2 50 763 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4faeb77e99e69680a9f2152513c74572.pdf 58bc32caec09d426b05f6f702ff94fcc PDF Text Text 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. �SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or �22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to �SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 20 SLOVAKIA The Spirit of THE 00Ni8'.l1ITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOHN F . GLE IMAN In the spring of 1939, when the young Slova)( RepubUc found itself before the difficult ta.sk of writing its Constitution, the crisis in Europe, caused by conflicting ideologicaJ trends, was ne,aring its cllmax. Democratic Liberalism, after a fruitful exlstence of 150 years ln ,Europe, was being a:ttacked from all sides, not only by the totalltarian currents of Communism, Fa.scism and Nazlsm, but also by other philosophi<:al, religious, economical and politlcal systems. In that apocatlyptical confusion of ideologles, the Committee a11p0tinted by the Assembly of the Slovak Republlc labored on the draft of cthe ConstiWtion Document. While i,t was thus occupied, natlonal aggref!Sion.s {rom the East, South, West and North, appeared ominously on the ltorizon, threatening with destruotion the healthy offshoot of the life of the Slovak State. Even if the enVtlronment of that rneological ferment and frightful international sltuation effected peoples deeply, the work or the Constitution Committee - desplte its compromising tenor - is, nevertheless, a clear reflectlon of the unity of thought and sentlme-nt of the Slovak people. In oppressed peoples there naturally develops not only a feeling of solldarJty, but also a profound religious llfe. Actu_a lly, the most slgnifloant trait of Slovak tradition is the Christian world-ou tlook of the natlon; that 1s true of both the Catholic majori ty and éhe Lutheran minority of the Slovak nation. But the tradition o! democratic freedoms also remained vary much alive. Along with Christian tradltion, these ideas, too, were the moving forces of Slovak polltics s-lnce the tbirties of the past century. Christian tra:dition and the Idea of democratic freedoms were the defensive bulwark, by which the currents of totalltarian ideologles were repulsed and which to a certaln extent unlfied politlical thinking in Slovakia. On!y thus could lt happen that, in the midst of aggressive totalitarlan ldeologies, whlch deflnltely dld suppress the principles of democratic liberaldsm, the Constltutlonal Law No. 185 of 1939 was approved by the Assembly of the Slovak Republic. Thls law adopted practically t-he whole system of democratic-liberaJistic Constltutlons of the 18th and 19th centurles. Only thus could lt happen that Slovakla - wedged In from the rlght and rhe left between Godless bolshevism and antl-Chrlstian neo-paganlfsm - brought forth a Constitutlon saturated with the Christlan spirit and especlally with the principles of the socia:! encycllcals of the Holy See. LIBERA LISTIC-DEMOC RATIC ELEMEN T $ ~he Constltution of the United States of America from 1788 and the Constrltutlion of the French Revolution became the models of the rlemocratlc-liberalistic consti'tutions of the 19bh century European States. They were the first to incorporate into constitutional norms the prlnclples of the great thlnkers of mod~rn democracy - Locke, Montesquleu and Rosseau: the right of determlnatlon of the majority of the people, the idea of equality before the law and the guarantees of lndlvidual freedoms. These, in Ume, became the great documenb! of human rights. SLOVAKIA 21 The Constitution of the Slovak Republic contalns alil the fundamental principles of these models. The constitutional intention to organize a State on the tested prlncipies of democrat.ic freedoms 1s documented by the very name of the State itself: "The Slovak Re-public." At a t.ime when dictators were in power in the surrounding totalitarlan States, the Slovak Constitution consistently validates the democratic principle of the right of determination of t.he majority In the elect,lon of t he president of the Repulfäc and the deputies of parliament, ,i n the decisions of parliament, the State Council, the Government and self-admlnistraiti-ng bodies. At a tíme when the USSR culminated the Iiquldatlon of lts so-called bourgeols cla.ss, whiC'h was outlawed, and in Germany the Nuremberg antl<Sem,l tic Ja,ws were compleUng their work, the Slovak Assembly dld not hesitate to accept a Constitution founded on the idea of equality of ail cltizens without regard to orlgin, nationality and religion. And just so, at a time when executlve power of government of the totalitarian super-States had atta:lned complete preponderancee in the management of the State, th Slovak Constltution codified without reservations a system outllned by Locke and culminated by Montesquieu, a system of legal and free government, depending on the division of State po.w er into the Iegislative, executive and judicial branches. T·h e centra! •leglslative power received its construction accord!ng to the pri'nci!)'les of Locke. Its bearer became the Assembly of the Slovak RepubUc. That centra! power in the State the Constitutlon executed also with the rest of the postulates of iiberal-democratic constitutions: with immunity and incompatibility of the members of the iegislature (Assembly), elected in general, direct, free and secret elections and wi,th the competency of elect!ng a president, establishing a budget and mhlitary duty, of permitting taxes and acceptlng international agreements. .According to t-he principles of Montesquieu, the Constitution subordinated executive power to legislatíve power and codified tbe responsibi,Jity of the president and the government to parliament. It regula.ted the activlty of lhe President, tbe Government and the State Council accordrlng to tested republican models. It followed democratic principles also by acknowledg!ng the direct participation of the clt.izenry in the State management tbrough the self-administ·ratlons of regions and profe.ssions. The lmmortail prtnolple of Monrtesquteu regarcting the independence of the judiciary also was fully validated in tbe Constitution. Complete separatlon of the judiciary from t.he executive power, as well as the principle tbat no one shall be deprived of bis own lawful judge, was also estarblisbed by law. Tbe lndependence of the judges was safeguarded by the codification of the princlple of non-transferabUity of judges and their lncompatlblllty wlth other pald functions, as weJJ as by expre.'3s!ng tbe princlple tbat a judge i~ bound only by Jaw and has the right to explore the validity of i;:overnmental regulations and whether Jaws were pronerly proclaimed. The Constitutlon did not lack the customary safeguards of freedom. Parag11aph 81 sald: "All lnhabltants, regardless or thE>lr orig'in. natlonaility, religion and calllng, enjoy the protec-tion of life. freedom an<l nroperty." Desides thls general prlnciple, lt guaranteed special prlnciple<i, such as: persona) freedom, domestic peace, secrecy of the mails, the right or 22 SLOVAKIA assembly and organization, freedom of the press and expresslon of opln1ons, freedom of rellgion, scientlfic research and arts, and the right of the nationali'Ues to use t.heir own language in pub41c llre and in the schools. Finally, with the sentence - "No one shall be punished for conduct whlch does not violate the legal pena! norm and tor w,h ich the penalty was not aforehand deflned by laiw or legal norm" - it adopted the classlcall princlple of the freedom of man "nulla poena, nullum crlmen sine lege," whlch is the foundatlon of legal oroer in a lawful State. CHRISTIAN- DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS When the shady sides of llberallstlc capitallsm unfettered the social struggles, the ideology of Marxlsm about permanent cla.ss war· fare arose and spread. Proclalmlng the lnevitabllllty of world revolutlon and t he dlct.atorship of the proletariat, t-he e!lminatlon of the burgeois class, the a:bolltion of pr!v,ate ownershi'p, a,nd collective economy of com munlties, thls ldeology threatened the entilre structure of Christlan civilizatlon wHh destruction. That is why already in the second half of the pas.t century Christlan thlnkers, especially the Cathollc Bis-hops Ketteler and Mermlllod, as well as Protel!tant pastor Constantine Frantz, sought posslbll!Ues of mltigating social opposltes and then by un-proJetarlatlzlng the proleteriat to destroy class differences completely. In the main, the papal encycllcals, beginrung with HERUM NOVARUIM (1890), tbrough QUADRAGESIMO ANNO (1931), all the way to MYS'l'IOI CORPORIS (1913), created a system, whicb - by the prlnciple of personalllsm, wlth emphasls on the social function of the famlly and wlth the buildlng of aut.onomous professional organlzatlons, wants to solve acute social problems, restrlct the stlIDlng interference of over-dlmensioned State power into every sectlon ot soclety and pl'lvate llfe, and, thus, rescue Chrlstlan soclety. It !s natural that the Slovak Republlc, being overwhelmlngly Ca,thollc, attempted to experiment with t.his system and Incorporated at least some of lts prlnclp'.les lnto its own Constltutlon. Thus lt was that regulatlons arose whi'c h protected especla,lly the family, and ln the spirit of these princlples also the worker, bis work and WQges, whereby strlkes - as somethlng outlived of the era of c:lass warfare - were forbidden. In the spirit of the encycllcals, the Con.stltution deflned the obligatlons of clrlzens - whlch are both splrltual and physical work - to fulflll the rtasks of thelr calllng, to help public organs perform the funotlons required by law and the authorltles and, flnaJly, the obllgatory care of the parents for the educatlon and trainlng of thelr chlldren. The regulatlon In paragraph 79 - "Ownershlp has a social functlon and blnds the owner to deal wlth tt In the lnterest or the general welfare" - i~ the basls of the encycllca:l QUADRAGESIMO ANNO and the socia,! wr!tlngs of Pope Plus XII. The most penetratlng social reform, whlch the Constltutlon took over from the encycllcal QUADRAGESI>MO ANNO, was the framewo rk ln-stltutlon of self•ad· mlnisitered States, pla.cing accordlng to ,thelr ca111ng all cltlzens wlth• out exceptlon lnto s1x professions or states: agrlcU!ture, industry, trade-commerce, banking, the free proresslons, and public employees. T,he Munlch Pact or Great BrlWn and France with Germany and Jtaly In Septem/ber, 1938, factually surrendered Centra! Europe to SLOVAKIA 23 tbe power of Hitler and MussollnL No one kn&w at tbat tlme ju,at when the furies of war would be unleasbed and what fate would befaJl Slovakla. In tbat bopeJess sl<tuation, all tbe Slovak clvic partles unlted w-ltb tbe Hlinka Slovak Peoples' Par,t.y to form the Party of Natlonal Unity In October, 1938. Hlstorlcal objectlvlty tells us to state that this bardJy would bave happened lf it were not for stlf!Lng pressure from all s!des. The Constltutlon codHled thls Party as the only representative o! the polltlcai will of the Slovak natlon. Thls fact undoubtedly s.hows sharply the belpless determlnatlon of a small natlon, which in its fatal danger was forced to make thls compromise with tbe giganttlc aggressor, wben h:ls stee1 columns omlnously waited on lts borders. Desplte this fact, bowever, the Constitution dld not accept the to<tall· tar!an pr!nclple of one party, beoause lt aJ.Jowed separate partie.s for the natlonalitles. In later years, under l'be pressure of tae totalltarian super-States and the war, tbls Constltutlon could not valldate ltself wlthout partlcular blndrances, but from the perspectlve of the f!rst decade, tbe Slovak Constltut!onal Document ltself In lts entlrety actualJy appears to us as a work of prľ:nclples, the prlnclples of democratic freedoms and tbe princlples of Cbrlstlan democracy. lt was tbe collective work of tbe spirit of the Slovak natlon that formed the State. And as sucb, it wlll pass on into history. • • • WHO SAID IT7 THE CZECHOSLOVAK WAY. "Dr. Beneš, tbe Czecboslovak Presldent, must be a tborn In tbe nesb of tbose wbo contend tbat Russia wlll deal only wlth puppets In nelghborlng countr~es of Eastern Europe. Benei ia no puppet. He ls no Communlst. Hls pol!tlcal pbllosopby ls ibased on the llberal democracy of tbe West. Vet no one is aurpriaed because hla good frlend, Stalln, has Just concluded a new agreement with hlm, provlding for entry of the Czechoalovak ad minlstration in Dr. Benei' homeland in the wake of the Red Army at the earllest posaible time. That ia exactly what we'd expect, for re latlona between Dr. Benei' government and that of the Soviet Union are a lo ng-atanding model of cordiality. "Tbe fact, of course, is tbat Dr. Bene!i ls a flrst-rate statesman, one of the best In tbe world. As such, he knows that a bright future for hia country ia out of the queat lon un leH lt has the good wlll of the USS R. He and bis countrymen also remember that 'Russla dld not desert tbem in the black era of Munlch. Today he bas Czechoslovakla wltb bim In tbe 20-year mutual asslstance treaty wlth Russla. "Tbe consequence ls tbat Russla respects the lndependence of lts good nelghbor. Dr. Bene!i, accordlngly, ls free not only to pian confldently for the future of bis own !and but to serve Europe and all the Unlted Natlons as an outstandlng leader for collect!ve securlty. Tbat is the Benei way, the Czechoslovak way, based upon tbe prlnclples of independence and lnterdependence. It sbould be studled as an example by tbe leaders of all countrles In Eastern Europe - and by Amerlcan frlends of tliose countrles." - (THE CIDCAGO SUN 1944). •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Constitution of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. John F. Gleiman Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 20-23 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gleiman, John F. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a19b874d39bd901d74ba5515132f17d0.pdf ae1523694f48a1f23883043c2922ad02 PDF Text Text 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned �SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man! � 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned �SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 Castles of Slovakia SLOVAKIA TRENčlN Above the city of Trenčin (Trencheen), Slovakla, same 1230 feet above sea level, are sproocl the plcturesques ruins of a fonner mighty strong,hold. Its or.igln ls ancient; they say that the uppermost part was built durlng the reign of Emperor Marcus Aurelius (a,bout 176 A.D.l by a Roman legionnaire called Terence, hence the name Terencium Trenčín. Terence, it is recorded, was sent into the terl1itory to subjugate the Quadi and Markom.ani. The latter were conquered at the base of the stony mount on whlch the Tulns can be seen today. An inscriptlon on the rock "Victoriae Auguatorum•.•" bears mute testimony to the fact. Many years later Trenčín was taken by various groups, the Huns, the Gepidl, the Avars, and the Magyars. Bretislav, a Czech Prince, raided Trenčín in 1607 and led away many prlsoners and cattle into Bohemia. In 1100 the town was devastated by another Czech Prince, Svätopluk. In the minds of ,the ,Slovak people, however, the most illustrious owner of the castle and ruler of Trenčin was Matthew Čá.k (Tchak) - "Lord of the Váh and t he Tatras." A~ter the death of the last Arpad ruler, Andrew NI, In 1301, Čá.k beca.me the adversary of Charle-s Robert and ,an ally of the Czech King, Wencesl<aus III; the latter died in 1306. For a Ume Charles Robent was pOiWerless to deal with Matthew Čá.k who ruled lndependenbly over Slovakia. Čá.k had 'h is own .army aud coined his own money. In 1312 he was beaten at Rozhanovce near Koške, but Cha.rles Robert could not take the castle where Ma.tthew Čá.k had retreated. A pea.ce pact between the Poles, Czechs and Austrlans · was signed a.t the stronghold August 24, 1335, in the presence of the Bohemian King, John of Luxemberg, and his son Charles. It was in the Trenčin Castle that Charles, brother of Zigmund, became engaged to Marie, the daughter of Louis the Great and heir to Au.stria. In 1396 Zlgmund gave the castle to General Ctibor, owner of the nelgh·b orlng castle of Bečkov. When John Ctibor dled In 1424, ~gmund gave the Trenčín Castle to hls second wife, Barbara Celska. 'rule Hus,site chlef, John Jiskra of Br.andys took the castle in 1440, expanded and garrlsoned lt. In 1458 Jlskra surrendered Tren· čin, as well as all the other Slovak fortresse:i in his possesslon, to King Mat!Mas. The latter ma.rried Catherine, the daughter of the Czech George Podebrady, a.t the Castle May 25, 1461. In 1475 Mathias donated the cast1e to Stephen Zá.polský, whose da.ughter became the wlfe of King Zigmund of Pola.nd. Under Zá.polský the castle was furnished with costly furniture and some of t,he flnest works of art. Zá.polskťs· son John was chosen King of Hungary In 1526. His adversary Ferdinand of the Habsburg line besleged the pla.ce, and General Katza.nler a.ctua.lly took it over 1n 1528 and destroyed lt by fJre. The' ca.stle eventua:lly was rebu!Jt, but it n&Ver became as resplendent as it was during Zá.polský's Ume. There is a legend connected with the well on the castle grounds - "the lovera' well.'' Aooord1ng to the legend, Stephen Zá.polský, returning from his wa.rs agalnst the Turk$, brought a bea.utiful slave, Faitima, for his wdfe Hed~vlg. After a Ume a. Turklsh pedd1er galned SLOVAKIA 19 entrance to the castle; lt wa.s Omar, the beloved of Fatima. Omar begged Zápolský to free Fatima. Tlring or Omar's pleas, Zápolský remarked: .. You cannot draw wat&r from thls stone, nor can you draiw a tear from my eye." Omar took Zápolský at bis word and, wlth a few of hls followers, began to dig for water in the stone. After three years of palnful effort, Omar was rewarded; he struck water. Zápolský was moved exceedlng1y by the deed and granted Omar's request. Alex Thurzo J·ecelved the Trenčin stronghold from Ferdinand; bis coat of arms marked wlth the year ló40 can be seen today on a w:!ndow of the lnner cais4le. Imrich Forgáč, who marrled the "Black Prlncess," Prince Wenceslaus' widow, inherlted the castJe in 1588. But already In 1600 we flnd the castle the property or tlhe llleehazye. The Turks tried to galn possesslon of the castle in 1663, but failed. Rakoczy II was also unsuccessful dn hl.s abtempt in 1703. I n 1742 Queen Marie Therese had the fortress re-p alred and the tow&r rebullt. The la.tter etand.s 105 feet hlgh and af·fords a.n exqulslte view of the vicinlty. There Ie a legend that t he orlginal tower was bullt by Louls I. When the Rakoczy rebellJons were quelled, a plague broke out ln Trenčln. People sought refuge In churches, but prayers did not seem to help. People dled In thelr homes and no one burled them. It seemed that death ruled over Trenčln. Then somethlng mlraculous took place. The guard on the castle tower sa,w a very br1ght llgM over the to-wer and then St. Francls Xavler stepped out of a cloud and blessed the people of Trenčin. Tihe guard sounded the alarm, and the whole garrlson went out to welcome the Salnt. The commander of the gar.ríso.n ma.de the sign oť the cross wlth hls sword and promlsed that the date of the Sa1nťs appearance would ever be a holy day In Trenčin. The plague passed and Trenčln wae saved. The people of Trenčin stm observe the memory of that day. But let me flnish bhe story of the Trenčin Ca.stle. A comma.nd ltad been gtlven that a garrlson occupy the castle at all tlmes. Klngs and queens pas,sed on, but the order was not revoked untll someone thought of 1t in 1782, when the garrlson wa.s called away at la.st, after occupylng the oastle for 112 years. Fire destroyed al! bulldlngs In 1790. • • • RED GEOGRAPHY: The news servlce of the Centra! Slovak Ca- thollc Bureau in Rome recently publlshed a story about a certain school inspector of the T rnava distrlct In Slovak!a who gave dlrectlvee to teachers on how to teach. Among other thlngs he sald that lf nuns were able to lnterest chlldren In a non-ex!etent being, God," then the teachers certalnly should be able to interest chlldren In Stalln who actually exlsts. "The Marx-Lenin doctrlnes of our Stalln," he contlnued, "must be applled In all classes. For exatnple, in gcography you teach the chlldren about the East and the West. Now, you could say: The sun rlses in the East; there 1s our great Stalln, the sun or the natlons whlch enllghtens all natlons wlth hls knOI\Vledge. The sun sets In the West; there you f!nd decayed capltallsm, the treacherous bourgeolele and murderous lmper!allsm." - But moot of the Slovak teachers and puplls prefer the advlce of Horace Greeley: Go West. young man!  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Trenčín Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 18-19 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9239fef5d8ab6eb3b2433e8a2957d812.pdf 084956448e2ce672b0e4c5192a28a424 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý �14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná �SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica �16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- �SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .; � SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý �14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná �SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica �16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- �SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .; � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA - 13 WINTER WONDERLAND If you have never been in Slovakia in the winter, you stm have somefälng to Jive for. Under present conditlon·s , when freedom and independence are suppressed by the Communist system, you will not be able to see the "Winter Wonderland" that Slovakia really !s, but you mlg-ht consider visiting the !and of the Slovaks at some future time when the plague of Communism has been dispeHed. Winter, in all its sparkling and majestlc sp1endor, presents to every !over of nature ťhe best opportunity of seeing and fully enjoying the natural beautles of S.Jovakia. The coUliltry, because of its mountainous regions, ls especially suiitable for wlnter sports, partlcularly skíing. But you need not be sportsmindeid to enjoy Slovakla In the winter. The sheer beauty of nature in Slovakia in the wlnter wm enohant you, unburden and refresh your soul, and give added zest for livlng. You may not want to participa:te in winter sports In Slovakia, bwt the ·happy sight of others enjoyi-ng themselves wiH soothe your tired nerves and give you a sa,tlsfactíon never before known to you. 'ľhe Slovak mountains, as I once knew them, are unsurpassed for t heir winter charm. Accompany me, lf you wlll, on an imaglnary trip to them. Let us sliart out into the Small Carpathians (Malé Karpaty), W'hich extend from ,the confluence of the Danube and Morava rJvers to the Myjava. 'l'hey divide the Váh plai'll from the Moravian plain a.nd are covered wlth Jeafy and parUy evergreen trees and many fores,t meadows. Their moderate slopes offer good skiing. At l!he southwestern end, above the vlllage of Devin, there 1s the Dev!nska Kobyla, (The Mare of Devin), the peak or whlch 1719 feet above sea level. Near the city of Modra, there lies the summer resort of Harmónia, open a-lso In wlnter, with many comfo1,table hotels with hot and cold runnlng water and good restaurants. In t he mountalns, about two and one-half mi,Jes from Harmónia, on the so-called Sands (Piesky) stand two huts: it:he Zochova hut (1443 fet up), and only three mlnutes from it is the other one. Near the highest point or the mountain highway Jeading from Pezinok to Pernek is Országh's hut (1750 feet up) on Ba:ba (Grandmother) near Pezinok. The best sk·ling in the Little Carpathians is near Smolenice, where there are plenity of grassy hills and forest roeadows. The White Carpathians ( Biele Karpaty) stretch trom Myjava along t he Slovak-Moravian border to the mountain of Makyta, where they meet the J avorn!ky. They are covered wlth dense foresrts; only thelr wide southern part is Jess wooded and good for skiing. The most impoi,ta.nt centre is the Holuby hut (3226 feet) on the Javorina. It is best approached on foot from the railway station of Stará Turá, or from the bus stop Kvetná, on the line Nové Mesto nad Váhom l'.aerský Brod. Otherwise you may get to it from the Moravian side by car from Uherský Brod. Opposite the Whlte Carpathians, on the other side of the Váh valley, are the Inovec Mounta!ns, through which passes the railway from Trenč!n to Topoľčany. They, too, are densely wooded and have good skiing grounds. Out of the t.hree tourist huts whlch were here, only the Trenč!n Munic!pal Hut (1500 feet) under Sharp Peak (Ostrý 14 SLOVAKIA Vrch ) at Soblanov remains. The shortest way up 1s from the station Soblanov following -the blue tourist mark, or trom Trenčin followlng the red. Contlnuing, t!he Javornlky, whlch have huts both on the Slovak and Moravian slde, are the Western Beskyds, the southern parts of which are called th-e Jeseníky. Here there are many wooded and bare hills which are wonderful grounds for both the weakest and best sklers. Thelr Jocation on the borders of Slovakla and Moravla brings them many visitors from both sides. The numerous vllla,ges of the Upper Kysuca reglon offer many possibilltles for accommodationa both in the hotels as well as In private homes (Makov, Tunovka, Raková, Čadca). The best known centers are: Bumbálka Hut, MakovPotok Hut and the summer resoi,t Tešinský, which are open In winter. On the roa.d from Veľká •Bytča to Makov 1s Satinka Hut. All these huts are near Makov and the bo.rder and have ldeaJ grounds for skllng. Beyond the Jablunkov Pass, near Cadca, the Beskyds continue on as the Western Beskyds and form the border between Slovakía and Poland. Wooded sectlons mlngled wlth bare ones form Idea) skllng terra.in, w,h ere down-bili ru.os six mlles long are not at aH rare. Near the sta11lon at Serafinov lh-ere is a fine hotel, the surroundings of wh1ch are suitable for skilng. From the station In Cadca or Oščad­ nica, tbere is a good approach to the hut on Rača ( 4020 feet). The Bysitr.lcká Vall-ey up to Erdťidka and the whole of tbe Oravská Magura, near Námestovo, is a flrst class skiing ground with only one draiwback. it ls bard to appr<>ach. Otherwise the Orava region 1s one of the most popular ski terralns and has good posslbHitles of approach from tbe ra.llway Žilina-Košice, and also trom tbe ra.!lway Kraľovany./Suchá Hora. From the gorge of the Strečno rise the migbty bills of tbe mountaln range called Small Fatra ( Malá Fatra), whlch 1s covered mostly w.lth coniferous trees. Mountain meadows and grassy valleys, as well as tbe bare peaks of Stoh and Chleb, are the most popular places of northwestern Slovakia. The ldeal surroundlngs of the hut on Chleb (4660 feet) may be approached trom the station of Strečno, Šútovo, Kraľova.ny and Párnica. The hut there has been re1>alred and can accomodate 60 persona. It 1s the s,tarting point for tours on the Fatranský K11lváň, Chleb, Rozsut-ec and to the valley where Ištvä.nová lles. Martinské hole (The Plalns of St. Martin) are the southern range of tbe Lirttle Fatra, extending l'.rom the gorge of Strečno southwards to the vaney of Zliechov, near Ôlčmany. Thelr slopes are mostly wooded, but in the hills are plenty of meadows connected with one another all the way down to the valleys. On the surrounding mountain meadows tbere 1s wonderful skiing wlth Jong downhlll runs and marvelous views of the far surroundings - the Hlgh Taitras, the Whit-e and Little Ca'fl)athlans, Beskyds, Radhošť, the Ore mountans and the Inovec and Nitra MounWns. In the Martinské mountalns there is a hut 4100 feet above sea level. The best way to approach it 1s from Turčiansky Svätý Mafltln along several marked roads. Opposite t:he Martinské hole Ile the Great Fatra Mountains, wblch have quit-e a di!ferent character. They -stretch from the valley of the T>iver Váh to the rlver Hron: and thelr northern part ls cut by the valley ot Lubochňa. The wlde ridges of Ostredok, Rakytov and Krlžná SLOVAKIA 15 are suitable for skiing, In the norvhern part of the Gre,at Fatra, there are ideal grounds for wlnter sports on th& Smrekovica. The best aPproach to the 4330 foot-high Smrekovica 1s from the station Podsuchá on the rallroad Ružomberok-Korytnica. The unusually hlgh and long lasting snow in the deep coniferous woods attract.s thou:sands of visltors to Smrekovica. Many stay ln Ružomberok where there ar& good accommodatlons and a tower for ski-jump like on the Smrekovica. The southern pa11t of the Grea,t Fatra is called Mountalns of Kremnica ( Kremnické hory), where there are plenty of houses for tourists. The cen,t~ of thls region is Kremnica which has several hot~Is. a tourist n.ight shelter near the station and many private accommod.aitlons. It is ,the s·tarting point for the Skalka hut. Contlnuing along the Great Fatra and the Mountains of Kremnica, on the other side of the river Hron, ·between the ratlway ZvolenLevice and Zvolen-Šahy, are the Mountains of Štiavnica ( Štiavnické hory), w1th Sitno a,s their •highest pea.lc. This region wlth its evergreen trees and large meadows, Jong ridges and slopes, is ideal for winter sports. The center of this region is Banská Štiavnica. The most visited plaoe, however, is the hut of Andrej Kmeť on Sitno (3330 feet up). from where one has a beautiful vlew as far as the Danube Plaln and the High Tatras. Below the Sitno, next to Lake Počuvadlo, ,are the Kállay sanatorium and the boarding house Anna, which offer good accommodations for guests. The mountains of Štiavnica have great suppl1es of ore and are called the Slovak Ore Mountains (Slovenské rudohorie). They stretch from the river Hron and the mountains of Štiavnica to Rožňava. The northern part is more or less connected and has several w:lde hllls, trom which there run long ridges in the form of rays, between which are deep valleys. The southwestern part is very prlmitive and has a tourist hut on the Javor (2722 fem), to whlch the best approa,ch !s from the statlons Podkriváň, or Píla pod Javorom, on the ra.ilway !lne Zvolen-Lučenec. The hut on Trsti (3722 feet) may be approached from Pila, near Tisovec, or directly from Tisovec. To the east from Oravská Magura one finds the Stag Mountains ( Roháče) , which have a high mountain character and resemble the Tatras. Sklers vis,it mostly the Smutná and Látaná valleys, as well as the Iong slopes of Rakoň, Volovec, Úplaz, or go even a.s far as Osobitá. Snow usually remains untll sprlng and lt is nothlng unusual to find s klers here even at Easter. Sklers sometlmes go from Rohäče to the valleys ot Račková or Žiar, wblch belong to the group of mountains called the Tatras of Liptov ( Liptovské Tatry), because of their idea! skilng terraln. Wlth their Iong slopes and mighty peaks they complete the Hlgh Tatras to which they really belong. The lo.nges,t and wldest mountaln range in Slovakla are <the Low Tatras (Nízke Tatry), which extend from the highway Banská Bystrica-Ružomberok to the •highway Telgart-Poprad. North of them flows the river Váh, south the rlver Hron. Only ,the lower part.s are covered wlth forests, the rest 1s bare so that a skler may undertake a one-day tour from Prašivá in the west to Ďumbier and Kráľova hoľa In the east wlthout much fatigue. The helght and breadth of the range affords long descents on both sides trom he!ghts of 200-4000 feet up. Not far from Banská Bystrica 16 SLOVAKlA 1s the winter sports center, the Sport hotel Donovaly (3330 feet) w!th Idea! surroundings, woods and meadows. The hotel !s filrs.t cla.ss and is sure to app&a.l to every guest. From this place there leads a romantlc trail to Korytnica., above whlch rlse the mighty rldges of Prašivá and Latiborská Hoľa. At a helght of 6460 feet is sltuated štefán.ik's hut beneaith the Ďumbier. The highest peaks are Chopok, to wh!ch a ski-lil\t wa.s built (6680 feet) from the valley of Demänová nea.r Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, and Ďumbier (6820 feet) where snow remains tlll Jate sprjng. From the station Kráľova Lehota there 1s a highway wh!oh crosses the Low Tatra range on its way to Podbrezová. lit passes through the villages of Malužiná and Vyšná Boca and reaches the mountain Sport hotel at the lovely hut on čertovioa (4210 feet), which is surrounded by evergreen trees and mountain meadows. Among the numerous Slovak mountains the High Tatras (Vysoké Tatry) are the most vlsited by lovers of winrter sports. lt !s mostily because of their high mountain altitude, long las-ting snow, good accommodations, technical equipment and varled terrain. The startlng polnts to the Hlgh Tatras are the railway staUons Štrba and PopradTatry on the Košice-Bohumln raiJway line. From Štrba there runs a good road to the high cllmatlc spa Štrbské Pleso (Tarn of Štrba, 4500 feet) where there are accomodatlons for 400-500 persons (Hotels Hviezdoslav, Solisko, Kmvä.ň, Móry, boarding bouses Jánošik, Marina, Poleka, Iskra and chalets of the Slovak Touris.ts', and Skiers' Olub). Beyond t>he tarn there are the FUTkotská, Mlynická and Mengušovská valleys, to wbdch -the sklers come from the ridge of Solisko and Patria. Tbe slope of Solisko -is preferred, because there is a skl-lif,t there for sklers to a heigbt of 6260 feet. In the Mengušov va.Jley under steep Osterva there 1s a hut at Popradské Pleso ('l'arn of Poprad) with accommodatlons for 150 guests. In late sprjng and even on summer days it 1s posslble to ski under the Saddle Váhy, near the hut under the Rysy (7600 feet), whlch ls open In summer only. Another center is Stary Smokovec, where about 1000 persons can be accommodated in hotels and boaroing houses ({}rand Hotel, Hoepfner, Palace, etc.). Skllng grounds are on the slopes of Slavkov's Peak and In the lovely Studenovodská (Cold Water) valley, or in the Great or Little Cold Valleys. There ls a funicular rallway runnlng to the Športhotel Hrebienok from which goes a toboggan slide and ski run. At the end of the Great Cold Valley there are wonderful skllng grounds near the :Obojn!cka hut (6400 feet) . In the Llttle Cold Valley there are two •huts: at the beglnning of the valley ls the hut Zamkovský (5200 feet), and at the upper end Lles the Téry hut (6730 feet) on the F'ive Spiš Lakes. In tbe surroundings there are lovely sk!lng grounds for good sklers. A popular skllng center is Tatranská. Lomnica., wbich 1s connected wlth Poprad by both electrlc and steam railways. It ls 3000 feet high, has healtby cllmate and good skllng places. There are good accomodatlons In the hotels and boardlng houses wbere 1000-1200 persons may be housed (Grand Hotel Praha, Hotel Lomnica, Ehern, Payer, Spišský ilom, Hubertus, Javorina, Božena, etc.). From beyond the Grand Hotel tb-ere ran a cable railway to the Lomnický št!t (Lomnica Peak, 8780 feet), now runnolng to the station Skalnaté Pleso (Rocky Lake. 5480 feet) only. Above and below the hut there are some of the best skUng places on tbe Saddle of Lomnica. In the Dead Garden (Mŕtva záhrad- SLOVAKIA 17 ka), the slopes of Svišťovka, or the skiing and bob sleigh raclng track. From the nearby Tatranské Matliary we approach huts which also have good skding grounds in their surroundings. They are as follows: the hut at Šalivový Prameň, tbe hut at Zelené Pleso (Green Lake) and the hut of Kežmarok, near the Biele plesá (White Lake's); the last one already Jies In t-he Belan Tatra. Not far away from Tatranské. Lomnica is situated the village Ždiar, famous for the fine costumes of its peasants. It has bus con.nections witb Tatranská Lomnica, Skiers may find good possibilities on the slopes of the Belan Tatra, near Javorina, or in the well known Wbite Water V,alley (Blelovodská dolina). Beyond the lowlands of Kežmarok tbere rise the Hi!Js of Levoča ( Levočské vrchy )J w•h ich are not very high but have good conditions for skiing and a hut, the Hut of Levoča under Javorina (4560 feet), best reached from Levoča. In the diroction of Prešov there is good skiing on the Branisko (3900 feet). The Slovak paradlise (Slovenský raj) also has its charm of frozen water-falls in winter, but few possibilities for skilng. Only the vicinitioo of Dobšiná, Krompachy and Gelnica have better terrains. Accomodation.s are found in the hut at tbe Ice Caves of Dobšiná. · Eastern Slovaklia (Východné Slovensko) has many good grounds, but the possibilities of accomodations are rare because many huts and lodging houses were destroyed. Tbe best skiing near Košice ls on Bankov, and at the hut Jahodná (2160 feet), where there are t\vo towers fo.r ski-jumping. The HUls of Slaná are alllo vislted bocause of their skiing terl1aJ!ns. Slovakla, endowed by nature wlth streams and lakes, mountains and valleys, with its modern and ancient structures and quaint vilJages, ls a !and of wondrous beauty and charm In all seasons, but In the winter it really ls a wonderland. • • • WHO SAID IT? "Tbe Slovak people h·ave ahvays shown a wlllingness to be a part of any federalized state, a readiness to cooperate with the other peoples in lt. ~heir history conclusively proves tha1: a natlon can be happy In such an order as long as it eujoys basic freedom. On the other hand, the history of the Slovak people also conclusively demonstrates that, not having this freedom, no natlon, even the smallest, wlll permit ltself to be pushed around by even lts racia! bloodbrother, wi.thout either openly fighting or (what 1s worse) plantlng the seeds of revolt that eventually brlng forth some terrlble harvest. The conclusion seems evident that the most benevolent and the best: inten.tioned domination wlll probably not be accepted by any natlon as a sub.stitute for self-rule." - {Congressman Daniel J. F!ood, Jan. ·1, 1946) . . • • • "Czech public opinion may be excused for not realizing that the sltuation In Slovakia at the close of 1923 !s radlcally 'dlfferent · from tba,t of the first year of the Revolutlon. And yet the bigher búreaucracy tends to act on the assumptlon that nothing has changed, •and ostrich-like to lgnore tbe keen and growing resentment in Slovakia and the urgent need !or measures to allay lt." - (R,· W. Seton Wat, son: "THE NEW SLOVAKIA," 1924). .. , .;  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia - Winter Wonderland Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 13-17 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d30e6d7dd5f8d711753576fe2f105984.pdf e38c890cc26110e84f610292af06c7a2 PDF Text Text DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- �2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even �SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. �4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. �SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three �6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha �SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- �8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- �SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond �10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters �SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." �12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • • � DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- �2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even �SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. �4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. �SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three �6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha �SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- �8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- �SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond �10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters �SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." �12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DECEMBEJIR, 1952 SLOVAKIA 1 What Led to the PROCLAMATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC KAROL SIDOR ( Former Ambassador of Slovakia to the Vatican) Our greait Svetozár Hurban Vajanský once wrote the following encouraglng words: " . . . fear not the proximity of events and do not be afrald of too small a perspective. Our elders sinned grievously dn that respect. In folio form, they published the war of the divine Titan against the Jews; they wrote enormous volumes about America and Palestine; and hístories about the cavalry units of Cracow and water nymphs. But they left us practically nothing about themselves and about their times; that is, they ddd not leave us thelr views and opin!ons so tha.t we, their successors, now stand before a dark corner, a:bout wh-lch we know only that in lt our natlon breathed, worked, suffered, bied, sinned, performed good works, quarreled and harmoniously formed associatlons, hated and loved. We - the unfortunate heirs of indolent fathers - have nothing in our hands'" So that a similar verdlct be not rendered agalnst us in the (uture, we must wrlte about everything - about everything that we authoTed or at least were witnesses of, about everything we saw with our own eyes and heard with our own ears. Such a testimony, of course, cannot be anythlng but subjective. But after a gre.ater lapse of bime, future historians will be able to form from various such subjective testimonies an objectlve picture about the events and the people of that particular tlme. The question of Slovak s,tatehood was dealt w-ith in a speech dellvered on February 21, -1939, by the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph Tiso, who said: "After a pause of a thousand years, after long years of fighting for its national rights, the Slovak natňon has its own government, its own paTUament, and is itself building its own state. Here on the floor of our own p.arliament, we -are buHding our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State. The Slovak natlon is bullding its own State, which is the organ of its soveraignty, the executor of its will and the defender of its interests. Never again must it happen that the Slovak nation be pla.ced in oppos!tion to its own State. Being a Slovak patriot and an idea! nationalist means b~ng a Joyal buUder of the Slovak State. Love for the Slovak nat!on 1s demonstrated conc.retely by loyalty and devotlon to the Slovak State. We do not uphold ťhe State just for the sake of having a State, but because, and only as long as, the nation needs it." In these words Dr. Tiso lndicated only the road we were to travel in bullding our own Slovak State In the future. "Here on the floor of our own parliament we are buildlng our own State, our own new State, our own Slovak State" - that was the directive for tbe future. Wben Dr. Joseph 'I'lso delivered bis speech in tbe Slovak Assembly on February 21, 1939, he was well aware of the fact tha:t we s,till clid not have a Slovak State. There did exist an autonomous Slovak Government and a Slovak parliament, hut that was not enough to al- 2 SLOVAKIA low us to speak about the Slovak State aa an already &X.isting formatlon. There was still lacking the proclamation of the State, lts recognition by foreign powers, and we also lacked that which makes a Sbate a State: our own army and our own representatives in other countries. The Slova.ks who uoted the number of times the words "Slovak State" were mentioned dn Tiso's speech before the Slovak Parliament oould be completely satisfied. And the Slovaks were saitlsfied, but the Cz.echs became dlscontented. Czech dissatisfactiou was demonstrated not only •in newspapers, but also in the sessions of the Centra! Government in Prague. In the sessions of thait government, as a State Minister, I urged the Czechs to fulfill everything t hey had bound themselves to fulfill by para~raphs of the Constltutlional Document wh!ch was adopted in the P11ague Parliament on November 22, 1938. The Slovak Government had entrusted me to concern myself with common problems in Prague, <the question of foreign affairs, finances and the army. I made concrete the Slovak demands and requested the Centra! Government to take a stand on them, app.rove them and hasten the.i!r rool!zation. On Wednesday, Maroh 1, 1939, at four o'clock in the afternoon, the Counc!l of Ministers was in session in Pr.ague. Present were the Czechs: Rudolph Beran, the Premier of the Government, and m!ndsters Chvalkov.s'ký, Syrový, Kalfus, Havell~a. Krejči, and Fischer. The Slovaks were represented by Karol ,stdor, Stephen Haššík (for mllitary affalrs) and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (for flnancial affairs). I pre-sented our demands in the military and financial departments. 'l'he first to reply was Premier Rudolph Beran. He said that two matters were involved: fundamental questions and partia! demands. 'ľhe entire Czeoll public, according to Beran, 1s condemning Tiso's speech in the Slovak Parllament in which he proclaimed that the Slovaks are building their ovm State, their own Slovak State, on the floor of parliament, and completely neglected to mention the Czech<rSlovak Republic even once. Beran demanded the Slovak Government to pubhloize its loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic, otherwise it would not be possil:ile to act on the partia! demands which were presented to ,h !m by me. "We must elther come to an ~greement," said Beran, "or part." We cannot circumvent this question on tiptoes as we would a cotpse. We cannot deny that a dangerous s:ltuation e:x:ists, added Beran, 'because !t could overwhelm not only the Czech Government, but the Slovak Government as well. When I waa permitted to reply to Premier Beran, I said: "We are not going to publish any fundamental manifestations about our loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republic. The Czechs and the Slovaks have accepted the law ,a bout the autonomy of Slovak!a, and that law mus,t not be neglected by the Czeohs. The Slovak party is fultilling wihat is in that law, because we, too, voted for that law, -as we also voted for the joint State budget for the yeiar 1939. The Slova.k Government !s responsible for the State in Slovakia, and the Czech Government cannot have guardlanship over !t. That we should continually have to e:x:press ourselves for the Czecho•Slovak !te• public !s nauseous particula.rly to me, because even dul'ing the Flrst Republlc I did not have to keep glving testlmony of my loyalty to the State and, as far a~ I am <'Oncernerl, 1 am not wllllng to do so even SLOVAKIA 3 now. During the life of the Flrst Republic, Slovaks In Government wanted to galn the trust of the Czechs and they s,tressed thei'ľ rellabllity iin such a manner that they never sald the words "Slovak" and "Slovakia" separately. but always added, when they sald Slovakia: and our beloved Czecho,Slovak 'Republic. And when tbey used tbe word "Slovaks," tbey lmmedlately added: and our derurly loved bretbrnn, t he Czecb.s. The bealtby reactlon to tbls unnatural status ls what is happening In Slovakla today, l.e. tbat only Slovakia and the Slovaks are stressed. We shall mentdon the Republlc ·a nd the Czechs only after tbe Republic and the Czecbs accept everythlng they have boun<l themselves to d-0 by the law pertalnlng <to the autonomy of Slovakla. I must say that slnce October 6~h nothlng has changed as far as the wlll of the Czechs is concerned." After I sald these words, a bitter debate followed. Most important were those spoken by Chvalkovský, Minister of Forelgn Af• fair;;. He said: "Whatever we have done thus far, we have not done well neither you, nor we. We stand before ,the questlon: Shall we stlll stay together, or shall we part. An EngHs,h st-ate&man once sa1d: a door must be either opened or closed. Every breeze cannot play ,vith lt. I was shocked by what Sldor has sald, that trom October &t-h nothlng has changed SlovakJa. Never in history did Slovakla have a Slov-ak Government. She has one slnce Ootober 6th, and that in ltself means tbat since October 6th much has changed In Slovakia. Slnce October 6th we ddd not have t!me enough to look eacb other in the eye. We had to worry about our relat!onsblp wlth our nelghbors, there were armies of tbree States on tbe terrltory ot the Republlc, and we could not resolve our interna) relatlons,blp speedlly. We, too, ha.ve a dlscon<tented mass of people, wbich 1s demanding tbat we correct the mlstakes of the past and avoid mlstakes In the present. I am not respons,ible for the past regime, but nelther ls Sldor. I am dolng wha.tever I can do. In the hlstory of forelgn mlnlsters, nowhere w!ll you find a minister who had received 27 ultimatums wlthln such a shoz,t time. Most of them are from the Magyars and the Poles decrylng the conduct of the Slovak and Ruthenlan Governments. Thus, it 1s very dlf~lcult for me to make order abroad, when these Governments, contrary to the Constituliona.1 Document, also lntervene in forelgn affalrs. Every week, with dispasslona.te perststence, I am Io Hltler's offlce seeklng recognitloo of Cz(lcbo-Slovakla's boundaries, and all I get ls an evaslve answer along wttb polntlng to tbe unsettled Interna) affairs of the State. The deputies trom Prague are saying that the question of ,the partlog of the Slovaks and tbe Czechs is only a matter of weeks, and at most one of montbs. The effe,ct abroad is tbat we are oot recognlzed as a subject of lnteroa.tlonal law, but only as an object. I demand that tbe Slovak Government state officlally that lt 1s for tbe Czecho·Slovak Republlc. It the Slovak Government decldes otherwise, we shall part. Tbe Czech nation shall not stand in the way of your procilalm1ng the lndependence or Slo• vakia. lt ls better lf this ha,ppens voluntarlly." Agalo I aoswered that the Slovak Government wlll not make any manlfestation of loyalty to the Czecho-Slovak Republlc as long as all the Slovak demands. emanatlng from the agreement between the Czechs and the Slovaks, are not fulfilled. 4 SLOVAKIA Premier Beran closed the J<ively meeting of the Mlnisterial Councll wlth the remark that the following week the plenum of the Centra! Government, of which the Slovak ministers headed by Dr. Tiso are also members, shaJI meet to definJtely resolve fundamental questlons and partia! programs, "since this could not be done through Sidor." The situation developed rapidly. I returned horne to Bratislava and requested the President of the Slovak Government, Dr. Joseph 'Nso, to call a joint meeting of the Slovak Government, the Executive Committee of the Slovak Assembly and the Executive Com mittee of Hllnka's Slovak Peoples Party. T hat meeting was held in Bratislava, on Monday, March 6, 1939. There I reported what had transpired thus (ar in Prague and requested that we clearly style the question of the Slovak State for ourselves and also decide on the manner of proclaimlng !t, because, according to my conviction, the situatlon in Prague was already such that we could no longer reckon with a new reconc!liation and further negotlation with the Czechs. After a lengthy <lebate, the stand unanimously accepted was given form by the president of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tlso, as follows: "To continue the bullding of the Slovak State in an evolutionary way and at this time not to proclaim tbe establishment immediately." That stand was proper and reasonable. Every natlon desires to have its own State, to build it in !ts own way. The Slovaks were building theirs on the floor of the Slovak Parliament and would proclaim lt when the Slovak deputies, the duly elected representatives of the Slovak nation, deemed !t proper to do so. Tbe followlng day, March 7, 1939, Dr. Artbur Seiss-Inquart came from Vlenna to pay me a "social call." Ht> told me tbat on this orcasion ·he would like to talk wlth Dr. Josepb Tlso. I called Dr. Tiso to my resldence, bence both or us were present durlng the conversat!on with Seiss-Jnquart. After a few social formalities, Selss-Jnquart turned to politics and remarked that the foreign sltuation was becomlng very dangerous lor the Slovak natlon. Adolph Hitler, he said, was ready to act severely against the entire Czech o-Slovak Hepublic. It is in the interest or the Slovaks not to become vlctlms along wlth the Czechs, but to save themselves by establish!ng thelr own Slovak State. T hereul)On, Dr. J osepb Tiso explalned wbat he had decided upon yesterday, tbat is, that we wanted to build the Slovak State ln an evolutlonary manner and dld not w"ish to proclaim lt rlght now. "To Slovak State independence," Dr. Joseph Tlso said, "we would like to come by a peaceful march toward our goal, pos$lbly by runn!ng toward it." "It is no longer enough," answered Seiss-Inquar t, "to march peacefully toward the goal, or even runn!ng loward lt. You must jump, because only by doing so will you attain your goal." The joint conference wlth the Czecbs was suppoaed to take place Marcb 9th. I had agreed witb prem!er Dr. Tlso that I would go to Prague afone and would let bim know by p-hone whether it would stlll be nec&SSary for bim and also tbe rest of the Slovak Jllllnlsters to come to P rague. SLOVAKIA 5 I arrived in Prague in the evenlng of March 8th. I a.scertained how the situation there sharpened against the Slovak.s and, therefore, that same evenlng I phoned to Bratislava, telling Dr. Tiso to stay horne and not to come to Pmgue. On March 9, at 4 p. m., the Mlnlsterlal Councll held a meeting in Prague. Present with me were all three delegates of the Slova.k Government: Dr. Joseph Zvrškovec (,l<'ore!lgn Affail'S). Stephen Hašš[k, (Milltary Affairs). and Dr. Alexander Hrnčár (Financlal Af· fairs). At the staTt of tbe session, Premier Beran suddenly announced that a secret meeting of the Mlnisterial Council was ahout to take place ,and requested all three delegates of the Sloivak Government to leave the assembly room. I remalne·d •In the room with Minister Paul Teplánsky. In an angered tone Beran said that in all the embassies of Prague the exact time of the proclamation of the independent State of Slovakla was known and that only the Prague Government knew nothing about it. I replled t!hat such rumors were inundatlng the whole of Slovakia, hut that we had not come to Prague to establish the truth or ialsehood of such rumors. We had come to present the Slovak tlemands and have the Centra! Government accept and approve them. We must talk abou t the concrete matters; these the delegates of the Slovak Government have prepared and, therefore, I asked that they be lnvited to the conference. My request was heard. In an atmosphere that threatened to explode, the three delegates of the Slovak Government and I presented the Slovak demands. Delegate Stephen Raššlk was so overwrought that Beran had to remind bim to compose himself when he began to pound the groon table sharply with bis f,ist. Such a thlng, he sald, had never before happened in the MinisteriaJ Council. When the tension was highest, a messenger came from the foyer to teli me that Minister Dr. Havelka wanted me on °the r,hone. Dr. Havelka was an aide to President Rácha al the Hrad (Oastle). He requested me to come to the Hrad at once; President Rácha urgently wished to speak with me. I returned to the conference room and said to Stephen Haššík: "Here is my briefcase; take it horne with you if I do not return. Presldent Rácha has called for me, and I sense that lt may be nothing good.'' Informing Beran that I was summoned to the Castle. I left the .Ministerial Council a little before midnight. On the ground floor of the building a police officer told me that 1 was to be held. I protested against this S-O vociferously that the whole bll'ilding of the Ministerial Council resounded wlth my protest. :'dy delention, however, was soon explalned, and I hurried to the Castle. After greetlng Presldent Rácha with a "good evening," l protested to him against the violation of my congressional immunity. Rácha knew nothlng about it and palnfully grasped his head. He was an old, overworked man, hut an honest and good man. Catching his breath, he sa~d stutterlngly: "Several moments ago I performed a very unpleasant task. I dismissed the premier of the Slovak Government, Dr. Tiso, and three 6 SLOVAKIA other min.!sters from their posts. I had to do lt, because the consoli• dation of conditions in Slovakia demanded it." I looped trom my chair and replied: "Mr. Presldent, I cannot agree w'ith the step you have taken. I am jo!n!ng wlth the dls• missed ministers and, here and now, tender you my reslgnat!on. I have nothing more to do in Prague." The President wias quite moved as he stood up and begged me not to resign and not let myself be overcome by hasty anger. "With full knowledge of what may happen to me here in Prague for my statement," I said quietly and seriously, "l repeat that I do not agree with what you have done; I protest agalnst lt and hereby tender you my reslgnatlon. I am golng home to Slovakla on the very next traln." :Aresident Rácha mopped bis forehead and head wlth both hands and in a voice completely broken asked me agaln not to resign, because, he said, -it would result In lm.mense harm for Slovakia. "I have nothlng to add to what I have sald," I replled and began walking toward the door. The Presldent caught up W'ith me, grasped my arm, and pleaded that I tarry a bit longer. "Beran will soon be here," he said. And at that very moment, the door burst open and Beran walked In hurrjedly. Stlll standing near the door, I related to Beran what I had told Rácha: 1 was resign.!ng and going home. Rácha and Beran, bowever, entreated me to stay on. They were convinced, they sald, with regard to condltions In Sloviakia, that I was not doing the right úhlng. I gave in to them to the extent that I would announce my reslgnatlon to them from Bratislava after I had consulted with my frlends. As I lett the Presldenťs oftice, in the corridor I met Peter Pridavok, who at that Ume wa.s head of the press department of the Slovak Government, also Dr. Dobrovský, my secretary, and my aMe, Lt. Fratrič. With my three ~rlends I rode to my Prague resldence. In the mornlng of the next day, l\farch 10th, I asked to get c onnected wlth the edltorlal office of the SLOVÁK in Bratislava. No one answered there. Then I tried to get connected wlth the General Secretariate of the Rllnka Slovak People's Party, but no one answered even there. Finally, they connected me with the Government Building -in Bratislava. Dr. Karol Kllnovský, Chlef of the Securlty Service In Slovakia, ,ans,wered tbe phone. I dlctated a rePort to bim to publlsh In the SLOVÁK. to wít, that "Sldor wa3 placed before an accompllshed fact In Prague In the matter of the dlsmissal of the Slovak mlnlsters; he dld not agree with the dlsmissal and protested against it to Presldent Rácha." The report was then p\tbllshed in the SLOVÁK that very day, In the issue berurlng the datellne of March 11, 1939. At that time Dr. Kllnovský told me that Martlal Law was proclalmed in Slovakla without the knowledge of the Slovak Government. The Bratiislava offlces, edltorlal and secretarlal, as well as the offlces of the Hlinka Guard were occupled by the Czech Army and police. Over 250 Slovaks had been arrested, hundreds of offl· clals were suspended, many GHards were taken lnto Moravla and hundreds of Slovaks had fled to Vienna to avold arrest. Somethlng wlthin me snapped. I could not belleve tha.t Rácha SLOVAil..lA 7 and Beran were as faithless as T. G. Masaryk and Bene!