th e genre . T he form o fV ajan sky's sketch d e ri ves, o f co urse, from Turgenev , whose Sportsman ·s Sketches, pu bli shed in 1852, a re perh aps th a t writer 's stron ges t work. Lik e Turge nev , V ajan sky se ts hi s sketches in th e countrys id e, a nd th ey d ispl a y a stron gly im agisti c tre nd in th e d epi cti o n bo th of la nd scape a nd th e p easant cha racter s who pop ul a te it . In the sketches o f bo th w riters a n a rrator a ppears as a pe rce iver, a nd the di stan ce be- �SLOVAKIA 97 tween his perceiving eye and the peasants he views creates a subtle irony, one that does not , however , undercut the warm lyricism of the style and m anner. T u rgenev ' s narrator is a gentleman proprietor and hunter ; Vaj an sky's is (presum a bly) a middle-class intellectual turning his attention to the life of the Slovak peasantry. The ideological point of this is never m ade specific, bu t it was pa tently implicit in the political logic of the times: the Slovak intellectu als were waitin g for the d awn of political consciou sness am ong the peasantry. In the first of these sketches, " On Basna rov Hill ," the ideological mom ent is most incisive , though its intrusiveness detracts from the sketch artisti cally. A peasant m other and her younger son lam ent the cruelty of the elder son who has cast the widowed m other out with out provision for support. In her conversation she turns to attack Slovak officials , whom as a peasan t she di stru sts . V aj an sky, overhearing her , interrupts to de fend those offi cials who are Slovak nationalists. But the distinction is los t on the old woman , who has little political or national consciousness. She simply tu rns her back on his appeal. T hi s argum en t is of course quite un-Turgenevan ; Turgenev the hun ter m ay speak to the peasants, but he d oes not harran gu e them ; indeed , Tu rge nev is a master of understa tem en t and this q u ality Vajansky was perha ps un a ble to ass imila te, as we have already seen in the case of Su cha ra tolest'. But V ajan sky is capa ble o f creating im ages as powe rful and movin g as those of T u rgenev . P erh a ps the fines t of his sketcties is the one called " Hlasnik " (The Night W atchman): a movin g im agistic portrayal of a peasan t watchm an 's round s at nigh t, in te rtwined with hi s service to a dead m an fo r whom he digs a grave and whose bod y he later visits. With vivid depict ion of both the m ovem ent of the watchma n ' s round s and hi s calls th rough the night on his horn , the piece is a m asterpiece of mood im agery th at recall s the fin est sketches of Tu rgen ev such as "The Singe rs" or " Bezin M eadow," but d oes not imi tate them except in th e m ost ge neral way . In fac t , none of Vajansky' s ind ividual sketches recalls an y specific sketch b y T urgenev. Vaj an sky's land scape is too differe nt , a nd Slovak society too d ist inct. Vajan sky has perfectly ad apted th e Turgenevan ske tch and u sed it in the cause of Slovak li terature and Slovak ideology. We are now in a better pos ition to answer the ques tion we posed at the ou tset : what qu a:ities in T urgenev appealed to Vajansky and per- �98 SLOVAKIA suaded him to use elements taken from Turgenev 's work? The question should be asked in the light of the almost total difference we have found between the two writers, in personality, artistic temperament , psychology of character creation and development, optimism and pessimism, artistic structure. Still, there was something in Turgenev 's work, whether Vajansky realized it consciously or not, which Vajansky found of creative use . I suggest that this was that very ambiguity of treatment of ideological heroes by Turgenev which attracted Vajansky to his work. This in spite ofVajansky's much greater aggressiveness, his nationalism, his greater optimism . For tl;ie fact was that the Slovak cause was going nowhere in the 1880's. Though it might well have been that eventually it would go somewhere , it seemed bogged down - and this is the view Vajansky embodies in Sucha ratolest' in his chapter on the elections. Hence it was necessary to create characters who were "superfluous," who could achieve nothing in the present, yet characters capable of success, at least in an idealized dimension projected into the future . Turgenev had done the same thing: Bazarov is a born leader capable of reforming Russia, yet he is a leader without real followers and he comes at a time that is premature . The other common feature between Turgenev's writings and those of Vajansky is that of a passive human mass, the peasantry, needing to be awakened and educated . This is perhaps the only point where Turgenev's ideology acquires a nationalist tinge: Russia's peasantry holds her back, prevents her proper development : hence , it is necessary to educate the peasantry. In Vajansky the peasantry, and to some extent the town masses, play a similar role . It is necessary to win these masses over if the Slovak cause is to succeed. Following their leader l:.udovft Stur, the Slovak patriots turned to Russia because they perceived the West, including the Czechs , as decadent. They were influenced in this by Herder's prophecy of the future greatness of the Slavs, a prophecy Herder had specially made for the Eastern Slavs on the basis of his stay in Riga. Stur also noted that the closeness of kinship and family ties, so important to the Slovaks, was duplicated among the Eastern Slavs but not among the Czechs. 1 This began a Slovak turn toward Russia and Russian culture that was beneficial for the development of the nascent Slovak literature , if it was probably harmful to the development of the Slovak national ideology. �SLOVAKIA 99 It is perhaps ironic that , motivated by considerations such as warmth of emotionality and closeness of kinship ties, V ajansky should have turned to writers like Pushkin and Turgenev, who, among Russians, were to be regarded as Westerners. Curiously, the Slovak leaders hardly knew the Russian Slavophiles, and their influence was perceptible only later. Yet, clearly the Slovak writers were seeking something they could use, and the precise source was not important. It is remarkable that when artists such as Edouard Manet or Vincent van Gogh or Mary Cassat turned to Japanese art for inspiration , they found woodblock prints of grim acin g actors and simpering courtesans , rather than the infinitely more subtle and more sophisticated art of such J a panese schools as the Rimp a or Shijo schools. Yet apparently Manet, Van Gogh , or Mary Cassat kn ew what they were looking for, and they rejected what they could not use; thus they succeeded in making that Japanese influence fruitful and not pernicious . In a similar way, Turgenev was a writer in many ways not con genial to Vajansky. But Vajansky had his own individuality and was a great enough artist to take from Turgenev what he needed . And he incorporated that something into his own distinct art. NOTES See, e. g., Jan V . Novak and Arne Novak, Pfehledn e dejin y literatury ceske (Olomouc, 1936-39), p. 82 1; Andrej Mraz , Dejiny slovensk ej literatury, Slovenska vlastiveda , Vol. 1, Literatura a jazyk (Bra tislava: Sloven ska Akademia vied a umenf, 1948), p . 214; Slovenska Akademia Vied, Ustav slovenskej li te ra tury, D ejin y slovenskej literatury, III (Bra tislava, 1965), 630-31 a nd passim . ' See Ludovft Stur , 0 narodnich pisnich a povestech plemen slovanskych (Prague , 1853). I Presented in Panel 65, "The Village in Slovak Literature ," at the AAASS convention in Asilomar, California on 21 September 1981. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1982-83, Vol. 30 Description An account of the resource Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 92 SLOVAKIA Vajansky and Turgenev Willia m E. H a rkin s It h as bee n said th a t literature feeds on lite rature m o re tha n it d oes on life, b y which it is m eant th a t a writer finds it m o re diffi cult to work directl y from life a nd tran sla te living expe rience directly into verbal a rt. Whe n o ne's source s a re them selves wo rd s a nd verb al fo rms, no act of tra n sla tion is required. The new " intertex tu al " approach to the semiotic stud y of literature wo uld seem to co nfirm this t ruth. It is a truism of Slovak literary history tha t the writer Svetozar Hurba n V aj a nsky was stro n gly influ en ced b y Ru ssian literature, a nd in parti cul a r b y Turgen ev. 1 Hurba n V aj a n sky st ands in th at nin eteen th- century Slovak ideological traditio n which turned its back on the W est , a nd specifically on the C zechs, a nd sou ght instead to find a n ideological base in Ru ss ian cul ture a nd Ru ssia n lite rature . T hi s pa per is inte nded to explore the questio n o f the exte nt o f Hurba n V aj a n sky's d epe nde nce o n Turge nev a nd to ve ntu re a n expla n a tio n of why Turge nev's le gacy was a suita ble bas is for V aj a n sky's w ritin gs . I will analyze V ajan sky' s most famous and probably his greatest novel , Su ch a. ratolest'(T he Dry B ranch , 1884) , as well as several o f his co untry sketches from the collectio n N a Basna.rovom kopci a ine crty (On Basnarov Hill a nd Other Sketche s, 1880-1 883) . At first sight it would seem that Tu rge nev wo uld h ave had ve ry little to o ffer the Slovak writer. V aj a n sk y was a n aggressive , d etermined a nd zealou s fi ghte r in the Slovak n atio n al cau se, him self witho u t hesita tio n a nd w ithout the intellectu al rese rvatio n s so typi cal of Tu rge nev's heroes. The them e o f n at io na lism is weak in Ru ss ia n Lite ra ture , pa rtl y becau se write rs did not iden ti fy th em selves with the R ussia n tsarist regim e, pa rtly b ecau se Ru ssia n n a tion a lism and na tio nal independence co uld be taken for gr a nted . T he sam e thing is tru e, of co urse, for En gli sh , Ame rican , o r Fre nch liter a ture, in which na tio na li st a nd p atriotic the m es a re no rmally weak , a nd in which a nti-na tion alist w riters are even kn ow n (Celine , M a ile r , etc.). Bu t in Ru ssia n li terature th e them e of natio n alism is alm os t pathologicall y weaken ed ; the reaso ns fo r this pheno m eno n mu st be sou gh t in Ru ssia 's unique spiritual and id eological develop ment . The a mbivalence of Turgenev's heroes would likewise seem SLOVAKIA 93 to offer little to Vajansky, who was in part see kin g to create p rototyp es for n a tional lead ership. Th e search for a lead e r is a Turge n evan the me , o f course, but in Turgenev would-be lead er after lead e r goes d own to d efeat: Rudin , L avreckij , ln sarov , Bazarov, Nezdanov. I will return to these points presently , but first let us look at Vajansky ' s n ovel, Sucha ratolest'. The h ero of the novel is Stani slav Rudopol'sky, the la ndless heir of a n ancient n oble family o f la ndowne rs . Stanislav's father, impoverished, h ad turned from the ancient noble ways to foll ow a middle -class ex iste n ce as a governm en t official. Through indu stry a nd sob riety he accumul ated a con siderable fo rtune, which h e left to his son Stani slav , a youn g m a n with arti st ic inclin ations and tale nts and n ow e ndowed with e n ough wealth to cultivate these. H e return s h o m e to dwell in his an cestral m ansion in the provin cial town of Rudopolie . H e re he vacillates between two women: one the wife of his b est friend a nd the model for a great spiritualized portrait h e is p ainting which m ay vaguel y symbolize the Slovak people a nd its aspirations ; the o ther, a flirt a tiou s widow. The n ovel fin ally resolves the conflict b y transmittin g his affect io n for hi s friend's wife into spiritu al love a nd a rtistic creativ ity , thus leaving him to the wi dow , w h o turns out , in spite of h e r initi al capriciousness, to b e full y worthy of him . At first Stanislav is indiffere nt to the Slovak nation al cau se, which h e regards as a historical blind alley, but h e is ultimately brou ght through his frie ndship with Slovak p atriots to a tru e sense of the value and significan ce o f that cau se. Thus h e becomes what must h ave been a historical rarity: a zeman (squire) who is pro-Slovak and anti-Magyar. But we must remember that h e is landl ess and th at h e belongs essentially to th e middle class rath er t h an to th e gentry: in this Vajansky seems to be say in g th at the future hope of Slovakia lay in the middl e-class intelli ge ntsia and in the towns. Stanislav fight s a duel with the local leader of th e Magyar nationalist party: this is purely symbolic; in the duel he is n early k illed but a lso su cceeds in wounding hi s antagonist. Finally h e is nursed back to h ealth by the widow, and the novel ends w ith an opti mi stic, up-beat conclus io n . The title phrase, "Such a ratolest', " " dry branch," is applied to Stan islav , both by other ch aracters a nd by h imself. I t impli es his roo tlessness and purposel essness , qualiti es wh ich he feels strongly; at the e nd of the novel he would see m , however , to have transcended these qualities . Still, the novel has usu a ll y been taken as an ev idence th a t the 94 SLOVAKIA zemans had nothing to contribute to the Slovak nationalist cause (just as the Russian critic Dobroljubov took the novel Oblomov as a concrete evidence that the Russian gentry could not supply national leadership). The point remains ambiguous, and we must note here that this kind of ambiguity is quite typical of Turgenev ' s heroes. Rudin talks like a leader but is incapable of acting; Lavreckij too talks nobly but never acts; Insarov is killed off before he has an opportunity to lead ; Bazarov is a born leader but has no cause to lead, and he too is killed off to make doubly certain that the revolution will not come in hi s time. Just so Stanislav, or Stano as the author usually calls him , has a personal spiritual developme nt which is said to be fruitful, but that development seems to imply only fruitlessness for the national cause: the true ~ovak patriots and leaders in the novel are Stano's friends and not Stano. The point is furth er obscured in Vajansky' s romantic treatment of Stano as a painter: his activity is entirely idealized and spiritualized as artistic creation . We can read this as symbolic, but still the novel is too realistic (it co ntains an entire chapter describing an election, for instance), to permit us really to identify Stano ' s art as a symbol of the national struggle. Indeed , there is much in Stano which we could identify as "superfluity, " in the Russian tradition of the lisnij celovek or superfluous man . Essentially good, Stano is also fruitless and without purpose. H e vacillates in his love life. He almost gets killed in a duel. Only his art enables him to transcend lisnost' or superfluity. But is Vajansky's novel really so dependent on Turgenev as the critics have thought? Some general features do seem to resemble Turgenev: the treatment of landscape ( though Vajansky' s countryside is brighter and less somber than Turgenev's); the theme of a stranger returning home to the country to live there (Lavreckij, Bazarov); the theme of superfluity and the ambigu ity in its treatment; last perhaps, the theme of art, though actually it is not so typical of Turgenev as we might have supposed. Finally Vajansky , most unfortunately , e nded his novel with a virtual paraphase of the endi ng of Turgenev's Fathers and Children: the description of the cemetery in which Bazarov rests (in Sucha ratolest' the dead woman is Anna, one of the novel's three h eroines). But in fact Vajansky was not really very d ependent on Turgenev. Before discussing the novel 's independence, however, we should attend to several aspects that recall Pushkin rather than Turgenev. First, the SLOVAKIA 95 trait of superfluity is as typical for Pu shkin as it is for Turgen ev, though in Pushkin it is d epicted with considerably less ambiguity . The theme of art is also Pushkinian , thou gh it must be said that Pushkin does not romanticize it the way Turgenev and Vajansky do . Several motifs involving Stano and the young orphan girl Anna recall Pushkin's Eugene On egin. As in On egin , a cultivated stranger comes to dwell in the countryside and makes a strong impression on a rathe r n aive native girl. As in On egin , the girl 's naivete is brought out throu gh the fact that she lacks discrimination in her choice of reading matter; specifically , the use of a library and books to assess character recalls Pushkin , though he used these for Onegin himself, for the hero , not the hero in e . There is a scene in which Anna , unable to sleep , gazes at the moon , as Tatyana does in Pushkin 's novel in verse. Finally, the duel in Vajansky's novel is som ewhat cl oser to the duel in On egin than it is to Bazarov' s duel wi th Pavel Kirsanov. But even in these d etails V aj a nsky shows great independence. Anna is impressed by Stano , but in the end she realizes his weakness and ambivalence a nd is repell ed by him , a nd the great bulk ofVajansky's novel is indepe nde nt both of Pushkin a nd Turgenev . If we look first of all at the n ovel 's st ructure, we a re impressed almost staggered - by V aj a n sky's originality. H e shows a freed om of con struction th at is truly amazing : without transitions he m oves from scene to scene, character to character, episode to episode. Events occur for which we are totally unprepared . Compared with Turgen ev, or Pushkin , his structure seems wild , formless , a rtl ess. These writers organize their materi al into tight structural units which themselves ha ve beginnings, middles and endi n gs. They operate with a restricted group of ch aracters in th e la te stages of their works. Vaj ansky can introdu ce a n ew ch aracter anyw here or at any time he wishes , nor does h e feel an obli gation to carry all hi s characters - even the importa nt ones - right down to the novel 's end. It would not be correct to say that Vajan sky' s novel is plotless it has a pl ot which, if less in scope than that of Pushkin 's Onegin could probably be compa red with T urge n ev's Smoke , or even Rudin . But in a certain sense, nothing h a ppens in Vajansky's novel with but one except ion: symbolic events occu r. Stano transcend s his attraction to his fri e nd 's wife. H e fi ghts a duel. Th e orphan Anna goes blind a nd dies. To a ttempt a more precise definition: th e realistic side of Vajan- 96 SLOVAKIA sky's novel lacks a plot stru cture . A second kind of event can occur which is radically unTurgenevan : this is the action of social groups: tavern brawls, demonstrations , election s held under conditions of corrupt ion. There is a far deeper sense of society in Vajansky' s fiction than in either Pushkin or Turgenev, and in this he was more of a realist. Presumabl y he had undergo ne the influ en ce of positivist philosophy, which turned its a ttent ion to society and created the new scien ce of sociology. Vajansky's "formlessn ess " would hardly have appealed to cultivated nineteenth-century readers . They would have preferred the powerful sense of form of a Pushkin , or the delicate understatement of a Turgenev. But to o ur times Vajansky's impatience with the constraints of form seems origin al and refreshing. I t h as often been said that Vajansky depicted a Slovak society that never ex isted, that is idealized. Yet in Sucha ratolest' that Slovak society hardl y appears a s idealized: it is dru nken , given to brawling, easily corrupted by bribes and drink. What Vajansky seems to intend here is a kind of dialectic opposition : ideal leaders will lead the people, brutalized by the Magyar oppress io n , to liberty . It is in suffi cient to say, then, that Vaj a nsky idealized Slovak society : in fact he gives us invaluable glimpses of life in a small Slovak country town of the day . The chapter depicting the elections is a masterly portrait that recalls, in its sordidness a nd detail , an American election of the ninetee nth or even twentieth century. Drink, arbitra ry challenges to the voters , repeat votin g - the familiar techniques of election control are all vividl y described. Thus Vajansky' s novel vacillates amb iguously be tween realism and id ealism . But the ambiguity is artistically fruitful and creative. In the years 1880- 1883 Vaj a n sky published a few sketch es of peasant a nd country life. The se sketch es, republish ed la ter in coll ected form unde r the titl e o f Na Basnarovom k opci a in e crty (On Basna rov Hill a nd Oth e r Ske tches), a re a m o n g hi s strongest a nd m os t ori ginal works, and it can o nly be re gretted th at he did not produ ce mo re exampl es of th e genre . T he form o fV ajan sky's sketch d e ri ves, o f co urse, from Turgenev , whose Sportsman ·s Sketches, pu bli shed in 1852, a re perh aps th a t writer 's stron ges t work. Lik e Turge nev , V ajan sky se ts hi s sketches in th e countrys id e, a nd th ey d ispl a y a stron gly im agisti c tre nd in th e d epi cti o n bo th of la nd scape a nd th e p easant cha racter s who pop ul a te it . In the sketches o f bo th w riters a n a rrator a ppears as a pe rce iver, a nd the di stan ce be- SLOVAKIA 97 tween his perceiving eye and the peasants he views creates a subtle irony, one that does not , however , undercut the warm lyricism of the style and m anner. T u rgenev ' s narrator is a gentleman proprietor and hunter ; Vaj an sky's is (presum a bly) a middle-class intellectual turning his attention to the life of the Slovak peasantry. The ideological point of this is never m ade specific, bu t it was pa tently implicit in the political logic of the times: the Slovak intellectu als were waitin g for the d awn of political consciou sness am ong the peasantry. In the first of these sketches, " On Basna rov Hill ," the ideological mom ent is most incisive , though its intrusiveness detracts from the sketch artisti cally. A peasant m other and her younger son lam ent the cruelty of the elder son who has cast the widowed m other out with out provision for support. In her conversation she turns to attack Slovak officials , whom as a peasan t she di stru sts . V aj an sky, overhearing her , interrupts to de fend those offi cials who are Slovak nationalists. But the distinction is los t on the old woman , who has little political or national consciousness. She simply tu rns her back on his appeal. T hi s argum en t is of course quite un-Turgenevan ; Turgenev the hun ter m ay speak to the peasants, but he d oes not harran gu e them ; indeed , Tu rge nev is a master of understa tem en t and this q u ality Vajansky was perha ps un a ble to ass imila te, as we have already seen in the case of Su cha ra tolest'. But V ajan sky is capa ble o f creating im ages as powe rful and movin g as those of T u rgenev . P erh a ps the fines t of his sketcties is the one called " Hlasnik " (The Night W atchman): a movin g im agistic portrayal of a peasan t watchm an 's round s at nigh t, in te rtwined with hi s service to a dead m an fo r whom he digs a grave and whose bod y he later visits. With vivid depict ion of both the m ovem ent of the watchma n ' s round s and hi s calls th rough the night on his horn , the piece is a m asterpiece of mood im agery th at recall s the fin est sketches of Tu rgen ev such as "The Singe rs" or " Bezin M eadow," but d oes not imi tate them except in th e m ost ge neral way . In fac t , none of Vajansky' s ind ividual sketches recalls an y specific sketch b y T urgenev. Vaj an sky's land scape is too differe nt , a nd Slovak society too d ist inct. Vajan sky has perfectly ad apted th e Turgenevan ske tch and u sed it in the cause of Slovak li terature and Slovak ideology. We are now in a better pos ition to answer the ques tion we posed at the ou tset : what qu a:ities in T urgenev appealed to Vajansky and per- 98 SLOVAKIA suaded him to use elements taken from Turgenev 's work? The question should be asked in the light of the almost total difference we have found between the two writers, in personality, artistic temperament , psychology of character creation and development, optimism and pessimism, artistic structure. Still, there was something in Turgenev 's work, whether Vajansky realized it consciously or not, which Vajansky found of creative use . I suggest that this was that very ambiguity of treatment of ideological heroes by Turgenev which attracted Vajansky to his work. This in spite ofVajansky's much greater aggressiveness, his nationalism, his greater optimism . For tl;ie fact was that the Slovak cause was going nowhere in the 1880's. Though it might well have been that eventually it would go somewhere , it seemed bogged down - and this is the view Vajansky embodies in Sucha ratolest' in his chapter on the elections. Hence it was necessary to create characters who were "superfluous," who could achieve nothing in the present, yet characters capable of success, at least in an idealized dimension projected into the future . Turgenev had done the same thing: Bazarov is a born leader capable of reforming Russia, yet he is a leader without real followers and he comes at a time that is premature . The other common feature between Turgenev's writings and those of Vajansky is that of a passive human mass, the peasantry, needing to be awakened and educated . This is perhaps the only point where Turgenev's ideology acquires a nationalist tinge: Russia's peasantry holds her back, prevents her proper development : hence , it is necessary to educate the peasantry. In Vajansky the peasantry, and to some extent the town masses, play a similar role . It is necessary to win these masses over if the Slovak cause is to succeed. Following their leader l:.udovft Stur, the Slovak patriots turned to Russia because they perceived the West, including the Czechs , as decadent. They were influenced in this by Herder's prophecy of the future greatness of the Slavs, a prophecy Herder had specially made for the Eastern Slavs on the basis of his stay in Riga. Stur also noted that the closeness of kinship and family ties, so important to the Slovaks, was duplicated among the Eastern Slavs but not among the Czechs. 1 This began a Slovak turn toward Russia and Russian culture that was beneficial for the development of the nascent Slovak literature , if it was probably harmful to the development of the Slovak national ideology. SLOVAKIA 99 It is perhaps ironic that , motivated by considerations such as warmth of emotionality and closeness of kinship ties, V ajansky should have turned to writers like Pushkin and Turgenev, who, among Russians, were to be regarded as Westerners. Curiously, the Slovak leaders hardly knew the Russian Slavophiles, and their influence was perceptible only later. Yet, clearly the Slovak writers were seeking something they could use, and the precise source was not important. It is remarkable that when artists such as Edouard Manet or Vincent van Gogh or Mary Cassat turned to Japanese art for inspiration , they found woodblock prints of grim acin g actors and simpering courtesans , rather than the infinitely more subtle and more sophisticated art of such J a panese schools as the Rimp a or Shijo schools. Yet apparently Manet, Van Gogh , or Mary Cassat kn ew what they were looking for, and they rejected what they could not use; thus they succeeded in making that Japanese influence fruitful and not pernicious . In a similar way, Turgenev was a writer in many ways not con genial to Vajansky. But Vajansky had his own individuality and was a great enough artist to take from Turgenev what he needed . And he incorporated that something into his own distinct art. NOTES See, e. g., Jan V . Novak and Arne Novak, Pfehledn e dejin y literatury ceske (Olomouc, 1936-39), p. 82 1; Andrej Mraz , Dejiny slovensk ej literatury, Slovenska vlastiveda , Vol. 1, Literatura a jazyk (Bra tislava: Sloven ska Akademia vied a umenf, 1948), p . 214; Slovenska Akademia Vied, Ustav slovenskej li te ra tury, D ejin y slovenskej literatury, III (Bra tislava, 1965), 630-31 a nd passim . ' See Ludovft Stur , 0 narodnich pisnich a povestech plemen slovanskych (Prague , 1853). I Presented in Panel 65, "The Village in Slovak Literature ," at the AAASS convention in Asilomar, California on 21 September 1981.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Vajanský and Turgenev Description An account of the resource William E. Harkins Slovakia, Vol. 30 (No. 55-56), 1982-83 pp. 92-99 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Harkins, William Edward, 1921-2014 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-83 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a01fa46f3883973925608e41e6246ea6.pdf 9f80c494a979434be4c2efa3cf00fa40 PDF Text Text 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. �SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This �18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and �SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds �20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not �SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. �SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This �18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and �SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds �20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not �SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This 18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds 20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christmas in the Low Tatra Region Description An account of the resource Robert A. Heckert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 16-21 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Heckert, Robert A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e053232aaec8337193ecdbab999efecc.pdf 8df400c730f836773bf33452cb91075d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 113 "Baked Blockheads" . (a fragment) \ FRANTISEK HECKO (1905-1960) In the morning, as soon as Michael Habdzha, a pudgy and stem peasant of Zelena Misa, stepped out of his house, his son Urban took his wife Christine (nee Svata) by the hand; and like children walking to school, they went hand-in-hand to the notary, signed a contract and a note , and bought a house with two vineyards in Wolfsvale . The entire transaction was very brief: Christine removed a linen pouch from the bosom of her dress, unwrapped the protective cover of the pouch, and took out twenty hundred-crown banknotes , part of which she earned through her own sweat and tears and part of which they had received after long supplication from the elders of Podhaj. Having placed the money on the desk in front of the notary, Christine and her husband signed the contract, and Theophil Hrzhic and Dominik Palkovic, the guarantors , vouched the draft with an additional fifteen-hundred crowns . The notary winked deliberately at the young woman and said, " So-o-o! Live in the house happily and use your property in good health! You-u-u made a go-o-od bargain. " The young couple left the notary office with pale faces, empty pockets, and shoulders slumping somewhat. It was hard to say what burdened their hearts the most; whether it was the property acquired in Wolfsvale , or the draft note for fifteen-hundred crowns, or the speed with which the transaction was performed. The notary put five of Christine's hundred-crown banknotes in his pocket, while the remaining fifteen bills he placed in his desk drawer for the former owner of the Wolfsvale property, Joseph Deograts, who, to the surprise of all, had emigrated with his family to America. The notary patted his pocket as if dusting his suit after contact with a hairy animal and mumbled, " Donkeys .. . both of you !" The young Habdzhas did not return home through the village. They walked through the barnyards, and even there they turned on purpose across Cabbage Fields and Hemp Fields towards Scabby Water. In Little Willows near the river, Christine's teeth began to rattle. She wept, while Urban, the vein on his forehead swollen, was angry because she regretted spending the money. They would have �114 SLOVAKIA walked this way and cried and been angry with each other, had the woman not grabbed the man in her arms . Tears in her eyes, she said with bluish lips , " Urban!" Her voice was like the cry of a drowning person. "Dear Christine!" She had never heard her name pronounced so tenderly . ' 'I'm scared, so scared that I'm shivering!'' Indeed, cold fever shuddered through her body. ' 'Don't be afraid and don't shiver! Do you realize, godly woman, the meaning of having one's own house?" The entire world turned around her. She knew, yes, and how well she knew it! But now she was glad because her Urban knew it, too. " I'm sorry if you think that I regret spending the money." And added still with tears in her eyes: ' 'But I'm afraid of the hell that will follow when those in the upper room learn what we did. I would rather take little Marc and fly directly over to Wolfsvale. Virgin Mary, help me!" It was not the money that worried her. She was concerned about the storm which would suddenly explode in the Habdzha's proud home • when papa and mama learned that the "baked blockheads" had once again challenged their absolute rule and played a stupid trick on them. Urban now knew for sure that his Christine was more dec~nt than he had ever thought her to be. He was very happy because of that, and his heart beat like a hammer. Laughing loudly, he lifted his wife up and tried to rock his longlegged girl in his arms while walking forward . But ~ime and time again she slipped in his hands. She did not know whether to slide down to the ground or to wind her arms around her husband's neck. She let him carry her for some distance, while a sweet indecision intoxicated her. But the moment was so great that it could not culminate in an ordinary embrace. He looked into her eyes and saw that her tears had seemingly dried: Christine 's shy girlishness retreated before a relentlessly onrushing womanly ripeness. \ Urban understood. And before she could,have opened her mouth, he let her touch the ground and outran her, calling to her, " Let' s go, Christine, let' s leave today! " " Yes , yes, yes! " The marks of feminine consent - her smile, the burning coals in her eyes , and fully expanded bosom - betrayed her thoughts clearly. Both found in their agreement a starting point, simple and direct, a stunning view of freedom craved by everything young and healthy in the world. �SLOVAKIA 115 Intoxicated spiritually, they sped up from Little Willows and ran across the Meadows to the bridge. The bridge, a formless stone structure thrown clumsily over the river bed of Scabby Water, connected Zelena Misa with Wolfsvale in the fields. A blackened statue of St. John Nepomucene haa stood on the bridge for long centuries, guarding the entrance to W olfsvale and looking with bulging, hateful eyes toward Zelena Misa. Both sat down on a low brick balustrade near the statue . St. John's eyes, from the Wolfsvale side, shone with goodness and won their approval. Urban and Christine looked down on troughlike W olfsvale , full of trees and grapevines, stakes and bushwood. The property which they acquired that day at the notary and which belonged to them was located beyond Goatshead, in Wolf Comers , now the wildest and deepest part of Wolfsvale. And perhaps because of the location and nature of their property, they felt twice as strongly that they aleady belonged there, among the grapevines and trees. When they walked down from the bridge toward Zelena Misa, a feeling of contempt toward the village took possession of them. The village seemed ugly, bare, and worn out. Sitting on a flat hill, the village was kneaded formlessly of brick clay and covered with fat straw. Even the church stuck upward like a fence post. Urban and Christine had acted wisely in drawing a good human being, their grandmother, into their secret plans . A less pious and more honest woman than her daughter Veronina, the devoted and servile wife of Michael Habdzha and the fierce mother of Urban, their grandmother Louise Kristova (nee Hrzhichova), proved to be very helpful to them. She advised then not to start before noon. Free as she was in all her actions , she did not need to account for her comings and goings . She ran to hire a wagoner with a long wagon and a cart, so they could take all their belongings . She also knew that her son-in-law, the farmer, would return only at sunset , for he had gone to Holy Hill from which one does not return quickly. Her daughter - as soon as she was rid of the morning cooking - grasped the opportunity provided by her husband 's absence , to " hit" the bottle, lie in the upper room , and tell the world to go to hell. Urban's brothers, Nicholas and Philip , and his sister Josephine , oppressed like Urban and Christine, were ready to assist in all the operations when they found the young couple was about to sneak out from the lower room . Joyfully anticipating their parents' anger, they danced in the yard. �116 SLOVAKIA In the Habdzha household, there had always been shouting and fighting ever since the house was built, with its four windows facing the square of Zelena Misa. The reins of the household had been held since time immemorial by the man, sharp as a razor, while the ladle had always been held in the hand of a woman as angry as a snake. If the Archangel Michael had established the man as the head of the household to beat all the others, the woman was certainly awarded by the Devil to the man to support him with anger and sly financial machinations. Only Urban, the " scoundrel," took it into his head to violate this age-old tradition. He had suddenly ceased to obey. He was, to be sure, more stubborn and sharper than his honorable ancestors. But at the same time , he had in his chest a greater heart and more mad handsomeness in his face. In the retinue of the Habdzhas , he might have been mistaken for a noble . Because of his rebellious character, he had not brought a respectible bride into the house , but a maidservant, almost with a child in her hands. He tore the Habdzhas' homespun customs to shreds. He turned the household upsidedown. And as if this were not enough , this ungrateful fellow took the side of a woman who sang non-peasant ballads about orphans and injustices above her son' s cradle. Because of these insults , the old Habdzhas bore an everlasting grudge against the beggarly lower room, and, except to give orders for work , they did not address Urban and Christine with a decent word. But Christine , like Urban before her, won the grandmother and her brothers- and sister-in-law to her side. No one could have endured the tears she shed in the corners. Even a beggar standing in the door took it upon himself to chide Veronica for mistreating her daughter-inlaw. Still nothing moved the old ones. It did not help that grandmother poured kitchen slop over Veronica, that Nicholas and Philip broke the chaff cutter in the barn , that Josephine stuck out her tongue at her father ; nor did the store room door chopped to pieces and other asininities committed by Urban affect his parents. It did not help either that the young people worked like dragons. They thought, the donkeys , that they might ~ ppease the old ones, and that peace would reign in the house . The oldsters were pleased, of course, with the output of the young. Because of that , they fed them, for the kitchen was open to all. But punishment - that was another matter! The old did not punish the young as workers , no - God forbid! - they could not find better hands. Yet the young deserved to suffer, to suffer greatly, for they were unworthy, for they had sinned against their ancestors , moldering, God knows how long, in the cemetery of �SLOVAKIA 117 Zelena Misa. In the opinion of the old ones, the young must suffer even more for Marc, who was born a month after the wedding. The child , having trespassed so vilely against tradition, was simply not considered a member of the family. He was a worm-eaten fruit. He was something that screeched aimlessly and would not be missed had he broken his neck. In such a case, there would at least be an empty comer for a more Christian apple. Yet the child, even in the midst of anger and hate , grew like a mushroom and was so dear that to harm him would have wrecked the entire house. And so the old had to shun the bastard. And for exactly the same reason, it was clear that Urban and Christine had no other choice than to disappear from the sight of the old ones . And so, as grandmother advised, that day when Michael Habdzha left for Holy Hill and his wife Veronica was digesting her extra quart of red wine and snorting in the upper room, the young Habdzhas loaded their few belongings safely onto the wagon and cart. Grandmother gave them their due portion of victuals and kitchen utensils from the common kitchen . Josephine brought grandmother's spotted cow from the stable. Nicholas and Philip tied together several bundles of clover and threw a sheaf of straw down from the hay loft. Christine took Marc in her knapsack. Veronica did not awake. Everything in the house was carried out without bangs or pangs. Yet, grandmother - God knows what kind of sorrow took hold of her eighty-year-old heart - was unable to part with Christine. The wagoner with his wagon and Urban with the cart and cow moved slowly down the street. Urban' s brothers and sister accompanied the fleeing couple. Everything was bundled together and dragged down the street. Only Christine and her grandmother-in-law , standing in the wide-open gate , wiped their eyes with the comers of their aprons. Even the lazy residents of Zelena Misa, crawling out of their clay holes to see what was going on, considered this long parting to be a stupid thing. It was fatal, indeed, to spend so much time taking leave. When the young woman finally set her foot outside the gate , old Habdzha , rather untimely, was about to enter at that very moment. Both the departing woman and the entering man stiffened in their positions. He changed from blue to black with anger ; she became pale with shame and dread. " Are you leaving? " He stood half-bent, supported by a walking stick. Yet his head was raised toward her. He confronted her menacingly. He looked hateful. Her heart pounded as she considered by-passing him. But she was unable to move from the spot. She only turned round and round . She felt as if she were nailed to the ground. Unable to hide her face , she �118 SLOVAKIA tried at least to avoid the recriminating look of her father-in-law. Luckily, sorrow overcame her, and the tears beclouded her eyes. This confused Habdzha. He bent to one side, by-passing her. He walked slowly, staring directly in her eyes. Then he spat and mumbled, "You pig!" What? Grandmother saw little Marc turn in the knapsack and look at her, spreading his little hands toward her. She blessed him, making the sign of the cross with her bony hand in the air. At the same time, the ugly word fell like cow's dung from the mouth of her son-in-law and hit her ears . With a hand weighted with anger, she slapped him across the mouth. There! Michael Habdzha stiffened. Blood sped into his face. He opened his mouth, gasping for air. He choked. Through a red fog, he saw and heard the onlookers of Zelena Misa laugh as they retreated into their doorways . He took his head in his hands. His heart, the wild Habdzha heart with thin walls, started its awful gallop. He mumbled something, something incomprehensible and disastrous, something lost in the sad moment when he slid down to the earth. (1946) '\ � SLOVAKIA 113 "Baked Blockheads" . (a fragment) \ FRANTISEK HECKO (1905-1960) In the morning, as soon as Michael Habdzha, a pudgy and stem peasant of Zelena Misa, stepped out of his house, his son Urban took his wife Christine (nee Svata) by the hand; and like children walking to school, they went hand-in-hand to the notary, signed a contract and a note , and bought a house with two vineyards in Wolfsvale . The entire transaction was very brief: Christine removed a linen pouch from the bosom of her dress, unwrapped the protective cover of the pouch, and took out twenty hundred-crown banknotes , part of which she earned through her own sweat and tears and part of which they had received after long supplication from the elders of Podhaj. Having placed the money on the desk in front of the notary, Christine and her husband signed the contract, and Theophil Hrzhic and Dominik Palkovic, the guarantors , vouched the draft with an additional fifteen-hundred crowns . The notary winked deliberately at the young woman and said, " So-o-o! Live in the house happily and use your property in good health! You-u-u made a go-o-od bargain. " The young couple left the notary office with pale faces, empty pockets, and shoulders slumping somewhat. It was hard to say what burdened their hearts the most; whether it was the property acquired in Wolfsvale , or the draft note for fifteen-hundred crowns, or the speed with which the transaction was performed. The notary put five of Christine's hundred-crown banknotes in his pocket, while the remaining fifteen bills he placed in his desk drawer for the former owner of the Wolfsvale property, Joseph Deograts, who, to the surprise of all, had emigrated with his family to America. The notary patted his pocket as if dusting his suit after contact with a hairy animal and mumbled, " Donkeys .. . both of you !" The young Habdzhas did not return home through the village. They walked through the barnyards, and even there they turned on purpose across Cabbage Fields and Hemp Fields towards Scabby Water. In Little Willows near the river, Christine's teeth began to rattle. She wept, while Urban, the vein on his forehead swollen, was angry because she regretted spending the money. They would have �114 SLOVAKIA walked this way and cried and been angry with each other, had the woman not grabbed the man in her arms . Tears in her eyes, she said with bluish lips , " Urban!" Her voice was like the cry of a drowning person. "Dear Christine!" She had never heard her name pronounced so tenderly . ' 'I'm scared, so scared that I'm shivering!'' Indeed, cold fever shuddered through her body. ' 'Don't be afraid and don't shiver! Do you realize, godly woman, the meaning of having one's own house?" The entire world turned around her. She knew, yes, and how well she knew it! But now she was glad because her Urban knew it, too. " I'm sorry if you think that I regret spending the money." And added still with tears in her eyes: ' 'But I'm afraid of the hell that will follow when those in the upper room learn what we did. I would rather take little Marc and fly directly over to Wolfsvale. Virgin Mary, help me!" It was not the money that worried her. She was concerned about the storm which would suddenly explode in the Habdzha's proud home • when papa and mama learned that the "baked blockheads" had once again challenged their absolute rule and played a stupid trick on them. Urban now knew for sure that his Christine was more dec~nt than he had ever thought her to be. He was very happy because of that, and his heart beat like a hammer. Laughing loudly, he lifted his wife up and tried to rock his longlegged girl in his arms while walking forward . But ~ime and time again she slipped in his hands. She did not know whether to slide down to the ground or to wind her arms around her husband's neck. She let him carry her for some distance, while a sweet indecision intoxicated her. But the moment was so great that it could not culminate in an ordinary embrace. He looked into her eyes and saw that her tears had seemingly dried: Christine 's shy girlishness retreated before a relentlessly onrushing womanly ripeness. \ Urban understood. And before she could,have opened her mouth, he let her touch the ground and outran her, calling to her, " Let' s go, Christine, let' s leave today! " " Yes , yes, yes! " The marks of feminine consent - her smile, the burning coals in her eyes , and fully expanded bosom - betrayed her thoughts clearly. Both found in their agreement a starting point, simple and direct, a stunning view of freedom craved by everything young and healthy in the world. �SLOVAKIA 115 Intoxicated spiritually, they sped up from Little Willows and ran across the Meadows to the bridge. The bridge, a formless stone structure thrown clumsily over the river bed of Scabby Water, connected Zelena Misa with Wolfsvale in the fields. A blackened statue of St. John Nepomucene haa stood on the bridge for long centuries, guarding the entrance to W olfsvale and looking with bulging, hateful eyes toward Zelena Misa. Both sat down on a low brick balustrade near the statue . St. John's eyes, from the Wolfsvale side, shone with goodness and won their approval. Urban and Christine looked down on troughlike W olfsvale , full of trees and grapevines, stakes and bushwood. The property which they acquired that day at the notary and which belonged to them was located beyond Goatshead, in Wolf Comers , now the wildest and deepest part of Wolfsvale. And perhaps because of the location and nature of their property, they felt twice as strongly that they aleady belonged there, among the grapevines and trees. When they walked down from the bridge toward Zelena Misa, a feeling of contempt toward the village took possession of them. The village seemed ugly, bare, and worn out. Sitting on a flat hill, the village was kneaded formlessly of brick clay and covered with fat straw. Even the church stuck upward like a fence post. Urban and Christine had acted wisely in drawing a good human being, their grandmother, into their secret plans . A less pious and more honest woman than her daughter Veronina, the devoted and servile wife of Michael Habdzha and the fierce mother of Urban, their grandmother Louise Kristova (nee Hrzhichova), proved to be very helpful to them. She advised then not to start before noon. Free as she was in all her actions , she did not need to account for her comings and goings . She ran to hire a wagoner with a long wagon and a cart, so they could take all their belongings . She also knew that her son-in-law, the farmer, would return only at sunset , for he had gone to Holy Hill from which one does not return quickly. Her daughter - as soon as she was rid of the morning cooking - grasped the opportunity provided by her husband 's absence , to " hit" the bottle, lie in the upper room , and tell the world to go to hell. Urban's brothers, Nicholas and Philip , and his sister Josephine , oppressed like Urban and Christine, were ready to assist in all the operations when they found the young couple was about to sneak out from the lower room . Joyfully anticipating their parents' anger, they danced in the yard. �116 SLOVAKIA In the Habdzha household, there had always been shouting and fighting ever since the house was built, with its four windows facing the square of Zelena Misa. The reins of the household had been held since time immemorial by the man, sharp as a razor, while the ladle had always been held in the hand of a woman as angry as a snake. If the Archangel Michael had established the man as the head of the household to beat all the others, the woman was certainly awarded by the Devil to the man to support him with anger and sly financial machinations. Only Urban, the " scoundrel," took it into his head to violate this age-old tradition. He had suddenly ceased to obey. He was, to be sure, more stubborn and sharper than his honorable ancestors. But at the same time , he had in his chest a greater heart and more mad handsomeness in his face. In the retinue of the Habdzhas , he might have been mistaken for a noble . Because of his rebellious character, he had not brought a respectible bride into the house , but a maidservant, almost with a child in her hands. He tore the Habdzhas' homespun customs to shreds. He turned the household upsidedown. And as if this were not enough , this ungrateful fellow took the side of a woman who sang non-peasant ballads about orphans and injustices above her son' s cradle. Because of these insults , the old Habdzhas bore an everlasting grudge against the beggarly lower room, and, except to give orders for work , they did not address Urban and Christine with a decent word. But Christine , like Urban before her, won the grandmother and her brothers- and sister-in-law to her side. No one could have endured the tears she shed in the corners. Even a beggar standing in the door took it upon himself to chide Veronica for mistreating her daughter-inlaw. Still nothing moved the old ones. It did not help that grandmother poured kitchen slop over Veronica, that Nicholas and Philip broke the chaff cutter in the barn , that Josephine stuck out her tongue at her father ; nor did the store room door chopped to pieces and other asininities committed by Urban affect his parents. It did not help either that the young people worked like dragons. They thought, the donkeys , that they might ~ ppease the old ones, and that peace would reign in the house . The oldsters were pleased, of course, with the output of the young. Because of that , they fed them, for the kitchen was open to all. But punishment - that was another matter! The old did not punish the young as workers , no - God forbid! - they could not find better hands. Yet the young deserved to suffer, to suffer greatly, for they were unworthy, for they had sinned against their ancestors , moldering, God knows how long, in the cemetery of �SLOVAKIA 117 Zelena Misa. In the opinion of the old ones, the young must suffer even more for Marc, who was born a month after the wedding. The child , having trespassed so vilely against tradition, was simply not considered a member of the family. He was a worm-eaten fruit. He was something that screeched aimlessly and would not be missed had he broken his neck. In such a case, there would at least be an empty comer for a more Christian apple. Yet the child, even in the midst of anger and hate , grew like a mushroom and was so dear that to harm him would have wrecked the entire house. And so the old had to shun the bastard. And for exactly the same reason, it was clear that Urban and Christine had no other choice than to disappear from the sight of the old ones . And so, as grandmother advised, that day when Michael Habdzha left for Holy Hill and his wife Veronica was digesting her extra quart of red wine and snorting in the upper room, the young Habdzhas loaded their few belongings safely onto the wagon and cart. Grandmother gave them their due portion of victuals and kitchen utensils from the common kitchen . Josephine brought grandmother's spotted cow from the stable. Nicholas and Philip tied together several bundles of clover and threw a sheaf of straw down from the hay loft. Christine took Marc in her knapsack. Veronica did not awake. Everything in the house was carried out without bangs or pangs. Yet, grandmother - God knows what kind of sorrow took hold of her eighty-year-old heart - was unable to part with Christine. The wagoner with his wagon and Urban with the cart and cow moved slowly down the street. Urban' s brothers and sister accompanied the fleeing couple. Everything was bundled together and dragged down the street. Only Christine and her grandmother-in-law , standing in the wide-open gate , wiped their eyes with the comers of their aprons. Even the lazy residents of Zelena Misa, crawling out of their clay holes to see what was going on, considered this long parting to be a stupid thing. It was fatal, indeed, to spend so much time taking leave. When the young woman finally set her foot outside the gate , old Habdzha , rather untimely, was about to enter at that very moment. Both the departing woman and the entering man stiffened in their positions. He changed from blue to black with anger ; she became pale with shame and dread. " Are you leaving? " He stood half-bent, supported by a walking stick. Yet his head was raised toward her. He confronted her menacingly. He looked hateful. Her heart pounded as she considered by-passing him. But she was unable to move from the spot. She only turned round and round . She felt as if she were nailed to the ground. Unable to hide her face , she �118 SLOVAKIA tried at least to avoid the recriminating look of her father-in-law. Luckily, sorrow overcame her, and the tears beclouded her eyes. This confused Habdzha. He bent to one side, by-passing her. He walked slowly, staring directly in her eyes. Then he spat and mumbled, "You pig!" What? Grandmother saw little Marc turn in the knapsack and look at her, spreading his little hands toward her. She blessed him, making the sign of the cross with her bony hand in the air. At the same time, the ugly word fell like cow's dung from the mouth of her son-in-law and hit her ears . With a hand weighted with anger, she slapped him across the mouth. There! Michael Habdzha stiffened. Blood sped into his face. He opened his mouth, gasping for air. He choked. Through a red fog, he saw and heard the onlookers of Zelena Misa laugh as they retreated into their doorways . He took his head in his hands. His heart, the wild Habdzha heart with thin walls, started its awful gallop. He mumbled something, something incomprehensible and disastrous, something lost in the sad moment when he slid down to the earth. (1946) '\ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1978-79, Vol. 28 Description An account of the resource Vol. 28 (No. 51-52), 1978-79. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1978-79 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 113 "Baked Blockheads" . (a fragment) \ FRANTISEK HECKO (1905-1960) In the morning, as soon as Michael Habdzha, a pudgy and stem peasant of Zelena Misa, stepped out of his house, his son Urban took his wife Christine (nee Svata) by the hand; and like children walking to school, they went hand-in-hand to the notary, signed a contract and a note , and bought a house with two vineyards in Wolfsvale . The entire transaction was very brief: Christine removed a linen pouch from the bosom of her dress, unwrapped the protective cover of the pouch, and took out twenty hundred-crown banknotes , part of which she earned through her own sweat and tears and part of which they had received after long supplication from the elders of Podhaj. Having placed the money on the desk in front of the notary, Christine and her husband signed the contract, and Theophil Hrzhic and Dominik Palkovic, the guarantors , vouched the draft with an additional fifteen-hundred crowns . The notary winked deliberately at the young woman and said, " So-o-o! Live in the house happily and use your property in good health! You-u-u made a go-o-od bargain. " The young couple left the notary office with pale faces, empty pockets, and shoulders slumping somewhat. It was hard to say what burdened their hearts the most; whether it was the property acquired in Wolfsvale , or the draft note for fifteen-hundred crowns, or the speed with which the transaction was performed. The notary put five of Christine's hundred-crown banknotes in his pocket, while the remaining fifteen bills he placed in his desk drawer for the former owner of the Wolfsvale property, Joseph Deograts, who, to the surprise of all, had emigrated with his family to America. The notary patted his pocket as if dusting his suit after contact with a hairy animal and mumbled, " Donkeys .. . both of you !" The young Habdzhas did not return home through the village. They walked through the barnyards, and even there they turned on purpose across Cabbage Fields and Hemp Fields towards Scabby Water. In Little Willows near the river, Christine's teeth began to rattle. She wept, while Urban, the vein on his forehead swollen, was angry because she regretted spending the money. They would have 114 SLOVAKIA walked this way and cried and been angry with each other, had the woman not grabbed the man in her arms . Tears in her eyes, she said with bluish lips , " Urban!" Her voice was like the cry of a drowning person. "Dear Christine!" She had never heard her name pronounced so tenderly . ' 'I'm scared, so scared that I'm shivering!'' Indeed, cold fever shuddered through her body. ' 'Don't be afraid and don't shiver! Do you realize, godly woman, the meaning of having one's own house?" The entire world turned around her. She knew, yes, and how well she knew it! But now she was glad because her Urban knew it, too. " I'm sorry if you think that I regret spending the money." And added still with tears in her eyes: ' 'But I'm afraid of the hell that will follow when those in the upper room learn what we did. I would rather take little Marc and fly directly over to Wolfsvale. Virgin Mary, help me!" It was not the money that worried her. She was concerned about the storm which would suddenly explode in the Habdzha's proud home • when papa and mama learned that the "baked blockheads" had once again challenged their absolute rule and played a stupid trick on them. Urban now knew for sure that his Christine was more dec~nt than he had ever thought her to be. He was very happy because of that, and his heart beat like a hammer. Laughing loudly, he lifted his wife up and tried to rock his longlegged girl in his arms while walking forward . But ~ime and time again she slipped in his hands. She did not know whether to slide down to the ground or to wind her arms around her husband's neck. She let him carry her for some distance, while a sweet indecision intoxicated her. But the moment was so great that it could not culminate in an ordinary embrace. He looked into her eyes and saw that her tears had seemingly dried: Christine 's shy girlishness retreated before a relentlessly onrushing womanly ripeness. \ Urban understood. And before she could,have opened her mouth, he let her touch the ground and outran her, calling to her, " Let' s go, Christine, let' s leave today! " " Yes , yes, yes! " The marks of feminine consent - her smile, the burning coals in her eyes , and fully expanded bosom - betrayed her thoughts clearly. Both found in their agreement a starting point, simple and direct, a stunning view of freedom craved by everything young and healthy in the world. SLOVAKIA 115 Intoxicated spiritually, they sped up from Little Willows and ran across the Meadows to the bridge. The bridge, a formless stone structure thrown clumsily over the river bed of Scabby Water, connected Zelena Misa with Wolfsvale in the fields. A blackened statue of St. John Nepomucene haa stood on the bridge for long centuries, guarding the entrance to W olfsvale and looking with bulging, hateful eyes toward Zelena Misa. Both sat down on a low brick balustrade near the statue . St. John's eyes, from the Wolfsvale side, shone with goodness and won their approval. Urban and Christine looked down on troughlike W olfsvale , full of trees and grapevines, stakes and bushwood. The property which they acquired that day at the notary and which belonged to them was located beyond Goatshead, in Wolf Comers , now the wildest and deepest part of Wolfsvale. And perhaps because of the location and nature of their property, they felt twice as strongly that they aleady belonged there, among the grapevines and trees. When they walked down from the bridge toward Zelena Misa, a feeling of contempt toward the village took possession of them. The village seemed ugly, bare, and worn out. Sitting on a flat hill, the village was kneaded formlessly of brick clay and covered with fat straw. Even the church stuck upward like a fence post. Urban and Christine had acted wisely in drawing a good human being, their grandmother, into their secret plans . A less pious and more honest woman than her daughter Veronina, the devoted and servile wife of Michael Habdzha and the fierce mother of Urban, their grandmother Louise Kristova (nee Hrzhichova), proved to be very helpful to them. She advised then not to start before noon. Free as she was in all her actions , she did not need to account for her comings and goings . She ran to hire a wagoner with a long wagon and a cart, so they could take all their belongings . She also knew that her son-in-law, the farmer, would return only at sunset , for he had gone to Holy Hill from which one does not return quickly. Her daughter - as soon as she was rid of the morning cooking - grasped the opportunity provided by her husband 's absence , to " hit" the bottle, lie in the upper room , and tell the world to go to hell. Urban's brothers, Nicholas and Philip , and his sister Josephine , oppressed like Urban and Christine, were ready to assist in all the operations when they found the young couple was about to sneak out from the lower room . Joyfully anticipating their parents' anger, they danced in the yard. 116 SLOVAKIA In the Habdzha household, there had always been shouting and fighting ever since the house was built, with its four windows facing the square of Zelena Misa. The reins of the household had been held since time immemorial by the man, sharp as a razor, while the ladle had always been held in the hand of a woman as angry as a snake. If the Archangel Michael had established the man as the head of the household to beat all the others, the woman was certainly awarded by the Devil to the man to support him with anger and sly financial machinations. Only Urban, the " scoundrel," took it into his head to violate this age-old tradition. He had suddenly ceased to obey. He was, to be sure, more stubborn and sharper than his honorable ancestors. But at the same time , he had in his chest a greater heart and more mad handsomeness in his face. In the retinue of the Habdzhas , he might have been mistaken for a noble . Because of his rebellious character, he had not brought a respectible bride into the house , but a maidservant, almost with a child in her hands. He tore the Habdzhas' homespun customs to shreds. He turned the household upsidedown. And as if this were not enough , this ungrateful fellow took the side of a woman who sang non-peasant ballads about orphans and injustices above her son' s cradle. Because of these insults , the old Habdzhas bore an everlasting grudge against the beggarly lower room, and, except to give orders for work , they did not address Urban and Christine with a decent word. But Christine , like Urban before her, won the grandmother and her brothers- and sister-in-law to her side. No one could have endured the tears she shed in the corners. Even a beggar standing in the door took it upon himself to chide Veronica for mistreating her daughter-inlaw. Still nothing moved the old ones. It did not help that grandmother poured kitchen slop over Veronica, that Nicholas and Philip broke the chaff cutter in the barn , that Josephine stuck out her tongue at her father ; nor did the store room door chopped to pieces and other asininities committed by Urban affect his parents. It did not help either that the young people worked like dragons. They thought, the donkeys , that they might ~ ppease the old ones, and that peace would reign in the house . The oldsters were pleased, of course, with the output of the young. Because of that , they fed them, for the kitchen was open to all. But punishment - that was another matter! The old did not punish the young as workers , no - God forbid! - they could not find better hands. Yet the young deserved to suffer, to suffer greatly, for they were unworthy, for they had sinned against their ancestors , moldering, God knows how long, in the cemetery of SLOVAKIA 117 Zelena Misa. In the opinion of the old ones, the young must suffer even more for Marc, who was born a month after the wedding. The child , having trespassed so vilely against tradition, was simply not considered a member of the family. He was a worm-eaten fruit. He was something that screeched aimlessly and would not be missed had he broken his neck. In such a case, there would at least be an empty comer for a more Christian apple. Yet the child, even in the midst of anger and hate , grew like a mushroom and was so dear that to harm him would have wrecked the entire house. And so the old had to shun the bastard. And for exactly the same reason, it was clear that Urban and Christine had no other choice than to disappear from the sight of the old ones . And so, as grandmother advised, that day when Michael Habdzha left for Holy Hill and his wife Veronica was digesting her extra quart of red wine and snorting in the upper room, the young Habdzhas loaded their few belongings safely onto the wagon and cart. Grandmother gave them their due portion of victuals and kitchen utensils from the common kitchen . Josephine brought grandmother's spotted cow from the stable. Nicholas and Philip tied together several bundles of clover and threw a sheaf of straw down from the hay loft. Christine took Marc in her knapsack. Veronica did not awake. Everything in the house was carried out without bangs or pangs. Yet, grandmother - God knows what kind of sorrow took hold of her eighty-year-old heart - was unable to part with Christine. The wagoner with his wagon and Urban with the cart and cow moved slowly down the street. Urban' s brothers and sister accompanied the fleeing couple. Everything was bundled together and dragged down the street. Only Christine and her grandmother-in-law , standing in the wide-open gate , wiped their eyes with the comers of their aprons. Even the lazy residents of Zelena Misa, crawling out of their clay holes to see what was going on, considered this long parting to be a stupid thing. It was fatal, indeed, to spend so much time taking leave. When the young woman finally set her foot outside the gate , old Habdzha , rather untimely, was about to enter at that very moment. Both the departing woman and the entering man stiffened in their positions. He changed from blue to black with anger ; she became pale with shame and dread. " Are you leaving? " He stood half-bent, supported by a walking stick. Yet his head was raised toward her. He confronted her menacingly. He looked hateful. Her heart pounded as she considered by-passing him. But she was unable to move from the spot. She only turned round and round . She felt as if she were nailed to the ground. Unable to hide her face , she 118 SLOVAKIA tried at least to avoid the recriminating look of her father-in-law. Luckily, sorrow overcame her, and the tears beclouded her eyes. This confused Habdzha. He bent to one side, by-passing her. He walked slowly, staring directly in her eyes. Then he spat and mumbled, "You pig!" What? Grandmother saw little Marc turn in the knapsack and look at her, spreading his little hands toward her. She blessed him, making the sign of the cross with her bony hand in the air. At the same time, the ugly word fell like cow's dung from the mouth of her son-in-law and hit her ears . With a hand weighted with anger, she slapped him across the mouth. There! Michael Habdzha stiffened. Blood sped into his face. He opened his mouth, gasping for air. He choked. Through a red fog, he saw and heard the onlookers of Zelena Misa laugh as they retreated into their doorways . He took his head in his hands. His heart, the wild Habdzha heart with thin walls, started its awful gallop. He mumbled something, something incomprehensible and disastrous, something lost in the sad moment when he slid down to the earth. (1946) '\  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Baked Blockheads" (a fragment) Description An account of the resource František Hečko Slovakia, Vol. 28 (No. 51-52), 1978-79 pp. 113-118 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hečko, František, 1905-1960 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1978-79 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/635b6ed1c68bba1673b6a0d1ff764bbc.pdf cf43258673a41d9008eacf50c98385b5 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. �8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . �10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. �SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). �12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. �13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- �14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . �SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- �16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . �SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2019, Vol. 44 Description An account of the resource Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 2019 7 DISPUTED DIVERSITY: "GUARDIANS OF THE NATION" AND THE MULTILINGUAL URBAN SPACES OF KASSA/KOSICE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY Frank Henschel Introduction The Slovak historian Pavel Hapak claimed that the cities of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) as part of the Kingdom of Hungary before 1918 epitomized "centers of a violent maygarization," 1 that is, the forceful assimilation of non-Magyar speakers like Slovaks or Germans or of other ethnic groups, into the Magyar language and culture One important city in the region was Kassa, today's Kosice, the second largest city in Slovakia. 2 By focusing on ethnic groups and on violent magyarization, Hapak, among others, contributed to a dominant historiographic narrative of Hungary as part of the East Central European region. Jeremy King and Rogers Brubaker characterized this narrative as "ethnicism" and "groupism" because it concentrates on antagonisms of national groups, ethnic tensions and fights for cultural hegemony as driving forces of history in the region. 3 The past was ethniczed by projecting today's national affiliations back into a time when there actually was no clear idea about one's national identity, making this an inappropriate term for historical analysis. 4 As other studies of the multilingual, multinational and multi-confessional cities of East Central Europe like Kassa/Kosice convincing1 Hapak, Pavel, " Das Nationalitiitenproblem in den slowakischen Stiidten am Beispiel von Gewerbe, Industrie und den Geldinstituten vom ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert bis zum Zusammenbruch der Monarchie," in Die Stiidte Mitteleuropas im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. by Wilhelm Rausch (Linz, 1984), 127--48, here 127. 2 For a deeper analysis of the historiography about Kosice since the 18 th century see Ondrej Ficeri. Kos ice v slovenskej historiografli (Kos ice, 2016) 3 Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of Eastern Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, ed. by Maria Sueur and Nancy M. Wingfield (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 200 I), 112- 52.; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," European Journal of Sociology 43, no. 2 (2002): 163-89. 4 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond "Identity," Theory and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 1--47. 8 SLOVAKIA 2019 ly argued, most people's everyday life in the 19'" century and fin-desiecle was less determined by ethnic identity than by social status, class, profession, religious affiliation, education, wealth, position in the community, local or regional origin, political standpoint etc. 5 I am aware that there actually were nationalist activities and endeavors, not least in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Monarchy, where the government, nationalist press and cultural institutions aimed at spreading national Magyar culture and language in order to marginalize or repress other languages like Slovak and German, and thus to homogenize the mostly diverse urban societies in nationalist terms. However, we have to trace back these processes to their original propagators and institutional contexts, not just repeat nationalist demands and claims as issues of an actual, fixed national or ethnic group and thus mistake them as realities and facts .6 In Kassa/Kosice, a considerable number of people advocated nationalist or ethnicist concepts of identity and awarded them relevance in the everyday urban life by centering all other social, cultural, religious or professional affiliations around this concept in order to strengthen and legitimate their position and reputation in the local society. With Pieter Judson I would like to call these activists "Guardians of the Nation". 7 They were not just nationalist intellectuals or pure men of action, but a specific blend of both. There was not a single collective organization, which served as a specific basis for their activities, but several local institutions and different occasions, where the "guardians" appeared and operated. They followed a specific ethno-national mindset, which they connected to single categories of history, culture, language, religion and which dominated their perception of urban space, the population and cohabitation. In order to realize their perceptions, they engaged in municipal politics, local 5 Balint Varga, " Multilingualism in Urban Hungary: 1880-1910," Nationalities Papers 42 (2014): 1-16; Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," Slavic Review 69, no. I (2010): 93- 119; Eleonora Babejova, Fin-de-siecle Pressburg: Conflict and Cultural Coexistence in Bratislava 1897- 1914 (New York: East European Monographs, Distributed by Columbia University Press), 617. 6 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. (Repr. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997), I 0-18 . 7 Pieter M. Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press), 2006 . SLOVAKIA 2019 9 cultural institutions like the theatre, in cultural or economic associations, in schools or churches, in memory culture. In all these spheres of urban life, the "guardians of the nation" sought influence and tried to infuse urban life and institutions with their concepts of ethnonational identity. 8 Using the example of Kassa/ Kosice I would like to illustrate some aspects of the struggle of national activists to fully homogenize, i.e. magyarize, the city in the second half of the l 9•h century and the limits of their endeavors. First, I will present some facts and figures about Kassa/Kosice from 1870 to the First World War. Then, I will show some results of my investigation concerning the magyarization of urban cultural spaces in Kassa/Kosice, namely the theatre, cultural associations and church communities. 9 Kassa/Kosice 1870-191 8 10 In the second half of the 19'" century, Kassa/Kos ice was one of the twenty largest cities in the Kingdom of Hungary and the second largest in Upper Hungary. The population grew from 22,000 to 45 ,000 and was nourished by both regional migration from the surrounding county of Abauj-Toma and from other regions of the monarchy. Although the economic relevance of Kassa/Kosice in compar8 Referring to Brubaker again, it is hard to distinguish between a "civic" (national, liberal) and "ethnic" (primordial) concept of identity because both aspects are deeply intertwined. Thus, there is also no rational purpose in classifying the first as "positive" and the latter as "negative" because both aimed at separating human collectives according to specific categories like language, culture, origin, religion etc. and excluding, marginalizing, even fighting the "others" not belonging to a such perceived collective. Rogers Brubaker, "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distin ction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism," in Nation and National Identity: Th e European Experience in Perspective, ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. (Chur: Ruegger, I 999), 55- 71. 9 For a detailed investigation and analysis see Frank Henschel, "Das Fluidum der Stadt ... ": Urbane Lebenswelten in Kassa/Kosice/Kaschau zwischen Sprachenvielfalt und Magyarisierung 1867- 191 8 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 20 I 7). 10 Because in 20 13 Kosice was awarded the title "European Capital of Culture," there was an increased interest in the city, resulting in a couple of richly illustrated academic publications which investigated some aspects of the local and regional history: Veronika Gayer, ed. Remembering the City: A Guide through the Past of Kos ice (Budapest: Terra Recognita Foundation, 2013); Stefan Sutaj and Nikoleta Dzurikaninova, eds. Struktury a fragmenty historickeho vyvoja Kasie (Kosice, 2014) . 10 SLOVAKIA 2019 ison to Budapest, Pozony/Pressburg (later Bratislava) or the mining di stricts in the north decreased, the city remained a regional center of culture, district administration, education and trade, not to mention that it was a self-governing autonomous municipality. Kassa/Kosice was quite "bourgeois." Some twenty percent of the population could be classified as living in bourgeois upper and upper-middle-class circumstances, regarding wealth, profession and rights. One of the most important feature s of Kassa/Kosice was its confessional diversity. The Roman Catholic Church remained dominant, but the smaller communities consolidated and even gained new members. Between 1880 and 1910, the percentage of Roman Catholics declined from seventy to sixty-three percent. By contrast, the percentage of Greek Catholics increased from 6.5 to eight percent, Calvinists went from four to eight percent, and the Jews expanded from eleven to fifteen percent. Only the Lutherans lost in population - down from nearly eight to 5.5 percent. Regarding the linguistic proportions, despite all the criticism of these instruments of identity politics and sources of ethnicized historiography, 11 I have had to rely on official censuses to at least give a sizeable hint: in 1880 Slovak and Magyar each were claimed as the mother tongue by about 40% of the population, German by some 17%. By 1910 the official Magyar language of administration increased so dramatically that three quarters of the population were declared as Magyars, 15 % as Slovaks and only 7 % as Germans. 12 However, these figure s say nothing about bi - or even trilingualism and they do not show the distribution, use and social hierarchy of the languages in everyday life. As the great writer Sandor Marai , born in 1900 in Kassa/Kosice wrote in his "memoir novel" not yet translated into English - the city undoubtedly carried a Magyar "atmosphere." But at the same time, Marai continued, it was characterized by an omnipresent multilingualism: the bourgeoisie in private preferred the German language, whereas the peasants from 11 Wolfgang Giiderle, Zensus und Ethnizitiit: Zur Herstellung von Wissen iiber soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und I 910 (Giittingen: Wallstein Verlag, 201 6); Theodore M. Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking: 1820-1 900 (Princeton: Princeton Uni versity Press, 1986). 12 Joachim von Puttkamer, " Mehrsprachi gkeit und Sprachenzwang in Oberungam und Siebenbiirgen 1867-1 9 14: Eine statistische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift fo r siebenbiirgische Landeskunde 26, no. I (2003): 7--40. SLOVAKIA 2019 11 the "hinterland," the domestic servants and the urban poor often spoke in Slovak. In many cases people used two or more languages in different situations. 13 Multilingualism was a characteristic of the local society and it did not necessarily correspond with one's national affiliation or patriotic attitude. However, for some, the "guardians" of language and culture, it in fact did. I will now tum to three distinct spheres of urban life in order to demonstrate their endeavors for ethno-national identity and at the same time point to the limits of their activism. The Theatre as an Arena of Magyarization 14 The first cultural space as a domain of the urban bourgeoisie was the theatre. Due to the widespread bilingual character of this class, national activists especially targeted bourgeois cultural institutions for magyarization. German, although widely regarded as a civilized language by the local bourgeoisie and not an obstacle to a patriotic affiliation to Hungary, was displaced step-by-step. The "cathedral" of bourgeois culture, the local theater, after renovations, reopened in 1899 as the "Nemzeti Szinhaz" (the National Theatre), and as a completely monolingual space. The Board for Theatre Affairs, a municipal committee, had already banned non-Magyar ensembles in the 1870s, only allowing some guest performances on summer open-air stages. This neglect of linguistic and cultural diversity, together with the often-blamed low quality of most pieces, resulted in poor attendance even in the new prestigious theater building. Thus, the new ensemble director Janos Komjathy, in charge from 1902 to 1912, tried to balance artistic quality, financial responsibility and the demands of the Municipal Theatre Committee for the promotion of Magyar national culture. Despite his success for most of the time, he was unable to avoid some scandals in the first years of his engagement. In 1903 Komjathy invited an ensemble from Brno, which resulted in a furious press campaign against this "Slavic invasion." The opera, which would have been staged by eighty actors and musicians, had to be cancelled. Soon, a similar protest broke out, 13 Sandor Marai , Bekenntnisse eines Biirgers: Erinnerungen (Miinchen: Piper, 2000), 18. 14 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Das Fluidum der Stadt, 110-124 (fn . 9). 12 SLOVAKIA 2019 accusing him of "germanization" of the theatre. The incident took place during a performance. Lacking a professional orchestra, Komjathy depended upon the local imperial army orchestra. Once during the performance of a national-romantic piece, including the "Kossuth-Dal," a song for the leader of the Hungarian Revolutionary War in 1848/49, the musicians skipped some parts, whereupon the audience, led by a group of students from the local Academy of Law, staged a noisy protest. The musicians left and Komjathy had to do a lot of diplomatic work not to lose the support of the orchestra for good. Such scandals were not repeated in the future , so it can be concluded that the director learned a lesson about the Magyar national demarcation of the Kassa/Kosice theatre. The local "guardians" regarded it as a space for explicit national cultural performances, including the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Clubs and Associations: Instruments of Nationalism? 15 However, not all spaces of bourgeois cultural life in Kassa/Kosice were charged so strongly with national ideology. The noble and bourgeois clubs (called Casinos) worked rather as rooms of social segregation. High fees and strict charters excluded unwanted members of urban society, such as the petty bourgeoisie and lower classes. Ethno-national segregation, however, did not play a role here. Rather, party politics and confessional differences led to separation : liberal and conservative, Catholic and Jewish . In the end, the Casinos were spaces of socializing and entertainment without strong political or ethno-national implications. Nevertheless, they also served for the promotion of Magyar patriotism amongst their members . Especially after the tum of the century, the multilingual character of the clubs disappeared due to the exclusive use of the Magyar language. Besides Casinos, civil society was also constituted by cultural associations. They had different aims than the Casinos, as demon15 For detailed literature and source material see Ibid. , 124-52 ; Frank Henschel , Vereinswesen und Erinnerungskultur in Kaschau I Kosice I Kassa zwischen Nationalismus und stadtbiirger/ichem P··.1gmatismus (1867- 1918). Working Paper Series for the Research Academy in Lei pzig 12. Leipzig: Leipziger Univ.-Verl. , 20 I 3. 13 SLOVAK.IA 2019 strated by two examples: the "Society for Education" and the "Kazinczy-Circle" (named after the famous reformer of the Magyar language, Ferenc Kazinczy). Both aimed at magyarizing the city, but in a division of labor. The Society offered Magyar-language courses for workers and organized popular patriotic events (readings, amateur-theatre) for the lower classes. Also, teachers and pupils were rewarded for success in school. In order to magyarize the Slovak hinterland, children from the surrounding villages were invited into the Nemzeti Szinhaz, where they were shown patriotic pieces in order to evoke national (Magyar) consciousness. This list of activities should not be mistaken as proof of unlimited success, since these were mostly single events. In 1913, the Committee of the Society for Education had to admit that their endeavors were disappointing, since the commitment of their members, both financially and personally, was low and the effects of linguistic assimilation were also low. The second association, the Kazinczy-Circle, addressed the bourgeoisie. Its foundation in 1898 was inspired by the Toldi-Circle in Pressburg or the Petofi-Circle in Budapest. It organized scientific and reading events, promoting progress in Magyar national culture, literature and science. However, struggling with the same problems as the Society, the Circle failed in reaching a broader share of the upper classes, which preferred to spend their leisure time in the casinos. The Churches : Magyarizing Broader Society? 16 The third, and last urban cultural space under investigation did not constitute an exclusive habitat of the bourgeoisie. Churches were basically open to all people and therefore they are quite interesting for the study of nationalizing practices. As already mentioned, Kassa/Kosice was characterized by a wide diversity of religious affiliations: Roman and Greek Catholics, Lutheran and Calvinist Protes17 tants as well as Orthodox and Reform Jewry. 16 For detailed literature and source material see Henschel , Fluidum der Stadt, 15379 (fn. 9); Frank Henschel , "Religions and the Nation in Kassa before World War I," Hungarian Historical Review 3, no. 4 (2014): 850-74. 17 There is an excellent investigation of the past and present of the Jewish community of Ko sice using the approach of cultural anthropology: Vanda Vitti, (Trans-) Formationen jiidischer Lebenswelten nach 1989: Eine Ethnografie in zwei slowa- 14 SLOVAKIA 2019 In the nationalizing atmosphere of the l 9•h century, though , every church community had to cope with the challenge of nationalist ideology and to adapt to the new thinking. On the front lines, Magyar national activists fought for linguistic homogenization of church services and the inner administration. Secondly, church representatives themselves were in favor of the Magyar nation, trying to distingui sh their community from others in respect of national loyalty. The only community whose Magyar character wasn't in doubt at all were the Calvinists, who saw themselves as "the" Magyar confession and fostered the Magyar language from the beginning. All other church communities were multilingual and, therefore, had to find an arrangement with nationali st claims. Only two chose the way of complete self-magyarization, though not before the first decade of the 20•h century: The first was the Jewish Reform community, which had split from Jewish Orthodoxy due to a country-wide schism of Hungarian Jewry in 1869. In 1904 the community's assembly voted for the exclusive use of Magyar in church services, correspondence and meetings. Before that, Jews in a strange cooperation of nationalist-liberal and conservative Catholic press were accused of being "Germanisers" due to their German-language use in public and within associations. The self-magyarization, thus, can be interpreted as an assimilative strategy according to Viktor Karady 's analysis of the integration of the Hungarian Jewry. 18 The second community, which voted for self-magyarization, likewise as a step towards integration, were the Greek Catholics. They used Orthodox rites and liturgy but stood under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite their Slavic origin and language, the nationalist press did not attack them as it did attack Jews and - as I will show- the Roman Catholic Church. By contrast, Greek Catholics enjoyed a pretty established status, as is proven by the fact, that many non-members contributed funds for the erection of a Greek Catholic Church building in the last decade of the 19'" century. However, in 1909 the Greek Catholic leadership abolished the use of Old Church Slavonic in its services and quite smoothly kischen Stiidten. Ethnografische Perspektiven auf das ostliche Europa I (Bielefeld : Transcript, 2015) . 18 Victor Karady, " Aspects of Unequal Assimilation in Liberal Hungary: Social Geography of the Movement to Magyarise Alien Surnames before 19 I 8," CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998 ( 1999): 49- 67 . SLOVAKIA 2019 15 adapted to the claims of the Magyar national idea. Although Roman Catholicism was the largest denomination in Kassa/Kosice and many representatives were involved in institutions and events promoting Magyar national culture and magyarization, nationalist attacks against the multilingual character and "missing" national loyalty were omnipresent. The Dominican Order was accused of slovakizing the city by maintaining Slovak-language services. The monks argued that the believers should be offered services in their mother tongue and that this had nothing to do with the promotion of a separate national idea. In fact, there had been some incidents when church-goers protested against services in the Magyar language and demanded Slovak instead. However, to interpret this as the manifestation of a strong national consciousness would be misleading. It was more a demand for language use as usual and appropriate. Therefore, although their number was reduced, Slovak language services survived until 1918 in all Roman Catholic churches of Kassa/Kosice. A very interesting case was the Lutheran community. Up to 1861 three divided communities existed, a Magyar, a German and a Slovak one. Then the Magyar and the German ones merged into the "First" Lutheran community, sharing the church building with an officially named "Second" community, which actually was run in the Slovak language. The attempt to avoid the interpretation of an ethnonational segregation is obvious. However, during the last quarter of the l 9•h century, representatives of both communities tried to realize a final fusion which should have resulted in the abolition of all nonMagyar services. There was widespread fear that the nationalist movement could gain influence in the Slovak community. In the end, despite multiple round-tables and several appeals to the believers of the second community, that they show "national morals," the unification never succeeded and the Lutherans of Kassa/Kosice remained linguistically separated. Conclusion In investigating multiethnic, multicultural and multilingual societies, it is necessary to concentrate not on "groups" but on categories and practices of activists, their perceptions, purposes and endeavors. As illustrated by the brief examples in the history of Kas- 16 SLOVAKIA 2019 sa/Kosice, the most important category for the local nationalist "guardians" was language. It served not only for the definition of one's ethno-national identity (being "a Slovak," "a German," "a Magyar") but its use also was seen as an expression of patriotism and national loyalty. Thus, German or Slovak-speaking people of Kassa/Kosice could be accused of "betraying" the Magyar nation and threatening Magyardom. As a consequence, local forms of magyarization were initialized, aimed at homogenizing the city. Not by accident did the "guardians" concentrate on language as the primary marker of national identity and loyalty. Although there was not much unifying them - different political affiliation, origin, age, religion, even mother tongue - they shared a specific attribute. It was their status as representatives of the free professions: 19 teachers, lawyers, journalists, in general persons engaged in the cultural sector. Magyar as the dominant and official state language, which some of these activists due to their actual descent from "Slovak" or "German" familie s only acquired as a second or third language, was their most important resource in order to gain and defend a higher social position in the local society. They even became members of the city council , which for a long time was dominated by nobles and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Thus, the "guardians" connected their social , political and cultural engagement with efforts for linguistic homogenization, precisely because magyarization, of Kassa/Kosice, was legitimized by the nationalist idea of Magyar hegemony in the city as well as in the entire country. Local magyarization was a multilayered project, aimed at different classes in different ways : in cultural institutions, associations, churches, schools, enterprises and the public. Whereas in the first decades of the investigated time German language use within the bourgeoisie was attacked, in the l 890's Slovak language use of the urban poor and the peasants of the surrounding areas became the target. However, there was no violent, repressive magyarization suddenly ambushing the population. Perhaps as a feature of small and middle sized cities, with their close and personal contacts among the citizens and policy-makers, magyarization was sometimes harsh in 10 Hannes Siegrist, "The Professions in Nineteenth-Century Europe" in The European Way: European Societies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. by Hartmut Kaelbe (New York : Berghahn, 2004), 68- 88 . SLOVAK.IA 2019 17 its tone, especially in the nationalist local press, but quite smooth in practice. It was definitely limited by the actual everyday life of using several languages. Bourgeois urban spaces indeed became magyarized quickly, but rather superficially. Thus, multilingualism as well as the national indifference of most inhabitants remained characteristic features of Kassa/Kosice up to the Second World War and reflects the atmosphere of the city to this day.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Disputed Diversity: "Guardians of the Nation" and the Multilingual Urban Spaces of Kassa/Košice in the Second Half of the 19th Century Description An account of the resource Frank Henschel Slovakia, Vol. 44 (No. 82-83), 2019 pp. 7-17 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Henschel, Frank Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2019 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5820cfa6b5d526b8e40d1774450f18f1.pdf 95fb31338013ee80a4c4852b0b160e6d PDF Text Text 28 SLOVAKJA 'Slovak som a Slovak budem ... 'l Explaining Nationalism in Post-Communist Slovakia Paal Sigurd Hilde The question of the position of Slovakia within the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), the official name as of April 1990, was among the most divisive issues in Slovak and Czech politics in the post-communist era. As is well known, the conflict over the future basis and structure of the federation eventually led to the division of the state on 1 January 1993. Despite the impression given by many press reports at the time, the break-up was not the result of Slovak secession. With the exception of the Slovak National Party (SNS), representing about 10 per cent of the votes in Slovakia, all Slovak political parties successful in the decisive June 1992 elections were in favor of some kind of common state with the Czechs. This included the winner, Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). There were, however, near irreconcilable policy differences between the left-populist HZDS and the right wing coalition victorious in the Czech Republic. Given the minority veto in the Federal assembly, whereby a minority of representatives from either Republic could block important legislation in the House of Nations, only a carefully crafted compromise could save the Federation from political deadlock. Rather than seeking a compromise, however, the Czech 1 The title is taken from Miroslav Kusfs 1981 samizdat essay. Reprinted in Miroslav Kusy: Eseje (Bratislava: Archa, 1991 ), pp. 88 -96 . �SLOVAKlA 29 right wing coalition led by Vaclav Klaus of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) pushed for the division of the state if a 'functional federation' was not possible. Unwilling and politically unable to accept Klaus 's vision of a strong federal government, Meciar reluctantly followed the Czech Prime Minister's lead towards a break-up. 2 The political phenomenon generally referred to as Slovak nationalisn was thus not the decisive force behind the break-up of the CSFR. 3 It was, however, Slovak nationalism that after the collapse of communism started the process that eventuallly led to the rejection of the common state by right-wing Czech parties. As all nationalisms, Slovak post-communist nationalism was a complex phenomenon. It came in moderate and more radical forms, focus sing on several political issues. In its most basic expression, it held that Slovakia and the Slovaks deserved a more equal and visible position within a state seen as unfairly dominated by the Czech part. 4 Basically all Slovak political parties, including the 2 On the process preceding the break-up see Eric Stein : Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fiss ure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). 3 Nationalism is fo r the purpose of th is study defined as a world view, which holds that the pop ulation of the world is divided into nations. A nation, claim nationalists, consists of a grou p of people identifiable and identifying according to cultural, religious, historical and/or territorial criteria. Nationalists see nations as constituting natural social units and seek to promote the po litical, cultural, economic or other kind of status, in symbolical or more material terms, of the nation they claim to represent. The nationalist discourse, common to a ll forms of nationalism, is used thro ughout the world, most often to oppose or defe nd existing political units. See Craig Calhoun: Nationalism (Buckin gham : Open University Press, 1997). •Foran examination of mainstream Slovak national ism see Paal Sigurd Hil de: 'Slovak Nationalism and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia', Europe-Asia Stu die s, vol. 51 (1999), no. 4, pp. 64 7-665. �30 SLOVAKIA most pro-federal, shared this demand. More radical expressions called not only for more radical solutions to the question of the Federation, but focussed also negatively on the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the perceived threat from Hungarian irredentism. In its exteme, which was promoted only by small, popular unrepresentative groups, Slovak · nationalism promoted radically anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian and sometimes also anti-Semitic views. This article will analyse another complexity of nationalism in post-communist Slovakia. 5 As with all nationalisms, the popular success of the Slovak form can be seen as a result of several, intricate causes. These include historical, political, social and econ omic determinants. The aim of this study is not to reach a final decision on what caused the apperance and success of post-communist nationalism. Rather, the article offers an overview of a range of possible explanations and the strengths and weaknesses of these. This might be a combination of all, some, just one or none . Ultimately, it was Slovak6 politicians and other political actors that gave nationalism the political significance it had after the collapse of communism. Without nationalists, there is no nationalism. Focusing merely on the role of actors, however, leaves many unanswered questions. The most important of these is why the demands and rhetoric of the nationalists gained such a favourable response from the population. Certain political factors in the postcommunist period can be seen to have facilitated the success of the nationalist agenda among Slovaks. One such factor was the 5 For the sake of simplifying the analysis the multi-issue complexity of Slovak nationalism will be not discussed in detail. • The word Slovak will in this article denote a person of Slovak culture and identity. Similarly, a Czechoslovak is a person of Czech or Slovak ethnicity with a Czechoslovak identity . �SLOVAK1A 31 institutional legacy of the socialist federation (more on this below). A second factor was the changing international environment after the Cold War, with the secession of the Baltic states, Slovenia and Croatia as examples of the new stress on national self-determination. Interaction with the two major 'others', the Hungarians and Czechs, was also important. The upsurge of post-communist nationalism in the Hungarian speaking minority in Slovakia and in Hungary, and the increasingly hostile attacks on Slovak nationalism, particularly in the Czech press, both served to spur Slovak nationalists into action. 