í and their adherents when it came to keeping agreements, solemn signatures and promises w!Jth the Slov.ak.s. I really respected Hácha and Beran and believed that whatever they would promlse and sign, they would aJso keep honorably and fulfill. But, Io and behold, they were overthrowlng the Slovak Governm~nt in Bratislava without the knowledge and behlnd the backs of the duly authorized representatlves of the Slovak Government and lts three delegates. Without the knowledge of the Slovak Government, they proclaímed Martlal Law in Slovakla, occupied the territory of autonomous Slovak1a with soldiers and gendarmes, arrested Slovak Deputies and hauled people to Moravia, wh!le they were telling• me that they were doing a very unpleasant duty in the "lnterest" ot Slovakia. Anti-Slovak elements In Slovalcta, encouraged by such mOO-'lures. ralsed tbeir beads on tbe streets and barked at tbe autonomlsts: "Now, we'll give you autonomy!" While I was thlnking about wbat was happening, the Czech Mln•lster Feierabend came to my resldence. He had a considerable understandlng for Slovak matters. He told me tbat Beran had flent him to teli me to vlslt Mm at once. "No!" I Teplled to Feierabend. "After yesterday'e events in Prague ano those that are happening In Slovakia now, I do not wlsh to speak wlth any one In Prague. Not even with you. or Beran." I remained in my resldence with my frlends. I wa!ted for Dr. Martin Sokol, president of the Slovak Assembly, who had suddenly been called to Prague, to flnlsh bis audience with Presldent Hácha. Wben he arrlved, I traveled wlth bim to Bt>atislava on the afternoon express. I arrlved In B!'atlslava at 9 P. M., March 10. A strong d!Vflslon ot the Hlinka Guard awalted me at the station; also a stronger one of the Czech army, Jed by a Colonel. Masses of people cllmbed aboard the engine and thousands upon thousands mllled around Nie s quare around the station. They sang maTches ot the Guard and acclalmed me voclferously. At the request ot the Czech Colonel, on the way to the edltorial offlce of the SLOVÁK, I stopped at the o!fice of the General Voyta, Commander of the National Army In Slo• vakla. He was a tough soJd.ier. But he saw the sltuatlon clearly and, lt seemed to me, dld not like lt at all. When I complalned that the army was shooting into the unarmed crowd In Bratislava, he replied that no one shot at the people, but a few salvos were fired into the aiT to frlghten them. Later, I ascertalned for myself that the Czech army In Bratislava really dld not shoot any one. Anthony Kopal, the only Slovak who was felled by a bullet, was shot by a Czecb gendarme. When I asked who had orderd the army and the tanks lnto the streets ot Branislava, Voyta told me that he personally was called to Prague by Syrový, Minister ot Natlonal Defense, who ordered bim to do so. I requested Voyta to free all prlsoners in Bratislava taken by bis men. Voyta replied that he would as soon as he found ou.t if· a.ny one was arrested in Bratislava.; and that he would notity me. Havlng appraised the sltuatlon at its source, I hurrled to my car and contlnued on my way to the SLOVÁK, whlle a masa ot 7000- 8 SLúVAKIA 8000 people, gathered about Voyta's office, cheered and sang robustly. When I arri ved at the SLOVÁK, I found the higher officials of the Hlinka Party, headed by Dr. Tis-0, already waiting for me. The entire executive body of the Assembly arrived and a lengthy deliberation began. Dr. Tiso, vice-president of the Party, presided at the session. He told about the situation that had developed in Bratislava, while Dr. Sokol and I related our experiences in Prague. I said that I would not go to Prague any more and requested that my resignatlon as State Minister be accepted by the conference. And forthwith, I proposed that the new Slovak Government be made up as follows: Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the Slovak Government; Dr. Martin Sokol, Minister of Interior; Joseph Sivák, Minister of Education; Julius Stano, Minister of Transportation; Dr. Peter Zaťko, Minister of Agriculture; Dr. Alex Hrnčár, Minister of Finance, and Dr. Gejza Fritz, Minister of Jusbice. The conference decided - wit,h only one dissenting vote, my own - that I shoulct not resign, but continue in the office of State Minister. Dr. Joseph Tiso t hen announced that he could not assent to accept the office offered him. He stated that here he was not <:oncerned aboQt himself personally - all such thoughts must now be secondary - but that he did not want to place President Rácha int-0 an unpleasant situation: he did not want Rácha pressed today to name as president of the Slovak Government that Tiso, whom he had yesterday dism1ssed from that office. 'I\he situation 1s šerious - said Dr. Tiso - and we must not use the Slovak pľO'blem to enha,nce our persona! interests and prestige. Slovakia needs a government, Tiso concluded, so that greater confusion and chaos would not ensue. Thereupon, the conference authorized Dr. Martin Sokol to proceed as follows: If Dr. Joseph Tiso were not acceptable in Prague, then Karol Sidor should be proposed as president of the Slovak Government. The next day, Saturday, March 11, 1939, the praesidium of the Slovak Assembly, presented the names of the new Slovak Government to President Rácha in Prague. This had to be done, because paragraph V, Article 4, of the Constitution of November 22, 1938, demanded it. It states: The members of the autonomous Slovak Gov• ernment, forming a com-ponent part of the Centra! Government, shaII be apointed by the Pr-esiident of the Republic on the motion of the praesidium of the Assembly of Slovakia. President Dr. Emil Hácha approved the second alternatíve and r.amed the new Slovak Government with me as lts president. The other members of my government were: Sivák, Sokol, Stano, Zaťko, Rrnčár and Fritz. This, then, was the !ega! Slovak Government created according to the Constitutlonal Document which was valid at the tíme. The very day that the news carried the names of the men constituting the new Slovak Government, I had several German vlsltors: editor Goldbach, then Carbus; later that night, close to mldnight of March 11, Wr. William Kepler, special deputy of Adolph Hitler and Assistant Secrebary of State for Foreign Affalrs, Dr. Selss- SLOVAKIA 9 Inquart, G-Overnor of Austria, and Joseph Biirckel, Austrian gauIeiter, who demanded that I 1mmediately proclaim the independence of the Slovak State by radlo either through the station in Bratislav•a or the one in Vienna. I replied that responsible factors of the Hlinka Party aind the Slovak Assembly had decided "to continue to build the Slovak State by an evolutionary process and not to proclaim its establishment right now." I explasined that I, too, was bound by that declslon and could not violate it without the assent of the Party and the Assembly. If lhe Assembly and the Party change thelr previous stand and on the floor of the .A;ssembly, now decide to P'ľOClaim an independent Slovak State "right now," I would comply wlth that changed attitude. My actions were governed, I said, not by expedl· ency or my persona! fancies, but by the policy of the nation according to the diirectives which I had from competent Slovak organs. I take my orders only from them, I concluded, and I will not execute the orders and commands given me by representatives of another natlon. Natura1'1y, the Germans were not satisfied with my answer. And they demonstrated their dissatisfaction in a very concrete fashion. On March 13, they vented thelr hatred of me by placlng a bomb under my horne in Bratislava to ktill me and my whole family. I thanked God that it was discovered in Ume and rendered harmless. Another bomb was placed under the Jesuit monastery in Brati!>lava where Dr. Joseph Tiso resided. That bomb actually exploded and caused quite a bit of damage to the walls and windows of the structure. No one, however, was killed. As soon as I took over the presidency of the Slovak Government all military regulations and orders, especla!ly the proclamation of Martial Law, were revoked and rendered invalid. The putsch of the Czech generals, ord8'l'ed by President Rácha and Premier Be1,an of the Centra! G-Overnment and executed by Syrový, Minister of NatiOJ1al Defense, was thus liquidated. I liberated Slovak prlsoners in Slovakia, returned all suspended persona to thelr jobs, and made certain mi!itary provisiions to pre-vent any new putsches. The orders provided for the placement of Slovak officers as supervlsors of the Slovak Government in all milltary formatlons which were headed !Jy Czeoh generals and colonels. Simultaneously, President Rácha and General Syrový ordered all commanders of the army in Slovakla not to undertake any ventures wlthout my knowlodge or wlthout the knowledge of the appointed Slovak offlcers. This provision of mine I considered most lmportant. It was thus that the Slovaks took over the command of the army in Slovakia before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State. That meant that the Slovaks took possession of one of the symbols of State sovereignty. How !mpo!'tant was this provision was demonstT,ated soon after the !ndependence of the Slovak State was proolaimed, when the Magyars a,ttacked the eastern borders of Slovakia, and our dlsciplined army, under the command of Lt. Colonel Augustine Malar, effectively resisted them. Without our mil!tary resistance, the Ma• gyars would have occupled the eastern area of Slovakla even beyond 10 SLOVAKIA Prešov, just as they had occupied the whole of Ruthenia. which offered no military reslstance. But even before the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak State, the knowledge that Slovak offlcers were in command of every m!llta.ry garrison In Slovakia evoked a remarkable satisfaction in the ranka of the Slovaks, who no longer had to fea.r that the barracks would agaln unload a host of soldiers who would fight agalnst the people and lts !nterests. On Monday, March 13, 1939, at 6:00 .A. M., Dr. Tiso arrlved in Bro.tňslava from Banovce to visit me. He told me that he had received an "lnv!tatlon" to vis!t Adolph Hitler in Berlin and asked me whether I would agree that he go. I answered h!m that I d!d, but wanted it approved by my whole government as well as the praesidlum of the Party and the A.ssembly. Thereupon, the Slovak Government, the praes!dium of the Assembly and the Party were called to meet In the offlce of the SLOVÁK. The conference lasted unb!l 12:30 P. M. The unanlmous decislon was: Dr. Joseph Tlso was to go to Berlin. After the conference. I issued the followlng off-icial statement for the Bratislava press and radlo: "We announce to the Slovak public that today, Monday morning, the praesldium of the Hlinka Slovak People's Party had a meeting in Bratislava. At thls meeting of the praesldlum of the Party, Dr. Joseph Tiso, former Presldent of the Slovak Government, announced that he had recefved au offlcial summons from the Relch Ohancellor, Adolph Hitler, to vis!t him at once In Berlin. The pra.esld<lum of the Party has acknowledged thls lnv!tation, and so has the Government of Karol Sldor. Consequently, Dr. Joseph Tiso crossed the border at Bratislava at noon today accompanled by the German Consul In Bratislava, deputy Stephen Danlhel and deputy Ing. Karmasin. The purpose of Dr. Joseph Tiso's trip to Berlin 1s a olarlfllcation of the present situat!on." In the instructions, which the conference gave to Dr. Joseph Tiso for hls trip to Berlin, he was told: to hear what Hitler had to say, but not to glve hlm any kind of blndlng statement; then to return to Brátlslava and report on h!s vlslt to competent Slovak factors and await the deflnite decislon of the Assembly, the Government and the Party. Dr. Joseph Tiso visited Rlbbentrop and Hitler in Berlin. After converslng w<lth them, he went to the Czecho-,Slovak embassy in llerlln, whence he phoned me and requested me to call the Slovak Assembly together. Thls telephon;, conversation took place with Tlso at 7: 30 P. M. on March 13, 1939. I lmmedlately got in touch with Presldent Hácha who, actlng in accord with Paragraph V of the ConB'titutlon of November 22, 1938, called a meeting of the Slovak Assembly on March 14, 1939. The Slovak Assembly, therefore, was convened Iegally, In the manner prescribed by the Const!tution of the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. Tuesday, March 14, 1939, at 9: 00 A. M. the Slovak Government, the praesldium of the Assembly and the Hlinka Party convened In the Government Buildlng at Bratislava. Dr. Joseph Tlso gave an exhaustlve report about hls trip to Berlin. The meeting approved h!s report enthus!ast!cally; he had done the task he was asked to do. After the meeting, the Slovak Assembly convened In 1ts quarters SLOVAKIA 11 for the session oa.Ued by the President of the Republ1c, Dr. En:(11 Rácha. Thls memorable meetlng of the Slovak A.ssembly opened at 10: 57 A. M., March 14, 1939, by the Vlce-Presldent of the Assembly, Dr. Karol Mederly. After golng through the rormallties, Dr. Mederly, in accordance to Paragraph 37 of the order or business, moved that the remaining buslness or the Assembly be conMdential. Therefore, only Deput!es of the Assemb!y and members of the Slovak Government remained in the assembly ha.11. Of the 63 duly elected representatives of the Slovak Assembly, 57 were present at this hlstorical session of the Slovak leglslature. T·h e secret session began at 11:10 A. M. The flrst order or business was my spe,ech, in wbich I deplcted events as they had developed in Slova.kla and recounted a.II that my Government had accomplished withln so short a time. In my name and in the name or the other mJnisters, I announced the reslgnation of my government. I concluded my speech In this manner: " . . . in the name of the ent.ire Government I tender our resignatione to this solemn Assembly. At thls very moment, this my decision is being ma.de kno,w n also to the constitutional factor.s in Prague and, with this, I proclaim the bTief act!v!J.ty of my Government at an end. Sir Deputles, I I)Tay that you be unlted, selt-conscious and mutually trustworthy, because only thus shall we be able to get our Slovak nation out of the present dlfficult situation and establlsh order and stablllity and a solid front. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that I sha.11 support with my whole strength and will everythlng that you sha.11 decide. Long live the Slovak natlon! Long live free Slova.kla!" Dr. Joseph Tiso then presented an extenslve report on hls trip to Berlin. In hls introduct.ion, Dr. Tlso stated that he ma.de the trip to BerMn, because the conference of March 13th had declded that he do so. In Berlin, Dr. 1'1so told forelgn minister · Joachim von Rlbbentrop: " . . . by lnltlatlve we Slova.ks will never glve the lmpulse to liquidat-e tbe Czecho-.Slovak Republic. But !! we see that the course of events ls developlng in such a way that it m!ght be more beneflclal to us, we s-hall consider it our duty to choose a suitable tlme to separate (from the Czeohs). lf our people see that events are tending In a dlrectlon lndicatlng that the only w·ay out fs to make otrrselves independent, then every Slovak wlll tlghten bis belt, live more frugally, wflll know how to bear up even under lesseT advantages, and shall say to hlmself: under the glven clrcumstances, t here was natblng else we could do. Rlbbentrop fully recognlzed and understod our posltlon." Then Dr. Tlso told about hls vlsit wlth Adolph Hitler. The iatter told hlm directly that the Magya.rs were preparing to occupy t he whole of Slovak.ia at that Ume. "And you must declare yourself agaJ!ns.t lt," sa!d Hitler ... "and declare yourself wlth llghtn1ng speed. This declaratáon must be ma.de to proper factors so that they would know that t.he Slovak natlon has lts own State, its own territory and that, therefore, it must prevent any one from ma.king clalms to enter Slovak terrltory and to the Slovak populatlon. There 1s no Ume for waiting. Not days, but hours shall declde the lssue." 12 SLOVAKIA Dr. 'l'iso thought for a moment, repeated the decision of the conference of March 13th, and ad ded: "You will pardon me, if I cannot say anything else more concrete." In short, Dr. Tiso followed the directlves given by the representatives of the Slovak nation: to un<lertake no obligatiollll, to promise nothlng In Berlin. Dr. 'l'iso concluded his repoi,t to the Assembly with the words: "Here, before the Assembly, I place the dry material gatbered in Berlin durlng my visit tb ere, the report which you •b ave just bearo, and I beg you to ponder over it and then ren der a decision !" Dr. Joseph Tlso made no proposal either for separating from the Czechs or for proclaiming an independent Slovak State. After Tiso completed his report, Dr. Martin Sokol, pres1dent of the Slovak A:ssembly, recessed the session for a few mlnutes. Durlng the recess, tbe deputles considered and d1scussed what they had hearo. When the meeting was called to order again at 12: 06 P. M., Dr. Sokol said: "You have heard the manlfestatlon of t-he President of the Slovak Government, Karol Sidor, and tbe report of Mr. Deputy Dr. Joseph Tiso about !)!!s conversaitlon with •Reich Chancellor Adolph Hitler and Reich Minister of Forelgn Affaiirs von Ribbentrop. No~v we are suppose<l to decide by voting whether the Assembly of Slovakia is for an indepen-dent Slovak State or not. We shall declare our vote by arlsing. Those In favor of proolaiming the in<lependence of the Slovak State, please rise!" lt was 12:07 P. M., March 14, 1939, when all 57 members of bhe Slovak Assembly arose from their seats and, thus, unanimously voted for the establishment of t•h e independent State of Slovakia. Thereupon, Dr. Sokol announced: "I flnd that the Assembly of Slovakia, as the only competent organ of the polltlcal will of the sovereign Slovak nation, has decided in favor of an independent Slovak State." &tm standing, the depu,ties sang t-he Slovak hymn "Hej, Slováci" (Yeah, Ye Slovaks), wMch later became the National Anthem of the Slovak State. ľt was thus that the .independence of fäe Slovak State was proclaimed. After a thousand years the Slovaks again became masters of their !and and their destiny. The hidden yearning of the natlon for its own State had come to life. Even here the words of Svetozar Hurban Vajanský are applicable: "To ascribe characteristics to the masses of people which they do not possess would be folly, indeed. But to rouse and develop the chara.cteristlcs ,..,,hfoh the native mass does possess, even though they are hi<lden, thrut is our fatal obligrution." This "fatal obUgation" was performed by the Slovak Deputies who proclaimed the independence of the Slovak State of March 14, 1939. They -had awakened the desire that was hidden in the soul of the nation, brought it out lnto the open and made lt real. And from 1939 to 1945, that Mdden desire, translated lnto reality, grew and prospered in the heart of every self-conscious and loyal Slovak. No one on this earth shall ever be able to stifle or kill this holy yearning of the Slovak nation for a new and more lasting State of its own - an Independent Slovakia. • • •  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource What Led to the Proclamation of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5), December 1952 pp. 1-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4c7f3780847a7cdbce96718eb7a6328c.pdf 5f17683da3998d3f9912c3a122735e3e PDF Text Text �S LU \ľ AKl A is publisbcd periodica lly by the Slovak League of Arneľica, a eultural and civie federation of Amer1eans of Slovak de::;cent. 1'he chief puľpose of 8 LOV AKl A 1s to promote a better understanding and appreciation oľ thc Slovak nation an d its long shuggle ľoľ Íľeedorn and in dependence. As Arneľicans, memhcľs of the Blovak L eaguc oľ ..\merica firmly bch eve that thc Slon.1k nation, just as all nations, has an inhcrent and Gocl-given right to ľľeedom and independence. 'ľhey ,ne clccli<:atcd to the cause of the Amcrie;an wa)' of life, Slovak freedom and world peac-e a11cl are determ:ined to oppose the plague of C01m11unisrn and all othrľ totnlitaľia11 political systems. yeaľ Subsniption to SloYakia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewhere. 8end subscriptions to: S L OVAKIA Box 150 Micl<lletown, Pa. Printed in t he U. S. A. JEDNOTA P RESS Middletown, Pa. � �S LU \ľ AKl A is publisbcd periodica lly by the Slovak League of Arneľica, a eultural and civie federation of Amer1eans of Slovak de::;cent. 1'he chief puľpose of 8 LOV AKl A 1s to promote a better understanding and appreciation oľ thc Slovak nation an d its long shuggle ľoľ Íľeedorn and in dependence. As Arneľicans, memhcľs of the Blovak L eaguc oľ ..\merica firmly bch eve that thc Slon.1k nation, just as all nations, has an inhcrent and Gocl-given right to ľľeedom and independence. 'ľhey ,ne clccli<:atcd to the cause of the Amcrie;an wa)' of life, Slovak freedom and world peac-e a11cl are determ:ined to oppose the plague of C01m11unisrn and all othrľ totnlitaľia11 political systems. yeaľ Subsniption to SloYakia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. J\. - $2.00 elsewhere. 8end subscriptions to: S L OVAKIA Box 150 Micl<lletown, Pa. Printed in t he U. S. A. JEDNOTA P RESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 3 (5) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b49364ff5e662df0a866f35276b20458.pdf 34a0be96c1ad38d3f8547688b8ebaaf2 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modem language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; cxercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover , bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a br ief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Pet er P. Yurchak, s hould be read by all students inter est ed in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation ; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00 ; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK WSTORY by Joseph Škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 27, 1864-MSGR. ANDREW HLINKA-Aug. 16, 1938 Champion of Slovak Freedom � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAl( as easily as you can any other modem language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; cxercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover , bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind ; 702 pages with a br ief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Pet er P. Yurchak, s hould be read by all students inter est ed in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation ; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00 ; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK WSTORY by Joseph Škultéty, translation by O. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �Sept. 27, 1864-MSGR. ANDREW HLINKA-Aug. 16, 1938 Champion of Slovak Freedom � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Andrew Hlinka (August 16, 1938) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6db964469e40c6a82c1dc4ccd8616824.pdf 60da0c84711338aeaf96dbd2056f4382 PDF Text Text 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's �SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But �64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.) � 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's �SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But �64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 6Z SLOVAKIA INDEPENDENT SLOVAKJA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DFSTBOYED BLUNDERING POLICIES RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRIBLE PLIGHT OF SLOVAKS AND OTHER IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES.... TRUE REPRESENTATIVES OF SLOVAK NATION SHOULD BE HEARD AND RECOGNIZED. (Speech of the Hon. Charles J. Kersten, Delivered at the Conference of Americans of Slovak descent sponsored by the Slovak League of Amerlca, Mal 23, 1952, Hotel Washington, Washington, D. C.) The Slovak League of America, a civte and cultural organlzatlon rounded In 1907 by Americans of Slovak descent, has made some fine contributlons to the Amerlcan way of llfe. And so have the Slovak organlzatlons afflllated with it. I am perfectly satisfied that the people in the League and the organizations affiliated with it are God· fearlng people, loyal citizens of the United States of Amerlca, who are ready and wllling to make any sacrlflce for the welfare and securlty ot our Country. I appreciate the fact that Americans or Slovak de· scent are interested in the fate of the nation from wbich they are de· s.cended, because lt is only natural that they should be. The terrible plight of the Slovak nation today - just as that or other nations of Centra! and Eastern Europe who had b een "Uber· ated" in 1945 - - is In a Jarge measure due to the blunderlng, undemocratic policies adopted and prosecuted and the secret agreements conC'luded by men of so-called democratlc governments. Our Government. or more correctly the present Admlnistratlon In Washington, cannot escape its measure of responsibillty for the inhumanlties suffered by the natlons behlnd the Iron Curtaln And slnce the present Admlnlstration in Washington bas lnltlated a campaign of truth to offset the vlcious campaign of lies of the Soviet Union, let us be- honest wltb ourselves and the rest of lhe world and admlt that it was morally wrong and contrary to every democratlc and Chrlstian pr!nc!ple to surrender the Slovaks and the other peoples of Centra! and Eastern E urope to the men of the Kremlln. Representatlves of thf' Slovak League ot Ameriťa made many trips to Washington to vlslt p_eople in the present Adminlstration· and teli them the truth about the Slovak nation. about the righteous struggle or the Slovak people for freedom and lndependence. .EMdently lt avalled them nothlng. Desplte the claim or our State Department that the Unltec\ States bas never opposed the aspiratlons of any p eople In Europe to determlne by thelr own free choice t he state or form or political organlzatlon under whlcb tbey wlsbed to live. tbe fact ls that tbe presi>nt Adminlstratlon never recognlzec\ or respected the rlght of self-<leterm!natlon fn the case of tbe Slovak peoole. If lt dld, tbf' inc\ependent Republic of Slovakia. establlsbed by tbe Slovak people tbrongh thf'ir duly elerte<l representatlves on Mar<'h 14. 1939, woulrl not bave bf'en wantonly destroyec\ in 1945 with tbe belp of our Administratlon! The Slovak Republiť was recognized by 27 variou~ government~. inclnding t he governments or Oreat Rritain Rnc\ the Soviet Union. Why wRs lt not recognized by the Government or thf' tlnitec\ Stalf's SLOVAKIA 63 oť America? Il was not recognized, because F. D. Roosevelt and hLs Administratlon believed Dr. Edward Benes, the leader of the Czech 1\ational Soclalists and reslgned presldent o-f Czecho•Slovakía, who was violently opposed to Slovak treeJom and lndependence. And the present Administratlon stlll tavors the followers of Benes, many of wbom were members of Gottwalďs regime and, therefore, collabo• rated with the Reds in the Prague Government. Birds of a featber flock togetber! No matter what the circumstances uncler wblcb the Slovaks galned their independence, tbe Republic of Slovakia never s hould have been destroyed agalnst the will of the Slovak people. Tbe rigbt of political asylum has always been regarded as soma. lbing sacred by the people of the United States. Why was this rlght violated by our Administration in the case of Dr. Joseph Tiso, pre• s ldent of the Slovak Republic? Did our State Department do the human t hlng, did lt act in accordance wlth Christian and democratlc prln• ciples when lt ordered our Army to surrender Tiso to hls political e nemies - and certaln death? Tbe S lovak L eague of America, repres enting the overwhelmlng majority of organlzed Amerlcans of Slovak d escelllt, protested strongly against the order, but this again availed lt nothing. Then it requested tbe present occupant of the Whlte House to protes t against the banging of Tiso, but even this decent thlng he refused to do. Slnce the calamity of 1945, the present Adminlstratlon has eon• s istently ignored the just demands of Americans of Slovak descent to grant a hearing to Slovak patrjots, the true representatlves of the Hlovak natlon. But it did glve ear and ald to tbe Slovak renegades and others from Czecho-:Slovakla wbo a.lways were and stm are op· posed to Slovak freedom and independence. You can tind them in the VOICE OF AMERICA and other government agencles; and these Slovak renegades and enemles of Slovak freedom and independence, mind you. are being paid witb your money, wltb the money of Ameri• can taxpayers. It 1s hlgh tlme that people In government and the general public of the United States reallze at long last something that the Czechs and Slovaks tbemselves have known for centuries, that 1s, that the Czec hs never were. are not. and do not want to be Slovaks - and the Slovaks never were, are not, and do not want to be Czechs. Thls bas been clearly demons trated by the two natlons especlally durlng the past 34 years . that 1s slnce the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. Why, tben, s hould t he present Adminlstratlon. or any administratlon for that matter, inslst that the Slovak n a tlon and the terrltory it has inhabited for the past 1500 years must contlnue to be explolted by another nation? Such a pollcy certainly !s not \Jl acco1d w!tb our beliefs and !s absolutely oppos ed and contrary to all Chrlstian and democ- ratic princlples. In short lt ls immoral and crlmlnal. You, my fellow•clt!zens, and your organlzatlons have been sl!ghted and !nsulted for many years by people In Government who are sup• posed to represent you. Your people In Slovakia In all their h!story have never suffered more than they have slnce thelr "llberatlon" by Benes and the Red armles In 1945. or course, it never should have happened, just as it should not have happened to the Poles, the Pkralnlans, Llthuanlans, Estonlans. Latvlans. and many others. But 64 SLOVAKlA the tact is that it did. All because ot tbe blundering polic!es ot govern ments, inctudlng our own. The Slovaks have ever opposed Commun!sm: and tbey strongly reslst lt today. Slovakia should not have been wantonly destroyed. because it could have served us in good stead today on the slde or the democratic world. It i.s in tbe interest or Amerlca tba1 all natlon!< or the earth, !nclnding the Slovak nation, bave the rigbt to setrcletermination and, it tbey so deslre, to he (ree and independent lt ls io tbe interests or justice and peace that even the Slovak natlon be rree to cboose the form of government under whlcb it shall live, so t hat tbe Slovaks, too, might enjoy t he blesslngs o! a government or tbeir own people, by their own people, and for their own people. My dear people, durlng the past two decades tbe people In Ameriran Government - and I mean speci!!cally our admlnlstratlons have wandered rar trom the straight and narrow path of rlghteousness. the road marked out by our ConstitutiÔn and the Ten Corumandments. You can help rlght the s ituation in November. For tbe sake or America and tor the sake or the nation you are descended r•·om, see to it tbat you do! • • • WHO SAI D IT? \ ' " T he -days of Soviet Ruuia's exc:lusion from Europe's affairs are w e r and, let us hope, will never return. It has not been an ea.sy task to bring tbree great powers into collaboration and to the point o! presentlng a common war front against the common German enemy. ílut In London, Washington, and Moscow. there are leaders who are hOld in enterprise, broad in thelr range of perceptlon, supported ny powerful opinion, and eager to face every change that ma.y help ,,s to banlsh the specter of war from our contlne nt. .. . We are In a :·..rtain .sense, a link between Europe and the East. We can never be ,nly western or only eastern. Nothing now will prevent the Soviet llnlon !rom playlng its part as a great oower In Europe'c. _atfa.irs. Aut this c:ertainly does mean that the Soviet t..,.,lon intends .o áom in-• ~te Europe. lt was not for such a purpose that Marahal Stalln met i>resident Rooaevelt and Churc:hill in Tehe ral' ' - (Edward Bene§, London, 2-29-44 ). • "We believe that freedom and t h e indepe,.,Je.-c. • of the Czechoslovak Republic: ar e guaranteed by the alllance w,t• t'le great U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep ,blics and the rest of the Slovan ie natlona who, flnally, found themselves and established an a!lsoclatlon ot Slovanlc blood. This is our unalterable belier. enrooterl in ouŕ mlnd!I an d hearts; it is not t he re11ult of a temporary world cons tellatlon, but tbe result of the historic mission of the Slovanic natlons. Just as our loyalty to the Republic 1s not to be abandoned in good or bar! tima11. jusť so rto we comprehenrl also onr loyalty to our 11:reat ally. a.nd varlous idi>ologies cannot itland in the way ot that loyalty." - (Ing. ·K. Fllo, l)Pputy of Lettrlcb's Demn,..ratic Party, in the P rágue Paŕ­ ·liamen1. 'H'ťo rrling to ČAS of Deci>mber 16,. 19-47.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Independent Slovakia Should Not Have Been Destroyed Description An account of the resource Hon. Charles J. Kersten Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kersten, Charles J., 1902-1972 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/1a59f5ef3d2e8febb2330f47e4e94be7.pdf e8f42dd6667bf6fe8b19186d469d7024 PDF Text Text S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. �60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r �SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.) � S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. �60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r �SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document S LOVAKIA: 69 THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL EOROPE D R. J OSEPH KI RSCH BAUM By the menits o! some pollllcal iustitutlons of the United States, of which U1e best known !s the National Commlttee for a Free Europe, there began, over a year ago a large and costly campa!gn in the interest of democracy In centra! and eastern Europe, which up to that línie had beeu domlnated by Moscow and the communi&t regimes instailed by it. The action certainly is most welcome, because .it means not only the streng,thening of the political forces ,vai!ch are flghting in th.e individual coun,trles behind the Iron Curtaín, in the shadow ot the gallows and con centration camps, a herolc flght for the freedom and democratic future of the!r own natlons, but also it is supJiosed to brlng the concepts of the democratic way of life into tl)e souls of nations which thus far have always lived under regimes as sulted the great power that ruled over the eastern pa,·t of Europe - never, bowever, under a real democratic regime. "Dad admlnistratlon and ignorant al)d irresponsible ruling c lass," aľc-ordlng to Hngh Seton-Watson, "finally destroyed aJI hope of real Democracy in Eastern Europe between t he wars ..." (Eastern l:urope Between the Wars. pg. 154, 265-266). Let u.s allow. however, that the oplnion of Seton-Watson is a bil loo severe, even then the sad fact remalns that the natlons of cent ra! and eastern Europe were not given the opportunity to live under a rule of democratic regimes long enough so that at Jeast in one generatlon democratic principles could take root and give rise to democratic- traditions. Attempts to install democratic reglmes after the first World War ended in a very s bort time In dictatorships e!ther of ~roups or of indlviduals (Polanc\ in 1926, YugosJavla in 1929, and later, but before World War II. ·Rumanla. Bulgaria and Au.stria). In Czechoslovakia, which formally preserved a democratlc facade, but in fact was in a very large measure a democracy "only for tbe Cze<'hs," as Robert Ingrim state<l in bis book "After Hitler Stalin ?" - or as Dr. Milan Hodža admitted more delicately In bis book "Federallon In Centra! Europe": "it also had a substantial share of errors." De mocracy, therefore, has only a few traditions in ea.s,tern Europe, but the ground is, nevertbeless, favorable for it, inasmuch as the social structure and spirituaJ tradltlons of the centra! Europeil.n nations rest on principles that are favorable to democracy. Tbe success of the efforts of the West, and especially the success of t.he action wbich ls belng unfolded by the National Committee for' a Frée :E::urope which appar-ently aims to gain the centra) European na,tions for democracy and the fight for it, depends, nevertheless, on the fulfillment of rertain basic ps ycbological s upposltions, wbicb are: l. Every nation of centra) and east Europe must be addressed in its own tongue and In the spirit or lts tradlllons and its mentality; 2. The campaign for democrary must not be misused for tbe renovation of such politiral formatlons wbiťb the majority of its inhabitants do not <lesire. 60 SLOV.AKIA 3. The centra) ·European natlons should not be addressed by persons, who, rightly or not. are regarded in the eyes of the lnd1vidu1'1 centra) European natlons as responsible for their traglc sltuatlon beeause ot thelr colla.boration with communi.sm. 4. These natlons must see a ehanrt> or real demotracy and real freedom in their countries. The fulfillment or these condltlons for the success oi th~ ca.mpa.ign for democracy in centra! Europe is demandAd not only tn capture the good will of the centra! Europea.n natlons. hut ·,lt!C cor reasons whicb are deeply rooted 1n the views and con·:lctlons of tbe ind!Vidua.1 natlons of central and eastern Europe: In thelr polltlcal a.spira.t!ons and also In no small mea.s ure in thelr hlstorical remtnlscences and resentments. ?.fany of the central European nations throughout whole generations often fought bloody battles to preserve thelr national ldentitles and tbelr languages and. 1berefore, the questlon of "wbo speaks to them In wha.t la.nguage" la a.II the more sensltlve wlth them than po)jtical circles of the West, often only superfl-cially and tendenciously a.C(luainted with the problems or eastern Europe, can real1ze. Regardless of the fa.cl whether a.ny one agrees with this or not, lt remalns an lndlsputable fact that natlonallsm today ls evldently more than ever before the most powerful pol!tical force In eastern Europe and is more lnslstently striVing tor priority before historlcal conslderatlons which have been reduced to absurdity by new events. Furthermore, there ls also the fact t hat for every central European natlon the cllmax ot lts polltical a.splrations is poHtlcal lndependence and equality, also that these natlons are convln<1ed tbat ft is only on the basls of democracy that they can claim equality and lndependence. To gain tbe centra) European nations for the fight agafnst the enemy - who on tbe Jeast expressfon of reslstance answers with gallows, bnllell!, jails and deportations - politlcal reallsm therefore demands that the feellngs and thoughts of the centra! European natlons be respeeted and that they be convlnced about tbe fulflllment of thelr natlonal asolrations In a manner which they can un<reratand. To speak or the lndivldual natlons of centra! Europé In a language whlch necessarily remlnrls them of an unhappy past, to speak to them about democra.cy by means of people, who in a large measure caused the present tragic sltuation In the indlvidual centra! European countries and are at the same representatives of reglmes and state formatlon.c: wbtch evoke only resentments, cannot be regarded as an a.ct elther polltlcally wlse or leadlng to su~ess. Sucb a campaign could evoke In the centra! European natlons the Idea that lt lt< concerned only with the restoratlon of reglmes and formatlons which exlsted In centra! Europe be!ore the communlst aggresslon and whlcb, in a large measure, were neither democratlc nor deslrable. The cboiťe of representatlvea of the varlous nattons la unfortnnate. In the case of the Czech and Slovak representatlves especla.lly, lt has been most unfortunate. Tbey are not the cholce of the peoples <1oncerned, hence cannot truly represent them. Thelr past ls tafnted wlth Jack of political honor, lmperial1stic deslgns al)d collaboratlon w1tb commtmism. To present sneh people as "representatlves" ot the!r SLOVAKIA 11 rt>s~ i vé ná.tions means a s.ad lack ' of knowledge or just plain .deception. It certainly 1s not wise or tactful tl> place before the mlcrol)'hone indivlduals who, after t be " liberatiôn" or -1945, collaborated as fellowtravelers with the Soviet occupation forces in the countrles b.ehlnd t he .iron Curtain and helped to break the mora! resis tance of theľr peoples. To dľe ánd. expose oneselr to the danger of gallows and concentration camps certainly cannot be expected under such circumstanees trom .centra! European nations, even though we speak to them about di--mocracy for which they c rave. The great idea of democratic freedoms; respec t {or the human pers on and individual lights sounds lronica.l when it lssues from the mouths of people who together witb t he communis ts voted tbP. laws to establish concentration camps, suppressed f~eedoro of tbe press, retreated cowardly to communlst aggression for fear of losing their own careers or property, and also had a part in other c rimes of post-war reglmes in the states of eastern Europe. The campaign for democ racy in central ancl eastern Europe can be s uécess rut only if 1t s hall not use and feature people who com11romised with collaboration with communism. hut shall eogage representativés without chauvinistic and imperialistic tendencies who are figbting for s uch a democ ratlc order in centra! Europe, In whicb every ,,ation would enjoy equality and frE'ellOm and also wouid have safe,:uarded its own se ,·nrity from outs ide at tacks . • • • WHO SAID IT? " And wha t could the Czech s expect from the ir imperiaJists, from tbe followe rs of tbe late Beneš? Should t hey risk their lives for another Government cons tituted abroa d •- an exiled Government whlch. in 1945, in collaboratlon wlth the Bolsheviks, murdered thousands of Czec hs on tbe pretext that they we re Nazi collaborators? Should the s ame people. installed once more by a forelgn power, massacre more t housands of Czechs as Bolsbevik collaborators? Should the Czech■ rise up and die for Mr. Ripka, who, during the war, told them from London that Ruaaian Bolshevism ia a continuance of Christianity? ... Amerlcans se11ing de mocracy in this way are doing ve ry bad bus iness." - {The Czech "PRAVDA.'" - London. June 1951) . • "We Slovak s and Czecbs also want to add our bit of joy to this great holiday of the USSR. . . . In honor oť the USSR our flags wave on our homes and In bis hea rt every Joyal cltizen or the Czecho,:iovak Republi c loves to remember our closest e astern neighbor. our frielld and loyal ally to whom we a re bound with deepť.st gratltude.. . . And, flnally, we are aware of the fact that it was the soldier of the USS R who de facto liberated us on our territory. The chairman of the Constltutional National Assembly, Mr. David, in bis speech on the ocťasion of the great hollday of the USSR quoted the words or Joseph Holeček. tbe Czecb writer. that "a Czech will actually be free onty when the RuHian soldier walk■ through the street■ of Prague." {Cbarles Hu§ek. Editor of CAS, the otriclal organ or L e ttrlch's Democratlc Party, November 7, 1947.)  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Fight for Democracy in Central Europe Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 59-61 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fbdef89074b2bc4b98bdc86f97c61bc3.pdf cca5aaa530f7aff178cddb1cf114da18 PDF Text Text S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But �66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 �SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s �68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46). � S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But �66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 �SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s �68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document S LOVAKIA 66 TIIE SECBET FUNDS OF BENE.S' INTELLIGENCE SERVICE The Archives of t he Intelllgence Department of any Foreign Office have never been accessible to any free Citizen, who is the s ource of power in a free state. Not even a M.P., a representative or the people and a law-maker, can see them. Such a department is a secret room in whlch the power-conjurors preserve the secrets of their tricks. Twice in our lieftime this alchemisťs kitchen has been opened to the public. In 1917 the Russian Bolsheviks published the secret documents of the tzarist Foreign Office, and in 1943 lhe Nazis published all the documents relatlng to the secret funds of the Czechoslovakian Foreign Office which, for twenty years, had as its chief medicine-man, the late Edward Benes. In both cases the documenus were publlshed for propaganda reasons by those who had come to power, but the action traine!l a spotlight on the fundamentals of forelgn policy. H e who has once had the opportunlty to see into lhe secret rooms of foreign pollcy must for ever after be an enemy of ~o-called sovereign states and an advocate of a European Federatlon or Nations whlch alone could eliminate the cancer of corruption whose workings are carefuly concealed in the Intelligence Departments of Foreign Offices. Had tbere been 30 million Czecbs, Europe would long ago bave belonged to them, because they are an incredibly diligent people, and one of the most diligent among tbem was thelr Foreign Secretary. Benes had no political conception wbatever, but he was a flrst• class traveler in principles and, had bis means not been so limited, he could have purcbased at least the whole of the democratic world. But, fortunately for the world, tbere were only 8 mlllion Czechs, and Benes had neither t be means nor the Ume to bring hls buslness to a successful conclusion. But what he achieved is truly remarkable. After the Hapsbnrg monarchy had been dismembered and Vienna had become the capital of a small Austria with 7 million inhabitants, tbe Austrian natlonal press, whose previous market had been an Em· pire wi.th 52 million inhabltants, found itself in a difficult flnancial position. Czechoslovakian foreign policy was naturally much concerned with neighboring Austria, and Benes, therefore, througb mediators, bought the Austrian Press concern. VERNA, which published two Viennese dailies, "DER WIENER TAG" and "DIE STUNDE." The member of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Office responsible Cor this business was a certain OPLATKA who, in his report (o!ficial uumber 58.194/34) stated: "The morning paper 'Der Wlener T ag' is intended for people of the social democratic party and on various questions was often more radical than the official party presa. 'Die Stunde,' on the other hand, since we took it over, has followed not the social democratlc, but rather the bourgeois democratic line, attempting to realize a collaboration between Social Democrats and Christian Socialista." As we can see, Benes was a well-equipped salesman of prlnci11les, having l\farxist and Cbristian ideals stored in the same drawer or his desk. He coulťl serve any Austrian ac<'orcling to bis taste. But 66 SLQVAKIA whatever the Austrian believed, Mr. Benes was always behind tt. ln view of this, we can understand why, even today, some Austrlan social democrats are firmly convinced that Benes' followers are the only true representatlves ot Czechoslovakian democracy, whlle the editor of "Pravda" (London) is a !asclst. Obvlously, for the editor of "Pravda" was never In a posltion to sell the last cow ot a Slovaklan crofter for taxes he owed to the Czechoslovaklan state, or to invest, from the pockets of Czechoslovakian taxpayers, halt-a-million r•ounds sterling in the di11eminatlon of Marxist and Christian democrat ic ideas in Vlenna. Another country to which Benes turned bis enterprising, diligent Czech spirit was Yugoolavia. The G-Overnment In Yugoslavla had neither tlme nor money to spare for lts own press, slnce it was heavlly engaged In supporting the forelgn, and prlnclpally t he French, press. Therefore, Benes, comandlng much larger funds t han the lmpoverished Yugoslavian Forelgn Secretary, declded to flnance the progovernment press in Yugoslavla. He supported the Belgrade dally '·Politika" and many local papers. When Mr. So.skle, owner of the opposltion daily "Pravda" in Belgrade, had made certaln wbence the pro-government "Politika" received money, he wrote to Benes as follows: Belgrade, Ie 20-XII-1931. A Son Excellence, Monsieur Mlnlstre des Affaires Extrangeres, Eduard Benes, Prague. Excellence: A ľoccasion de ces grands tel.es de Noel je prends la liberté de de vous presenter tous mes mellleurs voeu.x de bonheur pour Vous et Votre chere Patrie. Aussi je Vous prie de voulolr blen me permettre Que je. vous rappelle a Votre gentllle promesse a propos de norte emprunt, pour leguel vous avalt donné Votre parole de Grand Am! que Vous voulez falre tous ce Qu'y est necessaire: qu'on relalse la "Pravda," QUl-en plein relaise et sans aucun exageration, a blen mérite de Votre pays fraternel. Cet emprunt, come j'avals ľhonneur a Vous en donnes des renselgnments precis, sera absolument assure par la hypotheque unlque sur toute la proprlété de la " Pravda" qul est évalue a D1nars 22,000,000 (vlngt deux mllllons dinars) . . ." Mr. Sosklc, In sendlng bis Chrlstmas greetlngs to Benes and hls dear motherland, humbly remarked t hat his paper always favored brotherly Czechoslovakia and that he needed 22 mllllon dlnars, on loan, of course, but on a "security" on which obvlously no one ln Belgrade was wllling to advance money. On the margin of thls le tter Benes noted: " I only sald that there might be a poMibi lity of aome a11i1tanee and already he wrltes t hat I promised him thle loan. Answer hi"' not to come to Prague." But Mr. Sosklc was terrlbly in love wlth Czechoslovakla and came In spite or Benes' refusal, and he flnally imcceeded In gettlng 50,000 SLOVAKIA 67 Kc trom Benes, an assistance which was continually repeated. In this way the pres:: .~ Yugoslavia was for or against its own Govern,11ent. but always for .Benes. The French press looms large in this business. It needs a strong s tomach to read the reports of the Czechos\ovakian Embassy in France. In thls matter one of the moulders of French public opinton waa Profeaaor Fuscien Dominola. He waa secretary of the "lnatitut d'Etudea Slavea" and received 4,000 fra. a month from the CzechosJovakian Foreign Office, a good aalary In France at that time. But it was never enough for M. Dominois, who bombarded his benefactor ln Prague with demands for more money on the most ridicu\ous pretexr.a. tie ran up debts and, when pressed by hls creditors, asked l'rague to pay them. One such affair was dealt with in a letter trom Professqr Eiserua.nn, a Parlsian friend of Benes, to Mr. Hubert Ripka. Mr. Ripka occupled rather a speclal positlon, for he was entrusted with dellcate affalrs of J3enes ideology. So, In a lett~r written in German, Professor E:isemann - Editor of "Le Monde Slave" - wrote to Ripka about one or Dominois' affairs, about the shamelessness of bis colleague wbo worked not only for Czechoslovakla, but also for Yugoslavia and, in spite of various sources of income, ran up new debts and pressed tbe Czechs to pay them once more. This Ume the sum wa.s 20,000 frs. and the Czechs paid up once agaln. Dominols waa, of courae, not only for the Czechoalovaks and Yugoslavs. but also very much for the Rusalan Bolshevlka. There was nothing surprlsing in that. for Russ ia also is a slavonic country and the Profe:isor, the secretary of the "lo.stltut d'Etudes Slaves," was obviously j„voted to all the alavea who pald hls debts. The British chapter is rather a distingui:1bE,d one. Benes tried to make manifest in Great Britaln the klndnes~ o~ the Slavonlc nature. His ambassador here was Jan Masaryk, that klnd, jolly Slav and g reat dE:mocrat. He tried ~o help everywhere be rould. For instance, he suggested establishing the "Allan Leeper Funt!' to educate the daughter of the deceased Allan Leeper. ln a letter of 12th Feb ruary, 1935 (offlcial No. 1646 kab/35) it stated: "Allan Leeper (a brother or Ŕéx Leep'!r, ass!i;tant secretary to the Press Department of the Fore!gn Off1ce) was the beat, confidential friend (ani! 1 thtnk, schoolmate In Oxford) of Seton Watson . Ourlng the war he belped our ac• tlon by, memoranda wblch, altogether with Professor Seton Watson, he eiá.bora,ted ·'t or ~ Lord Grey and later for BaUour and prepared the cond!tlÓns for a favorable solutlon of the Czechoslovakia queation. He also prepared, with Seton Watson, the material ror a new arrangement in Centra! Europe for the British delegation to the Peace T reaty Conference. Since 1920 he was always at our diapoaal In lnformlng the British Government about Central Europe in our aenie." The Allan Leeper Fund was established. Jan Masaryk never troubled wlth detalled accounts of the small payments he made. Only for larger sums d!d he account and give an explanation. After the Munlch agreement Maaaryk reslgned and hla prace ·was taken by Mr. Lis!cky. He was a dlligent Czech offlélal who thought it bis duty to make a detalled list of all payments nrade by the Czechoslovakian Embassy in London in 1938. Hut lt is ratber a ,,,a.s 68 S LOVA:KIA large list to be published in such a small paper as " P ravda" (Lontlon). Benes' kindness was not conflned to Europe. The Czechoslovaklan Consul General in Sydney, Dr. Svetak, in a letter of 29th December, 1926, informed b is superiors how much he had paid to jou r nallsts trom various Australlan papers for not publishing statements unfavorab le to Masaryk and Benes. Normally journalists are paid for s omething they publish, but Benes also paid for silence. In a report dated 31st December, 1931, the Czec hoslovakian Consul General at Montreal, Mr. Moser, gave an account of the money he had paid for artic les favorable to Czechoslovakla in several Canadlan papers . AII the while, Benes malntained the best connections wlth So· viet Russia and at t he same time generously sup ported Russlan emlgr és and thelr anti-Soviet press. He did not sp end such a vast a mount of the Czechos lovakia n taxpayers' money •·- between a h a lf and a million pounds sterlíng every year - but he managed the spendln g In so economical and practical a way that the who le world became convinced that the best democracy and the greatest contemporary statesman were to b e found in Czechoslovakia. All this would be obvlous and natural to ardent individuallsts who e,onslder democracy from the point of view of their pr!vate interest. Ilut, unfortunat(lly, we are Jiving in this world together with Russian Bolsheviks. They can always do business with democratic indivlduals in the West, but W estern democrats cannot do business with lndlviduals of the Bolshev!k communlty, because there 1s a p enalty of death in Soviet countries for th e crime of turning poli tical prln ciples into pri vate buslness. - (Czech "PRAVDA" •- London - J une 1951) . • • • LETTRICH AND THE USSR. "Without the gigantic sacrlflces of the friendly USSR, especially its Red Ar my, wh!ch sh ed !ts blood on t he territory of the Republlc for six months, we would not have our freedom. The Czechoslovak. llepublic - and included in it free Slovakia - witbout regard to any and a ll d ifferences, never sball forget t hose sacrlfices of tbe Red Army, of tbe Soviet Union and tbe rest of the allied nations, and just as certalnly tbey shall no t forget the sacrlflces of t be Slovak natlonal insurrection. . . . From tbis convlncing experience it follows for u s. for the governmen t, for a ll pol!tlcal parties, and so also fo r the Democr atlc P arty, that our most self-evldent duty is to conslstently and lnexorably make polltics of frlendly understandlng and close cooper ation wlth a ll the vlctorious allied natlons, above all else, however, wlth our great neighbor - the largest Slovanic great power the USSR, and scrupulously avoid everything which eould In any manner hinder our efforts to attain these hlgh ldeals „ If we want to permanently hold on to our hard-earned freedom , an d state lndependence and guard agalnst possible -- future plots, we must de pend on the USSR, wbich fully respects our lndependence and h as no o tber demand on us than that we have a truly democratlc government, \ľhose poliC'y will not be In conrllct wlth Soviet interests, tha.t· we have order, in a word, that Cze<-hoslovakla be a strong and -eon• ~olidated State." - (Dr. J o!leph Lettrlch. ÔAS, 5-16-46).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Secret Funds of Benes' Intelligence Service Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 55-58 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cd097d77bb364356e1484c3c8e2503bd.pdf 967b63980e85bd86edd8d53a5c90cddd PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still �52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence �SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 �54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · ' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still 52 SLOVAKIA unknown to the public, and a general anxiety as to tbe future o[ Europe was bound to arlse among those nations concerned. Mo•cow made the firat move which revealed that •he had been able to galn a free hand in Central Europe, when she concluded a Treaty with Dr. Benea, a■ "Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia." lt was evldent by thls that tbe Kremlin was taklng over the States within its sphere of innuence as tbelr "protector and guarantor." The Czecha (a small nation numbering over seven mllllon) had 1iro-Russlan sympathles on the whole and were conaidered a■ the out. post of RuHian imperialiam in Europe and as reactlonaries supportlng 'ľsarist absolutism. Durlng the First Great War, they (the Czechs) had divided their loyalty. Soldiers in the Austrlan Army deserted en masse to the Rus• ;,ians, whlle at home they conducted the same policy as durlng thls Second Oreat War by pro!esslng loyalty to the occupant. Kenneth de Courcey, wrltlng in the REVIEW OF WORLD AFFAIRS. Aprll 28, 1944, said: "There is, in fact, almost no reslstance movement at all in Ruthenia, Slovakia, Mora via and Bohemia. The Rutheniana are ... anti-Ru• sian. The maHea in Slovakia are anti-Czech and anti-Ruaaian. The attitude of the Czech population ia curioua. Quite a number are now actually serving in the German forcea, viz., in the 5th and 8th Jaeger Divisiona, the 18th Motorized Oivialon, and the 81st, 122nd, 226th and 290th lnfantry Dlviaion. Czech induatry ia moat effectively aupporting the German war effort and many workers seem very much to dislike the idea of riaking the conaequencea of reaiatance. The Czech· clergy is largely supporUng Presldent Hacha, partly because of lts antl-Russian vlews and partly because it fears anti-clerlcalism from the radlcals abroad. AII theae facta are everywhere well-known on the Continent, and it cauaea a■toniahment to many frienda of the Alliea that they should be so little known In Britain and America. War-Time Ra• tioning and Conaumption, published by the Secretarlat ot the League of Natlons, Geneva, 1942, <itates that the inhabltants of Bol:jemia had t)le same ration as Germany (pp. 22-23)." · As the favored child of the Versallles Treaty, they (lhe; Czechs) were presented with Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, aÍthough these countrles had neither previously belonged to, nor were united with Bohemia. Despite the extension towards the East, there was stlll no possiblllty of the Czechs achlevlng a common frontier with Russla. In thls Second Great War, Dr. Benes, the Czech's representative in the Allied camp, began bis politlcal campaign by acting in accord• 11nce with the Britlsh program for the recoostruction ot Europe. but when Moacow became one of the Alliea, he ehanged the cour1e of his policy to flow along Soviet linea. The Czech's federatioo with ]'oland, which had been patronlzed by Brltain, wa.s thrown lnto the waste paper bask~t. Dr. nenes a.nnounced bis lntentlon of shortly t oncluding a post-war pact wlth the Soviet Union, which meant tbat he was leaving the camp of the Western world and hitcblng his wagon to the Russlan star. It was a policy whlch compllcated the future sltuatlon !or Centra) Europe. and Britaln of 1942- 1943 showed herself to be !ar from satlsfled with the premature polltlcal solutlon to thl~ point on the part or Russla. London wa.s lert wlth two alternatlves; elther to allow Dr. nenes to go to Moscow and set up resldence SLOVAKIA there, and so lose t hls pawn on its chessboard, or to hold a resentful <;:zech "Provisional Government" In London untll the war should further clarlfy the sltuation. lt was indeed soon to become clear, but In ravor Qf Russia. After the conference in Moacow, there aeemed no longer. any point in holdlng Dr. Benea in Eng land when he waa ao anxioua to offer hi• country aa a vaaaal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced t he Treaty wlth Dr. Benes, In whlch the "close and frlendly collaboratlon after the re-establishmen t of peace ..." was mentloned. This Treaty had put Czecho-Slovakla at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the Russlans dld not even argue over the fate of the 700,000 Carpathlan Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who had claimed the Polish Rut henians on racia! grounds as the kin of the Ukranians in the U.S.S .R., was apparently indlfferen t to thls group of Ruthenlan people, although the threat of tbe annexatlon of Carpatblan Ruthenla was later to prove useful wben the Czecbs showed a reluctance to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The "union" of Carpathlan Ruthenla wltb the Soviets 1!eemed hardly necessary at this point, when Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordlnated all Czecho·Slovakia to Russia. The policy of Dr. Benes' Government was a repetltion on a larger scale of its pollcy during t he Flrst Great War, the most extreme polnts belng more strongly underllned beneath the lnfluence of a s trenger Russla. Dr. Benes lnterpreted this policy in connectlon wlth Poland in bis book "Smyal Ceskoalovenske Revoluce" (The Sense or ihe Czecho-Slovak 'Revolution) Prague 1924: "In a war against tbe Centra! P owers (Germany and Austria) we need the Poles, and the reason for thls war has compelled us to recog• nlze Polanďs rights. Endeavoring to have our rlght:, ackno wledged. we must acknowledge tbe rlghts of the Poles le!!t we ourselves morally !ose our own. But, to gíve proof of our loyalty to our frienda (viz., the Ru1alan1) we had to oppoae their eaaential, antl-Ruaalan policy. 'ľhere were moments when Russia because of Poland, adopted a dangerous attitude towards the Allles. Briand had had to tear the first concession for Poland and Russia. In a short. Ume, because of Poland é\lld interna! polltlcal reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with Germany, I state impartlally, that the Allles were lncllned to solve certain questlons in a manner which was bound not to satlsfy t he Poles." The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away. Afterwards In hls message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on February 3, 1944, Dr. Benes sald that the time had not yet come to " examlne concretely tbe matters" which were negotlated at l\foscow, matters about whlch a "mutual understandlng" had been reacbed. Amongf!J: these "matters" was an agreement ampllfylng Artlcle 4 or the Treaty, which had stipulated that the two Powers "shall develop their economic relations on the largest posslble scale." The CzeehoSlovak lnduatrles, mine, and sourcea of hydraulie energy were to be nationallzed; the Czech war induatrles were to work for tt,e Ruaaian and Czecho-Slovak armiea ; war production waa , to be atandardized ao that it would conform wlth the Ruaalan war production; a new Czeeho-Slovak Army waa to be rai1ed and, "In the future interesta of Czecho-Slovakia," organized, trajned and equipped after the Red Army 0 54 SLOVAK.IA standards. "In the interests of democracy and ror the extirpatlon of German lnfluences," educatlonal (political) oftlcers were to be lntroduced lnto all units. The Czecho-Stovak currency was to be atabilized in conformity with Russia. Their railway, motor-roada and air lines were to be constructed to meet the economic ne eda of both cou ntriea. Thia Czecho-Slovakia of Dr. Benes, was to be nothing lesa, therefore, than the outpost of Ruaaia in the center of Europe, atretching practically as far as Bavaria. In the above Treaty, Moscow was also clearly expresslng its intentions towards Poland. The Protocol to thls pact contained the clause: The U.S.S.R. and the Czecho-Slovak Republic agree that, in the event of any third State which has common frontiera wlth the U. S. S. R., or with the Czecho-Slovak Republic ... de■i rlng to become a pa rty to this agreement ... it could be a tri partite agreement." Moscow had no desire to make a direct proposal to the Pollsh Government, but the Soviet Press, together wlth the ins-plred World Press, were to publlsh many hints In thls dlrectlon. On December 17, 1943, "Dziennik Polakl" in London gave a semlofflclal comment on the Pollsh Governmenťs attltude towards tbe Soviet-Benes Treaty, statlng that: "Poland had not, so far, been invited to partlc!pate. She attached rundamental importance to havlng frlendly relatlons wlth Russla and regarded them a.s a vltal element towards a broader solutlon and a system of general securlty. The prlnclples or mutual recognltlon of State soverelgnty and of non-lntervention In the State's atralrs ľormed a basis for good neighborly relatlons. Prlnclples no less important for Poland should, bowever, be added to them. There were 1. liberty, independence, and Integrity of the State; 2. general securlty; 3. loyalty to the alllances already concluded; 4. good-ne!ghborly relations with Russla; 5. cooperatlon between the smaller Európean State!I, to protect them trom German hegemony." ' Poiish reluctance to become part of so vaguely worded a Pact wbich, in subsequent agreements, was to mean the absorptlÓn of the weaker partner, met a wave or dissatlsfactlon trom Moscow'. · Dr. Beneľ Provisional Government was t o be remolded according to the designs of the Kremlin, and Communist Ministera were to be in tro. duced into the most prominent positíons. In Bobemia, tbe concluded Treaty encountered protests, not only from tbe constltutional Government of Hacha. whlch stíll exlsted, but from those people who did not want to change thelr present system of life lnto the Soviet order Slovakia quite simply recorded that Dr. Benes did not represent their nation and had no right to conclude any agreement on her behalf. Such was the Statement of the Slovakian Government and analogous wlth lt was the oplnion of the Slovak National Council in London, as expressed in their open letter to Hls Majesty"s Secretarjof State for Foreign Affalrs. Anthony Eden (January, 1944). They stated: "lt ia against justice and against the spirit and letter of the Atlantic Charter to bind the Slovak people by iŕlternational treatiea concluded in their names and on thelr behalf by unauthorized negotiators whose chief aim is to get domination over Slovakla again. In view ôf alt these facts the Slovak people cannot feel themselves to be bound by the Treaty signed in Mosc!ow on December 12, 1943." · '  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Beneš Sold Out to the Kremlin Description An account of the resource R. Umiastowski Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 51-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Umiastowski, R. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/445e73f92086848920fa0e59b230ac7f.pdf 95ca621af0286949d3bcf9d53f14cadb PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," �óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon �SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still � SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," �óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon �SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 49 NO AGRE EMENT WJTH 'rHE CZECHS D R. JO SEPH KIR SCHBAU M 'ťhe group of Czech emlgres, which still has on its program the -ene wal of the Versailles organlzation of Centra! Europe and thereby .ilso holdiag its overrule over Slovakia, recently declared to the lnternatlonal public that the Czechs have come to an agreement wlth the -Slovaks on a joint polltlcal program. AU such statements are in conflict wlth the truth. To make it ring true, the statement was made to tbe American press by a Czech politlcian of Slovak orlgin, Dr. Juraj Slá.vlk, and In other lands tbe same announcement was made by persona who date their political careers from 1945 - when they were unexpectedly pusbed to the top by a wave of collaboration wlth the Communists and then in 1948 under suspicious circumstances came to tbe western world. In the ínterest of truth and decency, it ls necessary that this willful and consclous deceptlon of the interuational public be exposed, because in polillcs the princi ple "do not resist evil" does not hold and sllence does not remove responsibility. W HO CA M E T O AN A GREE M E N T ? From in[orme.:1 places reports have become public that an agreemen t ot a fraction of Czech emigres, beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl. was reached with a still sma11er and politlca11y more insignificant group ot Slovak emigres, headed by Dr. Joseph Letlrich and Dr. John Pa-pá.nek. This was painted up as an "agreement ot the Ctechs a•1:1 Slovaks." Actually such an agreement does not exist. The statement that such au egreement was concluded had w other purpose, according to informed persons, than lo get furt.ber financial aid from The Natlonal Committee for a Free Europe and tbtc prorongatlon of visitors' vlza from American authorlties. Tbis was polnted out very clearly by a former deputy of the Slovak Democratic Party, Dr. Michael Zibrin, who is very well acquainted with the persons and the condltions in the camp of the so-called "CZECHO· SLOVAK" emlgratlon because of his long collaboratlon wlth thestpeople In the Prague parliament and also in exile. But even if tbese tractions of Czech and Slovak emigres did conclude an agreement ancl succeecled in getting Dr. Stephen Osu,iky to head the Centra) Committee, to designate this as an "agreement ol the Czechs and Slovaks" with a claim to speak ln the name of the Czech and Slovak nations, is at best an attempt to deceive the international public. After an, the right to conclude polltical agreements, whlch would be. binding on Czechs and Slovaks a.l!ke, is not had by Dr. Zenkľs g:roup and is not Pven had by the several S lovak emigres. who are wandering about the western world defending the idea of ::i Czeehoslovak state, because they do not represent the free will or the Slovak nation, but only themselves, or as Colonel Miksche so aptly put it la.st November in the World Review: "The few Slovak „:nigrants wanderlng about tbe West and advocatlng the Idea of a ;r;echoslovak State do not represent the free wlll of the Slovak people; · hey do not represent anythlng but thernselves," óO SLOVAKIA. Tbere are several thousands of each group of emlgres - Slovak and Ozecb - whicb are represented by varlous politlcal partles and polltical tendencies of the Czech and Slovak natlons. Without error and deceptlon lt 1s imposslble to prove by any mathema.tlcal rules that the Zenkl and the Lettrlch groups really represent the ma,Jority of polltlcal representa.tlves in the Czech and the ,Slovak emlgratlon, and so much the less such a politlca.l representa.tion whlch would reflect at least to a marked degree the polltica.l efforts and interests of the Slovaks. At the same tlme the adherents of these groups are without exceptlon morally and politlcally disquallfled not only In the eyes of the Slova.ks, but even in the eyes of the Czechs. They are "the men who brought Communism to Czechoalovakia, who are responaible for the plight of the Czec h and S lovak natlons" and, there. fore, "people are very annoyed whe n they hear of emigré pollciea and the Czech Rada ( Counci l) in America" (Intelllgence Digest, May, 1952). TH E PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF CZECHO-SLOVAKIA At the quest1on of any kind of agreement of Czech and Slovak emigrant groups regarding the contlnued exlstence of Czecho,Siova.kia after the liberation of Centra! Europe we must, however, Jook !rom another angle. Does the exlstence of the State, which was "an art!• !lcial product of a peace conference - a child of propaganda - and 50 per cent of whose inhabitants was In oppositlon against its existence" (World Review), have any polltlcal motivatlon? Over 80 per cent of the Slovak emigratlon, and certainly no less of the inhabitants of Slovakia, wlll answer in the negatlve under any and all condltlons. "The Slovak people are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatlcally antt-<:zech," states Colonel Miksche. And even on the Czech side today, lt 1s not only the group around General Lev P rchala, but even Prof. Bohdan Chudoba, C-01. Miksche and - lf we can belleve the NEW YORKSKÝ DENNÍK, which ls the most fana.tlcal supporter of the renewal of Czecho-Slovakla - even many members of the Councll of F\ree Czechoslovakla place a question mark after the problem ot the future of the Czecho-.Slovak Republic. Not so long ago nelther Dr. Stephen Osuský, nor Dr. Stránsky did not deny In their wrltten ma.ni· festatlons that Centra! Europe needs a dlfferent organlzation than that given it by the Versailles statute. Wlth the Versallles statute, however, loglcally must fall also the Czecho-Slovak State, whlch was the creation and piliar of the Versallles organlzatlon In the Danuhe Basin. THE SLOVAK CONCEPTION OF DANUBE COOPERATION No matter hpw much Czecb or other groups mlght deslre it, there can be no talk a.bout any klnd of an agreement between the Czechs and the Slova.ks In regard to the future of both natlons In the Czecho-Slovak State. For the overwhelml_ng majority ot the Slovak natlon, the Czechoslovak State was a definlte evolutionary station, after whlch the present Slovak generatlon has deflnltely pla.ced a perlod. It ls flnlshed buslness. And that not only because Czech polltlcs was unjust and shortslgbted towa.rd the Slova.ks In ma.ny respects, but above all else because the Slovaks know that the Czecbs ťannot guarantee thelr future. The contemporary Slovak generatlon SLOVAKIA 61 belleves that economic prosperity and national security can better be sa;fei uarded only in t he broader framework of a Centro-E uropean confederatlon composed of eth nic member States and by Slovak lndepende nce. This conceptlon has already been presented in detail on dlfferent occasions -b y Slovak polltlcal represenetatlves; 1t was prompted not on ly by Slovak lnterests, but also by the hlstorical development or t he Danub e Basin, lts natural geopolltical Jaws an d European lnterests. lf the Czech emigratlon accepts t his basis, certalnly t here shall be no opposition trom the Slovaks to conclude a federal agreement even wlth the Czech natlon, e ven though tbe Slovaks bave thus far a sad experience with three political agreements, concluded with Czech politlclans in -the past 35 years. "Pacta sunt servanda" !s somethlng unkn5>wn In Czech polltics as far as the Slovaks are concerned. Any other solution of t he Slovak question than that noted here would have to be forc ed on the Slovak nation. How Jong would 1t last, however, in the nelghborhood of Germany and Russla, an d in face of th'e oppositlon of not only th e Slovaks, but also tbe rest of the nat ions of t he Danube Basin of which not a single one deslres a renewal of the Versal))es order? In accord with the truth, therefore, it can be said in regard to the n ew attempt of the Czec h amigration to decelve t he lnternatlona l public with pronouncements about an agreemen t between the Czechs and the Slovaks, that "to t a lk about the reatoration of Czec hoelovakia ·n·owadays ia p lai n nonsense" {World Review) . • • • DR. BENES SOLD OUT TO TIIE KREMLJN R. UMIASTOWSKI (The following is an extract from the book " POLANiD, RUSSIA \ ND OREAT BRITAIN 1941- 1945" - a study of evidence - by R Umiastowski, which was published in November 1946 by Hollls and Carter, London. The author shows that Benes coJlaborated wlth tbe Stalinmen even against P oland.) • * • * T he results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences and the s ubs'equent resolutions concerning the territorial changes about to be e ffected, were not pub llshed and only filtered slowly through the Press. It was a few months before it became generaJly known for 1nstance, that after the war Europe - not only Germany, but a\1 Europe (except, perhaps, the few neutrals on ber outskirts) - was to come under the occupation of the three Great Powers The Russians were to stay in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and In Germany as far as the rlver Oder, or perhaps the Elbe; the Americans would occupy navaria, Wurtemburg and Saxony and the British the remalnder of Germany. It could not be clearer -· Poland after the war was to be in the hands of the Kremlin. The secret agreements at Moscow a1td Teheran were explained by the subsequent policy of the Powers, or rather by tbe policy of t he .SO;v,iets, As prevlously mentioned, the details o! the dec•is ions were still  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource No Agreement with the Czechs Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 49-51 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/55a952cd0f0ec80384ad5eaa57ef3d6c.pdf 38b04017f5c4f1151050f6988208938b PDF Text Text 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik �SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. �SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- �SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples �48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45). � 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik �SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. �SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- �SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples �48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 44 SLOVA.K:IA "FREE" AND "CZECHOSLOVAKIAN" DON'T RHYME ! Not all Czechs insist on the existencť' or Czec·boslovakla, the arti· !icial state establisbed by Czech imperialist,; to exploit the non-Czech nations of that territory wbich were in the majority. 'ľhe Czech National Committee in London, bť'aded by General Leľ Prchala, has been outspoken in this respect for many years. The (ollowing ·'Open Letter" by a member of tbat committee <'ame to us tbc latter part or February. We publish it in full Cor its exposé o[ the COUNCIL :>1<, FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA whicb poses as a representative group •Jf "democratic" exiles from Czechoslovakla. AN OPEN LETTER From V. L. Borin, Editor of Pravda, and Member of the Czech National Committee, London England, to the Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Un-American Activities, Washington, D. C. SIR: To support the struggle of alt nations for freerlom became a historical misslon of the U. S. sinťe President Lincoln won his struggle against slavery. Freerlom of nations is tbe principal question in the struggle of Centra! and Southeastern Europeon natlons a!('alnst Bolshevik oppre!;· i,lon. To support their struggle means to repudiate imperialisiil ot any kind and to 1ecognize unconditionally the right to self-dterminatiou of a~l nations on the territory in their ethnographi<'al boundarles and to assist them in their endeavor to form a federation o[ free nations. Some prominent citizens of the U. S. and some officials of the U. S. State Department sup1>ort tbe so-called ·•czechoslc,vaks" and tbeir organizations, givlng them a monopoli!ltic position in the Grew Com· mlttee anrl in American broadcasting Cor Czechoslovakia. The top :lľ· ganization of thE> so-called "C1.ecboslovaks" was, until Jánuary 25, 1951, the Council of Free Cze<'hoslovakia. To say "FREE CZECHOSLOVAKIA'' means to manifest a pro. found hypocrisy, or ignorance. "Free Czechoslovakia" means not freedom for nations in Czechoslovakia, but freedom for Czech imperialists to oppress Sudeten Germans and Hungarians who, in 1919, were forced against their will to live in Czechoslovakia; and to deny the r ight of self-determlnation to Slovaks who joined Czechoslovakia because full autonomy was promised them a promise which was never kept. Tbere are undoubtedly many refugees ft'om Czechoslovakia who maintain that their country was a paradisf' and they are perfectly rigbt [rom tbeir persona] point of view, for tbese were Czechoslova• kian professlonal soldiers, state officials, and rullng pollticlans wbo lost their paradlse. But the nations of Czechoslovakia, including the Czecha, do not wish to have anything in common with the paradise of the Czech imperialista and their state, which brought them from Nazi to Bolshevik SLOVAKIA 46 occupation, from one great to another, greater, disaster. The nations of Czechoslovakia wish to live freely, on equal terms and in a large federation which would be able to protect their fredeom. The leading political party of the Czech imperialists is the Czech National Socialist Party of the late Dr. Benes, which dif[ers from the German National Socialist Party of the late Adolf Hitler in its attitude to Russia. While the German National Socialista were violently anti-Russian, the Czech National Socialists were pro-Russian and consequently pro-Bolshevik, considering Russian Bolshevism (which for propaganda reasons i called Communim) as a new form of pan-Slavism. In thls belief the Czech National Socialists became agents of Russian Bolshevism and during the war their so-called "Czechoslovakian" exiled Government was a Trojan Horse - a Bolshevik Fiftn Column in Great Britain and in the U. S. One of the leaders of the Czech Nationa l Socialists, Mr. Hubert Ripka, broadcast through the B. B. C. on Novembe„ 7, 1942, as fol· lows: "The November revolution turned Russia into a modem state; technically, militarily and politically a powerful s overeign s tate. That revolution did nol only increase the strength of the Russlan Soviet State but it also raised to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living of the wide masses of the Soviet people." T))is !s not an accidental quotation. I can su pply you with a htmdred si milar. In this spirit Czech imperialists spoke and ac ted during the war, making pro-Bol■hevik propaganda among Ame ricans of Czech origin and among Czech people in their motherland. As a result of their activities 40 per cent of Czechs voted pro-Bolshevik in 1946. In February 1948 thP- Czech National Socialist Party split. Th~ Party itsel( still exists in Czechoslovakia. rollaborates with the Bol· sheviks and has its ministers in the present Czechoslovakian Govern ment. Some leaders of t his party emigrated abroad and their attitude changed apparently into an anti-Bolshevik one. Under the chairmans hip of the Czech National Socialist Peter Zenkl, they established In Washington t he so-called ·•councll ot Free Czechoslovaki a." They represent nobody and nothing but their past mismanagement of Czechoslovakia and their desire for the restoration of the ir lost paradise. They well know their real position and. therefore, try to keep tbeir power by political frauds and terror. They denoonce al\ Czech as well as Slovak democrats and Sudeten Germans as fascists. Confidential and false denunciations against their democratic opponents have been their principal political weapon slnce 1939. To give a concrete example of their a ctivities I would like to call your attention to a camp for refugees from Czecho~lovakia in Murnau. Germany, U. S. Zone. In this camp there were democratic Czechs. adherents of the Czech National Committee in London and democratic Slovaks, adherents of the Slovakian National Council Abroad. During one year the adberents of the so-called Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington made 241 denunciatlons against thelr democratlc Czech and Slovakian opponents In camp Murnau. The U . S. authorities investigated a ll these denun clatlons and they a ll pro,·ed to be fals"l. SLOVAXIA Such is the situatlon in . ev~ry camp [or refugees trom Czechoslovakia in Germany. · r can glve you an example of thei·r activltles in the U. S. Lasi year there arrlved In the U. S. the Slovaklan leader Mr. Karol Sldor, who during the war was in clisgrace with tbe German Nazls and was shelterecl In the Vatlcan. An Amerlcan columnist, Mr. Walter Wlnchell, started a public campaign agalnst Sldor denouncing bim falsely as a Nazl. When Mr. WlnchelJ was compelled to say what he knew about Sldor, he <'Onfessed that he knew nothing whatsoever, and that he hati , eceived all his information frÔm Congressman Kleln. But Mr. Kleln also ronfessed to know notbing about Sidor ani! he received all hls informatlon from Mr. Andrew · Valushek. Who is thls gentleman? He ia the manager of the "New-Yorkské Listy", a· Czech newspaper published in New York, which durlng the war was edited by two internaitonal Bolsheviks, Bension Batt and Desider Benau, disguised as " Czechoslovakian democratic refugees."' Mr. Valushek is also the se<'retary of th e American Fund for Czechoslovak RP.fugees, lne.. 1775 Broadway, Room 607, ,'<ew York 19. Among the sponsors or this organlzatlon are Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erbert Lehman, Governor Frank J . Lausche, Dorothy Thompson, and others. And Mr. Valushek is also in tbe Executlve Committee o! tbe Anti-Názi League wbose pro-Bolshveik cbaracter is certalnly well known to you. On August 25. 1950, tbe so-calJed "Councll of Free Czechoslovakit1" decided to make evldence or all refugees from Czechoslovakia in Germany'. Tbelr branob organizatlon In Germany i!ssued a circular N<l. 1010-201-Br. on August 31. 1950. in which they stated as follows: "The Council of Free Czechoslovakia ia the only recognized rep. resentative of political refugees from Czechoslovakia. ·. .• We need evidence of all refugees trom Czechoslovakla for their eventual transfer. The Government• requested to take our refugees ask that guarantee for every refugee concerning his politlcal reliability be given. "Please ke„p those who refuse to sign our evldence questionnaire under ca1·eful surveillance, and send us their names.•. .'' People do not want to sign tbe questlonnaires of the so-called Cruncll of Free Czechoslovakla, because they clo not wish to have anything in common wlth it. and they are afraid, conslderlng how ľlosely tbese gentlemen colJaborat!'d wlth the Russian Bolshevlks. 'ľbose who refuse to sign are talsely denounced to tbe U. S. and IRO Junctionaries and persecuted. On tbe ground of their false denunclatlon a Czecb Professor of Law from Prague University was recently d~prived of bis O.P.'s card. They are forcing refugees froro Czechoslova•kla to sign in order to have "evidence" tbat a majority ot retugees from Czecboslovakia are their adherents. I can glve you an example of how they deal with people wbo refuse to be their adherents. At Dijon. France, on September 7, 1950. Karol Vasak. a Czech lay student from Dijon University, was arrestecl by tbe Frencb Police as an alleged aRent of the Soviet Russlan NKVD. His arrest <'ausecl a sensation in Dijon because Vasak was known as an ardent Catbolle, very active in Catboliť organizatlons. Thernfore bis <'lise was publicized in tbe French press. Aťcording to titf> ' '. Aurore" of September 12. 1950, the <'Onstable wbo arreeted Vasak tol<I that n.ewspaper's ťorrespon~ent_: "Va.sak I!>. elther th!' viťtllll ot a tri\- SLOVAKIA 41 glc mlstake, or he ls such a dlsslmulator as I have never met In roy long police servlce." Thanks to some doubts whlch the police had, Vasak was not transported to Czechoslovak ia, bu t was gtven the c hoice: Czechostovak la or Alglers. or course he chose Alglers, whlther he was deported. Tha nks to the lnterest of French Cathollc circles h ls case was thoroughly lnvestlgated and the "Le Monde" or September 16, 1950, published an article under the headlng: "Arrest ól .Karel Vasak was a result of rlvalry between Czech studenLs." In the meant ime, the French police discovered that Vasak was an ardent antlCommunlst, and that the accusatlon, made agalnst him by two other Cze chs, was talse. But falae alao waa the atatement in " Le Monde"; becauae Vaaak waa denoun ced by two ad herenta of the Councll of Free Czechoalovak la In Waahlngton. Were the Sureté Natlonale to go througb thelr flles, they would {Ind that a tready In 1939 the offlclals of the Czechoslovak la Natlonal Commlttee of Mr. Benes had denounced a ll Czech and Slovaklan antlCommunlsts In France to the French Police as "dangerous Communlst agents." Thls was at the tíme when thls Czechoslovak lan Commltttle was a cover-up organlzatlon for Bolshevlk agents a'n d Mr. RipJ<a, I n hia office at 52 Avenua Bourdonala, Paria, waa hiding an internatlonal Bolahevlk agent, Simon Katz, who was wanted by the F rel)ch police. After the cottapse of France, the same Czech s and Stovaks, who In France were falsely denounced as dangerous communiata, were later confldentlally denounced in Brltaln by tbe same Benes adherents a11 Nazi agents and were imprlsoned, without investlgatlon , by the British. The Vasak affalr in France ls _oi;ily a contlnuatlon o! the late Renes' pollcy: it la a policy of Czech · Ímperlalista who. allied themaelvea with the Ru11ian Bolsheviks, adopted their methoda of 'd~é:elving the enemy, and perfected them with typlcal Czech thoroughne11. On J anuary 25, 1951, there was In Washington a meeflng or th~ so-called Councll or Free Czecboslovak ia, at wblch 17 members out of ľo passed a vote of censure agalnst P eter Zenkt, th e Natlonal Soclali).IL chairman of the Council. Mr. Zenk.l, therefore, declare~ that "the Council of F ree Czechoalovak la had disaolved itaelf and ceased to exist" because " the party syatem proved unworkable and the de le gates of the political parties had been unrepresenta tive anyway." Thls is the way In wbich _Czech Natlonal . Soclallsts understand democracy. 'ľheir conťeption of democracy does 11ot dlffer ffOTU that of German National Socialists. Mr. Zenkl then formed a new organization, th~ Czechoslovak lan Natlonal Commlttee. In thls new Czechoslovak lan Committee, ~r. Zenkl is obvlously the chairman ä~'<f among hls pro• mlnent "Cezchoslova ks" are Messrs. Papanek, Fi'ŕl-Fuerth, General lngr, Felerbend and the brother or the late PťesicÍEľnt Benes. No matter what they call themselves they cannot but conttnue the pollcy, of the late I;lenes _in deceiving the Western public a~d terrorízing polltical refu geea from Czec hoa lovakia. They can do th ls oply because they are sponsored by some prominent Axnerlcans and by offlclals of the U. S. State Department who I am sure mean. well, but are not lnformed. And many <Usasters have happened becau\je or the policy of l!Ome Amerlcans wtio were -not lnformed about :Eu~o,P,e ap<! Russlan Bo)shevlsm. , . ' . ,1 • I would like to call your attention to \he .faci that the actlvlties or these ·•czecboslova ks" are In contradlctlon ' to the U. S. prlnclples 48 SLOVAKIA of democracy and the U. S. historical mlssion in the world. In spite of thls, they are supported by American flnanťes, they have monopoly in broadcasting from tbe IJ. S., and the effect on people in Czecboslovakia is an absolute failure. They have the as ~istance .of the U. $. authorities in Germany and also of the I RO authoritles. their organizations have the monopoly of informing the authorities of Western Governments about refugees from Czechos\ovakia and, wltb thelr a.ssistance, arranged the emigration to tbe U. S. (as well as to Australia, New Zealand and other coun tries) of people who have never been Czecboslovaklan citizens and refugees. Therefore, I tbink tbat tbeir activitles deserve the attention of the United States Sena.te Committee on Un-Amerlcan Activities. Yours faithfully, V. L. BORIN. • • • WH O SAID IT? " CZECHS bow east POLITICALLY but west INTELLECTUALLY . . · . Not behind "Iron Curtain" - Communist police state doubted . . . Soviet withdrawal s een . . . . Most observers bere {In Prague) are incllned to doubt that Russia ig going to try to de•,elop in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany the kind of Communist police state that prevalia in Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland. . . . One popular tboory in Prague is tbat the Russians a lways withdraw from the West sooner or later for fear of being contaminated. . . Maybe it ia all just a dream but it ia a pleasant one though anyway a nd the Czeehoslovaks nurse lt Jealously ." - {NEW YORK TIMES, 8-5-47) . • "We are neighbors or Russia. Our security policy depends upon Russla. We bave no choice. . . . But any statement to the effect that we are behlnd a curtain or occupied by the Ru ■sians is absolute nonsense. This country and its poople are ABSOLUTELY DEMOCRATIC and we will remaln so, come what may. . . . We are a typical non. Soviet regime w ith no intention of so becoming. We are sociali!ltic and we w!ll develop along those Unes by evolution. . . But our conception or d emocracy remains the same now as before. . . . 1 am eonvinced th at in two or three years ou r position w ill be ve ry healthy.'' (Dr. Edward Benes, NEW YORK TIMES, 5-7-47) . • " l am genuinely grieved when I see a country like Czechoslovakia lost to the democratic cause. Here is a republic MODELLED AFTER AMERICAN POLITJCAL TRADITIONS BY MEN WHO l,OVED FREEDOM - transformed into a totalitarian Russlan satelIite state. . . . Most of the CZECHS don't like it. but there is nothing they can do about it. Dr. Benes. the able President of the country, has d~cid~ that only c!ose political and economic rela.tlon.,; wltb Communlst Russ la CAN GUARANTEE Czechoslovakla's future . . . . Eaeb time we have stoO<l up against Russia on a matter of prlnciple, she has ma'de CONCESSIONS that, from her point of vie"\!, were generous. I AM CONVlNCED THAT STALIN WANTS FRIEND~1-HP AND COOPERATION WITH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED ~'ľA 'ľE>S." (H. W. Kaltenborn. Radlo Broa<lcast. 7-6-45).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource "Free" and "Czechoslovakian" Don't Rhyme! Description An account of the resource V. L. Borin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 44-48 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Borin, V. L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/575fd74b2c0220cb32780f0e819fc80c.pdf 372740dc44a33c68193f09f3b6423935 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. �SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary. � SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. �SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA HOW TIIE CZECHS DECEIVED US CONST A NTIN E ČU L EN "Why do you not believe that old mistakes will not be repeated in the Czechoslovak Republlc?" I was asked by a Czech Slovak (a Czeehoslovak! ). "Because," I answer,,d, "only a donkey trlps twice on tbe same stone. And we Slovaks have already been deceived twice by Czech promiaes. One deceptlon was labeled the Pittsburgh Pact, and tbe second the Košice Agreement." "But you must belleve," said the Beneš Slovak, " just Jike a drowning man clinging to a straw." "Believe? But whom? The old decelvers? Here's a Jetter from a young Slovak who, In 1944, was one of those who believed the ~echs more than he dld hls brother Slovaks. After 1945," he wrltes, "many of my friends went to Prague to work in the mlnistrles. They worked in the Mlnistry of Foreign Trade, where Ripka was boss. When they wanted to execute some document, they had to steal it. In P rague they were willlng to employ Slovaks and, in cases, even elevate them, but they did not want them to work for Slovakia and make decisions and have influence on the trend of events and development of Slovakla." That young Slovak, an exile today, recently reminded me tbat I was right when I told bim, during the years of the Slovak Republlc, that the Czechs did not learn anything, or did they forget anythlng. At one Ume I collected a list of Czech promises very dillgently. Slnce 1919 I have recorded qulte a number or them. The first promlse sounded llke this: We Czechs are going to Slovakia only to help you out; when the Slovaks have capable people or their own, we w!ll ret•trn horne and let them manage their own arfalrs. Statlstics, however, show that there were less Slovaks in centra! offices in 1938, than there were in 1936. The schools in Slovakla, run by the Czechs, dld put out a lot of scholarly people, but !t seems that these schools were not as excellent as the Czech schools. Otherwlse someone mlght be able to say that this 1s just au anti-Czech argument to show that the Czechs used to send their worst professors to Slovakla, slnce they could not turn out, for example, anybody for the Jeading poslt!on in the Presidenťs office, in Parliament and in the varlous minlstries. The fact that out of 150 Generals only one was Slovak could be au argument that the Slovaks are a terribly peace-loving natlon and that the Czechs were all Žlžkas and warrlors. At the beginnlng of 1919, the offlclal Czech Press Bureau (ÔTK) had this joyful report propagated In Amer!ca: "The Slovak language shall be introduced as a required subject In the middle schools In Bohemia and Moravla. At the Prague philosophical facuJty it already has lts own seminary; it shall have a lecturer and the lectures on Slovak l!terature shall 'be ín Slovak. "Literary and scientlfic societles are prepar!ng to arrange coursel!I in Slovak for their members and for the general public. A Slovak dictionary and a Slovak comparat!ve . grammar are being publlshed. A review hlstory or literature wlll follow. SLOV AK1A "A council of foremost Slovaks here or technical expert& on the Slovak language, because the Minlstry of Schools and Natlonal Enlightenment wills it, are preparing plans and school books for Slovakia, which shall be placed before natlve Slovak experta and, after agreement and approval, shall be published speedlly and passed out to ouľ students. "Professors from all sides are answering our call to teach in the first complete Slovak gymnasimn in Skalica; they are perfectlng themselves in Slovak and, as soon as circumstances allow, they shall actively undertake teaching work. And after the first middle school, there shall be in other parts of our country a second, a third and a fourth. "Already today the Slovak language is at horne in our entire State. A former Clnderella has now become the most-liked chlld of the entire Czechoslovak society" (NÁRODNt NOVINY, Jan. 16, 1919). Well, what flnally happened? The Slovak language was uot lntroduced into Czech schools, nay they stlfled it even in Slovak schools. In Bohemia the Czecn language was taught, but in Slovakla only the Czech brand of Slovak, that is the so-called "Czechoslovak" language. A Slovak dictionary and grammar were not being published at that time at all, nor were they being pre· pared. The dictlonary was prepared later by Professor Tvrdt, a Slovak professor, who could not flnd a teaching position in Slovakia. Slovak text)><loks were not approved by Slovaks, "but by Czechs in Pragúe. They _dld not like to approve textbooks prepared by Slovaks, because books afforded the Czechs a nice income. As late as 1938, practtcally all. textbooks of technical schools and a large percentage of the other schools in Slovakia were in Czech. At the Skalica gymnazlum, where Slovak professors flocked in such numbers already in 1919, there were, in 19~8, 15% Slovak professors and 85% Czech. lndeed, iu 1938, the Slovak language was not "at horne" even at the Universlty of Bratislava, or in barr acks, tbe schools and offlces. In 1988, 80% of the leading official pos itions in Slovakia were in Czech hands and the majority of Czechs offlciated in Czech. And in Prague, in the centra! offlces, where the destluy of Slovakia was being decided, there were three Slovaks out of 200 officials. In a word, in 1919 the Czech Press Bureau wanted Americans of Slovak descent to relax their vigilance. In the meantime, the Czech parliament, witb a Czech majority, passed a Iaw, according to which the Slovak nation vauished as such and, follo.wiug U1e Magyar pattern, instead of a unitary Hungarian natlon, we had a unltary Czechoslovak nation, with the Czechoslovak language as the otflcial language, the State language. Whosoever wishes can believe new Czech promises. The Slovakl!I cannot and must not, because the Czechs are determlned to destroy the Slovak nation. A wlse and cautious person wlll not believe them, b&caúse the people doing the promlsing today are the pupils or Masaryk'a scbool and that school really excelled in deception. The "master" cheated to s uch an extent that he denled his own slgnature on the· document which was called the Pittsburgh Pact. The Slovak natlon has matured to sllch an extent that lt does not believe the Czechs. It shall belleve them, but with caution, only when t he Morava river shall again be thelr bouudary.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How the Czechs Deceived Us Description An account of the resource Constantine Čulen Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 42-43 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Čulen, Konštantín, 1904-1964 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/f841e2bddb560de426f2a8cd936a6f02.pdf e149e9d1fae319afac2fbbe288f8448e PDF Text Text 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. �BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e �tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a �SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? - � 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. �BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e �tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a �SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 38 SLOVA.KIA THE DIPLOl\lATIC SERVICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC DR. JOSEPH MIKUŠ Considering lhe circumstances under whlch the Slovak Sta.te originaled in post-Munich Europe, as well as lhe circumstances under whic:h lt existed and then came to a dramatic, though traglc end in 19•15, Slovak cliplomacy certainly had a most clifficult task to perforrn. Even though the Slovak diplomatic corps was iiware of the fact that the natlonal principle, whlch had given llfe to the Slovak Republlc, was a rnodern and progressive concept, nevertheless, at every step it had to contend wlth lhe prejudlces wblch preva.iled in certaln States of Europe, namely: tbe role playecl by ~rmany when the Slovak State originated and the relations - both foreigu and polltical - of Slovakia ,vith the German Reic:h as formulated in tbe so-called "Sc:hutzvertrag" (Treaty of Prolection). The first task of Slovak cliplomacy was to gain for the Slovak Hepublic as wide an internationa.l .recognilion a.s posslble. We wanted not only our nelghbors in Central Europe, but also the States in the most distant corners of the world, to take notice o( our color on the map or Europe. That was tbe acUvity whlch Slovak e mbassies in the neutra! States (Switzerland, the Vatlcan and Spain) were c·alled on to develop. This actlvlty was characterized by visits, memoraJ1da and notes. Only the war prevented the Slovak diplomatlc corps from completely consolidating the positlon of the Slovak State. ilut even then we must note that twenty-seven States diel recogl)ize tbe Slovak Republlc and had diplomatic or consular contacts with it. Among tbem, besldes tbe European States, were also Aslatic and South American States. Slovakia was, therefore, recognized not only by the States of the German-ItaliaJ1-Japanese coalltion, but also by several neutra.! States and some of the States of the Allled Bloc, among wbich, in the western hemispbere, were Costa Hica and J<,cuador. Not many people grasped the meaning of dlplomacy for the Slovak State. lt was often sald tbat we were a small State, thať events would run their course regardless whether our forelgn servlce wa.s' \\"eak or strong. Even Forelgn Mlnisler Tuka a nd his de,puty Polyák held to tbis v1ew. And it was for that reason that the budget ot the Foreign Ministry was alwa.ys so small. Embassles and consulates were established only In the States and clties which were considered more slgnlficant for us. The Slovak Republlc had embassies in Budapest, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Bucharest, Sophla; In tbe Vatlcan and the Qulrlnal; Berne, Madrid, Helsinki, Belgrade and later, Zagreb. There were General Consulates in Vienna, MUan, Stockholm, London, and Prague. Furthermore, there were several honorary consulates in foreign lands, as well as repatriatlon commlsslons in Paris and Brus!<els. At limes the competency of a slngle embassy extended over the territory or several States. The embassy in Berlin, for example, was deslgna.ted also for Denmark and the lla.ltlc States. The embassy in Madrid had to take care of practlcally the whole or Soutb America and also serve as a connecting llnk wltb the Slovaks in North America. BLOVAKlA 39 k was regrettable tbat for the narrow-mindedness of tbe ló'oreign Minister himself the Slovak forelgn service could not develop to the extent reo.ulred by Slovak national interests. lf we would bave established in embassy in Ecuador, for example, tbe embassy probably would have ci>ntinued to exh1t just as the P.mbassies of the Baltic States did in London and Washington. Slovak diplomacy, ot' course. belped in the economic field also. Even thougb the frozen economy of the States of war-torn Europe did not make thls task any easier, nevertheless tbe Slovak Republic attained quite an intensified circulation of economic relations in other States, whether considered on the basis of excha.nge paymenLs, or compensation of products, or by overrating in clearing, etc. Slovak diplomacy did its work well along these lines, even tbougb freQuently it had to compete wlt.h di,plomac ies of States wltb a long tradition and great experiences. Slovak products, trademarked "1\lade in Slovakia," were banled by trains over Europe and by shlps acToss the Mediterranean Sea. The i1tablllzation of Slovak exchange was due largely to Slovak foreign trade; it attavied the greMest degree of stability of practically all exchanges of the Centra! European Slates. But we did not lag behind even in the field of cultuľe. A cultural attaché functioned in every embassy. These men saw to it that Slovakia became known in the States to which they were sent. They made contacts with the press, radlo, universitles, etc. Slovak lectures were arranged at tbe universities of Leipzig, Rome, Na.ples. and Vien-na. Some legatlon offices issued information bulletin-s about Slovakla. Such bulletin-s were publisbed regularly by the em• bassies in Berne, Madrid and the General Consulate . In Stockholm. Slovak books also found their way into foreign lands through the e mbassies. Thus, tbe only objective books about Slovakia in the Parls libraries are those published by the Association for Slovak!I in Foreign Lands from the time of the Slovak State. Slovak dlplomatic personnel also publlsbed severaJ books in foreign \anguages about Slovakia and its people. Thus, the foreigner wbo '!tudies the Slovak question today ;_-, no longer dependent on the tendencious books of Czech and Magyar authors. From the cultural standpoint. significant was the reality that many Slovak artists could be schooled in foreign lands. AJso many more students than ever before were able to study at forelgn universities, eitber as excbange students or at thelr own ex,pense. Many students lived and studied not only in Vienna, Berlin, and J..,eipzig, but aJso in Switzerland, Italy and Spai!l. Toward tbe end of the war, the Slovak diplomatic corps suc<·essfully performed some signlficant acts of a bumanitarian characler. For example, Ing. Mračna, Chief of the pol!tical section of the Ministry of Foreign Affalrs. defended many American and French soldiers who escaped to Slovakia from German prison camps. And ~o it was that we were successful unto the very end of the war in keeping in Slovakia, in the luxurious confines of the Royal Hotel In Piešťany, the ltalian and Rumanian dlplomats who deserted Mu~solinl and Antonescu. lt must be emphasized that lhe Slovak diplomatic corps represented. the most independent group of the admlnlstratlon of tb e tO SLOVA.KLA Slovak State. Since the Germans recognized Slovakia as an ·independent State, the diplomatlc corps conducted itself abroad in a manner befitting the foreign service of an independent State. Slovak representatlves abroad were not controJled by aliens and acted toward German representatives in much the same manner as they did toward the representatives of other States. Because Slovak foreign servlce often was not in line with the regulations of the "Schutzver· trag" it was suspected in the eyese of German dlplomacy. For example, the embassy of the Slovak Republic at the Quirinal in Rome had contacts with the British ambassador there In the winter of 1939 and the sprlng of 1940, when England already was at war with Germany. We were lnterested In gettlng Brazllian wool for Slovakia. To bring the wool In by ship from overseas we needed permission from the English authoritles, a so--called "navycert." and we requested one at the Englieh embassy. Quite understandably, the „equest evoked certain fears regarding the final dispositlon of sneh an impoiitant war material. "Will the prepared wool be used in Slovakia, or is it destined for Germany?" we were asked. ,S o that our request might be considered, we had to produce proof with an explanatlon of our political and economic relations with Germany. Two memoranda resulted in which, along with Ambassador Zvrškovec, we showed that though we had a definite poIi tical relationship with Germany, yet the Slovak State was not at al! at war with the Allies and, from the standpoint of commercial po\icy, was completely independent, actlng politically as a neutra! State. It was self-evident, that we did this with Dr. Zvrškovec wlth the knowledge of the Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský. Later, when coples oť both these documents got into the hands of the German ambassador in Rome, Von Mackensen, through a member of the Slovak Embassy, and then into the hands of von Ribbentrop, Slovak diplomacy was subject to lts first purge. Presldent Tiso and several members of his Government were called to Salzburg, where on July 29, 1940, tbey had to answer to Hitler for these "undisciplined" acts or U1e Slovak diplomatic corps. "Den Zigeuner, den will ich nicht mehr sehen ! " (this Gypsy I do not want to see any more), Hltler screamed angrlly polntlng to Ďurčan-ský as Tlso was about to preeent bis Ministers. That ls how Ďurčanský was purged and, later, Zvrškovec. And that spelled the end for the free foreign pollcy of the Slovak State. During Tuka's minlstry, and with bis complicity, the ministrles in Bratislava were occupjed by German "beraterl'' (advlsors). But the Slovak embassies in foreign Jands acted quite independently in most cases even after that; not only towards Germany, but even towards Tuka himself. Whlle Tuka proclalmed voclferously that the Slovak Republic "lives and dles with the German Reloh," the Slovak dlplomatlc corps was fully aware or the fact that the Slovak nation wanted to Jive along with Germany or wlthout it, and wlth or wlthout Tnka. Our lnterest was to have Slovakla remain as Jong as posslble outside the domaln of the main military events, out or actual war. Tuka's declaration ot war against Russla in 1941 was regarded as a serlous po\itical mistake by the Slovak foreign service. Tuka failed as a palitician and as a lawyer. Slovak diplomaťy. except for a SLOVAKIA few exceptlons, was noted for its independence of opinion and action and for its objective reports. lt certainly deserved a better F'oreign Minister; his lack of judgment and foresight was fatal not only for himself, but, alas, even for rthe Slovak State. Along with this uncritlcal tendency, which overestimated Germany and the slgnificance of the "protection" guaranteed the Slovak State by it, the tendency to whlch only one or two members of the Slovak foreign servlce subscribed, >the unity of the Slovak diplomatic corps was also threatened by another tendency: the Czechoslovak tendency. To this category belonged Dr. Szathmáry, Ing. Országh, Ing. Géza Krno and Dr. Raklíányi. For these men the Slovak State was just an episode. Durlng the war they tried to make contact wlth Beneš to offer him their services. Today we know that Ing. Országh, who came to Madrid in May, 1943,. as the chief of the Slovak trade delegation to negotiate a trade agreement, brought some significant material, which he later sent to London. This "Czechoslovak" tendency was responsible for the chicanery wbich the officials of tbe Slovak foreign ministry later had to suffer during tbe so-called "screening" in Bratislava. In its substantial majority, however, tbe Slovak diplomatic corps remained loyal to the concept of tbe independent Slovak State even when lt was jailed for renderlng its service to that State. It is comforting that the most significant factors of the Slovak foreign service are today in foreign lands. and among them: Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Ďurčanský, Francis Tlso, Dr. Josepb Cieker, Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum, Dr. Galvánek, Dr. Bečko, Dr. Kaššovič, Dr. Pisko, Dr. števek, Dr. A. Grébert, Dr. Blyska, Dr. Ďatelinka, etc. All these men witb the rest of the Slovak emigration are fully aware of wbat the concept of an independent Slovak State means to their natlon today under Communlst rule. Thls concept of the Slovak State could bave been overshadowed by a temporary eclipse of the universal in,ternational constellation only because of the disproportlonate role which the frightened democracies reserved for Russia in Centra! and Eastern Europe at the conferences of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. And the Slovak State perished only because the principles of tbe Atlantic Charter and tbe rigbt of nations to selfdetermlnation were completely ignored. But the idea is definitely roorted in tbe blood and marrow of the Slovak nation wblch insists on havlng its own democratlc and independent Staite. Slovak diplomats, therefore, in free foreign lands wlll not let up in their labors until independent Slovakia once again takes its rigbtful place on the map of Europe - preferably a federated Europe. • • • "In the West some indivlduals assert that we are in the hands of the Soviets, yet the Governments look at tblngs differently. We are the Allies of the U.S.S.R. and we shall always remain faithful to the Soviets. We are friends of the West and we shall remain frlends. In flrm alllance witb the U.S.S.R. we are proceedlng and shall proceed our own way." (Dr. Edward Beneš, Prague Broadcast, October 9, 1945). WHO SAID IT? -  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Diplomatic Service of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Mikuš Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 38-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/9300c821ed15a55b939dcfcb0256c321.pdf 77429f714a8fae10074b53a07fbd9aa0 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we �shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence �SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · �SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, �iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the �ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the �SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, �32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- �SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon �SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). �SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. �36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- �S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47. � SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we �shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence �SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · �SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, �iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the �ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the �SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, �32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- �SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon �SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). �SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. �36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- �S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA ·uow FREE lS RADIO FREE EUROPE? BY KURT GLASSER 1- THE VOICE OF F REEDOM IN DOUBLE TAL K In the southeast corner of the English Garden, Munich's Centra! Park, a h andsome new building is being erected. This building, paid for by the voluntary contrlbutlons of millions of American citizens, will house the executive offices and studios of RADIO FREE EUROPE. Medium-wave broadcasts in Czech and Slovak have been started on an lllh•hour schedule, and are beamed eastward by a directional antenna. There are also brief s hort-wave programs in Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian; medium-wave programs in lhese languages are to follow later. Radio Free Europe is a private American station. lt is owned by the National Committee for a Free Europe, and supported through the Crusade for Freedom campaign. 'I'he response to the dramatic '·HELP LLFT THE IRON CURTAIN" posters is gratlfying. Presumably the donors are gratified to thlnk that their dollars are helping to fight Communism. They would not be quite so gratif!ed if they knew what was happening wlth some of their money. Q€neral Lucius D. Clay and other prlncipal figures in the National Committee for a Free Europe are, 1 believe, personally beyond reproach. It would not occur to any norma! journalist to write "m udraking" articles on any activity sponsored by them. lt never occurred to me to criticize RFE until l arrlved In Munich in 1951 and begaµ resear<:h on problems affecting iron-curtain refugees in Western Germany. Quite by accident I sturobled on the fol· Io wing facts: 1. The principal Czechs and Slovaks associated with the National Committee and those employed by Rad io Free Europe are not· - as is commonly supposed - fighters against Communism. Quite on the contrary, they fellow-traveled with the Communists from at least 1939 to 1948, helped them to power, and even today follow a Communist-sponsored propaga.nda line. 2. These individuals belong to an organization which has systematically betrayed members of the democratic underground in Czecho-Slovakia by tipping them off to Dictator Gottwa lďs secret police. 3. A number of Radio Free Europe staff members are either Communist agents or have criminal records. 4. Radlo Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program is helping Stalin by sabotaging international understanding and promoting rivalry and hatred between European peoples. WHY CZECHO-SLOVAKIA COLLAP SED The Czech exile organization associated with the National Committee is the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia," beaded by Dr. Peter Zenkl, formerly vice-Premler under Gottwald. This organization, known among exiles as the Benes party, has the inside track in determining who geta jobs in Radio Free Europe and what polic)' the station shall follow. To understand what thls means politically, we shall have to trace briefly the history of Czecho-Slovakla slnce World War 1. If the American staff óf the National Commlttee had studied this hlstory more critlcally than it evidently dld, it would not bave been duped by Czech fellow-travelers. To begin wltb, there is no "Czechoslovak ian" people, except as one has been dellberately created by the propaganda of the Czech natlonallst partles. The Czecbs and the Slovaks are two dlstinct natlons, witb languages as dlfferent as German and Dutch. T hey can, wltb some effort, understand each o tber and read each other's newspapers. At the end of World War I, when the old Austro-H ungarlan monarchy was collapsing, most Slovaks favored an Independent Slo-vakia. Tbey consented, however, to jolning wlth the Czech s on the 8trengtb of the so-called Pittsburgh Agreement, signed in 1918 by Presldent Thomas Masaryk of Czecbo·Slovakia. This agreement provtded for full equality between Ci:echs and Slovaks and a substantial measure of autonomy for Slovakia within t he framework ot Czecho-Slovakia. The Pittsburgh Agreement was never carried out. Instead, tbe Czech Government maintained centrallzed rule from Prague and discrlminated systematlcally against tbe Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans (who are really German-speaking Austrians). In 1925 Masaryk justlfied tbe denial of Slovak autonomy by stating that tbe Pitts· burgh Agreement was slmply a recommendatioo of American Czechs and Slovaks and, tberefore, not blnding. Only Czech civil servants got tbe best jobs, and tbe Government, first under :'lfasaryk and later under Benes, did ali lt could to promote Czech nationalism and culture al tbe expense of the non-Czech peoples of the Republjc. Tbe result was tbat both the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans, not to mentlon some 250,000 Hungarians, became increaslngly anxious to "get out !rom under." Tbls fact was made abundantly clear in Lord ;Runciman'5: 1938 report to the Britlsh Government. The Czecho-Slovak Government had not neglected to operate .a ťontinuous, high-pressure public relations campaign io tbe United States and otber western countrles When Hitler demanded cesslon of the Sudetenland in September 1938, the sympatbies of the western world were wholly wltb Czecho-Slovakla, wbich was pictured as an island of peaceful democracy In the sea of fascism. 