7 Even more important in increasing support for nationalist de mands in post-communist Slovakia was the issue of economic reform. The generally harder impact of the Federal economic programme on the Slovak than on the Czech economy was by many taken as a sign of the disadvantaged position of Slovaks within the common state.8 The call for a greater Slovak control over economic policy thus became the one of the most important and substantial claims of Slovak nationalists . Yet, even given the activities of nationalists and the political factors conducive to the appeal of the nationalist discourse, to understand post-communist nationalism one must understand the historical developments that formed the basis for the appeal of the ethnic nationalism in Slovakia. Several historical precondition s can be identified . These are the topic of this study . 7 For examples of this see (H ungarian) Andrej Ferko: Stredna Europa - Eseje (Bratislava: VSSS, 1998) and (Czech) Dusan Sl obodnfk: Proti sedemhlavemu drakovi : Z dejin zapasu za Sia vensko (Bratislava: VSSS, 1998 ). ' In a January 1992 poll , for example. 53 % of respondents in Slovakia antici pated that the Czech economy wou ld grow at the expense of the Slovak. Cen trum pre social nu analyzu: Aktualne problemy Cesko-S/ovensk a, januar 1992 (Bratislava: CSA, 1992), p. 29. �32 SLOVAKIA Preconditions for the Success of Post-Communist Nationalism. To clarify the analysis of the historical preconditions of postcommunist nationalism, it is useful to divide the examination into two stages. The first stage focuses on the generally different impact nationalist ideas have had in the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. Whereas the civic, territorial version of nationalism became dominant in the West, ethnic, especially linguistically centred nationalism prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEE)9. In the twentieth century, this ethnic nationalism be came the underlying ideal for the political reorganisations of CEE in two world wars. The first half of the twentieth century thus served to establish ethnic nationalism as a dominant political ideology and ethnic ties as primary lines of political identification. An example of the causes of the success of ethnic nationalism thus forms what one might call the 'deep ' historic background for understanding post-communist nationalism. The second stage in the analysis focuses on the impact of the socialist era. For the majority of the population of post-commu nist Slovakia, the just over forty years of communist indoctrination through education, mass media and other means, had formed their primary so urce of fo rmal socialisation. Moreover, Soviet Communism brought one of the most dramatic periods of social and economic change in Slovak history. The analysis below outlines the different assessments scholars have made of the impact the social, economic and political devel opments of the las t halfcentury before 1989 had on the strength of nationalism in Slovakia. • Central and Eastern Europe will in this article denote roughly the area of the fonner Habsburg Empire as well as the European parts of the Romanov and Ottoman em pires. �SLOVAKIA 33 The Success of Ethnic Nationalism. In his celebrated 1882 lecture, Ernest Rennan started by making a distinction 'between the fusion of "races" in the nations of Western Europe, and the retention of ethnic distinctiveness in Eastern Europe .' 10 In 1944, Hans Kohn developed this theme when he introduced the concepts of 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalisms. 11 While challenged by several authors, this typology has survived the test of time and is used in various forms by scholars today. As most nationalisms contain both civic (Western) and ethnic (Eastern) elements, the distinction is, as Anthony D. Smith points out, analytical and not normative. 12 Czechoslovak nationalism in the interwar years, for example, was clearly ethnic m relations with Germans and Hungarians, but civic m its merger of Slovaks and Czechs into one nation. On the whole, scholars agree on the basic causes why civic nationalism was more successful in Western Europe and ethnic nationalism in the Eastern part of the continent. The main factors are generally identified as the socio-economic and, partly linked, cultural differences between the two regions at the time of the dissemination of nationalist ideas. 13 From about the fifteenth century, Western Europe saw the beginning of the development of the modem state. The new economy saw the abolition of serfdom , the weakening of the feudal-agricultural economy and the strengthening of trade and manufacture centred in cities. The develop0 Anthony D. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 9 ' '' Hans Kohn : The Idea of Nationalism (New York : Collier, 1967), pp. 329-331. 12 Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, p. 126 '-' For a good analysis of East-West historical differences see Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries: A Hi/story of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (Lo ndon, Routledge, I 998), pp. 15-25. �34 SLOVAKlA ment of centralised, strong states, yet with an increasingly urbanised and literate population capable of challenging the authority of the ruler, had important social, economic and political effects. Western, civic nationalism grew gradually out of the socio-economic developments and changes in political thought of pre-nineteenth century Europe. 14 This nationalism was state centred and focused on gaining the loyality of and homogenising the population of a territory. Crucially, nationalist ideas were promoted in societies whose elites, if not populations, were already quite homogenous culturally. This was particularly the case in Protestant, North-Western Europe. In important respects, Central and Eastern Europe was relatively 'backward' when nationalist ideas spread through the intellectual life of the region in the early nineteenth century. 15 The relative backwardness had both external and internal causes. The centuries of warfare with the Ottomans had weakened the states in the region and led to their inclusion into large empires. Hungary, which then included today's Slovakia, came under Habsburg rule after the battle of Mohacs in 1526. At the eve of the French Revolution, the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov empires dominated Central and Eastern Europe. Compared with rapidly developing Western states, the three Eastern empires remained despotic. As the feudal-agricultural economic structure retained its dominance, no strong middle class developed . In Slovakia, or Felvidek (Upper Hungary) as the Hungarian rulers called it, the development of mining in Eastern Slovakia, for instance, led to the growth of some smaller towns. Generally, these were dominated by ethnic 14 See Liah Greenfeld: Nationalism : Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1992 ) ,s The concept of Central and East European 'backwardness' is obviously very general and simplifying, also given the large differences within the region . �SLOVAKJA 35 Germans or Jews. The majority of the population of Slovakia remained rural and often illiterate. The socio-econonic conditions for cultural homogenisation were, therefore, not present. The ethnically very heterogeneous dynasties of Central and Eastern Europe were initially not interested in trying to turn their empires into nation-states on the Western model. 16 Only in the final decades of the nineteenth century did Tsarist Russia attempt to Russify the Western Borderlands and the Hungarian leadership promote its policy of Magyarisation (Hungarianisation). 17 Given its lack of an ethnic nobility and being an integral part of Hungary proper, the Slav population of Felvidek was particularly exposed. Yet even here the Hungarian nation-bulding project did not succeed. History was soon to take a surprising turn. Ultimately more successful than the civic nation builders in CEE were elites opposed to central rule and integration. State centred, civic nationalism had no advantages for such elites. When they adopted nationalist discourse as a political tool , they were inspired by German romanticism rather than Western liberalism . Nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe looked not to Locke and Stuart Mill, but to Herder and Fichte. In German romantic thought, it was not political boundaries that determined the extent of a nation , but culture and particularly language. In the ethnically diverse empires of CEE such ideas were to have a dramatic impact. It was no coincidence that two leading Slovak (Pan-Slav) nationalists, Jan Kollar and Pavo) Jozef Safarik, both studied at "' Charles Ingrao: ' Forum: Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: An Historical Perspective', Nationalities Papers, vol. 27 ( 1999), no. 2, p. 293 . 17 See Edward C. Thaden (ed.): Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Fin land, J855 - 19 14 (Princenton: Princenton University Press, 198 I ) and Tibor Frank: 'Hungary and the Dual Monarchy, 1867- 1890' , in Peter F. Sugar, Peter Hanak and Tibor Frank (eds.): A History of Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). �36 SLOVAKJA the University of Jena in the early nineteenth century. 18 The 'father of Slovak nationalism', Cudovit Stur, like Kollar and Safarik, a Protestant, also studied in Germany, in Halle. 19 By the outbreak of World War One, ethnic nationalism had emerged as one of the leading political ideologies in Central and Eastern Europe. In Austria-Hungary, leaders claiming to represent various ethnically defined nations, such as Slovak nationalists in the Slovak National Party, promoted their rights within the Empire. World War I was to bring victory to such nationalist programmes. Towards the end of the war, when the Entente Powers started supporting the programmes of Central and Eastern Europe (mainly exile) nationalists , their support was limited to the de mand for an administrative reorganisation of Austria-Hungary . By 1918, however, the right to self-determination had come to mean the right for independence. Allied victory in World War I thus resulted in a reorganisation of the Central European region according to the principle of the 'self-determination of nations', that is, the self-determination of ethnically defined nations. This right was by no means allowed for all , particularly not for the 'defeated nations'. All the new and old, expanded states of the region contained sizeable ethnic minority groups . While political life in Austria-Hungary had increasingly taken the form of a struggle between the central authorities and nationalist leaders, inter-war Central and Eastern Europe took this to a new level. In the new Czechoslovak Republic as well, ethnic belonging became the main dividing line in politics. Ethnic Ger- "Victor S. Mamatey : 'The Establishment of the Republic' . in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luz.a (eds.): A History of the Czechoslovak Republic: l 9 l 81948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 6. 19 Peter Petro: A History of Slovak Literature (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), p. 65 . �SLOVAKIA 37 mans and Hungarians (Magyars) voted overwhelmingly for ethnically based parties . The Slovaks, according to official ideology part of the Czechoslovak nation, were divided. As in the late Habsburg period, one part of the Slovak political elite was Czechoslovak nationalist, another, strongly connected to the Catholic clergy, was more sceptical to the Czechoslovak idea. Loyal to the Czechoslovak state until pushed into declaring independence inl939, the Slovak nationalist movement promoted Slovak, as opposed to Czechoslovak, national awareness and nationalism throughout the inter-war period . While it is impossible to get an accurate picture of the popular support for Slovak nationalism after World War II, it seems safe to agree with Carol Skalnik Leff's claim that when taking power in 1948, the communists faced a 'full-blown' Slovak nationalism. 20 If the creation of a Slovak education system, the flowering of Slovak culture and promotion of Slovak nationalism in politics was not sufficient to cement the importance of ethnic belonging and nationalism in people's thinking in the inter-war years, the Second War War was .2 1 With the rise towards authoritarian rule by the Slovak People ' s Party from the autumn of 1938, ethnic nationalism became a central part of official ideology. In the region as a whole, ethnicity became a supreme organizing principle increasing or limiting chances for employment, economic prosperity and even survival. Supported by the Catholic clergy, the Slovak state sought to educate the Slovaks into becoming good nationalists. Nationalism was promoted in schools, the mass media and 10 Carol Skalnik Leff: National Conflict in Czech oslovakia (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press. 1987), p. 281. 11 On national identity in the inter-war period see Owen V. Johnson: Slovakia 191 8- 1938: Education and the Making of a Nati on (Boulder: Co lumbia Uni versity Press, 1985). �38 SLOVAKIA official and religious life in general. 22 For many groups among ethnic Slovaks, the war-time state was a positive experience. The relative economic prosperity, the ease of employment (especially for the young intelligentsia) and the elevated position of the Catholic faith and church were aspects of the state that for some Slovaks compared favourably with pre-war Czechoslovakia. Obviously, for parts of the population, the experience had been clearly negative. For Jews and Romanies it was one of inhuman crimes. Yet, despite the horrors and injustices, the experience of independence under German influence strengthened the position of nationalism in Slovak society. While the leaders of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising had called for the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia, they did not want to return to the centralist system of the First Republic (1918-1938). The extent to which Slovakia had been changed by the war became evident in the 1946 election. Whereas the Slovak political scene had been split on the issue of Slovakia's position within the common state before the war, all parties standing in 1946 supported Slovak self-rule within Czechoslovakia in their programmes. 23 The Impact of the Socialist Period. In the intersection between empirical studies that directly or indirectly offer an explanation for the success of nationalism in post-communist Slovakia and general theoretical works on nationalism, it is possible to identify three main approaches to the question of the impact of the communist era. The first focuses 22 See e.g. Yeshayahu Jelinek : The Parish Republic: H/inka 's Slovak People's Party 1939- 1945 (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1976). lJ Jan Ryc hlik : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20.stoleti: Cesko-slovenske vztahy 19451992 (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 1998), pp.40-42. �SLOVAKIA 39 mainly on the way in which nationalism survived despite the forty years of communism. Given the strength of Slovak nationalism before Communism and the resilience of ethnic and cultural ties, nationalism would, according to this approach, have survived whatever policy the Communist Party had chosen. Scholars taking this approach would put the greatest emphasis on the 'deep' historic background outlined above. The second approach, where scholars stress the continuation of nationalism through the socialist period, could be considered the mainstream historical view . This approach focuses on the way Slovak national identity and support for nationalism survived the socialist era not only because of their pre-1948 strength, but also due to certain policies during Communism that served to strenghten their basis of support. According to the final approach, the success of post-communist nationalism was mainly due to the policies adopted by the Communist Party. Putting much less emphasis on the strength of precommunist national identity and nationalism (and thus the •deep' historical explanation), the 'due to' approach takes two main forms . One focuses on the effects of the socio-economic development of Slovakia during Communism, the other on the impact of the construction of nationally based institutional structures. These three analytical categories form a continuum rather than three clearly identifiable positions. Differences between studies falling into the different categories are generally one of focus or degree. Few scholars argue the extreme positions: that postcommunist nationalism was purely a revival of suppressed nationalism, or that it was a result of developments in the communist period only. Most would note the continued expressions of Slovak nationalism during the communist era, and then stress the degree to which the socialist period suppressed , maintained or actually strengthened the appeal of nationalism. �40 SLOVAKIA Nationalism Despite Communism. Particulary in the first years after the collapse of Communism, the 'retum-of-history'argument was commonly used to explain the success of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Precommunist nationalism, merely suppressed by the communist regimes, re-emerged to become the political factor it had been forty years earlier. As one historian put it: Communism may have temporarily relieved Central Europe's ethnic tensions for nearly half a century. But if religion was the opiate of the people, Communism proved no more effective than methadone (sic) in suspending their craving for ethnically whole nation states, without providing a cure. 24 In the literature on nationalism in Slovakia, Jacques Rupnik supported this view when he argued that Slovak nationalism had been in the 'communist refrigerator' for most of the period after 1948. 25 Of the monographs in English discussing Slovak nationalism, Stanislav Kirschaum's A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival is, arguably, one of those that leans most toward the 'despite ' approach. 26 While describing in detail the persistence of nationalism during Communism and the radical changes Slovak society went through, Kirschbaum notes no positive effect of the communist regime on the strength of Slovak national identity and nationalism. Rather, he highlights the attempts the communist lea- 1 ' Ingrano: 'Forum ... ' , p. 307 . 15 Jaques Rupnik, quoted in Martin Butora and Zora Butorova: 'Slovakia after the Split ' ,Joumal o[Democracy,vol. 4(1993), no. 2,p. 75 . 16 Stanislav Kirschbaum : A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (London : Macmillian, 1995). �SLOVAKIA 41 dership made at suppressing national identity.27 If Slovak nationalism gained strength during the communist period , it was more a reaction to the 'Czechoslovakism' favoured by the regime .2 8 The primordialist theories of nationalism would be the most obvious theoretical basis for the works in this approach. Stressing the ' ineffable, and at times overpowering' strength of the ' cultural givens' in a society, Clifford Geertz, for example, points to how ethnic ties in some societies come to be seen as a 'natural some would say spiritual affinity' .29 Given the strong emphasis put on cultural belonging in Slovak history, at least since the late nineteeth century, one could argue that ethnicity had gained a primordial character in Slovak society by the end of World War II. Consequently, the communist regime would not have been able to suppress Slovak identity, and therefore neither the potential for Slovak nationalism. While not going as far as the primordialist in stressing the naturalness of central ties, the so-called ethno-sym- bolist theories of nationalism could also be interpreted as lending support to the 'despite' approach. According to Anthony D. Smith, post-communist nationalism confirms the resilience and strength of ehnic myths, symbols and popular memory. He writes:' Though the timing of the current ethnic revival is a function of social and geopolitical changes, their contents and intensities are largely determined resources,' by pre-existing ethno-sy mbolic 30 27 Note e.g. ibid., pp. 228, 245, 252. Kirschbaum ta.lees a very favo urable view of Slovak nationalism and a more negative one of the common Czech and Slovak state . " Ibid., p. 24 7. 19 Clifford Geertz: The Interpretation of Cultures (London : Fontana, 1973). pp . 259-260 . 0 ' Anthony D. Smith : 'LSE Centennial Lecture: The Resurgence of Nationalism ? Myth and memory in the renewal of nations ', British Journal of Sociology, vo l. �42 SLOVAKIA Empirical support for the 'despite' argument can be found in post-communist Slovakia. In a study of regional patterns of political culture, a group of Slovak sociologists found strong similarities between the inter-war and post-communist era. 31 In both periods, nationalist and populist parties gained most support in northwest and central Slovakia. The persistence of this regional pattern seems to suggest that at least elements of pre-communist political culture had been preserved. Moreover, studies from other post-communist countries show that national minorities that were actively discouraged from maintaining their separate identity and culture, still emerged to voice nationalist demands after Communism. In Poland, this was the case with the German minority .32 While counter-factual history necessarily amounts to speculation, it does seem likely that regardless of what the policy the Communists had adopted, also the separate Slovak identity, in both its cultural and political expression, would have survived. The relatively short period of communist rule would clearly have facilitated this. As can be seen from the above, focusing on links to pre-communist nationalism and the preservation of popular myths and memory has some advantages. Firstly, it points to the strength of ethnic nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The conviction that ethnically defined nations formed natural bases for political legitimacy, be it in a separate state or as 47 (1996), no. 4, p. 573. Elsewhere, Smith does stress the role of communi st policies in preserving these myths and memories. See e.g. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, 237, endnote 9. 31 Vladimir Krivy , Viera Fialova and Daniel Balko: Slovensko a jeho regi6ny: sociokultume suvislosti volebneho spravania (Bratislava: Nadacia Media, 1996). 12 Janusz Mucha: 'Democratisation and Cultural Minorities: The Polish Case of the 1980s/90s', East European Quarterly, vol. 25 (1992), no. 4. �SLOVAKIA 43 an autonomous region within a larger entity, had by 1948 been deeply ingrained in CEE. This was not only the case with most of the Slovak political elite, but also, many historians would agree, large parts of the population. Secondly, stressing the preservation of political culture is perhaps the only way to explain the continued regional pattern of support for nationalism. In its pure form, the 'despite' argument rejects any important effect of the socialist period on national identity and the popular view of nationalism. If one accepts that national identity is a social construct, that nations are not some kind of natural social unit, this jump across forty years of history is difficult to defend. As shall be discussed in more detail below, 1948-1989 was probably the most dramatic period of social and economic change in Slovak history. It was also a period of an intense policy of officially managed, public socialisation. Given the impact this period had on people' s lives, it seems difficult to assume that popular views on national identity and nationalism would not also change. One example that it had is that before 1948 Slovakia was a deeply religious society and mainstream nationalism was strongly connected to the Catholic Church. In the post-communist period, however, the leading nationalists parties HZDS and SNS were both secular. Catholic nationalism, as represented by the Christian Democratic Party (KDH), was much less successful. Explanations focusing more on the way the communist period served to change Slovak national identity and thereby the bases for nationalism during that period, thus seemingly provide a more convincing explanation for the widespread appeal of nationalism in the postcommunist era. Finallly, the 'despite' argument cannot explain the emergence of 'new' nationalisms in the post-communist period . Some groups without a history of common national identity and nationalism formed nationalist parties after 1989. Most im- �44 SLOVAKIA portantly, this included the Roma community. Also the emergence of a relatively strong nationalism in Moravia and Silesia was a sign of the increased importance of cultural identity. 33 Traditionally a regional identity and before Communism never a major political issue, the Moravian-Silesian autonomy party became the largest party in the Czech National Council in 1990. Nationalism Through the Communist Era. The 'through' approach makes up the middle ground between stressing the resilience of pre-communist nationalism and the strengthening of national identity during the communist period. Studies falling into this category would seek to explain the perpetuation of national conflict due to the persistence of support for nationalism built up before the communist period and to certain factors that served to strengthen Slovak national identity during the 1948-1989 era. Most historical studies tend to be in this category. Carol Skalnik Leff' s 1987 seminal book on national conflict in Czechoslovakia is probably the best study in English in this category. 34 In Leff's analysis, the deep social, economic and cultural differences between the Czech Lands and Slovakia were politicised during the inter-was republic. A triangular pattern of support and opposition was created, whereby the central leadership in Prague relied on the pro-Czechoslovak section of the Slovak political elite to help neutralise the demands of Slovak nationalists. In the communist period , this pattern persisted until it was displaced JJ Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin: Czechoslovakia 1918- 1992: A Laboratory for Social Change (Oxford: Macmill an and St. Anthony ' s, 1996), p. 51 . 14 Leff: National Conflict. Ryc hlik: Cesi a Slovaci .. . 1945-1992 is a later, eve n more detailed work of this approcah. �SLOVAKIA 45 with the ascent of Gustav Husak to power in 1969. Both the interwar and the socialist regimes failed in their attempts to modernize away the problem of Slovak nationalism (culturally and educationaly in the inter-war period, economically during socialism). These failures, combined with the unwillingness of both regimes to adequately accommodate the Slovak nationalist's demands, led to a growing sense of antagonism (mutual antagonism, as Czechs resented that Slovaks used times of international crisis to force through their demands). Leff concludes: 'Given the persistence of Slovak national feeling, on the one hand, and Czech power, on the other, the result has been persistent national conflict'. 35 While Leff notes that Slovak nationalism was strong in the post-war period, much due to the experience of statehood during the war, she also identifies several factors during the communist era that served to strengthen its basis. The existence of separate Slovak political institutions, for instance, was important. Leff writes: 'Week as the KSS (Slovak Communist Party) and the SNR (Slovak National Council) were in the years following 1948, both would retain the capacity to serve as nationalist time bombs. ' 36 One important reason for this was that the system of separate Slovak institutions created a Slovak elite separate from Prague-based Czechoslovak one. 37 Also other aspects of the regime 's policy proved counter-productive to its official aim of promoting the 'coming together' (zblfienie) of Czechs and Slovaks. The mass media, for instance, was 'segmented and not adapted to the integrative intentions of the policy-making elite. 38 Thus , by the late 1980, 'the Slovak question ' had become 'deeply, perhaps 35 Leff: National Conflict, p. 282. Ibid ., p. 112 . 37 Ibid ., p.294 . " Ibid., p. 297 . 36 �46 SLOVAKlA irreversibly, woven into the fabric of Czechoslovak politics as usual'. This statement carries with it the implication that the Slovak question wi1l continue to assert itself as a political force in the future .39 Three years after Leff published her study, her prediction came true . Theoretically, the 'through' approach occupies the middle ground between the primoridalists emphasis on the strength of cultural ties and the stress put on social processes by the modernist and institutional views outlined below. With more emphasis on the way myths, symbols, values and memories are preserved in societies, ethno-symbolist theories would come closest to forming a theoretical basis for this approach. From the ethno-symbolist perspective, the communists ' attempt to defuse nationalism in Slovakia by flagging symbols of self-determination could only serve to strengthen the feeling of national identity. The reason for this was that the only symbols that would evoke a positive response from the population would be symbols that had a basis in popular tradition . For example, while the communists did try to reframe the historical image of r.udovft Stur as a social revolutionary, they could not eradicate the view of Stur as a champion of Slovak rights so strongly ingrained in popular tradition and myths . As Smith writes : "Ethno-history is no sweetshop in which nationalists may ' pick and mix'; it sets limits to any appropriation by providing a distinctive context and patterns of events, personages and ,, 4 0 processes ... . The most obvious strength of the 'through' approach is that by stressing both the strong social basis of pre-communist nationalism and the way it was maintained and changed during the 1948-1989 period , it can account more or less convincingly for 39 ' 0 Ibid. , pp. 281 -282 . Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, p. 45 �SLOVAKIA 47 nationalism in both periods. It points to the continuity of not only political conflict over the status of Slovakia, but also that of popular symbols and myths. Noting how the communist period maintained and strengthened preexisting national identity and traditions also allows for an explanation of the persistent regional differences in support for nationalism. Despite these important strengths, however, the 'through' approach does have some weak points. Some will argue that the most important of these is that it does not go far enough in emphasising how dramatically the communist period changed Slovak society. As with the 'despite' approach, the focus on the continuation of national conflict through the communist period also faces problems in explaining the 'new' nationalisms of the post-communist era. The political organisation and activism of the Romany community after 1989, for example, is difficult to explain without stressing the way the communist period served to strengthen the importance of ethnic belonging. Nationalism Due to Communism. Studies focusing on the way the communist period . served to strengthen national identity and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe are generally more theoretically grounded than the two approaches above. The presentation of these will therefore have to be a bit different. Two main theoretical starting points can be identified. 41 The first, based on modernisation theories of 41 Shari Cohen supposes a third, unconventional, approach in her Politics without a Past: The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism (Lon- don: Duke University Press, 1999). It was not the strength of national identity in Slovakia that formed the basis for the success of post-communist nationalism, Cohen claims, but rather the lack of a clear historical consciousness. By �48 SLOVAKJA nationalism, focus on the massive socio-economic changes in the CEE countries during the fourty years of communist rule. As many other countries and areas of the region, Slovakia underwent a rapid transformation from an agricultural to an industrial society. Such a process of social modernization, scholars such as Ernest Gellner claim, is the basis for the strength of post-communist nationalism. The second starting point is based on the so called 'new institutionalism' in social science. According to its proponents, the communist regimes honoured their Leninist commitment to national self-determination by building nationally defined institutions and stressing national identities. Rather than, as intended, weakening the social basis for nationalism, however, their policy served to strengthen it. Put otherwise: the Soviet type nationality policy was to be 'nationalist in form, socialist in content ' . When the socialist content disappeared, only the nationalist form remained . Modernisation. It is the erosion of traditional society and its values with urbanisation and the growth of the state that, in Gellner's view, is responsible for the emergence of nationalism.42 In an agricultural society, where mobility is low and socialisation within the family and local community is sufficient, a person's language and culture is of little consequence. Urban life, particularly in the industrial age, exercises different pressures on the population. Industrial society, requiring formal socialisation through an education preventing the emergence of a collective memory of World War II, the communist regime made Slovak society susceptible to elite manipulation after the collapse of communism. 42 Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). �SLOVAKIA 49 system, thus makes an individual's culture and especially language important. Particularly when cultural differences overlapped with an actual or perceived pattern of social and economic discrimination, nationalism is a likely outcome. In socialist societies, as they suppressed civil society, class identities and other social lines of identification , the importance of cultural identities became particularly strong. When the regimes collapsed, there existed no 'serious rival ideology ' or any 'serious rival institutions' capable of providing alternatives to identification along national lines. 43 In the resulting 'double vacuum', nationalism, the 'culture of industrialism ', was 'the most plausible and easily available candidate for filling this emptiness. ' 44 After the Communists came to power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Slovakia entered its most important period of socio-economic development. Over a period of seventeen years, the share of agricultural workers in the total workforce more than halved: from 62.2% in 1948 to30.1% in 1965. 4 5 By 1989 it has reached 14.5%. Similarly, the percentage of the population living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants increased from 11.5% in 1950 to 40.8% in 1991 .46 In the space of a few decades, Slovakia was transformed from an agricultural to an industrial society. That the industrial structure of Slovakia was accordingly based on the socialist idealisation of heavy industry, matters little in this context. Territorial and social mobility increased, as did the general level of education. The steadily increasing availability and reach 43 Ernest Gellner: ' Nationalism in the Vacuum', in Alexander J. Motyl (ed .): Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 250. 44 Ernest Gellner: 'Homeland of the Unrevolution' , Daedalus, vol. 122 (1993) , no. 3, p. 152. 45 See Krejci and Machonin : Czechoslovakia, p. 120. 46 Ibid., p. 126. �50 SLOVAKIA of mass communication, such as radio and television, also served to promote a standardised ('high') culture. Combined, these factors served to increase cultural homogeneity in the Slovak population and put focus on the differences between the Slovaks and other cultural groups in society. An individual's cultural-cumnational identity was therefore highlighted . The main strength of the modernist approach is that it brings our attention to the massive social and economic changes in the region during Communism. Slovak society was fundamentally changed through industrialisation and urbanisation . Most theories of nationalism hold that modernisation (towards a Western type society) is at least conducive to the formation of national consciousness and emergence of nationalism. If one accepts this , the socialist period is likely to have strengthened the appeal of nationalism in Slovakia. Furthemore, the modernisation approach offers an explanation for why new ethnic conflicts arose once Communism released its grip. Even the communities without the history of nationalism can be seen to have been mobilised as a result of industrialisation. There are, however, several weaknesses with this modernist view. First, in its pure form it is very functional and does not accredit much importance to ideas. This is problematic particularly because the massive transformation and uprooting of Slovak society took place under heavy pressure from socialist socialisation. Second, if urbanisation and industrialisation were the main causes of post-communist nationalism, then one should expect to find the strongest nationalism where the effects of these processes was strongest. Before 1948 eastern Slovakia was the most 'backward' and multi-cultural region of Slovakia. Consequently, it was one of the regions that went through the most dramatic socio-economic development during Communism. Despite this , after 1989, sup- �SLOVAKIA 51 port for nationalist parties in the region was well below the Slovak average. 47 Indeed, inhabitants of Kosice, the 'capital' of eastern Slovakia and the second largest city in the country, were among those most vocally opposed to the break-up of the CSFR in the autumn of 1992.48 The Institutional Approach. The institutional approach places the cause of the strength of post-communist nationalism in the policies and structure, the institutions, of the communist regimes. The stress Leninism put on the right of national self-determination led most Soviet-style socialist regimes to not only promote national self-identification, but also build institutional frameworks along national lines. This served to institutionalise national identity as the key identity and thus create the nationalist bias of politics after the collapse of Communism. In its most basic form , the institutional approach stresses the way in which members of political institutions tend to promote the interests of their institutions in competition with others . Throughout the socialist period, Slovakia had cultural, academic , administrative and political institutions separate from the all-Czechoslovak ones. Due to the policy of stressing the Slovakness of these institutions, recruitment was conducted almost exclusively in Slovakia, and sometimes among Slovaks only. The separate poli tical institutions consisted most importantly of a branch of the Communist Party (KSS), a parliamentary assembly (SNR), and 47 See Krivy, Fialova and Balko: Slovensko ajeho regi6ny, pp.29 1-342 . •• For a more humorous expression of this see Peter Holub: 'At' uz to nestes tf piijde: Kosice se branf mirodnfmu sjednocenf', Respect, 24-30, August 1992, pp. 5-6. �52 SLOVAKIA ( except for the period 1960-69) an executive branch. While limited in their political importance during Communism, these institutions gained a dramatically different role with democratisation . Not long after the collapse of Communism, the Slovak government and legislature started calling for an increase in their competencies. Using nationalist rhetoric to mobilise the population was an obvious way to gain support for strengthening the authority and power of the Slovak institutions at the expense of federal ones. On a more complex level, the institutional approach examines the wider impact institutional structures had on creating certain attitudes and beliefs in the population. One leading institutional theoretician , Rogers Brubaker, explained the strength of postcommunist nationalism in the Soviet Union as a result of the ' dual institutionalisation ' of what he termed ' territorial nationhood ' and 'ethnic nationality ' .49 Territorial nationhood refers to the linkin g of a specific territory to national identity through the admi nistrative division of the country according to nationality. As with most administrative components in the Soviet Union, Slovakia was a clearly defined territorial unit interpreted as the homeland of the Slovaks. While this was made explicit after the federalisation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, it was implicit already from the end of World War IL The principle of equality (rovny s rovnym) introduced during the war and maintained in the 1948 Constitution •• Rogers Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 23-54. The nationality and, particularly after 1969, the institutional stru cture of socialist Czechoslovakia was almost identical to that of the Soviet Unio n. �SLOVAKIA 53 was clearly interpreted as a principle of equality of nations. 50 Hungarians, Ruthenes, Romanies and other national groups in Slovakia were national minorities; the Slovaks were the statotvorny (literally: state forming) nation. Along with officially pronouncing Czechoslovakia a country of two nations, the regime built institutions to create the appearance of national self-determination. While Czechoslovakia did not go as far as the Soviet Union in awarding the constituent republics symbols of statehood, the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics were in the 1968 Law on Federalisation declared to have the status of independent legal subjects that surrendered part of their sovereignty to the Federation. The Republics were also awarded the 'inalienable right of self-determination even to the point of separation'. 51 The Law on Federalization thus 'rehabilitated and restored the idea of a national state as an attribute of a fully developed nation'. 52 The effect of this policy was to encourage Slovaks to think of themselves as a separate nation with wide-ranging political rights. The second aspect of Brubaker's institutional approach focuses on the way the communist regime made ethnic identification compulsory. In common English usage, the concepts of 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are synonymous. In the socialist federations, however, the distinction was important. All who held Czechoslovak passports were Czechoslovak citizens. Their nationality, however, would be Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthene, Romany, Polish, Ukrainian or some other. A person's nationality 5 ° Katarina Zavacka: "Metamorf6zy statopravneho postavenia Slovenska v Ceskoslovensku v rokoch 1948-1967" in Vladimir Gonec (ed. ): Cesko-s/oven ska historicka rocenka I 998 (Brno: Masarykova Universita, 1998), pp. 17-29. 51 See ' Ustavnf zakon 143/ 1968 Sb.' at http://www.psp. czldocs/textslconstitution. 1968.html. 52 Kusy: Eseje,p. 69 . �54 SLOVAKIA was ascertained at birth according to that of her of his parents and could generally not be changed. As in inter-war Czechoslovakia, the communist regime did promote a Czechoslovak political identity. Avoiding the word narod, nation, which has clear ethnic connotations, the communists called for the creation of a 'Czec hoslovak working people ' (ceskoslovensky pracujlici J'ud). The identity was not, even in relation to the Czechs and Slovaks, intended as a Czechoslovak cultural identity. On the contrary, the Communist Party put great stress on promoting the cultures of the various national groups, particularly the Slovak. Generous reso urces were devoted to building cultural institutions and supporting the cultural life of all official nationalities. 53 For most children primary and sometimes secondary and higher education was available in their mother tongue. While all culture was to be socialist, the art forms favored by the regime, those that were seen to form the basis of national culture (s uch as folk dancing and traditional artisan-and craftsmanship), were not particularly affected . The Centre for the Production of Folk Art (UI:UV) and the folk-dancing and folk-mu sic group the Slovak People' s Artistic Collective (SI:UK) were presented as the best of centuries-old , traditional Slovak culture, thus reminding all of not only the cultural , but also historical separateness of the Slovaks. Combined, these two processes of institutionalisation made nations and nationality into basic units of people' s world-view. When the communist regime collapsed and democratisation started, nationally based institutions and their elites became centres of 51 See Elena Londakova: ' Slovcnske predjarie: Myty a realita slovenskej inte li gcncic v Ceskoslovensku pred rokom 1956 (a po iiom)', in Vladimir Gonec (ed .): Cesko-s/ovensk;i historick;i rocenka I 998 (Brno: Masarykova Universita, 1998), p. 2 10 and Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska (Prague: NLN, 1998), pp. 275-276 . �SLOVAKIA 55 political activity. 54 National identity became the basic organising. principle in politics. The nationally defined elites in the separate national institutions could gain popular support among a population identified and identifying according to their nationality by claiming to defend the interest of that nation. The system of compulsory national identification thus became the basis for new political constituencies. The main strength of the institutional approach is that it offers a very powerfull explanation of the near universal succes of national identity and nationalism as political principles after Communism. It does so by placing the cause of this succes in the very world-view engendered by the communist regime. As Brubaker writes: the communist nationality policy 'created a political field supremely conductive to nationalism' .55 The 'new' nationalism of the post-communist period can therefore be explained. Due to its explanatory strength, the institutional approach has emerged as one of the most popular among scholars trying to explain postcommunist nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the institutional approach, like the other presented above, has its shortcomings. Like the modernist approach it cannot alone explain the regionalised support for nationalism in Slovakia, nor does it account for the impact of pre-communist nationalism. 54 This was also the case for minorities that did not have explicitly political institutions. For example, the Slovak Hungarian cultural organization CSEMADOK became the centre of Hungarian political activity in the first period after 1989. ss Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed, p. I 7 �56 SLOVAKIA Conclusion While the process thc1· 1ed to the break-up of the common Czech and Slovak stat:· after communissm has received a fair amount of attention, few scholars have attempted to comprehensively explain why nationalism had such succes in postcommunist Slovakia.56 The above is only an overview of the possible explanations for the success of post-communist nationalism that would meet with the most support among scholars today. In fact, it is doubtful there will ever be single generally accepted explanation, be it theoretical or historical. As Katherine Verdery noted, nationalism in the post-communist region 'has many causes, ranging from the macro-social to matters of personal identity. It is, in other words, overdetermined, and the relevant causes vary from one county to another. 5 7 What is needed to approach a consensus on what factors were most important in the Slovak case, is a series of studies that evaluate the explanatory power of various approaches, such as those above. If this article serves to encourage someone to write such a study, it has served its purpose. ,. To this author's knowledge, the only monograph that explicitly does so is Cohen: Politics without a Past. 57 Katherine Verdery: 'Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania' , Slavic Review, vol. 52 (1993), no. 2, p. 180. � 28 SLOVAKJA 'Slovak som a Slovak budem ... 'l Explaining Nationalism in Post-Communist Slovakia Paal Sigurd Hilde The question of the position of Slovakia within the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), the official name as of April 1990, was among the most divisive issues in Slovak and Czech politics in the post-communist era. As is well known, the conflict over the future basis and structure of the federation eventually led to the division of the state on 1 January 1993. Despite the impression given by many press reports at the time, the break-up was not the result of Slovak secession. With the exception of the Slovak National Party (SNS), representing about 10 per cent of the votes in Slovakia, all Slovak political parties successful in the decisive June 1992 elections were in favor of some kind of common state with the Czechs. This included the winner, Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). There were, however, near irreconcilable policy differences between the left-populist HZDS and the right wing coalition victorious in the Czech Republic. Given the minority veto in the Federal assembly, whereby a minority of representatives from either Republic could block important legislation in the House of Nations, only a carefully crafted compromise could save the Federation from political deadlock. Rather than seeking a compromise, however, the Czech 1 The title is taken from Miroslav Kusfs 1981 samizdat essay. Reprinted in Miroslav Kusy: Eseje (Bratislava: Archa, 1991 ), pp. 88 -96 . �SLOVAKlA 29 right wing coalition led by Vaclav Klaus of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) pushed for the division of the state if a 'functional federation' was not possible. Unwilling and politically unable to accept Klaus 's vision of a strong federal government, Meciar reluctantly followed the Czech Prime Minister's lead towards a break-up. 2 The political phenomenon generally referred to as Slovak nationalisn was thus not the decisive force behind the break-up of the CSFR. 3 It was, however, Slovak nationalism that after the collapse of communism started the process that eventuallly led to the rejection of the common state by right-wing Czech parties. As all nationalisms, Slovak post-communist nationalism was a complex phenomenon. It came in moderate and more radical forms, focus sing on several political issues. In its most basic expression, it held that Slovakia and the Slovaks deserved a more equal and visible position within a state seen as unfairly dominated by the Czech part. 4 Basically all Slovak political parties, including the 2 On the process preceding the break-up see Eric Stein : Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fiss ure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). 3 Nationalism is fo r the purpose of th is study defined as a world view, which holds that the pop ulation of the world is divided into nations. A nation, claim nationalists, consists of a grou p of people identifiable and identifying according to cultural, religious, historical and/or territorial criteria. Nationalists see nations as constituting natural social units and seek to promote the po litical, cultural, economic or other kind of status, in symbolical or more material terms, of the nation they claim to represent. The nationalist discourse, common to a ll forms of nationalism, is used thro ughout the world, most often to oppose or defe nd existing political units. See Craig Calhoun: Nationalism (Buckin gham : Open University Press, 1997). •Foran examination of mainstream Slovak national ism see Paal Sigurd Hil de: 'Slovak Nationalism and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia', Europe-Asia Stu die s, vol. 51 (1999), no. 4, pp. 64 7-665. �30 SLOVAKIA most pro-federal, shared this demand. More radical expressions called not only for more radical solutions to the question of the Federation, but focussed also negatively on the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the perceived threat from Hungarian irredentism. In its exteme, which was promoted only by small, popular unrepresentative groups, Slovak · nationalism promoted radically anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian and sometimes also anti-Semitic views. This article will analyse another complexity of nationalism in post-communist Slovakia. 