'l'be fact of the matter was that the country was well along the road to civil war. If Brltain and France had backed tbe Prague Government and had Czecho-Slovakla t ried to figbt, \t is practically certaln tbat the Slovaks, Sudeten Germans and Hungarians would have refused to cooperate. At · the beight of the Munlch crisis, Professor Cernak, Slovak s pokesman in the Prague cabinet, presented Benes wlth an ultimatum demanding agreement to Slovak autonomy wltbln 24 hours, otherwise he would leave bis post in the government. Reluctantly Prague agreed to grant autonomy on October 6, 1938. However, after Munich, in March 1939, the Prague Government deposed Slovak Prime Minister 'l'iso, occupied Bratislava with Czech armed forces and installed a new governmenľ In Slovakia. lt was this interventlon which gave Hitler tbe excuse to march lnto Prague. lt must be admitted that the Slovak Republlc came int~ existence SLOVAKIA witb Hitler's belp. But tbis did not make it a Nazi state any more t han German aid to Finland corrupted tbe lnstitutlons of· tbaľcoimtry. BENES BECOMES A TOOL OF STALIN · It is understandable tbat Benes sbould have turned to Stalin for support after "tlie Municb debacle. Brltaln and France had, as h e felt, let bim down. The only power wlilch could restore Czecho-Slovakia was Soviet Russia and, it may be added, the only way in which Czechoslovakia with its pre-war boundaries can be held together today is by sheer force. In any case, the "Czechoslovakian Liberat!on Move· ment," wbich was started in Paris and moved to London in 1940. was based from the beginnlng on the pr!ncipie of constant and close collaboratlon with the Soviet Union. As Dr. Peter Zenk l, whose influence today over Radio Free Europe is apparent from the posttion he holds, sald in a speech to th e Temporary :-.ationat Assembly in );ovember 1945: " The nationa lly conscious Czechs and Slovaks have no doubt that in thelr own interest, as well as ín lnľernational interests, perma~ent collaboration with the USSR is neceua ry. Never without the USSR, never against the USSR, always on its side!" The collaboration between the Benes party and the Sovi_ets ' ~ontinued even during the strained relations between the USSR and the Western powers whicb, lasted from September 1939 unt!I Hltler's atiack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. As H ubert Ripka, Beneš' ~Iinister of Informatlon in the LoI)don "Czecboslovak Democratic Government," explained in bis book "East and West" (London, 1944): "Since, in the new situation, it was impossible to collaborate officia lly with the Soviet Union, we ... did nothing whlch might pre. judice or prevent the renewal of cooperatlon at the earliest possible • moment; l need only recall how strongly our attltude contrasted wlth that of .many others during the Soviet-Finnish War. Moreover, even in that period, there was no lnterruption of the personal contacts and exohange of information between ourselves and important Soviet representatives in London, Paria, Washington and elsewhere." The Provisional Czecboslovakian Government, which was ·ftnanced by the British, introduced Jarge ·numbers of "democratic Czechoslovakian refugees," who were in reality Soviet agents. One of t•hese, L.udwig Freund, joined the staff oť the Communist "Daily Worker" at B ritlsh Government expense. Others, such as Messrs. Bieheller, Ohrenstein, Klinger and Steín (none- of whom were Czechs or Slovaks) Joined the staff of the Britlsh Broadcasting Company and prepared t he speeches for the "non-Communist" members of the Czech governme nt. Here ts a s ample of this propaganda: " ... the Ruuian Novemb·er Revolution not only increaaed the strength of the Ruasian Soviet State, it also ralaed to greater heights than ever before the standard of civilization, culture and living, of the wide ma11es of the Soviet peoples.... Bolshevism is a supér.national ideal, an eternal ideal, a human ideal, an ideal whlch has klndled the minds of the noblest of men from the time of Piato and through the· Christian era, through the Freneh Revolution and untll today.: : . Juat as the French Revolution strovť to realize the idea! · of equality." (B. B. C. program of·,November 7, 1942, speech by Mr. Ri1>lfä). · SLOVAKIA 28 Tbis Mr. Ripka is anotber leadlng f!gure in the "Council of Free Czecboslovakia," wbich has played a leadlng role in tbe selection of Czech and Slovak personnel for Radio Free Europe Benes and bis friends also introduced a number of Commun!st .igents into the U nited States (also disguised as democratic Czecho• Slovak!an refugees) , sneh as the Soviet employee Bension Batt wbo publlshed tbe Czech paper New Y orkské Li sty and a Hungarian Communist Desider Benau, who edited the Slovak paper ("Czechoslôvak daily") called New Y or k ský Denník. Benau is now editor of a Communist dally in Slovakia. In 1941 the KremUn decided that the Benes organization was worthy of recognition as the official Czecho,Slovak government, and iJ1 1943 Benes went to Moscow and formally concl uded an agreement with Stalin. I am not informed as to tbe details or this agreement. but apparently lt provided that the Sovlets and not tbe United States s hould occupy Czecho0Slovakia as well as indicating wbat part!es s hould be allowed after the war. Needless to say, the dominating role of .the Communist Party was assured. II - THE F A K E D E MOCRACY - 1945-1948 As the war drew to a c lose, in late 1944 and early 1945, the Benes Government moved in a body from London to Kosice and then Prague, with a long stop-over In Moscow. While in the Soviet capital, the "Czechoslovak" politicians received exact instructions as to wbat they· were to do wben tbey got horne. Stalin did not want to alarm t be Western Allles by setting up an outright Communist government in P rague while tbe bulk of the Gls and Tommies were stm in Ger• many. lt was therefore decided to use the sy'stem of "bloc politics" (compulsory coalition of several parties) wbich is in vogue in the Soviet Zone of Germany and which General Eisenhower had rejected for the U. S. Zone "since it !s incompatible w!th the traditional American idea of political activity and effective political l!fe in a democratic sense" (New York Times, October 17. 1945). Only the fol lowing part!es were permitted: 1. Communist Part y ; 2. National Socialist (Benes) Party ; 3. Social Democratic (Socialist) Party; 4. The Czec h Cleri ca l Party (Srameťs "Česká Lldová Strana." ). The Agrarian Party and the Small Tradesmen's Party, which had existed b efore tbe war, were forbidden, slnce tbey refused to collaborate with tbe Communists. George Str!brny was sentenced to life imprisonment and Rudolpb Beran (no relation to tbe archbishop) was sentenced to 20 years in 1946 for attempting to organlze "unauthorized" polltlcal parties. Slnce the Soviets were not sure bow the Social Democratic Party would bebave (in Germany it is strongly anti-Communist) tbey suppJied this party with new leaders from Moscow. who elected the Communist Zapotorky as head of the United Czech Trade Unions. To make sure nothing would go wrong, some 200.000 c~ech and Slovak citizens wbo had given evidence of bP.lng anti-Communist were ex<'luded from the 1946 elections on one pretext or another. To cap tbe cllmax, tbe Communist leader Klement Gottwal<l. who had been r arefully groomed In Moscow for the job, was elected Prime Minister. As for the Slovaks, the Sovlets seemed for a time to support Slovak autonomy an<l then cbange<l th~ir minds Tn any case, thP, iLOVAKIA Slovaks were not a sked what they thought about the matter. Mr. F. A . Voight, the editor of the London magazine "Nlneteenth Century and After," described thc situation in th e following terms: 1-'Czechoslovakia is today a vassal state in a procesa of dissolution. Of the three administratíve areas which compose it, one, Car. patho-Ukraine, has been annexed by the Soviet Union. The second, Slovakia, is independent from Prague but not from Moscow. The quarrel between Czechs and Slovaks seems to be irreconcilable. One has the impression that the Czechoslovak state is today a fiction and that it will never again be a reality. For if one should remove the Russian overlordship, the Czechs could only recover power over the Slovaks by force of arms. And in this undertaking they would cer. tainly be defeated, for they have not a single friend in centra! Europe, whereas the S lova ks have many.... Even in Bohemia and Moravia the central government has but little authority. lt ia a pliable tool of the Russian supervision, with little will of its own. Dr. Benes is the victim of the politics which he has followed for so long." - And this was written not in 1948, bu t appeared in November 1945! ~embers of the Benes group in exile try to pretend that they entered the government In 1945 on the theory that the four parties would operate on a "live and let live" basis. This is straigh t mythology. In the first place, n o non-Communist politicians in their right minds would get together and elect a Communlst prime minister. Secondly, the non--Communlst parties had no polltlcal programs of t heir own. All parties had accepted a common program, the so-called Kosice Program of 1945, named after the city in which it was adopted. '!'he Kosice Program had been prepared in advance by t he Communists and included tbe complete s oclalization of industry ·and agricul• ture, as well as many of tbe ot her measure!< taken slnce 1948 by the Gottwald government. In other w ords, the complete commun!zation of the country had been prepared in advance with t he active collaboration of the Benes party. These collaborators included Hubert Ripka, Peter Zenkl, John Papanek, J. Stransky, Ferdinand Peroutka and a number of others . who are today connected, directly or indirectly, with the National Committee for a Free Europe and with Radio F ree Europe. Most of these National Fronters are enjoying the protection of the United States today; a large number have been provided with jobs on research pro. jects paid for by the Crus ade for Freedom or by the State Department. From the point of view of long-range international politics, the most significant thing which h appened during the period of fake democracy was the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans. Some of t hese people h ad been Nazis. What the post-war Czech government, with the active encouragement of the Soviets, did was to deport the entire German-speaking minortly, regardless of their po. litical attitudes. P eople whose ancestors had lived in the border areas of Bohemla for almost a thousand years we re forced overnight t o leave tbeir horne.s and property and were shlpped in frelght cars to varlous points in Germa ny. Not content with exproprlatlng the Sudetens, an art!on wlthout precedent or justlficatlon In lnternatlonal law, the ao SLOVAKI.A Commun ist partlsans, with the explicit appro val of Benes and his frien<!s, tortured and -murdered tens of t housands, !ncluding m any Sudetens with antl-Nazi records. Thjs is a hlstorlcal fact, however little lt may be_ k nown in th e Un lted S tates. T he expulslon :was so tho rÓugl;l_ . that. _numbers of n on-Germ an J ews were .deported, slm ply bec,a.u.se .t hey had lndicated "German'.' as thel r Janguage in t he Jast cen's us: slnce Ylddish was . 110.t recognized by. t he . Czech s t atistical authorťties. · · "-T.he Czechs," wrote Mr. Voight, · " have developed the most violent nationallsm. They have adopted a racial doctrine akin to H itler's (with · the difference that the Slava instead ot the .Germans are the Herrenvolk') and _their methods are hard ly difterent trom those of the Fascísts. They ·have; in truth, become Slavic Nazis." The -power behind tll.e expulsions was . r evealed recently In t he Prague Communist paper Rude Pravo (1951, No. 63), wbich edltorial ized as follows: "Thrl>ugh the historical victo ry of the Soviet Union it was possible to i-eorganize our country so as to banish once and for all the dangers stemming from unsolved natlonality problems and from the i;editious propaganda which threatened our first republic. lt ia impossible to overestimate the · historic importance of the fact that a fter a history of a thousand years the expulsion of the Germans has guar anteed the safety of our Fatherland as never before. Our peoples owe undying thanks to Comrade Stalin, who advocated this soluti9n in Potsdam and fought it through against the resistance of the Western powers." . The expulsion o f the Sude ten Germans created a political powder barrel compared to which the Pollsh Corridor before World W a r II was a medium•slzed lady cracker. Germany, whlch lost a large part ot its food-produc!ng terrltory and is populated to the bursting po int, v.iii never wlllingly accept tbe exile ot the Sudet ens. Czecho-Slovakla. on t he ot her ha nd, can hold on to t he Sudetenland on ly so long as she is backed by s uperior military rorce - th a1 of S oviet Russla. The way out of tbe dllemma would be for t he Czechs to make an agreeruent witb the Sudeten Germans pe rmitting them to come back. T hi!I is, ho.wever, exactly what Stalin does not want, slnce a Czech state at peace wlt h Germany and stable wlth ln itself would no longer depend on Russia n support to keep it in existence. F or this reason, Stalln's Czech puppets dld and continue to do every th ing to prevent a s ettlement of the Sudeten problem. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe conform exactly to this Stalinist pollcý. The Kremlin's pollcy or m alntainlng hatred a t white b eat between the Czech s and the Germans was expounded by Otto Graf, now a member or the political statf of Radlo Free Europe in Munlch, as follows: "lf, in conn~tion with Ge rmans in Czechoslovakia, the -queation of the humanitarian tradltion of the Czech people ia raiaed, then the question is raised in the wrong place. lf lt were aimply that we didn'.t WANT to live wlth the Germans, the question might be justlfled. The fact is, we CAN'T live .wlth them." - ( Svet Prace, Vol. 1, No. 11, September 20, 1945, page 3). Ceskosloven1ke Noviny, the organ of th e Councll or Free CzechoSlovakla, tbe U. S. orga nization of Benes' followers which su ppllee the SLOVAKIA 31 intelJectual leadershlp for Radlo Free · Europe, put the matter even more blunlly. How's thls for Ch rislian. Brotherhood? : "The Czechoalovak ian emigration knowa well that the new world Ôrder ia only poaaible on the baaia of the equality of all peoples in Eur!)pe. But at the eame time it hear,1 clearly the voice of t~. people a t home, which uttera thia apontaneoua .wi1h: Never to have , to eat at the aame table wlth German1, ever to have to pray_ I!" ·tti.e aame church with them." - (Artlcle by Duben, No. 24, Page 8), Fortunately not all Czech.s are ready to a.ccept Stalln's gospl!l .or liatred. An oppositlon group b eaded by General Prchala, the only Czech general who ever opposed Hitler on the battlefleld, has slgned a compact with the Sudetep GerD)an rep;-esentatio n In Munlch. Thls <:ompact. concluded on August 4, 1950, provldes that arter the Jlberatlon oťCzecho-Slovakla the Sudeten Germans shall be !ree to return to their homes. Therearter both natións shali enjoy equal rights under a federatlve štate.· General Prchala and bis followers i.ilso believed In ~elf-determln ation ·ror the Slovaks. ' ·.• · The policy or the Prchala group, the Czech Natlonal Commlttee, 1s so senslble that tbe Benes party bas not bePn able to thlnk. of a.ny rational argument agalnst it. So they follow the tbreadworn tactlcs or <lenounclng Prchala and his followers as rascists. And wba.t does the American management of Radlo Free Europe clo about the problem or the Slovaks and the Sudeten Germans? lt refuses to discuss lt. As Mr. Grltfith, polJUcal advlser to Mr. J ackson, stated I!) a press conference held on AprlJ 30, 1951: "Men of good will cannot a·IJow them1elve1 to be distracted in attempting · now to answer queations whlch cannot be answered now." Mr. Jackson backed bim up by saying: "The problem of Czech1 and Slovaka in Germany (sic) ·w ill not be diacu11ed on the air on thi1 transmitter." A llttle l:.ter in the conference the followlng interchange took place: "Queslion: Do you have at present the cooperatlon of all tbe main Czech and Slovak political tactlons among the emlgrants? " Mr. Jackson: Oh yes, the answer is yes." Mr. Jackson was evldently mlslnformed. •Radlo Free Europe does not have the cooperatlon of the Czech Nat1011al Commlttee, whlch has as regiatered members some 3,000 of the 12,000-odd Czechs no-w ' llvlng in Germany as well as a sizable memhershl p In Great Brltaln„ Canada, AustraJla, eti;. ~or does lt have the good wlll of the Slovak ~a.~lonjll Councll Abroad, the largest and most conslstently antl-Commun lst organlzatlon of exiled Slovaks .,..... or any representativ e group of Slovak patrlots. The Americans ln chacge or Radio Free Europe may think they are belng neutra!. ActuallY, they are exhlblllng partlsanship or the most vlclous sort, that sort whlch refuses to come out In the open and show lts cards. The resull ls that Radlo Free Europe 1s llkely to antagonlze more people than lt pleases, Jncludlng exaclly those groups which tbe United States should be courtlng as allles In lts struggle against world Communlsm, By following the Benes line and then " refuslng to discuss," the station la by impllcatlon condonlng :Czech ult.a-11atlonll]ism and the b rutal -expuls lon of milllons of -:reNgees. T.bere ls ,iothing tbat Stalin couJd like better. •, 32 SLOVAKIA I II - HOW TO RUN AN ANTI-COMMUNIST UNDERGROUND WITH COMMUNIST AGENTS On February 21, 1948, the "non-Communist" members of Gottcabinet resigned. To analyze just what h a ppened in t he "Gottwald Putsch" would be an involved historical job which I do not wan t to undertake here. Two points, however, a re signif icant: walďs 1. M inisters Ripka, Zen kl , Papanek and Stransky and others who n ow run the Council of F r ee Czechoslovakia and whose policies dominate the Czech program of Radio F ree Europe m ade not even a show ot resistance to the Communist g rab for power. Minister Zenkl spent the whole week-end ot the Putsch at a country house-party comfortably removed trom the scene of operations. 2. The fact that the Kremlin did not consider these gentlemen necessary any more in their previous positions does not of itself make them any less Communist fellow-travelers than they wer e before. lf Stal in should fire Molotoff, wou l d he be any less of a Bolshevi k ? N ot necessari ly. tThe Czech exile V. L. Borln writes ("Against the H angman," London, 1951, page 14) that he th inks t he real reason for th e "reorganization of 1948" was not to consolidate Communist power, since the Communists already had all the power they needed, but to make h!ghpower politlcians available for a razzle·dazzle job designed to confuse the United States and Britain. T h is t hesis is h ard to prove or disprove. lt is, nevertheless, lnteresting that most of the Benes g roup, including all the ministe11s and many "smal\ fry," left Czecho-Slovakia without the sligh test lnterference from the Government. The retiring dignitaries, escorted by several Communist agents traveling incognito, fellow-traveled to the United States Zone of Germany, wbere they announced themsel ves as "democrats" who had tought the good fight and as m artyrs of democracy. Tbey were met witb open arms (and with financial support) by the U. S. authorities, particuarly by certain former Czechs who h ad emigrated earlier and become U. S. citizens, A short whlle later the grou p was assembled in New York, where lt proceeded to promote the American Fund for Czecboslovak Refugees, l ne. (1775 Broadway), roping in such respect• able sponsors as Elleanor Roosevelt, Senator H erb ert Lehman, Dorothy 'ľhompson, etc., etc. Don't blam e these good people too hastily: the American publ ic was so hopel essly misinformed about what had really 1-appened in Czecho,Slovakia that to help the "poor refugees" seemed the natural and human thing to do. In order to be taken seriously, an exile organizatlon has to have an underground movement in the same country. So th e exiled Benes party organized an underground, the principal menib ers of whlch had been selected before Messrs. Zenkl, Ripka and Stransky had ever left Czecho,Slovakla. That it "vas possible to organize an underground at all was due to the fact that tbe Benes party, on the middle and loweľ levels, lncluded a number of people who were sincere democrats ancl an ti-Communists. If you want an effective underground in a dictatorshlp country you have t o pick leaders who are unknown politically. Instead, Ripka, Zenkl and .Stransky picked Mrs. M ilada Horakova, National Socialist (Benes) Party member or Parliament and known anti-Communist; Josef Ne- SLOVAKIA 33 staval, Jawyer, member of NSP Centra! Executive Committee; Misa Frana Zem inova, First Vice-Chairman of the NSP; Jiri Hej da, econo• mist, member of the State Economic Council. Of the foregoing, all except Hejda were under observation by the Communist Secret Police, a fact which Ripka and his friends must have known if they were not poli tical idiots. In addi tion to these leaders. a set of liaison officers were appointed who were equally suspect, including Zenkľs brother Hudolf and the secretaries of Benes and Ripka. On the first anniversary of Benes' death the exiles asked their friends to mail protests to the U. S. Embassy in Prague. Although these letlers were anonymous, they did serve to tip off the Communlst secret police as to the location of resistance centers. Radio Free Europe is now conducting a similar "give-away" program. Exlled Czechs and Slovaks ,vrite in about themselves and persona) news is broadcast under a "nickname" but with mention of the localities in which the families llve. Several exiles have pointed out to the writer that this procedure is sufficient, in smaller towns, to provide the secret police with very useful information. As a center for making contacts wlth members of the underground in Czecho-Slovakia, Ripka and his friends established an operational headquarters in Frankfurt under the direction of a certain Gen eral Mor avec, formerly hea.d of the "Czecboslovakian Jntelligence Service" in London. This operational Headquarters was and is a key position in the whole structure of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia's under· ground. Jt was and ls tbe German sending and receivlng station for couriers coming back and forth from Czecho-Slovakia. Jts connection with Radlo Free Europe will be discussed in the last chapter. I have heard Moravec described as a well-meaning man without too much political sense. His staff, however, includes or included the following individuals: 1. As principal deputy, D r. Schenk. As a police officlal of Brunn (Brno), Dr. Schenk asslsted In the arranging of the famous Brunn Death March on Corpus Christi Day, 1945, in which tbe entire Ger• man population of that city was forced to march 60 kilometers to the Austrian border. Tbose who straggled were beaten to death. At night the Germans were locked in cement barracks to which Soviet soldiers were admitted for the purpose of raping the women. Between 2000 and 3000 Germans died before the march was over. In 1948 Dr. Schenk, as a "democratic exile," got a job screening refugees for the JRO, where he had the reputation of approvlng only Benes supporters for asslstance. H e then went to work in Moraveťs office where he 1,till is, according to the !atest lnformatlon. 2. M ih ula, a courier between Frankfurt and Prague. Hls travels ceased abruptly in February 1951 when the United States Court ln Hegensburg sentenced bim to 7 years imprisonment as a Communist s py. 3. Rudolf Sima, courier for Moravec and shnultaneously member of the S'I'B (Czech Secret Police). He was recently arrested In Stuttgart and is now in U. S. custody. 4 Schn eeberger, occasional inmate of tbe Valka "Foreigners' Camp" near Nurn-berg. The frequency and overtness with which th!s gentleman crosses tbe borcler has given rise there to the general opinlon SLOVAKIA 34 that he is also an STB man . .At the time of this writing he was at Jarge in the U. S. Zone of Germany. 5. Satran, well known to emigres as a Prague underworld chai-acter and one-tíme proprietor of "The Spider," a dive used extensively for the exchange of stolen goods. Convictions are reported ·for deallng in stolen goods, pandering and cheating at cards. H e has recently gone to work for Radlo Free Europe but bis Whereaboutli is --strictly secret." 6. Vera Chovancova, Moravec's secretary and girl-friend of a cerLain Marian, W'ho is know.n to be an STB agent. Mornvec also had couriers who were not membe1:s of the Czech 8TB, ho-wever, these dlsappeared at a discouraging rate whlle crossing 1he border, for reasons that are not bard to guess. To meet the prob• lem caused by t.he ensuing persorinel shortage. Moravec's offtce sent letters by the conductors on the Orient Express, which carries through cars from Prague to Ostende. Anyone who knows anything about dictatorships knows that conductors on international traina are alwaya agenta of the secret police. The result of Moravec's efficient operations was that when Gott· walp's .-Communists held their famous espionag~ trials, the state prosecutor had a f-a~rly complete file of all th~--correspondence sent or received by the defendants. Significantly en.o ugh, the record of the trial contained no mention of Moravec or his headquarters, nor did the prosecution introduce a letter which Ne11taval had written, aaking that Ripka be dropped from the organizatio11 for Communlat _c olla. boration. Mrs. Horakova was sentenced to death, Nestaval and H ejda to life imprisonment and slxty-eight year old Miss Zeminova to twenty years at bard Jabor. Wlth this operaťiôn, the democratlc resl11tance in Czechoslovakia, insofar as · lt existed in the Benes party, was effectively liquidated. IV - AMERICA'S LAT.EST PROBLEM CHILO In the selectlon of personnel to pian and carry out its Czech broadcasting problem, the National Commlttee for a Free Europ e relied heavlly on the advice of the CollÍlcll for Free Czechoslovakla. !<'or a whlle, in early 1951, the org_ahizatlon spllt on the quesUon of who was a fellow-traveler, but slnce then, as I understand it, things have tieen happlly patched up. •· ·• The he~d of the entire Czech g·ro~p in ~uni~h is Ferdinand Peroutka, formerly propaganda director of the Natlonal Socialist Party and editor of the newspaper Oi,esek (Today) in Prague. Slnce Mr. Peroutka is responsible for puttlng together a program for w hlch Ámericans are pay!ng and which - in spite of the prlvate ausplces of Radlo Free Europe - 1s frequently taken as representing .Americall pol!cy and opln!on, it is important to know what klnd of democr,acy ~fr. Peroutka advocates. Here are some of his opinions, taken from his book "Talť ·nebo tak" (So or So), published in Prague in 1947: "N ever in history was Russia so mighty, never were the forcea of socialiam so colosaaly forged together. This ls a new hiitorical epoch. Nevertheless some people think in a stick-in-the-ltlUd ' fashion. lt has not yet been possible to convince everyone of the neceísity: of the overthrów'·of 'capitalism_._, __., ( Page 8). SLOVAKIA 36 "Already in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it became clear that whoever d.oes not want socialism small must take. it big. You people, who today pr aise this or t hat virtue of capitalism, tell me, how have yo u s olved the social problem . .." ( Page 9. Transla. tor's note : By t he use of. "sma ll" and "big" Mr. Peroutka would seem to identlfy himself with th e Bolshevlkl or "big" socialista, as op. posed to the Mens hevikl or "small" socialista.) " Along the road on which the Russian Revolution passed, there lie the rotting remains of t he unfulfilled pr ophecies of its enemies. This (the revolution: tr.) is a historical impulse a s g reat as the Reformation or the Fre nch Revolutlon, perhaps as gr eat as Christianity•. " ( Page 33) "In our situation resistance against the great work of s ocialízation - open or secret - can only be considered as reaction. In this respect w e need have no doubt who are the reactionaries." ( Page 141 ) '.'Many t lmes we have said, that in this land only one develop. ment is possible, to socialism. Have our activities helped this develop. ment? Or have we obstructed it ? ... lt is necessary for everyone to be able to say proudly : 1 was there, 1 hel ped!" ( Pages 170.171) Mr . Peroutka is backed up by two experts in dialectical materlali~m. Dr. Ziak and Dr. (Berger) Bellak. Dr. Zlak ls the editor of an intelleetual magazlne called Tribuna which 1s forb idden In F rance and ano ther called "Reality" which is forbidden in Switzerland. Unfortunately I have not been able to peruse these journals as I do not r_e ad Czech, but I am told that their basic thesis !s the need for t he party masses to sub mlt to Jeadershlp by the elite cadre. Bellak was formerly a Communist Party functionary in Slovakia under the name of Berger. H e puts out a German-language sheet called "MH!tant Democra cy'" which few Germans read because it takes Stalin's anti• German line. Some of the staff members are left-wing sociallsts, such as J osef Kodicek, who helped put out pro..Sovlet propaganda over BBC durln g the war, and Ma,rtin K vetko. who partlclp ated in a Communist-sponsored uprising In 1S!ovakia in August 1944. Pavel Tlgrld (formerly Schonfeld), Peroutka's asslstant, was for mer editor o f a magazlne called "Lift Culture" and has admltted openly havlng collaborated wlth th e Communists. Some of the lesser personnel are rather interestlng, such as Eva Fischl, daugh ter of the present Czech Communist amb assad or to Eastern Germ any, and Mesdames Kamlerova and Lisa. nov a who were speclalists in inclting riots against the German management of Camp Valka and who ostentatiously exhibited a plcture of Stalln In their room. There is a Mr. Stein, who is reported to be a Communist functionary from the Prague reglon. I do not k now whether he is tbe same Stein whom the Comm unlsts planted with BBC during tbe war. A FEW POl.lCY HEADACHES Tbe fact tbat the Natlonal Commlttee for a Free Europe gave the Benes party free relgn In personnel and pollcy matters for tbe Czech program of Radlo Free Europe h as ralsed a number of thorny problems. Some of these affeet only the station a.od tbe Commlttee. Other~ involved th e basic forelgn relatlons of tbe Unlted States. 36 SLOVAKIA To begin with, the broadcasts have evoked a very mixed reaction. Since the Slovaks in the Benes group {the renegade Slovaks) are those who have accepted tbe premise of a unitary Czecho-Slovak state, .iud since this attitude tends to color the political commentaries, the pro· gram is automatically distasteful to tbe overwhelming majority of patrlotlc Slovaks who are definitely anti-Commun!st. As one Slovak leader put it to me: "they speak our language but they do not apeak our thoughts." So far as the Czechs are concerned, the political orientatiou of the program is likely to appeal only to those who favor the Benes policy of ad vanced socialism bordering on Communism. These people won't find too much wrong with tbe Gottwalcl regime anyway. T he program holds out little hope for the Czech citizen who wants a positive pian for getting away from socialism and Soviet domination. In other words, it simply is not a clear-cut anti-Communist program. 'ľhe most that can be said about it is that it is an antl-the-particulargroup-of-Oommunists-who-Olappen-to-be-running-Czechoslovakia-at-lthe-moment program. It is doubtful whether Americans intended to put their money into financing sguabbles between rival groups of Communists and near-Communists. Another problem is essentially a technical one. The mission of the station requires that it have a good source of news from inside Czecho•Slovakia. At the present Ume, Radio Free Europe is trying to use the Moravec office as a source. Slnce, however, Moravec's only reliable agents {in the sense of getting there and back ) are also agents o( the Communist serret police, •Radio Free Europe is getting only such news as the Gottwald government cares to give it, which isn't too much. The other horn of this rlilemma is that if Radio Free Europe tries to set up its own couriers, the Communists within the Moravec outfit and within its O\ľll set-up can easily arrange for their liguida· tion. At the moment, the station is buying information from whomever will give it, and paying fan cy prices. The result is that enterprising Czechs are cooking up the most amazing stories; and the staff has no way of checking whether these stories are true or not. Even the collection of news material ad boc has run !nto diffiC'ulties. The individual ass!gned to collect news from the inmates ot Camp Valka, one Yaroslav Dvoracek, the leader of the Benes group in the camp is - to break the monotony - not a Communist nor even a fellow-traveler. He is a former member of the Czech Fasc ist Party of General Gayda. Unfortunately Mr. Dvoracck's activities were rudely interrupted on April 18, 1951 by the police. He was in jail, while I was there, awaiting trial on rharges of misappropriating CARE packages and clotbing sent by American friends to the Sokol or camp alhletic organization. On the Political side, the most immediate problem is that the anti-<Sudeten tendencies of Radio Free Europe's Czech-Slovak program are getting the Germans mad as hornets. There have already been !leveral protests by German refugee groups and a formal interpellation in the Bavarian parliament_ It was reported that plans for a formal protest to the United States by the Centra) German Government at I~nn were being consiclered. When I was in New York in March, I attempted to dlscuss tbe problem of German public relations wlth of- S LOVAKIA 37 ficials of the National Committee and was told, in effect, that since Radlo Free Europe would not broadcast in Germau no such problem wa.s anticipated. The station is, bowever, located in Germany. There are plenty of Sudeten Germans who can understand Czech and .they teli other G.ermans what they hear. Tbere is a public relations problem. If it gets m uch worse the Unit.ed States Government may find it necessary .to do something about it. N EEDED - A GOOD CLEANUP Before going further, I would like to point out that the criticisms ir, this report have been directed solely at the Czech and Slovak actlvities of Radio Free Europe. Nothing said here is intended to refer to any of the other programs, about which I am not informed. It would be too bad if the present fizzle in the Czech and Slovak program oť Radio Free Europe should cause people to ťeel the whole idea s hould be dropped. The pian is a splendid one if carried out properly. Whwt is needed is a thorough housecleaning in which all Communists and fellow-travelers are definitely and permanently f!red. Administration and program planning should be in the hands of Ameri· cans, who should lay down the political pollcy. Personnel investigations should be made by political analysts who know their h!story and are experts in comparative ideologies. In the case of the Czech program, the cleanup won't be easy since it involves the uprooting of a jungle of misinformation, prejudices and vested interests planted by Czech and "Czecho-Slovak" fellow-travelers over a number of years. The bistory of this crypto-Communist inf!uence on the State Department, American universities and the public in general is a wbole subject in itself, which would probably take a Congressional investlgation to unravel. • • • WHO SAID IT ? "There is one tbing we can express and interpret in full. It is the sincere, deep hearty and infinite gratitu'de of all Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet Union, to its people, its army and its skipper, Generalissimo Stalin, for everything that they have so far done and are stm doing for us. It is the unfalsified, unselfisb and pure feeling of friend• ship and sympathy that we bave for this great, for us so intimate and n eighborly a country. It is the pure joy from the joys of the successes and the progress of the USSR, it 1s the unshatterable hope that Slovanism in its new form will safeguard for itself and for the world a deserved peace, in which all nations antl states shall live their own Jives, freely, without fears, democratlcally and In dignity, in agreement, welfare and happiness. In this spirit from our souls we greet the jubileeing USSR, we congratulate it from our hearts for the results attained ln peace and war. We wish that it keep on prospering, flourishing and growing mighty unto its own greatness, but also unto the welfare of all mankind. Long live the Soviet Union and may its Soviet chief and skipper, J. V. Stalin, in full health live to see many more of its joyous jubilees." - Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, ČAS, 11-7-47.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource How Free is Radio Free Europe? Description An account of the resource Kurt Glasser Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 25-37 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Glaser, Kurt, 1914-1993 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/3a30f0930fb14252cce15b5ae15d325c.pdf 67b79a93269b6588ade3875e6c82c94e PDF Text Text AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law �2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial �SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European �SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. �Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. �6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· �SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt �8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . �SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the �10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- �SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. �12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l �SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, �14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was �SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. �16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided �SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng �18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f �SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. �20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? �SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. �JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: �SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. �24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document AUGUST, 1952 SLOVAKIA THE CASE OF DR. JOSEPH TISO B Y DR. M ICHAEL ZIBRIN F rom a legal standpo111t. the case of Dľ. Joseph Tlso may be di"ided into two parts, the first part taking place in the American Zone of Germany, and the second part in the National Court or Bratislava, the capltal of Slovakia. 1 was a witness at the Nuremberg T rials, where I had taken copious notes. There 1 met people in Czecho-Slovak uniforms who had Slo vak and Czech-souncling names, but spoke with a strong Magyar and German accent. Tbey were neither Czech nor Slovak by origin. One army captain could not even speak Czech correctly. These people were under Major Ečer, a Ieft·"' inger, wbo had borrowed the title or " General." His department boasted that it had tracked down Hr . .tosepb Tiso. President of the independent State of Slovakia and, later, alao the entire Goveľllment of the Slovak Republic. Ečer and bis group were sent to Germany by the Provislonal ľzecho-Slovak Government of Dr. J ohn Šrámek (the premier), but rbey were in contact more with Dr. Hubert Ripka or directly witb Dr. l~dward Beneš than they were with Šrámek. Formally, they were to <"Oncern themselves w!th Cze<"ho-Slovak refugees as a I enatriation c-ominission and also follow the Nuremberg Trials against war criminals. Tbey had a department for eve•·yth lng; and experts In every de1,artment. Of course. Ečer's outfit had at it~ disposal huge sum., of money to tr ack down the members of the Government of the Slovak Republlc, and especially P resident Tiso. When Beneš returned to l'rague. Ečer recelved his instructlons directly from bim. NO POLITICAL ASYLUM FOR TI SO After Presldent Tlso and thP Slovak Government !1ad fJeJ Sloľakia in Apríl, 1945. tbey sought ref11ge in Kremsmiinster Tbe Iast .,.et>k ot Aprll, Dr. Joseph Tlso set 0 111. for Mnnich to Carclinal Faul•11 1>er's residence, but was delayed two days in bis jOtl''D';!Y, oecause Munlch was occupied by the Aroeri()an Army by April 30. 194á. It was th•1~ t hat Dr. Josepb Tlso became senarated trom his Government and had a bsolutely no contact with 1I. That explains wby l:!•3 signature ;5 mil'~lng on the "Surrender No•t>·' of May 8. 1945, wbirh w1s b anded !o fi 0 1eral Walton H. Walker or thf' Amerlcan Army in J< .. 0 .nsmiinst.er. .\.r!C'0rd,ng to a report In the "STARS AN D ST R!"~:S" at that ••mP when Dr. J osepb Tiso C'Onld not reach l\funich. h .. •·"!tire.i to a umall monastery in Bavaria, wbere he remainerl until mi!irnry unlls Jlicked bim up for questloning and then Jed hlm off to 111 "itnerican roncentration renter. Tlso reroained in the roncentra• :on r 11 mp ror Quite some Ume. He was questionecl not only by Amerlcan •·1thoritles. but also by Ečer's soldlers until, finally. he was surren,➔ ..red by t)Je lT. S. ·Army to Ečer and taken to Prague In November 194u, This. in short, relates to the first part ot Tii;o's case, h :, we čan­ not pass it over so llgbtly. because hls brief account éontalns many tpgal lncons'ÍRtencies. náy even illegalltles, and is contrar y to every·thing whtch has heretofore or therellfter taken place anywbere· irÍrPtnlltion-ally aťrordlng to AmeriC'an Law 2 SLOVAKIA As soon as the Slovak Government of Dr. Stephen Tlso, a co usin ol Dr. Joseph Tiso, in the name of all t he refugees fľom S lovakia, handed over to the representative of the American Army the note given below and subjected itself to its commands, at that moment the status of all escapees and, therefore, even that of the leading Slovak politlcos, should have been considered according to international practices and American la,ws, where the right of asylum, except in this one case, had never before been vlolated, at least not as far as I can recollect. The "Surrender Note" of the Slovak Government to the Ameri• cau Army read as tollows: GOVERNMENT IN EXILE AT KREMSM0NSTER, AUSTRIA SLOVAKIAN To Lieuteuant General Walton H. Walker of the U. S. Army For the Commanding General XX Corps of the U. S. Army On behalf of the S lovakia n Government In exile at Krems• miinster, Austria, I, Dr. Štefan Tiso, as Prime Minister thereof, . do submit myself, the members of my Government, our famílied and our governmental policy completely to the Comm anding General of the XX Corps of the Third Army of the United State:1. W e submit ourselves for such disposltion as may b e wise and ordered by the Allied High Comand. We beg full protectlon of the Armies of the United States in whose homeland are living about one-thlrd of our natlon and accept the democratic prlnciples of the people, for the people and by the people. W e take the liberty on this occasion to beg for protection for the entire Slov,ak colony whlch was forced to leave its country and is now iu Kremsmiinster, Austria, also for a ll our couu• trymen who live in territories occupled by the Allied forces. Kremsmiinster, 1fay 8, 1945. (Seal of the Prime Ministry) Dr. Štefan Tiso, Premier. Or. Mikuláš Pružinský, Mlnister of Financa. Medricky, Minister of Agrlculture. Kočiš, Minister of Education. T. J. Gašpar, Deputy. W. O. Collier, Brig. Gen. U. S. Army. T. O. Curtls, Col. G. S. C. Davld W. Allard, Capt. Inf. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE STARTS TISO ON ROAD TO GALLOWS True it is that all the Allies met in London as a joint International Commisslon to discuss the punishment of "War Crininals." Dr. Ečer was the Czecho·Slovak member of this Commlssion. It is also true that certain directives were agreed tiPOn for the surrender of war crlminals to indlvidual states on whose terrltorles the gullty or accused were supposed to have committed war crimes. Offlcial SLOVAKIA 3 clocuments o( the Supreme Command o( the United Armies are supposed to tel1 ns jnst how many times such surrenders were effected, the negotiations that took pla<'e. as well as the decision reached ln each <'ase. Copies of these documenL~ were sent automatically to the Nuremberg Court to ascertain whether the persons to be surrenderecl to indivldual states ,vere needed or not at any bearings of the Court. or wbether the Court itself intended to try tbe lndividuals in questlon. 1 checked over these documents quite thoroughly but failed to flnd ?.nything of the sort relating to Dr. Joseph Tiso, or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso. I am, therefore, inclined to believe tbe whispered reports which circulated in Nuremberg át that tíme both among the Allies and the members of Ečer's commisslon tbat the surrender ot Dr. Joseph Tlso was not in accord with accepted legal precepts or p1,actices and that some violations of accepted laws and practlces had occurred in Tiso's case. On June 25th, and agaln on J une 27, 1945, the Czecho-Slovak Hadio clalmed that Dr. Joseph Tiso and, later, even ibe Slovak Government, were taken into custody by American authorities. Reports had it tbat they were transportecl to Pilsen. But the reports were false. Americans of Slovak descent were lntensely interested in the tate of Tiso and Slovakia. They requested their State Department not to surrender Tiso and the members of the Slovak Government to nenes• "Provisional Czechoslovak Government," because that certainly wo111<1 mean death for Tiso. But thls availed them nothing, Al the insistence of Benes' Government. the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. authoritles In Austrla to surrender Tiso and bis group to Benes' "Czechos lovak War Crimes Commisslon" wlthout even lnvestigating their statns as is evidenced from a letter of Actlng Secretary DEAN ACHESO~. written August 30, 19H. and published ln the "JEDNOTA" {Middlelown, Pa.) '.\{arch 5, 1947. Tbe letter read: "Since detalls concerning the surrender of Dr. Stephen Tiso and members of his Government are not available to the Department of State, a copy of your letlf'r has been transmittecl to the W ar Department together \ľith a request that the Secretary of War <'Ommunicate \ľl th you dlrectly on this particular matter. "A totJal of flfteen high officials af the former Slovak Government weľe arrested by the Unlted States Army at varions limes during tbe montbs of May and June. 1945. . . . "The arrest of these individuals and their rel ease to the CzechoSlovak Government was in conformity with United States policy re. garding the disposition of United Nations' nationals who cÓllaborated with or assisted the enemy. The policy is to apprehend such coJlat.orators as may be founcl within the jnrisdictión of tTnited States milltary authorities. to notify the respertive United Nations' Governments of such apprehension, and to hold such persons pending the clecision of the respective government~ as to their <lis_posltlon unless they are to de detained as war criminals or for other reasons. In view of ~bis policy, the Department of State, in October, 1945, informed the Commandíng General of thc Uníted States Forces, European SLOVAKJA T.beater, that the fifteen individuala in hia cuatody who had been membera of ·· the collaborationiat Slovak Government ahould be re• leaaed to the appropriate Czechoalovak authoritiea. They were handed over in November, 1945. . . . From Acbeson's letter it ls quite evldent that Benes' "Provision,u Czechoslovak Government" was included among the "United Natlon,ľ t:overnments." All Benes had to do 1, as label any citlzen of Czecho· Slovakia a "collaborator'' and the U. S. State Department, "in r.011 · tormity with United States policy" pursued at tbat tlme, delivered He11es' politicdl opponents to Ečer witbout even investlgating tbe cbll,rges of collaboration. American tradltions went down tbe draln. 'ľbe rigbt of political asylum, always regarded as something sacred by tbe people of tbe Unlted States was violated in the case of Tlso and the Slovak Government. Benes. it seems, could get away with everyt,blng, because he knew the right people. Tbe ract that he 1 esigned as president and left his country wheu it faced a grave r-risis aud tben congratulated bi~ successor, wbo was elected coasti· tutlonally, meant nuthing to the U. S. State Department. But. it meant certain death to many patriotic Slovaks and untolll sufferings to many t housands more. It !s quite certain that negotiations were tied u1> several t lme!I. because the Engllsh were reluctant to agree tbat 'ľi so be surrendered to Ečer at a tíme when Prague had alreally announcect his deliveraiLce to Ečer. No matter how tb.e events of that time were distorted, the ract remalns that an unexpected telepbone call from the airport was rec·eived during a session of tbe Prague Parliament, reportlng that Dr. Joseph Tiso was brought to Prague. Shortly thereafter, Minister Ko· pecký gleefully displayed a pboto taken at tbe Prague airport which showed bow Tiso was being led under heavy guard with bands bound by a cbain and a loc-k. All the Communlsl papers and eveu tbe organ of Šrámek's Czec-h Populist Party, LlDOVÁ DEMOKRACIA (People's IJemocracy), displayed the picture promlnently. . Shortly aftE>r bis arrlval in Pragne, Tl~o was transported to Bratislava. wbere one wing of the Jail was em.ptied to take care of bim and bis ľOmpan!ons Tbey werE> guarded not by ordlnary jail guards. bm by !',elect. members of tbe Nationality Securlty Ouard. EV ERYTHING SET AGAINST TISO Investigation of • Tiso began at onre. But not according to accepted practice and, bence. wbole month~ pasRed witbout a regular preparation to review tht: case of Dr Tlso. As ROOn as Tiso was, placed in the jail or the Federal Co11rt. bis case. arcording to the laws in force at that time. belonged before the National Conrt and the lnves1:gation had to be made by the procurators or prosecutlng attorneys or tbe Natlonal Court. The prosecuting attornP.vs assigned to prosecute '.ľiso and his group were: Dr. George Šujan. Dr. l{lgan and Dr. Ra§la. Since each prosecutor waR assigned particular persons to prosecute. the whole investlgatlon suffered from a taek of unity ancl wa.s casual; hence, lt could malte little headway. Secondly, tbe prosecutlon. it seems. could not or dld not wan t to flnd any wltnesses besldes those who were arreste,I. Sl,OVAKIA 5 And, thirdly, the Prague State Court constautly kept sendlng c1emands to have Dr. Tiso tPstiľy Iu varlous cases which were tried there. T lso was beard as a w1tness, and theše hearings took up much of tbe .tlme of the inveseigating organs. And so, for techoical reasons, as well as polltical efforts to oostpone Dr. Tlso's trial, the case of Dr. Tiso was not even ready up 10 the electlons or May, 1946, and, hence, could not even get started before tbat time. as the Communlsts had reckoned that it would. They exerted tremendous pressure to have the trial begln before the elections. but there were so many compllcatlons that it was imposslble to do so. After the electlons wblť'h the Slovak Democratic Party had won so decisively and In which tn<> promis,i of sparing Tiso's llfe plaýéd such a prominent role, it appeared for a time that Dr. Joseph Tlso would get a fair tria!. There is a great dlfference between a court and a court When a person appears in court, there can be doubts and objectlons as to bis personallty and morallty. The C'ourt exlsts for tbe purpose of removing such doubts; when that happens , the accused person Ie morally rehabl»tated. Very grave charges were made agalnst Tls o not only In the emigratlon. of Dr. Beneš, but also on the podlum of the Prague parllament. l3ut there al"o were promises and guarantees that t he worst would not happen. 'rhe beginning of 1946 was s igniflcant for its polltical ferment. witb pressure on the Slovak Democratlc Party. and the pressure or Dr. Beneš and the Prague Government on the supreme rlgbts or a soverelgn nation. These rlghts. it was thought. the Slovak NaUonal Coun<'ll, beaded by Dr. Joseph Lettrlch, had been assured by the socalled Košie.e Agreement of March 2. 1945. Tberefore, whatever t.he representatlves of tbe Slovak Natlonal C'ouncll had willingly ylelded to the Benešltt>s and the Zenklltes must be evaluated in terms of the infltu•nce these concesslons had on the fate of Dr. Joseph Tlso. If -w e woul<I glauce over t he resolutlons ot the Slovak National ('ounc il of March 2. 1945. wbere that body stressed the plcture ot Hate llte as it visuallzed it, t hen there !s llttle dlfference between 1hat co.n<'eption and the Slovak State as lt actually was. And lf the a:c<'epted princlples and resolutions had been adhered to and not devlated trom after t he electlons, In whlch the Slovak Democratlc Party had beaten t he Commnnlsts cleclslvely, Dr. Tlso unquestlonably would bave been allve today. From Aprll to June, 1943. Šrám ek's provislonal Czecho-Slovak Government In T,ondon was preparing the St.ate Act. whicb was pro<'lalmed' ón Jnne 30, 1943. It was plalnly evldent that thls act tbreat: Pned Tis6 and the entlre body of the Slovak Government. On March 2, 1945, the Slovak Natlonal Council clemanded In the very tlrst paragraph of the KošlcP Agreement that the new government of Czecho-Slovakla decJare that it does not identity itselt wlth tbe proclamatlon or June 30, 1943, of the Czecho-Slovak Government in I..ondon. 6 SLOVAKIA BE N EŠ H A S HIS WAY Shortly after arrivin~ in Prague, Dr. Edward Ileneš formally betray~d · Ruthenia to the U .,S.S.R., and, being recognized by Stalin, felt that he \ľas firmly in the saddle again. Alrea.dy on June 22, 1945, be demanded that the Slovaks relinqulsh what they had voted for on ?>farch 2, 1945. Dr. Beneš disregarded the wishes of tbe Slovak majority and begau to push bis own exponents to the forefront - Slávik. Hečka, etc. but when this dld not go well for bim, he turned to Dr. Vavro Šrobár •and Dr. Vladimír Clementis and several other more compliant persons wbo were willing to repudlate everything tbat Beneš had to promise in Moscow and Košice. Clementis was a leading Communist In Slovakia, while Dr. Šrobár, whom Beneš had named Financa Minister against the will off tbe entire Slovak Nalional Councll, was the foremost proponent of Beneš's National Socialism among the Slovaks. Confrontea w1th the promises he had made and the note wlllcb he had seut to the Slovak National Council trom London by means or Ursíny and Novomeský, Dr. Beneš sald that these were forced out ot him, just as the Pittsburgh Pact of 1918 had been forced on Masaryk. And, he aclded, tbat "everything was not in order even in MosBeneš remonstrated and demonstrated that an absolutely indeJJendent Slovakia was out of the question, that the threat of Russia was ever present, and that after Rutheuia, Slovakia woulcl surely be next in line for absorption by the USSR. The dlscussions and debates finally ended with the first. Prague Treaty of June 2, 1945. whiC'h cleflned the ľunctions of the various ministries, the matters 011 wbicb only the Prague Government could rule, and the matters that ,ľere s11ppose<1 to belong to the competency of tbe Slovak Natlonal Council. It is rathe r amusing that the seventh article of tbat Prague Agreement stated that tbe seat of he Supreme Court would -be in Hrntislava. That seat is still in Prague as it always had been. DEMOCRATS W IN E L ECTION S, B U T L OS E EVERYT HI N G Agreement or no agreement. Dr. 13eneš and bis Goľernment did what they pleased. Llfe in the state went according to the Prague Agreement more or less untll April 1946 - a month before the flrst JJOSt-war parliamentary elections. Then beli itself broke loose • The Slovak Democratic Party was attacked furiously by all Czech partles, being incited by Beneš, as well as the Communists. Despite this, ho,i,·ever. notbing can justify tbose "ho concluded tbe Prague Agreement of June 22, 1945. Even though the Freedom Party came into being at that Ume with money supplied by Šrobár, Beneš ancl thP Communists, or wa.