5 As with all nationalisms, the popular success of the Slovak form can be seen as a result of several, intricate causes. These include historical, political, social and econ omic determinants. The aim of this study is not to reach a final decision on what caused the apperance and success of post-communist nationalism. Rather, the article offers an overview of a range of possible explanations and the strengths and weaknesses of these. This might be a combination of all, some, just one or none . Ultimately, it was Slovak6 politicians and other political actors that gave nationalism the political significance it had after the collapse of communism. Without nationalists, there is no nationalism. Focusing merely on the role of actors, however, leaves many unanswered questions. The most important of these is why the demands and rhetoric of the nationalists gained such a favourable response from the population. Certain political factors in the postcommunist period can be seen to have facilitated the success of the nationalist agenda among Slovaks. One such factor was the 5 For the sake of simplifying the analysis the multi-issue complexity of Slovak nationalism will be not discussed in detail. • The word Slovak will in this article denote a person of Slovak culture and identity. Similarly, a Czechoslovak is a person of Czech or Slovak ethnicity with a Czechoslovak identity . �SLOVAK1A 31 institutional legacy of the socialist federation (more on this below). A second factor was the changing international environment after the Cold War, with the secession of the Baltic states, Slovenia and Croatia as examples of the new stress on national self-determination. Interaction with the two major 'others', the Hungarians and Czechs, was also important. The upsurge of post-communist nationalism in the Hungarian speaking minority in Slovakia and in Hungary, and the increasingly hostile attacks on Slovak nationalism, particularly in the Czech press, both served to spur Slovak nationalists into action. 7 Even more important in increasing support for nationalist de mands in post-communist Slovakia was the issue of economic reform. The generally harder impact of the Federal economic programme on the Slovak than on the Czech economy was by many taken as a sign of the disadvantaged position of Slovaks within the common state.8 The call for a greater Slovak control over economic policy thus became the one of the most important and substantial claims of Slovak nationalists . Yet, even given the activities of nationalists and the political factors conducive to the appeal of the nationalist discourse, to understand post-communist nationalism one must understand the historical developments that formed the basis for the appeal of the ethnic nationalism in Slovakia. Several historical precondition s can be identified . These are the topic of this study . 7 For examples of this see (H ungarian) Andrej Ferko: Stredna Europa - Eseje (Bratislava: VSSS, 1998) and (Czech) Dusan Sl obodnfk: Proti sedemhlavemu drakovi : Z dejin zapasu za Sia vensko (Bratislava: VSSS, 1998 ). ' In a January 1992 poll , for example. 53 % of respondents in Slovakia antici pated that the Czech economy wou ld grow at the expense of the Slovak. Cen trum pre social nu analyzu: Aktualne problemy Cesko-S/ovensk a, januar 1992 (Bratislava: CSA, 1992), p. 29. �32 SLOVAKIA Preconditions for the Success of Post-Communist Nationalism. To clarify the analysis of the historical preconditions of postcommunist nationalism, it is useful to divide the examination into two stages. The first stage focuses on the generally different impact nationalist ideas have had in the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. Whereas the civic, territorial version of nationalism became dominant in the West, ethnic, especially linguistically centred nationalism prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEE)9. In the twentieth century, this ethnic nationalism be came the underlying ideal for the political reorganisations of CEE in two world wars. The first half of the twentieth century thus served to establish ethnic nationalism as a dominant political ideology and ethnic ties as primary lines of political identification. An example of the causes of the success of ethnic nationalism thus forms what one might call the 'deep ' historic background for understanding post-communist nationalism. The second stage in the analysis focuses on the impact of the socialist era. For the majority of the population of post-commu nist Slovakia, the just over forty years of communist indoctrination through education, mass media and other means, had formed their primary so urce of fo rmal socialisation. Moreover, Soviet Communism brought one of the most dramatic periods of social and economic change in Slovak history. The analysis below outlines the different assessments scholars have made of the impact the social, economic and political devel opments of the las t halfcentury before 1989 had on the strength of nationalism in Slovakia. • Central and Eastern Europe will in this article denote roughly the area of the fonner Habsburg Empire as well as the European parts of the Romanov and Ottoman em pires. �SLOVAKIA 33 The Success of Ethnic Nationalism. In his celebrated 1882 lecture, Ernest Rennan started by making a distinction 'between the fusion of "races" in the nations of Western Europe, and the retention of ethnic distinctiveness in Eastern Europe .' 10 In 1944, Hans Kohn developed this theme when he introduced the concepts of 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalisms. 11 While challenged by several authors, this typology has survived the test of time and is used in various forms by scholars today. As most nationalisms contain both civic (Western) and ethnic (Eastern) elements, the distinction is, as Anthony D. Smith points out, analytical and not normative. 12 Czechoslovak nationalism in the interwar years, for example, was clearly ethnic m relations with Germans and Hungarians, but civic m its merger of Slovaks and Czechs into one nation. On the whole, scholars agree on the basic causes why civic nationalism was more successful in Western Europe and ethnic nationalism in the Eastern part of the continent. The main factors are generally identified as the socio-economic and, partly linked, cultural differences between the two regions at the time of the dissemination of nationalist ideas. 13 From about the fifteenth century, Western Europe saw the beginning of the development of the modem state. The new economy saw the abolition of serfdom , the weakening of the feudal-agricultural economy and the strengthening of trade and manufacture centred in cities. The develop0 Anthony D. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 9 ' '' Hans Kohn : The Idea of Nationalism (New York : Collier, 1967), pp. 329-331. 12 Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, p. 126 '-' For a good analysis of East-West historical differences see Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries: A Hi/story of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (Lo ndon, Routledge, I 998), pp. 15-25. �34 SLOVAKlA ment of centralised, strong states, yet with an increasingly urbanised and literate population capable of challenging the authority of the ruler, had important social, economic and political effects. Western, civic nationalism grew gradually out of the socio-economic developments and changes in political thought of pre-nineteenth century Europe. 14 This nationalism was state centred and focused on gaining the loyality of and homogenising the population of a territory. Crucially, nationalist ideas were promoted in societies whose elites, if not populations, were already quite homogenous culturally. This was particularly the case in Protestant, North-Western Europe. In important respects, Central and Eastern Europe was relatively 'backward' when nationalist ideas spread through the intellectual life of the region in the early nineteenth century. 15 The relative backwardness had both external and internal causes. The centuries of warfare with the Ottomans had weakened the states in the region and led to their inclusion into large empires. Hungary, which then included today's Slovakia, came under Habsburg rule after the battle of Mohacs in 1526. At the eve of the French Revolution, the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov empires dominated Central and Eastern Europe. Compared with rapidly developing Western states, the three Eastern empires remained despotic. As the feudal-agricultural economic structure retained its dominance, no strong middle class developed . In Slovakia, or Felvidek (Upper Hungary) as the Hungarian rulers called it, the development of mining in Eastern Slovakia, for instance, led to the growth of some smaller towns. Generally, these were dominated by ethnic 14 See Liah Greenfeld: Nationalism : Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1992 ) ,s The concept of Central and East European 'backwardness' is obviously very general and simplifying, also given the large differences within the region . �SLOVAKJA 35 Germans or Jews. The majority of the population of Slovakia remained rural and often illiterate. The socio-econonic conditions for cultural homogenisation were, therefore, not present. The ethnically very heterogeneous dynasties of Central and Eastern Europe were initially not interested in trying to turn their empires into nation-states on the Western model. 16 Only in the final decades of the nineteenth century did Tsarist Russia attempt to Russify the Western Borderlands and the Hungarian leadership promote its policy of Magyarisation (Hungarianisation). 17 Given its lack of an ethnic nobility and being an integral part of Hungary proper, the Slav population of Felvidek was particularly exposed. Yet even here the Hungarian nation-bulding project did not succeed. History was soon to take a surprising turn. Ultimately more successful than the civic nation builders in CEE were elites opposed to central rule and integration. State centred, civic nationalism had no advantages for such elites. When they adopted nationalist discourse as a political tool , they were inspired by German romanticism rather than Western liberalism . Nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe looked not to Locke and Stuart Mill, but to Herder and Fichte. In German romantic thought, it was not political boundaries that determined the extent of a nation , but culture and particularly language. In the ethnically diverse empires of CEE such ideas were to have a dramatic impact. It was no coincidence that two leading Slovak (Pan-Slav) nationalists, Jan Kollar and Pavo) Jozef Safarik, both studied at "' Charles Ingrao: ' Forum: Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: An Historical Perspective', Nationalities Papers, vol. 27 ( 1999), no. 2, p. 293 . 17 See Edward C. Thaden (ed.): Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Fin land, J855 - 19 14 (Princenton: Princenton University Press, 198 I ) and Tibor Frank: 'Hungary and the Dual Monarchy, 1867- 1890' , in Peter F. Sugar, Peter Hanak and Tibor Frank (eds.): A History of Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). �36 SLOVAKJA the University of Jena in the early nineteenth century. 18 The 'father of Slovak nationalism', Cudovit Stur, like Kollar and Safarik, a Protestant, also studied in Germany, in Halle. 19 By the outbreak of World War One, ethnic nationalism had emerged as one of the leading political ideologies in Central and Eastern Europe. In Austria-Hungary, leaders claiming to represent various ethnically defined nations, such as Slovak nationalists in the Slovak National Party, promoted their rights within the Empire. World War I was to bring victory to such nationalist programmes. Towards the end of the war, when the Entente Powers started supporting the programmes of Central and Eastern Europe (mainly exile) nationalists , their support was limited to the de mand for an administrative reorganisation of Austria-Hungary . By 1918, however, the right to self-determination had come to mean the right for independence. Allied victory in World War I thus resulted in a reorganisation of the Central European region according to the principle of the 'self-determination of nations', that is, the self-determination of ethnically defined nations. This right was by no means allowed for all , particularly not for the 'defeated nations'. All the new and old, expanded states of the region contained sizeable ethnic minority groups . While political life in Austria-Hungary had increasingly taken the form of a struggle between the central authorities and nationalist leaders, inter-war Central and Eastern Europe took this to a new level. In the new Czechoslovak Republic as well, ethnic belonging became the main dividing line in politics. Ethnic Ger- "Victor S. Mamatey : 'The Establishment of the Republic' . in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luz.a (eds.): A History of the Czechoslovak Republic: l 9 l 81948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 6. 19 Peter Petro: A History of Slovak Literature (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), p. 65 . �SLOVAKIA 37 mans and Hungarians (Magyars) voted overwhelmingly for ethnically based parties . The Slovaks, according to official ideology part of the Czechoslovak nation, were divided. As in the late Habsburg period, one part of the Slovak political elite was Czechoslovak nationalist, another, strongly connected to the Catholic clergy, was more sceptical to the Czechoslovak idea. Loyal to the Czechoslovak state until pushed into declaring independence inl939, the Slovak nationalist movement promoted Slovak, as opposed to Czechoslovak, national awareness and nationalism throughout the inter-war period . While it is impossible to get an accurate picture of the popular support for Slovak nationalism after World War II, it seems safe to agree with Carol Skalnik Leff's claim that when taking power in 1948, the communists faced a 'full-blown' Slovak nationalism. 20 If the creation of a Slovak education system, the flowering of Slovak culture and promotion of Slovak nationalism in politics was not sufficient to cement the importance of ethnic belonging and nationalism in people's thinking in the inter-war years, the Second War War was .2 1 With the rise towards authoritarian rule by the Slovak People ' s Party from the autumn of 1938, ethnic nationalism became a central part of official ideology. In the region as a whole, ethnicity became a supreme organizing principle increasing or limiting chances for employment, economic prosperity and even survival. Supported by the Catholic clergy, the Slovak state sought to educate the Slovaks into becoming good nationalists. Nationalism was promoted in schools, the mass media and 10 Carol Skalnik Leff: National Conflict in Czech oslovakia (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press. 1987), p. 281. 11 On national identity in the inter-war period see Owen V. Johnson: Slovakia 191 8- 1938: Education and the Making of a Nati on (Boulder: Co lumbia Uni versity Press, 1985). �38 SLOVAKIA official and religious life in general. 22 For many groups among ethnic Slovaks, the war-time state was a positive experience. The relative economic prosperity, the ease of employment (especially for the young intelligentsia) and the elevated position of the Catholic faith and church were aspects of the state that for some Slovaks compared favourably with pre-war Czechoslovakia. Obviously, for parts of the population, the experience had been clearly negative. For Jews and Romanies it was one of inhuman crimes. Yet, despite the horrors and injustices, the experience of independence under German influence strengthened the position of nationalism in Slovak society. While the leaders of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising had called for the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia, they did not want to return to the centralist system of the First Republic (1918-1938). The extent to which Slovakia had been changed by the war became evident in the 1946 election. Whereas the Slovak political scene had been split on the issue of Slovakia's position within the common state before the war, all parties standing in 1946 supported Slovak self-rule within Czechoslovakia in their programmes. 23 The Impact of the Socialist Period. In the intersection between empirical studies that directly or indirectly offer an explanation for the success of nationalism in post-communist Slovakia and general theoretical works on nationalism, it is possible to identify three main approaches to the question of the impact of the communist era. The first focuses 22 See e.g. Yeshayahu Jelinek : The Parish Republic: H/inka 's Slovak People's Party 1939- 1945 (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1976). lJ Jan Ryc hlik : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20.stoleti: Cesko-slovenske vztahy 19451992 (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 1998), pp.40-42. �SLOVAKIA 39 mainly on the way in which nationalism survived despite the forty years of communism. Given the strength of Slovak nationalism before Communism and the resilience of ethnic and cultural ties, nationalism would, according to this approach, have survived whatever policy the Communist Party had chosen. Scholars taking this approach would put the greatest emphasis on the 'deep' historic background outlined above. The second approach, where scholars stress the continuation of nationalism through the socialist period, could be considered the mainstream historical view . This approach focuses on the way Slovak national identity and support for nationalism survived the socialist era not only because of their pre-1948 strength, but also due to certain policies during Communism that served to strenghten their basis of support. According to the final approach, the success of post-communist nationalism was mainly due to the policies adopted by the Communist Party. Putting much less emphasis on the strength of precommunist national identity and nationalism (and thus the •deep' historical explanation), the 'due to' approach takes two main forms . One focuses on the effects of the socio-economic development of Slovakia during Communism, the other on the impact of the construction of nationally based institutional structures. These three analytical categories form a continuum rather than three clearly identifiable positions. Differences between studies falling into the different categories are generally one of focus or degree. Few scholars argue the extreme positions: that postcommunist nationalism was purely a revival of suppressed nationalism, or that it was a result of developments in the communist period only. Most would note the continued expressions of Slovak nationalism during the communist era, and then stress the degree to which the socialist period suppressed , maintained or actually strengthened the appeal of nationalism. �40 SLOVAKIA Nationalism Despite Communism. Particulary in the first years after the collapse of Communism, the 'retum-of-history'argument was commonly used to explain the success of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Precommunist nationalism, merely suppressed by the communist regimes, re-emerged to become the political factor it had been forty years earlier. As one historian put it: Communism may have temporarily relieved Central Europe's ethnic tensions for nearly half a century. But if religion was the opiate of the people, Communism proved no more effective than methadone (sic) in suspending their craving for ethnically whole nation states, without providing a cure. 24 In the literature on nationalism in Slovakia, Jacques Rupnik supported this view when he argued that Slovak nationalism had been in the 'communist refrigerator' for most of the period after 1948. 25 Of the monographs in English discussing Slovak nationalism, Stanislav Kirschaum's A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival is, arguably, one of those that leans most toward the 'despite ' approach. 26 While describing in detail the persistence of nationalism during Communism and the radical changes Slovak society went through, Kirschbaum notes no positive effect of the communist regime on the strength of Slovak national identity and nationalism. Rather, he highlights the attempts the communist lea- 1 ' Ingrano: 'Forum ... ' , p. 307 . 15 Jaques Rupnik, quoted in Martin Butora and Zora Butorova: 'Slovakia after the Split ' ,Joumal o[Democracy,vol. 4(1993), no. 2,p. 75 . 16 Stanislav Kirschbaum : A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (London : Macmillian, 1995). �SLOVAKIA 41 dership made at suppressing national identity.27 If Slovak nationalism gained strength during the communist period , it was more a reaction to the 'Czechoslovakism' favoured by the regime .2 8 The primordialist theories of nationalism would be the most obvious theoretical basis for the works in this approach. Stressing the ' ineffable, and at times overpowering' strength of the ' cultural givens' in a society, Clifford Geertz, for example, points to how ethnic ties in some societies come to be seen as a 'natural some would say spiritual affinity' .29 Given the strong emphasis put on cultural belonging in Slovak history, at least since the late nineteeth century, one could argue that ethnicity had gained a primordial character in Slovak society by the end of World War II. Consequently, the communist regime would not have been able to suppress Slovak identity, and therefore neither the potential for Slovak nationalism. While not going as far as the primordialist in stressing the naturalness of central ties, the so-called ethno-sym- bolist theories of nationalism could also be interpreted as lending support to the 'despite' approach. According to Anthony D. Smith, post-communist nationalism confirms the resilience and strength of ehnic myths, symbols and popular memory. He writes:' Though the timing of the current ethnic revival is a function of social and geopolitical changes, their contents and intensities are largely determined resources,' by pre-existing ethno-sy mbolic 30 27 Note e.g. ibid., pp. 228, 245, 252. Kirschbaum ta.lees a very favo urable view of Slovak nationalism and a more negative one of the common Czech and Slovak state . " Ibid., p. 24 7. 19 Clifford Geertz: The Interpretation of Cultures (London : Fontana, 1973). pp . 259-260 . 0 ' Anthony D. Smith : 'LSE Centennial Lecture: The Resurgence of Nationalism ? Myth and memory in the renewal of nations ', British Journal of Sociology, vo l. �42 SLOVAKIA Empirical support for the 'despite' argument can be found in post-communist Slovakia. In a study of regional patterns of political culture, a group of Slovak sociologists found strong similarities between the inter-war and post-communist era. 31 In both periods, nationalist and populist parties gained most support in northwest and central Slovakia. The persistence of this regional pattern seems to suggest that at least elements of pre-communist political culture had been preserved. Moreover, studies from other post-communist countries show that national minorities that were actively discouraged from maintaining their separate identity and culture, still emerged to voice nationalist demands after Communism. In Poland, this was the case with the German minority .32 While counter-factual history necessarily amounts to speculation, it does seem likely that regardless of what the policy the Communists had adopted, also the separate Slovak identity, in both its cultural and political expression, would have survived. The relatively short period of communist rule would clearly have facilitated this. As can be seen from the above, focusing on links to pre-communist nationalism and the preservation of popular myths and memory has some advantages. Firstly, it points to the strength of ethnic nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The conviction that ethnically defined nations formed natural bases for political legitimacy, be it in a separate state or as 47 (1996), no. 4, p. 573. Elsewhere, Smith does stress the role of communi st policies in preserving these myths and memories. See e.g. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, 237, endnote 9. 31 Vladimir Krivy , Viera Fialova and Daniel Balko: Slovensko a jeho regi6ny: sociokultume suvislosti volebneho spravania (Bratislava: Nadacia Media, 1996). 12 Janusz Mucha: 'Democratisation and Cultural Minorities: The Polish Case of the 1980s/90s', East European Quarterly, vol. 25 (1992), no. 4. �SLOVAKIA 43 an autonomous region within a larger entity, had by 1948 been deeply ingrained in CEE. This was not only the case with most of the Slovak political elite, but also, many historians would agree, large parts of the population. Secondly, stressing the preservation of political culture is perhaps the only way to explain the continued regional pattern of support for nationalism. In its pure form, the 'despite' argument rejects any important effect of the socialist period on national identity and the popular view of nationalism. If one accepts that national identity is a social construct, that nations are not some kind of natural social unit, this jump across forty years of history is difficult to defend. As shall be discussed in more detail below, 1948-1989 was probably the most dramatic period of social and economic change in Slovak history. It was also a period of an intense policy of officially managed, public socialisation. Given the impact this period had on people' s lives, it seems difficult to assume that popular views on national identity and nationalism would not also change. One example that it had is that before 1948 Slovakia was a deeply religious society and mainstream nationalism was strongly connected to the Catholic Church. In the post-communist period, however, the leading nationalists parties HZDS and SNS were both secular. Catholic nationalism, as represented by the Christian Democratic Party (KDH), was much less successful. Explanations focusing more on the way the communist period served to change Slovak national identity and thereby the bases for nationalism during that period, thus seemingly provide a more convincing explanation for the widespread appeal of nationalism in the postcommunist era. Finallly, the 'despite' argument cannot explain the emergence of 'new' nationalisms in the post-communist period . Some groups without a history of common national identity and nationalism formed nationalist parties after 1989. Most im- �44 SLOVAKIA portantly, this included the Roma community. Also the emergence of a relatively strong nationalism in Moravia and Silesia was a sign of the increased importance of cultural identity. 33 Traditionally a regional identity and before Communism never a major political issue, the Moravian-Silesian autonomy party became the largest party in the Czech National Council in 1990. Nationalism Through the Communist Era. The 'through' approach makes up the middle ground between stressing the resilience of pre-communist nationalism and the strengthening of national identity during the communist period. Studies falling into this category would seek to explain the perpetuation of national conflict due to the persistence of support for nationalism built up before the communist period and to certain factors that served to strengthen Slovak national identity during the 1948-1989 era. Most historical studies tend to be in this category. Carol Skalnik Leff' s 1987 seminal book on national conflict in Czechoslovakia is probably the best study in English in this category. 34 In Leff's analysis, the deep social, economic and cultural differences between the Czech Lands and Slovakia were politicised during the inter-was republic. A triangular pattern of support and opposition was created, whereby the central leadership in Prague relied on the pro-Czechoslovak section of the Slovak political elite to help neutralise the demands of Slovak nationalists. In the communist period , this pattern persisted until it was displaced JJ Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin: Czechoslovakia 1918- 1992: A Laboratory for Social Change (Oxford: Macmill an and St. Anthony ' s, 1996), p. 51 . 14 Leff: National Conflict. Ryc hlik: Cesi a Slovaci .. . 1945-1992 is a later, eve n more detailed work of this approcah. �SLOVAKIA 45 with the ascent of Gustav Husak to power in 1969. Both the interwar and the socialist regimes failed in their attempts to modernize away the problem of Slovak nationalism (culturally and educationaly in the inter-war period, economically during socialism). These failures, combined with the unwillingness of both regimes to adequately accommodate the Slovak nationalist's demands, led to a growing sense of antagonism (mutual antagonism, as Czechs resented that Slovaks used times of international crisis to force through their demands). Leff concludes: 'Given the persistence of Slovak national feeling, on the one hand, and Czech power, on the other, the result has been persistent national conflict'. 35 While Leff notes that Slovak nationalism was strong in the post-war period, much due to the experience of statehood during the war, she also identifies several factors during the communist era that served to strengthen its basis. The existence of separate Slovak political institutions, for instance, was important. Leff writes: 'Week as the KSS (Slovak Communist Party) and the SNR (Slovak National Council) were in the years following 1948, both would retain the capacity to serve as nationalist time bombs. ' 36 One important reason for this was that the system of separate Slovak institutions created a Slovak elite separate from Prague-based Czechoslovak one. 37 Also other aspects of the regime 's policy proved counter-productive to its official aim of promoting the 'coming together' (zblfienie) of Czechs and Slovaks. The mass media, for instance, was 'segmented and not adapted to the integrative intentions of the policy-making elite. 38 Thus , by the late 1980, 'the Slovak question ' had become 'deeply, perhaps 35 Leff: National Conflict, p. 282. Ibid ., p. 112 . 37 Ibid ., p.294 . " Ibid., p. 297 . 36 �46 SLOVAKlA irreversibly, woven into the fabric of Czechoslovak politics as usual'. This statement carries with it the implication that the Slovak question wi1l continue to assert itself as a political force in the future .39 Three years after Leff published her study, her prediction came true . Theoretically, the 'through' approach occupies the middle ground between the primoridalists emphasis on the strength of cultural ties and the stress put on social processes by the modernist and institutional views outlined below. With more emphasis on the way myths, symbols, values and memories are preserved in societies, ethno-symbolist theories would come closest to forming a theoretical basis for this approach. From the ethno-symbolist perspective, the communists ' attempt to defuse nationalism in Slovakia by flagging symbols of self-determination could only serve to strengthen the feeling of national identity. The reason for this was that the only symbols that would evoke a positive response from the population would be symbols that had a basis in popular tradition . For example, while the communists did try to reframe the historical image of r.udovft Stur as a social revolutionary, they could not eradicate the view of Stur as a champion of Slovak rights so strongly ingrained in popular tradition and myths . As Smith writes : "Ethno-history is no sweetshop in which nationalists may ' pick and mix'; it sets limits to any appropriation by providing a distinctive context and patterns of events, personages and ,, 4 0 processes ... . The most obvious strength of the 'through' approach is that by stressing both the strong social basis of pre-communist nationalism and the way it was maintained and changed during the 1948-1989 period , it can account more or less convincingly for 39 ' 0 Ibid. , pp. 281 -282 . Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, p. 45 �SLOVAKIA 47 nationalism in both periods. It points to the continuity of not only political conflict over the status of Slovakia, but also that of popular symbols and myths. Noting how the communist period maintained and strengthened preexisting national identity and traditions also allows for an explanation of the persistent regional differences in support for nationalism. Despite these important strengths, however, the 'through' approach does have some weak points. Some will argue that the most important of these is that it does not go far enough in emphasising how dramatically the communist period changed Slovak society. As with the 'despite' approach, the focus on the continuation of national conflict through the communist period also faces problems in explaining the 'new' nationalisms of the post-communist era. The political organisation and activism of the Romany community after 1989, for example, is difficult to explain without stressing the way the communist period served to strengthen the importance of ethnic belonging. Nationalism Due to Communism. Studies focusing on the way the communist period . served to strengthen national identity and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe are generally more theoretically grounded than the two approaches above. The presentation of these will therefore have to be a bit different. Two main theoretical starting points can be identified. 41 The first, based on modernisation theories of 41 Shari Cohen supposes a third, unconventional, approach in her Politics without a Past: The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism (Lon- don: Duke University Press, 1999). It was not the strength of national identity in Slovakia that formed the basis for the success of post-communist nationalism, Cohen claims, but rather the lack of a clear historical consciousness. By �48 SLOVAKJA nationalism, focus on the massive socio-economic changes in the CEE countries during the fourty years of communist rule. As many other countries and areas of the region, Slovakia underwent a rapid transformation from an agricultural to an industrial society. Such a process of social modernization, scholars such as Ernest Gellner claim, is the basis for the strength of post-communist nationalism. The second starting point is based on the so called 'new institutionalism' in social science. According to its proponents, the communist regimes honoured their Leninist commitment to national self-determination by building nationally defined institutions and stressing national identities. Rather than, as intended, weakening the social basis for nationalism, however, their policy served to strengthen it. Put otherwise: the Soviet type nationality policy was to be 'nationalist in form, socialist in content ' . When the socialist content disappeared, only the nationalist form remained . Modernisation. It is the erosion of traditional society and its values with urbanisation and the growth of the state that, in Gellner's view, is responsible for the emergence of nationalism.42 In an agricultural society, where mobility is low and socialisation within the family and local community is sufficient, a person's language and culture is of little consequence. Urban life, particularly in the industrial age, exercises different pressures on the population. Industrial society, requiring formal socialisation through an education preventing the emergence of a collective memory of World War II, the communist regime made Slovak society susceptible to elite manipulation after the collapse of communism. 42 Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). �SLOVAKIA 49 system, thus makes an individual's culture and especially language important. Particularly when cultural differences overlapped with an actual or perceived pattern of social and economic discrimination, nationalism is a likely outcome. In socialist societies, as they suppressed civil society, class identities and other social lines of identification , the importance of cultural identities became particularly strong. When the regimes collapsed, there existed no 'serious rival ideology ' or any 'serious rival institutions' capable of providing alternatives to identification along national lines. 43 In the resulting 'double vacuum', nationalism, the 'culture of industrialism ', was 'the most plausible and easily available candidate for filling this emptiness. ' 44 After the Communists came to power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Slovakia entered its most important period of socio-economic development. Over a period of seventeen years, the share of agricultural workers in the total workforce more than halved: from 62.2% in 1948 to30.1% in 1965. 4 5 By 1989 it has reached 14.5%. Similarly, the percentage of the population living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants increased from 11.5% in 1950 to 40.8% in 1991 .46 In the space of a few decades, Slovakia was transformed from an agricultural to an industrial society. That the industrial structure of Slovakia was accordingly based on the socialist idealisation of heavy industry, matters little in this context. Territorial and social mobility increased, as did the general level of education. The steadily increasing availability and reach 43 Ernest Gellner: ' Nationalism in the Vacuum', in Alexander J. Motyl (ed .): Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 250. 44 Ernest Gellner: 'Homeland of the Unrevolution' , Daedalus, vol. 122 (1993) , no. 3, p. 152. 45 See Krejci and Machonin : Czechoslovakia, p. 120. 46 Ibid., p. 126. �50 SLOVAKIA of mass communication, such as radio and television, also served to promote a standardised ('high') culture. Combined, these factors served to increase cultural homogeneity in the Slovak population and put focus on the differences between the Slovaks and other cultural groups in society. An individual's cultural-cumnational identity was therefore highlighted . The main strength of the modernist approach is that it brings our attention to the massive social and economic changes in the region during Communism. Slovak society was fundamentally changed through industrialisation and urbanisation . Most theories of nationalism hold that modernisation (towards a Western type society) is at least conducive to the formation of national consciousness and emergence of nationalism. If one accepts this , the socialist period is likely to have strengthened the appeal of nationalism in Slovakia. Furthemore, the modernisation approach offers an explanation for why new ethnic conflicts arose once Communism released its grip. Even the communities without the history of nationalism can be seen to have been mobilised as a result of industrialisation. There are, however, several weaknesses with this modernist view. First, in its pure form it is very functional and does not accredit much importance to ideas. This is problematic particularly because the massive transformation and uprooting of Slovak society took place under heavy pressure from socialist socialisation. Second, if urbanisation and industrialisation were the main causes of post-communist nationalism, then one should expect to find the strongest nationalism where the effects of these processes was strongest. Before 1948 eastern Slovakia was the most 'backward' and multi-cultural region of Slovakia. Consequently, it was one of the regions that went through the most dramatic socio-economic development during Communism. Despite this , after 1989, sup- �SLOVAKIA 51 port for nationalist parties in the region was well below the Slovak average. 47 Indeed, inhabitants of Kosice, the 'capital' of eastern Slovakia and the second largest city in the country, were among those most vocally opposed to the break-up of the CSFR in the autumn of 1992.48 The Institutional Approach. The institutional approach places the cause of the strength of post-communist nationalism in the policies and structure, the institutions, of the communist regimes. The stress Leninism put on the right of national self-determination led most Soviet-style socialist regimes to not only promote national self-identification, but also build institutional frameworks along national lines. This served to institutionalise national identity as the key identity and thus create the nationalist bias of politics after the collapse of Communism. In its most basic form , the institutional approach stresses the way in which members of political institutions tend to promote the interests of their institutions in competition with others . Throughout the socialist period, Slovakia had cultural, academic , administrative and political institutions separate from the all-Czechoslovak ones. Due to the policy of stressing the Slovakness of these institutions, recruitment was conducted almost exclusively in Slovakia, and sometimes among Slovaks only. The separate poli tical institutions consisted most importantly of a branch of the Communist Party (KSS), a parliamentary assembly (SNR), and 47 See Krivy, Fialova and Balko: Slovensko ajeho regi6ny, pp.29 1-342 . •• For a more humorous expression of this see Peter Holub: 'At' uz to nestes tf piijde: Kosice se branf mirodnfmu sjednocenf', Respect, 24-30, August 1992, pp. 5-6. �52 SLOVAKIA ( except for the period 1960-69) an executive branch. While limited in their political importance during Communism, these institutions gained a dramatically different role with democratisation . Not long after the collapse of Communism, the Slovak government and legislature started calling for an increase in their competencies. Using nationalist rhetoric to mobilise the population was an obvious way to gain support for strengthening the authority and power of the Slovak institutions at the expense of federal ones. On a more complex level, the institutional approach examines the wider impact institutional structures had on creating certain attitudes and beliefs in the population. One leading institutional theoretician , Rogers Brubaker, explained the strength of postcommunist nationalism in the Soviet Union as a result of the ' dual institutionalisation ' of what he termed ' territorial nationhood ' and 'ethnic nationality ' .49 Territorial nationhood refers to the linkin g of a specific territory to national identity through the admi nistrative division of the country according to nationality. As with most administrative components in the Soviet Union, Slovakia was a clearly defined territorial unit interpreted as the homeland of the Slovaks. While this was made explicit after the federalisation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, it was implicit already from the end of World War IL The principle of equality (rovny s rovnym) introduced during the war and maintained in the 1948 Constitution •• Rogers Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 23-54. The nationality and, particularly after 1969, the institutional stru cture of socialist Czechoslovakia was almost identical to that of the Soviet Unio n. �SLOVAKIA 53 was clearly interpreted as a principle of equality of nations. 50 Hungarians, Ruthenes, Romanies and other national groups in Slovakia were national minorities; the Slovaks were the statotvorny (literally: state forming) nation. Along with officially pronouncing Czechoslovakia a country of two nations, the regime built institutions to create the appearance of national self-determination. While Czechoslovakia did not go as far as the Soviet Union in awarding the constituent republics symbols of statehood, the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics were in the 1968 Law on Federalisation declared to have the status of independent legal subjects that surrendered part of their sovereignty to the Federation. The Republics were also awarded the 'inalienable right of self-determination even to the point of separation'. 51 The Law on Federalization thus 'rehabilitated and restored the idea of a national state as an attribute of a fully developed nation'. 52 The effect of this policy was to encourage Slovaks to think of themselves as a separate nation with wide-ranging political rights. The second aspect of Brubaker's institutional approach focuses on the way the communist regime made ethnic identification compulsory. In common English usage, the concepts of 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are synonymous. In the socialist federations, however, the distinction was important. All who held Czechoslovak passports were Czechoslovak citizens. Their nationality, however, would be Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthene, Romany, Polish, Ukrainian or some other. A person's nationality 5 ° Katarina Zavacka: "Metamorf6zy statopravneho postavenia Slovenska v Ceskoslovensku v rokoch 1948-1967" in Vladimir Gonec (ed. ): Cesko-s/oven ska historicka rocenka I 998 (Brno: Masarykova Universita, 1998), pp. 17-29. 51 See ' Ustavnf zakon 143/ 1968 Sb.' at http://www.psp. czldocs/textslconstitution. 1968.html. 52 Kusy: Eseje,p. 69 . �54 SLOVAKIA was ascertained at birth according to that of her of his parents and could generally not be changed. As in inter-war Czechoslovakia, the communist regime did promote a Czechoslovak political identity. Avoiding the word narod, nation, which has clear ethnic connotations, the communists called for the creation of a 'Czec hoslovak working people ' (ceskoslovensky pracujlici J'ud). The identity was not, even in relation to the Czechs and Slovaks, intended as a Czechoslovak cultural identity. On the contrary, the Communist Party put great stress on promoting the cultures of the various national groups, particularly the Slovak. Generous reso urces were devoted to building cultural institutions and supporting the cultural life of all official nationalities. 53 For most children primary and sometimes secondary and higher education was available in their mother tongue. While all culture was to be socialist, the art forms favored by the regime, those that were seen to form the basis of national culture (s uch as folk dancing and traditional artisan-and craftsmanship), were not particularly affected . The Centre for the Production of Folk Art (UI:UV) and the folk-dancing and folk-mu sic group the Slovak People' s Artistic Collective (SI:UK) were presented as the best of centuries-old , traditional Slovak culture, thus reminding all of not only the cultural , but also historical separateness of the Slovaks. Combined, these two processes of institutionalisation made nations and nationality into basic units of people' s world-view. When the communist regime collapsed and democratisation started, nationally based institutions and their elites became centres of 51 See Elena Londakova: ' Slovcnske predjarie: Myty a realita slovenskej inte li gcncic v Ceskoslovensku pred rokom 1956 (a po iiom)', in Vladimir Gonec (ed .): Cesko-s/ovensk;i historick;i rocenka I 998 (Brno: Masarykova Universita, 1998), p. 2 10 and Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska (Prague: NLN, 1998), pp. 275-276 . �SLOVAKIA 55 political activity. 54 National identity became the basic organising. principle in politics. The nationally defined elites in the separate national institutions could gain popular support among a population identified and identifying according to their nationality by claiming to defend the interest of that nation. The system of compulsory national identification thus became the basis for new political constituencies. The main strength of the institutional approach is that it offers a very powerfull explanation of the near universal succes of national identity and nationalism as political principles after Communism. It does so by placing the cause of this succes in the very world-view engendered by the communist regime. As Brubaker writes: the communist nationality policy 'created a political field supremely conductive to nationalism' .55 The 'new' nationalism of the post-communist period can therefore be explained. Due to its explanatory strength, the institutional approach has emerged as one of the most popular among scholars trying to explain postcommunist nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the institutional approach, like the other presented above, has its shortcomings. Like the modernist approach it cannot alone explain the regionalised support for nationalism in Slovakia, nor does it account for the impact of pre-communist nationalism. 54 This was also the case for minorities that did not have explicitly political institutions. For example, the Slovak Hungarian cultural organization CSEMADOK became the centre of Hungarian political activity in the first period after 1989. ss Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed, p. I 7 �56 SLOVAKIA Conclusion While the process thc1· 1ed to the break-up of the common Czech and Slovak stat:· after communissm has received a fair amount of attention, few scholars have attempted to comprehensively explain why nationalism had such succes in postcommunist Slovakia.56 The above is only an overview of the possible explanations for the success of post-communist nationalism that would meet with the most support among scholars today. In fact, it is doubtful there will ever be single generally accepted explanation, be it theoretical or historical. As Katherine Verdery noted, nationalism in the post-communist region 'has many causes, ranging from the macro-social to matters of personal identity. It is, in other words, overdetermined, and the relevant causes vary from one county to another. 5 7 What is needed to approach a consensus on what factors were most important in the Slovak case, is a series of studies that evaluate the explanatory power of various approaches, such as those above. If this article serves to encourage someone to write such a study, it has served its purpose. ,. To this author's knowledge, the only monograph that explicitly does so is Cohen: Politics without a Past. 57 Katherine Verdery: 'Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania' , Slavic Review, vol. 52 (1993), no. 2, p. 180. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2003, Vol. 37 Description An account of the resource Vol. 37 (No. 68-69), 2003. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 28 SLOVAKJA 'Slovak som a Slovak budem ... 'l Explaining Nationalism in Post-Communist Slovakia Paal Sigurd Hilde The question of the position of Slovakia within the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), the official name as of April 1990, was among the most divisive issues in Slovak and Czech politics in the post-communist era. As is well known, the conflict over the future basis and structure of the federation eventually led to the division of the state on 1 January 1993. Despite the impression given by many press reports at the time, the break-up was not the result of Slovak secession. With the exception of the Slovak National Party (SNS), representing about 10 per cent of the votes in Slovakia, all Slovak political parties successful in the decisive June 1992 elections were in favor of some kind of common state with the Czechs. This included the winner, Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). There were, however, near irreconcilable policy differences between the left-populist HZDS and the right wing coalition victorious in the Czech Republic. Given the minority veto in the Federal assembly, whereby a minority of representatives from either Republic could block important legislation in the House of Nations, only a carefully crafted compromise could save the Federation from political deadlock. Rather than seeking a compromise, however, the Czech 1 The title is taken from Miroslav Kusfs 1981 samizdat essay. Reprinted in Miroslav Kusy: Eseje (Bratislava: Archa, 1991 ), pp. 88 -96 . SLOVAKlA 29 right wing coalition led by Vaclav Klaus of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) pushed for the division of the state if a 'functional federation' was not possible. Unwilling and politically unable to accept Klaus 's vision of a strong federal government, Meciar reluctantly followed the Czech Prime Minister's lead towards a break-up. 2 The political phenomenon generally referred to as Slovak nationalisn was thus not the decisive force behind the break-up of the CSFR. 3 It was, however, Slovak nationalism that after the collapse of communism started the process that eventuallly led to the rejection of the common state by right-wing Czech parties. As all nationalisms, Slovak post-communist nationalism was a complex phenomenon. It came in moderate and more radical forms, focus sing on several political issues. In its most basic expression, it held that Slovakia and the Slovaks deserved a more equal and visible position within a state seen as unfairly dominated by the Czech part. 4 Basically all Slovak political parties, including the 2 On the process preceding the break-up see Eric Stein : Czecho/Slovakia: Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Fiss ure, Negotiated Breakup (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997). 3 Nationalism is fo r the purpose of th is study defined as a world view, which holds that the pop ulation of the world is divided into nations. A nation, claim nationalists, consists of a grou p of people identifiable and identifying according to cultural, religious, historical and/or territorial criteria. Nationalists see nations as constituting natural social units and seek to promote the po litical, cultural, economic or other kind of status, in symbolical or more material terms, of the nation they claim to represent. The nationalist discourse, common to a ll forms of nationalism, is used thro ughout the world, most often to oppose or defe nd existing political units. See Craig Calhoun: Nationalism (Buckin gham : Open University Press, 1997). •Foran examination of mainstream Slovak national ism see Paal Sigurd Hil de: 'Slovak Nationalism and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia', Europe-Asia Stu die s, vol. 51 (1999), no. 4, pp. 64 7-665. 30 SLOVAKIA most pro-federal, shared this demand. More radical expressions called not only for more radical solutions to the question of the Federation, but focussed also negatively on the position of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the perceived threat from Hungarian irredentism. In its exteme, which was promoted only by small, popular unrepresentative groups, Slovak · nationalism promoted radically anti-Czech, anti-Hungarian and sometimes also anti-Semitic views. This article will analyse another complexity of nationalism in post-communist Slovakia. 5 As with all nationalisms, the popular success of the Slovak form can be seen as a result of several, intricate causes. These include historical, political, social and econ omic determinants. The aim of this study is not to reach a final decision on what caused the apperance and success of post-communist nationalism. Rather, the article offers an overview of a range of possible explanations and the strengths and weaknesses of these. This might be a combination of all, some, just one or none . Ultimately, it was Slovak6 politicians and other political actors that gave nationalism the political significance it had after the collapse of communism. Without nationalists, there is no nationalism. Focusing merely on the role of actors, however, leaves many unanswered questions. The most important of these is why the demands and rhetoric of the nationalists gained such a favourable response from the population. Certain political factors in the postcommunist period can be seen to have facilitated the success of the nationalist agenda among Slovaks. One such factor was the 5 For the sake of simplifying the analysis the multi-issue complexity of Slovak nationalism will be not discussed in detail. • The word Slovak will in this article denote a person of Slovak culture and identity. Similarly, a Czechoslovak is a person of Czech or Slovak ethnicity with a Czechoslovak identity . SLOVAK1A 31 institutional legacy of the socialist federation (more on this below). A second factor was the changing international environment after the Cold War, with the secession of the Baltic states, Slovenia and Croatia as examples of the new stress on national self-determination. Interaction with the two major 'others', the Hungarians and Czechs, was also important. The upsurge of post-communist nationalism in the Hungarian speaking minority in Slovakia and in Hungary, and the increasingly hostile attacks on Slovak nationalism, particularly in the Czech press, both served to spur Slovak nationalists into action. 7 Even more important in increasing support for nationalist de mands in post-communist Slovakia was the issue of economic reform. The generally harder impact of the Federal economic programme on the Slovak than on the Czech economy was by many taken as a sign of the disadvantaged position of Slovaks within the common state.8 The call for a greater Slovak control over economic policy thus became the one of the most important and substantial claims of Slovak nationalists . Yet, even given the activities of nationalists and the political factors conducive to the appeal of the nationalist discourse, to understand post-communist nationalism one must understand the historical developments that formed the basis for the appeal of the ethnic nationalism in Slovakia. Several historical precondition s can be identified . These are the topic of this study . 7 For examples of this see (H ungarian) Andrej Ferko: Stredna Europa - Eseje (Bratislava: VSSS, 1998) and (Czech) Dusan Sl obodnfk: Proti sedemhlavemu drakovi : Z dejin zapasu za Sia vensko (Bratislava: VSSS, 1998 ). ' In a January 1992 poll , for example. 53 % of respondents in Slovakia antici pated that the Czech economy wou ld grow at the expense of the Slovak. Cen trum pre social nu analyzu: Aktualne problemy Cesko-S/ovensk a, januar 1992 (Bratislava: CSA, 1992), p. 29. 32 SLOVAKIA Preconditions for the Success of Post-Communist Nationalism. To clarify the analysis of the historical preconditions of postcommunist nationalism, it is useful to divide the examination into two stages. The first stage focuses on the generally different impact nationalist ideas have had in the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. Whereas the civic, territorial version of nationalism became dominant in the West, ethnic, especially linguistically centred nationalism prevailed in Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEE)9. In the twentieth century, this ethnic nationalism be came the underlying ideal for the political reorganisations of CEE in two world wars. The first half of the twentieth century thus served to establish ethnic nationalism as a dominant political ideology and ethnic ties as primary lines of political identification. An example of the causes of the success of ethnic nationalism thus forms what one might call the 'deep ' historic background for understanding post-communist nationalism. The second stage in the analysis focuses on the impact of the socialist era. For the majority of the population of post-commu nist Slovakia, the just over forty years of communist indoctrination through education, mass media and other means, had formed their primary so urce of fo rmal socialisation. Moreover, Soviet Communism brought one of the most dramatic periods of social and economic change in Slovak history. The analysis below outlines the different assessments scholars have made of the impact the social, economic and political devel opments of the las t halfcentury before 1989 had on the strength of nationalism in Slovakia. • Central and Eastern Europe will in this article denote roughly the area of the fonner Habsburg Empire as well as the European parts of the Romanov and Ottoman em pires. SLOVAKIA 33 The Success of Ethnic Nationalism. In his celebrated 1882 lecture, Ernest Rennan started by making a distinction 'between the fusion of "races" in the nations of Western Europe, and the retention of ethnic distinctiveness in Eastern Europe .' 10 In 1944, Hans Kohn developed this theme when he introduced the concepts of 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalisms. 11 While challenged by several authors, this typology has survived the test of time and is used in various forms by scholars today. As most nationalisms contain both civic (Western) and ethnic (Eastern) elements, the distinction is, as Anthony D. Smith points out, analytical and not normative. 12 Czechoslovak nationalism in the interwar years, for example, was clearly ethnic m relations with Germans and Hungarians, but civic m its merger of Slovaks and Czechs into one nation. On the whole, scholars agree on the basic causes why civic nationalism was more successful in Western Europe and ethnic nationalism in the Eastern part of the continent. The main factors are generally identified as the socio-economic and, partly linked, cultural differences between the two regions at the time of the dissemination of nationalist ideas. 13 From about the fifteenth century, Western Europe saw the beginning of the development of the modem state. The new economy saw the abolition of serfdom , the weakening of the feudal-agricultural economy and the strengthening of trade and manufacture centred in cities. The develop0 Anthony D. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 9 ' '' Hans Kohn : The Idea of Nationalism (New York : Collier, 1967), pp. 329-331. 12 Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, p. 126 '-' For a good analysis of East-West historical differences see Robert Bideleux and Ian Jeffries: A Hi/story of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (Lo ndon, Routledge, I 998), pp. 15-25. 34 SLOVAKlA ment of centralised, strong states, yet with an increasingly urbanised and literate population capable of challenging the authority of the ruler, had important social, economic and political effects. Western, civic nationalism grew gradually out of the socio-economic developments and changes in political thought of pre-nineteenth century Europe. 14 This nationalism was state centred and focused on gaining the loyality of and homogenising the population of a territory. Crucially, nationalist ideas were promoted in societies whose elites, if not populations, were already quite homogenous culturally. This was particularly the case in Protestant, North-Western Europe. In important respects, Central and Eastern Europe was relatively 'backward' when nationalist ideas spread through the intellectual life of the region in the early nineteenth century. 15 The relative backwardness had both external and internal causes. The centuries of warfare with the Ottomans had weakened the states in the region and led to their inclusion into large empires. Hungary, which then included today's Slovakia, came under Habsburg rule after the battle of Mohacs in 1526. At the eve of the French Revolution, the Ottoman, Habsburg and Romanov empires dominated Central and Eastern Europe. Compared with rapidly developing Western states, the three Eastern empires remained despotic. As the feudal-agricultural economic structure retained its dominance, no strong middle class developed . In Slovakia, or Felvidek (Upper Hungary) as the Hungarian rulers called it, the development of mining in Eastern Slovakia, for instance, led to the growth of some smaller towns. Generally, these were dominated by ethnic 14 See Liah Greenfeld: Nationalism : Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1992 ) ,s The concept of Central and East European 'backwardness' is obviously very general and simplifying, also given the large differences within the region . SLOVAKJA 35 Germans or Jews. The majority of the population of Slovakia remained rural and often illiterate. The socio-econonic conditions for cultural homogenisation were, therefore, not present. The ethnically very heterogeneous dynasties of Central and Eastern Europe were initially not interested in trying to turn their empires into nation-states on the Western model. 16 Only in the final decades of the nineteenth century did Tsarist Russia attempt to Russify the Western Borderlands and the Hungarian leadership promote its policy of Magyarisation (Hungarianisation). 17 Given its lack of an ethnic nobility and being an integral part of Hungary proper, the Slav population of Felvidek was particularly exposed. Yet even here the Hungarian nation-bulding project did not succeed. History was soon to take a surprising turn. Ultimately more successful than the civic nation builders in CEE were elites opposed to central rule and integration. State centred, civic nationalism had no advantages for such elites. When they adopted nationalist discourse as a political tool , they were inspired by German romanticism rather than Western liberalism . Nationalists in Central and Eastern Europe looked not to Locke and Stuart Mill, but to Herder and Fichte. In German romantic thought, it was not political boundaries that determined the extent of a nation , but culture and particularly language. In the ethnically diverse empires of CEE such ideas were to have a dramatic impact. It was no coincidence that two leading Slovak (Pan-Slav) nationalists, Jan Kollar and Pavo) Jozef Safarik, both studied at "' Charles Ingrao: ' Forum: Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: An Historical Perspective', Nationalities Papers, vol. 27 ( 1999), no. 2, p. 293 . 17 See Edward C. Thaden (ed.): Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Fin land, J855 - 19 14 (Princenton: Princenton University Press, 198 I ) and Tibor Frank: 'Hungary and the Dual Monarchy, 1867- 1890' , in Peter F. Sugar, Peter Hanak and Tibor Frank (eds.): A History of Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). 36 SLOVAKJA the University of Jena in the early nineteenth century. 18 The 'father of Slovak nationalism', Cudovit Stur, like Kollar and Safarik, a Protestant, also studied in Germany, in Halle. 19 By the outbreak of World War One, ethnic nationalism had emerged as one of the leading political ideologies in Central and Eastern Europe. In Austria-Hungary, leaders claiming to represent various ethnically defined nations, such as Slovak nationalists in the Slovak National Party, promoted their rights within the Empire. World War I was to bring victory to such nationalist programmes. Towards the end of the war, when the Entente Powers started supporting the programmes of Central and Eastern Europe (mainly exile) nationalists , their support was limited to the de mand for an administrative reorganisation of Austria-Hungary . By 1918, however, the right to self-determination had come to mean the right for independence. Allied victory in World War I thus resulted in a reorganisation of the Central European region according to the principle of the 'self-determination of nations', that is, the self-determination of ethnically defined nations. This right was by no means allowed for all , particularly not for the 'defeated nations'. All the new and old, expanded states of the region contained sizeable ethnic minority groups . While political life in Austria-Hungary had increasingly taken the form of a struggle between the central authorities and nationalist leaders, inter-war Central and Eastern Europe took this to a new level. In the new Czechoslovak Republic as well, ethnic belonging became the main dividing line in politics. Ethnic Ger- "Victor S. Mamatey : 'The Establishment of the Republic' . in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luz.a (eds.): A History of the Czechoslovak Republic: l 9 l 81948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 6. 19 Peter Petro: A History of Slovak Literature (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), p. 65 . SLOVAKIA 37 mans and Hungarians (Magyars) voted overwhelmingly for ethnically based parties . The Slovaks, according to official ideology part of the Czechoslovak nation, were divided. As in the late Habsburg period, one part of the Slovak political elite was Czechoslovak nationalist, another, strongly connected to the Catholic clergy, was more sceptical to the Czechoslovak idea. Loyal to the Czechoslovak state until pushed into declaring independence inl939, the Slovak nationalist movement promoted Slovak, as opposed to Czechoslovak, national awareness and nationalism throughout the inter-war period . While it is impossible to get an accurate picture of the popular support for Slovak nationalism after World War II, it seems safe to agree with Carol Skalnik Leff's claim that when taking power in 1948, the communists faced a 'full-blown' Slovak nationalism. 20 If the creation of a Slovak education system, the flowering of Slovak culture and promotion of Slovak nationalism in politics was not sufficient to cement the importance of ethnic belonging and nationalism in people's thinking in the inter-war years, the Second War War was .2 1 With the rise towards authoritarian rule by the Slovak People ' s Party from the autumn of 1938, ethnic nationalism became a central part of official ideology. In the region as a whole, ethnicity became a supreme organizing principle increasing or limiting chances for employment, economic prosperity and even survival. Supported by the Catholic clergy, the Slovak state sought to educate the Slovaks into becoming good nationalists. Nationalism was promoted in schools, the mass media and 10 Carol Skalnik Leff: National Conflict in Czech oslovakia (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press. 1987), p. 281. 11 On national identity in the inter-war period see Owen V. Johnson: Slovakia 191 8- 1938: Education and the Making of a Nati on (Boulder: Co lumbia Uni versity Press, 1985). 38 SLOVAKIA official and religious life in general. 22 For many groups among ethnic Slovaks, the war-time state was a positive experience. The relative economic prosperity, the ease of employment (especially for the young intelligentsia) and the elevated position of the Catholic faith and church were aspects of the state that for some Slovaks compared favourably with pre-war Czechoslovakia. Obviously, for parts of the population, the experience had been clearly negative. For Jews and Romanies it was one of inhuman crimes. Yet, despite the horrors and injustices, the experience of independence under German influence strengthened the position of nationalism in Slovak society. While the leaders of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising had called for the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia, they did not want to return to the centralist system of the First Republic (1918-1938). The extent to which Slovakia had been changed by the war became evident in the 1946 election. Whereas the Slovak political scene had been split on the issue of Slovakia's position within the common state before the war, all parties standing in 1946 supported Slovak self-rule within Czechoslovakia in their programmes. 23 The Impact of the Socialist Period. In the intersection between empirical studies that directly or indirectly offer an explanation for the success of nationalism in post-communist Slovakia and general theoretical works on nationalism, it is possible to identify three main approaches to the question of the impact of the communist era. The first focuses 22 See e.g. Yeshayahu Jelinek : The Parish Republic: H/inka 's Slovak People's Party 1939- 1945 (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1976). lJ Jan Ryc hlik : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20.stoleti: Cesko-slovenske vztahy 19451992 (Bratislava: Academic Electronic Press, 1998), pp.40-42. SLOVAKIA 39 mainly on the way in which nationalism survived despite the forty years of communism. Given the strength of Slovak nationalism before Communism and the resilience of ethnic and cultural ties, nationalism would, according to this approach, have survived whatever policy the Communist Party had chosen. Scholars taking this approach would put the greatest emphasis on the 'deep' historic background outlined above. The second approach, where scholars stress the continuation of nationalism through the socialist period, could be considered the mainstream historical view . This approach focuses on the way Slovak national identity and support for nationalism survived the socialist era not only because of their pre-1948 strength, but also due to certain policies during Communism that served to strenghten their basis of support. According to the final approach, the success of post-communist nationalism was mainly due to the policies adopted by the Communist Party. Putting much less emphasis on the strength of precommunist national identity and nationalism (and thus the •deep' historical explanation), the 'due to' approach takes two main forms . One focuses on the effects of the socio-economic development of Slovakia during Communism, the other on the impact of the construction of nationally based institutional structures. These three analytical categories form a continuum rather than three clearly identifiable positions. Differences between studies falling into the different categories are generally one of focus or degree. Few scholars argue the extreme positions: that postcommunist nationalism was purely a revival of suppressed nationalism, or that it was a result of developments in the communist period only. Most would note the continued expressions of Slovak nationalism during the communist era, and then stress the degree to which the socialist period suppressed , maintained or actually strengthened the appeal of nationalism. 40 SLOVAKIA Nationalism Despite Communism. Particulary in the first years after the collapse of Communism, the 'retum-of-history'argument was commonly used to explain the success of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. Precommunist nationalism, merely suppressed by the communist regimes, re-emerged to become the political factor it had been forty years earlier. As one historian put it: Communism may have temporarily relieved Central Europe's ethnic tensions for nearly half a century. But if religion was the opiate of the people, Communism proved no more effective than methadone (sic) in suspending their craving for ethnically whole nation states, without providing a cure. 24 In the literature on nationalism in Slovakia, Jacques Rupnik supported this view when he argued that Slovak nationalism had been in the 'communist refrigerator' for most of the period after 1948. 25 Of the monographs in English discussing Slovak nationalism, Stanislav Kirschaum's A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival is, arguably, one of those that leans most toward the 'despite ' approach. 26 While describing in detail the persistence of nationalism during Communism and the radical changes Slovak society went through, Kirschbaum notes no positive effect of the communist regime on the strength of Slovak national identity and nationalism. Rather, he highlights the attempts the communist lea- 1 ' Ingrano: 'Forum ... ' , p. 307 . 15 Jaques Rupnik, quoted in Martin Butora and Zora Butorova: 'Slovakia after the Split ' ,Joumal o[Democracy,vol. 4(1993), no. 2,p. 75 . 16 Stanislav Kirschbaum : A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival (London : Macmillian, 1995). SLOVAKIA 41 dership made at suppressing national identity.27 If Slovak nationalism gained strength during the communist period , it was more a reaction to the 'Czechoslovakism' favoured by the regime .2 8 The primordialist theories of nationalism would be the most obvious theoretical basis for the works in this approach. Stressing the ' ineffable, and at times overpowering' strength of the ' cultural givens' in a society, Clifford Geertz, for example, points to how ethnic ties in some societies come to be seen as a 'natural some would say spiritual affinity' .29 Given the strong emphasis put on cultural belonging in Slovak history, at least since the late nineteeth century, one could argue that ethnicity had gained a primordial character in Slovak society by the end of World War II. Consequently, the communist regime would not have been able to suppress Slovak identity, and therefore neither the potential for Slovak nationalism. While not going as far as the primordialist in stressing the naturalness of central ties, the so-called ethno-sym- bolist theories of nationalism could also be interpreted as lending support to the 'despite' approach. According to Anthony D. Smith, post-communist nationalism confirms the resilience and strength of ehnic myths, symbols and popular memory. He writes:' Though the timing of the current ethnic revival is a function of social and geopolitical changes, their contents and intensities are largely determined resources,' by pre-existing ethno-sy mbolic 30 27 Note e.g. ibid., pp. 228, 245, 252. Kirschbaum ta.lees a very favo urable view of Slovak nationalism and a more negative one of the common Czech and Slovak state . " Ibid., p. 24 7. 19 Clifford Geertz: The Interpretation of Cultures (London : Fontana, 1973). pp . 259-260 . 0 ' Anthony D. Smith : 'LSE Centennial Lecture: The Resurgence of Nationalism ? Myth and memory in the renewal of nations ', British Journal of Sociology, vo l. 42 SLOVAKIA Empirical support for the 'despite' argument can be found in post-communist Slovakia. In a study of regional patterns of political culture, a group of Slovak sociologists found strong similarities between the inter-war and post-communist era. 31 In both periods, nationalist and populist parties gained most support in northwest and central Slovakia. The persistence of this regional pattern seems to suggest that at least elements of pre-communist political culture had been preserved. Moreover, studies from other post-communist countries show that national minorities that were actively discouraged from maintaining their separate identity and culture, still emerged to voice nationalist demands after Communism. In Poland, this was the case with the German minority .32 While counter-factual history necessarily amounts to speculation, it does seem likely that regardless of what the policy the Communists had adopted, also the separate Slovak identity, in both its cultural and political expression, would have survived. The relatively short period of communist rule would clearly have facilitated this. As can be seen from the above, focusing on links to pre-communist nationalism and the preservation of popular myths and memory has some advantages. Firstly, it points to the strength of ethnic nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War. The conviction that ethnically defined nations formed natural bases for political legitimacy, be it in a separate state or as 47 (1996), no. 4, p. 573. Elsewhere, Smith does stress the role of communi st policies in preserving these myths and memories. See e.g. Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, 237, endnote 9. 31 Vladimir Krivy , Viera Fialova and Daniel Balko: Slovensko a jeho regi6ny: sociokultume suvislosti volebneho spravania (Bratislava: Nadacia Media, 1996). 12 Janusz Mucha: 'Democratisation and Cultural Minorities: The Polish Case of the 1980s/90s', East European Quarterly, vol. 25 (1992), no. 4. SLOVAKIA 43 an autonomous region within a larger entity, had by 1948 been deeply ingrained in CEE. This was not only the case with most of the Slovak political elite, but also, many historians would agree, large parts of the population. Secondly, stressing the preservation of political culture is perhaps the only way to explain the continued regional pattern of support for nationalism. In its pure form, the 'despite' argument rejects any important effect of the socialist period on national identity and the popular view of nationalism. If one accepts that national identity is a social construct, that nations are not some kind of natural social unit, this jump across forty years of history is difficult to defend. As shall be discussed in more detail below, 1948-1989 was probably the most dramatic period of social and economic change in Slovak history. It was also a period of an intense policy of officially managed, public socialisation. Given the impact this period had on people' s lives, it seems difficult to assume that popular views on national identity and nationalism would not also change. One example that it had is that before 1948 Slovakia was a deeply religious society and mainstream nationalism was strongly connected to the Catholic Church. In the post-communist period, however, the leading nationalists parties HZDS and SNS were both secular. Catholic nationalism, as represented by the Christian Democratic Party (KDH), was much less successful. Explanations focusing more on the way the communist period served to change Slovak national identity and thereby the bases for nationalism during that period, thus seemingly provide a more convincing explanation for the widespread appeal of nationalism in the postcommunist era. Finallly, the 'despite' argument cannot explain the emergence of 'new' nationalisms in the post-communist period . Some groups without a history of common national identity and nationalism formed nationalist parties after 1989. Most im- 44 SLOVAKIA portantly, this included the Roma community. Also the emergence of a relatively strong nationalism in Moravia and Silesia was a sign of the increased importance of cultural identity. 33 Traditionally a regional identity and before Communism never a major political issue, the Moravian-Silesian autonomy party became the largest party in the Czech National Council in 1990. Nationalism Through the Communist Era. The 'through' approach makes up the middle ground between stressing the resilience of pre-communist nationalism and the strengthening of national identity during the communist period. Studies falling into this category would seek to explain the perpetuation of national conflict due to the persistence of support for nationalism built up before the communist period and to certain factors that served to strengthen Slovak national identity during the 1948-1989 era. Most historical studies tend to be in this category. Carol Skalnik Leff' s 1987 seminal book on national conflict in Czechoslovakia is probably the best study in English in this category. 34 In Leff's analysis, the deep social, economic and cultural differences between the Czech Lands and Slovakia were politicised during the inter-was republic. A triangular pattern of support and opposition was created, whereby the central leadership in Prague relied on the pro-Czechoslovak section of the Slovak political elite to help neutralise the demands of Slovak nationalists. In the communist period , this pattern persisted until it was displaced JJ Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin: Czechoslovakia 1918- 1992: A Laboratory for Social Change (Oxford: Macmill an and St. Anthony ' s, 1996), p. 51 . 14 Leff: National Conflict. Ryc hlik: Cesi a Slovaci .. . 1945-1992 is a later, eve n more detailed work of this approcah. SLOVAKIA 45 with the ascent of Gustav Husak to power in 1969. Both the interwar and the socialist regimes failed in their attempts to modernize away the problem of Slovak nationalism (culturally and educationaly in the inter-war period, economically during socialism). These failures, combined with the unwillingness of both regimes to adequately accommodate the Slovak nationalist's demands, led to a growing sense of antagonism (mutual antagonism, as Czechs resented that Slovaks used times of international crisis to force through their demands). Leff concludes: 'Given the persistence of Slovak national feeling, on the one hand, and Czech power, on the other, the result has been persistent national conflict'. 35 While Leff notes that Slovak nationalism was strong in the post-war period, much due to the experience of statehood during the war, she also identifies several factors during the communist era that served to strengthen its basis. The existence of separate Slovak political institutions, for instance, was important. Leff writes: 'Week as the KSS (Slovak Communist Party) and the SNR (Slovak National Council) were in the years following 1948, both would retain the capacity to serve as nationalist time bombs. ' 36 One important reason for this was that the system of separate Slovak institutions created a Slovak elite separate from Prague-based Czechoslovak one. 37 Also other aspects of the regime 's policy proved counter-productive to its official aim of promoting the 'coming together' (zblfienie) of Czechs and Slovaks. The mass media, for instance, was 'segmented and not adapted to the integrative intentions of the policy-making elite. 38 Thus , by the late 1980, 'the Slovak question ' had become 'deeply, perhaps 35 Leff: National Conflict, p. 282. Ibid ., p. 112 . 37 Ibid ., p.294 . " Ibid., p. 297 . 36 46 SLOVAKlA irreversibly, woven into the fabric of Czechoslovak politics as usual'. This statement carries with it the implication that the Slovak question wi1l continue to assert itself as a political force in the future .39 Three years after Leff published her study, her prediction came true . Theoretically, the 'through' approach occupies the middle ground between the primoridalists emphasis on the strength of cultural ties and the stress put on social processes by the modernist and institutional views outlined below. With more emphasis on the way myths, symbols, values and memories are preserved in societies, ethno-symbolist theories would come closest to forming a theoretical basis for this approach. From the ethno-symbolist perspective, the communists ' attempt to defuse nationalism in Slovakia by flagging symbols of self-determination could only serve to strengthen the feeling of national identity. The reason for this was that the only symbols that would evoke a positive response from the population would be symbols that had a basis in popular tradition . For example, while the communists did try to reframe the historical image of r.udovft Stur as a social revolutionary, they could not eradicate the view of Stur as a champion of Slovak rights so strongly ingrained in popular tradition and myths . As Smith writes : "Ethno-history is no sweetshop in which nationalists may ' pick and mix'; it sets limits to any appropriation by providing a distinctive context and patterns of events, personages and ,, 4 0 processes ... . The most obvious strength of the 'through' approach is that by stressing both the strong social basis of pre-communist nationalism and the way it was maintained and changed during the 1948-1989 period , it can account more or less convincingly for 39 ' 0 Ibid. , pp. 281 -282 . Smith: Nationalism and Modernism, p. 45 SLOVAKIA 47 nationalism in both periods. It points to the continuity of not only political conflict over the status of Slovakia, but also that of popular symbols and myths. Noting how the communist period maintained and strengthened preexisting national identity and traditions also allows for an explanation of the persistent regional differences in support for nationalism. Despite these important strengths, however, the 'through' approach does have some weak points. Some will argue that the most important of these is that it does not go far enough in emphasising how dramatically the communist period changed Slovak society. As with the 'despite' approach, the focus on the continuation of national conflict through the communist period also faces problems in explaining the 'new' nationalisms of the post-communist era. The political organisation and activism of the Romany community after 1989, for example, is difficult to explain without stressing the way the communist period served to strengthen the importance of ethnic belonging. Nationalism Due to Communism. Studies focusing on the way the communist period . served to strengthen national identity and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe are generally more theoretically grounded than the two approaches above. The presentation of these will therefore have to be a bit different. Two main theoretical starting points can be identified. 41 The first, based on modernisation theories of 41 Shari Cohen supposes a third, unconventional, approach in her Politics without a Past: The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism (Lon- don: Duke University Press, 1999). It was not the strength of national identity in Slovakia that formed the basis for the success of post-communist nationalism, Cohen claims, but rather the lack of a clear historical consciousness. By 48 SLOVAKJA nationalism, focus on the massive socio-economic changes in the CEE countries during the fourty years of communist rule. As many other countries and areas of the region, Slovakia underwent a rapid transformation from an agricultural to an industrial society. Such a process of social modernization, scholars such as Ernest Gellner claim, is the basis for the strength of post-communist nationalism. The second starting point is based on the so called 'new institutionalism' in social science. According to its proponents, the communist regimes honoured their Leninist commitment to national self-determination by building nationally defined institutions and stressing national identities. Rather than, as intended, weakening the social basis for nationalism, however, their policy served to strengthen it. Put otherwise: the Soviet type nationality policy was to be 'nationalist in form, socialist in content ' . When the socialist content disappeared, only the nationalist form remained . Modernisation. It is the erosion of traditional society and its values with urbanisation and the growth of the state that, in Gellner's view, is responsible for the emergence of nationalism.42 In an agricultural society, where mobility is low and socialisation within the family and local community is sufficient, a person's language and culture is of little consequence. Urban life, particularly in the industrial age, exercises different pressures on the population. Industrial society, requiring formal socialisation through an education preventing the emergence of a collective memory of World War II, the communist regime made Slovak society susceptible to elite manipulation after the collapse of communism. 42 Ernest Gellner: Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). SLOVAKIA 49 system, thus makes an individual's culture and especially language important. Particularly when cultural differences overlapped with an actual or perceived pattern of social and economic discrimination, nationalism is a likely outcome. In socialist societies, as they suppressed civil society, class identities and other social lines of identification , the importance of cultural identities became particularly strong. When the regimes collapsed, there existed no 'serious rival ideology ' or any 'serious rival institutions' capable of providing alternatives to identification along national lines. 43 In the resulting 'double vacuum', nationalism, the 'culture of industrialism ', was 'the most plausible and easily available candidate for filling this emptiness. ' 44 After the Communists came to power in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Slovakia entered its most important period of socio-economic development. Over a period of seventeen years, the share of agricultural workers in the total workforce more than halved: from 62.2% in 1948 to30.1% in 1965. 4 5 By 1989 it has reached 14.5%. Similarly, the percentage of the population living in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants increased from 11.5% in 1950 to 40.8% in 1991 .46 In the space of a few decades, Slovakia was transformed from an agricultural to an industrial society. That the industrial structure of Slovakia was accordingly based on the socialist idealisation of heavy industry, matters little in this context. Territorial and social mobility increased, as did the general level of education. The steadily increasing availability and reach 43 Ernest Gellner: ' Nationalism in the Vacuum', in Alexander J. Motyl (ed .): Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities: History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 250. 44 Ernest Gellner: 'Homeland of the Unrevolution' , Daedalus, vol. 122 (1993) , no. 3, p. 152. 45 See Krejci and Machonin : Czechoslovakia, p. 120. 46 Ibid., p. 126. 50 SLOVAKIA of mass communication, such as radio and television, also served to promote a standardised ('high') culture. Combined, these factors served to increase cultural homogeneity in the Slovak population and put focus on the differences between the Slovaks and other cultural groups in society. An individual's cultural-cumnational identity was therefore highlighted . The main strength of the modernist approach is that it brings our attention to the massive social and economic changes in the region during Communism. Slovak society was fundamentally changed through industrialisation and urbanisation . Most theories of nationalism hold that modernisation (towards a Western type society) is at least conducive to the formation of national consciousness and emergence of nationalism. If one accepts this , the socialist period is likely to have strengthened the appeal of nationalism in Slovakia. Furthemore, the modernisation approach offers an explanation for why new ethnic conflicts arose once Communism released its grip. Even the communities without the history of nationalism can be seen to have been mobilised as a result of industrialisation. There are, however, several weaknesses with this modernist view. First, in its pure form it is very functional and does not accredit much importance to ideas. This is problematic particularly because the massive transformation and uprooting of Slovak society took place under heavy pressure from socialist socialisation. Second, if urbanisation and industrialisation were the main causes of post-communist nationalism, then one should expect to find the strongest nationalism where the effects of these processes was strongest. Before 1948 eastern Slovakia was the most 'backward' and multi-cultural region of Slovakia. Consequently, it was one of the regions that went through the most dramatic socio-economic development during Communism. Despite this , after 1989, sup- SLOVAKIA 51 port for nationalist parties in the region was well below the Slovak average. 47 Indeed, inhabitants of Kosice, the 'capital' of eastern Slovakia and the second largest city in the country, were among those most vocally opposed to the break-up of the CSFR in the autumn of 1992.48 The Institutional Approach. The institutional approach places the cause of the strength of post-communist nationalism in the policies and structure, the institutions, of the communist regimes. The stress Leninism put on the right of national self-determination led most Soviet-style socialist regimes to not only promote national self-identification, but also build institutional frameworks along national lines. This served to institutionalise national identity as the key identity and thus create the nationalist bias of politics after the collapse of Communism. In its most basic form , the institutional approach stresses the way in which members of political institutions tend to promote the interests of their institutions in competition with others . Throughout the socialist period, Slovakia had cultural, academic , administrative and political institutions separate from the all-Czechoslovak ones. Due to the policy of stressing the Slovakness of these institutions, recruitment was conducted almost exclusively in Slovakia, and sometimes among Slovaks only. The separate poli tical institutions consisted most importantly of a branch of the Communist Party (KSS), a parliamentary assembly (SNR), and 47 See Krivy, Fialova and Balko: Slovensko ajeho regi6ny, pp.29 1-342 . •• For a more humorous expression of this see Peter Holub: 'At' uz to nestes tf piijde: Kosice se branf mirodnfmu sjednocenf', Respect, 24-30, August 1992, pp. 5-6. 52 SLOVAKIA ( except for the period 1960-69) an executive branch. While limited in their political importance during Communism, these institutions gained a dramatically different role with democratisation . Not long after the collapse of Communism, the Slovak government and legislature started calling for an increase in their competencies. Using nationalist rhetoric to mobilise the population was an obvious way to gain support for strengthening the authority and power of the Slovak institutions at the expense of federal ones. On a more complex level, the institutional approach examines the wider impact institutional structures had on creating certain attitudes and beliefs in the population. One leading institutional theoretician , Rogers Brubaker, explained the strength of postcommunist nationalism in the Soviet Union as a result of the ' dual institutionalisation ' of what he termed ' territorial nationhood ' and 'ethnic nationality ' .49 Territorial nationhood refers to the linkin g of a specific territory to national identity through the admi nistrative division of the country according to nationality. As with most administrative components in the Soviet Union, Slovakia was a clearly defined territorial unit interpreted as the homeland of the Slovaks. While this was made explicit after the federalisation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, it was implicit already from the end of World War IL The principle of equality (rovny s rovnym) introduced during the war and maintained in the 1948 Constitution •• Rogers Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 23-54. The nationality and, particularly after 1969, the institutional stru cture of socialist Czechoslovakia was almost identical to that of the Soviet Unio n. SLOVAKIA 53 was clearly interpreted as a principle of equality of nations. 50 Hungarians, Ruthenes, Romanies and other national groups in Slovakia were national minorities; the Slovaks were the statotvorny (literally: state forming) nation. Along with officially pronouncing Czechoslovakia a country of two nations, the regime built institutions to create the appearance of national self-determination. While Czechoslovakia did not go as far as the Soviet Union in awarding the constituent republics symbols of statehood, the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics were in the 1968 Law on Federalisation declared to have the status of independent legal subjects that surrendered part of their sovereignty to the Federation. The Republics were also awarded the 'inalienable right of self-determination even to the point of separation'. 51 The Law on Federalization thus 'rehabilitated and restored the idea of a national state as an attribute of a fully developed nation'. 52 The effect of this policy was to encourage Slovaks to think of themselves as a separate nation with wide-ranging political rights. The second aspect of Brubaker's institutional approach focuses on the way the communist regime made ethnic identification compulsory. In common English usage, the concepts of 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are synonymous. In the socialist federations, however, the distinction was important. All who held Czechoslovak passports were Czechoslovak citizens. Their nationality, however, would be Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthene, Romany, Polish, Ukrainian or some other. A person's nationality 5 ° Katarina Zavacka: "Metamorf6zy statopravneho postavenia Slovenska v Ceskoslovensku v rokoch 1948-1967" in Vladimir Gonec (ed. ): Cesko-s/oven ska historicka rocenka I 998 (Brno: Masarykova Universita, 1998), pp. 17-29. 51 See ' Ustavnf zakon 143/ 1968 Sb.' at http://www.psp. czldocs/textslconstitution. 1968.html. 52 Kusy: Eseje,p. 69 . 54 SLOVAKIA was ascertained at birth according to that of her of his parents and could generally not be changed. As in inter-war Czechoslovakia, the communist regime did promote a Czechoslovak political identity. Avoiding the word narod, nation, which has clear ethnic connotations, the communists called for the creation of a 'Czec hoslovak working people ' (ceskoslovensky pracujlici J'ud). The identity was not, even in relation to the Czechs and Slovaks, intended as a Czechoslovak cultural identity. On the contrary, the Communist Party put great stress on promoting the cultures of the various national groups, particularly the Slovak. Generous reso urces were devoted to building cultural institutions and supporting the cultural life of all official nationalities. 53 For most children primary and sometimes secondary and higher education was available in their mother tongue. While all culture was to be socialist, the art forms favored by the regime, those that were seen to form the basis of national culture (s uch as folk dancing and traditional artisan-and craftsmanship), were not particularly affected . The Centre for the Production of Folk Art (UI:UV) and the folk-dancing and folk-mu sic group the Slovak People' s Artistic Collective (SI:UK) were presented as the best of centuries-old , traditional Slovak culture, thus reminding all of not only the cultural , but also historical separateness of the Slovaks. Combined, these two processes of institutionalisation made nations and nationality into basic units of people' s world-view. When the communist regime collapsed and democratisation started, nationally based institutions and their elites became centres of 51 See Elena Londakova: ' Slovcnske predjarie: Myty a realita slovenskej inte li gcncic v Ceskoslovensku pred rokom 1956 (a po iiom)', in Vladimir Gonec (ed .): Cesko-s/ovensk;i historick;i rocenka I 998 (Brno: Masarykova Universita, 1998), p. 2 10 and Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska (Prague: NLN, 1998), pp. 275-276 . SLOVAKIA 55 political activity. 54 National identity became the basic organising. principle in politics. The nationally defined elites in the separate national institutions could gain popular support among a population identified and identifying according to their nationality by claiming to defend the interest of that nation. The system of compulsory national identification thus became the basis for new political constituencies. The main strength of the institutional approach is that it offers a very powerfull explanation of the near universal succes of national identity and nationalism as political principles after Communism. It does so by placing the cause of this succes in the very world-view engendered by the communist regime. As Brubaker writes: the communist nationality policy 'created a political field supremely conductive to nationalism' .55 The 'new' nationalism of the post-communist period can therefore be explained. Due to its explanatory strength, the institutional approach has emerged as one of the most popular among scholars trying to explain postcommunist nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the institutional approach, like the other presented above, has its shortcomings. Like the modernist approach it cannot alone explain the regionalised support for nationalism in Slovakia, nor does it account for the impact of pre-communist nationalism. 54 This was also the case for minorities that did not have explicitly political institutions. For example, the Slovak Hungarian cultural organization CSEMADOK became the centre of Hungarian political activity in the first period after 1989. ss Brubaker: Nationalism Reframed, p. I 7 56 SLOVAKIA Conclusion While the process thc1· 1ed to the break-up of the common Czech and Slovak stat:· after communissm has received a fair amount of attention, few scholars have attempted to comprehensively explain why nationalism had such succes in postcommunist Slovakia.56 The above is only an overview of the possible explanations for the success of post-communist nationalism that would meet with the most support among scholars today. In fact, it is doubtful there will ever be single generally accepted explanation, be it theoretical or historical. As Katherine Verdery noted, nationalism in the post-communist region 'has many causes, ranging from the macro-social to matters of personal identity. It is, in other words, overdetermined, and the relevant causes vary from one county to another. 5 7 What is needed to approach a consensus on what factors were most important in the Slovak case, is a series of studies that evaluate the explanatory power of various approaches, such as those above. If this article serves to encourage someone to write such a study, it has served its purpose. ,. To this author's knowledge, the only monograph that explicitly does so is Cohen: Politics without a Past. 57 Katherine Verdery: 'Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-socialist Romania' , Slavic Review, vol. 52 (1993), no. 2, p. 180.