« organized by Široký, and the concessions, made at a tíme when the Communists strongly demanded thE' tria! of Dr. Joseph Tlso, may in ~ome way be justified, there is no one who can teli me that Lettrlch was in any ,ľay justified to renounce the right to gra.nt amnesty. The man who did that knew well that Tiso was in the custody oľ the Fecleral Court in Bratislava and that he was surrendered from Slovak juriscliction ·into the hands of Beneš and the Czechs who hated him fanatically and undivldedly. ····· SLOVAKIA 7 Iu Article 1 of the second Prague Agreement there is a section O, which speaks about clemency and states: "The President of tbe Republic grants mercy even in Slovakia and that also in matters which belong before the People's Courts and the National Court - on the motion of the Commissloner of Justice, who presents lt to the Government through the Officers of tbe Slovak NaUonal Council; the Government then returns the motion to tbe Ofticers of tbe Slovak National Council, if it has objections against it from the standpoint of all-state interests. bnt otherwise presents it to the President of the Republlc." When Dr. Lettriťh together with John Ursiny presented this agreement to the officers of the Democratic Party for approval and later a lso, when they explained it, expressly gave assurances that before signing this agreement they had dellberated with Dr. Beneš and that he ha.cl deflnltely promised and assured them that he would grant mercy to Dr. Tiso and they could safely transfer the power ot amnesty to bim. It is interesling, however, that nothing about tbis assurance ls D1entioned either in Dr. Kvetko's book, whlch was published in Bratislava in 1947, or in the article of Dr. Lettrich which descrlbes the case or Dr. Tiso. In bis articles Dr. Lettrich refers to the assurance of Dr. Beneš of September 1946 in Topoľčianky, where Beneš expressly promised that he would grant mercy to 'ľiso and added: "By my declsion I shall not cause any complications in Slovakia." In evaluating the truth and the proclamations of Beneš we must admit that in June, 1945, both presidents of the Slovak National Counc!I - Schmldtke, as well as Lettrich - had expressed themselves very sharply against Tlso in offlclal manifestations, when they already knew that Dr. Tlso was under arrest in Bavaria slnce June 9, 1945. We must not forget tbat the Premier at that time was Fierlinger who had attacked Tlso very sharply, and aJ.so the Democratic Party for standing back of Tiso. Per· 5onal expressions of Beneš, sneh as "Tiso wi ll hang," were known •o Lettrich and also to Ursiny. And that is more reason why they ;,honld have considered well whether they could believe Beneš, slnce they themselves had sald on various occasions, relating from their own P.Xperiences, that Beneš cannot be believed and especially not when be was concerned with the problem of savlng or destroying an enemy which he hated so insanely as he dld Dr. Joseph Tlso. As soon as the second Prague Agreement went into effect, Tiso c-ould have been saved only before the Court, if the Court would have rendered any other verdict but that of death. Despite the fact that Tiso's fate was sealed In such a way, we must not · end this chapter after the second Prague Agreement, because, in my oplnion, it is just at such limes that people prove best whether they possess character and a spina! column. L ETTRICH'S PRE-E LECTION PROMISES I know that many „people pleaded with :Beneš to grant clemency to· TiS-O even before the tria! was lnitlated. Beneš promlsed everybody ·that he would. But despite Beneš's promlse, leadlng polltlclans o! the Rlov1tk Democratlc Party should not have believed bim. if they thougbt 8 SLOVAKIA seriously and bonorably about tbe promises the Party had giveo tbe representatives of the Catbolic wing. Io Aprll 1946, the ,econd Prague agreemeot wa.s not tbe ooly iigreement made; an agreement was also concluded witb tb.e so-called <..:atbolic wing of tbe Democratic Party, wbicb was actlng more lndel'endeotly, and foť quite a Ume it was not known wbetber or not lt would bolt tbe Democratlc Party and join wltb tbe Freedom Party. Tbis so-called Catbolic agreement of tbe Democratlc Party was attacked viciously not only by tbe Communists, but also by tbe Beaeš Czechs. One of tbe main polnts of this agreement, even tbougb lt was oot expressed in writing, was that Tiso's life would be spared. In tbe May, 1946 elections, the Communists suftered a territlc l;teing, tbe Democratlc Party taking 62 per cent of the total vote cast iu Slovakia. So. everybody, especially tbose who voted for tbe Democratlc Party candidates, thought that the Party would keep lts pro mise to save the life of Dr. Tiso. The <..:ommunists and various representatives of tbe Trade Uuions, ho" ever. kept poundlng the tables all summer in 1946 to instltute the tria! of Tiso. It was clear that the matter could not bé delayed ľor long. Suddenly in the second half or October, 1946, without the Tiso matter stralghtened out, Dr. Lettrlch embarked on a visit to tbe llnlted States. Lettrlch claims that before his departure he had come to ao uoclerstandlng witb Pollák and Cvinček, Vice-Presidents of tbe Slovak ,\ .'atlonal Council, tbat the matter would not be asslgned to the Natio nal Court oefore h1s return home. Cvinček, however, denled that Lettrlcb had ,ald anything of the sort. But even 1t if was the trutn, !r is a very weak and slok alibi. Dr. Lettrloh was aware of the fa.cc , na· whlle he 1\!'aS preslrlent of the Slovak Natlonal Councll, tbe Com• •nunists got i.ny one tbey wanted on the Councll of Commissloners. Aud he knew that tbe most important minlstry, the Mlnlstry of tbe lnterlor, did not go to a member of the strongest party, but, lt was said, to a 11on-party man, Beneš's man, a servant of the Communlsts, tó General Ferjenčik. Tbe signature of Dr. Lettrich is on Ferjenčik's deoree. Arter tbese experiences could Lettr!ch belleve that Cvinček and Pollák would be able to hold the )lne w!thout hlm, when he hlmseU adm!ts in hls artlcle that Milan Pollák was uncertaln, tick.le and for tbe executlon of Dr. Tiso? · · The fact ls that after the departure ot Dr. Lettrlch, the case ot Dr. Tlso was presented to the National Court, and tbe presldent of the court senate became the feared Dr. Igor Da.xner, And here I see for Uié second Ume the sealed will of Dr. Beneš to bang Tlso at all costs. And for the second tlme I see Tlso's fate sealed with the a.s· slsiance of the representatlves of the Slovak Democratlc Party despite the promises and obllgatlons to tbe eleotorate. " I W tL L HANG OR. T ISO!" · Wben Dr. Daxner was allowed to become tbe presiding judge, 1Íolbfog good could be expected. All the assumptlons in thls regard XJaxner manitested by hls behavlor long before the tria! -and proved lt afterward. ·: . SLOVAKIA 9 The day before the date of the main hearing was set, I myselt waé convinced of thls when I tried to help to remove Daxner. The Communiste, however, were so firmly anchored in the Slovak NaUonal Council that Dr. Daxner was approved as preslding judge of the National Court wlthout any dltflculty. On November 18, 1946, the National Court was supposed to eonvene an"d,determine the term of the maln hearing, begin the trlal anil present the decument ot charges agalnst Tiso. The previous day, when I had gone to Dr. Daxner to ask for a permanent admlttance pass to tbe tria!, Dr. Daxner began to argue and tried to persuade me to go along wlbh ševčik and Pollák, and not with the "popullsts and separatlsts." He asked me to follow the tria! of Dr.l Tlso and use my lnfluence In the Democratlc Party so that lt would not ldentlfy Itself wlth Dr. Tlso and would not make any dlfflculties for Da.xner. When I retueed, he banged bis flst on the table and screamed: "You are doing wrong. The Communiata will devour you, tear you to piecea, and I will hang Dr. Tiao!"1 tried to quiet bim ciown and cautioned him 'that a judge should not talk that way and that lt also was against the law for a judge to express his opinion so resolutely against the accused. But Daxner oniy grew more exclted, banged the table agaln and agaln and yelled: " Do whatever you want to, but I shall hang him !" I related the incident to Andrew Cvlnček, addlng that I was williog to teit:fy to it a.t any th:p.e. I reminded hlm that I knew Daxner well. I knew that Daxner WltS a paralytlc, a sadlst and a person of very bad mora! and · spirltual qualitles. I also told hlm that I did not belleve that Beneš would grant amnesty to Dr. Tlso. I refused to talk about the matter before the body o! o!ficers of tbe Democratlc Party, because ševčik and Pollák were among them, and · r knew definitely that they were betraylng our matters to the Communlsts. In fact I knew that ševčík was a paid agent ot tbe )JKVD (secret police). Thereupon the offlcers or the Party named a five-member commlttee to hear my story. Urslny, Cvlnček and Dr. Pietor reallzed the gravity of the situatlon and promlsed to try to do somethlng in Prague before December 2, the date when the hearings in the case or Dr. Tiso were to be concluded. THE M OCK TRIAL BEGINS But, alas, nothing happened. On December 2, 1946, Dr. Daxner opened the tria! with Dr. Joseph Tlso before the Natlonal Court in Bratislav-a. The trial took place in the jury room. The prosecutlon was represented by Dr. Rigan, Dr. Šujan anu Dr. Rašla. Dr. Tlso ,via.s defended by Dr. Grečo and Dr. Ža!Íkay. That is how a correspondenťs repor.t would read. And tbat is jus t about how the reports of the Slovak Press Bureau lookec\. But the truth 1s altogether differenl Tlso's frlends and bis famlly had engaged the servlces of a very respectable counsellor, Dr. Lojek, to defend Tiso. However, as soon as D"r. Lojek presented the full authorlzatlon or Dr. Joseph Tlso, he was ordered to appear before the poliťe, who began to inVesfigate hlm. They as ked why he wanted to defend Tlso, who dlscussed the defe nse wlth htm, how much he was pald, and other Jess sensLble Queatlons. What Lojek actually went tbrough ls known only to bim and the 10 SLOVAKIA police. The fact is that he gave up the defense o[ Tiso, and there was nothing else for T!so to do but ask the court to provide defense counsels. This incident, !( everythiug else Iu the tria! against Tiso would be iu order, ra!sed a reasou.ab!e doubt that the tria! would be just and in order. At the same time it made people th!nk and assume that the tria! would be carried on according to some agreement, that it would be a forma! process and. therefore, could not be just and fair. In a word that everyth!ng was cut and drled and Tiso's fate was sealed. I do not press the faet that Dr. Daxner was the presiding judge, but for the sake of the truth I must remlnd that attempts were made to remove Daxner before lhe tria! started. Of course, the tria! wa.,; prepared and no one could degress from the prepared program or could successfully take exception to it. Besides Daxner, there were six attendant justices, one a judge by profession, and tbree attendant justices as a reserve, in case one or the other attendant justices would drop out or get sick. It is a universal custom, that against such a court - whether it be called a senate or a jury - the accused, the prosecutor and the defense have the rlght to testify whether a certain person is accepta ble to them or not, and, also to state wbat objections they might entertain against any person of lhe jury or court. Likewise the principle holds universaJJy that when one is proposed as a wltness he cannot be in tbe same tria! also as an attendant or part of the court, and much less so as the presid!ng judge of the court. Slnce the Slovak Democratic Party could uot remove Daxner, tbe defense attomeys tried to replace bim as was their right to do. In the first place they objected because Daxner was incarcerated during the Slovak Republic and, later, had expressed himself on various occasions that all the accused must be hanged and, therefore, it was evldent that he was prejudiced. According to all pena! laws. prejudlce 1s an excluding circumstance. Then they proposed to have Dr. Daxner as a witness to testify that after Da.·rner was freed from jail, Dr. Tlso had allowed bim to take over hls judgeshlp again. Alexander Mach wanted Daxner to testify that it was only by the grace of Mach that Daxner was freed from prison on the basis of the false med!cal testimony and a false X•Ray picture. Daxner simply admltted Mach's statement and proclaimed that bis testimony was no longer needed. As far as prejudice was concerned. he sa!d that the objection was not proper, because he sald he was objeetive, and imediately ordered the tria! to begin. AL L OBJECTION S OVE RRU L ED According to every Jaw. objections cannot be overruled by a •judge against whom they are made. This is a fundamental princlple of pena! procedure. But laws were no gulde for Daxner. He had only one gulde: to condude the process as speE!dily a.s poss!ble and render the verdict he had promlsed bis bosses. When the defense counsels saw that they were gett!ng nowhere, they began to tackle the matter from a Jegal standpoint. They ob- SLOVAKIA ll jected that the court was not made up properly, and that the de<:rees of lhe Slovak ::-l'ational Council about people's courts were not valid and, finally, that Dr. Tiso was not surrendered properly by the American occupation authorltles, as prescribed in accepted 1nter· natlonal regulations, but that Tiso was forcefully transported lnto Czecho-Slovakia without the knowledge of the four powers concerned, or only with the knowledge of one of those powers. The defense sald that if Tiso was a war crlmlnal, then bis surrender should have been determined by t he Internatlonal Tribunal in :-.1Uremberg. U he was not a war crimlnal, and the American General In command in Kremsmlinster May 8, 1945, accepted the capitulatlon or the Government of Dr. Stephen Tiso, then, in that case, all members of that Government, and so much more the Presldent, have the rlght the right of asylum, thls belng based on the following arguments: l. According to the Atlantlc Charter, i!IS\ted by the Presldent or llle United States and the Engllsh Prime Minister, every nation has the · right to choose the form of government under which it shall live· and to its own statehood; 2. the head of such a state was not subject to the legislative power of a foreign state for pena! acts, which may have been committed during the existence of and on the territory of such a State; 3. the Slovak State was recognized by some 27 States, including Great Britaln, with which it had diplomatlc rela· tions; also with the Soviet Union: 4. neither Great Drltain nor France agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso and, therefore, Dr. Tlso should be returned to Altčitting, in Bavaria, wbere on Jtme 9, 1945. he was arrested by American Military Police. 'l"hls contention o[ the defense still holds today. I myself can eonflrm that Britaln and France never agreed to the surrender of Dr. Tiso. According to the International Agreement oť J anuary 13, 1942, eoncluded in London, which refers to the Atlantlc Charter and the proclama.tion of Roosevelt and Churchill of October 25, 1941, lliternatlonii:lly only those criminals were to be surrendered who had undertaken, besides mllitary acts, such attacks against clvillzed populntions whlch were considered criminal among clvilized natlons. Tiso was not accused of such a crime. Furthermore, others who could be surrendered were those·,, who as occup,tnts, or representatives of occupants, committed or allowed to be committed punishable acts against the clvillan popu!a:tion. · Tiso was not accused of ,any such punlsha.ble acts by the In· habitants of the ló Slovak vlllages which were taken by the Slovak Hepubllc from the Polish territory. If, however, he or bis subordinates had commltted a pena! act on Pollsh terrltory, then, accordlng to the agreement above, Dr. Tiso could be accused only by the Poles and tried II! Warsaw. . Na.turally, Dr. Daxner repucliated any and all such objectlons and announced that bis court was competent to try Dr. Tlso. Then the tleťense counsels requested that the tria! take place before a regular and not before a revolutionary national court, because all the preferred pena! acts were commltted before the two decrees of 1945 ot tbe Slovak National Councll were effective. The defense clalmed that only Cor pena! acts commltted after the issuance of some pena! form ,vas 1-t posslble to carry ·on a pena! procedure arcording to sucb a norm. 12 SLOVAKIA even though penal sanctions remain according to some Jater norm. The pena! procedure itself, however, should be carrled on according to thé norma! penal oťder. Even Tlso hlmself declared that he dld not recognlze the decree of the Slovak National Court, by whlch the socalled National Court and the People's Courts were establlshed, because he was under arrest trom June 9, 1945, and, therefore, could not have committed any pena! act against the regulations lssued by the Slovak National Councll. We la.wyers had debated whole hours before the Tiso tria! · about these very weighty Jegal problems and then even durlng the trial, but Daxner repudiated them in a s ingle moment by banglng on the table and screaming: "I . repudiate all objections. ľll take care of all pena! procedures here!" And that is how the tria) against Tiso began. Up to that tíme, the tria) room was fllled wlth Slovak and Czech reporters and forelgn observers, but after that moment all who were not resldents of Bratislava left the proceedlngs, because they reallzed that the fate of Tlso was sealed and only a mock tria) was to be staged. During the two hours, which I have thus f.ar desctibed, Daxner several tlmes howled llke a jackall, banged on the table and threat• ened Dr. ~abkay, and even Dr. Kšinan, who defended Mach, tbat he would tbrow tbem out of the court room. The whole procedure was recorded on sound tape and tbat evenlng the newsmen wbo _gave a report. about the trial, p•ayed this portion of the recorded tape, wblch was falthfully recorded. The popula.tlon of Slovakl-a bega.n to sound off because of Da.xner's conduct. Tbe Democratic Party and lts representatlv01, were the target of bitter and viclous attacks; the people inslsted that the Party keep lts promlses. It began to be generally sald that Tiso's verdict was already settled and that what• ever Da.xner was doing was only a comedy. Desplte the fact that tbi!I was true, thls process nevertheless. brought out some hlstorical trutbs which we shall need In the future and whicb without tbi.B trial would not have come to l!ght. Wh~n Dr. Žabkay rose to bis feet on March 6th and said only t.hree words - "Prosim, aby bolo ..." ("l beg, in order that lt be") he was lnterrupted by Daxner who jumped to bis feet and barked: "Tbe court overrules tbat!" When Žabkay protested and explained that the court could not overrule something which he had not al! yet aaid, Dr. Daxner bellowed: "But I tel1 you tbat the court does over• rule lt!" THE W I TNESSES The wltnesses who testified in the Tlso tria) might be ·p laced in three categories: . • l, The Catholic clergymen toward whom I)axner acted . arro· gantly. I thtnk tbat it was on account or tbem that Dr. Tiso decided tQ (!Pl!&k In h!s own defen$e, They were Archblshop Charles Kmefko and BJshop Michael Bm;alka. From the leg.al standpo!nt, I regarded it as the greatest tnsult When Dr.. Daxner announced in the name of the Court that , he woul<l SLOVAKIA 13 not swear ln tbese witnesses. Ordinarily, according to prevalling la.ws in Europe, the court does not swear in a wltness when there are reasons why it does not want to believe hlm. That 1s, In Europe a witness is first heard and then the court determlnes whether he ah!Wi be sworn io or not. Daxner's conduct was openly provocatlve and in· s ulting to disbonor such a serlous, aged man, as was Dr. Kmetko, wbo was respected by all decent Slovaks regar-dless of thelr rellgious beliefs. It is sigo1ficant that at tbe time Dr. Kmeťko was teslfylng, the Czech Catholic clergymen had several deliberatlons and lssued memoranda and reports, but displayed practically no open interest in what was happening In Slovakia. Not even Archbishop Joseph Beran, the Czech Primate, could find anything to say in tbe interest of the honor of the Catholic priesthood of Slovakia representéd by Pr, KmeCko. Tbe Czech clergymen followed Beran's example and. failed to ralse their volces and to rally tbe Catholic Czechs !n defense ot Justlce and righteousness. 2. In· the second category belonged the Slovak members of Gottwa.lďs government, namely, Ursiny and Lichner. Daxner talked to Ursíny as thóuugh he were an underling. From flve meters away Daxner greeted htm: "Why we, Mr. VlcePreinler of the Government, know each otber well, because we or• ganlzed the underground together." - Ursíny broke out lnto a broad s mlle and said nothing, though he should bave said: You, Mr. presidlng judge, were nowhere and did nothing, unless you were in some tavern, Sir, and there I, John Ursíny, did not go. Otberwise Ursíny did not say anything substantial, except that 'ľiso did not want bim in the Slovak Government. nor in the Peasant Banks, and that he was In the concentratlon camp at Illava for three days, but was not beaten there and was fed well. Daxner exploited Ursiny, however, by using general expres11ions, s·uch as, "Why we know that ... Why we did that together ... Why that does not have to be explained to us." Of course, the Communist press immediately glorified Daxner as a great hero of the underground movement, to whose actlvlty_ UT· Ríny hlmself had attested. Minlste.r .Tohn Lichner, however. ,v,as a witness of another type. Daxner did not welcome bim with a smile or a greetlng, but with the questlon: "You were a minister of Dr. Tiso's Government?" - He -then asked Lichner whether he traveled and delivered speeches in a uniform of tbe (Hlinka) Guard and why Tiso later dlsmlseed hlm. ' .Licbner expla!ned as best he could, but it must have been evident even to hlm tbat Daxner was not even remotely lnterestjid. 3. The third group of witnesses was the most interestlng. I be· ·11evé I can· characterize thls group properly, because I had wltnessed t hé N'uremberg trlals. There I saw ield Marshal von Paulus go before the :rrtternational Trlbunal, and in Bratislava I saw General Ferdin,and Čatld!ľ go béfore the National Cou-rt. Both men had much in common Both were soldlers, generals; thelr appearance In court w.as .a -surprlse; and both appeared a.t a time when lt. was opportune for tbe. Commun!sta and einbárrasslng for the defense. · In Nuremberg, ·Goerlng read romances and detectlve storles and generally was not lnterested In the tria!. When, to hls great surprlse, 14 SLOVAKTA the American Police brought Paulus, the heroic "defender" of Stalingrad, into the court room, Goering for a moment took off bis glasses, looked around, llstened and then said to the leading personaJities of the German General Staff: "'Fhis is hopeless ! this is swinishness ! " Should I repeat only thls sentence In reference to Čatloš, I would help the reader of these lines, because the result wlll be the same. Paulus entered the Nuremberg court room slowly with a oautious step; he was attired in an elegant dark blue sult, a starc-hed whJte s hirt, as if it was out of porcelain. He spoke slowly and pretended to be deaf; bis eyes were glassy, his frame strlkingly numb, and hli< eyes up1ifted almost straight to the heavens. The same could be s-ald for Čatloš. He, too, was dressed In a dark blue suit and was about twice as deaf as Paulus; but bis eyes, s tance were the same - just as if twlns appeared on two different stages. Paulus saw nothing but evil in everythlng that Hitler dld. Čatloš tried to prove to Tiso that he knew about all thlngs - the posslble and the impossible - because he, Čatloš, reported to bim on everything every morning ,at nine o'clock. Tlso smiled ironically and saíd: "To report, report he did, but whether he told me everything, I do not know." The fact is, according to what Čatloš said, that Čatloš sbould have sat in Tiso's place; for those acts Čatloš and not Tiso should have answered. It is interesting that bctb generals stuck to the orders or MosťOW, that they preferred to be deaf and more deaf, so tbey could speak slowly and thus have time to think thlngs over. Both held up faiľly well the first several hours, but then both slipped up a bit. Paulus was taken back to Moscow, and Catloš to the Rratislava jail. Later Catloš was taken to Prague, where Czéťh mllltary correspondents questloned him. I had not met Paulus before and, hence, did not know bim. But I knew Čatloš from my cbildhood days, and the last time I saw ·hlm was In September, 1939, in Prešov. The Catloš, who seven years later ťame to the court room of Dr. Daxner, seemed to be about twenty years older and bis mind compared wlth that or a tbird grader and not that of a general. I am wllling to testlfy under oath even today that the Catloš who sat before Daxner was not the master of his own wlll, tbat he was a broken man actlng under pressure of some one else. Catloš definitely was not a.ťtlng as a norma! person. Another such wltness was Dr. Martin Sokol, former Premier or the Slovak Parliament. The first day he acted as Catloš did; ma.ny t!mes he made it aggravating for Tiso; h e was stupified, deaf and gazed toward tbec eiling. On the second day Sokol reacted differently; as lf the Slovak environment began to affect bim and the lnjections were Joslng tbelr force (here I remind tbat the expression "!njectlons" was used by Dr. Tiso when answerlng ča.tloš); his answers took on a Slovak color and he talked clearly and lntelligently abotu the confllcts between Dr. Joseph Tlso and Dr. Vojtech Tuka. Dr. Sokol conld not revoke everytbing he had saia, but on the seťond day Dr. Sokol definitely appeared wlth bis old smlle in tbe lE>ft ťorner of bis month. nespite thlfl, bowever. the characteristic lnfluen('e.'! of Rmislan indodrinatlon were planlly evldent. This was SLOVAKIA 15 intluences also by the thlrd par:ticipant of the Moscow school, D1. John Spišiak, the former ambassador of the Slovak Republic in Budapest. Were I to repeat how Spišiak appeared and what he said, I would only be repeating what I had said about Paulus. It was the same school, the very same school wlthout regard to the fact where the s tudents dld the answerlng, whether In Athens, Budapest, Bratislava, or Prague. Then there was a special group, a group of German origin, who al one tlme or auother were actlve in Slovakia. As a Slovak, or as a defense couusel of Slovak orlgin, I would never rely on thelr testi• mony. I was very glad, nay even proud, that Dr. Tlso never appealed to the testimony of these Germans. We can thank Dr. Tlso that we do not have disputes s uch as the Czechs have among themselves over what answers of Ludin are correct and which are false. K. H. Frank, Hitler's man in Prague, signed a different protocol every hour before his death. According to one, Krajina was the leader of the Czech reslstance and, according to another, Dr. J . Krajina, the future secretary-general of Zenkľs party, was the greatest collaborator with the Germans . We Slovaks do not have such differences. And for that we can be thankful to Dr. Tlso, who never concerned himself with German testlmony. Defense speeches refuted the propriety of the court and demanded that Dr. Tiso be returned to the American occupation authoritles in Germany. They pointed out that if Tiso had acted in the manner of Daxner, Da.xner would today be a natlonal corpse and not the presldlng judge of the Natlonal Coun. The defense counsels further polnted out that General Kristin, :VIinister Široký and Minister Ďuriš - who were sentenced to dle. but were saved by Tlso - would have Jong been dead, if Tiso had followed Daxner's example. The defense demonstrated that it was not true, as the prosecu· tion stated, that America, Great Britain and France were at war with Slovakla, but conversely officers of the Slovak Army played tennis with Amerlcan flyers, because every one regarded them not as enemles, but as interned persons of a forelgn state. T H E V ERDICT : " DEATH" - A S FORECAST On the 18th of March, 1947, the Court adjourned to prepare the verdlct. Suddenly, llke a bolt out of clear sky, the report came at 10 P. M. on Apríl 14, 1947, when the officers of the Democratlc Party were in session, that Dr. Daxner had designated the next day, April 15, 1947, as the day he would render the verdict. The Ume was set for 9:0 OA. M. AU of us turned pale, because none of us had expected it. Of course, the Communists were not surprised at all, because they knew l'verything that Daxner was going to do. On Aprll 15, 1947 at 9:30 A. M. the rea.ding of the verdict be· gan; it lasted until 9 P. M. We had expected almost anything to happen. However, that a judge would subordinate hlmself or become subservient to a political party - that no lawyer, no senstble man expected to happen. lt was a s urprise for everybody. 16 SLOVAKIA After the verdict was rendered, the third pbase of the Dr, Tlso ca se began - the final chapter: the fight for amnesty. After the judge rendered the verdict of death on the gallows for Tiso,. Daxner asked the condemned Tiso whether he would request the Court for clemency. Tlso measured DaxneT carefully and said slowly: "I do ask for clemency on mora! grounds." Dr. Žabkay, the defense attorney, presented the Court the rea· sons why Tlso sbould receive mercy and asked tbe Court that Dr. Josepb Tiso's request be placed before tbe proper authorities without delay. Dr. Rigan, State Prosecutor, stated: "1 bave no objections against a favorable executlon or tbe request of Dr. Tiso for mercy." However, all the more disgraceful is wnat continued to take place In the secret sesslon of tbe Court Senate which, accordlng to Jaw, was supposed to consider the request or the condemned man and take a definite stand on it. Generally when the verdict rendered is not unanimous, that 1s wben al! the attendant justices do not vote for the same punishment, then amnesty 1s recommended, and the condemned man usually gets a 30-year or a lite sentence in prison. Tbe verdlct in Tiso's case was not unanimou11; in some things it was 5-2 and in others again 4-3 against Tiso. Here, then, were all t he prerequ!sltes for the Senate to recommend mercy for Tiso. But Da.'<ner, tbe presiding judge, by a Jong and violent procedure, prevailed in bis demand that tbe request of Dr. Tiso be not consldered, but handed over to the Commissar of Justice, Dr. Ivan Štefä.nlk, so that he mi~ht put it before the National Court. F ROM CAIPHAS TO PILATE - TO HE ROD Everything had to be done speedily, because only 48 bours remained <to study and debate the amnesty <1Ue0<tion, and during that time tbe matter had to pass through the Commlss-ary, tbe Slovak National Council, the Government and, finally, the matter could be resolved only by tbe presldent of the Czecbo-Slovak Re-public, Dr. Edward Beneš. Wednesd·ay mornlng, April 16, 1947, the Communi&ts began to demonstrate; deputations o( partisans and polltical prisoners began to pour toto the offlce of tbe S lovak National Councll, and it was feared that the Communists would start some disturbances and riots. The Commlssar delivered the documenl,; in the morning at 9: 00 A. M. to tbe President of !,he 'Slovak National Council, Dr. Joseph Let· trich, and requested that he not only take care of the documents at once, bll't at the same Ume that he place a recommendatlon for the request o! clemency. As s oon as Dr. štefánik prepared the necessary motlon. the officers of ,the 'SNC assembled a bit before 11: 00 A. M. to coni,ider the request of Dr. Joseph Tiso. . The two Communist members of this of!iclal body, Schmldtke and Dr. Horväth, did not attend the sesslon and notiffed the SNC that they \O'OUld Mt -attend lt. The request witb all documents, therefore, was to be consldered by three members of the Slovak Democratlc Party: Dr. Lettrich. Ml· lan Pollák 11nd Canon Msgr. ,Andrew Cvlnček. This tbreesome decided SLOVAKIA 17 that all the documents or Dr. 'ľiso, as well as the motlon or the Commissar and the request of Dr. Tiso, as prepared by Dr. Žabkay, shall be ceded to the Go\'ernment WľťHOUT COM:\1ENT or recommendation; also that they would immediately inform the Government by phone of their declslon and that they are sending their blghest officer, Dr. Martinček, by auto to Prague so that the documents might get tbere as soon as possible. If the president of the SNC had not made tbe so-called second agreement in Prague on Aprll 11, 1946, thereby surrendering its right to grant amnesty, tbe !ate or Dr. Tlso could have been de• ided with final validity by tbe tbree above-mentlooed members of tbe SNC. According to tbe new Jegal order, tbat is according to the fatal Prague agreement, it was obligatory on tbe motion of the Commissar for Justice to place documents before the Government. The latter then returns tbe recommendation to tbe praesldlum of tbe SNC i( it bas any objections to it from tbe standpoint of State lnterests; otherwlse it places it before the president of tbe Republic . That was the way tbe Jaw read. Tbe commissar did place tbe documents witb the opinion that amnesty be granted, but the praesidium of the SNC did not even do as muc b as the Commissar; witbout backing Tiso it surrendered al! documents and Tiso into tbe hands or tbe Government and Dr. Beneš. 'ľhis ls all tbat the Slovak National Councll said: "The doc uments, in the intent of agreement No. 2, art. 1, par. B, are being ceded to the presidency of the Government in Prague, April 17, 1947." Tbat is all and notbing more. Actually the three Democ rats, members or tbe Executlve or the SNC - of whom only Dr. Lettricb is alive today - did not even say a word in Tiso's bebalf; and none of them did anything about lt. 'ľhe people who criticized the way Dr. Lettrich acted, are stlll reproaching him for it today. On t he other band, the Government and l:leneš began to to wash their Judas' hands and said: well, how could we grant mercy, wben the Slovaks themselves -- even when no Communlsts were present, when only representatives of the Democratic Party were present, like Lettrich, Cvinček and Pollák - could not agree upon a word of recommendation? Of course, as far as the Government and Beneš are concerned. tbey knew better, even if such a senseless alibi partially was supported by the impossible stand of the SNC. But Dr. Lettrich never will be able to justlfy bis actlon before :rnyone in tbe world; and he must not be angry when the Slovaks and the Czechs claím that he is guilty for Tiso not getting clemency. For the sake or objectivity, I shall quote a few paragraphs from Lettriclťs hanclwritten report about those moments: "On April 17. 1947, when the praesidium of the SNC was assembllng, the situation was very difficult. Tbe Communists tbreate ned w-ith strikes and riots; the Oommissar of Jnstice dld not present a recommendatlon to grant mercy; and the request could hardly wln in the praes idíum of the SNC. That 1s to say, tbe praesidlum of the SNC had 5 members: three for the Democratic Party and two for the Slovak Communlst Party. One of the representatlves of the Democratíc Party was nnrertain: elther he would have voted against grantlng 18 SLO~A.KIA mercy or he would have ábstáined from voting. In both cases a ·majority was not assured for clemency: This was a delicate situation. It was necessary to flnd a way out. The idea was to get a recommendatlon !rom the Commissars for clemency and so forestall a posslble negatíve declsion of the praesidium o[ the SNC and outride au ominous, open politicaJ crisis, which could have had unforeseen consequences. "After dellberating the matter with political co-workers and after discussing it with the Communist members of the praesidium of the SNC, lt was decided that the SNC would return Tiso's request for mercy to the Commissar· or Justice; Commissar Dr. šte[ánik would complement lt with a positive recommendation for grantlng clemency and then would send · i t 'to · the praesidlum of the SNC. The latter would then agree that the Commissar's recommendati0)1, for granting mercy be placed before the Government with t he request to ·present it to the Pľesident for me1:itorious judgment." LETTRICH CANNOT ESCAPE BLAME FOR TISO'S DEATH - . Betwe~n my account and the h:µid-written account of Lettrlch there is the difference : I. clai~ that štefánik hlmself brought the documents to the praesidiuµi , 'ôt. the SNC and there immediately made the recommendation fo r clemency, whereupon the praesidium went into session at once. Almost to t he last moment before the praesldium began lts ses·s ion, I was in the same room in which thé meeting was to také place and I know definitely that Dr. Štefánik hád the documents with bim and that one of the secretaries - either Lettrich's Dr. Haviar, or Cvinček's Dr. Bystrický ·_ announced that the <.:ommunist members would not come to the meeting. When Dr. Lettricb knew that the Coinmunist members would be i.bsent, did he still fear that Milan Pollák alone would outvote bim? Wby did he not at least move a finger to indicate in some way that he would try to fulflll what he had promised bis constituents and wh'<tt it was his mora! duly to fulfill? He knew that the overwhelming majority or the population of Slovakia demanded everythlng possible be done to-save the life of Dr. Joseph Tiso. After the decision of the praesidium, I asked Cvinček why he agreed to such a solutlon. He expressly referred to Lettrich, who explained to him tbat according to Article 1, par. B of the Prague Document, the p'residency of the SN€ only' pre!lents• 'documents, but does not have to give its opinion about them, and ·that in law the right of opinion for the praesidium, of .the SNC doeS'·not exist. . I remember that · several members of the praesidium. of the Democratlc Party strongly crltlcized the prodeedings; óne · of, 'them, Dr. Emanuel Bohm, Js. In the U.S.A,, and ..,anotb,er,., Ing. K-orneJ . Filo is in France. Bohui made rep1w\<w,es1 ,~herejlS, li'ilo- in.sisted that everything wlthln the pow!lr_o! ,all,?f us, ou!íp,t ~.o b~,.~one sp ,that Ppague would grant c lemencr to ,Tiso. And .,he himself . 11oq ;~veral.,.o th~r ľri~n~s at. once cal)~d ' thelr_ tr\ends In Pragu_e; h1(?rixie.<;1_', thé1ii'.;ap,out the mistake tha.t wa~., made :an.d req\lested their lnteryenJlpq, w.!th, indivldual mlnis~ers. ~t' was_ t~ps ~hjl;~_.:prtina, Š,ráme,k°,J~</,.. oteers 'ťere <:alled. . . , , , , ,. When the _ge~?.ral. public ,;a_rq~iJ a~ou~ the maúer: .,tbe ó9yei-nment, ·:áeneš, nay _e_x~n ~ettrich, _rec~iv(ld ),i..u_ndredii pf lelegrams from Bratislava a.lone. · · f SLOVAKIA 19 The Ministers of the Democratic Party w.e re then already in Prague. Every one of them received telephone requests from us private and offlclal - to correct the mlstake. But all were pessimistlc, dominated by an "oh, whaľs the use" attltnde. For example, Dr. Johu Ursíny said by phone and two days Jater publicly stated that Zenkľs answer. after talking to bim over an hour was: - "For our voters it is impossible for us to vote for mercy for T iso and for us it is unprofitable." Zenkl repeated this also to other Ministers, w ho intervened for Tiso and, finally, he gave the same answer even to Dr. John Šrámek. BENEŠ'S ALIBI: THE SLOVAK$ DID IT The greatest surprise waa when our Ministers ascertained that even John Maaaryk would vote to reject the plea for mercy. 'rhis was one of J án Masaryk's most despicable deeds; I know not how 11 months later he alibied thls sin In the otber world. E ven individ,ľal church councils and superiors of various religlous bodies intervened in Prague in behalf of Tiso. On the other hand, the Trade Organizations, Jed by Dezider Benau, ·and other Communist organlzations includlng local units of industria! unions, demanded the execution of the verdict. The situation was tense, lndeed. The performance of the praes ldlnm of the SNC was condemned by every one. Tbus, for example, t he :p}lÁVO LIDU, organ of the Social Uemocrats, in a long article blamed the Slovaks for everylhing and in bold-faced letters sald: " It seemed that the SNC took a neutra) stand on the question and, tberefore, there was no reason for tne Prague govern ment to recommend to the Presirtent of the Republic to change everytbing in the verdict of the Slovak court. . . . Dr. Lettricb, president of the SNC and chairman of the Slovak De mocratic Party, has almost a two-1hlrds majority in Slovakla. And yet up to Wednesday he did not decide wh ether he should recommend to the Government to grant cle mency to Tiso." In the US A Czech Cathollc newsman Anthony Jandáček, wrote: " The bl.a.me for the execution of tbe verdlct of death rest!\ with sevoral weaklings, who did not oppose the Communist demand and, as official representatlves of the SNC. di d not even manage as mucb as to recommend to t he Presldent of the Republic to grant clemency." Furthermore. Jandáček ·said : "Dr. J oseph Lettrich shall once have a dlfflcult problem and task to explain why he was a weakllng and wby he did ,not recommend m ercy." The Amerlcan correspondent (NCWC) John l\lauthner similarly C'baracterlzed the whole procedure agalnst Dr. Tiso and especially the behavlor of the presidenC'y of the SNC. A. Ross. another American <'Orrespondent and hundrecls of others also expressed themsel\'es Rimilarly. Even before the Government renderecl a decision and Dr. Edwanl Deneš could express himself on the matter, the welghtle!!l step in behalf of Tlso was made. Archbisho o Xaverio Ritter. the Papal Jnter.nunclo In Prague. vislted Dr. Beneš. Despite Rltter's ardent JJ)ea for Tiso. Denell fulfilled what he had planned long ago and somet hing that several gentlemen attempted to Jegalize for bim. 20 SLOVAKJA The documents were not as yet in Prague, but the Government was called together at 5:00 P. M., because it thought that by that time they would certainly arrive. When they diel not arrive by 5: 00 P. M., Gottwald forced a vote which was not for the benefit of Ti5o. The Czech Populists and the Slovak Democrats voted for c lemency, while the others were for execution. We learned about this decision or the Government a few minutes after it was macle and, therefore, the praesidium of the Democratic Party m et again at the residence of Dr. Lettrich. Every one phoned to whom he could; even Lettrich attempted to get Beneš, hut could no t ľontact him. That certainly wa.5 strange, ·because at other times he could contact him in a matter or two minutes. At that fatal moment he could not reach Beneš. So telegrams were sent instead. An American correspondent for the NCCW characterized tbose telegrams thus: "The popularity of Dr. Lettrich quickly diminished, because in the whole question of Dr. Tiso he washed his hands and hesitated to personally request mercy for Tiso. Lettrich waited until Tiso was dead and then immediately he sent a telegraphic protest against the execution." In the USA we must recall and note that members of the GovernU\ent knew that the Communists were forcing the execution of Dr. Tiso, because they wanted to weaken t he Democratic Party. The Comruunists failed to weaken the DP in May, 1946, by forming the Freedom Party, so they sought to wreck it by forcing Tiso's execution. Every minister in Prague knew that very well and, without exception, every one was visited several limes and informed about this by some Slovak politician in Prague. These ministers, however, i.,referred to belp tbe Comnrnnfsts break np the anti-Communist ranks in Slovakia tban to vote clemency for Tiso. And today these same Czech politici ans are enjoying life in Washington, D. C.; among them are Zenkl, Ripka, Stránsky, and Mayer. As tar as I am concerned all these confirmed their collaboration with Communism when they voted to reject Tiso's plea for clemency. Tbe sbort session of the ministerial council was interrupted once for a sbort tíme, wben Ursíny and Šrámek requested the National Socialists to at least abstain from voting on the Tiso plea. Zenkl. howpver, would hear none of it. Tbe Government presented the motion to reject mercy, even tbough the court documents of Dr. Tiso were not even in Prague at the time, and Dr. Beneš, also witbout even looking at the documents, complied witb the motion and rejected the request for mercy as early as Wednesday, tbat is Apríl 16th. The rejection was announeed by tf'letype by Beneš's cbancery to the police station of Ferjenčík's cffice in the late night hours. However. wp had Beneš's decision by phone from Prague much earlier. BENEŠ WAS THE LAW It is interesting that Beneš, rejecting amnesty, diel not make usf' of the means prescribed by law and did not a.nnounce his decisfon by returning the documents through ttle praesidium of tbe SNC wbich would tben hand them over to tbe Commissar of Justice. Why did Beneš do that? Diel he not belleve tbem? SLOVAKIA 21 No. When Beneš rejected Tlso's request, the documents as yet were not in Prague and therefore he could not stamp the customary formula "nelze vyhoveli" (cannot be granted) on them. But he was interested in the execution taking place already Friday morning and, therefore, through bis servants, Ferjenčík's per· sonal office and Ferjenčik' s police, already on \Vednesrlay night, several hours after the decision of the Government, he notified Bratislava about bis decision and told them to be ready to go through with everything he had o rdered. Tbe Chief of Police announced this to Dr. L ettri<·h at midnight, and the State machinery at Bratislava began preparations for the execution, which no one could now stop according to law or regula· tions. On the morning of the second day, wben Dr. Daxner visited Tiso in bis ·celi to inform bim in tbe presence of hls counsellors that Beneš rejected the plea for mercy, the documents were not In Bratislava. AII were still in P rague and it was only about an hour later that the Presidenťs office placed the seal of the •Republic on them and the ;,ignalure of the Chief ef the Chancery. Tbe documents were not on hand when the Government made its clecision, or when the President macle bis clecision, or when Tiso was lnformed about the mat ter in bis cell by Daxner. Everything was done by telegrams. Wben Daxner lett Tiso's cell, Tiso's sister came to vtsit htm, then bis Jegal counsellors. wbile ever at bis slde was a Capuchln priest. At that ttm e tbere still were several sesslons and it was wbtspered in secret just what migbt yet be done in Tiso's bebalf. •TISO LOYA L TO GOD AND NATION TO T H E E N D Tiso. however, dlel not want to bear about any indication; very s harply he repeatecl what he had demonstratecl several limes during the trial: he was not concerned about his life. because if he. must make the sacrifice, he will do so proudly, but by no word or act would he change wbat he diel or saicl -as the Presiclent of Slovakia. This was also well known at tbat time and so it was with anxiety t hat the last ho·urs of Dr. Tiso were followed to see how all this woulcl thuncler over excitecl Slovakia. To the last moment Tiso was nnbroken, manly, just as he was before in the Court in macl Daxner's presence. wben he clefended bis truth and many limes crossed the interests of bis defense, who wanted to help bim. But Tlso never once in bis tria! clenied or revoked anything tbat he had proclaimed at any ti me. From his defense speech one sentence resonn<ied for hours in the E-ars of every llstener: "And if I were agaín placed by Provldence in a pos ition to deC"icle, I would decide, on tbe whole, tbe same way as I did In the past." Witb this sentence Dr. Tiso rejected even tbe Jast extenuating <·i rcumsta.nce. For tbe historian. Dr. Tiso even in the last moments of bis life gave the fundamental sketch and the greatest proof of his manliness. determination and steadfastness for everything that he had preached and done. JJ SLOVAKIA Two hours before bis execution he wrote bis final l egať'y it\ bis own hand, in which he demanded the nation to be barmonious and unite<I In the prosecution of the great princi ple "For God and for :s;ation" In every regard and at all times. His !lnal sentences, wriHen in tbe jail of tbe Federal Court are most serious sentences and the greatest proof of Tiso's personality. The next day "ČAS" was supposed to explain at length wby Tiso was denied clemency. Ferjenčíťs police, however, confiscated that issue, and tbe Slova.ks found out officially from the Communist ''PRAVDA" and the -broadcast of April 18th -- a report conslstlng of a single sentence - tbat the execution had taken place. TISO MORE DANGEROUS DEAD THAN ALIVE Tiso was dead. Ileneš's servants had done t heir work. -but tbe questton still remains unanswered: Why did the praestdium of the Slovak National Council refuse to surrender the corpse of Dr. Joseph 'ľlso so that it might be buried according to the rttes of the Catholiľ Church? Between the tíme lhat clemency was denied and the execution there passed some 40 hours and no directives \ľere given - at least not publicly - as to what disposition was to be made of the body or Tiso. After tbe execution, wben the defense counsellors asked for · tlie body in the name of Tlso's family, the request was telegraphed to I'rague. It was only then that Prague. as well a!< the Bratislava factors, became aware of the mistake they had made by not granting cle· mency_ A certain Prague politlco characterlzed the situation with the cxpression: "lt seems that the cleacl Tiso is golng to be mo;e dangerous than the live one." l felt the same way about the matter. and so did quite . a few or my frlends whÓ intervened prlvately in the interest of Tiso. And ,ľe. felt that way long before the executlon. · Prague deli-berated at length and found it hard to reuder a deci• sion in the matter of the disposition of the body of Dr. Tiso. Already then reports were heard in Prague that ,the bitter silence of the Slo, ak people might have serious consequences for the future. No one wanted to be held responsible for imythlng. 1t was useless to sene! the matter to Prague because, accordlng to the law, the Natlonal Court had the rlght to decide the disposition of the body of Tlso, as it had clone in several instances previously. Everybody was afrairl of the con!<equences and no one was willing to guarantee that peace woul<I be r,reserved. Ftnally, by telegram Prague agreed with Dr. Daxner and Dr. Ferjenčík that Daxner shall suTrender tbe body not to the Tiso family , but to Ferjenčík, who in turn shall have the body bmied secret\y. Ferjenčik's police covered the casket and hauled it to St. Martin's ťemetery on Racišdorfská Road. where three graves had been dug. Tbe prlest brought in by the police. after identlfying tbe body, performed a quiet burial. Ferjenčik and his people were not successful in keepln~ tbe matter secret, because universlty student!I were near the scene during the whole eplsode and, tberefore. for a tíme it was known wbere Dr. Tlso ,vas burled. :. =•: SLOVAKIA 23 For several hours the students clashed with the police near tbe grave of Tiso, and despite tbe fact tbat the police questioned tbem and ascertained who they were, the students showered Tiso's grave with flowers and wreaths. The second and following days, the police constantly guarded St. Martin's cemetery, People were beaten and jailed, because they tried to get near Tiso's grave under variou3 pretexts. Some students were expellecl from Svoraclov and others even from hlgh schools. WHO KILLED TI SO ? Tbe Czech press immediately began tbe process of washing hands and placing the whole responsibility for tbe execution of Tiso on the Slovaks, especially on Dr. J osepb Lettrich, president of the Slovak NationaJ Council and head of tbe Slovak Democratic Party. It was plalnly evident that Prague was nervous. The Communists were happy, and the Freedom Party maliciously reproached the Democrats. be· ,. c-ause they did not save the life of Tiso. The fact remains that ·an overwbelmingly majority of the Catholic voters wbic h supported the Democr.atic Party wa.s not fooled by tb.e overtures of the Freedom Party, because it knew that its member·s were the servant.-s of the Communists. But this electorate did let it be known that it was terribly disappointed and that it lost falth 1·1 tbe leadership of the Slovak Democratic Party and absolutely all confi<lence in Prague. Prague felt generally that the Slovaks would neve'r ngain want to live togethei, witb tbe Czec hs in a common state. And 'ľlso's execution did not make the Slovaks flock to the Communists or even into the ranks of tbe servants of Beneš, as were the members of the Freedom Party, and so much tbe less to the Social Democrats. The Slovaks regarded tbe decision of the minlsterlal council, as well as the declsion of Beneš as a step that was neitber statelike nor diplomatlc, but rather as a blunder which would WTe<.'k the State. F.:verybody became suspicious of the members of the praesidium o[ tbe Slovak National Council, when they dld not support an amnesty ;ind did not exact it, but acted like weaklings and s pineless men, violating· the- promlse given the electorate. Undoubtedly all those involved began to feel that way also. }!ut lt was too late. U nity of resistance against Communism was being lost. and after Tiso's execution the Communists were coercing the Government and, later, even Beneš hlmself, to commit more blunders and make more concessions to them. The integrity of the State was s haken so badly that the Government one day unanimously voted to accept the invitation to tbe Marshall pian, and three days Jater, under pressure of tbe Communists, repudlated lts clecision just as unanimously. It was a Government wlthout government. 'I'he Communlst.'I did whatever they wanted wlth lt. Tbe mlnlsters lost th elr backbone, some bowed to Beneš and others to the Communlsts; tbelr uprootecl consciences persecuted tbem for their sbameful votlng in the Tlso case. N O ~SCAPE FROM PUNISHMENT Wben Dr. Beneš began to fall pbyslcally and bis spiritual condi• tion worsened, all ascrlbed it to bis unfortunate decision of denying <'lemenc-y to 'ľiso. 24 SLOVAKIA Beneš, the Zenklites (followers or Dr. Zenkl) and tbe . Communists tbought that witb the extorted execution of Tiso they would sbake only t be Slovak Democratic Party. But they were sadly mistaken. Wlth the execution of Tiso they shook the entire State to its foundations. The curse of those who shall not forget April 18, 1947, broke all connections which were stm preventlng the downfall of the CzechoSlovak St.ate. The lost faith of the Slovak people could not be regained. And when the supports of a united Slovakia were uprooted, the Communists realized their pian altogether smootbly, accorcllng to the plans and orders of the Moscow Politburo. I clo not want to believe tbat any one would want to ascribe to Dr. Tiso that he would avenge himself beyond the grave, but when in March, 1948, - less than a year after bis execution - John Masaryk committed sufoide, a large part of the people pointed to the hand oť justice for his shameful voting on April 16, 1947. When the Communists played around witb Beneš like a puppet for a while, and he was practically under house arrest and shortly thereafter died, qulte a few people recalled those to whom he had denied clemency ancl who had suffered so much during bis regime. In Slovakia every one recalled April 18, 1947. And even if not maliciously, but at least confirmed in the faith that none of the guilty would escape justice, every one saw the hane! of Providence, Who deals out justly and does not let Himself be carried away or frightened. TISO' S STATURE GROWS WITH YEARS Dr. Tiso made the greatest sacritice that any human can make. He acted bravely and hono1,ably. This made a great impression on every one. But the shameful, cowardly behavior whether of Slovaks or Czechs, whether of the people of Prague or Bratislava, who had anything to do with bis amnesty, elevated the dead Tiso to a national hero and martyr, who is mentioned reverently in Slovakia even by those who previously were agalnst bim. Immature political factors, Jed by anger and hatred, had attained tbe opposite of what tbey had desired. They diel not divide but a'?tually united tbe Slovaks as they were never before united. And they showed them a new road for the future, whicb even today is full of sufferings, but eventually sball mean salvation and a free life for the nation of Tiso. Those. were the motives and thought:; which Jed me to ,vrite this dissertatlon, so that I could point out tbe tmth and expla!n, wben the persons ·involved are free again. After the events of February, 1948, lt was reported that the Commun!sts removed the body of Tiso from its grave and had !t cremated in Brno, Moravia. I recelved the report from Bratislava in 1948, but it remains unconfirmed. Let the tmth be whatever it may, the Gloriola, Faitb and Mytb of Dr. Joseph Tiso - despite all the evil deeds and designs of bis and our enem!es - shall always remain so sublime th at no malignities oť the Communists or the Beneš followel'S s hall ever dim them and they sball nev& Iose their lustre as long as a single Slovak shall live beneath the Tatras.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Case of Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Dr. Michael Zibrin Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4), August 1952 pp. 1-24 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Zibrín, Michal, 1899-1968 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/51cbb0acbe81cc1074aad64f2bda6191.pdf 3cb71a143f67bad10f423d4eccf3d1ef PDF Text Text �A I' SLOVAKl A is publishetl periodi<:ally by the Slornk Lcag-ue of _\merica, a cultural aml ťiYit ľecleľatio11 of Arneľ­ ic:ans of Sloqtk des<:ent. 'ľhť ľhieľ purpose oľ 8 LOYAK1A is to pľomotť a bcttcľ unclerstancling and a ppľľc-intio11 oľ the ~loYak 11atio11 and its long; :-;tľllg-glť f'oľ ťľeedom and independe11ec. As Arneľic·am;, 1nembPľs of the 3loY.d-: L eague oľ .\ 111eľ i <.:a fiľlnl _Y belieYe that the f-;lornk natio11, just as nll 11atiorn,, has mi inherť11t a11d Gocl-giYe11 right to freeclom and indepenclence. The:v a ľť declieated to thť rnnsť oť the Ameľiean \\'H,Y of' hfe, HloYak fľeedorn nnd \\'Oľld peac·e and are clctcnn.incd to oppose tlw plague of C'ommunisrn and al \ otheľ totnlitaľiai1 politic·nl systems. _\.C'Hľ Subs('ľiption to Slon1kia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewheľť. Sen cl subscľi1itio11s to: SL O Y AK I ~\ Box 150 Middlcto\\'n, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � �A I' SLOVAKl A is publishetl periodi<:ally by the Slornk Lcag-ue of _\merica, a cultural aml ťiYit ľecleľatio11 of Arneľ­ ic:ans of Sloqtk des<:ent. 'ľhť ľhieľ purpose oľ 8 LOYAK1A is to pľomotť a bcttcľ unclerstancling and a ppľľc-intio11 oľ the ~loYak 11atio11 and its long; :-;tľllg-glť f'oľ ťľeedom and independe11ec. As Arneľic·am;, 1nembPľs of the 3loY.d-: L eague oľ .