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 'Slovák som a Slovák budem...': Explaining Nationalism in Post-Communist Slovakia Description An account of the resource Paal Sigurd Hilde Slovakia, Vol. 37 (No. 68-69), 2003 pp. 28-56 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hilde, Paal Sigurd, 1970- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2003 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fb2ab3a578d038d57e9b181c3c6076c1.pdf 32d484c7344930be58908110a965a896 PDF Text Text 81 SLOVAKIA From Bratr nas to At'jdou Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague 1 Paa! Sigurd Hilde The Velvet Divorce between the Czech and Slovak parts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub lic (CSFR) was a political undertaking. All public opinion polls taken in the period 1990-1992 showed a clear majority in favour of a common state among both Slovaks and Czechs.2 The decision to divide the country came as a result of a compromise between two political parties - or more specifically, between two politicians: Vaclav Klaus of the (Czech) Civic Democratic Party and Vladimfr Meciar of the (Slovak) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. While both Klaus and Meciar argued that they wanted to preserve the common state, their visions of such a Czech and Slovak state were so disparate that an agreement to differ was the only possibility. Most detailed studies of the break-up agree that if either of them , Meciar or Klaus, were to be identified as 'more guilty' in promoting the break-up, it would not be the Slovak nationali st Meci ar, but the Czech ' Thatcherite ' Klaus. 3 Ultimately, what sank the good ship Czechoslovakia was that the Czech captain, the ' A sli ghtly different version of thi s arti cle was originall y published in Norwegian in Nordisk @stforum, Yol . 15/2. 200 I , pp.5-16. 2 See. for example, Sharon Wolchik: 'The Pol itics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia', fast European Politics and Society, Vol. 8/ 1994. I , pp.153-188. 3 See, for example, Abby Innes: Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. London. 200 I , particularly pp. 176-2 19. �SLOVAKIA 82 o ne that had a lw ays fo ught the hardest to keep it a fl oat, gave the order to sc uttle. The a im of thi s paper is to prov ide a n in sig ht into the deve lopme nt of the vi e ws on Slovaki a, Slovaks and Slova k nati o na li sm in th e Czec h Land s: fro m the ideas unde rl y in g the creati o n of Czech oslova ki a in 19 18 to those leading to the di sso luti o n of th at country in 1992. Natu ra ll y, the re is no c lear 'Czec h view ' of matters re lating to Sl ova ki a. Even if one di srega rds indi vidu a l o pini o ns and con ce ntrates o n what mi g ht be ca ll ed c ultura l ' heteroste reotypes' (v ie ws of the othe r), o ne w ill still find , fo r in stance, strong reg io na l differe nces w ithin the Czech La nd s. Any ana lys is of the ' Czec h view ' will thu s, eve n in the best case, be a probl e mati c prese ntati o n o f e lu sive collecti ve attitudes. Furthe rm ore, give n the absence of publi c opinio n surveys fo r most of the peri od studi ed , it is imposs ibl e to asce rta in ho w representati ve suc h attitudes were. The pi cture of Sl o va ki a presented here will be based to a large deg ree o n the attitudes ex pressed by leadin g po liti c ia ns, jo urn a li sts a nd o th er ' opini o n-fo rmers' in the Czec h Lands. For thi s reaso n the arti c le will present o pini o ns mo re typi ca l of Prague tha n. fo r in stance, Mo ra via, whe re co ntacts w ith Slovaks a nd Sl ovaki a we re more direct. Ho we ve r, as an earli er study , simil ar to thi s, argued , ' in Prag ue and in the C zec h Land s in genera l there are few opportunities to ga in a broad , direct impress ion of Slovaks, and the Czec h view of the Slovak is the refore the res ult of tra nsmitted , dedu ced impress io ns. ' 4 Whe n attitudes are acqui red ma inl y indirec tl y, opini o n-formers pl ay an important rol e. Gi ve n the limited scope of thi s arti c le, th e many theoreti cal and methodo log ica l pro bl e ms of suc h a stud y ca nno t be e xamined. Interestin g a nd impo rtant aspec ts, suc h as the inte raction between th e C zech and Slo va k he teroste reotypes o f eac h othe r, will al so have to be ig no red . Gi ven these limitati o ns, thi s articl e beco mes a mere in - 0 Petr Pi'fh oda : ' Slovac i ces kyma ocima'. Svedect vf, Vol. I 3/52. 1976, p.637. T he arti cle was publi shed under the pseudonym Jan Prfbram. �SLOVAKIA 83 troducti o n to the issue - an introducti o n th at mi g ht mo ti vate othe rs to make a c loser and broader examin atio n. Three aspects - three stages In her exce ll e nt stud y of the co nfli c t betwee n S lova ks a nd Czec hs, Caro l Ska lnik Leff a na lysed the develo pme nt of a se nse of mutu a l resentment betwee n the two gro ups. 5 A lmost througho ut Czechos lovak hi sto ry, there was persiste nt o ppos it ion fro m the Czec hdo min ated politi ca l leade rship , bo th de mocrati c a nd Co m m uni st, aga in st ful fi llin g pro mi ses of a uto no my for the Slova k part of the co untry. On the one hand , thi s fa ilure to live up to the pro m ises of 19 18, 1945 and , some argue, 1968, led to the deve lo pme nt of a sense of betraya l in Slovak ia. On the ot her ha nd, in creas ing numbers of Czec hs ex pressed a nger over what they perce ived as S lovak in gratitude - Slovak ungratefuln ess fo r a ll the ass istance Czec hs affo rded Slovaki a. Moreove r, the way Slovak po liti c ians, in the Czec h perception, ex pl o ited tim es of crisis in Czec hos lovaki a to pro mo te the ir narrow nati o na li st ai ms ca used pa rti c ul ar rese ntm ent. T h is deeprooted mutu al resentme nt was, Leff arg ued in 1987 , o ne of th e ma in reasons why the co nfl ic t betwee n the Czec hs a nd S lovaks wo ul d rema in an unresolved pro bl e m.6 She was soon to be proven right. If o ne examines the Czec h view of S lovaki a, Slovaks and S lovak natio na li sm mo re broad ly than Leff, it is poss ible to ide nti fy two furth er impo rta nt aspec ts of the Czec h view. The firs t mi g ht be des cribed as big-brothe rl y co nce rn . Ma ny Czec h inte ll ect ua ls, po li tic ians and other Slova ko ph iles we re ge nuine ly interes ted in and conce rned abo ut th e we lfare and fate of the S lova ks. T he ir e ngagement was we ll in tended and , espec ia ll y before 19 18 but a lso later, of g reat he lp to Slova k inte ll ec tu a l a nd c ultu ra l li fe. However, no t in fre qu e ntl y d id thi s bi g brothe rl y co nce rn deve lop into a peda nt ic a nd 5 Carol Skalni k Leff: Na tional Conf7ict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton . 1987 , particu larly pp. 148-177. 6 Ibid .. p. 282 . �84 SLOVAKI A arroga nt pate rn a li sm . Not surpri s in g ly, thi s was not favo urabl y received in Slovak ia. T he seco nd aspec t of the Czec h view of S lova ki a a nd the S lovaks is best described as a lac k of aware ness. Average know ledge of po liti ca l a nd eco no mi c conditi o ns in S lova ki a a nd S lova k c ul ture was never ex tensive in the Czech Lands. Partic ul arl y impo rtant was th e w id espread ig norance of the c ultu ra l, soc ia l and es pec iall y re li g iou s diffe re nces betwee n th e average Czec h and Slovak. Hi sto ri ca ll y, thi s un aware ness was to a large degree a res ult of th e qui ck and re lati ve ly pa inl ess acce ptance by the Czec hs of a Czechos lovak ide ntity and the offic ia l ideo logy of the ex iste nce of a Czec hos lovak nati o n. Thi s lack of kn o wl edge often led to in sensiti vity to wards Slovak di stin cti ve ness. Czech po liti c ia ns thu s occas io na ll y made po litica l dec isio ns that suited co nditio ns in the Czec h La nds w itho ut proper concern fo r the di ffe rent impac t the ir po lic ies mi g ht have on Slovaki a. C learl y, th ere is no c lear-c ut di stinc ti o n betwee n the three analytica l aspects of the Czec h view of Slovaks and Slovak nationa li sm. A ll three were present to a greate r o r lesser ex tent th rougho ut the hi story of co ntacts between the two gro ups, and they overl ap. To a certa in degree, however, th ey re prese nt stages throu g h whi c h ma in strea m o pini o n in th e Czec h La nd s went as time progressed . Bi gbrothe rl y co ncern was c learly the most important facet in th e pre19 18 pe ri od and in the ear ly years of the First Repu bli c. The inte rwar pe ri od is most stro ng ly marked by the Prague leadership ' s ig norance of the parti c ul ar soc ia l, econo mi c and re li g io us conditi o ns in Slovak ia. After the dra mati c eve nts in 1938 and 1939, wi th the Mu ni c h Acco rd, S lova k a uto no my a nd la te r ' ind e pe nde nce ' durin g Wo rl d W ar II , Czec h rese ntme nt towards the Slovaks, a nd espec iall y S lovak nat io na li sm, beco mes in creas in g ly impo rta nt. Fi fty years later, thi s animos ity was to dec ide the fa te of the co mm on Czec h and Sl ovak state. �SLOVAKIA 85 Big Brother In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overarching aim of Czech political parties was to force Vienna to acce pt increased autonomy for ' the hi storic lands ' (basically today 's Czech Republic) within the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of a wider Slav cooperation within the Empire, particularly with th e Slovaks, had ga in ed stre ngth among Czech intell ec tual s from about the 1830s. However, after the success of Hung aria n nat ion ali sm in th e 1867 Ausgleich, Czech leaders became concerned not to a ntagoni se their potential allies in Budapest. The result was that 'Czec h politicians, thou gh sy mpathetic toward [the Slovaks], were re luctant to inte rfere on the ir behalf in Hungary, for this would constitute a violation of Hungary 's state rights and mi ght jeo pardize the Czech program that was based on Bohemia's hi storic state ri ghts. ' 7 The lack of broader politica l cooperation did not preve nt an increasing activism in favour of the c ulturall y oppressed Slovaks, especially among Czech intellectua ls. Whil e Czech culture and society , and Czech nationalism, deve loped rapidly in line with the rapid social and economic deve lopm e nts in the re lativel y liberal Austrian part of the Monarch y, the s itu ation for Slovak culture a nd nationali sm was much more difficult. Particularly after 1867, the Hun garian authoriti es led a heavy-handed assimilation policy (Magyarisation) towards the minorities in Hungary . Many Czech intellectuals expressed a deep sy mpathy for the fate of what they saw as their Slovak brethren in Hun gary and the Slovak national dema nd s. 8 Especially 7 Victor S. Mamatey: 'The Estab li shment of the Republic'. in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza (eds.): A History or the Czechosl ovak Republic: 19 18- 1948. Princeton . 1973 , pp. 3-38 (9). 8 Under th e leadership of L'.udovit Stur. Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodza, a Slovak National Council , formed in Vienna on 16 September I 848 , gave Slovak nationalism its first clear political expression in form of the declaration De mands or the Slovak Nation. Thirteen years later, this time inspired mainly by Stefan Marko Daxner and Jan Francisci, an even clearer national programme was formulated in the 186 1 Memorandum or the Slovak Nation. See Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska. Prague. 1998. pp. I 19- 13 1. �SLOVAKIA 86 from th e 1880s , ac ti ve support fo r Slovak nati onali st intell ec tu als increased. As H. Gordon Sk ill ing wrote: 'from the leighteen] eighties on, there graduall y deve loped, among Czech cultu ra l and pro fes sional persons, a substanti al concern for the Slovaks and a desire to promote Czech and Slovak cooperati on. ' 9 M ost importantl y, the Czech interest in Sl ovaki a took an organised fo rm w ith th e creati on of Ceskoslovanska j edn ota (Czec hos lav Unity), in 1895 . Thi s organi sati on offered fin ancial support to Slovak publi cati ons, grants for Slovak students in the Czech L ands and promoted Czech in vestments in Slovaki a. 1° Furthermore, Ceskoslovan- ska jedn ota sought to spread in form ati on about Sl ovaki a and the Slovaks among Czechs. Thi s w illingness to help the Sl ovaks did not di sappear with the es tabli shment of th e Czec hoslovak state in 19 18. With the gradu al ' liberation ' of what the new Czechos lovak authoriti es considered to be 'S lovaki a' (no admini strati ve boundari es ex isted), a new admini strati on had to be establi shed. The old admini strati ve apparatu s in Hungary consisted almost exc lusive ly of M agyars (ethni c Hungari ans) or ass imil ated intelligenti fro m other cultures. M ost of these refu sed to work for the new Czechos lovak state. As there were far from sufficient educated, patri oti c Sl ovaks to take over the admini strati on, officials had to be imported from the Czech L ands. The first major immi grati on ca me in the spring of 19 19, when ra il way and postal workers in Sl ovaki a stopped work ing to protest again st the new regime. A t th e urgent request of K ornel Stodola, the official res ponsibl e for ra il ways, ' several th ousand patri oti c Czech 9 H . Gordon Ski lling: T. G. Ma.r nryk : Against the Current. 1882- 19 14. London . 1994. p.68 (hereafter Ski ll ing: Mw;ary k). JU Mi ros lav Pek nfk: ·K profi lu slovensko-ceskych vztahov pred prvou sve tovou voj - nou'. in Mi lan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (eds.) : Slovensko ,w zaciatku 20. storocia (Spo /ocnost: stat a narod v siiradniciach doby). Brati slava. 1999. pp.9 1-9 3: Mari e L. Neudorn: ' Slovakia in the Czech Press at the Turn of the ineteen th and Twe nti eth Ce ntu ries' . in John Morison (ed. ): The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers fro m the Fourth World Cong ress for So viet and East European Studies. Harrogille. I 990. London . 1992. pp. 38-6 I. �SLOVAKIA 87 vo lunteers hurri ed fro m Bohe mi a a nd Mo ra via and at a mo me nt 's notice.' 11 Late r, me mbe rs of othe r profess ion a l groups ca me to take up vacant pos iti o ns in S lovaki a: sc hoo lteac hers, uni versity lec ture rs, gend armes, tax collectors a nd bureaucrats of a ll so rts. It has bee n estimated th at 50-60 000 Czec hs went to Sl ovaki a in 19 19-20 and about as many aga in in the years up to 1930. 12 Whil e undo ubtedl y moti vated partl y by the ava il ability of jobs, the w illin g ness to uproot and move to still un safe S lova ki a o n sho rt no ti ce does suggest at least some idea li sm amo ng the vo lunteers. In 19 19-20 there was still armed confli ct betwee n Hun gari an and Czechoslo va k fo rces fo r control o ve r Slovaki a. Even fo r an un e mpl oyed bu reaucrat it could no t have been an easy dec isio n to move there. Few Czec hs can be seen to have do ne mo re to ra ise sy mpathy fo r the Sl o vaks a nd the ir fa te th an To mas Garri g ue Masaryk. Bo rn in Hodonfn , in the Slov acko reg io n of Morav ia, Masaryk ca me fro m a reg ion o n the bo rde r betwee n Czec h and Sl ova k lang uage and c ul ture. Hi s fa ther was Sl ova k and hi s moth er a Germ ani sed C zec h. 13 Gi ven thi s bac kg round , the idea of Czec h and Slovak politica l cooperation mu st have co me easil y to M asaryk. In hi s po litica l li fe , he became one of the ma in propo ne nts of suc h cooperati o n among Czec h politi c ians. As a pro fessor at the C harl es Uni ve rs ity in Prag ue, he was the ma in so urce of in spirati o n fo r a g roup of Slovak stu dents who wo uld later make up an impo rta nt part of the po liti ca l e lite in Czechoslova ki a. Th ese stude nts , best know n as hlasisti, afte r th e name of the ir j o urn a l Hlas (Vo ice), beca me the ma in supporte rs of the C zechos lovak idea in Slovaki a. 14 Yet, despite hi s ge nuin e co nce rn for the S lovaks, M asary k 's speec hes and arti c les at times ex pressed a pa te rn a li st and arroga nt 11 R. W. Seton-Watson : A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London. 1943. p.323. 12 Jan M ec hyr: Slovensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I. Prague. 199 1. p.27. 1 '- K arel Capek: Hovory s T. G. M asa1y kem. Prag ue. 1947. pp.8-9, I I 8. 14 Vl ad im ir Bakos: Questions of the Nation in Slo va k Thoug ht. Brati slava. 1999. pp.1 3-57 . �88 SLOVAKIA attitude toward s Slovak culture and hi story . For instance, Masaryk rej ected calls for a plebisc ite in Slovakia after World War l, arg uin g that 'one cannot allow such a vote there, since the Slovaks have bee n so oppressed that they have never had the opportunity to think politically and they would not know in whose hand s to put th eir fate. ' 15 Even c learer was hi s comment on rece nt negotiation s with Slovak leaders in a letter to hi s dau ghter Alice, in 1924: 'It is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or rather spoilt brats.' 16 Given the relatively low educational level and minimal political experience of most Slovaks in 1918 , claims about their immaturity clearly had some justification in the first years after the establi shme nt of Czechoslovakia. However, Czech politicians continued throu ghout the ex istence of the Czechoslovak state to explain the lack of understanding for their policies in Slovakia as a sign of the politica l immaturity of Slovaks. Commenting on relations between Czech and Slovak exiles during World War II, for instance, Edvard Be nes informed the British Foreign Mini stry , that ' the re existed unity among the Czechs while the Slovaks, he conceded, because of their political immaturity, reflected the divided opinions at home.' 17 Also in the post-Communist period , Slovak nationalism , and especially its more radical expressions, were presented as clear signs of the political immaturity of the Slovaks. 'Everyone has the right to live his nineteenth century,' became a common remark in sarcastic comments. 18 " Quoted in Robert 8. Pynsent: ' Masaryk 's ·' Path of Democracy". Or: The Democrati c National Socialist Ideal'. in K atarina A. M . K ocourek (ed.): T. G. Masaiyk 1850- /937. A Collection of Essays to Commemora te the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas G. Masaryk . London, 2000, p. 35 -57 (41 ) (a specia l issue of Masa1yk Journal). 16 Quoted in Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek: The Life of Eduard Benes: Cze- choslovakia in Peace and War. Oxford , 1997, p.5 I (herea fter Zeman and Klimek: Eduard Benes) . 17 Quoted ibid. pp.168-69. 18 Otto U lc: 'Czechoslovakia ' s Velvet Divorce ' , East European Quarterly, Vol.30/3, 1996, pp. 33 1-352 (340). �SLOVAKIA 89 From a Czech po int of view, the re lati o nship between the C zechs and Sl ovaks was c learl y a bi g broth er - littl e brother re lati o nship. The Czech partner in the Czec h-S lovak unio n was c learl y superior in po pulati o n (abo ut 2: I), and fo r most of the hi sto ry of the common state a lso in soc io-econo mic deve lo pment (for example, in education , car-ow nership , numbe r of te le pho nes , etc .). Czech nationa li sts could be proud of a ri c h nati o na l hi story a nd a hi g hl y deve lo ped Czec h c ulture, whil e Slovak nati o na li sts, for hi stori ca l reasons, had less to brag abo ut. The pi cture of Slovaki a as a less deve lo ped, less c ultured ' hinte rl and ' re ma in ed in Czec h po pul ar c ulture, parti c ul arl y in Prague, eve n after Slovak ia reac hed a basica ll y equ al leve l of soc io-econo mi c developme nt (abo ut I 980) . 19 As Petr Prfh oda, the pse udo nymo us Jan Prfbram, observed in the ex ile jo urna l Svedect vfin 1976: T he charac te ri sti c tra its of [the Czec h view of Slovaks a nd S lovaki a] have o ne co mmo n de no m inato r: an a lbe it unc lear, th o ug h multi face ted inferiority. Slovaks see m primiti ve, imm ature, emo ti o na ll y unrestra ined and uneducated [ ... ] The na ivety and lack of ex pe ri e nce amo ng those who come to the unknow n Czec h e nvironme nt is qui c kl y mi sunde rstood as stupidity. A Slovak is qu ite simpl y asc ribed a child 's menta li ty .20 Ignorance On the first page of its 27 Nove mber 1935 iss ue, in an artic le by the fa mo us Czec h jo urn a li st Ferdin and Pe routka, the influenti al journal Pl ftomnost (Presence) asked its readers: ' Do you know of anyone who unde rstand s Slova ki a?' 2 1 F ifty-fi ve years late r, Vac lav Have l' s ad visor Pe te r Hun c ik to ld the Ch a irm a n of th e Sl ova k N ati o na l 19 M il an K ucera and Zdenek Pavlfk: ·Czech and Slovak Demograph y ·, in Jiff M usil (ed.): The End or Czechoslovak ia. Budapest, 1995 , pp. 15-39. 20 Prfhoda: ·s Jovaci ceskyma oc ima' , p.643. 21 Ferd inand Peroutka: ·Nevfte o nekom , kdo rozu mf Slovensku?' , Prfto mnos t, Vo l. 12/47. 1935 , p. I . as reprod uced in Anton Ras la: Zastupova l som ceskoslovensky stat - vyznanie. Presov, 1999, p.268. �90 SLOVAKIA Co un c il , Fra nti se k Mi k losko, th at the Pres ide nt a lways had mi graines whe n he trave ll ed in Slovaki a. 22 Thi s was no t due to the c lim ate, but beca use Have l fe lt great unease abo ut not know ing Slovaki a. Such ac know ledge me nts refl ect the limited kno wl edge of Slovaki a and the Slovaks in the C zech Land s. As Prfhoda o bserved : ' Of all the ne ig hbo urin g nati o ns we know the S lovaks the leas t and ex press the least interest in the m and the ir nat io n. Admittedl y, we have been introdu ced th e best to th e Sl ova ks, but we kn ow th e leas t abo ut the m. ' 23 It is poss ible to ide nti fy severa l reasons fo r thi s lac k of know ledge and understanding. Partl y, it was a res ult of the somew hat confusin g nature of Slovak po liti cs . A lmost thro ugho ut the histo ry of Czechoslovaki a, the politica l e lite in Slova ki a was di vided o n the iss ue of inc reased se lf-governm e nt. Pe ri odi ca ll y, thi s inte rn a l stru gg le amon g S lovak po liti c ians over whethe r S lovaks did or did not want a uto no my mu st have been confu s in g eve n for th e most interested C zech o bserver. Gu stav Hu sak, fo r exampl e, contributed to muddlin g the picture of S lovak nati o na li sm : fro m be ing the prime propo ne nt o f th e federa li sati o n of Czec hos lova ki a befo re a nd durin g the 1968 ' Prag ue S prin g', Hu sak sudde nl y changed into a pro po ne nt of ce ntrali sati o n o nce he was in po wer in Prag ue. Thi s s ituation was exacerbated by the lac k of opportunity pro po nents of inc reased Sl ovak se lf- rul e had to prese nt thei r views to the Czech publi c. Genera ll y, the Slovak po liti c ians who most eas il y ga ined access to the pages of the Prag ue press were those in favo ur of centra li sed rul e. Furth e rmo re, the lac k of know ledge a nd unde rstand in g of S lovaki a a mo ng Czec hs was a res ult of a lac k of in terest in S lova k affa irs. Slovaki a was, at least in the in ter- war peri od, a po liti ca ll y less impo rta nt part of the country. Even if sy mpathy fo r the S lovaks had pl ayed a ro le in the suppo rt C zec h po li tic ians gave the pl ans fo r an inde pe nde nt Czec hos lova ki a, th e re we re o ther impo rt a nt reaso ns 22 Frantsiek M iklosko: Cas stretnutf. Brati slava, 1996, p.44. 23 Pffhoda: ·s tovaci ceskyma oci ma', p.643. �91 SLOVAKIA why they wanted a union . The main ' problem ' in Czech hi story has been the question of the Czechs ' position as a small nation surrounded by Germans. In Slovakia and the Slovaks, Czech leaders found a doub le solution to their problem. As a people, the Slovaks represented a biological reinforcement to the Czech , renamed the Czechoslovak, nation , making it the majority nation in the new state. They thus helped legitimate Czech(oslovak) domination of Czechoslovakia. (One should not forget that there were about 50 per cent more German than Slovak speakin g citizens (3 versus 2 million ) in interwar Czechoslovakia.) As a territory . Slovakia formed a bridge out of the German encirclement towards Ru ssia, which before 1917 was perceived as a rival of Germany and protector of the Slavs, and towards Czechoslovakia ·s all y Romania. For those perceivin g the state from such a ' Great-Czech ' point of view, Czechos lovakia was merely 'a reestabli shment of th e Czech state, reinforced by the Slovak territorie s, which were so weak and neglected that it was simply not necessary to see them as a separate entity. ' 24 The most important reason for the lack of knowl edge and understandin g of Slovakia among Czechs was , however. the uncritical acceptance of the Czechoslovak idea by most Czechs. In th e interwar yea rs, the Czechoslovak ideo logy was a pillar ce ntral to the very existence of the state. Even Masaryk argued th at ' there is no such thing as a Slovak nation 25 paganda ' . l- .. I; that is an invention of Hungarian pro- In Slovakia, on the other hand, the idea of one Czecho- slovak nation met res istance, [i]n the minds of th e Czechs, the notions of 'Czec h' and ' Czechoslovak' had blended into one by th e end of the Second World War at the latest. A significa nt conseq uence of thi s psycho- soci al operation was the removal of the Slovaks as a distinct ethni c entity from the Czech field of vis ion . The Slovaks eventuall y began to be perceived as H L.:.ubomfr Liptak: Slovensko v 20. storocf. Bratisl ava. 1998. 2nd edition. p. 128 . 15 Pynse nt : ' Masaryk ·s "Pa th of Democracy''". p.41. �92 SLOVAKIA part of the same nat iona l organi sm - almost as the advocates of the Czechoslovak concept would like to have it only thi s organi sm was not Czechoslovak but Czech.26 The net result of thi s process was that the social, c ultura l and reli g ious differences betwee n the Czechs and Slovaks became invisible to the majority of Czechs who never learned to kn ow the Slovaks and Slovakia directly. Thi s aga in led to the anticipatio n that Slovaks would have a s imil ar world view and would react in the sa me way as Czechs to events and po li c ies. The co nsequences of such anticipation varied over time. In the inter-war period , it was the insensitive attitude of the new regime towards the Catholic Church that was most important. Czech nation alism had the Hu ss ite peri od as its Golden Age; a Golden Age that was termin ated by the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the following violent co unterReform ation in Bohemia and , to a somew hat lesser degree, Morav ia. With the sec ulari sing impact of the industriali sation and urbani sati on of the Czech Lands in the nineteenth century, thi s gave Czech nationalism a not only sec ul ar, but often an openly anti-Catho lic edge. 27 Although the Protestant minority was proportionately bi gger in Slovakia than in the Czech Land s, there was no clear connection between anti-Catholici sm and nation ali sm even amon g Protestant Slovak nat ionali sts. On the contrary, one direction within the Slovak nati ona l move ment was closely co nnec ted to the Catholic fa ith . The Catholic national ists, led from the early twentieth century by Andrej Hlinka, were more skeptica l of cooperation with the Czec hs than were the hlasi sti. Man y Czech politicians and intellec tu a ls were, from the point of view of Slovak Catholics, dangerously radical liberals, if not atheist anti-Catholics. 28 When the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 28 October 1918 was followed by a wave of 26 Zdenek Suda: ' Slovakia in Czech Nati onal Consciousness ' , in Musil (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia, p.1 39- 155 ( 11 8) (hereafter Suda: ' Slovakia ' ). 27 R. W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London, 1943, p.33 1. 28 Jan Rychl fk : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoletf: Cesko-sl ovenske vztahy , 19 14- 1945. Bratislava, 1997, p.38 (hereafter Rychlfk: Cesi a Slo vac1). �SLOVAKIA 93 anti-Catholic gestures in the Czech Lands, the worst fears of the Slovak Catholics were reali sed . As lsmo Nurmi wrote: ' if the anti-Catholic mood was fashionable in the Czech lands, it was not so in Slovak ia and even less so when a numbe r of desecration s of reli g iou s c ult objects, churches, statues, crosses etc. were committed [ ... ] also in Slovakia [by] civil servants and particularly the Czechoslovak Army.' 29 The attempt to create a Czechoslovak national hi story and tradition with the Hussite era as pivotal was a clear sign of the lac k of understanding among Czech (and some Slovak) leade rs for the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Masaryk 's official ' inclusion ' of Slovakia in the Hu ss ite tradition on the basis of Jan Ji skra 's ' crusade ' into Slovakia was not only hi storically dubiou s, but also, and not surpri sin gly, rejected by the Slovak Catholic clergy. As Suda wrote: ' To the Catholic majority of the Slovaks, among whom Catholicism had a very pronounced conservative tin ge typical of a pre-modern society , a common programme with the Czechs based on the traditions of the Protestant Reformation must have been almost an anathema. ' 30 After 1948, with the industriali sation of Slo vaki a unde r Communi st rul e, the religious differen ces be tween the Czech a nd Slovak parts of the common state were so mew hat diffused. Albeit a clear scepticism towards 'Czech liberali sm ' was visible in Christian democratic circles in Slovakia also after the collapse of Communism, another as pec t of the Czech ignorance of Slovak affairs beca me more important. As noted above , very many Czechs saw Czechoslovakia and the ' Czechoslovak nation ' as their state and nation , quite often interpreted as a Czech state a nd nation that included the Slovaks. After World War II , the rec reation of Czechoslovakia was acco mpanied by an official recog niti on by all political leaders, albeit some Czec h politicians were reluctant to do so, of the ex iste nce of two 29 lsmo Nurmi: Slo vakia - A Playground for Na tionalism and National Identity. 191 8- /920 : M anifestations of the Na tional Identity of Slovaks. Hel sinki. 1999. pp. 92-93. 30 Suda : ·Slovakia ' . p.11 5. �SLOVAKIA 94 fo un d in g nati ons in the co untry . Thi s princ ipl e was reaffirmed with the federa li sati on of 1968. Despite thi s offic ial recogniti on, there was ve ry littl e understanding a mong Czec hs of S lovak atte mpts to promote the ir separate ide ntity. Proba bl y the best kn ow n exa mpl e of S lova k po li tic ians ' dema nd s fo r 'v isibility and equ a lity ' fo r S lovaki a w ithin Czec hos lovaki a was the stru gg le fo r the name of the federati on in the sprin g of 1990 . Th e so-ca ll ed ' hy phe n-wa r ' sta rted w he n new ly e lec ted Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l suggested c ha ng in g the offic ial name of the Republic, the Czechoslovak Soc iali st Republic, by mere de leti on of the word ' Sociali st' . Whil e fo r mos t Czec hs thi s so luti on mu st have see med natural , it ran into oppos iti on in S lovaki a? A Sl ovak co unter-proposa l, the Czec ho-Slovak Re public, or just Czec ho-Slovaki a, a name that made Slovaki a more vi s ibl e to the world , was, however, not acceptabl e to most Czec h po liti c ians. The reasons given fo r thi s were that th e hyphe n had been used in the name of the Second Republi c (1938 -39, th at is, afte r the Muni c h Accord), a nd beca use ' C zec ho' (Ces k o) was not consi de red a pro pe r word in the Czech language. As one leading comme ntator compl ained in Lidove noviny: ' We in the Czec h Land s perce ive the insiste nt de mand of Sl ovaki a fo r a di vidin g line in the na me of the Re public as tac tl ess and coarse. " 2 Onl y afte r two mo nth s o f de bate in the three nati onal asse mbli es (the Czec h, Slova k and Federa l) and the mass medi a was a compromi se fo und : The Czec h and Slovak Federa l Republic. Have l quic kl y rea li sed th at he had made a mi stake by not consul ting politic ians fro m both the Czec h a nd Sl ova k Re pu b li cs before making hi s suggestion public. In a n atte mpt to rec ti fy the s itu ati on the hospitali sed Have l sent a le tter to the Federal Asse mbl y in February, where he stated : -' ' M il an Su tovec: Semi6za aka pol i tik um a/ebo "Pom lckov;-i vojna ". Brati slava, 1999, pp. 174- 196 (hereafter Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna). -' 2 Ji ff Hanak: 'Nespraved li ve a tedy neprijatelne' . Lidove Noviny. 28 M arch 1990. p.l. �SLOVAKIA 95 We a ll kn o w th at thi s hyphe n, whi ch fo r a ll Czechs seems ridi c ul o us, unnecessary and ugly, is mo re tha n just a hyphe n. In thi s hyphe n o ne ca n find severa l decades, if not ce ntu ries of th e hi sto ry of the S lo va k nati o n [ ... ] The Sl o vak nation is ri g htfull y tryin g to fin d its ide ntity, fo r reason s Czec hs probabl y do n ' t understa nd , eve n if they o ught to understand them.33 Resentment Exampl es of Czec h skepti c ism a nd resentment to ward s Slo vak nati o na li sm ca n be fo und as earl y as the middl e of th e nine teenth century. From the late 1840s, a majo rity of Slovak inte ll ectua ls ado pted the new codifi cati o n of th e S lovak lang uage , as publi shed in 1846 by Cudovft Stur, as a pl atfo rm fo r the Sl ovak national programme. This met w ith strong res istance fro m Czech and Slovak inte llectua ls promotin g Czec h-Sl ovak unity: they saw the Slovaki zed versio n of Hu ss ite Bible Czec h used by ma ny Slovak inte llec tua ls until then, as the clearest bo nd between Czechs and Slovaks.34 If in the inte rwar years Czec hos lovak leade rs cons idered Slovak nati o na li sm a pro bl e m, it was ma inl y after 1938 th at o pe nl y hostil e attitudes toward s it e merged. The ex pl oi tatio n by Slovak nati o na li sts of the weakness of the Czec hos lovak reg ime after the Munich cri sis to push trou gh thei r de mands fo r a uto no my, c ulmin atin g in the ac ceptance by the Slovak leade rs of German de mand s fo r Slovak indepe ndence in M arc h 1939, was conside red a stab in the back by most Czechs. 35 Durin g the Second World W ar, Ed vard Be nes, the C zechoslovak Pres ide nt-in -ex il e, was o ne of the sharpest cri tics of what he considered the Slovak be traya l. He was ' o bstin ate in defending the Czec hos lovak ca use: its betraya l by the Slovaks mattered more to him than the grow ing press ure from Moscow. He be li e ved th at the " As quoted in Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna, pp.269-27 1. 34 Sk illing: Masary k, p. 69. 35 Petr Pffhoda: ' M utual Perceptions in Czech-S lovak Relationshi ps ', in M usil (ed .): The End of Czechoslovakia. pp. 128- 138 ( 134 ). �96 SLOVAKIA Slovak heresy undermined the ve ry fo undations of the state, and Czechoslovaki sm was for him a part of the foundations. ' 36 Throu ghout the war, Benes and other Czech politi cians fought for the reestabli shment of the First (th at is, pre-Muni ch) Republi c. Most Slovak politici ans, howe ver, including former Czechos lovak Prime Minster Milan Hodza, con sidered thi s a less th an optim um solution. 37 Only reluctantly , given th e situation in Slovakia after the Slovak National Upri sing in the autum n of 1944, was Benes forced to accept a de facto asymmetric federalisation of post-war Czechoslo va ki a. However, despite previou s agreements, most importantl y the Kosice Government Programme, drafted by the first pro visional government after the country was partly -liberated from the East, the question of Slovaki a's position within the country cont inued to divide the Czec h and Slovak non-Comm uni st parties after the war. The willin gness of the Czec h democratic parti es to coo perate with the Communi sts in reducin g the powers of the Slovak nation al organs , cruci all y after the 1946 elections, contrib uted to undermining the position of the Democratic Party in Slo va ki a. The Czechos lovak Communi st Party was thu s abl e to exploit ' the anti -Sl ovak nati onali sm among Czech political parties and [ ... ] the isolated position of the Slovak democrats. ' 38 Thi s clearly weakened the democrats' ability to oppose the Communi sts' increasing political power in the country. During and after 1968 , the negati ve view of Slo vak nationali sm and Slovakia in the Czech L ands was reinforced. After the Soviet-led in vas ion on 2 1 Au gust 1968, 'sociali sm with a human face ' was gradually di smantled and replaced by ' norm ali sation '. Th e only maj or reform of the Prague Spring to survive was the dec ision to federalize Czechoslovakia. In Sl ovaki a thi s decision w as generall y interpreted 36 37 Zeman and Klimek : Eduard Bene{ p.203. Milan Hodza : Federarion in Cenrra l Europe: Renections and Reminiscences. London. 1942, pp.93-94. 38 Ji rf K ocian: ·Narodnf soc ialis te a slovenska otazka 1945- I 948 ". in Michal Bar- novsky (ed.) : Od dikratury k diktature. Brati slava. 1995 . pp.57-65 (6 I ). (hereafter K oc ian: ' Narodnf socialiste') �SLOVAKIA 97 as a more just organi sation of the common state. In the Czech Lands, however, many saw federalisation as a further example of the Slovak nationali sts' skill in drawing advantages from Czechoslovakia's mi sfortune. The fact th at the new party leade r and late r Pres ident of Czechoslovakia, Gu stav Hu sak, was Slovak, also contributed to the negative picture of Slovakia and Slovaks. As Petr Pithart wrote: the Czech public was di sappointed, even di sg usted, by the Slovaks ' ex peri e nce of havin g ga ined sati sfac tion with federalization; at best, it was seen as foolishness a nd at worst, as blind se lfi shness and eve n betrayal. ( ... ) in the Czec h Lands there was an increasing ly obvious di sg ust for the regime and for the Slovaks, as the ones through whom normali zation was allegedly introduced and carried out. 39 A s ign of the growing irritation with and resentment toward s Slovak nationa li sm and Slovaks in ge ne ral in the Czech Lands, was the increas in g ly popul a r de mand that Czech taxpayers should not have to subsidi se the ungrateful Slovaks. Already in 1933 Czechoslovak Prime Min ster Ja n Malypete r had rejected the demand for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that Slovakia would not be able to pay its way . In the Czech press, headlines read along the lines: ' We are paying for Slovakia ' .40 Thi s be lief that the Czechs were subsidis in g th e Slovaks was observed also by Prfhoda forty-three years late r: ' In the Czech Lands the view of Slovak parasiti sm [parazitismu s] is common and it is formulated more or less like thi s: we Czechs are payin g for the Slovaks. ' 41 The Czechoslovak Communist Party was committed to so lvin g the probl e m of Slovak nation alism, which it interpreted as a mainly eco nomic iss ue , through equ ali zat ion of the standard of li ving bet- 39 Petr Pithart: ' Towards a Shared Freedom ' , in Mu sil (ed.): Th e End of Czechoslovakia.pp.20 1-222 (206). 40 Vi ctor S. Mamatey: ' The Development of Czechoslovak Democ racy ', in Mamatey and Luza (eds.) : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp.99-166 ( 15 1). 41 Prfhoda: "S lovac i ces kyma ocima', p.647. �SLOVAKIA 98 wee n the Czech and Slovak parts of the co unty. Economic transfers, parti cul arly through a higher level of in vestment in Sl ovaki a were, therefore, considered important. They continued even during the di ffic ult years in the 1970s and 1980s, but were kept secret, probabl y to avoid un favo urable reactions in the Czech L ands. After the co llapse of Communi sm, opposition to w hat was popularl y referred to as the Czech ' money pipeline' (p enezovod) to Slovak ia was quickl y made into a politi cal demand. In the first formal ro und of negoti ation s on th e future of the fe derati on after the co ll apse of Communi sm, in Lnare in April 1990, the Czech delegati on demanded a halt to Czec h subsidies to Slovaki a.42 From Czech to Czechoslovak nationalism and back As noted earlier, the Czechos lov ak directi on within Czech poli ti cs was by no means dominant pri or to W orld W ar I. Czec h nationali sts concentrated mainl y on defending and enhancing Czech autonomy w ithin th e Habsburg M onarchy. With the success of the Czec hoslovak idea in the Entente capitals in 19 17-1 8, however, most Czec h nati onali sts quite quickl y became convinced Czec hos lovak nati onali sts; Czech nati onali sm was ex panded to include th e Sl ovaks, the Czec hs' ' little bro ther ' in Hungary. Cultura ll y and economi ca ll y wea k, the Slovaks posed no threat to either Czech culture or politica l and economic dominati on of the new state. A nd after all , as M asaryk himse lf pointed out, the Slovaks were merely Czec hs w ith a slightly di fferent hi story. Th e attachment o f Czech politi cians to the Czech os lovak idea ca n be clearl y see n after W orld W ar II. In 1968 , a document supposedly written by members of th e (Czec h) Nation al Soc iali st Party 4 in I 946 was pub I ished in the Slova k press . ' Its authors argued th at the bes t way to so lve the problem of Slovak nati onalism was fo rced ass imil ati on of the Sl ovaks into good Czec hoslovaks. Whil e seri ous • • 2 BBC Summa1y of World Broadcast. EE/0738 B/2. 13 Apri I 1990. 3 T he document was first publi shed in Vac lav Kral: Cestou k tinoru, Prague, I 956, but attrac ted relati ve ly little attention until reproduced in the mass medi a in 1968. �99 SLOVAKIA doubts exist as to th e authenticity of thi s ' Memorandum on Slovakia' , most hi storian s seem to agree that the idea of turnin g the Slovaks into good Czechoslovaks was not alien to certain leading Czech politicians at the time. 44 The reaction to what was perceived as the Slovak betraya l of 1938-39 was increased Czechoslovak nationali sm. However, during the Communist period , a nd particul ar ly after 1968 , Czech nationalism gradually gained supporters in the Czech Lands . As Prfhoda wrote in 1976: 'I am not sure how thin gs are in Slovakia, but among Czechs the concept of a com mon state is being re-eva luated these days . I have eve n heard : let the Ru ss ia ns make Slovakia into a union republic or something and leave us in peace!' 45 Obviou sly , ne ither Czech nor Slovak separat ism was politically acceptable durin g Communist rul e. After th e 'Velvet Revo lution' , however, influe ntial vo ices soo n e merged in the Czech Land s questioning the union with the Slovaks. As earl y as the beginning of May 1990, in the aftermath of the hyphe n war, the Czech writer Ludvfk Vaculfk, the author of the 'Two thousand words' manifesto in 1968, wrote a sharpl y worded articl e in Litenimf noviny. 46 ' W e Czechs have a great debt to the Slovaks,' Yaculfk argued. This debt was due to the fact that the Czechs had happily made Slovakia ' theirs' without takin g into account what it meant to be Slovak. Through their behaviour, however, the Slovaks had made it difficult for the Czechs to appreciate thi s debt. Th e Czechs had g ive n the Slovaks the ir industry and inte lli gentsia, so mething that had only caused the Slovaks to ' until thi s day complain about the qua lity of these supplies'. The Czechs had give n the Slovaks a way out of defeat as a separate state during World War II. Even Communism , brou g ht to Slovakia by Czechs afte r the war, had g ive n the Slovaks more in material terms than it had to the Czechs. When the Czechs then tri ed to ease th e die- 44 See Koc ian: ' Narodnf soc iali ste' . passim: Rychlfk: Ce.si II Slo vaci. pp. 54-55: ·Na okraj diskusie: 0 tzv. Slovenskom memoranda Cs. narodne sociali stickej strany ', Nase snahy . Vol. I 9/2. 1983. p. 9. 45 Prfhoda: ' Slovaci ceskyma ocima ' . p.653. 41 ' Ludvik Vaculfk: ' Nase slovenska otazk a', Litenimf noviny. Vol.1 /5, 1990. p.2. �SLOVAK IA 100 tatorship during 1968, the Slovaks saw thi s as a Czech matter and instead forced through 'autonomy '. For this they escaped with lighter puni shment during the era of ' normali sation .' Now aga in , after the col lapse of Communism, when Czechs were trying th eir utmost finally to defeat the dictatorial regime , the Slovaks were 'coming with their prestige demands'. ' Do we need thi s?' he asks rhetorically and then concludes : We have found ourse lves with a thankless task in th e fate of the Slo vaks, and I think th at we should end it without se lf-pity - more with a smil e into th e mirror. [ ... l Why should the Slovaks ha ve to force out of us, centimetre by ce ntimetre, somethin g that they can have in one go? By separating from the Slovaks , purely of our ow n volition , we " lose" - judging from experience to date - economic losses. Politicall y we lose th e Hungarian and Ruth ene problem s. We put another border between us and th e Soviet Union. 47 At th e time of hi s writ ing, Yaculfk ' s recommendation th at th e Czec hs should dispense with the Slovaks accorded with neither public nor political opinion in the Czech Republic. At that stage not even the most radical Czech politician s were promoting divi sion of the state. Gradually , however, the need to resolve the probl em of th e common state w ith the Slovaks once and for all became pressing. As Yaculfk observed in December of 1990: 'Public opinion poll s show that 75 percent of Czechs are said to favour a common state with the Slovaks. Had one, on the other hand , asked if we should let the Slovaks go, just as many would probabl y have answered " yes" to thi s as we ll. ' 48 In Slovakia, the question of the statu s of the Slovak Republic within the Czech and Slovak state became a centra l political topic . 47 Ibid. The double quotation marks arou nd -- Jose" were added to make th e irony more vi sible. The original tex t is : ' Od loucenfm od Slovaku. jez j e vyhradne v nasf vu li. ztratfme - souzeno dosavadnf zkusenostf - ekonomicke ztraty. • 48 Ludvik Yaculfk: ' M ec iar mozna odejde' . Litenimf noviny . Vol. I /39. I 990. p.2. �SLOVAKIA 101 Sl ovak politicians began to co mpete over w ho co uld present a programme th at would benefit and pro mote Slovaki a the most. Thi s led to a gradual radi ca li sati on of Slovak demands in the negoti ation s on the future of the federati on. Such radica li sati on in turn provoked a voc iferou s reaction in the Czech L ands. Th e influenti al Czec h j ournal R esp ekt refl ec ted th e growin g antagoni sm toward s Sl ovaki a in th e Czec h L ands. Headlines from the Spring of 1992 such as ' The supreme Slovak irrespon sibility' ( 17 Febru ary, p.2), ' B alkan model on the hori zo n: how long w ill the Czech-Slovak statu s quo las t?" (24 Febru ary, p.2) and 'A bsurd parliamentary drama: who saves Slovak ia from sovereignty?' (6 A pril , p.2) ev ince an increas ingly criti ca l view o f Sl ovak politi cs . In the issue th at co incided with the electi ons of 8 June, the criticism ca me to its logica l co nclu sion . Peter Schutz, Respekt 's (Sl ovak-Hungari an) correspondent in Slovak ia, wrote in the arti cle ' Slovaki a adheres to nati onal soc iali sm': ' The shameful result of thi s electi on formul ated onl y one alternati ve - either lMec iar 's party] HZDS disintegrates, or the CSFR. ' 49 Vl adimfr Ml ynar ex pressed the same message in the subtitle o f hi s arti cle in the same issue: 'A lone into Euro pe or together into the Balkans'. 50 Parti cul arl y the politi ca l ri ght in th e Czec h Lands increasingly saw Slovaki a as an obstac le on the road ' back ' to Europe. After the 1990 elec ti ons, th e ri ght had graduall y strengthened its pos ition among the Czech elec torate. In Slovaki a, on the other hand , it was the more reform- scepti ca l and patri oti c parti es on the politica l left that had enjoyed greater success. Gi ven th e spec ial minority veto of both the Czec h and Slovak groups of deputies in th e House of Nati ons of the Federal Assembl y, a left-patri otic maj ority in Slovaki a was a worry ing prospec t for the Czech proponents of radi ca l reform s. A month before th e parliam entary election s in June 1992, V aclav 09 Peter Sch utz: ·s tovensko sa prihlasilo k narodnemu socializmu - Pos lcdne zvone- nie pre federaciu ·, Respekt. 8- 14 June 1992, p.2. ~ V lad imir Ml ynar: ·v Cechac h tes ne vftezstvf prav ice - lecne na Balka n·. Respekt, 8- 14 June 1992. p.3. Sarni do Evropy nebo spo- �102 SLOVA KI A Kl aus made it c lear that if a fu ncti o na l federa ti o n was not poss ible after the e lect io ns, he and his partners were ' ready to create a mec hani sm for a q uick, c ivili sed and prob le m-free div isio n of the state. ' 51 Conclusion By the late summ er of 1992, th e do min ant view of Slovak ia in C zec h po liti cs had, in a se nse, co me full c irc le to co inc ide with the views th at preva il ed pri o r to W o rl d W ar I. Fro m hav ing bee n a strateg ica ll y less attrac ti ve partne r in the seco nd ha lf of the nineteenth ce ntury, Sl ovaki a beca me a strateg ic asset in the firs t ha lf of th e twenti eth . Afte r W o rld W ar II , however, S lovak ia a nd th e S lovaks gradu a ll y lost the ir strateg ic impo rt a nce for the Czec hs. The large Ge rm an mino rity in the Czec h Lands was ex pe ll ed in the firs t years after the war, taking the edge off the Ge rman threat. Furthermore, fo r C zec h democ rats, the Communi st co up of Febru ary 194 8 put an e nd to a ll ideas of seekin g sec urity a nd integrati o n in the East, th ro ugh Slova ki a. In stead , they now turn ed exc lu sive ly to the West: to th e US , NATO . the E uro pean Co mmunity and eve n the o ld ri va l, Ge rmany. At the th resho ld of the twenty- first ce ntury, Slova ki a, w ith its c umbe rso me soc ia li st eco no my, its po puli st nati o na li sm , and its pro bl e ms with Hun ga ry over the Hungari an mino rity in Slovaki a and the G abc fk ovo- Nagy maros da m projec t o n the Da nube, aga in became a strateg ic burden. The Czec hos lovak traditi o n and adhe re nce to the Czec hos lovak idea were still strong in the Czec h Lands. Tho ugh the Czec h politica l ri ght had the suppo rt of gro ups suc h as The Czec h Initi ati ve, whic h gathered aro und 50,000 sig natures in favo ur of Czec h independe nce in fo ur days in June 1992 in Prague, most Czec hs were still in favo ur of a co mm o n state w ith the Slova ks. 52 Thu s Kl aus and hi s partners co uld not push throug h a break-up w itho ut so me effort. Co nsequ ent ly, as Abby Innes wrote: ' Kl a us preferred a strategy o f shi ftin g res- 51 As cited in Marian Lesko: Meciar a meciarizm us: polit ik bez .~kruptif" politika bez zabran. Bratis lava. 1997, p.78. 52 BBC Summary of World Broadcast. EE/ 14 12 B/5. 20 June I 992. �SLOVAKIA 103 po ns ibility fo r the confli c t e ntire ly onto the Slovak side and c la imed th at it was now "ev ide nt th at votes fo r the HZ DS are votes fo r th e di visio n o f the state". ' 53 Give n th at th e do min a nt Czec h im age of S lovak nati o na li sm, a nd of Vl adim ir Mec iar, was negative, Kl aus was lucky in hav in g hi s tas k made eas ier. Hi s ca mpa ig n was furth er ass isted by th e oppos iti o n of the leading S lova k parti es to th e ree lection of Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l in Jul y. Hav ing fa il ed to be ree lec te d , Have l res ig ned pre m ature ly whe n th e Slo va k Nation a l Co unc il passed a large ly sy mbo li c dec larati o n of sovere ig nty o n 17 Jul y. Have l, prev io us ly o ne of the leading pro po ne nts of the co mmo n state, now le nt hi s support to a di visio n of the state. 54 The first day of Janu ary 1993 saw the creati o n of two new states: the C zec h Re publi c and the Sl ovak Re publi c. Of the two, the Czec h Republi c c learl y adopted the mantl e of successor to Czec hos lovaki a. T he new Czec h state had the sa me capita l, the same fl ag (in breac h o f an earli e r agree me nt) and the sa me pres ide nt. C zec h co mpani es and even po liti ca l parties fo r a lo ng time ke pt the word 'Czechos lovak ' in the ir na me (for exampl e, the S in CSA, Czec h[os lovak] A irlin es). Mos t things re ma ined as they had bee n, exce pt w ith o ut the Slovaks. As Vaculfk had po inted o ut so po ig nantl y in 1990: ' Whe n th e "Federati o n" started crac king in its fo undatio n, I got the idea fo r a new , in spi rin g ly o ptimi sti c so luti o n: whe n S lov aki a breaks away there w ill be no o ne to preve nt us fro m ca lling o ur state Czec hos lovak ia ... ' 55 " A bby Innes: ' T he Breakup of Czechos lovak ia: T he Impact of Part y Deve lopment on the Separation of the State· . Eust European Politics and Society. Vol. I I /3. 1997. pp. 393-435 (424). '" I va n L amper and V ladimir Ml ynar: ·skoncila ceskoslovenska statnost: Rozhovor s pos lednfm prezi dentem CSFR Vac lave m Havlem ' . Respekt. 20-27 July 1992. p.4. " Vac ulfk: ' Meciar mofoa odejde'. p.2 . � 81 SLOVAKIA From Bratr nas to At'jdou Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague 1 Paa! Sigurd Hilde The Velvet Divorce between the Czech and Slovak parts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub lic (CSFR) was a political undertaking. All public opinion polls taken in the period 1990-1992 showed a clear majority in favour of a common state among both Slovaks and Czechs.2 The decision to divide the country came as a result of a compromise between two political parties - or more specifically, between two politicians: Vaclav Klaus of the (Czech) Civic Democratic Party and Vladimfr Meciar of the (Slovak) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. While both Klaus and Meciar argued that they wanted to preserve the common state, their visions of such a Czech and Slovak state were so disparate that an agreement to differ was the only possibility. Most detailed studies of the break-up agree that if either of them , Meciar or Klaus, were to be identified as 'more guilty' in promoting the break-up, it would not be the Slovak nationali st Meci ar, but the Czech ' Thatcherite ' Klaus. 3 Ultimately, what sank the good ship Czechoslovakia was that the Czech captain, the ' A sli ghtly different version of thi s arti cle was originall y published in Norwegian in Nordisk @stforum, Yol . 15/2. 200 I , pp.5-16. 2 See. for example, Sharon Wolchik: 'The Pol itics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia', fast European Politics and Society, Vol. 8/ 1994. I , pp.153-188. 3 See, for example, Abby Innes: Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. London. 200 I , particularly pp. 176-2 19. �SLOVAKIA 82 o ne that had a lw ays fo ught the hardest to keep it a fl oat, gave the order to sc uttle. The a im of thi s paper is to prov ide a n in sig ht into the deve lopme nt of the vi e ws on Slovaki a, Slovaks and Slova k nati o na li sm in th e Czec h Land s: fro m the ideas unde rl y in g the creati o n of Czech oslova ki a in 19 18 to those leading to the di sso luti o n of th at country in 1992. Natu ra ll y, the re is no c lear 'Czec h view ' of matters re lating to Sl ova ki a. Even if one di srega rds indi vidu a l o pini o ns and con ce ntrates o n what mi g ht be ca ll ed c ultura l ' heteroste reotypes' (v ie ws of the othe r), o ne w ill still find , fo r in stance, strong reg io na l differe nces w ithin the Czech La nd s. Any ana lys is of the ' Czec h view ' will thu s, eve n in the best case, be a probl e mati c prese ntati o n o f e lu sive collecti ve attitudes. Furthe rm ore, give n the absence of publi c opinio n surveys fo r most of the peri od studi ed , it is imposs ibl e to asce rta in ho w representati ve suc h attitudes were. The pi cture of Sl o va ki a presented here will be based to a large deg ree o n the attitudes ex pressed by leadin g po liti c ia ns, jo urn a li sts a nd o th er ' opini o n-fo rmers' in the Czec h Lands. For thi s reaso n the arti c le will present o pini o ns mo re typi ca l of Prague tha n. fo r in stance, Mo ra via, whe re co ntacts w ith Slovaks a nd Sl ovaki a we re more direct. Ho we ve r, as an earli er study , simil ar to thi s, argued , ' in Prag ue and in the C zec h Land s in genera l there are few opportunities to ga in a broad , direct impress ion of Slovaks, and the Czec h view of the Slovak is the refore the res ult of tra nsmitted , dedu ced impress io ns. ' 4 Whe n attitudes are acqui red ma inl y indirec tl y, opini o n-formers pl ay an important rol e. Gi ve n the limited scope of thi s arti c le, th e many theoreti cal and methodo log ica l pro bl e ms of suc h a stud y ca nno t be e xamined. Interestin g a nd impo rtant aspec ts, suc h as the inte raction between th e C zech and Slo va k he teroste reotypes o f eac h othe r, will al so have to be ig no red . Gi ven these limitati o ns, thi s articl e beco mes a mere in - 0 Petr Pi'fh oda : ' Slovac i ces kyma ocima'. Svedect vf, Vol. I 3/52. 1976, p.637. T he arti cle was publi shed under the pseudonym Jan Prfbram. �SLOVAKIA 83 troducti o n to the issue - an introducti o n th at mi g ht mo ti vate othe rs to make a c loser and broader examin atio n. Three aspects - three stages In her exce ll e nt stud y of the co nfli c t betwee n S lova ks a nd Czec hs, Caro l Ska lnik Leff a na lysed the develo pme nt of a se nse of mutu a l resentment betwee n the two gro ups. 5 A lmost througho ut Czechos lovak hi sto ry, there was persiste nt o ppos it ion fro m the Czec hdo min ated politi ca l leade rship , bo th de mocrati c a nd Co m m uni st, aga in st ful fi llin g pro mi ses of a uto no my for the Slova k part of the co untry. On the one hand , thi s fa ilure to live up to the pro m ises of 19 18, 1945 and , some argue, 1968, led to the deve lo pme nt of a sense of betraya l in Slovak ia. On the ot her ha nd, in creas ing numbers of Czec hs ex pressed a nger over what they perce ived as S lovak in gratitude - Slovak ungratefuln ess fo r a ll the ass istance Czec hs affo rded Slovaki a. Moreove r, the way Slovak po liti c ians, in the Czec h perception, ex pl o ited tim es of crisis in Czec hos lovaki a to pro mo te the ir narrow nati o na li st ai ms ca used pa rti c ul ar rese ntm ent. T h is deeprooted mutu al resentme nt was, Leff arg ued in 1987 , o ne of th e ma in reasons why the co nfl ic t betwee n the Czec hs a nd S lovaks wo ul d rema in an unresolved pro bl e m.6 She was soon to be proven right. If o ne examines the Czec h view of S lovaki a, Slovaks and S lovak natio na li sm mo re broad ly than Leff, it is poss ible to ide nti fy two furth er impo rta nt aspec ts of the Czec h view. The firs t mi g ht be des cribed as big-brothe rl y co nce rn . Ma ny Czec h inte ll ect ua ls, po li tic ians and other Slova ko ph iles we re ge nuine ly interes ted in and conce rned abo ut th e we lfare and fate of the S lova ks. T he ir e ngagement was we ll in tended and , espec ia ll y before 19 18 but a lso later, of g reat he lp to Slova k inte ll ec tu a l a nd c ultu ra l li fe. However, no t in fre qu e ntl y d id thi s bi g brothe rl y co nce rn deve lop into a peda nt ic a nd 5 Carol Skalni k Leff: Na tional Conf7ict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton . 1987 , particu larly pp. 148-177. 6 Ibid .. p. 282 . �84 SLOVAKI A arroga nt pate rn a li sm . Not surpri s in g ly, thi s was not favo urabl y received in Slovak ia. T he seco nd aspec t of the Czec h view of S lova ki a a nd the S lovaks is best described as a lac k of aware ness. Average know ledge of po liti ca l a nd eco no mi c conditi o ns in S lova ki a a nd S lova k c ul ture was never ex tensive in the Czech Lands. Partic ul arl y impo rtant was th e w id espread ig norance of the c ultu ra l, soc ia l and es pec iall y re li g iou s diffe re nces betwee n th e average Czec h and Slovak. Hi sto ri ca ll y, thi s un aware ness was to a large degree a res ult of th e qui ck and re lati ve ly pa inl ess acce ptance by the Czec hs of a Czechos lovak ide ntity and the offic ia l ideo logy of the ex iste nce of a Czec hos lovak nati o n. Thi s lack of kn o wl edge often led to in sensiti vity to wards Slovak di stin cti ve ness. Czech po liti c ia ns thu s occas io na ll y made po litica l dec isio ns that suited co nditio ns in the Czec h La nds w itho ut proper concern fo r the di ffe rent impac t the ir po lic ies mi g ht have on Slovaki a. C learl y, th ere is no c lear-c ut di stinc ti o n betwee n the three analytica l aspects of the Czec h view of Slovaks and Slovak nationa li sm. A ll three were present to a greate r o r lesser ex tent th rougho ut the hi story of co ntacts between the two gro ups, and they overl ap. To a certa in degree, however, th ey re prese nt stages throu g h whi c h ma in strea m o pini o n in th e Czec h La nd s went as time progressed . Bi gbrothe rl y co ncern was c learly the most important facet in th e pre19 18 pe ri od and in the ear ly years of the First Repu bli c. The inte rwar pe ri od is most stro ng ly marked by the Prague leadership ' s ig norance of the parti c ul ar soc ia l, econo mi c and re li g io us conditi o ns in Slovak ia. After the dra mati c eve nts in 1938 and 1939, wi th the Mu ni c h Acco rd, S lova k a uto no my a nd la te r ' ind e pe nde nce ' durin g Wo rl d W ar II , Czec h rese ntme nt towards the Slovaks, a nd espec iall y S lovak nat io na li sm, beco mes in creas in g ly impo rta nt. Fi fty years later, thi s animos ity was to dec ide the fa te of the co mm on Czec h and Sl ovak state. �SLOVAKIA 85 Big Brother In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overarching aim of Czech political parties was to force Vienna to acce pt increased autonomy for ' the hi storic lands ' (basically today 's Czech Republic) within the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of a wider Slav cooperation within the Empire, particularly with th e Slovaks, had ga in ed stre ngth among Czech intell ec tual s from about the 1830s. However, after the success of Hung aria n nat ion ali sm in th e 1867 Ausgleich, Czech leaders became concerned not to a ntagoni se their potential allies in Budapest. The result was that 'Czec h politicians, thou gh sy mpathetic toward [the Slovaks], were re luctant to inte rfere on the ir behalf in Hungary, for this would constitute a violation of Hungary 's state rights and mi ght jeo pardize the Czech program that was based on Bohemia's hi storic state ri ghts. ' 7 The lack of broader politica l cooperation did not preve nt an increasing activism in favour of the c ulturall y oppressed Slovaks, especially among Czech intellectua ls. Whil e Czech culture and society , and Czech nationalism, deve loped rapidly in line with the rapid social and economic deve lopm e nts in the re lativel y liberal Austrian part of the Monarch y, the s itu ation for Slovak culture a nd nationali sm was much more difficult. Particularly after 1867, the Hun garian authoriti es led a heavy-handed assimilation policy (Magyarisation) towards the minorities in Hungary . Many Czech intellectuals expressed a deep sy mpathy for the fate of what they saw as their Slovak brethren in Hun gary and the Slovak national dema nd s. 8 Especially 7 Victor S. Mamatey: 'The Estab li shment of the Republic'. in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza (eds.): A History or the Czechosl ovak Republic: 19 18- 1948. Princeton . 1973 , pp. 3-38 (9). 8 Under th e leadership of L'.udovit Stur. Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodza, a Slovak National Council , formed in Vienna on 16 September I 848 , gave Slovak nationalism its first clear political expression in form of the declaration De mands or the Slovak Nation. Thirteen years later, this time inspired mainly by Stefan Marko Daxner and Jan Francisci, an even clearer national programme was formulated in the 186 1 Memorandum or the Slovak Nation. See Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska. Prague. 1998. pp. I 19- 13 1. �SLOVAKIA 86 from th e 1880s , ac ti ve support fo r Slovak nati onali st intell ec tu als increased. As H. Gordon Sk ill ing wrote: 'from the leighteen] eighties on, there graduall y deve loped, among Czech cultu ra l and pro fes sional persons, a substanti al concern for the Slovaks and a desire to promote Czech and Slovak cooperati on. ' 9 M ost importantl y, the Czech interest in Sl ovaki a took an organised fo rm w ith th e creati on of Ceskoslovanska j edn ota (Czec hos lav Unity), in 1895 . Thi s organi sati on offered fin ancial support to Slovak publi cati ons, grants for Slovak students in the Czech L ands and promoted Czech in vestments in Slovaki a. 1° Furthermore, Ceskoslovan- ska jedn ota sought to spread in form ati on about Sl ovaki a and the Slovaks among Czechs. Thi s w illingness to help the Sl ovaks did not di sappear with the es tabli shment of th e Czec hoslovak state in 19 18. With the gradu al ' liberation ' of what the new Czechos lovak authoriti es considered to be 'S lovaki a' (no admini strati ve boundari es ex isted), a new admini strati on had to be establi shed. The old admini strati ve apparatu s in Hungary consisted almost exc lusive ly of M agyars (ethni c Hungari ans) or ass imil ated intelligenti fro m other cultures. M ost of these refu sed to work for the new Czechos lovak state. As there were far from sufficient educated, patri oti c Sl ovaks to take over the admini strati on, officials had to be imported from the Czech L ands. The first major immi grati on ca me in the spring of 19 19, when ra il way and postal workers in Sl ovaki a stopped work ing to protest again st the new regime. A t th e urgent request of K ornel Stodola, the official res ponsibl e for ra il ways, ' several th ousand patri oti c Czech 9 H . Gordon Ski lling: T. G. Ma.r nryk : Against the Current. 1882- 19 14. London . 1994. p.68 (hereafter Ski ll ing: Mw;ary k). JU Mi ros lav Pek nfk: ·K profi lu slovensko-ceskych vztahov pred prvou sve tovou voj - nou'. in Mi lan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (eds.) : Slovensko ,w zaciatku 20. storocia (Spo /ocnost: stat a narod v siiradniciach doby). Brati slava. 1999. pp.9 1-9 3: Mari e L. Neudorn: ' Slovakia in the Czech Press at the Turn of the ineteen th and Twe nti eth Ce ntu ries' . in John Morison (ed. ): The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers fro m the Fourth World Cong ress for So viet and East European Studies. Harrogille. I 990. London . 1992. pp. 38-6 I. �SLOVAKIA 87 vo lunteers hurri ed fro m Bohe mi a a nd Mo ra via and at a mo me nt 's notice.' 11 Late r, me mbe rs of othe r profess ion a l groups ca me to take up vacant pos iti o ns in S lovaki a: sc hoo lteac hers, uni versity lec ture rs, gend armes, tax collectors a nd bureaucrats of a ll so rts. It has bee n estimated th at 50-60 000 Czec hs went to Sl ovaki a in 19 19-20 and about as many aga in in the years up to 1930. 12 Whil e undo ubtedl y moti vated partl y by the ava il ability of jobs, the w illin g ness to uproot and move to still un safe S lova ki a o n sho rt no ti ce does suggest at least some idea li sm amo ng the vo lunteers. In 19 19-20 there was still armed confli ct betwee n Hun gari an and Czechoslo va k fo rces fo r control o ve r Slovaki a. Even fo r an un e mpl oyed bu reaucrat it could no t have been an easy dec isio n to move there. Few Czec hs can be seen to have do ne mo re to ra ise sy mpathy fo r the Sl o vaks a nd the ir fa te th an To mas Garri g ue Masaryk. Bo rn in Hodonfn , in the Slov acko reg io n of Morav ia, Masaryk ca me fro m a reg ion o n the bo rde r betwee n Czec h and Sl ova k lang uage and c ul ture. Hi s fa ther was Sl ova k and hi s moth er a Germ ani sed C zec h. 13 Gi ven thi s bac kg round , the idea of Czec h and Slovak politica l cooperation mu st have co me easil y to M asaryk. In hi s po litica l li fe , he became one of the ma in propo ne nts of suc h cooperati o n among Czec h politi c ians. As a pro fessor at the C harl es Uni ve rs ity in Prag ue, he was the ma in so urce of in spirati o n fo r a g roup of Slovak stu dents who wo uld later make up an impo rta nt part of the po liti ca l e lite in Czechoslova ki a. Th ese stude nts , best know n as hlasisti, afte r th e name of the ir j o urn a l Hlas (Vo ice), beca me the ma in supporte rs of the C zechos lovak idea in Slovaki a. 14 Yet, despite hi s ge nuin e co nce rn for the S lovaks, M asary k 's speec hes and arti c les at times ex pressed a pa te rn a li st and arroga nt 11 R. W. Seton-Watson : A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London. 1943. p.323. 12 Jan M ec hyr: Slovensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I. Prague. 199 1. p.27. 1 '- K arel Capek: Hovory s T. G. M asa1y kem. Prag ue. 1947. pp.8-9, I I 8. 14 Vl ad im ir Bakos: Questions of the Nation in Slo va k Thoug ht. Brati slava. 1999. pp.1 3-57 . �88 SLOVAKIA attitude toward s Slovak culture and hi story . For instance, Masaryk rej ected calls for a plebisc ite in Slovakia after World War l, arg uin g that 'one cannot allow such a vote there, since the Slovaks have bee n so oppressed that they have never had the opportunity to think politically and they would not know in whose hand s to put th eir fate. ' 15 Even c learer was hi s comment on rece nt negotiation s with Slovak leaders in a letter to hi s dau ghter Alice, in 1924: 'It is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or rather spoilt brats.' 16 Given the relatively low educational level and minimal political experience of most Slovaks in 1918 , claims about their immaturity clearly had some justification in the first years after the establi shme nt of Czechoslovakia. However, Czech politicians continued throu ghout the ex istence of the Czechoslovak state to explain the lack of understanding for their policies in Slovakia as a sign of the politica l immaturity of Slovaks. Commenting on relations between Czech and Slovak exiles during World War II, for instance, Edvard Be nes informed the British Foreign Mini stry , that ' the re existed unity among the Czechs while the Slovaks, he conceded, because of their political immaturity, reflected the divided opinions at home.' 17 Also in the post-Communist period , Slovak nationalism , and especially its more radical expressions, were presented as clear signs of the political immaturity of the Slovaks. 'Everyone has the right to live his nineteenth century,' became a common remark in sarcastic comments. 18 " Quoted in Robert 8. Pynsent: ' Masaryk 's ·' Path of Democracy". Or: The Democrati c National Socialist Ideal'. in K atarina A. M . K ocourek (ed.): T. G. Masaiyk 1850- /937. A Collection of Essays to Commemora te the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas G. Masaryk . London, 2000, p. 35 -57 (41 ) (a specia l issue of Masa1yk Journal). 16 Quoted in Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek: The Life of Eduard Benes: Cze- choslovakia in Peace and War. Oxford , 1997, p.5 I (herea fter Zeman and Klimek: Eduard Benes) . 17 Quoted ibid. pp.168-69. 18 Otto U lc: 'Czechoslovakia ' s Velvet Divorce ' , East European Quarterly, Vol.30/3, 1996, pp. 33 1-352 (340). �SLOVAKIA 89 From a Czech po int of view, the re lati o nship between the C zechs and Sl ovaks was c learl y a bi g broth er - littl e brother re lati o nship. The Czech partner in the Czec h-S lovak unio n was c learl y superior in po pulati o n (abo ut 2: I), and fo r most of the hi sto ry of the common state a lso in soc io-econo mic deve lo pment (for example, in education , car-ow nership , numbe r of te le pho nes , etc .). Czech nationa li sts could be proud of a ri c h nati o na l hi story a nd a hi g hl y deve lo ped Czec h c ulture, whil e Slovak nati o na li sts, for hi stori ca l reasons, had less to brag abo ut. The pi cture of Slovaki a as a less deve lo ped, less c ultured ' hinte rl and ' re ma in ed in Czec h po pul ar c ulture, parti c ul arl y in Prague, eve n after Slovak ia reac hed a basica ll y equ al leve l of soc io-econo mi c developme nt (abo ut I 980) . 19 As Petr Prfh oda, the pse udo nymo us Jan Prfbram, observed in the ex ile jo urna l Svedect vfin 1976: T he charac te ri sti c tra its of [the Czec h view of Slovaks a nd S lovaki a] have o ne co mmo n de no m inato r: an a lbe it unc lear, th o ug h multi face ted inferiority. Slovaks see m primiti ve, imm ature, emo ti o na ll y unrestra ined and uneducated [ ... ] The na ivety and lack of ex pe ri e nce amo ng those who come to the unknow n Czec h e nvironme nt is qui c kl y mi sunde rstood as stupidity. A Slovak is qu ite simpl y asc ribed a child 's menta li ty .20 Ignorance On the first page of its 27 Nove mber 1935 iss ue, in an artic le by the fa mo us Czec h jo urn a li st Ferdin and Pe routka, the influenti al journal Pl ftomnost (Presence) asked its readers: ' Do you know of anyone who unde rstand s Slova ki a?' 2 1 F ifty-fi ve years late r, Vac lav Have l' s ad visor Pe te r Hun c ik to ld the Ch a irm a n of th e Sl ova k N ati o na l 19 M il an K ucera and Zdenek Pavlfk: ·Czech and Slovak Demograph y ·, in Jiff M usil (ed.): The End or Czechoslovak ia. Budapest, 1995 , pp. 15-39. 20 Prfhoda: ·s Jovaci ceskyma oc ima' , p.643. 21 Ferd inand Peroutka: ·Nevfte o nekom , kdo rozu mf Slovensku?' , Prfto mnos t, Vo l. 12/47. 1935 , p. I . as reprod uced in Anton Ras la: Zastupova l som ceskoslovensky stat - vyznanie. Presov, 1999, p.268. �90 SLOVAKIA Co un c il , Fra nti se k Mi k losko, th at the Pres ide nt a lways had mi graines whe n he trave ll ed in Slovaki a. 22 Thi s was no t due to the c lim ate, but beca use Have l fe lt great unease abo ut not know ing Slovaki a. Such ac know ledge me nts refl ect the limited kno wl edge of Slovaki a and the Slovaks in the C zech Land s. As Prfhoda o bserved : ' Of all the ne ig hbo urin g nati o ns we know the S lovaks the leas t and ex press the least interest in the m and the ir nat io n. Admittedl y, we have been introdu ced th e best to th e Sl ova ks, but we kn ow th e leas t abo ut the m. ' 23 It is poss ible to ide nti fy severa l reasons fo r thi s lac k of know ledge and understanding. Partl y, it was a res ult of the somew hat confusin g nature of Slovak po liti cs . A lmost thro ugho ut the histo ry of Czechoslovaki a, the politica l e lite in Slova ki a was di vided o n the iss ue of inc reased se lf-governm e nt. Pe ri odi ca ll y, thi s inte rn a l stru gg le amon g S lovak po liti c ians over whethe r S lovaks did or did not want a uto no my mu st have been confu s in g eve n for th e most interested C zech o bserver. Gu stav Hu sak, fo r exampl e, contributed to muddlin g the picture of S lovak nati o na li sm : fro m be ing the prime propo ne nt o f th e federa li sati o n of Czec hos lova ki a befo re a nd durin g the 1968 ' Prag ue S prin g', Hu sak sudde nl y changed into a pro po ne nt of ce ntrali sati o n o nce he was in po wer in Prag ue. Thi s s ituation was exacerbated by the lac k of opportunity pro po nents of inc reased Sl ovak se lf- rul e had to prese nt thei r views to the Czech publi c. Genera ll y, the Slovak po liti c ians who most eas il y ga ined access to the pages of the Prag ue press were those in favo ur of centra li sed rul e. Furth e rmo re, the lac k of know ledge a nd unde rstand in g of S lovaki a a mo ng Czec hs was a res ult of a lac k of in terest in S lova k affa irs. Slovaki a was, at least in the in ter- war peri od, a po liti ca ll y less impo rta nt part of the country. Even if sy mpathy fo r the S lovaks had pl ayed a ro le in the suppo rt C zec h po li tic ians gave the pl ans fo r an inde pe nde nt Czec hos lova ki a, th e re we re o ther impo rt a nt reaso ns 22 Frantsiek M iklosko: Cas stretnutf. Brati slava, 1996, p.44. 23 Pffhoda: ·s tovaci ceskyma oci ma', p.643. �91 SLOVAKIA why they wanted a union . The main ' problem ' in Czech hi story has been the question of the Czechs ' position as a small nation surrounded by Germans. In Slovakia and the Slovaks, Czech leaders found a doub le solution to their problem. As a people, the Slovaks represented a biological reinforcement to the Czech , renamed the Czechoslovak, nation , making it the majority nation in the new state. They thus helped legitimate Czech(oslovak) domination of Czechoslovakia. (One should not forget that there were about 50 per cent more German than Slovak speakin g citizens (3 versus 2 million ) in interwar Czechoslovakia.) As a territory . Slovakia formed a bridge out of the German encirclement towards Ru ssia, which before 1917 was perceived as a rival of Germany and protector of the Slavs, and towards Czechoslovakia ·s all y Romania. For those perceivin g the state from such a ' Great-Czech ' point of view, Czechos lovakia was merely 'a reestabli shment of th e Czech state, reinforced by the Slovak territorie s, which were so weak and neglected that it was simply not necessary to see them as a separate entity. ' 24 The most important reason for the lack of knowl edge and understandin g of Slovakia among Czechs was , however. the uncritical acceptance of the Czechoslovak idea by most Czechs. In th e interwar yea rs, the Czechoslovak ideo logy was a pillar ce ntral to the very existence of the state. Even Masaryk argued th at ' there is no such thing as a Slovak nation 25 paganda ' . l- .. I; that is an invention of Hungarian pro- In Slovakia, on the other hand, the idea of one Czecho- slovak nation met res istance, [i]n the minds of th e Czechs, the notions of 'Czec h' and ' Czechoslovak' had blended into one by th e end of the Second World War at the latest. A significa nt conseq uence of thi s psycho- soci al operation was the removal of the Slovaks as a distinct ethni c entity from the Czech field of vis ion . The Slovaks eventuall y began to be perceived as H L.:.ubomfr Liptak: Slovensko v 20. storocf. Bratisl ava. 1998. 2nd edition. p. 128 . 15 Pynse nt : ' Masaryk ·s "Pa th of Democracy''". p.41. �92 SLOVAKIA part of the same nat iona l organi sm - almost as the advocates of the Czechoslovak concept would like to have it only thi s organi sm was not Czechoslovak but Czech.26 The net result of thi s process was that the social, c ultura l and reli g ious differences betwee n the Czechs and Slovaks became invisible to the majority of Czechs who never learned to kn ow the Slovaks and Slovakia directly. Thi s aga in led to the anticipatio n that Slovaks would have a s imil ar world view and would react in the sa me way as Czechs to events and po li c ies. The co nsequences of such anticipation varied over time. In the inter-war period , it was the insensitive attitude of the new regime towards the Catholic Church that was most important. Czech nation alism had the Hu ss ite peri od as its Golden Age; a Golden Age that was termin ated by the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the following violent co unterReform ation in Bohemia and , to a somew hat lesser degree, Morav ia. With the sec ulari sing impact of the industriali sation and urbani sati on of the Czech Lands in the nineteenth century, thi s gave Czech nationalism a not only sec ul ar, but often an openly anti-Catho lic edge. 27 Although the Protestant minority was proportionately bi gger in Slovakia than in the Czech Land s, there was no clear connection between anti-Catholici sm and nation ali sm even amon g Protestant Slovak nat ionali sts. On the contrary, one direction within the Slovak nati ona l move ment was closely co nnec ted to the Catholic fa ith . The Catholic national ists, led from the early twentieth century by Andrej Hlinka, were more skeptica l of cooperation with the Czec hs than were the hlasi sti. Man y Czech politicians and intellec tu a ls were, from the point of view of Slovak Catholics, dangerously radical liberals, if not atheist anti-Catholics. 28 When the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 28 October 1918 was followed by a wave of 26 Zdenek Suda: ' Slovakia in Czech Nati onal Consciousness ' , in Musil (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia, p.1 39- 155 ( 11 8) (hereafter Suda: ' Slovakia ' ). 27 R. W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London, 1943, p.33 1. 28 Jan Rychl fk : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoletf: Cesko-sl ovenske vztahy , 19 14- 1945. Bratislava, 1997, p.38 (hereafter Rychlfk: Cesi a Slo vac1). �SLOVAKIA 93 anti-Catholic gestures in the Czech Lands, the worst fears of the Slovak Catholics were reali sed . As lsmo Nurmi wrote: ' if the anti-Catholic mood was fashionable in the Czech lands, it was not so in Slovak ia and even less so when a numbe r of desecration s of reli g iou s c ult objects, churches, statues, crosses etc. were committed [ ... ] also in Slovakia [by] civil servants and particularly the Czechoslovak Army.' 29 The attempt to create a Czechoslovak national hi story and tradition with the Hussite era as pivotal was a clear sign of the lac k of understanding among Czech (and some Slovak) leade rs for the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Masaryk 's official ' inclusion ' of Slovakia in the Hu ss ite tradition on the basis of Jan Ji skra 's ' crusade ' into Slovakia was not only hi storically dubiou s, but also, and not surpri sin gly, rejected by the Slovak Catholic clergy. As Suda wrote: ' To the Catholic majority of the Slovaks, among whom Catholicism had a very pronounced conservative tin ge typical of a pre-modern society , a common programme with the Czechs based on the traditions of the Protestant Reformation must have been almost an anathema. ' 30 After 1948, with the industriali sation of Slo vaki a unde r Communi st rul e, the religious differen ces be tween the Czech a nd Slovak parts of the common state were so mew hat diffused. Albeit a clear scepticism towards 'Czech liberali sm ' was visible in Christian democratic circles in Slovakia also after the collapse of Communism, another as pec t of the Czech ignorance of Slovak affairs beca me more important. As noted above , very many Czechs saw Czechoslovakia and the ' Czechoslovak nation ' as their state and nation , quite often interpreted as a Czech state a nd nation that included the Slovaks. After World War II , the rec reation of Czechoslovakia was acco mpanied by an official recog niti on by all political leaders, albeit some Czec h politicians were reluctant to do so, of the ex iste nce of two 29 lsmo Nurmi: Slo vakia - A Playground for Na tionalism and National Identity. 191 8- /920 : M anifestations of the Na tional Identity of Slovaks. Hel sinki. 1999. pp. 92-93. 30 Suda : ·Slovakia ' . p.11 5. �SLOVAKIA 94 fo un d in g nati ons in the co untry . Thi s princ ipl e was reaffirmed with the federa li sati on of 1968. Despite thi s offic ial recogniti on, there was ve ry littl e understanding a mong Czec hs of S lovak atte mpts to promote the ir separate ide ntity. Proba bl y the best kn ow n exa mpl e of S lova k po li tic ians ' dema nd s fo r 'v isibility and equ a lity ' fo r S lovaki a w ithin Czec hos lovaki a was the stru gg le fo r the name of the federati on in the sprin g of 1990 . Th e so-ca ll ed ' hy phe n-wa r ' sta rted w he n new ly e lec ted Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l suggested c ha ng in g the offic ial name of the Republic, the Czechoslovak Soc iali st Republic, by mere de leti on of the word ' Sociali st' . Whil e fo r mos t Czec hs thi s so luti on mu st have see med natural , it ran into oppos iti on in S lovaki a? A Sl ovak co unter-proposa l, the Czec ho-Slovak Re public, or just Czec ho-Slovaki a, a name that made Slovaki a more vi s ibl e to the world , was, however, not acceptabl e to most Czec h po liti c ians. The reasons given fo r thi s were that th e hyphe n had been used in the name of the Second Republi c (1938 -39, th at is, afte r the Muni c h Accord), a nd beca use ' C zec ho' (Ces k o) was not consi de red a pro pe r word in the Czech language. As one leading comme ntator compl ained in Lidove noviny: ' We in the Czec h Land s perce ive the insiste nt de mand of Sl ovaki a fo r a di vidin g line in the na me of the Re public as tac tl ess and coarse. " 2 Onl y afte r two mo nth s o f de bate in the three nati onal asse mbli es (the Czec h, Slova k and Federa l) and the mass medi a was a compromi se fo und : The Czec h and Slovak Federa l Republic. Have l quic kl y rea li sed th at he had made a mi stake by not consul ting politic ians fro m both the Czec h a nd Sl ova k Re pu b li cs before making hi s suggestion public. In a n atte mpt to rec ti fy the s itu ati on the hospitali sed Have l sent a le tter to the Federal Asse mbl y in February, where he stated : -' ' M il an Su tovec: Semi6za aka pol i tik um a/ebo "Pom lckov;-i vojna ". Brati slava, 1999, pp. 174- 196 (hereafter Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna). -' 2 Ji ff Hanak: 'Nespraved li ve a tedy neprijatelne' . Lidove Noviny. 28 M arch 1990. p.l. �SLOVAKIA 95 We a ll kn o w th at thi s hyphe n, whi ch fo r a ll Czechs seems ridi c ul o us, unnecessary and ugly, is mo re tha n just a hyphe n. In thi s hyphe n o ne ca n find severa l decades, if not ce ntu ries of th e hi sto ry of the S lo va k nati o n [ ... ] The Sl o vak nation is ri g htfull y tryin g to fin d its ide ntity, fo r reason s Czec hs probabl y do n ' t understa nd , eve n if they o ught to understand them.33 Resentment Exampl es of Czec h skepti c ism a nd resentment to ward s Slo vak nati o na li sm ca n be fo und as earl y as the middl e of th e nine teenth century. From the late 1840s, a majo rity of Slovak inte ll ectua ls ado pted the new codifi cati o n of th e S lovak lang uage , as publi shed in 1846 by Cudovft Stur, as a pl atfo rm fo r the Sl ovak national programme. This met w ith strong res istance fro m Czech and Slovak inte llectua ls promotin g Czec h-Sl ovak unity: they saw the Slovaki zed versio n of Hu ss ite Bible Czec h used by ma ny Slovak inte llec tua ls until then, as the clearest bo nd between Czechs and Slovaks.34 If in the inte rwar years Czec hos lovak leade rs cons idered Slovak nati o na li sm a pro bl e m, it was ma inl y after 1938 th at o pe nl y hostil e attitudes toward s it e merged. The ex pl oi tatio n by Slovak nati o na li sts of the weakness of the Czec hos lovak reg ime after the Munich cri sis to push trou gh thei r de mands fo r a uto no my, c ulmin atin g in the ac ceptance by the Slovak leade rs of German de mand s fo r Slovak indepe ndence in M arc h 1939, was conside red a stab in the back by most Czechs. 35 Durin g the Second World W ar, Ed vard Be nes, the C zechoslovak Pres ide nt-in -ex il e, was o ne of the sharpest cri tics of what he considered the Slovak be traya l. He was ' o bstin ate in defending the Czec hos lovak ca use: its betraya l by the Slovaks mattered more to him than the grow ing press ure from Moscow. He be li e ved th at the " As quoted in Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna, pp.269-27 1. 34 Sk illing: Masary k, p. 69. 35 Petr Pffhoda: ' M utual Perceptions in Czech-S lovak Relationshi ps ', in M usil (ed .): The End of Czechoslovakia. pp. 128- 138 ( 134 ). �96 SLOVAKIA Slovak heresy undermined the ve ry fo undations of the state, and Czechoslovaki sm was for him a part of the foundations. ' 36 Throu ghout the war, Benes and other Czech politi cians fought for the reestabli shment of the First (th at is, pre-Muni ch) Republi c. Most Slovak politici ans, howe ver, including former Czechos lovak Prime Minster Milan Hodza, con sidered thi s a less th an optim um solution. 37 Only reluctantly , given th e situation in Slovakia after the Slovak National Upri sing in the autum n of 1944, was Benes forced to accept a de facto asymmetric federalisation of post-war Czechoslo va ki a. However, despite previou s agreements, most importantl y the Kosice Government Programme, drafted by the first pro visional government after the country was partly -liberated from the East, the question of Slovaki a's position within the country cont inued to divide the Czec h and Slovak non-Comm uni st parties after the war. The willin gness of the Czec h democratic parti es to coo perate with the Communi sts in reducin g the powers of the Slovak nation al organs , cruci all y after the 1946 elections, contrib uted to undermining the position of the Democratic Party in Slo va ki a. The Czechos lovak Communi st Party was thu s abl e to exploit ' the anti -Sl ovak nati onali sm among Czech political parties and [ ... ] the isolated position of the Slovak democrats. ' 38 Thi s clearly weakened the democrats' ability to oppose the Communi sts' increasing political power in the country. During and after 1968 , the negati ve view of Slo vak nationali sm and Slovakia in the Czech L ands was reinforced. After the Soviet-led in vas ion on 2 1 Au gust 1968, 'sociali sm with a human face ' was gradually di smantled and replaced by ' norm ali sation '. Th e only maj or reform of the Prague Spring to survive was the dec ision to federalize Czechoslovakia. In Sl ovaki a thi s decision w as generall y interpreted 36 37 Zeman and Klimek : Eduard Bene{ p.203. Milan Hodza : Federarion in Cenrra l Europe: Renections and Reminiscences. London. 1942, pp.93-94. 38 Ji rf K ocian: ·Narodnf soc ialis te a slovenska otazka 1945- I 948 ". in Michal Bar- novsky (ed.) : Od dikratury k diktature. Brati slava. 1995 . pp.57-65 (6 I ). (hereafter K oc ian: ' Narodnf socialiste') �SLOVAKIA 97 as a more just organi sation of the common state. In the Czech Lands, however, many saw federalisation as a further example of the Slovak nationali sts' skill in drawing advantages from Czechoslovakia's mi sfortune. The fact th at the new party leade r and late r Pres ident of Czechoslovakia, Gu stav Hu sak, was Slovak, also contributed to the negative picture of Slovakia and Slovaks. As Petr Pithart wrote: the Czech public was di sappointed, even di sg usted, by the Slovaks ' ex peri e nce of havin g ga ined sati sfac tion with federalization; at best, it was seen as foolishness a nd at worst, as blind se lfi shness and eve n betrayal. ( ... ) in the Czec h Lands there was an increasing ly obvious di sg ust for the regime and for the Slovaks, as the ones through whom normali zation was allegedly introduced and carried out. 39 A s ign of the growing irritation with and resentment toward s Slovak nationa li sm and Slovaks in ge ne ral in the Czech Lands, was the increas in g ly popul a r de mand that Czech taxpayers should not have to subsidi se the ungrateful Slovaks. Already in 1933 Czechoslovak Prime Min ster Ja n Malypete r had rejected the demand for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that Slovakia would not be able to pay its way . In the Czech press, headlines read along the lines: ' We are paying for Slovakia ' .40 Thi s be lief that the Czechs were subsidis in g th e Slovaks was observed also by Prfhoda forty-three years late r: ' In the Czech Lands the view of Slovak parasiti sm [parazitismu s] is common and it is formulated more or less like thi s: we Czechs are payin g for the Slovaks. ' 41 The Czechoslovak Communist Party was committed to so lvin g the probl e m of Slovak nation alism, which it interpreted as a mainly eco nomic iss ue , through equ ali zat ion of the standard of li ving bet- 39 Petr Pithart: ' Towards a Shared Freedom ' , in Mu sil (ed.): Th e End of Czechoslovakia.pp.20 1-222 (206). 40 Vi ctor S. Mamatey: ' The Development of Czechoslovak Democ racy ', in Mamatey and Luza (eds.) : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp.99-166 ( 15 1). 41 Prfhoda: "S lovac i ces kyma ocima', p.647. �SLOVAKIA 98 wee n the Czech and Slovak parts of the co unty. Economic transfers, parti cul arly through a higher level of in vestment in Sl ovaki a were, therefore, considered important. They continued even during the di ffic ult years in the 1970s and 1980s, but were kept secret, probabl y to avoid un favo urable reactions in the Czech L ands. After the co llapse of Communi sm, opposition to w hat was popularl y referred to as the Czech ' money pipeline' (p enezovod) to Slovak ia was quickl y made into a politi cal demand. In the first formal ro und of negoti ation s on th e future of the fe derati on after the co ll apse of Communi sm, in Lnare in April 1990, the Czech delegati on demanded a halt to Czec h subsidies to Slovaki a.42 From Czech to Czechoslovak nationalism and back As noted earlier, the Czechos lov ak directi on within Czech poli ti cs was by no means dominant pri or to W orld W ar I. Czec h nationali sts concentrated mainl y on defending and enhancing Czech autonomy w ithin th e Habsburg M onarchy. With the success of the Czec hoslovak idea in the Entente capitals in 19 17-1 8, however, most Czec h nati onali sts quite quickl y became convinced Czec hos lovak nati onali sts; Czech nati onali sm was ex panded to include th e Sl ovaks, the Czec hs' ' little bro ther ' in Hungary. Cultura ll y and economi ca ll y wea k, the Slovaks posed no threat to either Czech culture or politica l and economic dominati on of the new state. A nd after all , as M asaryk himse lf pointed out, the Slovaks were merely Czec hs w ith a slightly di fferent hi story. Th e attachment o f Czech politi cians to the Czech os lovak idea ca n be clearl y see n after W orld W ar II. In 1968 , a document supposedly written by members of th e (Czec h) Nation al Soc iali st Party 4 in I 946 was pub I ished in the Slova k press . ' Its authors argued th at the bes t way to so lve the problem of Slovak nati onalism was fo rced ass imil ati on of the Sl ovaks into good Czec hoslovaks. Whil e seri ous • • 2 BBC Summa1y of World Broadcast. EE/0738 B/2. 13 Apri I 1990. 3 T he document was first publi shed in Vac lav Kral: Cestou k tinoru, Prague, I 956, but attrac ted relati ve ly little attention until reproduced in the mass medi a in 1968. �99 SLOVAKIA doubts exist as to th e authenticity of thi s ' Memorandum on Slovakia' , most hi storian s seem to agree that the idea of turnin g the Slovaks into good Czechoslovaks was not alien to certain leading Czech politicians at the time. 44 The reaction to what was perceived as the Slovak betraya l of 1938-39 was increased Czechoslovak nationali sm. However, during the Communist period , a nd particul ar ly after 1968 , Czech nationalism gradually gained supporters in the Czech Lands . As Prfhoda wrote in 1976: 'I am not sure how thin gs are in Slovakia, but among Czechs the concept of a com mon state is being re-eva luated these days . I have eve n heard : let the Ru ss ia ns make Slovakia into a union republic or something and leave us in peace!' 45 Obviou sly , ne ither Czech nor Slovak separat ism was politically acceptable durin g Communist rul e. After th e 'Velvet Revo lution' , however, influe ntial vo ices soo n e merged in the Czech Land s questioning the union with the Slovaks. As earl y as the beginning of May 1990, in the aftermath of the hyphe n war, the Czech writer Ludvfk Vaculfk, the author of the 'Two thousand words' manifesto in 1968, wrote a sharpl y worded articl e in Litenimf noviny. 46 ' W e Czechs have a great debt to the Slovaks,' Yaculfk argued. This debt was due to the fact that the Czechs had happily made Slovakia ' theirs' without takin g into account what it meant to be Slovak. Through their behaviour, however, the Slovaks had made it difficult for the Czechs to appreciate thi s debt. Th e Czechs had g ive n the Slovaks the ir industry and inte lli gentsia, so mething that had only caused the Slovaks to ' until thi s day complain about the qua lity of these supplies'. The Czechs had give n the Slovaks a way out of defeat as a separate state during World War II. Even Communism , brou g ht to Slovakia by Czechs afte r the war, had g ive n the Slovaks more in material terms than it had to the Czechs. When the Czechs then tri ed to ease th e die- 44 See Koc ian: ' Narodnf soc iali ste' . passim: Rychlfk: Ce.si II Slo vaci. pp. 54-55: ·Na okraj diskusie: 0 tzv. Slovenskom memoranda Cs. narodne sociali stickej strany ', Nase snahy . Vol. I 9/2. 1983. p. 9. 45 Prfhoda: ' Slovaci ceskyma ocima ' . p.653. 41 ' Ludvik Vaculfk: ' Nase slovenska otazk a', Litenimf noviny. Vol.1 /5, 1990. p.2. �SLOVAK IA 100 tatorship during 1968, the Slovaks saw thi s as a Czech matter and instead forced through 'autonomy '. For this they escaped with lighter puni shment during the era of ' normali sation .' Now aga in , after the col lapse of Communism, when Czechs were trying th eir utmost finally to defeat the dictatorial regime , the Slovaks were 'coming with their prestige demands'. ' Do we need thi s?' he asks rhetorically and then concludes : We have found ourse lves with a thankless task in th e fate of the Slo vaks, and I think th at we should end it without se lf-pity - more with a smil e into th e mirror. [ ... l Why should the Slovaks ha ve to force out of us, centimetre by ce ntimetre, somethin g that they can have in one go? By separating from the Slovaks , purely of our ow n volition , we " lose" - judging from experience to date - economic losses. Politicall y we lose th e Hungarian and Ruth ene problem s. We put another border between us and th e Soviet Union. 47 At th e time of hi s writ ing, Yaculfk ' s recommendation th at th e Czec hs should dispense with the Slovaks accorded with neither public nor political opinion in the Czech Republic. At that stage not even the most radical Czech politician s were promoting divi sion of the state. Gradually , however, the need to resolve the probl em of th e common state w ith the Slovaks once and for all became pressing. As Yaculfk observed in December of 1990: 'Public opinion poll s show that 75 percent of Czechs are said to favour a common state with the Slovaks. Had one, on the other hand , asked if we should let the Slovaks go, just as many would probabl y have answered " yes" to thi s as we ll. ' 48 In Slovakia, the question of the statu s of the Slovak Republic within the Czech and Slovak state became a centra l political topic . 47 Ibid. The double quotation marks arou nd -- Jose" were added to make th e irony more vi sible. The original tex t is : ' Od loucenfm od Slovaku. jez j e vyhradne v nasf vu li. ztratfme - souzeno dosavadnf zkusenostf - ekonomicke ztraty. • 48 Ludvik Yaculfk: ' M ec iar mozna odejde' . Litenimf noviny . Vol. I /39. I 990. p.2. �SLOVAKIA 101 Sl ovak politicians began to co mpete over w ho co uld present a programme th at would benefit and pro mote Slovaki a the most. Thi s led to a gradual radi ca li sati on of Slovak demands in the negoti ation s on the future of the federati on. Such radica li sati on in turn provoked a voc iferou s reaction in the Czech L ands. Th e influenti al Czec h j ournal R esp ekt refl ec ted th e growin g antagoni sm toward s Sl ovaki a in th e Czec h L ands. Headlines from the Spring of 1992 such as ' The supreme Slovak irrespon sibility' ( 17 Febru ary, p.2), ' B alkan model on the hori zo n: how long w ill the Czech-Slovak statu s quo las t?" (24 Febru ary, p.2) and 'A bsurd parliamentary drama: who saves Slovak ia from sovereignty?' (6 A pril , p.2) ev ince an increas ingly criti ca l view o f Sl ovak politi cs . In the issue th at co incided with the electi ons of 8 June, the criticism ca me to its logica l co nclu sion . Peter Schutz, Respekt 's (Sl ovak-Hungari an) correspondent in Slovak ia, wrote in the arti cle ' Slovaki a adheres to nati onal soc iali sm': ' The shameful result of thi s electi on formul ated onl y one alternati ve - either lMec iar 's party] HZDS disintegrates, or the CSFR. ' 49 Vl adimfr Ml ynar ex pressed the same message in the subtitle o f hi s arti cle in the same issue: 'A lone into Euro pe or together into the Balkans'. 50 Parti cul arl y the politi ca l ri ght in th e Czec h Lands increasingly saw Slovaki a as an obstac le on the road ' back ' to Europe. After the 1990 elec ti ons, th e ri ght had graduall y strengthened its pos ition among the Czech elec torate. In Slovaki a, on the other hand , it was the more reform- scepti ca l and patri oti c parti es on the politica l left that had enjoyed greater success. Gi ven th e spec ial minority veto of both the Czec h and Slovak groups of deputies in th e House of Nati ons of the Federal Assembl y, a left-patri otic maj ority in Slovaki a was a worry ing prospec t for the Czech proponents of radi ca l reform s. A month before th e parliam entary election s in June 1992, V aclav 09 Peter Sch utz: ·s tovensko sa prihlasilo k narodnemu socializmu - Pos lcdne zvone- nie pre federaciu ·, Respekt. 8- 14 June 1992, p.2. ~ V lad imir Ml ynar: ·v Cechac h tes ne vftezstvf prav ice - lecne na Balka n·. Respekt, 8- 14 June 1992. p.3. Sarni do Evropy nebo spo- �102 SLOVA KI A Kl aus made it c lear that if a fu ncti o na l federa ti o n was not poss ible after the e lect io ns, he and his partners were ' ready to create a mec hani sm for a q uick, c ivili sed and prob le m-free div isio n of the state. ' 51 Conclusion By the late summ er of 1992, th e do min ant view of Slovak ia in C zec h po liti cs had, in a se nse, co me full c irc le to co inc ide with the views th at preva il ed pri o r to W o rl d W ar I. Fro m hav ing bee n a strateg ica ll y less attrac ti ve partne r in the seco nd ha lf of the nineteenth ce ntury, Sl ovaki a beca me a strateg ic asset in the firs t ha lf of th e twenti eth . Afte r W o rld W ar II , however, S lovak ia a nd th e S lovaks gradu a ll y lost the ir strateg ic impo rt a nce for the Czec hs. The large Ge rm an mino rity in the Czec h Lands was ex pe ll ed in the firs t years after the war, taking the edge off the Ge rman threat. Furthermore, fo r C zec h democ rats, the Communi st co up of Febru ary 194 8 put an e nd to a ll ideas of seekin g sec urity a nd integrati o n in the East, th ro ugh Slova ki a. In stead , they now turn ed exc lu sive ly to the West: to th e US , NATO . the E uro pean Co mmunity and eve n the o ld ri va l, Ge rmany. At the th resho ld of the twenty- first ce ntury, Slova ki a, w ith its c umbe rso me soc ia li st eco no my, its po puli st nati o na li sm , and its pro bl e ms with Hun ga ry over the Hungari an mino rity in Slovaki a and the G abc fk ovo- Nagy maros da m projec t o n the Da nube, aga in became a strateg ic burden. The Czec hos lovak traditi o n and adhe re nce to the Czec hos lovak idea were still strong in the Czec h Lands. Tho ugh the Czec h politica l ri ght had the suppo rt of gro ups suc h as The Czec h Initi ati ve, whic h gathered aro und 50,000 sig natures in favo ur of Czec h independe nce in fo ur days in June 1992 in Prague, most Czec hs were still in favo ur of a co mm o n state w ith the Slova ks. 52 Thu s Kl aus and hi s partners co uld not push throug h a break-up w itho ut so me effort. Co nsequ ent ly, as Abby Innes wrote: ' Kl a us preferred a strategy o f shi ftin g res- 51 As cited in Marian Lesko: Meciar a meciarizm us: polit ik bez .~kruptif" politika bez zabran. Bratis lava. 1997, p.78. 52 BBC Summary of World Broadcast. EE/ 14 12 B/5. 20 June I 992. �SLOVAKIA 103 po ns ibility fo r the confli c t e ntire ly onto the Slovak side and c la imed th at it was now "ev ide nt th at votes fo r the HZ DS are votes fo r th e di visio n o f the state". ' 53 Give n th at th e do min a nt Czec h im age of S lovak nati o na li sm, a nd of Vl adim ir Mec iar, was negative, Kl aus was lucky in hav in g hi s tas k made eas ier. Hi s ca mpa ig n was furth er ass isted by th e oppos iti o n of the leading S lova k parti es to th e ree lection of Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l in Jul y. Hav ing fa il ed to be ree lec te d , Have l res ig ned pre m ature ly whe n th e Slo va k Nation a l Co unc il passed a large ly sy mbo li c dec larati o n of sovere ig nty o n 17 Jul y. Have l, prev io us ly o ne of the leading pro po ne nts of the co mmo n state, now le nt hi s support to a di visio n of the state. 54 The first day of Janu ary 1993 saw the creati o n of two new states: the C zec h Re publi c and the Sl ovak Re publi c. Of the two, the Czec h Republi c c learl y adopted the mantl e of successor to Czec hos lovaki a. T he new Czec h state had the sa me capita l, the same fl ag (in breac h o f an earli e r agree me nt) and the sa me pres ide nt. C zec h co mpani es and even po liti ca l parties fo r a lo ng time ke pt the word 'Czechos lovak ' in the ir na me (for exampl e, the S in CSA, Czec h[os lovak] A irlin es). Mos t things re ma ined as they had bee n, exce pt w ith o ut the Slovaks. As Vaculfk had po inted o ut so po ig nantl y in 1990: ' Whe n th e "Federati o n" started crac king in its fo undatio n, I got the idea fo r a new , in spi rin g ly o ptimi sti c so luti o n: whe n S lov aki a breaks away there w ill be no o ne to preve nt us fro m ca lling o ur state Czec hos lovak ia ... ' 55 " A bby Innes: ' T he Breakup of Czechos lovak ia: T he Impact of Part y Deve lopment on the Separation of the State· . Eust European Politics and Society. Vol. I I /3. 1997. pp. 393-435 (424). '" I va n L amper and V ladimir Ml ynar: ·skoncila ceskoslovenska statnost: Rozhovor s pos lednfm prezi dentem CSFR Vac lave m Havlem ' . Respekt. 20-27 July 1992. p.4. " Vac ulfk: ' Meciar mofoa odejde'. p.2 . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 2005, Vol. 38 Description An account of the resource Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 81 SLOVAKIA From Bratr nas to At'jdou Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague 1 Paa! Sigurd Hilde The Velvet Divorce between the Czech and Slovak parts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub lic (CSFR) was a political undertaking. All public opinion polls taken in the period 1990-1992 showed a clear majority in favour of a common state among both Slovaks and Czechs.2 The decision to divide the country came as a result of a compromise between two political parties - or more specifically, between two politicians: Vaclav Klaus of the (Czech) Civic Democratic Party and Vladimfr Meciar of the (Slovak) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia. While both Klaus and Meciar argued that they wanted to preserve the common state, their visions of such a Czech and Slovak state were so disparate that an agreement to differ was the only possibility. Most detailed studies of the break-up agree that if either of them , Meciar or Klaus, were to be identified as 'more guilty' in promoting the break-up, it would not be the Slovak nationali st Meci ar, but the Czech ' Thatcherite ' Klaus. 3 Ultimately, what sank the good ship Czechoslovakia was that the Czech captain, the ' A sli ghtly different version of thi s arti cle was originall y published in Norwegian in Nordisk @stforum, Yol . 15/2. 200 I , pp.5-16. 2 See. for example, Sharon Wolchik: 'The Pol itics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist Czechoslovakia', fast European Politics and Society, Vol. 8/ 1994. I , pp.153-188. 3 See, for example, Abby Innes: Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. London. 200 I , particularly pp. 176-2 19. SLOVAKIA 82 o ne that had a lw ays fo ught the hardest to keep it a fl oat, gave the order to sc uttle. The a im of thi s paper is to prov ide a n in sig ht into the deve lopme nt of the vi e ws on Slovaki a, Slovaks and Slova k nati o na li sm in th e Czec h Land s: fro m the ideas unde rl y in g the creati o n of Czech oslova ki a in 19 18 to those leading to the di sso luti o n of th at country in 1992. Natu ra ll y, the re is no c lear 'Czec h view ' of matters re lating to Sl ova ki a. Even if one di srega rds indi vidu a l o pini o ns and con ce ntrates o n what mi g ht be ca ll ed c ultura l ' heteroste reotypes' (v ie ws of the othe r), o ne w ill still find , fo r in stance, strong reg io na l differe nces w ithin the Czech La nd s. Any ana lys is of the ' Czec h view ' will thu s, eve n in the best case, be a probl e mati c prese ntati o n o f e lu sive collecti ve attitudes. Furthe rm ore, give n the absence of publi c opinio n surveys fo r most of the peri od studi ed , it is imposs ibl e to asce rta in ho w representati ve suc h attitudes were. The pi cture of Sl o va ki a presented here will be based to a large deg ree o n the attitudes ex pressed by leadin g po liti c ia ns, jo urn a li sts a nd o th er ' opini o n-fo rmers' in the Czec h Lands. For thi s reaso n the arti c le will present o pini o ns mo re typi ca l of Prague tha n. fo r in stance, Mo ra via, whe re co ntacts w ith Slovaks a nd Sl ovaki a we re more direct. Ho we ve r, as an earli er study , simil ar to thi s, argued , ' in Prag ue and in the C zec h Land s in genera l there are few opportunities to ga in a broad , direct impress ion of Slovaks, and the Czec h view of the Slovak is the refore the res ult of tra nsmitted , dedu ced impress io ns. ' 4 Whe n attitudes are acqui red ma inl y indirec tl y, opini o n-formers pl ay an important rol e. Gi ve n the limited scope of thi s arti c le, th e many theoreti cal and methodo log ica l pro bl e ms of suc h a stud y ca nno t be e xamined. Interestin g a nd impo rtant aspec ts, suc h as the inte raction between th e C zech and Slo va k he teroste reotypes o f eac h othe r, will al so have to be ig no red . Gi ven these limitati o ns, thi s articl e beco mes a mere in - 0 Petr Pi'fh oda : ' Slovac i ces kyma ocima'. Svedect vf, Vol. I 3/52. 1976, p.637. T he arti cle was publi shed under the pseudonym Jan Prfbram. SLOVAKIA 83 troducti o n to the issue - an introducti o n th at mi g ht mo ti vate othe rs to make a c loser and broader examin atio n. Three aspects - three stages In her exce ll e nt stud y of the co nfli c t betwee n S lova ks a nd Czec hs, Caro l Ska lnik Leff a na lysed the develo pme nt of a se nse of mutu a l resentment betwee n the two gro ups. 5 A lmost througho ut Czechos lovak hi sto ry, there was persiste nt o ppos it ion fro m the Czec hdo min ated politi ca l leade rship , bo th de mocrati c a nd Co m m uni st, aga in st ful fi llin g pro mi ses of a uto no my for the Slova k part of the co untry. On the one hand , thi s fa ilure to live up to the pro m ises of 19 18, 1945 and , some argue, 1968, led to the deve lo pme nt of a sense of betraya l in Slovak ia. On the ot her ha nd, in creas ing numbers of Czec hs ex pressed a nger over what they perce ived as S lovak in gratitude - Slovak ungratefuln ess fo r a ll the ass istance Czec hs affo rded Slovaki a. Moreove r, the way Slovak po liti c ians, in the Czec h perception, ex pl o ited tim es of crisis in Czec hos lovaki a to pro mo te the ir narrow nati o na li st ai ms ca used pa rti c ul ar rese ntm ent. T h is deeprooted mutu al resentme nt was, Leff arg ued in 1987 , o ne of th e ma in reasons why the co nfl ic t betwee n the Czec hs a nd S lovaks wo ul d rema in an unresolved pro bl e m.6 She was soon to be proven right. If o ne examines the Czec h view of S lovaki a, Slovaks and S lovak natio na li sm mo re broad ly than Leff, it is poss ible to ide nti fy two furth er impo rta nt aspec ts of the Czec h view. The firs t mi g ht be des cribed as big-brothe rl y co nce rn . Ma ny Czec h inte ll ect ua ls, po li tic ians and other Slova ko ph iles we re ge nuine ly interes ted in and conce rned abo ut th e we lfare and fate of the S lova ks. T he ir e ngagement was we ll in tended and , espec ia ll y before 19 18 but a lso later, of g reat he lp to Slova k inte ll ec tu a l a nd c ultu ra l li fe. However, no t in fre qu e ntl y d id thi s bi g brothe rl y co nce rn deve lop into a peda nt ic a nd 5 Carol Skalni k Leff: Na tional Conf7ict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton . 1987 , particu larly pp. 148-177. 6 Ibid .. p. 282 . 84 SLOVAKI A arroga nt pate rn a li sm . Not surpri s in g ly, thi s was not favo urabl y received in Slovak ia. T he seco nd aspec t of the Czec h view of S lova ki a a nd the S lovaks is best described as a lac k of aware ness. Average know ledge of po liti ca l a nd eco no mi c conditi o ns in S lova ki a a nd S lova k c ul ture was never ex tensive in the Czech Lands. Partic ul arl y impo rtant was th e w id espread ig norance of the c ultu ra l, soc ia l and es pec iall y re li g iou s diffe re nces betwee n th e average Czec h and Slovak. Hi sto ri ca ll y, thi s un aware ness was to a large degree a res ult of th e qui ck and re lati ve ly pa inl ess acce ptance by the Czec hs of a Czechos lovak ide ntity and the offic ia l ideo logy of the ex iste nce of a Czec hos lovak nati o n. Thi s lack of kn o wl edge often led to in sensiti vity to wards Slovak di stin cti ve ness. Czech po liti c ia ns thu s occas io na ll y made po litica l dec isio ns that suited co nditio ns in the Czec h La nds w itho ut proper concern fo r the di ffe rent impac t the ir po lic ies mi g ht have on Slovaki a. C learl y, th ere is no c lear-c ut di stinc ti o n betwee n the three analytica l aspects of the Czec h view of Slovaks and Slovak nationa li sm. A ll three were present to a greate r o r lesser ex tent th rougho ut the hi story of co ntacts between the two gro ups, and they overl ap. To a certa in degree, however, th ey re prese nt stages throu g h whi c h ma in strea m o pini o n in th e Czec h La nd s went as time progressed . Bi gbrothe rl y co ncern was c learly the most important facet in th e pre19 18 pe ri od and in the ear ly years of the First Repu bli c. The inte rwar pe ri od is most stro ng ly marked by the Prague leadership ' s ig norance of the parti c ul ar soc ia l, econo mi c and re li g io us conditi o ns in Slovak ia. After the dra mati c eve nts in 1938 and 1939, wi th the Mu ni c h Acco rd, S lova k a uto no my a nd la te r ' ind e pe nde nce ' durin g Wo rl d W ar II , Czec h rese ntme nt towards the Slovaks, a nd espec iall y S lovak nat io na li sm, beco mes in creas in g ly impo rta nt. Fi fty years later, thi s animos ity was to dec ide the fa te of the co mm on Czec h and Sl ovak state. SLOVAKIA 85 Big Brother In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the overarching aim of Czech political parties was to force Vienna to acce pt increased autonomy for ' the hi storic lands ' (basically today 's Czech Republic) within the Habsburg Monarchy. The idea of a wider Slav cooperation within the Empire, particularly with th e Slovaks, had ga in ed stre ngth among Czech intell ec tual s from about the 1830s. However, after the success of Hung aria n nat ion ali sm in th e 1867 Ausgleich, Czech leaders became concerned not to a ntagoni se their potential allies in Budapest. The result was that 'Czec h politicians, thou gh sy mpathetic toward [the Slovaks], were re luctant to inte rfere on the ir behalf in Hungary, for this would constitute a violation of Hungary 's state rights and mi ght jeo pardize the Czech program that was based on Bohemia's hi storic state ri ghts. ' 7 The lack of broader politica l cooperation did not preve nt an increasing activism in favour of the c ulturall y oppressed Slovaks, especially among Czech intellectua ls. Whil e Czech culture and society , and Czech nationalism, deve loped rapidly in line with the rapid social and economic deve lopm e nts in the re lativel y liberal Austrian part of the Monarch y, the s itu ation for Slovak culture a nd nationali sm was much more difficult. Particularly after 1867, the Hun garian authoriti es led a heavy-handed assimilation policy (Magyarisation) towards the minorities in Hungary . Many Czech intellectuals expressed a deep sy mpathy for the fate of what they saw as their Slovak brethren in Hun gary and the Slovak national dema nd s. 8 Especially 7 Victor S. Mamatey: 'The Estab li shment of the Republic'. in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomfr Luza (eds.): A History or the Czechosl ovak Republic: 19 18- 1948. Princeton . 1973 , pp. 3-38 (9). 8 Under th e leadership of L'.udovit Stur. Jozef Miloslav Hurban and Michal Miloslav Hodza, a Slovak National Council , formed in Vienna on 16 September I 848 , gave Slovak nationalism its first clear political expression in form of the declaration De mands or the Slovak Nation. Thirteen years later, this time inspired mainly by Stefan Marko Daxner and Jan Francisci, an even clearer national programme was formulated in the 186 1 Memorandum or the Slovak Nation. See Dusan Kovac: Dejiny Slovenska. Prague. 1998. pp. I 19- 13 1. SLOVAKIA 86 from th e 1880s , ac ti ve support fo r Slovak nati onali st intell ec tu als increased. As H. Gordon Sk ill ing wrote: 'from the leighteen] eighties on, there graduall y deve loped, among Czech cultu ra l and pro fes sional persons, a substanti al concern for the Slovaks and a desire to promote Czech and Slovak cooperati on. ' 9 M ost importantl y, the Czech interest in Sl ovaki a took an organised fo rm w ith th e creati on of Ceskoslovanska j edn ota (Czec hos lav Unity), in 1895 . Thi s organi sati on offered fin ancial support to Slovak publi cati ons, grants for Slovak students in the Czech L ands and promoted Czech in vestments in Slovaki a. 1° Furthermore, Ceskoslovan- ska jedn ota sought to spread in form ati on about Sl ovaki a and the Slovaks among Czechs. Thi s w illingness to help the Sl ovaks did not di sappear with the es tabli shment of th e Czec hoslovak state in 19 18. With the gradu al ' liberation ' of what the new Czechos lovak authoriti es considered to be 'S lovaki a' (no admini strati ve boundari es ex isted), a new admini strati on had to be establi shed. The old admini strati ve apparatu s in Hungary consisted almost exc lusive ly of M agyars (ethni c Hungari ans) or ass imil ated intelligenti fro m other cultures. M ost of these refu sed to work for the new Czechos lovak state. As there were far from sufficient educated, patri oti c Sl ovaks to take over the admini strati on, officials had to be imported from the Czech L ands. The first major immi grati on ca me in the spring of 19 19, when ra il way and postal workers in Sl ovaki a stopped work ing to protest again st the new regime. A t th e urgent request of K ornel Stodola, the official res ponsibl e for ra il ways, ' several th ousand patri oti c Czech 9 H . Gordon Ski lling: T. G. Ma.r nryk : Against the Current. 1882- 19 14. London . 1994. p.68 (hereafter Ski ll ing: Mw;ary k). JU Mi ros lav Pek nfk: ·K profi lu slovensko-ceskych vztahov pred prvou sve tovou voj - nou'. in Mi lan Podrimavsky and Dusan Kovac (eds.) : Slovensko ,w zaciatku 20. storocia (Spo /ocnost: stat a narod v siiradniciach doby). Brati slava. 1999. pp.9 1-9 3: Mari e L. Neudorn: ' Slovakia in the Czech Press at the Turn of the ineteen th and Twe nti eth Ce ntu ries' . in John Morison (ed. ): The Czech and Slovak Experience: Selected Papers fro m the Fourth World Cong ress for So viet and East European Studies. Harrogille. I 990. London . 1992. pp. 38-6 I. SLOVAKIA 87 vo lunteers hurri ed fro m Bohe mi a a nd Mo ra via and at a mo me nt 's notice.' 11 Late r, me mbe rs of othe r profess ion a l groups ca me to take up vacant pos iti o ns in S lovaki a: sc hoo lteac hers, uni versity lec ture rs, gend armes, tax collectors a nd bureaucrats of a ll so rts. It has bee n estimated th at 50-60 000 Czec hs went to Sl ovaki a in 19 19-20 and about as many aga in in the years up to 1930. 12 Whil e undo ubtedl y moti vated partl y by the ava il ability of jobs, the w illin g ness to uproot and move to still un safe S lova ki a o n sho rt no ti ce does suggest at least some idea li sm amo ng the vo lunteers. In 19 19-20 there was still armed confli ct betwee n Hun gari an and Czechoslo va k fo rces fo r control o ve r Slovaki a. Even fo r an un e mpl oyed bu reaucrat it could no t have been an easy dec isio n to move there. Few Czec hs can be seen to have do ne mo re to ra ise sy mpathy fo r the Sl o vaks a nd the ir fa te th an To mas Garri g ue Masaryk. Bo rn in Hodonfn , in the Slov acko reg io n of Morav ia, Masaryk ca me fro m a reg ion o n the bo rde r betwee n Czec h and Sl ova k lang uage and c ul ture. Hi s fa ther was Sl ova k and hi s moth er a Germ ani sed C zec h. 13 Gi ven thi s bac kg round , the idea of Czec h and Slovak politica l cooperation mu st have co me easil y to M asaryk. In hi s po litica l li fe , he became one of the ma in propo ne nts of suc h cooperati o n among Czec h politi c ians. As a pro fessor at the C harl es Uni ve rs ity in Prag ue, he was the ma in so urce of in spirati o n fo r a g roup of Slovak stu dents who wo uld later make up an impo rta nt part of the po liti ca l e lite in Czechoslova ki a. Th ese stude nts , best know n as hlasisti, afte r th e name of the ir j o urn a l Hlas (Vo ice), beca me the ma in supporte rs of the C zechos lovak idea in Slovaki a. 14 Yet, despite hi s ge nuin e co nce rn for the S lovaks, M asary k 's speec hes and arti c les at times ex pressed a pa te rn a li st and arroga nt 11 R. W. Seton-Watson : A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London. 1943. p.323. 12 Jan M ec hyr: Slovensko v Ceskoslovensku : Slovensko-ceske vztahy I 9 I 8- 199 I. Prague. 199 1. p.27. 1 '- K arel Capek: Hovory s T. G. M asa1y kem. Prag ue. 1947. pp.8-9, I I 8. 14 Vl ad im ir Bakos: Questions of the Nation in Slo va k Thoug ht. Brati slava. 1999. pp.1 3-57 . 88 SLOVAKIA attitude toward s Slovak culture and hi story . For instance, Masaryk rej ected calls for a plebisc ite in Slovakia after World War l, arg uin g that 'one cannot allow such a vote there, since the Slovaks have bee n so oppressed that they have never had the opportunity to think politically and they would not know in whose hand s to put th eir fate. ' 15 Even c learer was hi s comment on rece nt negotiation s with Slovak leaders in a letter to hi s dau ghter Alice, in 1924: 'It is necessary to be patient with the Slovaks - they are children, or rather spoilt brats.' 16 Given the relatively low educational level and minimal political experience of most Slovaks in 1918 , claims about their immaturity clearly had some justification in the first years after the establi shme nt of Czechoslovakia. However, Czech politicians continued throu ghout the ex istence of the Czechoslovak state to explain the lack of understanding for their policies in Slovakia as a sign of the politica l immaturity of Slovaks. Commenting on relations between Czech and Slovak exiles during World War II, for instance, Edvard Be nes informed the British Foreign Mini stry , that ' the re existed unity among the Czechs while the Slovaks, he conceded, because of their political immaturity, reflected the divided opinions at home.' 17 Also in the post-Communist period , Slovak nationalism , and especially its more radical expressions, were presented as clear signs of the political immaturity of the Slovaks. 'Everyone has the right to live his nineteenth century,' became a common remark in sarcastic comments. 18 " Quoted in Robert 8. Pynsent: ' Masaryk 's ·' Path of Democracy". Or: The Democrati c National Socialist Ideal'. in K atarina A. M . K ocourek (ed.): T. G. Masaiyk 1850- /937. A Collection of Essays to Commemora te the 150th Anniversary of the Birth of Thomas G. Masaryk . London, 2000, p. 35 -57 (41 ) (a specia l issue of Masa1yk Journal). 16 Quoted in Zbynek Zeman and Antonin Klimek: The Life of Eduard Benes: Cze- choslovakia in Peace and War. Oxford , 1997, p.5 I (herea fter Zeman and Klimek: Eduard Benes) . 17 Quoted ibid. pp.168-69. 18 Otto U lc: 'Czechoslovakia ' s Velvet Divorce ' , East European Quarterly, Vol.30/3, 1996, pp. 33 1-352 (340). SLOVAKIA 89 From a Czech po int of view, the re lati o nship between the C zechs and Sl ovaks was c learl y a bi g broth er - littl e brother re lati o nship. The Czech partner in the Czec h-S lovak unio n was c learl y superior in po pulati o n (abo ut 2: I), and fo r most of the hi sto ry of the common state a lso in soc io-econo mic deve lo pment (for example, in education , car-ow nership , numbe r of te le pho nes , etc .). Czech nationa li sts could be proud of a ri c h nati o na l hi story a nd a hi g hl y deve lo ped Czec h c ulture, whil e Slovak nati o na li sts, for hi stori ca l reasons, had less to brag abo ut. The pi cture of Slovaki a as a less deve lo ped, less c ultured ' hinte rl and ' re ma in ed in Czec h po pul ar c ulture, parti c ul arl y in Prague, eve n after Slovak ia reac hed a basica ll y equ al leve l of soc io-econo mi c developme nt (abo ut I 980) . 19 As Petr Prfh oda, the pse udo nymo us Jan Prfbram, observed in the ex ile jo urna l Svedect vfin 1976: T he charac te ri sti c tra its of [the Czec h view of Slovaks a nd S lovaki a] have o ne co mmo n de no m inato r: an a lbe it unc lear, th o ug h multi face ted inferiority. Slovaks see m primiti ve, imm ature, emo ti o na ll y unrestra ined and uneducated [ ... ] The na ivety and lack of ex pe ri e nce amo ng those who come to the unknow n Czec h e nvironme nt is qui c kl y mi sunde rstood as stupidity. A Slovak is qu ite simpl y asc ribed a child 's menta li ty .20 Ignorance On the first page of its 27 Nove mber 1935 iss ue, in an artic le by the fa mo us Czec h jo urn a li st Ferdin and Pe routka, the influenti al journal Pl ftomnost (Presence) asked its readers: ' Do you know of anyone who unde rstand s Slova ki a?' 2 1 F ifty-fi ve years late r, Vac lav Have l' s ad visor Pe te r Hun c ik to ld the Ch a irm a n of th e Sl ova k N ati o na l 19 M il an K ucera and Zdenek Pavlfk: ·Czech and Slovak Demograph y ·, in Jiff M usil (ed.): The End or Czechoslovak ia. Budapest, 1995 , pp. 15-39. 20 Prfhoda: ·s Jovaci ceskyma oc ima' , p.643. 21 Ferd inand Peroutka: ·Nevfte o nekom , kdo rozu mf Slovensku?' , Prfto mnos t, Vo l. 12/47. 1935 , p. I . as reprod uced in Anton Ras la: Zastupova l som ceskoslovensky stat - vyznanie. Presov, 1999, p.268. 90 SLOVAKIA Co un c il , Fra nti se k Mi k losko, th at the Pres ide nt a lways had mi graines whe n he trave ll ed in Slovaki a. 22 Thi s was no t due to the c lim ate, but beca use Have l fe lt great unease abo ut not know ing Slovaki a. Such ac know ledge me nts refl ect the limited kno wl edge of Slovaki a and the Slovaks in the C zech Land s. As Prfhoda o bserved : ' Of all the ne ig hbo urin g nati o ns we know the S lovaks the leas t and ex press the least interest in the m and the ir nat io n. Admittedl y, we have been introdu ced th e best to th e Sl ova ks, but we kn ow th e leas t abo ut the m. ' 23 It is poss ible to ide nti fy severa l reasons fo r thi s lac k of know ledge and understanding. Partl y, it was a res ult of the somew hat confusin g nature of Slovak po liti cs . A lmost thro ugho ut the histo ry of Czechoslovaki a, the politica l e lite in Slova ki a was di vided o n the iss ue of inc reased se lf-governm e nt. Pe ri odi ca ll y, thi s inte rn a l stru gg le amon g S lovak po liti c ians over whethe r S lovaks did or did not want a uto no my mu st have been confu s in g eve n for th e most interested C zech o bserver. Gu stav Hu sak, fo r exampl e, contributed to muddlin g the picture of S lovak nati o na li sm : fro m be ing the prime propo ne nt o f th e federa li sati o n of Czec hos lova ki a befo re a nd durin g the 1968 ' Prag ue S prin g', Hu sak sudde nl y changed into a pro po ne nt of ce ntrali sati o n o nce he was in po wer in Prag ue. Thi s s ituation was exacerbated by the lac k of opportunity pro po nents of inc reased Sl ovak se lf- rul e had to prese nt thei r views to the Czech publi c. Genera ll y, the Slovak po liti c ians who most eas il y ga ined access to the pages of the Prag ue press were those in favo ur of centra li sed rul e. Furth e rmo re, the lac k of know ledge a nd unde rstand in g of S lovaki a a mo ng Czec hs was a res ult of a lac k of in terest in S lova k affa irs. Slovaki a was, at least in the in ter- war peri od, a po liti ca ll y less impo rta nt part of the country. Even if sy mpathy fo r the S lovaks had pl ayed a ro le in the suppo rt C zec h po li tic ians gave the pl ans fo r an inde pe nde nt Czec hos lova ki a, th e re we re o ther impo rt a nt reaso ns 22 Frantsiek M iklosko: Cas stretnutf. Brati slava, 1996, p.44. 23 Pffhoda: ·s tovaci ceskyma oci ma', p.643. 91 SLOVAKIA why they wanted a union . The main ' problem ' in Czech hi story has been the question of the Czechs ' position as a small nation surrounded by Germans. In Slovakia and the Slovaks, Czech leaders found a doub le solution to their problem. As a people, the Slovaks represented a biological reinforcement to the Czech , renamed the Czechoslovak, nation , making it the majority nation in the new state. They thus helped legitimate Czech(oslovak) domination of Czechoslovakia. (One should not forget that there were about 50 per cent more German than Slovak speakin g citizens (3 versus 2 million ) in interwar Czechoslovakia.) As a territory . Slovakia formed a bridge out of the German encirclement towards Ru ssia, which before 1917 was perceived as a rival of Germany and protector of the Slavs, and towards Czechoslovakia ·s all y Romania. For those perceivin g the state from such a ' Great-Czech ' point of view, Czechos lovakia was merely 'a reestabli shment of th e Czech state, reinforced by the Slovak territorie s, which were so weak and neglected that it was simply not necessary to see them as a separate entity. ' 24 The most important reason for the lack of knowl edge and understandin g of Slovakia among Czechs was , however. the uncritical acceptance of the Czechoslovak idea by most Czechs. In th e interwar yea rs, the Czechoslovak ideo logy was a pillar ce ntral to the very existence of the state. Even Masaryk argued th at ' there is no such thing as a Slovak nation 25 paganda ' . l- .. I; that is an invention of Hungarian pro- In Slovakia, on the other hand, the idea of one Czecho- slovak nation met res istance, [i]n the minds of th e Czechs, the notions of 'Czec h' and ' Czechoslovak' had blended into one by th e end of the Second World War at the latest. A significa nt conseq uence of thi s psycho- soci al operation was the removal of the Slovaks as a distinct ethni c entity from the Czech field of vis ion . The Slovaks eventuall y began to be perceived as H L.:.ubomfr Liptak: Slovensko v 20. storocf. Bratisl ava. 1998. 2nd edition. p. 128 . 15 Pynse nt : ' Masaryk ·s "Pa th of Democracy''". p.41. 92 SLOVAKIA part of the same nat iona l organi sm - almost as the advocates of the Czechoslovak concept would like to have it only thi s organi sm was not Czechoslovak but Czech.26 The net result of thi s process was that the social, c ultura l and reli g ious differences betwee n the Czechs and Slovaks became invisible to the majority of Czechs who never learned to kn ow the Slovaks and Slovakia directly. Thi s aga in led to the anticipatio n that Slovaks would have a s imil ar world view and would react in the sa me way as Czechs to events and po li c ies. The co nsequences of such anticipation varied over time. In the inter-war period , it was the insensitive attitude of the new regime towards the Catholic Church that was most important. Czech nation alism had the Hu ss ite peri od as its Golden Age; a Golden Age that was termin ated by the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 and the following violent co unterReform ation in Bohemia and , to a somew hat lesser degree, Morav ia. With the sec ulari sing impact of the industriali sation and urbani sati on of the Czech Lands in the nineteenth century, thi s gave Czech nationalism a not only sec ul ar, but often an openly anti-Catho lic edge. 27 Although the Protestant minority was proportionately bi gger in Slovakia than in the Czech Land s, there was no clear connection between anti-Catholici sm and nation ali sm even amon g Protestant Slovak nat ionali sts. On the contrary, one direction within the Slovak nati ona l move ment was closely co nnec ted to the Catholic fa ith . The Catholic national ists, led from the early twentieth century by Andrej Hlinka, were more skeptica l of cooperation with the Czec hs than were the hlasi sti. Man y Czech politicians and intellec tu a ls were, from the point of view of Slovak Catholics, dangerously radical liberals, if not atheist anti-Catholics. 28 When the declaration of Czechoslovak independence on 28 October 1918 was followed by a wave of 26 Zdenek Suda: ' Slovakia in Czech Nati onal Consciousness ' , in Musil (ed.): The End of Czechoslovakia, p.1 39- 155 ( 11 8) (hereafter Suda: ' Slovakia ' ). 27 R. W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks. London, 1943, p.33 1. 28 Jan Rychl fk : Cesi a Slovaci ve 20. stoletf: Cesko-sl ovenske vztahy , 19 14- 1945. Bratislava, 1997, p.38 (hereafter Rychlfk: Cesi a Slo vac1). SLOVAKIA 93 anti-Catholic gestures in the Czech Lands, the worst fears of the Slovak Catholics were reali sed . As lsmo Nurmi wrote: ' if the anti-Catholic mood was fashionable in the Czech lands, it was not so in Slovak ia and even less so when a numbe r of desecration s of reli g iou s c ult objects, churches, statues, crosses etc. were committed [ ... ] also in Slovakia [by] civil servants and particularly the Czechoslovak Army.' 29 The attempt to create a Czechoslovak national hi story and tradition with the Hussite era as pivotal was a clear sign of the lac k of understanding among Czech (and some Slovak) leade rs for the position of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. Masaryk 's official ' inclusion ' of Slovakia in the Hu ss ite tradition on the basis of Jan Ji skra 's ' crusade ' into Slovakia was not only hi storically dubiou s, but also, and not surpri sin gly, rejected by the Slovak Catholic clergy. As Suda wrote: ' To the Catholic majority of the Slovaks, among whom Catholicism had a very pronounced conservative tin ge typical of a pre-modern society , a common programme with the Czechs based on the traditions of the Protestant Reformation must have been almost an anathema. ' 30 After 1948, with the industriali sation of Slo vaki a unde r Communi st rul e, the religious differen ces be tween the Czech a nd Slovak parts of the common state were so mew hat diffused. Albeit a clear scepticism towards 'Czech liberali sm ' was visible in Christian democratic circles in Slovakia also after the collapse of Communism, another as pec t of the Czech ignorance of Slovak affairs beca me more important. As noted above , very many Czechs saw Czechoslovakia and the ' Czechoslovak nation ' as their state and nation , quite often interpreted as a Czech state a nd nation that included the Slovaks. After World War II , the rec reation of Czechoslovakia was acco mpanied by an official recog niti on by all political leaders, albeit some Czec h politicians were reluctant to do so, of the ex iste nce of two 29 lsmo Nurmi: Slo vakia - A Playground for Na tionalism and National Identity. 191 8- /920 : M anifestations of the Na tional Identity of Slovaks. Hel sinki. 1999. pp. 92-93. 30 Suda : ·Slovakia ' . p.11 5. SLOVAKIA 94 fo un d in g nati ons in the co untry . Thi s princ ipl e was reaffirmed with the federa li sati on of 1968. Despite thi s offic ial recogniti on, there was ve ry littl e understanding a mong Czec hs of S lovak atte mpts to promote the ir separate ide ntity. Proba bl y the best kn ow n exa mpl e of S lova k po li tic ians ' dema nd s fo r 'v isibility and equ a lity ' fo r S lovaki a w ithin Czec hos lovaki a was the stru gg le fo r the name of the federati on in the sprin g of 1990 . Th e so-ca ll ed ' hy phe n-wa r ' sta rted w he n new ly e lec ted Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l suggested c ha ng in g the offic ial name of the Republic, the Czechoslovak Soc iali st Republic, by mere de leti on of the word ' Sociali st' . Whil e fo r mos t Czec hs thi s so luti on mu st have see med natural , it ran into oppos iti on in S lovaki a? A Sl ovak co unter-proposa l, the Czec ho-Slovak Re public, or just Czec ho-Slovaki a, a name that made Slovaki a more vi s ibl e to the world , was, however, not acceptabl e to most Czec h po liti c ians. The reasons given fo r thi s were that th e hyphe n had been used in the name of the Second Republi c (1938 -39, th at is, afte r the Muni c h Accord), a nd beca use ' C zec ho' (Ces k o) was not consi de red a pro pe r word in the Czech language. As one leading comme ntator compl ained in Lidove noviny: ' We in the Czec h Land s perce ive the insiste nt de mand of Sl ovaki a fo r a di vidin g line in the na me of the Re public as tac tl ess and coarse. " 2 Onl y afte r two mo nth s o f de bate in the three nati onal asse mbli es (the Czec h, Slova k and Federa l) and the mass medi a was a compromi se fo und : The Czec h and Slovak Federa l Republic. Have l quic kl y rea li sed th at he had made a mi stake by not consul ting politic ians fro m both the Czec h a nd Sl ova k Re pu b li cs before making hi s suggestion public. In a n atte mpt to rec ti fy the s itu ati on the hospitali sed Have l sent a le tter to the Federal Asse mbl y in February, where he stated : -' ' M il an Su tovec: Semi6za aka pol i tik um a/ebo "Pom lckov;-i vojna ". Brati slava, 1999, pp. 174- 196 (hereafter Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna). -' 2 Ji ff Hanak: 'Nespraved li ve a tedy neprijatelne' . Lidove Noviny. 28 M arch 1990. p.l. SLOVAKIA 95 We a ll kn o w th at thi s hyphe n, whi ch fo r a ll Czechs seems ridi c ul o us, unnecessary and ugly, is mo re tha n just a hyphe n. In thi s hyphe n o ne ca n find severa l decades, if not ce ntu ries of th e hi sto ry of the S lo va k nati o n [ ... ] The Sl o vak nation is ri g htfull y tryin g to fin d its ide ntity, fo r reason s Czec hs probabl y do n ' t understa nd , eve n if they o ught to understand them.33 Resentment Exampl es of Czec h skepti c ism a nd resentment to ward s Slo vak nati o na li sm ca n be fo und as earl y as the middl e of th e nine teenth century. From the late 1840s, a majo rity of Slovak inte ll ectua ls ado pted the new codifi cati o n of th e S lovak lang uage , as publi shed in 1846 by Cudovft Stur, as a pl atfo rm fo r the Sl ovak national programme. This met w ith strong res istance fro m Czech and Slovak inte llectua ls promotin g Czec h-Sl ovak unity: they saw the Slovaki zed versio n of Hu ss ite Bible Czec h used by ma ny Slovak inte llec tua ls until then, as the clearest bo nd between Czechs and Slovaks.34 If in the inte rwar years Czec hos lovak leade rs cons idered Slovak nati o na li sm a pro bl e m, it was ma inl y after 1938 th at o pe nl y hostil e attitudes toward s it e merged. The ex pl oi tatio n by Slovak nati o na li sts of the weakness of the Czec hos lovak reg ime after the Munich cri sis to push trou gh thei r de mands fo r a uto no my, c ulmin atin g in the ac ceptance by the Slovak leade rs of German de mand s fo r Slovak indepe ndence in M arc h 1939, was conside red a stab in the back by most Czechs. 35 Durin g the Second World W ar, Ed vard Be nes, the C zechoslovak Pres ide nt-in -ex il e, was o ne of the sharpest cri tics of what he considered the Slovak be traya l. He was ' o bstin ate in defending the Czec hos lovak ca use: its betraya l by the Slovaks mattered more to him than the grow ing press ure from Moscow. He be li e ved th at the " As quoted in Sutovec: Pomlckova vojna, pp.269-27 1. 34 Sk illing: Masary k, p. 69. 35 Petr Pffhoda: ' M utual Perceptions in Czech-S lovak Relationshi ps ', in M usil (ed .): The End of Czechoslovakia. pp. 128- 138 ( 134 ). 96 SLOVAKIA Slovak heresy undermined the ve ry fo undations of the state, and Czechoslovaki sm was for him a part of the foundations. ' 36 Throu ghout the war, Benes and other Czech politi cians fought for the reestabli shment of the First (th at is, pre-Muni ch) Republi c. Most Slovak politici ans, howe ver, including former Czechos lovak Prime Minster Milan Hodza, con sidered thi s a less th an optim um solution. 37 Only reluctantly , given th e situation in Slovakia after the Slovak National Upri sing in the autum n of 1944, was Benes forced to accept a de facto asymmetric federalisation of post-war Czechoslo va ki a. However, despite previou s agreements, most importantl y the Kosice Government Programme, drafted by the first pro visional government after the country was partly -liberated from the East, the question of Slovaki a's position within the country cont inued to divide the Czec h and Slovak non-Comm uni st parties after the war. The willin gness of the Czec h democratic parti es to coo perate with the Communi sts in reducin g the powers of the Slovak nation al organs , cruci all y after the 1946 elections, contrib uted to undermining the position of the Democratic Party in Slo va ki a. The Czechos lovak Communi st Party was thu s abl e to exploit ' the anti -Sl ovak nati onali sm among Czech political parties and [ ... ] the isolated position of the Slovak democrats. ' 38 Thi s clearly weakened the democrats' ability to oppose the Communi sts' increasing political power in the country. During and after 1968 , the negati ve view of Slo vak nationali sm and Slovakia in the Czech L ands was reinforced. After the Soviet-led in vas ion on 2 1 Au gust 1968, 'sociali sm with a human face ' was gradually di smantled and replaced by ' norm ali sation '. Th e only maj or reform of the Prague Spring to survive was the dec ision to federalize Czechoslovakia. In Sl ovaki a thi s decision w as generall y interpreted 36 37 Zeman and Klimek : Eduard Bene{ p.203. Milan Hodza : Federarion in Cenrra l Europe: Renections and Reminiscences. London. 1942, pp.93-94. 38 Ji rf K ocian: ·Narodnf soc ialis te a slovenska otazka 1945- I 948 ". in Michal Bar- novsky (ed.) : Od dikratury k diktature. Brati slava. 1995 . pp.57-65 (6 I ). (hereafter K oc ian: ' Narodnf socialiste') SLOVAKIA 97 as a more just organi sation of the common state. In the Czech Lands, however, many saw federalisation as a further example of the Slovak nationali sts' skill in drawing advantages from Czechoslovakia's mi sfortune. The fact th at the new party leade r and late r Pres ident of Czechoslovakia, Gu stav Hu sak, was Slovak, also contributed to the negative picture of Slovakia and Slovaks. As Petr Pithart wrote: the Czech public was di sappointed, even di sg usted, by the Slovaks ' ex peri e nce of havin g ga ined sati sfac tion with federalization; at best, it was seen as foolishness a nd at worst, as blind se lfi shness and eve n betrayal. ( ... ) in the Czec h Lands there was an increasing ly obvious di sg ust for the regime and for the Slovaks, as the ones through whom normali zation was allegedly introduced and carried out. 39 A s ign of the growing irritation with and resentment toward s Slovak nationa li sm and Slovaks in ge ne ral in the Czech Lands, was the increas in g ly popul a r de mand that Czech taxpayers should not have to subsidi se the ungrateful Slovaks. Already in 1933 Czechoslovak Prime Min ster Ja n Malypete r had rejected the demand for Slovak autonomy on the grounds that Slovakia would not be able to pay its way . In the Czech press, headlines read along the lines: ' We are paying for Slovakia ' .40 Thi s be lief that the Czechs were subsidis in g th e Slovaks was observed also by Prfhoda forty-three years late r: ' In the Czech Lands the view of Slovak parasiti sm [parazitismu s] is common and it is formulated more or less like thi s: we Czechs are payin g for the Slovaks. ' 41 The Czechoslovak Communist Party was committed to so lvin g the probl e m of Slovak nation alism, which it interpreted as a mainly eco nomic iss ue , through equ ali zat ion of the standard of li ving bet- 39 Petr Pithart: ' Towards a Shared Freedom ' , in Mu sil (ed.): Th e End of Czechoslovakia.pp.20 1-222 (206). 40 Vi ctor S. Mamatey: ' The Development of Czechoslovak Democ racy ', in Mamatey and Luza (eds.) : A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp.99-166 ( 15 1). 41 Prfhoda: "S lovac i ces kyma ocima', p.647. SLOVAKIA 98 wee n the Czech and Slovak parts of the co unty. Economic transfers, parti cul arly through a higher level of in vestment in Sl ovaki a were, therefore, considered important. They continued even during the di ffic ult years in the 1970s and 1980s, but were kept secret, probabl y to avoid un favo urable reactions in the Czech L ands. After the co llapse of Communi sm, opposition to w hat was popularl y referred to as the Czech ' money pipeline' (p enezovod) to Slovak ia was quickl y made into a politi cal demand. In the first formal ro und of negoti ation s on th e future of the fe derati on after the co ll apse of Communi sm, in Lnare in April 1990, the Czech delegati on demanded a halt to Czec h subsidies to Slovaki a.42 From Czech to Czechoslovak nationalism and back As noted earlier, the Czechos lov ak directi on within Czech poli ti cs was by no means dominant pri or to W orld W ar I. Czec h nationali sts concentrated mainl y on defending and enhancing Czech autonomy w ithin th e Habsburg M onarchy. With the success of the Czec hoslovak idea in the Entente capitals in 19 17-1 8, however, most Czec h nati onali sts quite quickl y became convinced Czec hos lovak nati onali sts; Czech nati onali sm was ex panded to include th e Sl ovaks, the Czec hs' ' little bro ther ' in Hungary. Cultura ll y and economi ca ll y wea k, the Slovaks posed no threat to either Czech culture or politica l and economic dominati on of the new state. A nd after all , as M asaryk himse lf pointed out, the Slovaks were merely Czec hs w ith a slightly di fferent hi story. Th e attachment o f Czech politi cians to the Czech os lovak idea ca n be clearl y see n after W orld W ar II. In 1968 , a document supposedly written by members of th e (Czec h) Nation al Soc iali st Party 4 in I 946 was pub I ished in the Slova k press . ' Its authors argued th at the bes t way to so lve the problem of Slovak nati onalism was fo rced ass imil ati on of the Sl ovaks into good Czec hoslovaks. Whil e seri ous • • 2 BBC Summa1y of World Broadcast. EE/0738 B/2. 13 Apri I 1990. 3 T he document was first publi shed in Vac lav Kral: Cestou k tinoru, Prague, I 956, but attrac ted relati ve ly little attention until reproduced in the mass medi a in 1968. 99 SLOVAKIA doubts exist as to th e authenticity of thi s ' Memorandum on Slovakia' , most hi storian s seem to agree that the idea of turnin g the Slovaks into good Czechoslovaks was not alien to certain leading Czech politicians at the time. 44 The reaction to what was perceived as the Slovak betraya l of 1938-39 was increased Czechoslovak nationali sm. However, during the Communist period , a nd particul ar ly after 1968 , Czech nationalism gradually gained supporters in the Czech Lands . As Prfhoda wrote in 1976: 'I am not sure how thin gs are in Slovakia, but among Czechs the concept of a com mon state is being re-eva luated these days . I have eve n heard : let the Ru ss ia ns make Slovakia into a union republic or something and leave us in peace!' 45 Obviou sly , ne ither Czech nor Slovak separat ism was politically acceptable durin g Communist rul e. After th e 'Velvet Revo lution' , however, influe ntial vo ices soo n e merged in the Czech Land s questioning the union with the Slovaks. As earl y as the beginning of May 1990, in the aftermath of the hyphe n war, the Czech writer Ludvfk Vaculfk, the author of the 'Two thousand words' manifesto in 1968, wrote a sharpl y worded articl e in Litenimf noviny. 46 ' W e Czechs have a great debt to the Slovaks,' Yaculfk argued. This debt was due to the fact that the Czechs had happily made Slovakia ' theirs' without takin g into account what it meant to be Slovak. Through their behaviour, however, the Slovaks had made it difficult for the Czechs to appreciate thi s debt. Th e Czechs had g ive n the Slovaks the ir industry and inte lli gentsia, so mething that had only caused the Slovaks to ' until thi s day complain about the qua lity of these supplies'. The Czechs had give n the Slovaks a way out of defeat as a separate state during World War II. Even Communism , brou g ht to Slovakia by Czechs afte r the war, had g ive n the Slovaks more in material terms than it had to the Czechs. When the Czechs then tri ed to ease th e die- 44 See Koc ian: ' Narodnf soc iali ste' . passim: Rychlfk: Ce.si II Slo vaci. pp. 54-55: ·Na okraj diskusie: 0 tzv. Slovenskom memoranda Cs. narodne sociali stickej strany ', Nase snahy . Vol. I 9/2. 1983. p. 9. 45 Prfhoda: ' Slovaci ceskyma ocima ' . p.653. 41 ' Ludvik Vaculfk: ' Nase slovenska otazk a', Litenimf noviny. Vol.1 /5, 1990. p.2. SLOVAK IA 100 tatorship during 1968, the Slovaks saw thi s as a Czech matter and instead forced through 'autonomy '. For this they escaped with lighter puni shment during the era of ' normali sation .' Now aga in , after the col lapse of Communism, when Czechs were trying th eir utmost finally to defeat the dictatorial regime , the Slovaks were 'coming with their prestige demands'. ' Do we need thi s?' he asks rhetorically and then concludes : We have found ourse lves with a thankless task in th e fate of the Slo vaks, and I think th at we should end it without se lf-pity - more with a smil e into th e mirror. [ ... l Why should the Slovaks ha ve to force out of us, centimetre by ce ntimetre, somethin g that they can have in one go? By separating from the Slovaks , purely of our ow n volition , we " lose" - judging from experience to date - economic losses. Politicall y we lose th e Hungarian and Ruth ene problem s. We put another border between us and th e Soviet Union. 47 At th e time of hi s writ ing, Yaculfk ' s recommendation th at th e Czec hs should dispense with the Slovaks accorded with neither public nor political opinion in the Czech Republic. At that stage not even the most radical Czech politician s were promoting divi sion of the state. Gradually , however, the need to resolve the probl em of th e common state w ith the Slovaks once and for all became pressing. As Yaculfk observed in December of 1990: 'Public opinion poll s show that 75 percent of Czechs are said to favour a common state with the Slovaks. Had one, on the other hand , asked if we should let the Slovaks go, just as many would probabl y have answered " yes" to thi s as we ll. ' 48 In Slovakia, the question of the statu s of the Slovak Republic within the Czech and Slovak state became a centra l political topic . 47 Ibid. The double quotation marks arou nd -- Jose" were added to make th e irony more vi sible. The original tex t is : ' Od loucenfm od Slovaku. jez j e vyhradne v nasf vu li. ztratfme - souzeno dosavadnf zkusenostf - ekonomicke ztraty. • 48 Ludvik Yaculfk: ' M ec iar mozna odejde' . Litenimf noviny . Vol. I /39. I 990. p.2. SLOVAKIA 101 Sl ovak politicians began to co mpete over w ho co uld present a programme th at would benefit and pro mote Slovaki a the most. Thi s led to a gradual radi ca li sati on of Slovak demands in the negoti ation s on the future of the federati on. Such radica li sati on in turn provoked a voc iferou s reaction in the Czech L ands. Th e influenti al Czec h j ournal R esp ekt refl ec ted th e growin g antagoni sm toward s Sl ovaki a in th e Czec h L ands. Headlines from the Spring of 1992 such as ' The supreme Slovak irrespon sibility' ( 17 Febru ary, p.2), ' B alkan model on the hori zo n: how long w ill the Czech-Slovak statu s quo las t?" (24 Febru ary, p.2) and 'A bsurd parliamentary drama: who saves Slovak ia from sovereignty?' (6 A pril , p.2) ev ince an increas ingly criti ca l view o f Sl ovak politi cs . In the issue th at co incided with the electi ons of 8 June, the criticism ca me to its logica l co nclu sion . Peter Schutz, Respekt 's (Sl ovak-Hungari an) correspondent in Slovak ia, wrote in the arti cle ' Slovaki a adheres to nati onal soc iali sm': ' The shameful result of thi s electi on formul ated onl y one alternati ve - either lMec iar 's party] HZDS disintegrates, or the CSFR. ' 49 Vl adimfr Ml ynar ex pressed the same message in the subtitle o f hi s arti cle in the same issue: 'A lone into Euro pe or together into the Balkans'. 50 Parti cul arl y the politi ca l ri ght in th e Czec h Lands increasingly saw Slovaki a as an obstac le on the road ' back ' to Europe. After the 1990 elec ti ons, th e ri ght had graduall y strengthened its pos ition among the Czech elec torate. In Slovaki a, on the other hand , it was the more reform- scepti ca l and patri oti c parti es on the politica l left that had enjoyed greater success. Gi ven th e spec ial minority veto of both the Czec h and Slovak groups of deputies in th e House of Nati ons of the Federal Assembl y, a left-patri otic maj ority in Slovaki a was a worry ing prospec t for the Czech proponents of radi ca l reform s. A month before th e parliam entary election s in June 1992, V aclav 09 Peter Sch utz: ·s tovensko sa prihlasilo k narodnemu socializmu - Pos lcdne zvone- nie pre federaciu ·, Respekt. 8- 14 June 1992, p.2. ~ V lad imir Ml ynar: ·v Cechac h tes ne vftezstvf prav ice - lecne na Balka n·. Respekt, 8- 14 June 1992. p.3. Sarni do Evropy nebo spo- 102 SLOVA KI A Kl aus made it c lear that if a fu ncti o na l federa ti o n was not poss ible after the e lect io ns, he and his partners were ' ready to create a mec hani sm for a q uick, c ivili sed and prob le m-free div isio n of the state. ' 51 Conclusion By the late summ er of 1992, th e do min ant view of Slovak ia in C zec h po liti cs had, in a se nse, co me full c irc le to co inc ide with the views th at preva il ed pri o r to W o rl d W ar I. Fro m hav ing bee n a strateg ica ll y less attrac ti ve partne r in the seco nd ha lf of the nineteenth ce ntury, Sl ovaki a beca me a strateg ic asset in the firs t ha lf of th e twenti eth . Afte r W o rld W ar II , however, S lovak ia a nd th e S lovaks gradu a ll y lost the ir strateg ic impo rt a nce for the Czec hs. The large Ge rm an mino rity in the Czec h Lands was ex pe ll ed in the firs t years after the war, taking the edge off the Ge rman threat. Furthermore, fo r C zec h democ rats, the Communi st co up of Febru ary 194 8 put an e nd to a ll ideas of seekin g sec urity a nd integrati o n in the East, th ro ugh Slova ki a. In stead , they now turn ed exc lu sive ly to the West: to th e US , NATO . the E uro pean Co mmunity and eve n the o ld ri va l, Ge rmany. At the th resho ld of the twenty- first ce ntury, Slova ki a, w ith its c umbe rso me soc ia li st eco no my, its po puli st nati o na li sm , and its pro bl e ms with Hun ga ry over the Hungari an mino rity in Slovaki a and the G abc fk ovo- Nagy maros da m projec t o n the Da nube, aga in became a strateg ic burden. The Czec hos lovak traditi o n and adhe re nce to the Czec hos lovak idea were still strong in the Czec h Lands. Tho ugh the Czec h politica l ri ght had the suppo rt of gro ups suc h as The Czec h Initi ati ve, whic h gathered aro und 50,000 sig natures in favo ur of Czec h independe nce in fo ur days in June 1992 in Prague, most Czec hs were still in favo ur of a co mm o n state w ith the Slova ks. 52 Thu s Kl aus and hi s partners co uld not push throug h a break-up w itho ut so me effort. Co nsequ ent ly, as Abby Innes wrote: ' Kl a us preferred a strategy o f shi ftin g res- 51 As cited in Marian Lesko: Meciar a meciarizm us: polit ik bez .~kruptif" politika bez zabran. Bratis lava. 1997, p.78. 52 BBC Summary of World Broadcast. EE/ 14 12 B/5. 20 June I 992. SLOVAKIA 103 po ns ibility fo r the confli c t e ntire ly onto the Slovak side and c la imed th at it was now "ev ide nt th at votes fo r the HZ DS are votes fo r th e di visio n o f the state". ' 53 Give n th at th e do min a nt Czec h im age of S lovak nati o na li sm, a nd of Vl adim ir Mec iar, was negative, Kl aus was lucky in hav in g hi s tas k made eas ier. Hi s ca mpa ig n was furth er ass isted by th e oppos iti o n of the leading S lova k parti es to th e ree lection of Pres ide nt Vac lav Have l in Jul y. Hav ing fa il ed to be ree lec te d , Have l res ig ned pre m ature ly whe n th e Slo va k Nation a l Co unc il passed a large ly sy mbo li c dec larati o n of sovere ig nty o n 17 Jul y. Have l, prev io us ly o ne of the leading pro po ne nts of the co mmo n state, now le nt hi s support to a di visio n of the state. 54 The first day of Janu ary 1993 saw the creati o n of two new states: the C zec h Re publi c and the Sl ovak Re publi c. Of the two, the Czec h Republi c c learl y adopted the mantl e of successor to Czec hos lovaki a. T he new Czec h state had the sa me capita l, the same fl ag (in breac h o f an earli e r agree me nt) and the sa me pres ide nt. C zec h co mpani es and even po liti ca l parties fo r a lo ng time ke pt the word 'Czechos lovak ' in the ir na me (for exampl e, the S in CSA, Czec h[os lovak] A irlin es). Mos t things re ma ined as they had bee n, exce pt w ith o ut the Slovaks. As Vaculfk had po inted o ut so po ig nantl y in 1990: ' Whe n th e "Federati o n" started crac king in its fo undatio n, I got the idea fo r a new , in spi rin g ly o ptimi sti c so luti o n: whe n S lov aki a breaks away there w ill be no o ne to preve nt us fro m ca lling o ur state Czec hos lovak ia ... ' 55 " A bby Innes: ' T he Breakup of Czechos lovak ia: T he Impact of Part y Deve lopment on the Separation of the State· . Eust European Politics and Society. Vol. I I /3. 1997. pp. 393-435 (424). '" I va n L amper and V ladimir Ml ynar: ·skoncila ceskoslovenska statnost: Rozhovor s pos lednfm prezi dentem CSFR Vac lave m Havlem ' . Respekt. 20-27 July 1992. p.4. " Vac ulfk: ' Meciar mofoa odejde'. p.2 .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource From Bratr náš to Aťjdou - Slovakia, the Slovaks and Slovak Nationalism seen from Prague Description An account of the resource Paal Sigurd Hilde Slovakia, Vol. 38 (No. 70-71), 2005 pp. 81-103 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hilde, Paal Sigurd, 1970- Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2005 LCNAF