\ 111eľ i <.:a fiľlnl _Y belieYe that the f-;lornk natio11, just as nll 11atiorn,, has mi inherť11t a11d Gocl-giYe11 right to freeclom and indepenclence. The:v a ľť declieated to thť rnnsť oť the Ameľiean \\'H,Y of' hfe, HloYak fľeedorn nnd \\'Oľld peac·e and are clctcnn.incd to oppose tlw plague of C'ommunisrn and al \ otheľ totnlitaľiai1 politic·nl systems. _\.C'Hľ Subs('ľiption to Slon1kia $1.00 peľ in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewheľť. Sen cl subscľi1itio11s to: SL O Y AK I ~\ Box 150 Middlcto\\'n, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 2 (4) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource August 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/e69a2a2f0d54637fbb50516f7b7967f3.pdf 8b2ea9aa98ff238a46467ca06d984ef8 PDF Text Text Monsignor Dr. Joseph Tiso (right) with the beloved Monsignor Andrew Hlinka, charnpion of Slovak freedom, and Monsignor Dr. Charles Korper (left) in Bratislava, Slovakia, June 5, 1938, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh P act. �DR. JOSEPH TISO National Hero of the Slovak Nation � Monsignor Dr. Joseph Tiso (right) with the beloved Monsignor Andrew Hlinka, charnpion of Slovak freedom, and Monsignor Dr. Charles Korper (left) in Bratislava, Slovakia, June 5, 1938, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Pittsburgh P act. �DR. JOSEPH TISO National Hero of the Slovak Nation � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Joseph Tiso, Andrew Hlinka, and Charles Körper (June 5, 1938) and portrait of Joseph Tiso Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ca848c11db1831c3dea9d219fc406d38.pdf 05ebb1620f2736aac93f4f27d4224040 PDF Text Text 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- �SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the �SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. �SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, �64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30). � 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- �SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the �SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. �SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, �64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- SLOVAKIA 61 tenced to death; and he g ranted it in all cases. It serves and it shall continue to serve to the honor of the Slovak President and the Slovak Republic for all times that during its duration no one was e:xecuted in Slovakia by Slovak authorities. But what can be said about the period after 1945? Let us take a concrete case, that of Dr. Joseph Tiso, President of Slovakia. The Slovak Democratic Party, supported by the Catholics in the 1946 elections because they bel!eved tbat, among other things, it would prevent the execution or the Slovak President, did not even have the power to save bis life. Even in that case it was Beneš who had to decide, and declde he did - as he always had done before against Slovakia, on the recommendation of the Czech ministers who again wanted to come to Slovakia as liberators. The perlod from the Banská Bystrica insurrection (August 1944) is and shall remain a sad chapter in Slovak history. Tbis debacle ls the joint property of tbe Communists and the Lettricb Democrats. In the name of the revolution against Naziism they liquidated Slovak independence; in the name of democracy they vied with each other in attesting loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union; and in the namt o( humanity tbey built gallows. Today tbe communlsts In Czecboslovakia celebrate this revolution not because it was democratic, but because it was communistic. ll is well, however, that tbe Lettrichites, too, without reservatlons c-laimed and stlll claim it as their own, because thereby before bistory they assume the responsibili,ty for lhe liquidalion of Slovak independence, for lbe mass graves wilb hundreds of corpses, for the bloody verdicts of the People's Courts, for the thousands of citizens who langulshed in jails for long months, nay even years, without belng given a hearing or a tria!, for the torture-chambers of the STB (Securlty l:'ollce), for confiscatlng the property of persons who were not even given a tria! in Court, [or tbe arbitrary looting of churches and schools, for the revengeful police investigations and terror in the whole nation. Tbose are the marks of the politics of the people's• democratic rulers of Slovakia, the symbols of the freedom of the gallows a ccording to which Slovak and world history shall know them. The politlcian might, perbaps, pass over these matters with a heavy sigh In the interest of some agreement, the judge, however, must call a crime a crime, and the historian must record [acts on the pages or history. Today Slovakia has new generations, trained in the spirit or independence - generations wbo are suffering in jails and concentration camps at home. Many of them already have fa!len, but from thelr blood ls bom a new [orce and a new determination for those llving who shall never desert their nation and shall never surrender the right to thelr own lndependence. And abroad, in emigration, Slovakia has hundreds of young people who studied there and thousands of others who are going tbrougb the valuable school of Life. Let them be wheresoever they may, they s hall never s urrender the right to Slovak independence. During twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republlc, Slovaks only in isolated cases rould go abroad to study. Today the people's-<lemocratic regime has afforded them this advantage: they had to flee their homeland before its terror. And the SLOVAKIA ideals, the bearers of which are especially these young generations, prove to us clearly that thls 1s the cbaln of natural evolutlon of Slovak revolutiona.ry efforts from the tlme of Štúr down to our present limes. We know that Louls Štúr proclaimed Slovak independence al• ready in 1848. Tbe Slovak parliament only sanctioned th!s revolutíonary act of Štúr's in 1939 and thus real!zed what Štúr's generatlon did not have enough strengtb to effect. We are often mistaken by the outslde imperialistlc pressure wbicb hastened the politlcal development of Slovakia. This, bowever, cannot be taken as a denial of the matteľ. If that were so, then tbe nation at home would not yearn !or, and tbe overwhelming majority of Slovak exlles would not work for, Slovak independence. Every nation has a na,tural am.bition to create its own bistory in its own state and, represented by its own state. as an independent factor lt wants to contribule to t he increase ot the cultural values of all hu manity. Tbe Slovaks demand thelr independence because they are ·a natlon with t.heir own bisto ry, language and cult ure, and because they are com• manded to do so by charity to themselves and by a healthy mind. Why there is not a Single natlon in the world tbat would not want to be Independent. Enslavement of one's own nation can be tbe deslre or vengeful, self-seeking, mentally warped and confused lndlv!duals. Let us look upon the matter from whatever standpolnt, Czechoslovak• ism is and shall always remain an expression of nationa\ and persona! inferiority. Let it not be a surprise, then, if we turn our attentlon loday to Dr. Stephen Osuský, the foremost Slovak among a very small group ot people who sl!IJ hold to the Czechoslovak conceptlon. We do t h at because we want to believe that Mr. Osuský wil\ not lend bis name to lmpede t.he efforts of the Slovak nation. For some time now we are gettíng report.s that the political group of Dr. Lettrich wants to solve the present crlsis of the Czechoslovak foreign reslstance wlth the aid of tbe person of Dr. Osuský, who is supposed to become president of the Council ot Free Czechoslovak!a. Dr. Osuský is not famlliar with tbe Slovak politlcal sltuation at horne, because he bas been away from Slovakia for many years. And yet some people, wbo have become accustomed to serve the Czechs in the in terest of their persona) careers, want to use Dr. Osuský to decelve the western world by claiming that Slovaks are for th e Czechoslovak Republic. These people have already gone so far as to pian a Czecbo-Slovak federation w!th Dr. Stepben Osuský as its first president. They want to explolt the situatlon, because they are reck• oning with a strong pressure on Czech ex!led factors on account ot the problem of the Sudeten Germans whicb especially today, wben negotlatlons are in progress to conclude a peace treaty wlt-h western Germany, ls gaining polltlcal !mportance. It !s believed that Germany, as an im portant factor of lnternatlona!· politics wh!cb sball have extraordlnary slgnificance for the defense ot Europe, shall lnslst on t he exclusion from the ex!led governments, whlch shall arise in tlme, of all those wbo willingly cooperated with Moscow, wbo with their pol!cies Jed their nations into the present situation and are a!so responslble for the brutal expulsion of millions of Germans from thelr anclent homelands. SLOVAKIA 63 Th!s concerns especially the Czech politicians in exile, who are the bearers of Beneš's old pol!cy, wh!ch always was pro-Soviet and as such evoked many politlcal contentions and dltferences in Europe. The Germans may not want to intervene In the polltlcal affalrs of centra! European nations, but it is natural that they will want to have the nationality questlons in this sector solved at last to the full satisfactlon of the indivídua! natlons. And Germany, as an important European factor, has the full rlght to present these questions to the lnternatlonal forum. Such a development is undoubtedly presupp0$ed even by some people of Lettrich's faction who want to get something for themselves out of the situation, and Dr. Osuský !s supposed to help them in this. The representati ves of sever al families, reallzing their weakness In the naiton, still want to take possession or Slovakla so that they could gain rule there wlth the help of the Czechs. Once in power, they flgure that they wlll be able to proclaim the representatives of the idea of Slovak lndependence as enemles of the Czechoslovak Republic and so prevent their return to Slovakla so they themselves mlght rule without oppos!tlon. But these gentleman are grossty mistaken. The idea of Slovak independence cannot be ltilled and sllenced even by the liquidatlon of the representatlves of Slovak independence. They still can mlslead and deceive the western world for a Ume, but they cannot decelve the Slovak nation any more. If Dr. Osuský wants to have a correct appraisal about the mlnd of the Slovak natlon, Jet h!m come to the meet!ngs of Slovak emigrants in Canada or In the USA, or Jet him visit the European DP camps. Th!s pollcy of Lettrich's people, alas, cannot be called anything but bllnd. Are these people really so non-critlcal that they cannot see the!r own m!stakes and errors? It seems that mora Ii ty and responslb!llty have been excluded completely trom thelr policy. People who created or helped to prepare the bloodiest regime In our hl story, do such people want to return again as Jlberators? Their consclence 1s probably so dead to the reproac·h es and crímes which the natlon shall one time put before them because they are concerned only wlth thelr careers and the regalning of their Jost propertles. Or do they think that their crimes shall not be subject to crltlclsm and judgment? Where crimes have been committed, there must be sought the crim!nal. The people who conducted the politlcs of the Slovak Republlc were placed on tria! by them after 1945, and they certainly did not cause the nation any such suffering as !t 1s golng through slnce 1945. To give these people to the nation as llberators would be as paradoxlcal as if, after conv!ctlng tbe innocent Rudolph Beran, Beneš would have become the leader of tbe Czech Agrarlan Party. These are welghty facts, and very weighty from the standpoint of history and polltics. We present them to Dr. Osuský to conslder whether he wants to Identity himself wlth Lettrlch's polltlcs and represent bis followers before the world and the natlon. It depends entlrely on hlm whether he sball succumb to these people or whether he shall let the decislon in hls own hands. We remlnd that Slovak history is belng made even in emlgration. And there are only two possiblllties: on the side of Š.túr and Hlinka, that is on the slde or tbose who belleved in the Independent future of the Slovak nat!on, 64 SLOVAKIA or on tbe opposlte side - on t he side of the enemies of Slovak inde• pendence. To deny a nat.ion lts right to independence means to deny it even the right of individuality. lťs something llke when Lettricb and Slávik speak aibout democracy, but protest that an opportunlty be given the Slovaks to declde by a democratic expression of will whether tbey want to live in their own state or wlth tbe Czechs In a Czechoslovak Republic. It is clear proof that they fear the will of the nation and want to force their own conceptlon on the nation. Woe, however, to the politician, wbo is afraid of the expression of bis own natlon! The Czechoslovaks often say wishfully that the West wlll not recognize the right of the Slovaks to independence. To this we can only remark thait here the wish is the father of the thought. U all Slovaks today would stand on the correot Slov.ak side and not in the servlces of aliens, this silly question would not have to be brought up at all, because Slovak independence is above all else a matter ot life and death wlth the Slovaks. The Slovaks do not threaten any one wlth it; and it is not an expression of some form ot imperlalism, but an expression of natural rlght. And the Slovaks shall see thls right recognized and respected just because it is natural and democratic and !s, therefore in line with the 1'rinciples expressed in the A tlantic Chaflter by President Roosevel,t and Winston Churchill, as well as in the interest of a unlted Europe, wh ere every nation, large and small, is supposed to be united into a European associatlon as an independent unit. Only a policy which will guarantee all nations equal freedom shall bring Euro))e the long awaited just and lasting peace and weltare. The Slovaks attained autonomy October 6, 1938, witbout the help of people ot the Lettricb type and just so will they attain even the renewal ot their democratic independence. We are thlnklng realist!cally and we are aware of the fact that we are a small nation. But even a small nation has a rlght to live and to live in such an arrangement which best serves its interests. In 1918 we said that our Magyar marriage was unsuccessful and we had to part; and in 1938 we said the same thing about our Czechoslovak marriage. What was natu11al always prevailed. A natural right by which we want to convince the world about the thlnking of the Slovaks is also the plebiscite. Slávik and Lettrich are against a plebiscite, that is against the democratic rig,h t of the Slovaks to determine their own future. It now depends on Dr. Stephen Osuský whether he shall join the one or tbe other side. The Slovaks shall reach their goal, but it depends on Dr. Osuský whether they shall do so with bis help or without lt. • • • W H O SAID IT? WHO SAID IT ? "No polltical party In Slovak•, has taken as sharp a stand against bolshevism as our party. W e are convinced that the antl-communlst movement must be suported b y the whole of Europe, the entlre cultural and Chrlstlan world. At the Ume the Red Army invaded Poland, we defended the Idea that Czecho• Slovakla must hurry to help the Poles wlth weapons In h and and f!ght agalnst bolshevlsm." - (Andrew Hlinka, SLOVÁK, 11-18-30).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource For Dr. Stephen Osusky's Benefit Description An account of the resource Dr. Peter Skalenický Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 60-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Skalenický, Peter Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6744e6aad7468419ac2624101a85e953.pdf 37c8e65feb163eb93b316fe90cf05207 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka �60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- � SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka �60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen- � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 69 THE BLIND ALLEY OF TIIE CZECHOSLOVAKS BY: THE INFORMER The leading personalities ot the Council of Free Czechoslovakla In Canada had a special meeting last October in Toronto. The sesslon concerned itself wlth three burning questlons: 1. Amerlcan semi-offlclal places and factors ot the Natlonal Committee tor a Free Europe have agaln threatened to shut off au mora! and flnanclal aid it the feuding Czechoslovaks, i. e. the so-called "seventeen" members ot Dr. Osuský" and the "thirteen" ot Dr. Zenkl, do not flnd a common platform of cooperatlon and, as far as possible, a broa:der and a more effective Slovak representation in this framework. It was decided that the Toronto branch would appeal to the leading personalitles of the Councll In the USA to lssue a joint manifesto wlth the Zenkl group on October 28, the Czechoslovak Independence Day. In a word: another ma.neuver to deceive the Amerlcans who glve them bread. (As far as is known, no joint manlfesto was issued on October 28th.) 2. Czechoslovak leaders of both factions were also told that the U. S. factors concerned would welcome a move by them to flnd a platform for coming to an understandlng wlth the Sudeten Germans. Thts is all tbe more necessary, because the Allies are ready to sign a separate peace wlth Western Germany and accept it lnto the allled defense alliance. Thls point caused those present, especlally the Czech members, to qulver. And they bave reason to tremble. The Sudeten Germans will remember for a long tlme who expelled them from their anclent homeland. And the Beneš Czechs know that a strong group of antlBeneš ·Czechs, their adversarles, have already come to an understanding wlth the Sudeten Germans, slgnlng an agreement ot triendshlp wtth them, subject to certain condltlons whlch are not acceptable to the Beneš Czechs. And even if the latter would promlse to rlght the devastating damage and injustice done to the Sudeten Germans, lt would avail them nothlng, because the Germans know that the Beneš Czechs, together with the Czech Reds, are responsible for thelr expulslon from the Sudetenland of Bobemla. 3. The National Committee for a F ree Europe has been severely criticized for the type of lts "Free Gzechoslovakia" broadcasts in Munlcb. Protests against the strlctly "pro-Czech" stand of the Munlch Radlo Free Europe bave come from the Bavarian Federal Government, the German Government in Bonn, tbe antt-Beneš groups in Europe, England and the USA, and representatlves of the overwhelmlng majority of Slovaks In Europe, England, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Canada and the USA. Tbe Beneš Czecho~lovaks are aware of all thls, hence thelr dilem ma. 'I'helr Czechosl wak s hlp ls sin king and they are exerting all -their strength to save lt. Peroutka, suppo sedly the dlrector of the "Czecbo slovak Unit" of RFE, of late is not as wild as he used to be. He was told to tone dL•wn a bit and replace several people in the Czechoslovak Unit of tb,\ NCFE broadcasts - at Jeast those who are overly burdened with communlst collaboration. Of course, Peroutka 60 SLOVAKIA will see to it that Bentt Czechoslovaks are replaced only by Beneš Czechoslovaks ! Summarlly said, there is nothlng new In the Czechoslovak sky. We are not at all surprlsl•d by the behavlor of the hard-bolled adherents or Czechoslovak centraliem. But we are very mucb surprlsed with the Slovak servants renderlnr. them Jip servlce. Rudolph Fraštackf, a BeneA Czechoslovak, recently rťturned from a European trip and told trlends that among the most recent Slovak escapees he dld not !Ind a slngle one who stands for Cze1.hoslovakism. Slnce these !atest escapees interpret the sentiments ot 1.he Slovaks at horne, we can safely say that in Slovakia, regardless of thelr reli gious or previous political divisiona, the Slovaks almoat to ,1 man are againat the reatoration of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovaks are In a bllnd alley, because they dld not b elieve In slgns of the tlmes. Freedom 1s the watchword, the everlastlng h ope and the ultlmate goal <•f all nations of the earth - lncluding the S lovak nation. FOR DR. STEPHEN OSUSKY'S BENEFIT DR. PETER SKALENICKÝ The more new refugees arrive from Slovakia, so all the more and repeatedly do they confirm the fa<:t that our policy, based in our stand of Slovak independence, is correct. Even these new escapees, often former adberents of former CzechoslovQk political parties, confinn the fact that the Slovak nation not only yearns for lts own independence, but also tbat in Slovakia today no one believes tbat it will be possible to renew the Czechoslovak Republic. Nay, the people at horne do not b elieve tbat responsible people in exile can be found wbo would work against Slovak independence. It ls something natural. Certainly, a nation wh!cb once has had its own state and bas tasted of the advantages of its own independence will never surrender it, and it can be deprived of it only by force and violence. We can look upon tbe origln of the Slovak Republic in any manner that we will, but no one can deny, nor can any one erase from Slovak hlstory tbe actuallty that the Slovaks did have thelr own state from 1939 to 1945, that tbey did bave their own president and tbeir own government, and that Slovakia dirl _appear on the map of Europe as an Independent political unit. It is often said that the Slovak Republic was a satelllte state. Even under sucb circumstances, it was comparatively more than tbe Slovaks had during the first Czecboslovak Republic, or after 1945. 'ľbe president of Slovakla and the government always had more power tban the president of the Slovak National Council (Lettrich) and the commissars had after 1945. tbat ls during the period wben tbe Czecboslovak Republic was already_ supposed to he a federative state. And even thougb tbe cluration of the Slovak State falls into the perlod of war, Swiss newsmen told tbe world that the Slovak Republic was an oasis of consolidated peace and welfare. Tbat was because the Slovaks decided tbeir own affairs In tbelr country. The president of the Slovak IRepublic coulcl grant reprieves to those sen-  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Blind Alley of the Czechoslovaks Description An account of the resource By: The Informer Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 59-60 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/92ce057f19db82f9536d068c99a5b8da.pdf a434c2df13029e448a36faca66bab2c2 PDF Text Text 66 SLOVA.KIA THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt, side by aide." On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow, Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic." And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic "is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy." The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka, in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37). And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda." These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt, after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade agalnst their old communistic love. To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world �SLOVAKIA 67 outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii, determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc• ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons, and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure only in all its conclusions. The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory. They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon• taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such miraculous speed to everything Soviet. When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence, but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously. Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch, after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with lt in all fundamental questlons. We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha Soviet Union and communism are concerned. And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm• pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation. That is, after au, the law ot democracy. But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks. • They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon. The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them �68 SLOVAKIA the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint• ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand, organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre• paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more valuable personallties. The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin• als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred, witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal "as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ; h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that 'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947. • • • • • • "The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re· gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio. • "Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr. Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter. � 66 SLOVA.KIA THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt, side by aide." On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow, Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic." And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic "is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy." The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka, in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37). And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda." These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt, after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade agalnst their old communistic love. To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world �SLOVAKIA 67 outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii, determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc• ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons, and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure only in all its conclusions. The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory. They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon• taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such miraculous speed to everything Soviet. When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence, but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously. Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch, after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with lt in all fundamental questlons. We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha Soviet Union and communism are concerned. And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm• pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation. That is, after au, the law ot democracy. But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks. • They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon. The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them �68 SLOVAKIA the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint• ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand, organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre• paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more valuable personallties. The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin• als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred, witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal "as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ; h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that 'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947. • • • • • • "The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re· gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio. • "Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr. Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 66 SLOVA.KIA THE SWVAKS AND THE BENE.š CZECHS JOSEPH ORAVSKÝ On November 14, 1945, Dr. Peter Zenkl, had qulte a speech in the Prague National Assembly. A stenographic record notes that he was accorded a thunderous applause when he said: "Never without the Soviet Union, never against the Soviet Union, alwaya aolidly with lt, side by aide." On December 18, 1943, after the signing ot the agreement ot "eternal friendship and post-was cooperation" between Prague and Moscow, Dr. Hubert Ripka proclaimed: " Having negotiated an allied agreement wlth the Soviet Union, we have accompllahed a good deed which we can rightfully be proud of. Thia treaty undoubtedly is one of the foundation stones of the aecurity, the prosperity and the atrength of the Republic." And later, this same Dr. Hubert Ripka, as Minister of Foreign Trade, in an interview with the editor of the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in October 1947, openly admitted that the strengtbening of economic contacts between the USSR and the Czechoslovak Republic "is not dictated by the communista," and added: "That la my policy." The well-known politlcian of Hradčany Castle, Ferdinand Peroutka, in bis Czech •book " Tak nebo tak," published in 1945 by F. Borovt in Prague, appraised the significance of the Bolshevik Revolutlon scientlfically and statesmen-like in this manner: "In 1917 there began a new epoch of mankind. We observe at every step that the Russian Revolutlon ia more than a single State, that it is a world outlook for which men are fighting in all places of the earth" (page 37). And a year later, writing in "DNEŠEK," June 11, 1946, the same Peroutka expressed bis feellng in this manner: " The Eaat, there la our liberator, our ally and our protection in the future . . . lf in England there still can be found factora, who show a bigoted hatred for the Soviet Union, then these cannot even be considered as our frienda." These enthusiastic expressions about the Soviet Union, which we have recalled, belong to men who determined and directed the foreign policy of Prague for a long number ot years, band in hand with thelr politlcal master, Dr. Edward Beneš. Their political master, whom they served so faithfully, became a vlctim of his own policy. But they remalned alive. Every judlcious person would suppose and rlgthfully expect that these glorifiers of the Soviet Union would spend the rest of the years, whlch stm separate them from the grave, in humllity and penance. If they flamed with love for everything that the Russian Revolutlon brought, then it would be wise of them not to walk in broad daylight in the free and democratic world with thelr love for the Soviet Union. And it would have .been proper and more like them tt, after living the honeymoon weeks in the embrace of communism, they dld not try to offer themselves as modest virglns for the crusade agalnst their old communistic love. To err ls human. And in politics people err frequently. But in the case ot these persona! and political friends of Beneš, we were and are not concerned with an error ot limited, temporary importance and extent. We were and are not concerned wlth the persona! error of an indlvldual, political factor, but wlth the fundamental error of world SLOVAKIA 67 outlook of the whole political caste which, being led by Edward Beneii, determined and gave llfe to a whole polltlcal system. And thls system was not invented during the war and post•war years just for the sake of politlcal tactlcs. Long before World War II, this system was systematlc• ally fostered and practiced by Edward Beneš and bis lettlst companlons, and in 1946 it was introduced into the political and state structure only in all its conclusions. The planners and representatlves of this system regarded the incursion of the Soviet Union into Central Europe as their own victory. They could have no reservations for the Soviet Union in 1946, because they had none prior to that Ume. That is why t hey rejolced so spon• taneously with Edward Beneš over the advent of the Soviet system into Eurone; that is why they had no trouble in collaborating wlth the communists; and that is why they adapted themselves with such miraculous speed to everything Soviet. When we quoted the above statements of Zenkl, Peroutka and Ripka, we were not thinking about their persona!, human existence, but about the system which they embraced and promoted so vigorously. Whatever they did, they did not do in their names only, tbut also in the name of the system which reached deeply into practical llfe and whlch, after the victory of communism in Centra! Europe, was identlfled with lt in all fundamental questlons. We Siovaks could never see eye to eye with the policies of Edward Beneš and bis people and we rejected their system as a matter ot principle, because our views of the Soviet Union and communism clashed with theirs. It is a matter of historical record that the Slovaks are fightlng communism and communists for over a 100 years. An abyss separated and stm separates us as far as vlewpointa on t ha Soviet Union and communism are concerned. And we admit that we d!d not expect to see these Czech political heroes of Edward Beneš's system in the pol!tlcal arena again. When they d!d get into !t, we dld not reckon that they would meddle in the questlons that vitally effect the present and future of the Slovak nation. From our hearts we w!sh that the Lord God give the Czech nation good and honorable fighters aga!nst communlsm, that He endow it with discerning political leaders, who will lead it along the right path. But if the Czech natlon ls satisfied wlth the people, who so lm• pressively taught them to love the Soviet Union, well there is noth!ng we can do about it, because we do not want to meddle in fundamental questlons that concern the present and future of the Czech nation. That is, after au, the law ot democracy. But frankly and in the interest of truth, we must again recall to the rlghtlsts and to the leftists that we do not wish the noble, herolc and uncompromissing struggte of t he Slovak natlon against communlsm to be connected wlth them at any tlme or any place. We Slovaks cannot and do not want to degrade our anti·communist stand to the level of these people, no matter what the prtce. The Slovak natlon is s uffer!ng the consequences ot the brutal commun!st reality which the political system, represented by these people, has hung on the'lr necks. • They are the express!on of a certain morality which does not suff!ce for the mora! needs of the present ser!ous period and so much less suita the spiritual and character dlsposition of the Slovak natlon. The!r persona! acqualntances and fr!endsh!ps could open for them 68 SLOVAKIA the doors of politlcal asylum. Out of the magnanlmity of these acquaint• ances and frlendshlps they could be assured mlnisterlal penslons for Jlfe. That ls a questlon of philanthropy and of private r elatlons. But a responsible and serlous comprehension of the anti-communist stand, organlzatlons ot antl-communist propaganda and the psychological pre• paratlon of antl-communlst resistance, exclude any purpose to use them as an exclusive and of!lcial argument against communism. It wou!d be tragic, indeed, if in the historic evaluation of forces between Christianity and democracy, on the one hand, and communism on the other, there would not be avallable other moral and polltlcaUy more valuable personallties. The Slovak natlon wants to wage lts antl-communist fight to Unal victory. And it is convinced that the whole free and demociratic world also wants to finish this fight. 'I'he Slovak nation, therefore, rightfully expects that its uncompromlsing fight against communistlc and every other kind of slavery deserves recognltlon and polltical and moral appreciatlon. The Slovak nation, therefore, is not dependent on the anti-communlst substltute, composed of persona! and politlcal values wblch irretrievably belong to the past and to political asylum. We can get to the soul of every nation only by means of uprlghtness and a genulne recognition of moral and polltical responsibillty. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Dr. Tiso died a hero. The Nuremberg criminals died as crimin• als, regretting thelr crimes. Dr. Tiso had nothing to regret. Even iu the packed court, organized agalnst htm by communlst hatred, witness followed witness testlfying in Tiso's interest. A crlmlnal "as never loved. Dr. Tiso was loved by his people as no other man was ever loved in Slovakia. He was not a criminal. Even the sadistic 'Natlonaľ Court recommended mercy for Tiso. So did the Slovak 'National' Council. Tiso's Ufe depended only on one man ; h!s life was in the hands of Dr. Beneš . . . the 'humanisť and that 'great democrať . . . who 1s reportedly a can.dldate for the Nobel Peace Prize. Beneš can now rest satlsfied; he wanted blood and he got it. When Dr. Beneš refused Tiso's plea for mercy he became Tiso's judge and murderer. The blood of Tiso remains on bis hands." Ján Petrovič, Bratislava, Slovakia, April 1947. • • • • • • "The executlon of Monslgnor Tiso shall go down in hlstory as a great crime against the entire Slovak nation. His traglc death was a pol1tical murder for which the present communist-domlnated re· gime In Czechoslovakia is wholly responsible. But the memory of t he Slovak Republiťs war-time president is forever enshrined in the hearts of bis countrymen for he was truly the Father of b is Country." - Teachers of Slovak and Slovak History at Benedlctlne H!gh School, Cleveland, Ohio. • "Czech and Slovak Commun!sts demanded Dr. Tlso's head, and Dr. Edward Beneš obliged. It was plainly premed!tated murder." Pb,ilip James Anthony. " J edonta" Feature Wrlter.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Slovaks and the Beneš Czechs Description An account of the resource Joseph Oravský Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 56-58 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Oravský, Joseph Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/af2fdc2a646a90d08f95570fbd4a822d.pdf 5b12f46826b779824e8506f23cba600b PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 63 BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory. It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt. It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will. A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened. The story of this political fraud is as follows: In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo• vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia. Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\ Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much. In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30 mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian. Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis allies. Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow. In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London �54 SLOVAKIA and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, Moscow also gave its consent. But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser• tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal polltlcal fraud. Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation." Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans. lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group. Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in• corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy, and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason. At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded �SLOVAKU 66 a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on. When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1, who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington . Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people. In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees." The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70 pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck, and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer. AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police. The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}. tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš .1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S. But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt. 'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ). � SLOVAKIA 63 BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory. It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt. It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will. A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened. The story of this political fraud is as follows: In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo• vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia. Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\ Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much. In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30 mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian. Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis allies. Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow. In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London �54 SLOVAKIA and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, Moscow also gave its consent. But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser• tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal polltlcal fraud. Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation." Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans. lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group. Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in• corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy, and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason. At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded �SLOVAKU 66 a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on. When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1, who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington . Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people. In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees." The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70 pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck, and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer. AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police. The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}. tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš .1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S. But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt. 'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 63 BENEš: KING OF POUTICAL CHEATS At the meeting of the Czech-Sudeten German Federal Commlttee at Bonn, last December, General Prchala, chairman of the Czech Natlonal Commlttee in London, declared that he considered the expu\sion of Sudeten Germans from their motherland as tbe darkest cbapter in Czecb bistory. It wa.s a dark cbapter, a crime equalled only by H itler's attempt to exterminate the J ews. About half a million Sudeten Germans lost tbeir lives. T he Czech R evolutionary Guards, composed of youngsters whose parents were lmprlsoned or executed by the Gestapo durlng the war, e mployed a thoroughly Nazi brutality against the Sudeten Germans. These wlld youngsters were glven a free hand by t he Bene/:í Government in Prague. They committed such atroclties, mostly on innocent people, that lt is disgustlng even to write about lt. It was beyond understanding h ow the Brltlsh and U. S . Governm ents, whlch were responsible for the existence of the s o-called Czechoslovakian exiled Government, could give their approval to the tarbarous expulslon of Sudeten Germans, who in 1918 b ecame Czechoslovaklan citizens against their will. A young Czech student of history, Mr. S. Brzobohaty, took the trouble to flnd out why and when tbe Western Allies gave thelr cousent to such barb arity. And he discover ed that it neve r happened. The story of this political fraud is as follows: In 1942, Mr. Beneš, who was personally a very revengeful man and believed that the Sudeten Germans were tbe principal reason of his misfortune wbich deprived him of the Presidency of Czechoslo• vakia, asked the Britlsh Forelgn Offlce to approve his pian to expel Germa n Nazis from Czechoslovakia a fter the war. The British Forelgn Office had nothing against th e expulslon of German Nazis trom Czechoslovak ia. Th en Beneš vlsited the Soviet Russian Ambassador to the Czechoslovakian exiled Government and asked h!m for permisslon to expe\ Germans from Czechoslovakia, and informed him that the B r ltish had agreed to it. Bogomilov informed bis Government in Moscow but the Russ!an Bolsh eviks refused to agree with the Beneš pian, for at that Ume they stm believed that there migbt be some posslbllity of a separate peace with Ger many, and tberefore they did not wlsb to provoke the Germans too much. In June 1943, Beneš left for Washington, wbere he had a 30 mlnute talk with President Roosevelt. H e asked bim for permission to expel Germans frrm Czechoslovakia, an d assured Roosevel t that t he Bri t i sh and Ru ssians h ad g iven t heir f ull consent t o the pian. Roosevelt answered that he would not oppose a pian approved by bis allies. Then Beneš returned to London, called aga!n on Bogomllov, and informed bim that the British and U. S. Governments had given thei r c onsent t o the expu lsion of Germans, and that on l y the Russi ans wer e opposi ng i t . Bogomilov agaln !nformed his Government in Moscow. In the meantime the German military sltuation had worsened, so tbat Moscow hoped for complete vlctory In Europe. And because London 54 SLOVAKIA and Washington took the responsibllity for the expulsion of Sudeten Germans, Moscow also gave its consent. But later, polltical experts in the U. S. State Department came aero.ss the Beneš pian and dlsa.g reed. In the material which Stettinius prepared for Roosevelt for Yalta, it was expressly etated that no expulsion of national groups should be permitted. Yalta, however, ended In d lscord, and thls question never came up on the program. The a sser• tlon of Beneš -and hls followers now organlzed in the so·called Councll ot Free Czecho.slovakla in Washington that thelr allles a pproved the expuls ion of Sudeten Germans 1s nothing but a colossal polltlcal fraud. Thle was not the firet political fraud perpetrated by Benei. His whole political career wae based upon lies and frauds. Czechoslovakia itself was brought into exilltence by a political fraud. The Czechs never wanted an independent state, having fought for a century for a reorganization of the Hapsburg Monarchy into a federal state of nations. Masaryk and Beneš had no followers for their adventure in the First World War, at leaat not among Czechs. AII the Czech politic.il partie& and legally elected representatives of the Czech nation, durlng the war, formed the Czech National Committee in Prague, which alone had the right to 11peak in the name of the Czech nation. On the 14th of January, 1917, this Committee iasued a declaration, condemning the war, and Masaryk's adventure abroad, and advocating the autonomous existence of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. After the flrst war, In 1925, Beneš publlshed hls book, "T,he World War and Our Revolutlon," in whlch he remarked concerning this declaration of .the representatlves of the Czech nation: "The rejection of our policy was solemn, without any reaervation, and de.::isive." lt really was so, because the Czechs did not wish to have anything to do with Masaryk and Beneš. But Mr. Beneš managed it otherwlse. On page 449 of the same book Beneš says: "Although this declaration rejected our policy, we managed to explain it in our favor to the public in the ENTENTE. We suppressed the passage about autonon,y within the framework of the Hapsburg Monarchy, publishing and emphasizing the paasages again11t the war and for the right of the independent existence of the Czech nation." Thls Ie what Beneš stated himself publicly about his politlcal methods. H e was a po\it!cal cheat and he was proud to be a polltlcal cheat. He possessed boundless arrogance in lylng and was tlreless in cheatlng. When the Britlsh Prime Minister, at the Peace Treaty Conference In 1919, asked about the three milllon Sudeten Germans. lleneš promlsed most solemnly that Czechoslovakia would be organlzed on t he Swiss model, thus glvlng autonomy to each national group. Hardly was the treaty signed than Czech s oldiers were ordered to shoot at Sudeten Germans who demanded autonomy. Slovakla was in• corporated lnto Czechoslovakla on the basls of a most solemn promise that it should be a federal state with full Slovakian autonomy, and when the Slovakian leaders asked for the fulflllment of tlils promlse they were imprlsoned for hlgh treason. At the Conference at Genoa, in 1922, Beneš swore eternal fidelity to his French and British benefactora and, behind their backs, and without the knowledge of the Czechoalovakian Government, concluded SLOVAKU 66 a Treaty with the Ruaalan Bol1hevlk1. H 11 fame abroad waa based on money he paid out from the fund1 of the Czechoslov aklan Forelgn Mini1try to foreign journallats who made propaganda for hi1 per1on. When the German Nazl1 occupied Prague, the archlvea of the Czechoslovaklan Forelgn Miniatry fe ll lnto their handa. They publlahed a book contain ing a list of Frenc h, British and American per1onallt le1, who were paid by Benei durlng Czechoslov akia' a twenty year1' exlatence; and photocopiea of the recelpt1 slgned by theae people were alao publlahed - for Beneš never gave away a penny without demandlng a receipt, thus keeplng hla foreign agenta to hee l. The Brltiah Fore ign Office certain ly has a copy of thl1 book, and so ha■ the State Department in Wa1hington . Beneš proclalmed hlmself Czechoslov aklan Presldent In 1940, and unfortunate ly recelved the support ot some prominent Brltish people. In order to secure for hlmself t be asslstance ot the Russian Bolsbevlks he rendered tbem lnvaluable servlces durlng tbe war. lt waa he who, In 1939, auggested to Roo1evelt the Idea that Stalln wished to democratiz e hla regime. He brought and introduced into France, Great Britaln, and the U. S. the large1t Bolshevik F lfth Column, dl1gul1ed as "democrati c Czechoalov aklan refugees." The present Czechoslov akian Minister ot tbe lnterlor, Nosek, was durlng the war counsellor to tbe Beneš Governmen t In London and was paid trom tbe pockets of Brltlsb taxpayers to tbe tune of 70 pounds Sterllng a month, tax free. The present ch,ef of the Bolshevlk mllitary e1pionage again1t Britain, General Laatovicka, was in the . B. B. C. durlng the war. Also here were Belheller, Slan1ky, Sllnck, and a hundred other Bol1hevik agenta, all dl1guised a■ Czechoalov akia n democrata, and all pald by the Briti1h taxpayer. AII the Czecbs and Slovaks bere wbo were an obstacle to thls great fraud of Beneš and bis followers were falsely denounced as proNazl and, wltbout investlgatlo n, were lmprlsoned by tbe Britlsh police. The followers ot Beneš are now organlzed In the so-called Councll of Free Czechoslov akla, whose headquarte rs ls In Washington, Czechs, who know thls soclety and, therf'fore, do not wisb to have anythlng to do wlth it, are organlzed In the Czech Natlonal CommlttE>e in London. In the retugee camp at Murnau, Bavarla (U. S. Zone}. tbere are some adherents or Benei!; the remalnder of the refugees are adberents of the Czeoh Natlonal Comm.ittee . In one year, the Beneš .1dherent.s made 241 denunciatio n1 to the U. S. authorltie1 agalnst thelr opponenta. The U. S. authoritie1 lnve1tlgate d all the1e denunciatlon1 and they all proved to be false. The U. S. authorltles know the adherents of tbe Councll of Free Czechoslov akla pretty well by now, and they are fed up wltb them, desplte the protectlon accorded them by certaln personalltl es In tbe U. S. But, unrortunate ly, lt 1s not necessary to go as far as Oermany or the U. S. to experlenre the worklngs or the new "dJplomacy by denunclatlo n." I could draw upon my own experlence s to prove lt. 'ľbe Brltlsb securlty servlres a.ppear to be poUUcal\y uneducated however errtclent they may be In other respects and, as long as tbls 1s llO, our King of Fraud or, at \east, bis Trojan Horee, tbe Fren Czechos lovaklan Flfth Column. wlll contlnue to graze unharmerl In our mld.c;t. - (The Czec h "Pravda," London, January 1951 ).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Beneš: King of Political Cheats Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 53-55 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/2cdaac0688357b8c1d5f4f9d35026a92.pdf ef5e9274705487f6301c7fef1bdeed56 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 47 AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk, then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends, permit an American who has learned your languages and history to throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations. The study of the past and observation of today's events boil down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise, one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much, much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo• sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance. The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical, economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected. Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up, and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership. The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble, but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted lt too. �SLOVAKIA Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes. The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro· gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made? The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly democratlc and progresslve ones. Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word "Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con• sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll• teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re• fused to be assimillated by the Czechs. �SLOVAKlA 49 Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing, but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist" and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at• tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc duty to demand freedom. Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber 11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony; they wísb to "fly alone and fly right." This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde• pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the western world when the tlme comes for the debut. In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al• ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only Cor tbe time being, definltely. However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will �60 SLOVA.K.IA look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing. lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class ! And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts, which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern, civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be and just how blind can they be? What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard. Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have been a benefactor and friend immediateJy. Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress. It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng, progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista, your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s applles to both Slovaks and Czechs. �SLOVAKIA 61 The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro• gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move• ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies. And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re• sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some• t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do· ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God• insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that, inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene• gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc. How will they contend with the rest? Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for it, must once reap Satan's trash. The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause. �52 SLOVAKIA WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr. Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947. • • • "MURDER IN SLOVAKIA" ( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) . Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastl y and shameful form.••• But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor." Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste• panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it wi II be too late. Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record. By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and murder has free sway. � SLOVAKIA 47 AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk, then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends, permit an American who has learned your languages and history to throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations. The study of the past and observation of today's events boil down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise, one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much, much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo• sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance. The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical, economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected. Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up, and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership. The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble, but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted lt too. �SLOVAKIA Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes. The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro· gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made? The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly democratlc and progresslve ones. Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word "Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con• sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll• teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re• fused to be assimillated by the Czechs. �SLOVAKlA 49 Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing, but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist" and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at• tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc duty to demand freedom. Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber 11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony; they wísb to "fly alone and fly right." This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde• pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the western world when the tlme comes for the debut. In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al• ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only Cor tbe time being, definltely. However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will �60 SLOVA.K.IA look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing. lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class ! And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts, which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern, civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be and just how blind can they be? What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard. Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have been a benefactor and friend immediateJy. Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress. It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng, progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista, your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s applles to both Slovaks and Czechs. �SLOVAKIA 61 The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro• gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move• ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies. And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re• sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some• t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do· ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God• insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that, inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene• gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc. How will they contend with the rest? Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for it, must once reap Satan's trash. The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause. �52 SLOVAKIA WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr. Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947. • • • "MURDER IN SLOVAKIA" ( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) . Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastl y and shameful form.••• But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor." Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste• panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it wi II be too late. Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record. By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and murder has free sway. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 47 AN HONOR IN SWVAK SEPARA'l1ISM By E. W ., an Amer i c an Stude n t of Centra l E u r opean Polit ics The above title should not cause surprise and if it causes talk, then its main purpose is accompl!shed. Slovak and Czech friends, permit an American who has learned your languages and history to throw a few comments into the .slowly-but-surely boiling pot now termed "separatism." Curiosity arouaed by friends of both nationalities has propelled me headlong into reference books, newspaper research, etc., from the time of SS. Cyril and Methodlus to the present to "look the ground over" of this old question wlth a new face dealing wlth independent statehood for both nations. The study of the past and observation of today's events boil down to the plain fact that neither nation fared too well down the centuries while being tied to another, even in the pre.sent-day tie of two people closely related to each other. Even in a family where two brothers go into a partnershlp it must be understood that to succeed neither must try to get a head of the other; either both must proceed together or both must remain at an even pace. Otherwise, one will soon "lord it" over the other. Now in tbe Slovak and Czech issue, very frankly, both have a list of grievances against the Czechoslovak republ!c, though it is most obvious that the Slovak list is much, much Jonger. And that, breeding dlscontent and an unhealthy atmo• sphere, Jong ago signaled the tíme for a termlnation of all relationshlps before lt comes to blows. In fact, that tíme did come and the Slovaks did get the opportunity for self-rule, but world affairs engulfed and finally rulned the little state and brought it to former surveillance. The loglcal conclusion now, when the fight for freedom is again essential, is to have each nation go its own way, live peacefully apart and stm be good frlends. Actually, ~wo relatives can always be better friends by going to two separate City Halls, churches, markets, etc. Furthe rmore, it is only inherent in every creature as in every nation to be independent, for only in that way can lts polltical, economlc and spiritual rlghts be freely exercised and protected. Two cooks in one kitchen never did too well except to mess it up, and even worse when one gets the honors and the other peels the potatoes. There is no progress in such a system for both, but only for one. Matter of fact, it amazes an outsider that two peoples of such greatly dlfferent temperaments ever did go into such a partnership. The only apparent reason seems to be that the Slovaks after centurles of oppression thought that the Czechs might give them a better deal. The irony was, however, that the Slovak never did get a fair deal, for the big-hearted, good, though a bit naive soul, was made a fool of at every occasion.. No Slovak who went to a federal office bulldlng after 1918 will ever forget when he asked for s omethlng and was told in sing-song fashion "nelze vyhovHi; mluvte po česky" ("Can't help you; speak in Ozech"). But that belongs to the list of grlevances, for whlch the good Czech people are not responslble, but only thelr regime whlch milked the good Slovak cow and insulted lt too. SLOVAKIA Tbe Slovaks apparently feel confident enougb, as ľm aure all good Czecbs do, to try a little country of thelr own for a change. Tbey feel tbey can succeed at it. And tbey did !rom 1939-194-5. Slnce tbey are certain tbat tbey can run thelr own government, carry on sound economlcs lnternally and in outslde trade, not be afraid to be llttle in tbe midst of big odds, etc., then wby should the larger Bohemla have anytbing to fear in belng a country on lts own? However, and tbis from the record, Bohemia herself was never afrald for she was alwa.ys tbe leader, but only a certain group of ber degenerate, of!iceseeking, renegade "leaders" do not want Bohemia independent, for tben tbere would be less titles and more centralized work (wb at tbat breed never liked), and then there would be no Slovakla to rule and from wbicb to take •·ror free," because tben they would have to pay for everythlng in fair trade. Yes, the fear 1s not in good Czechs, but in some poor ex-leaders wbo would hate to lose Slovakia, the happy huntlng ground for food, labor, graft and taxes. The ill-begotten, Benes-betrayed republic. according to this renegade· group, should continue to exist, holding two un wllllng natlons iu bondage to a regime that dared call itself democratic and pro· gresslve. How democratic was that r egime when a Slovak had no word In it? How progressive was it when it curbed every desire for Slovak independence and wanted to pave the streets of Bratislava with Slovak heads should same attempt at freedom be made? The greatest !ie of the century was the claim that Czechoslovakla was democratlc. Apparently the word sounded good but they didn't know just what it meant. And. tbe fact that "equal" partner Slovakla was beld as a colony and exploited proves the fact. Tbose who fought and stlll flght against Slovak independence are the backward, underoocratic ones, and tbose who figbt for Slovak freedom are the truly democratlc and progresslve ones. Tbls small Czech imperlallstlc group has also coined tbe word "Czechoslovak." Since God never did create such a species of man, lt ls a barefaced insult to H im (but then tbey didn't believe In Hlm) and an insult to every Czecb to be called half a Czech and half a Slovak for tbe same reason. Tbe ,\·hole idea ls ridlculous blologicaUy and morally, as well. Of course, tbe title is a pure, underbanded political scbeme to attempt asslmilatlon of the Slovaks by the Czechs. Had this group any foresight, they would have understood that sucb attempts at assimilation do not work anywhere on earth except in America where dozens of nations make.s lt expedient and even beneficial to assume one name of identification. But In a republlc of only two natlons, and partlcularly in a !and where both natlons never did have too much freedom for centuries, the scheme smeUs of subordlnatlon of one nation to another or ellmlnation of both to create a new breed. Tbat only creates contempt and averslon. Con• sequently, that bright idea has helped to create a good bit of lll• teellng. Equality 1s misconstrued in such a case, because the true concept of equality lies not in adoptlng the name of another natlon but in retalnlng your own and belng irble to go just as far wlth' lt as your neighbor. In any case, however, tbe Slovaks stubbornly re• fused to be assimillated by the Czechs. SLOVAKlA 49 Next, this same group goes further in the game of antagonizing, but not shamlng the Slovaks, by coining another word "aeparatist" and "aeparatiam" by whlch they thlnk they wlll abuse all freedomloving Slovaks and, perbaps, s quelcb tbelr movement for independence. Anotber rldlculous title wblcb ls so wrong morally, and whicb causes more aversion towards tbe old regime tban a desire to come back to tbe [old. And, to attempt to squelcb or ridicule any at• tempts for justified independence is morally wrong, for it !s a Godgiven rigbt to flght for freedom from evil, In fact, it !s a patriotlc duty to demand freedom. Tbe "Czechoslovak" group apparently fails to comprebend tbat tbe Slovaks wlll never be contented in a republic wltb anotber 11ation, regardless of wbo that migbt be, after they have tasted some freedom, and tbere will always be discontentment wltb wblch tbey will always have to contend, and wbicb will only be a wblp for tbeir own backs. Apparently, bes ides a lack of comprehenslon of the real situatlon, they also fall to admit this truth to themselves and follow through on the obvious and the apparent. The Slovaks have had enougb of subjugatlon, in any form; they do not wish to be a colony; they wísb to "fly alone and fly right." This separatist movement, then, wlll go on untfl klngdom come so long as Slovaks keep hoping and praying for freedom and inde• pendence. Tbe boil has long been rípe but always there were world affalrs and new terrors which forced domestlc problems l nto tbe background. First the Nazis and then the Commles. But after tbat the current discontentment wlll sweep away every trace of a republic of two nations . The Slovaks and Czechs abroad wlll work out thelr indivídua! states and elect thelr own governments, but some or the groundwork can and should be done here to pave a favorable impressíon and receptlon for the two little countries into the western world when the tlme comes for the debut. In the meantime, the group o( "Czechoslovak" agitators !s running hlgh fever to stem the tide of separatlsm and attempt to klll lt b efore Communism is cleaned out. And thelr cbief weapon apparently is bostlle propaganda, abuse and every trick to dlscredit Slovak leaders here and abroad and. particularly, In front of the United Nations and our own American government. To be a separatist is termed by them a crime, and some foollsh people believe them, as do some uninformed American offlclals who at present are too preoccupied with our own affairs to get the facts on the Slovaks. However, that will pass too, and then there will be time to study the matter of the small natlons. Communlsm is our first problem today and Interna] dlsputes must come second for a whlle. This apparently makes the " Czechoslovak" feel confident that lt wlll al• ways be second and that Washington is sold and fooled by tbeir propaganda for the renewal of the old republlc. But tbat !s only Cor tbe time being, definltely. However, wben there w!ll be time to thlnk of small nations and tbeír battles, there will then be time to flnd tbe Slovak truth and botb Czecb and Slovak aversion towards the renewal of a joint republic. How absolutel y ridiculous the "Czechoslovak" group will 60 SLOVA.K.IA look when the facts are analyzed and they flnd they have been abuslng and dlscredltlng an honorable t hing. lf separa t iam ia a crime, they will then be to ld, and rlght In Wa shington, w hat awfu l criminala our forefahera were when they struggied unde r t he Brit iah a nd went t o war a gainst them; what ug ly fanatics they w ere w hen they met and wrote up t he lis t of grievances against Great Britai n a nd finally the Declara t ion of lndepe ndence and the Constitution which formed t h is g reat and wonderful America. - Sepa ra tista of t he first class ! And it is the same wondertul America, founded by separatlsts, which has given a home to such as they and protects thelr wild propaganda under the articJe or freedom of speech even when they a buse those w ho als o fi ght for freedom tro m a regime wors e t han t he old Engl ish crown because it functioned in a more modern, civilized age. In a bus ing a Slovak desire for independence, they ope n ly tell the whole w orld that after all t hese yeara, Amerlca had no rig ht t o independence fro m Brita in. They aJso abuse the memory ot our honorable, brave and tarsighted coJonists, and even Washington who Jed them, for having Jaid the foundation for the greatest nation in the world. ConcJuslveJy, the Americans or 1776 were the greatest separatista on the face or the earth when they wrote the Declaration ot Independence. How blgoted can the "Czechoslovaks" be and just how blind can they be? What troubJe-maklng separatlsts were lhe French with all thelr revoJutlons, and the Irlsh, and the Israelis, and h osts of o thers who waged wars for years untll their voice in the w!lderness was heard. Now that they have won their independence, we praise them for the!r patience, bravery and do au we can to help them and welcome them lnto our world of free natlons. It is a plty, though, that all such separatlsts have to work so hard, pay such great prices for their freedom, when their partners could have granted them thelr liberty from the start, an_d instead of becoming an enemy could have been a benefactor and friend immediateJy. Look around, you who are separatists, Czechs and Slovaks, and see how separatlsm ls golng on today in every field for a better worJd, and how much glorious hlstory ha.s been made by separatista through the centuries, for it is they who turn the wheeJs of progress. It is the separatist from the standard scheme that is enterprlslng, progressive and democratlc in every field. And yet, accordlng to your own papers, the "CzechosJovaks" cJaim that the separatlsts are not democrat!c, progresslve, etc. The tact that t.hey are separatista proves othel'Wise, and the ones who retard their progress are the duJI conservatives, dictatorial and contradictory. Hence, separatista, your Jot ls a glorious and an honorabJe one. There is no shame in wantlng freedom, rather lt is a duty to flght for it, even when your own ldnd curb lt and attempt to dlscredlt you. That, as all things, wiJI pass, and at least by the Jaw ot averages, with your ettorts, the SJovaks musJ, be tree some day. The day ls at your flngertlps to name and reallze. Read your own hlstory and that ot thls land, and you wlll flnd lt full of freedom-lovlng people as yoursel!. There is no shame, then, in belng a separatist, and th!s applles to both Slovaks and Czechs. SLOVAKIA 61 The Cz.e chs must free themselves of their own leaders who have betrayed them and led them lnto chaos; and they should prepare now to rlse with new leaders, true Czechs, who are lnterested In thelr own people and not with artillatlons wlth powers who would swallow them up. Let them also prove that they do not need Slovakla, that they can subsist wlthout ber, and that they can truly be slsters and exemplary natlons. Leave the renegades and weakllng.s behlnd, and forge ahead lnto new horlzons, not back to stale systems that wlll hurt all over agaln. Come up wlth new leaders, fresh leaders, pro• gresslve leaders who aren't afrald to live alone. A separatlst move• ment should be as strong among Czechs as among the Slovaks. Form two nations as friends, not one republic as enemies. And, to those that want the old republlc and are waltlng to re• sume office, and to those who trumpet this false ldeology on reams and reams of paper to keep such a degenerate idea allve, conslder how foolish you sound now when you think you abuse good people by calling them separatists and think you are plnnlng a crlme to thelr backs when actually you are flatterlng them and placlng them lnto a glorious classlflcation. Consider how even more foollsh you wlll feel when all your evll, dlrty work of dlscredlting wlll ltself be discredited and separatlsm will after all win out and produce some• t hlng decent and fine which the old republlc was not capable ot do· ing. And above all, you are not only politically but also morally wrong, as are all who curb movements for freedom. The separatlsts are the real democrats and progressives, for it !s they who want freedom and democracy and not you who want to bind two natlons lnto an outdated and hated republic. Yours !s only a cause of contradlction and stubborn hate to preserve something that 1s rotten trom the core. For every move to stamp out independent ideas you only acquire new enemies, and the more enemies the more stronger the separatlsts; and the more ot those, the sooner two independent countrles wlll be formed. Any decent Czech w!ll tllll you that the old republlc was a ml.stake and "just not right," and any decent Slovak, by God• insplred love of country, automatlca\ly wants independence for hls natlon. What percentage then do you rea\ly have In your camp? 5 per cent or even less? And a Gallup poli is not needed to reallze that, inherently, the Slovak wants hls own government and country! Any Slovak that wants the old Czechoslovak republlc !s a twisted and spoiled breed that, frankly, even the Czechs ot the old regime should not care to associate with and form a partnersh!p wlth. That rene• gade type, wlth shame must be admitted, count up to a fractlon ot one percent of all Slovaks, no more. It !s amazing and tantastic, that with this tiny group then, the old regime wants to form a republlc. How will they contend with the rest? Satan himself has walked about the earth sowing dissenslon and oppre.ssion. Those who curb freedom anrl abuse thoše who flgbt for it, must once reap Satan's trash. The floor o[ every ball is yours, separatists„ and the movement i~ yours to complete and the fruits of lndependence wlll be yours to enjoy. This 1s the exhortatlon of an A.m erlcan whose studles prove you ha.ve a cause - a just and holy cause. 52 SLOVAKIA WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "By executing Dr. Tiso, priest-presldent of wartlme Slovakia, the Czechoslov.ak governm ent of Dr. Beneš h as turned t he clock of civilizatlon back a few centuries in Czecho-Slovakia. T he mu rder of this gallant and upright Slovak leader and exemplary priest, w ho remained wlth b is people under the most trying condltions, by Dr. Edward Beneš, who resigned as president of his country and surrendered it 'in toto' to the Nazis, must s hock every Christian and every believer In the democratic way of life. Tbe infamous act of th e Beneš governm ent rightfully deserves the »evere.st condemnation of all righteous people." - Stephen Šuhaj čik, Councilman Second W ard, Cleveland, Ohio, April 1947. • • • "MURDER IN SLOVAKIA" ( From the speech of Hon. Alvin E . O' Konski of Wisconsin, in the House of Representati ves, Wednesday, Aprí l 23, 1947) . Mr. Speaker, the recent hanging by the Communists of Czech0slovakia of the brave and gallant Monsignor Joseph Tiso was murder in its most ghastl y and shameful form.••• But the hanging of Monsignor Tiso itself is not the greatest tragedy. The greatest tragedy is the silence by our American President and by our American State Department while this murder was going o n. Our Government gave the Czec hosl ovakian Government hundreds of million of dollars in the past two years. We are going to give them mi llions of dollars more. Vet, with this giving of millions of dollars to the Government of Czechoslovakia, our President and our State Department are not even men enough to stand up and protest against this murder by the Soviets. AII of this leads me to believe that the l eaders of our country in the White House and in our State Department no longer understand the meaning of the term " honor." Monsignor Tiso is dead. H e was murdered. Whi l e he was murd ered America was sil ent. The day is not very far distant when these American leaders will regret their silence. The day may come and may be too soon when these leaders who were so shamefully silent wi l l b e treated the same way that Monsignor Tiso and Bishop Ste• panic and General Mihailovitc h were treated. Then maybe there will be protests. But then it wi II be too late. Frankly, 1 do not think America coulá have saved the life of Monsignor Tiso. But I am ashamed that my country did not even have the decency and honor to file a protest just for the record. By some miracl e suc h a protest might have at least postponed the exec utio n. Here in Ame r i ca our o fficials grant our basest cr i minals a stay of execution. The least that our national leaders could have done i s f ile a p lea for the same consideration for a Christian lover of freedom M onsignor T i so whose only c rime was that he hated Communi sm just as he hated nazism. But Ameri ca remains silent and murder has free sway.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An Honor in Slovak Separatism Description An account of the resource By E. W., an American Student of Central European Politics Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 47-52 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Anonymous Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/eb1d6340b2bbe1b294801953ebfa8501.pdf a085e310acd3ef0b5c8710012d6b1111 PDF Text Text 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO HIS PEOPLE In the spirit of the sacrifice I am about to make, I send this message to the Slovak nation: In harmony and unison pursue always, everywhere and in every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND FOR THE NATION. THAT IS NOT ONLY THE UNEQUIVOCAL INTENT OF Slovak history, but also the explicit command of God, Who has made it the law of nature and has inculcated it into the soul of the nation and every one of its members. That precept I have served all my life and, therefore, I consider myself first of all a martyr of God’s law. Secondly, I feel that I am a martyr of the defense of Christianity against bolshevism, against which our nation must in all possible ways defend itself, not only in the spirit of its Christian character, but also in the interest of its future. As I beg you to remember me in your prayers, so do I promise to pray to God Almighty for you and supplicate that He bless the Slovak nation in its vital struggle for God and for the nation, so that the Slovak nation will always remain a faithful and devoted son of the Church of Christ. Bratislava, April 18, 1947, 3 a.m. DR. JOSEPH TISO. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Tiso's Last Message to His People Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 p. 46 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Tiso, Jozef, 1887-1947 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6036a6cfc57a8c6328882ea4fd8d79a3.pdf a232be884f6cf20bd4c5ec3d07a2e82a PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar �46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar �46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • • • ;}IJHIIIIIIIIUll ttlllUlltltllll l lllllllll llllllllllllllllllllllllUIIIHIUII IIIIIIIIIIIIUI IIIUhl lllllll llllUOttlllflllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllflllllHIIIHIIIUIIIIIIIIIUI UIUIUtl. PRESIDENT TISO'S LAST MESSAGE TO ms PEOPLE " In the spirit of the sacrlfice I am about. to make, 1 aend thl• message to the Slovak natlon : " In harmony and un lson pursue alway,, everywhere and In every respect the great principle: FOR GOD AND F-OR THE NATION. I=== _ ::}f;:~~i'.:I~~~.:~;: : : ~.:=;:~•::~~:::;.:~: I===_ "That precept I have ,erved all my llfe and, therefore, 1 '=- != 1 1 ~ ;:;ľi:he;t ~y:f afi:,.:;,. a~~ :h::~:n:: :o:~,.::~~n~:co::~:~,! bolshevism, against which our nation must in all ponlble way, :::•::..:<;:•~;::,:~:: :,:~• ,:~:;:: of 1t, Chri,tlan cha~oto•, '=- 1 "A• 1 beg you to remember me In your praye,.., so do I pro. _ Br atislava, April 18 , 1947, 3 a. m. 1 ~~:~_0[;:t:f:;: : i~}~~};,~f!J~:;.:.1;.:-t: 1 DR. JOSEPH TISO. ~ (ltl1111111UIIIIIHU lllllllllltlllUIIIIIIUUIIIIIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIIIINUlllllUlMIIIUIIIIIIIIUIIUIIIIIUHI IIIIIIUll111111111111111111UUl'11WIIIIIIIUIIHUIUlfUUIHIIIIIHfUl l~ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 45 DR. JOSF..PH TISO Priest, Teacher, President and National Hero of the Slovak Nation Dr. Joseph Tiso, war-time president of the Slovak Republic, was born October l3, 1887, in Veľká Bytča, Slovakia. After completing bis elementary training, he studied !n Zilina and Nitra, then completed bis theological studles in Vlenna. He was ordained priest in 1910 and a year later attalned the rlegree of Doctor of Theology. Fa.ther Tiso served as chaplain in Oščadnica, Rajec, and Bánovce. In 1914 he served in the army as field chaplain and in 1915 was i.amed spir.itual director of the seminary at Nitra and professor or religion at the college and high school there. In 1918 he was appoint· ed professor or theology. In 1921, he was honored by the Holy Father with the title of Monslgnor; this was a first in Slovak history. Msgr. Joseph Tiso was very active as an organizer· and writer. He was imprisoned twice by the government for "anti-state" activities, the general term for anything that did not coinclde wlth the political ideology of the government. While incarcerated Dr. Tlso translated several apologetic works· into Slovak. Father Tiso was truly a man of his people and for bis people. He strained every effort to elevate them spiritually and m?,terially. In 1924 Dr. Jaseph Tiso hecame pastor of the church at Bánovce and served the spiritual and temporal needs of the people there until he was imprisoned in 1945. As a member of Hlinka's People's Party, he wa.s elected to parliament in 1925 and in 1927 was appointed Min• ister of_ Hep.lt}I and · Physical Culture by the Masaryk ~eglme. Dr. T,iso was . instrumental In electing Dr. Beneš president of Czecho-Slovakia in 1935. The Slovaks had about enough of the Masa• ryk aind Beneš regimes at that time, but Dr. Tlso used bis oratorical skill to persuade -the .. lJlinka members of parliament to vole for bim. Without the 30 votes of the H linka People's Party Dr. Beneš never would have been elected Presldent. . . Dr. · 'ľlso. _vjsíted America .Qnly once; tb.at was in 1937 when he came as a member of a delegattori of the Society of St. Adalbert, Slo· vakia's greatest Catholic publishlng house. · When Slovakia was granteď autonomy on October 6, 1938, the Frague government named Dr. Tlso president of the autonomous Slovak government. The follov.ing year. when Czechoslovakla collapsed completely, the Slovak parliament declared the lndependence of Slovakia on March 14. T he parliament elected Dr. .Ťoseph T iso presidénľ of the independent Slovak Republic on October -26. 1939. Under Tiso's guldance Slovakia fared quite well even during the years. He saved wbatever he could for bis natlon. Even bis political enemles admit that. Wben tbe wlld Red armles were rushlng toward Bratislava, Dr. Joseph TJso and the Slovak Government with· rlrew to Kremsmiinster, Austria, where they formally surrendered to the U. S. Army. Al the insistence of the provisional Czecho-Slovak ,1ľar 46 SLOVAKIA government, the U. S. Department of State ordered the U. S. Army authorities in Austria to surrender Tlso and his group to the CzechoSlovak War Crimes Commlsslon. In November 1945 Dr. Tlso and members of the Slovak government were delivered to Czecho-Slovak authorities as war criminals, though their status was never lnvesti· gated by the U. S. authorities. From Pra.g ue Dr. Tiso and several of hls group were sent to Bra• tislava to stand tria! before the Natlonal Court The tria! began December 2, 1946, and ended March 14, 1947. Sentence was pronounced by the Court on Aplil 15, and Father Tiso, reciting the rosary out loud, was Jed to the gallows at 5: 30 a. m. on April 19, 1947; he was pronounced dead seven mlnutes Jater. SJovaks the world over agree wlth Father Tiso's aged mother: Dr. Tlso died a martyr for the cause of his people and his Church. • Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Tiso Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 45-46 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8a07f8a0f63768f3250f2df46d174473.pdf 2ae7e0bca944237820e30c44ff57c0f7 PDF Text Text SLOVAKÍA Z5 1 WAS IN SWVAKJA Edward L. Delaney Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country, have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and. As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a, the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs. Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city. There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's older ci ties. · It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal. Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State, a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light. An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar. Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band· shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel, winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart in Centra! Europe. What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the usua,I formalities of visitor and host. "Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In• teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot �26 SLOVAKIA view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns. Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces and unappetlzing meals. Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let, stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste. In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes, spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were reasonabl!l. Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets. Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany for nearly five years. In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur• chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had. At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty. Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops beyond the warrlng zone. �SLOVAKIA 27 The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde• pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved. Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es, but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials. The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary prosperity with scant worry about the future. Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942, that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war and the pf!nalties to follow. In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the minute as tomorrow's newspaper. For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives, with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States seventy-five years ago. Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries. Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other �SLQVAKIA 28 centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old. The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes. Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica" and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year old room to find tbat I was frozen to death. Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia, those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops. Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In• dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the needs of Stalin. Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled for indepen?.encei · · S LO V A K IA - V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into tbe Red. orbít. Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque referŕed �i LOVAKIA efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague. Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla. Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be great Slav domain of tbe Soviet. Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd· ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds or tbe OnA Supreme Being. THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS? Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts. A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de· veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty tomes on tbe origin or man, etc. ' 1• Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul) also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd. "You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black bair and blue eyes. If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia! kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for hair and eyes. lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe �30 SLOVAKIA Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have been in that general part of the Near East. The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today. Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns - which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come. So there they stayed. Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin' lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions. He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin, Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have found, do have similarity. The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages. Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots, instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica. S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to Banska Bystrica. It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al· thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a �SLOVAKIA 31 Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe. It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub• Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European continent. In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave, half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be· fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile. A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about 1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov· ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re· 1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights. As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country. On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor• thy of attentlon "Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term) Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt. What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_> the Reds aga in?" It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out and then . . . "Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther. lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he �32 SLOVAKIA Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back• ward tor ~ century or so." "You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured to say. "NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros• períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi· rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!• oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man· archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about it tben." That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY agreed with bim. But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen· tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In '.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art! exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition. MEETING PRESIDENT TISO At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon. Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New York. He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did. �SLOVAKIA 33 When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t, cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t, whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on politlcal issues - domestic and foreign. Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real thoughts. He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted bis dark blue eyes. Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a sovere!gn state. "Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian government." Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not president. "There was Richelieu." He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history was correct. After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I would like to do so. "Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m." WHAT ABOUT POLICIES? Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside Central Europe during these days. "It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?" '"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu• lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them. But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo his none too subtle meaning. �34 SLOVAKIA "Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from the Vatican." "The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop. In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other than I have polnted out." All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics. AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ? Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again llilite in a government after tbe war? That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government, there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy, which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de· s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations. They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent country. The problems facing them were many and varied. President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through the enactment of the programs of development then under way. NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects. Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme." He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for �SLOVAKIA 36 tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come into the country to aid In its development. THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941, but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work· Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort. l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood brotbers? Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man." Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla• vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department, as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination. Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth· less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon, is a grave question. Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland. AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted, smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet to be wrltten. �36 SLOVAKlA TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later, he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat is another story. Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me. "Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable humor In you." "Perbaps," he smlled. "Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?" "Wbat, · for instance·?" "I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod Canadlan whisky." Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. · The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most treasur-ed possession. Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna, whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot, Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country. COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months, was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials. "That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?" �SLOVAKIA 37 Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know, but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo· vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport me? Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an extended period. 1 GO TO PIESTAN Y At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al· though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force, judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme. Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the Slovak State. Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children - ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister, Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally, he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by Germany and cooperating with it. TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a �38 SLOVAK.IA later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee," twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers." Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians" "Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no. I was not restralned from associating with them. In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because, unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt· ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also. They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was for a trip there and return the same day. Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres, uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer. Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group. It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search and seizure. Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer, a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and filmed, as were other of bis plays. TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of �SLOVAKIA 39 anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de• manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but falsehoods. Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts. Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He felt that it was h!s death knell. It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews. WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A - GERMANS TAKE OVER In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force a quarrel with a giant. Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded. Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city. Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was at tbelr door. Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany." An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope for greater consideratlon. But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice. however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans tlncl :,ou." �40 SLOVAKlA Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.? Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed. Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable. Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away. Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the western horizon. " LIBERATION" BY THE REDS But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies. Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and also become known to the Allied authorlties. The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna and then to Sllesia. Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded - whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers were sent to brighten tbelr rooms. ··· ~- ' �SLÔVlinA 41 What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon. More on this will follow. The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy and the giant. Might was right. The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told later. THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer" but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per• manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that he sustained other injuries. The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people. Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re. peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re• membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control, once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf• fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also, was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume - regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt. After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil• �42 SLOVAK.IA lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards. When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready left. Now, where to go or what to do? Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the Hed army captured and butchered them. OFF TO PRAGUE An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation." At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock, tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would ever get out of the stricken city. The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel, I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express train which landed me in Prague about mldnight. All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de• parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation." Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then? Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.• of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees in dayl!gbt llours. �SLOVAKIA 43 REVOLUTION AND REVENGE Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making. Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments. Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by tbe crowd Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view. A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe walls and the rattle of machlne guns Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty, tben ten miles away. Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;, of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was: '·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?" Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet, the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the Cruclfixion. THE SAD AWAKENING On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz. These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague. The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not. General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are �SLOV~ .I A 110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard. And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta. By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city, they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words. It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit. It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks, who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to Red dominat!on. After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that ~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort. For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra! :E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records. Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past bistory. But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has 1emalned. • • • WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950). � SLOVAKÍA Z5 1 WAS IN SWVAKJA Edward L. Delaney Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country, have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and. As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a, the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs. Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city. There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's older ci ties. · It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal. Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State, a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light. An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar. Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band· shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel, winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart in Centra! Europe. What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the usua,I formalities of visitor and host. "Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In• teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot �26 SLOVAKIA view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns. Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces and unappetlzing meals. Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let, stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste. In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes, spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were reasonabl!l. Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets. Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany for nearly five years. In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur• chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had. At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty. Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops beyond the warrlng zone. �SLOVAKIA 27 The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde• pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved. Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es, but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials. The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary prosperity with scant worry about the future. Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942, that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war and the pf!nalties to follow. In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the minute as tomorrow's newspaper. For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives, with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States seventy-five years ago. Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries. Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other �SLQVAKIA 28 centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old. The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes. Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica" and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year old room to find tbat I was frozen to death. Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia, those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops. Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In• dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the needs of Stalin. Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled for indepen?.encei · · S LO V A K IA - V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into tbe Red. orbít. Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque referŕed �i LOVAKIA efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague. Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla. Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be great Slav domain of tbe Soviet. Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd· ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds or tbe OnA Supreme Being. THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS? Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts. A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de· veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty tomes on tbe origin or man, etc. ' 1• Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul) also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd. "You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black bair and blue eyes. If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia! kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for hair and eyes. lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe �30 SLOVAKIA Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have been in that general part of the Near East. The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today. Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns - which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come. So there they stayed. Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin' lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions. He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin, Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have found, do have similarity. The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages. Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots, instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica. S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to Banska Bystrica. It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al· thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a �SLOVAKIA 31 Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe. It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub• Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European continent. In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave, half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be· fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile. A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about 1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov· ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re· 1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights. As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country. On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor• thy of attentlon "Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term) Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt. What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_> the Reds aga in?" It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out and then . . . "Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther. lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he �32 SLOVAKIA Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back• ward tor ~ century or so." "You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured to say. "NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros• períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi· rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!• oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man· archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about it tben." That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY agreed with bim. But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen· tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In '.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art! exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition. MEETING PRESIDENT TISO At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon. Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New York. He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did. �SLOVAKIA 33 When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t, cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t, whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on politlcal issues - domestic and foreign. Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real thoughts. He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted bis dark blue eyes. Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a sovere!gn state. "Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian government." Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not president. "There was Richelieu." He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history was correct. After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I would like to do so. "Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m." WHAT ABOUT POLICIES? Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside Central Europe during these days. "It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?" '"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu• lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them. But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo his none too subtle meaning. �34 SLOVAKIA "Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from the Vatican." "The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop. In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other than I have polnted out." All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics. AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ? Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again llilite in a government after tbe war? That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government, there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy, which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de· s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations. They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent country. The problems facing them were many and varied. President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through the enactment of the programs of development then under way. NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects. Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme." He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for �SLOVAKIA 36 tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come into the country to aid In its development. THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941, but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work· Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort. l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood brotbers? Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man." Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla• vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department, as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination. Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth· less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon, is a grave question. Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland. AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted, smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet to be wrltten. �36 SLOVAKlA TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later, he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat is another story. Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me. "Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable humor In you." "Perbaps," he smlled. "Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?" "Wbat, · for instance·?" "I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod Canadlan whisky." Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. · The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most treasur-ed possession. Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna, whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot, Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country. COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months, was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials. "That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?" �SLOVAKIA 37 Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know, but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo· vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport me? Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an extended period. 1 GO TO PIESTAN Y At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al· though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force, judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme. Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the Slovak State. Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children - ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister, Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally, he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by Germany and cooperating with it. TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a �38 SLOVAK.IA later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee," twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers." Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians" "Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no. I was not restralned from associating with them. In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because, unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt· ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also. They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was for a trip there and return the same day. Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres, uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer. Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group. It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search and seizure. Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer, a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and filmed, as were other of bis plays. TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of �SLOVAKIA 39 anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de• manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but falsehoods. Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts. Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He felt that it was h!s death knell. It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews. WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A - GERMANS TAKE OVER In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force a quarrel with a giant. Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded. Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city. Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was at tbelr door. Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany." An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope for greater consideratlon. But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice. however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans tlncl :,ou." �40 SLOVAKlA Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.? Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed. Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable. Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away. Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the western horizon. " LIBERATION" BY THE REDS But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies. Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and also become known to the Allied authorlties. The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna and then to Sllesia. Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded - whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers were sent to brighten tbelr rooms. ··· ~- ' �SLÔVlinA 41 What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon. More on this will follow. The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy and the giant. Might was right. The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told later. THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer" but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per• manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that he sustained other injuries. The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people. Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re. peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re• membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control, once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf• fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also, was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume - regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt. After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil• �42 SLOVAK.IA lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards. When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready left. Now, where to go or what to do? Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the Hed army captured and butchered them. OFF TO PRAGUE An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation." At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock, tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would ever get out of the stricken city. The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel, I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express train which landed me in Prague about mldnight. All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de• parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation." Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then? Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.• of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees in dayl!gbt llours. �SLOVAKIA 43 REVOLUTION AND REVENGE Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making. Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments. Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by tbe crowd Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view. A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe walls and the rattle of machlne guns Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty, tben ten miles away. Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;, of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was: '·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?" Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet, the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the Cruclfixion. THE SAD AWAKENING On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz. These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague. The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not. General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are �SLOV~ .I A 110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard. And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta. By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city, they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words. It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit. It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks, who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to Red dominat!on. After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that ~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort. For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra! :E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records. Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past bistory. But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has 1emalned. • • • WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKÍA Z5 1 WAS IN SWVAKJA Edward L. Delaney Many Slovaks in America, especially those horn in this country, have but a limited knowledge of their parents' or grandparents' !and. As for the millions of Americans who have no klnsbip with Slovak!a, the word is merely the latter half of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been impressed upon their consclousness by the propaganda bureaus ot tbe late Edward BAnes and bis predecessor Thomas Masaryk. One will search long In those propaganda papers for any paragraphs conveying the impresslon that the Slovaks are the political, cultural or industria! equals o! the Czechs. Perhaps one reason that the Czech rather than the Slovak part of the hyphenated name has been given greater publicity !s that the capital, Prague, is predomlnantly Czech and the majority or visitors from other parta of the world seldom get beyond that city. There is no denying that the Prague of pre-1945 days did possess an individua.l atmosphere and charm for those who are interested In the architectural treasures and historlcal landmarks of Europe's older ci ties. · It was this writer's good fortune to have vis!ted or reslded Cor extended periods in several ot the other European capitals before visiting Prague. Many months later I was afforded the opportunity for a stay of two years in Slovakia. At that Ume the synthetic CzechoSlovakia had ceased to exist. Following nine hundred years or struggling fot; independence, the Republic of Slovakla was establlshed and the people could say that they had attained somethlng approximating tbeir goal. Tbe evening of my arrival in Bratislava, capital of tbe new State, a Professor Doba! called on me at the Carlton Hotel. He lnformed me that he was connected with the State propaganda bureau and that their attache, Streiznic, at tbe Berlin Legatľon, had telegraphed that l was arrlvlng. Foreign correspondents and writers were sought out by them and efforts made to present their country In the best light. An appolntment was made ror me to meet bis cbief, Tido J. Gaspar. Tido J., as I soon learned, was the most photographed man in Slovakia. No news reel was complete witbout bim smiling or band· shaking 'bi~ way into the center of the picture. He was the official greeter An actor with the wbole country as bis stage. In bis !apel, winter or summer, was always a gardenia, a full bloom rose or a cluster of flowers In season. His attire was patterned on tbe rigorously correct Unes 'Óf New York's ófficial greeter, Grover Whalen. In fact one got the lmpresslon that T!do J. Gaspat may bave met or studied tbe life-and-times of Grover Wbalen or the late Jimmy Walker, the most popular mayor New York ever had. for he was their counterpart in Centra! Europe. What can I do for you ?" · he asked after we had exchanged the usua,I formalities of visitor and host. "Nothlng," I informed bim, except to suggest what would be In• teresting · for me from a scen!c as well as a hlstor!cal point ot 26 SLOVAKIA view. That appealed to him. The alert and competent young men or his travel department la!d out an !tlnerary for me whlch covered the pr!ncipal c!tles and !ncluded a short stay in the justly famed H!gh Tatra resorts of the Carpath!an Mounta!ns. Bratislava was at that tlme the Mecca for all who, by any maneuvering, could arrange to go there. World War II was in the early stages. Food restrictions and rationing had been !mposed on a large part of Western and Centra! Europe. A long bridge over the Danube connects Bratislava with Austrla, across which rolls the rail and motor traff!c to Vlenna some s!xty miles away. But !t ls no longer the Vienna of Johann Strauss and Franz Lehar music with food and rink to be enjoyed in lelsurely comfort. Even in those early days of the war all Au.stria and Germany were areas of dismal faces and unappetlzing meals. Bratislava - which many still referred to as Pressburg - was the magnet that drew vlsitors from all Centra! Europe. For in Slovakia was to be had food and rink, muslc and laughter w!thout let, stay, or hindrance. With the exception of the adjoining country of Hungary, no other part of Centra! Europe enjoyed the essentials and many of the luxuries of life, as did the people of Slovakla before the period when Stalin's hordes swarmed over the country like a swarm of locusts and literally laid lt to waste. In most of the propaganda that emanated from various sources in Europe and was eagerly snapped up and exaggerated by the sinlster influences in this country, the impression was conveyed that Germany syphoned off the food resources of Slovakia long before thelr armies actually occupled the country late in the year 1944. Even at the risk of being charged with attempting to mitigate the sins of the Nazi Reglme. I assert that, in those days it was regarded as rare good fortune if one could get lnto the Slovak paradise and there obtain a good meat wlth whatever was desired in the way of w!nes, spirits or liquors, all at prices which, even in those tlmes were reasonabl!l. Until the severe winter of 1944-45, citrus fruits, such as lemons and oranges from Italy or Spain, might he had in the public markets. Such delicacies had been off the markets in Austria and Germany for nearly five years. In addition to al! dairy products, poultry, beef, pork, sugar, <>onfectionery and tobacco wares were obta!nable in Slovak!a with but slight restrlctlons on the amount of certaln items that mlgbt be pur• chased. Also clotbing. s boes and dress materlals were to be had. At tbat time the shops of Austrla and Germany were bare of goods. Just over the Danube from Bratislava the sbops were emoty. Such stores as the Woolworth cbain were barren. Shelves and tables of empty cartons or a single item - usually a wooden toy or some article of glass. Rows of the same useless article. Nothing was to be found that contalned metal, cotton, rubber wool, s!lk - all of which materials were needed for the war supplies. After observing those empty shops in Vienna, Munich, Berlin. Frankfurt and Cologne, it was as a fairyland to enter business establlshments of the same type In Slovakia and f!nrl most anything one might expect to see in shops beyond the warrlng zone. SLOVAKIA 27 The people or Slovakia knew they were enjoylng a verltable heaven of plenty as compared to thelr neighbors. T heir new status as an independent country began in the spring of 1939. Only a few rersons, whether in the cities. towns or villages, did not realize that they were the envy of people in their neighborlng states. Slovak inde• pendence and self-determinatlon was paying them divldends even in the material advantages they could see and understand. Small wonder that their political leaders were popular and their policles approved. Therefore it was not surprlsing that the majority of the people had only words or praise for President Joseph Tiso and the other of!icials of their young republic. What many dld not reallze was that Germany was syphonlng off thelr surplus or agrlcultural and manufactured products. In exchange the Slovaks dld recelve some goods, such as tools, machinery, electrical equipment and rallway supph es, but for the most part they got only promises to pay in such materials. The debt owing by Germany was increasing with staggerlng amounts each month. But the majority of the people enjoyed thelr temporary prosperity with scant worry about the future. Although there was little doubt in their minds as early as 1942, that the Axls Powers were doomed to defeat, they held to the hope that by somf! political magic they would escape the horrors of war and the pf!nalties to follow. In those days of the Republlc of Slovakla, it was a country or contrasts. Evidences of its centuries old clvilizatlon and customs were to be observed alongside products that were as up to the minute as tomorrow's newspaper. For example: the express tralns making daily trips to and from the high Tatra resorts were powered by Diesel electrlc locomotives, with Jounge. dining and observation cars comparable to those of other European railway systems. But in the country, through which the deluxe traln sped smoothly, one observed also the prlmltlve ox carts on winding dlrt roads. Oxen pulled the ploys and harrows In the fields. Moreover, the branch railway lines that wound around or over the mountains and dipped down into fertile valleys offered the traveler what comfort he might get from a bard wooden bench In a dlmly llgh ted coach behlnd a wood burnlng steam engine of the type used In the western mountain country of the Unlted States seventy-five years ago. Stepping from the modern express on the High Tatra run, to the minlature traln that huffed and puffed its way to Banska Stiavnica was like bridging a gap of t.hree quarters of a century. It chanced that my arrival in Banska Stiavnica synchronized with a heavy snow storm. After plodding through darkness and deep snow for what seemed to be a mlie, the youth. who had dragged my luggage on a sled. ushered me through the portals of a buildlng that had al\ the appearances of an old Roman ruln. It was old and the Romans had probably been there. but lt was not ruined and from the durable manner in which stone and mortar were put into buildings In those middle ages, it will not be in rulns for another few centuries. Tens of thousands of shoes or sandals had worn deep grooves In the stone door step. E lectrlc llghts replaced the candles or oil tapers that had _Iighted the way for guests who came there in other SLQVAKIA 28 centuries, but that was a bout all the concesslon that had been made to the lJ!Odern world. The building, so l learned from the Sudeten German woman who operated it, was over three hundred years old. The cold room to which I was asslgned boasted a bed whlch was less than three centuries old, but it was about the only modem plece In the antique setting. Although appreciat!ng the charm of archltectural treasures and old Jandmarks, there are limes when one misses the creature comforts that are affored in our modern hotels and homes. Tbat was one of tbose times. But the warmlng effect of a "slivovica" and gobs or excellently roasted goose, i,olisbed off with another potent drink, served to banlsh the fear of \Vaking in that three hundred year old room to find tbat I was frozen to death. Oddly enough one seldom heard about the precious metals that were once part of Slovakia's contrlbutlon to the worlďs wealth. Much of the old currency and art objects in the Hungarian empire and Centra! Europe were made from gold and silver ores that were mined at Kremnica and near Banska Stiavnica. But witb tbe increaslng costs of production and the relatlvely cbeap prlce or the metal during tbe quarter of a century before tbe birth of the Republlc of Slovakia, those -mines had been practically abondoned. World War II altered tbe situation. Centra) Europe was cut off (rom tbe silver producing countries of North and South America. Mining of that metal was steppe<l up. The silver sm.iths of Slovakia again plied thelr trade and many articles of thelr handlwork appeared in the sbops. Througb the perfidlous acts of the signers of the agreements at Teheran and Yalta, Stalin's minions. the Communist confiscators, have no doubt taken possession of tbose sources of wealth. Whatever treasure ts taken from them now, finds its way into the coffers ot the Communists instead of belng rashioned into articles for the use ot people or for objects of art in the churcbes or Cbrist. Like other In• dustries, whicb were created or resulted after tbe establishment of the Republic or Slovakia. tbe mines or Stiavnica are servlng the needs of Stalin. Political charlatans. such as Edward Benes, who were lauded by tbe American press and propagandists. sold tbe Slovaks lnto bondage for less than the thirty pieces o! sllver, wbich was the prlce of J udas for betraying bis Master. Tbey wanted and for a Ume e njoyed persona) aggrandizement and polltlcal power as puppets of tbelr Moscow master. They silenťed any murmur of protest tbat mlgbt have been raised by the people who for nine bundred years had struggled for indepen?.encei · · S LO V A K IA - V ICTI M OF TE.H ERAN A N D Y A LTA Tbe Centra! European satellites around the Soviet star are often to as. being of Slavic origin. Some omnisctent ones give that as one reason why Stalin had little dlfflculty In merging them into tbe Red. orbít. Slovakia, as we know, was one or tbe countrie!\ sold lnto bondage at Teheran and Yalta - tbe completlon or the betrayal belng seen when Eduarq Benes returned in 1945 as puppet president of tbe socalled Czecho-Slovakia and for two years or so made grotesque referŕed i LOVAKIA efforts to disguise tbe fact tbat Stalin, and not Benes or Klement Gottwahl, was tbe supreme belng In their capltal al Prague. Etbnologlcally lt is not lncorrect to group tbe peoples ot Russla. Poland, Czecboslovakia, Ukralnla, Bulgarla and Yugoslaľia into a Pan-Slav classlflcation. Tbe vast majority of the peoples In lhe socalled Slav nations bas llttle in common witb tbe Russa!ns. In past generations tbere was a bond of Cbristian religion wb!cb ran tbrough all tbe Slav countries, eitber tbe Ortbodox Greek-Russian Cburcb or, in tbe case of Slovakia, Poland, Croatia. lbe Roman Catbollc Cburcb. Tbe rise or atbelstlc Communlsm In Russla was t be deatb knell of Chrlstlanity tbere, bence a splltting wedge was d riven between most of the Balkan and Centra! European countries and t be great Slav domain of tbe Soviet. Slovakla, Poland and Croatla bave been predominantly Roman Catbollc for centuries. Only a small percentage are adherents ot tbe Ortbodox Cburcb. Hence, any contention tbat tbere is a racia! and religlous afflnity among the Slav peoples, wblcb simplifled tb elr enslavement by Moscow, 1s lacklng In support. F urthermore, lt is leaktng out tbrougb cracks and crinks In the Iro!l Curtaln that Stalln ls flnd· ing more tban a llttle dltficulty In merglng the Slovaks lnto bis godless domain. Wben for over eleven centuries a people, sucb as tbe Slovaks wbo bave prayed to God and H is Son, tbe Cbrlst, lt ls not llkely tbat tbe delty of tbe Kremlin can soon purge t belr mlnds or tbe OnA Supreme Being. THE SLOVAK$ ARE CELTS? Also - lf we were to accept the oplnlon of a learned professor it was my good fortune to meet in Banska Bystrica - tbere ls no RACIAL kinshlp between tbe Slovaks and tbe Russians. The Slovaks are not Slavs, asserted tbat student of blstory, but on the contrary ' they are Celts. A professor Doba! In Bratislava had given me a note ót lntroductlon to tbe curator of tbe museum In Banska Bysttica. It de· veloped tbat tbe gentleman knew more about the bistory ot manklnd tban Gl bbons, H. G. Wells, or any ot tbose wbo bave wtltten. 'Welgbty tomes on tbe origin or man, etc. ' 1• Tbls Slovak scbolar, well along In yt>ars, bad ·been lnstrúctor In a unlversity al Constantlnople (before it was called Istanbul) also in Budapest. His speclalty was Sanskrit Arabic, tbe Hebrew language and otber writings on tbe earlíest hlstory or manklnd. "You are Irisb," he said to me, after we had dlsposed of a slivovica and coffee, "and the Irlsh are Celts. A characteristlc ot tbe l rlsb is black halr with blue eyes. Tbat 1s observed among our people here In Slovakla." President Tiso, 1 have already mentioned had black bair and blue eyes. If the professor ,vas endeavorlng to make me feel a racia! kinshlp wlth the Slovaks - the Celtlsh background - he certatnly supported hls oplnion wlth more arguments than black and b lue for hair and eyes. lt was a lengthy thesls he expounded on tbe !:'Ubject, but the glst or lt was that au the people or Europe stem from the origlnal tn h abitants llvlng in tbe region around the Medlterranean, the Jordah, tbe 30 SLOVAKIA Hed and the Dead Sea. The garden of Paradise is supposed to have been in that general part of the Near East. The Celts - as part of the early human family of whlch we have any history, so the professor asserted - were brawny, pioneer lads, pagans in those days, of course, who hunted and explored and pushed their way westward. Some of them got as far as the western s hores of Europe, which we now know as the coast of Brittany in France. From there they launched boats and set up their cabeens in Ireland and Scotland, wbere they are today. Some of those early Ce!ts, acco rding to this student of the subject, decided tha,t the area just west of the Carpathian Mountalns - which is Slovakia - was a pretty good part of the earth to stake out for t heir children and grandchildren for generations to come. So there they stayed. Like the other Celts who went on to I reland, they were converted to Christ!anlty well over a thousand years ago and bave remained steadfast in their faith ever slnce, just as have the fightin' lrish. That, the Banska Bystrica gentleman lnformed me. is another evidence of the kinship, the similarlty in character and traditions. He then escorted me to a conical plie of stones towerlng four stories high, in which were kept many relics and articles that had been dug from the ground in Slovakia over th e past generations. There were cooking utensils, ornaments of solid gold and silver, bits of clothing, crude instruments for killing, such as tbe crusaders of the middle ages carried, and many other articles. Oddly enough, 1 had seen articles almost identically the same in the museum of Dublin, Ireland, on one of my visits there. Those in the Dublin museum had been unearthed in tbe peat bogs and fields of Ireland. The professor had a point there. The traces of clvllization, which we have found, do have similarity. The old gentleman then took me to his home and into the b asement or cellar under it. There were stacks of musty manuscripts, some on tbe oldest known kind of parchment. The signs and symbols on tbey were just hierog!yphics to me, but to that scholar they told stories and epics of hlstory wbich had been written in the mlddle ages. Whether or not tbe Slovaks are Celts and kin ot the Irish and Scots, instead of the Russians, I shall not attempt to prove. But that was the contention of one learned Slovak in Banska Bystrica. S LOV AKIA U NDER THE REDS Of course, now that the Communisl<i are in Slovakia, and Moscow is to be regarded as the fountain head of all culture and wisdom, it is likely that any reference to tbe Cbristian Celts as being remotely related to the Slovaks will be purged trom the people's minds and records. It would be interesting to know what the Communlsts have done to the sbrlne, the mausoleum of Fatber Andrej H linka In Ruzomberok, at wbich I had knelt in prayer a day or so before going to Banska Bystrica. It was Father Hlinka who, by bis zeal, tireless energy and strength of cbaracter, had brought about the political unity and solidarity wh!ch made possi ble tbe creation of the Slovak Republic. Al· thougb lt was short Jlved, it did demonstrate to the world that a SLOVAKIA 31 Slovak state is feasible and may again be upon the maps of Europe. It would be incorrect to assert that everyone in the Slovak Repub• Ile, durlng the stx years of its exlstence, was enthuslastlcally 01>tlmistic as to lts future in the assembly of nations comprlsíng the European continent. In this connection, it shoula be mentioned, tbat tbe greatly_ publicized pian or proposal said to bave been urged by General Dwight Eisenhower, !or a United States of Europe, may be dlsmissed as wlshful thinking. Such a "United States" could not possibly function at thls stage of world history when half of Europe is free and half s lave, half Christlan and half under the ruthless dominatlon of pagan dictators. Until the situation 1s altered and Communism ls banished from Europe, there can be no lasting unity. To even dlscuss the matter be· fore that 1s accomplished, is utterly Cutile. A SLOVAK TEXAS RANGER SPEAKS HIS MIND A well-to-do industrialist in Bratislava pointed out to me about 1942 what was to be the fate of Slovakla and Europe in the postwar period. He iS not a Slovak but one who resided in Slovakla when it was part oľ the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. then under the gov· ernment of Czechoslovakia and remained to carry on under tbe Re· 1mblic, as did many of Hungarlan, Czecb, Austrian or German natlonality. All enjoyed equ al rights. As be may still be living there, it would be wrong to mentlon bis name, because reprisals might be inflicted on bim, should these words be brought to the attentlon of Red spies in tbis country. On my lnitial visit to bis home, the first objects that met my eyes were a western saddle and a Wlnchester rifle In a regulatlon leather holster. Very much American. Then I got tbe story. He had been a Texas Ranger in bis younger days! There were notches in bis leg from slugs of desperados, several of wbom he had killed in bis encounters wltb tbem along the borders of the Rio Grande. Speaklng five languages fluently and knowing thl! contlnent of Europe thorougbly, his opinions on the current and impending eventa were wor• thy of attentlon "Wbat a misfortune 'Teddy' Roosevelt isn't in the White House today," he said shortly after we met. "Things would be dlfferent. Tbe way lt appears now, Europe is being delivered stralgbt lnto chaos and Communism. You know what that means? I do. Durlng the bloody reign of terror under tbat so-and-so (expressive Texas Ranger term) Bela Kun, I witnessed enough of lt. I was !nterpreter before some ot the committees in Budapest and stared that 'so-and-so' In the eye many a tlme. ľd bave kllled bim if I got the chance, and he knew lt. What is the intention of Franklln Roosevelt? To dellver us over t<_> the Reds aga in?" It was necE>ssary to first destroy the forces or Hitler, I pointed out and then . . . "Then what? Thaťs tbe quest!on. True enougb the Nazl yoke on the German people must be broken and they be brought back to belp in the scheme of thlngs. But you mark my worda, Stalln is the only one who ia winning anything in thia war. He'a not winning it elther. lťs being given to him. Unless bis henchmen are thrown out of t.he 32 SLOVAKIA Balkans, the Baltic states, Poland and all the other spots he will take over soon; the whole of Europe and western civllizatlon wlll go back• ward tor ~ century or so." "You are not so badly off here in Slovakia at present," I ventured to say. "NQnsense. Our freedom here is but temporary, and so 1s the pros• períty, Fooľs gold. You know what tbat 1s? A flasb In the pan, a mi· rage. Can't make this country self-sufficient. It bas to be bltcbed on t& some other part of Europe. Always has been. Tbe Germans deve!• oped it at one period of bistory. It was part of tbe Hapsburg Man· archy, tben the neglected half of Czecho·Slovakla. It wlll be taken over by the Reds after the war - see if ľm not rlght. Could make it a self·determining state, if the otber European powers, supported by America, demanded it. But tbey won't, unless great pressure ls brougbt on the influences now in Washington, London and Paris. But ľm not leaving here. Sure, ľm what tbey cal\ a capitallst, an enemy of the Reds. rve gat that Wincbester and two Colt plstols. Wben they're empty the Reds can take wbaťs left. I won't know mucb about it tben." That was one man's opinion of wbat was transplring in Slovakia anct Centra! Europe at tbat time and wbat he thought tbe future beld far tbem. He was not always so explosive in bis observatlons. but in tbe two years and more I knew bim I learned to respect his estimate of the Europeao scene. though at times I may not have entlrPIY agreed with bim. But was be not right as regards the sell-out of Christianity in Cen· tral Europe? Was he not correct In bis predictlon that only Stalln was wiooing t he war and that bis greatest aldes were then oot In '.\toscow. but In London and Washington? In these days when we art! exhorted to strlve and save and struggle to rescue Europe and ourselves rrom the menace of Communlst cont.rol, let us reflect on tbe facts or tbose who - wltb wbat appears to bave been pre-determlnation - consigned Slovak:a and otber Christian nations to perdition. MEETING PRESIDENT TISO At a dinner party in Bratislava l flrst met Joseph Mracna, formerly Consul far Czecboslovakia in New York. lt developed, wben comparlng notes, t hat we had both salled from New York on the same day in Oecembr 1939. He on tbe Vulcania bound far Llsbon. wbile my voyage was on tbe Excalibur witb Genoa as my destinatlon. Mracna and bis wlfe, who was Viennese. were very pro-American an.d longed far the tlme when they migbt return to tbe Unitd States wher-e he ·had many frlends and acqualntaoces, several of whom were also my friends. Although born In Slovakia, Mracna had spent tbe greater part of bis life in other countries. He attended unlversities in Vienna and Par!s, following wb!ch he had been occup!ed In forelgn countrles even before becoming the Czecboslovakian Consul In New York. He was, at the time I knew him, a member of tbe Foreign Office of the new Sl_ovak .Republlc wbere hls experience and knowledge of affalrs in .several other countries was most usefuL I asked !f he could arrange an audience for me with the Pres!dent. He said he could; and did. SLOVAKIA 33 When I arr!ved at the presldentlal palace at the time ap polnted for my a udlence, Ka rol Murin, persona) secretary for the Preslden t, cautioned me aga!nst detaining him too long and also mentioned that it would be inappropriate to questlon him on matters of foreign a nd domestlc policy. Mracna, it seems, had lnferred that !t was more of a persona) and human interest chat that I desired with the P res!den t, whlch was correct, but r was also most eager to interview bim on politlcal issues - domestic and foreign. Monsignor J oseph Tiso. or Pres!dent Tiso as he was then, rad!a ted those qua lities so often observed in the successful pol!tlc!an. An!mation, vigor, affability and the obvious desire to make frlends and please people, withont Jettlng it appear as a veneer to mask h!s real thoughts. He greeted me with a hearty llandshake and. after Karol Murin left us. he Jed the way to the corner of bis study in the palace. He was in perfect health, but a physical dlrector would undoubtedly have prescribed more exercise to guard agalnst overwelght whlch ls often the worry of those nearing the half-century mark. His black ha!r was but sparsely sprinkled wlth grey and a radiant tr!nkle llgh ted bis dark blue eyes. Slnce my knowledge of the Slovak language was limited to some dozen or more words and he spoke very little Engllsh, our interview was carried on in German. My openlng remark was that he had established history by belng the first Catholic priest to be the head of a sovere!gn state. "Oh, no," he replied, "there was Selpel in the former Austrian government." Monsi'gnor Seipel, 1 reminded bim, was prime minister but not president. "There was Richelieu." He, too, as l called to bis attention, was prime minister whiJe Louis of France was king. So it seemed that my reference to history was correct. After some minutes or general conversatlon I said that I had been cautioned not to question bim on matters of state, but that I would like to do so. "Please do. Any questions you ask, l'll try to answer the m." WHAT ABOUT POLICIES? Then 1 was free to touch on several topics that lnterested me and most anyone else who had any knowledge of the happen!ngs !nside Central Europe during these days. "It is true that your pol!cies are dictated by Germany?" '"No," he lnsfsted. "In forelgn matters our policies are formu• lated so that tbey do not conflict with those of the Axls Powers. Slnce we are within their orblt lt would be sulcidal to strongly oppose them. But in domestlc matters we form our own pollcles whlch, In many instances, do not coincide wlth those of Germany. German terr!tory as you know is just across the Danube. Only a bridge between us but it !s a long bridge." He smiled when he realized that. I grasvoo his none too subtle meaning. 34 SLOVAKIA "Some of your critics," I then said, "declare that you - and by that I mean the Slovak Republic - are subject to instructions from the Vatican." "The usual charge of the uninformed," he replied. "l have no connection with the Vatican, except through the diplomatic channels, the same as other countries to which the Vatican City has accredited representation. (T here was a Vatlcan diplomatic official resident in Bratislava.) Any communications affecting the religious affairs of our people would be transmitted through the bishops. I am not a bishop. In my capacity as president I have no counection with Rome, other than I have polnted out." All rellgious denominations were accorded the same right of worship, he pointed out. The largest Protestant group was the Lutheran Evangelical, of which Rev. Martin Razus was the accepted leader and who was not only cooperating with bim politically, but they were personal friends. In the eastern part of the state were also many Orthodox or Greek Catholics. AGAIN WITH THE CZECHS ? Was lt likely, l asked, that the Slovaks and Czechs would again llilite in a government after tbe war? That questinon did not receive a direct answer. He remlnded me that trom the very inception of the Czecho-Slovakian government, there had been dlscrimintalon against tbe Slovaks. The autonomy, which had been promlsed, had been denied them. Those who protested and agitated for Slovak rights, such as Hlinka and hlmself, were imprisoned. Something like nine months he had spent in a Czech jail for protestlng the injustices that were lnflicted on t he Slovak people and demanding that their rights be recognized. Later he had been Minister of Health in the Prague cabinet. The Slovaks. he assured me, de· s ired to live in peace and harmony wlth the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarlans and the Germans, but they a lso believed they were entltled to the "self-determlnation" that had been loudly proclaimed and was said to be the lnalienable right even of all small nations. They were now, for the first Ume in hlstory, an independent country. The problems facing them were many and varied. President Tiso referred wlth considerable pleasure to hls vislt in the Unlted States in 1937. He expressed the wish that the thousands of Slovaks in Canada and the United States be informed of the prospects for bette rment which he felt was due their people through the enactment of the programs of development then under way. NEED OF TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS Thelr greatest problem, he said, was in finding men and women for the jobs that had been created. "We need technlcians, instructors in t he schools and universities and speciallsts for industria! projects. Our hlgh schools are over-crowded. Students want education and want to get ahead, but we lack sufflcient teachers. Tbe same in many businesses. We bope to meet these needs in tlme." He made the remark that, although s peclallsts and technlclans were urgently needed. he boped tbey would not bave to rely too much on the Germans. Tbat and otber comments indicated hls disllke for SLOVAKIA 36 tbe small army of German engineers and tecbnicians wbo had come into the country to aid In its development. THE SLOVAKS AND THE RUSSIANS There had been a small token Slovak force sent against the Soviet soon after the outbreak of the German-Soviet hostillties in 1941, but they were withdrawn and tbe men, for the most part, were work· Ing in various industries that contributed products for the war effort. l pointed out to the President that they and tbe Russians were Slavs and was it not consistent that they be on tbe side of tbeir blood brotbers? Tbere was a pause and bis face became very earnest. "Quite true, We are blood brothers. But when tbose blood brotbers are Bolsheviks and Communlsts," doubling his flst and pounding on the table in front of bim Tiso said, ''then we'll fight to tbe last man." Presldent Tiso, like the martyred Draja Mlhailovitcb of Yugosla• vla, Archbisbop Stepinac and Mindszenty of Budapest, did not hesitate to take a firm and defiant stand against the greatest menace Christian civlllzation was then facing - and is still facing today. But because he and tbose other courageous ones were not deceived by tbe propaganda, the pious platitudes and spurious pollcies of tbe Western Powers as regards tbe Soviet, he was marked for sacrifice. The Washington State Department, at tbe bebest of Stalln's puppets, actually delivered bim to tortures and to death. Deny it tbougb they would llke to do today - when Christian leaders llke J osepb Tiso are neetled to weld Central Europe into a strong bastion against the Communlst horde - the bald trutb remains that In 1945 our State Department, as a supine and subserv!ent tool of Stalin. cons!gned T!so and tbe Slovaks t_o Red domination and extermination. Regardless of all arguments to the contrary, Josepb Tiso was slncerely desirous of helping his people - the long oppressed country that for nine hundred years had kept the fires or Chrlstlanlty alive in Centra! Europe. How long those fires will smoulder under the ruth· less domination of Communist destroyers of religion and clvllizatlon, is a grave question. Wbether it was mistaken judgment for tbe Slovaks to accept the assistance of Germany, to achieve the measure of independence they enjoyed, is a matter of oplnion. There was no war in progress wben the Slovak Republlc was born and none was imminent. Tbey revolted against obvlous injustices of tbe Prague Government. The Czech majority could bave compromised and settled tbeir dlfferences. Tbey did not. Wben tbe interna] revolt came. Hitler took advantage of tbe situatlon and proffered bis migbt against outslde aggresslon. Slovakla accepted tbe offer. If Josepb Tiso was a traltor to bis country, then tbe same can be said of Eamon de Valera in Ireland, Mabatma Gbandi in India. or the gallant Marsball Mannerheim in brave little Flnland. AII were patriots fighting for tbeir people. All were persecuted, smeared and discredited, but tbeir names will live in tbe blstories yet to be wrltten. 36 SLOVAKlA TI SO HAD A SENSE OF H UMOR After furtber lengtby dlscussion of varlous toplcs, I was about to depart when Karol Murin came to Inform tbe President tbat tbe Finance Minister was waitlng to see bim. Tlso accompanled me lnto a vast room looklng out across a walled garden in wbicb he sald líe took dally walks. Little dld l know tben tbat, over two year.s later, he would be taking many long walks togetber in another walled enclosure and resume our discussions on tbe worlďs affairs. But tbat is another story. Tbe air of tbe room was cbilly. - A tbougbt occurred to me. "Your Excellency," I said, ·•some persons told me tbat you a re always very seriouJ and earnest. But tbere's a twlnkle ot mirtb In your eyes at times and I bave an Idea tbat there's conslderable humor In you." "Perbaps," he smlled. "Would lt be appropriate If I gave you a little present?" "Wbat, · for instance·?" "I tbougbt tbat in tbese cold days of winter, just for mediclnal purposes, of course, you migbt appreciate a half dozen bottles ot gflod Canadlan whisky." Tlso chuckled and bis eyes lígbted witb the mirth I had noted there before. "ľll be glad to get lt," be' ~'aid. · The half dozen bottles were duly delivered fróm a source In "Bra tislava wbere I knew it was obtainable. Later on Karol Murin ask-ečl me to call again at tbe palace, wben I was given the compllments ot the Presldent and a token of bis appreciation for the whisky. It lš a wonder!ully embroidered table c loth, one of the finest specimens ot Slovak rieedlework that could posslbly be found. It is today my most treasur-ed possession. Very recently a letter came to me trom Karol Murin who ls now a resident of Canada. He informed me that my friend Joseph Mracna, whom I got to know very well in tbe two years following our meeting, had been murdered by the Commnnists. The Slovak patriot, Monslgnor Joseph Tlso, was delivered to Benes and bi.s Red Government by. the United States autborlties to be exterminated, because he was the arch enemy of Communism. Jn 1946, the year when· that assistance to Communist deslgns was. rendered by our offlclals, lt was polltlcally unwise to declare one's 'undying opposition to the forces or antl-God even then seeklng our destruction. Presldent Tiso pald tbe supreme penalty for bis devotion to bis God and bis country. COMES MY TURN TO BE I NVESTIGATED Tbe Carlton Hotel, in Bratislava, where I had reslded for months, was a meeting place for German military officers, legation attaches and couriers, coming and going all the tíme. A physician llving in the hotel, wbom I had called on a tlme or two for professlonal services, informed· me tbat someone at the German Legatlon had quizzed bim about me. The pbyslcian was Slovak, bis wife Hungarlan, enougb to assure me they were not sympathetic to the German otflcials. "That American 1s no frlend ot Germany," the legation omclal sald to the physician. ·'Whaťs he dolng here and why is he permitted to stay ?" SLOVAKIA 37 Just what the doctor said to dlvert suspicion, I do not know, but within a few days the local police inspectors came to question me a bout my stay in the country, my source ot income, what 1 was doing, and so on. My replles were vague, but apparently satlsfactory for the Slovak police. But it caused me considerable worry. Pressure mlght be brought to bear which would send me across that bridge into German territory. That I must escape at all costs. Again I sought out Joseph Mracna In the Foreign Office. We bad talked frankly before and I knew I could trust hlm. My permit to remaln in Slo· vakia was about to expire and also my passport. Would they deport me? Mracna conferred wlth the proper authoritles, then lnformed me that if I did not become a "public charge·• - that !s, if I had assets on which to live - they . would give me sanctuary. I -would not be detported even at the expiration of permits or passports. I assured him that my persona! assets were sufficient to maintaln me for an extended period. 1 GO TO PIESTAN Y At the suggestion of Mracna, I arranged to live in Piestany, a health resort about sixty mlles from Bratislava which !s famed for its hot baths. It was far enough from the capltal that the German mllitary officlals or Gestapo agents wer not prowling around. Al· though the Republic malntalned its own police and defense force, judiciary, customs and ·immigration officials - no one arrlving or departing without tbeir sanction - there seemed to be a tacit agreement that the German military and legation oftlcials could come there for extended holidays. They came malnly [or food and drink, which weré almost non-existent in Germany and Austria at that tlme. Piestany is world famed. The baths - mud and hÓt pools - are beneficial for those wlth rheumatlsm, arthritls and other ills. Before the war there were visitors from as far away as India, Africa and l;loth North and South America. The two largest hotels - one on an island of the Vah River, and on which are the hot springs had been taken over and operated by the Interior Department ot the Slovak State. Soon after I went there as a voluntary "internee," Piestany became tbe headquart.ers of many involuntary internees of the Slovak Government. First to arrive were twenty-six - including the children - ot the !talian dlplomatlc corps in Bratislava. The !talian Minister, Cortese. had declared his allegiance to the antl-Mussolini, or Badoglio government, which jolned forces with the Western Allies. Naturally, he and bis entlre staff who shared his sympathles were anathema to the Germans. With the setting up of the Fascist forces in Northern Haly, pressure was brought to bear on Slovakia to deport the anti Fascists to the northern part of Italy which was still occupied by Germany and cooperating with it. TISO, TH E H U MAN ITARIAN But. contrary to generally circulated statements that President Tiso was a puppet ot Germany, he deflnitely refused to llsten to the suggestlons or demands of the Germans. nor wonld he consent to the Itallan Legatlon staff belng interned In Germany, which was a 38 SLOVAK.IA later idea of the Germans. So wlthin six weeks or my taking up residence in the Grand Royal Hotel in Piestany as a lone "internee," twenty-slx Italians moved in together with two attaches of the Slovak Foreign Offlce a.s guardians or "watchers." Two of the arrivals were Count Giovanni Revedin and his Amerlcan-born wife with whom I had become acquainted previously. The question was put to the Countess and the Foreign omce "guardians" "Are internees being held incommunicado?" The answer was no. I was not restralned from associating with them. In ternment in Piestany was not so onerous for them, because, unofflcially, Slovakia was more pro-Allied than pro-Axis. It is doubt· ful if any of the Allied countries were as considerate of interned subjects of an "enemy" nation as Slovakla was for those ot the !talian Diplomatlc corps, now no longer officially welcome. Later on arrived some from the Rumanian and Bnlgarian legations also. They were quartered at the governmenťs expense in one of the country's best hotels, permitted to retain their motor cars. though restricted in the use of them. If, however, any member of the corps found it necessary to go to Bratislava. some slxty miles distant, the Foreign Office representative granted permlssion. Usuaiiy lt was for a trip there and return the same day. Otherwise they were free - as was the case wlth myself - to roam all about the countryside, to nearby villages, to go flshing, bathing In the splendld pool in summer or in the Vah River and getting what relaxation they might need by attending the Jocal movie theatres, uslng tbe s kating rinks in wlnter and the tennis courts In summer. Slnce they were cut off from their sources of income, the Slovak government advanced them a small amonnt of spending money at regular intervals, pald hospital bills for those who required sneh hospitalizatlon, and very large fees for speciallsts who performed operatlons on some members or the group. It was convenient for me that friends with diplomatic immunity were there. The manuscrlpts on which I was then working would have ticketed me into one of the Nazi concentration camps had they fallen into their hands. Bnt Count Revedin as well as members of the Minister's family kept them in their possession - safe from search and seizure. Another who had taken ,;anctuary there was Siegfried Geyer, a dramatlst well known in Germany, Austria and Hungary, whose plays had been performed in Switzerland, Sweden, London and New York. One of his comedles, "Candle Light," was presented in Londoo where it ran for a year. Later it was brought to New York. where lt had some success. then was purchased by Warner Brothers and filmed, as were other of bis plays. TISO NOT AN ANTI-SEMITE The purge or J ews In Austria forced GPyer to flee into Slovakia where he was given presidential permission to remain. That same permission was granted to others I knew personally. One of them was an official of the Slovak travel bureau and another was an engineer for the resort and bealth department who resided wlth bis wlfe in Piestany and whom I vlsited many Limes. Another was a physician attached to tbe government hospital. Hence the base accusatlons of SLOVAKIA 39 anti-Sem!tism that were hurled against Tiso - when the Reds de• manded his death - were false and easily proven to be noth!ng but falsehoods. Siegfried Geyer and I were work!ng daily on some manuscrlpts. Through underground communication I had been warned that milltary forces were to occupy the country. Two nights later the w!fe or a Slovak cabinet minister came to inform me that in a few hours the Germans would be in Piestany. Geyer was with me at the time. He felt that it was h!s death knell. It was two weeks or more before any action was taken toward deportation of the Jews. On the night of September 8, 1944, Geyer Jeft me, saying that we would meet at eleven in the morning. I never saw bim again. Through an acquaintance I learned that he wa s picked off the street the morning after leaving me and was carted away in a blue motor van. Three others of my acquaintances vanished the same day. For years they had found sanctuary and In many instances exceptional employment in the Slovak Republic, and this is asserted in direct contradiction of generally circulated propaganda by pressure groups that President Tiso and bis cablnet members aided in tbe extermlnation of the J ews. WAR COMES TO S LOVAK I A - GERMANS TAKE OVER In the sixteen months of my residence tbere, before the German occupation I had observed growing resentment against their powerful nelghbor. Now it became more bitter though the people were prudent enough not to make any outward sign of it. A pigmy does not force a quarrel with a giant. Tbe !talian diplomatic internees merited the attentlon of the German occupatlon officials. First tbeir motor cars were lmpounded. Then they were moved to tbe other hotel an an island In the Vah River, the two bridges a cross the river being circled with barricades and sentries posted at eacb end. A curfew edict went lnto effect and miles of barbed wire barriers were thrown around the city. Trenches and embankments were dug on tbree sides of tbe city, fleld telephones and power cables being strung along the streets and far into the country side. Tbls front was to be held at all costs - so lt was said. Slovakla now began to realize that all war fronts were closing in on ber. For over five years tbey had boped and prayed that this destructlon would not be vislted on them. But now it was at tbelr door. Tbe morning following the German occupatlon I went to tbe office of Inspector Vavro of tbe Slovak police. Prevlously wben my twelve month residence permit had exp!red I had sougbt bim. He merely sm!led at my fears. "Are you loslng any sleep over lt?" he asked. "Go away from here. l've forgotten you're in Piestany." An "enemy" subject, wbicb technically I was, could not bope for greater consideratlon. But now Vavro was no longer in complete autbority. His advice. however, was tbe same as before. "Didn't I teli you long ago that l've forgotten that you are here?" he said. "Return to your bouse and stay out of sight for a wb!le. My report witb your name on lt bas been conveniently misla!d. It will be some tiroe before tbe Germans tlncl :,ou." 40 SLOVAKlA Tbree days later men visited me, saying that tbey were wlth tbe German State Police. Tbere was tbe usual routine question!ng. Identlfication papers; occupation; slnce wbat date and wby was I residing' In the country? Wbat ls contained In the luggage and what !s in the mass of manuscripts, papers, etc.? Joseph Mracna had given me a letter to be sbown at just such times. It came lnto view and served to substantlate my statement tbat tbe Slovak autborities were acquainted with the contents of my bulging brief case. After a tborougb searcb of the place in whlch tbey found no radio, camera, weapons, photograpbs or otber susplcious appearing articles, the three men departed. Tension tbrougboul the country was becoming more noticable. Reports ŕlltering through from the eastern boundaries of the country were terrlfying. The Germans, being forced westward, forced all the villagers to evacuate ·with them' - or be shot. Their houses were burned. But before doing so they were stripped of everythlng In the way of metal. Door hinges, locks, farm machinery, tools and lmplements were taken away. Long convoys of half starved and bedraggled evacuees from the eastern slde of Slovakla and also from Hungary woved westward by wagon and on foot. Sometimes for eight or ten hours at a time those wretched and homeless people were coming at snalľs pace over t he. pHls, through the fringe of Piestany, and then vanished over the western horizon. " LIBERATION" BY THE REDS But even worse fate awaited those who eluded the German evacuation decrees. The Red "liberators" advancing into the eastern areas of Slovakia confiscated what might have been overlooked by the Germans. They roundetl up and deported children; no one seemed to know wbere. It was rumored they were sent to Russia. So between the plague of Germany, and the terrorlsts of the Soviet, poor llttle Slovakla had little to choose. They were caught between two enemies. Pressure was brought to bear on tbe Slovak government to hand the interned diplomats over to Germany. I took a message for them to tbe Swlss Consulate In Bratislava, for transmission to the outside world. It was hoped that if publicity was given their pllght in the Swiss and other neutra! papers, it would have some reaction, and also become known to the Allied authorlties. The messages and reports in Switzerland did perhaps seŕve to alter the announced lntention of the Germans to dellver the Ital!ans lnto the hands of the Mussolini faction in North Italy, who mlght have shot them as traltors. Instead they were sent first to Vienna and then to Sllesia. Amerlcan flyers who made forced landings or were shot down over Slovakia were taken in hand by the Slovak authorities. Tbose who requlred bospitalization were given tbe best the capltal atrorded - whlch was excellent. Karol Murin told me on · one of my vlslts to the Palace that, on instructions trom Presldent Tlso, he and bis wlfe s ougbt out the Amerlcan prlsoiiers in the hospltals to see that nothlng was left undone for tbeir comfort. Even bouquets of flowers were sent to brighten tbelr rooms. ··· ~- ' SLÔVlinA 41 What a contrast trom the shameful treatment that was accorded Pres!dent Tiso, Karol Murin and members of their cab!net when they voluntarlly sought sanctuary In the American zone of occupatlon. More on this will follow. The Germans ended all the consideration and special attention that was given war prisoners. The German military officials took them, as well as many Slovaks, despite protests from the President and Foreign Minister, Stephen Tiso. Again it was a case of the pigmy and the giant. Might was right. The story of tbe gbastly occupation and betrayal will be told later. THE BEGINNI N G OF THE END On New Year's Eve of 1945 I was wltb frlends In Piestany. 'ľbe forbidden {by the Germans) broadcasts of tbe London radlo w1:,re turned on for the latest news in Czecb, German and Englisb. Also that evening Adolf Hitler broadcast a brlef greeting to der Deutscber Volk - hls "friends." Some of the llsteners insisted that lt was not Hitler's voice. Otbers expressed the opinion tbat lt was "der Fubrer" but a very mucb changed volce. It was generally believed tbat the attempted assassination of six montbs previously had left some per• manent impaiľment. During tbe iatter part of 1944 motlon pictures of him - wblcb was unusual - were always taken at a distance and tbere was a no ticeable awkwardness of one arm. It was rumored that he sustained other injuries. The London radlo gave lengthy discussions on tbe plaos for the liberation and rehabilitation of Centra! Europe. We assumed that there was complete accord among the Allied Powers and that tbe views and oplnlons expressed represented tbose of tbe United States. The piana were thoae of the Red dominated group of Edwa rd Benes and foreto ld th e diaaster t hat was inevitab le. Anyone with even the most meagre knowledge of European history knew that the rulers of the Kremlin hoped to dominate and absorb all tbe S lav people. Therefore, it was alarmlng for the people in Centra! Europe to observe the manner in whlch the Allled Powers permitted the Soviet to occupy the Balkans, move up into Hungary and tben sweep lnto Slovakla. As my friends In Piestany and Bratislava pointed out re. peatedly, the Allied Powers, and particularly America, should have re• membered what bappened in the Ilaltlc states, In Flnland and in Poland. It was tbe pattern of Red absorb tion and complete control, once they planted foot on the soil o f a country. The only exceptlon was that of Spalo - the slngle country where the Communlsts ~uf• fered milltary defeat. Offlcial Washington, let us remem ber also, was cooperatlve with the Communist terrorists in Spain at that Ume - regardless of the denials that some or the hierarchy of the e lect now wish to read lnto the record. Moscow's deslgns in Spain, in the Baltic states, In the Balkans and no w in Centra! Europe were so obvious as the Pyramlds on the Sahara. The milltary o ccupatlon was but the prelude to permanen t lncorpo ration lnto the Red orblt. After the Red army occupied Budapest, whlch for centurles had been a bastlon of Chrlstlanlty against the antl-Christlan forces on the East, it left only Bratislava as the lmportant city of the Danube between Budapest and Vienna. Mlllions of kronen In materials and mil• 42 SLOVAK.IA lions of man-power hours were expended on the defenses. The Eastern Front, lt seemed, would soon be in our front yards. When the day and night booming of artlllery began to be hear d in Piestany, many felt it wise to move westward. A famlly I knew In Bratislava had obtalned a motor truck and fuel two precious thlngs - intending to flee into southern Bavaria. By phone from Piestany I arranged to share space in the Bavaria-bound truck. But when l arrived there by train trom Piestany the truck had a\ready left. Now, where to go or what to do? Huge artlllery pieces were being wheeled through the str eets westward. German milltary supplies in motor cars and wagons trundled westward. Cattle and horses were being driven in the directlon of Vienna. It is doubtful if they got far along that road before the Hed army captured and butchered them. OFF TO PRAGUE An acquaintance advised me to Jeave for Prague as rall transport was still operating in that direction. When I inquired about visa or permit to enter the ·'Protectorate" and officiaľs secretary informed me that "tbe bars are down; you may go anywhere you can obtain transportation." At tbe railway station J got a ticket for Prague. A train was scbeduled to leave that evening about six. Tbe station was a seething mad-house. Pandemonium, orrlerly confusion, bundreds of terrorstricken people with bundreds of bags. bundles and babies trying to get somewbere - anywbere. In tbe black-out, long after slx o'clock, tbere was an air-raid warning. Police herded people into a vast underground shelter that had been tunnelled into a rocky bili aero.ss the railway tracks. MorP .:onfusion, anxiety and wondering if we would ever get out of the stricken city. The train - scheduled for six o'clock - left in tbe thickening blackness of the night about eleven. People were packed in to suffocation. At a town called Cuty. on thP. Crontier, l transferred to anotber train tbat landed me in Brno, now Czechoslovakia, about eight in the morning. After snatching four hours sleep at the Grand Hotel, I contrived to board (without the special military permit) an express train which landed me in Prague about mldnight. All train service into Slovakia ended tbe morning after I de• parted. Had J delayed a few hours longer tbe Reds would have inc luded me in their spreading net of "liberation." Even the most unobservant person must bave sensed the uneasiness of the Germans then in Prague. Czechs and the evacuees from Slovakia, Hungary and Poland knew it was but a matter of weeks or days when the American and British forces would be in Berlin. Tb'at meant the end of the war. but what then? Every day motor trucks and cars of all kinds were being loacled with bousehold goods, cats, dogs, bird cages, German women and children. Then at evening they rolled off into the darkness. Branche.• of trees or other <'amouflaging uas used to disguise the vebicles as much as possible. They dld not chance mass movements or evacuees in dayl!gbt llours. SLOVAKIA 43 REVOLUTION AND REVENGE Friday evening, May Fourtb, marked tbe beglnning ot tbe uprising against six long years ot German dictatorsbip. A mysterious and ominous atmospbere pervaded Prague. Crowds began convergmg in Wenselplatz - as it was then called_ For wbat? No one seemed to know. Sometbing was to bappen. A revolution was in tbe making. Little by little tbings occurred. Men, women and boys began defacing German words on tbe fronts of business establ!shments. Tbey commenced to alter tbe street signs - - which were in dual language - Czecb and German_ Tbe electric trams were halted by tbe crowd Then matters became more serious. Sirens screamed, military cars pushed througb tbe crowds, commands were barked over t.he loud speakers in the s quare. Small armoured tanks rolled into view. A plstol shot, a woman's scream, crowds surging back against tbe walls and the rattle of machlne guns Four days and nigbts tbe battle continued. The Prague raáio remained in Czech hands and was their greatest asset. Pleas from it were directed to the American forces, said to be thirty, tben twenty, tben ten miles away. Professor Matousek, director of tbe station, would beg in broken English for tbem to hurry. The Stars and Stripes waved from the top;, of buildings and in many windows. An enthusiastic welcome would be glven tbeir liberators. The question asked by hundreds was: '·When do you think tbe Americans wíll get here?" Little did they know then that they would never arrive_ That Prague and the Czechs, together with the millions of Slovaks, had b een sold down-river by Eduard Benes in a secret deal entered into with Stalin. A deal that had the benediction of Franklin D. Roosevelt who was even then loudly prating about saving the Western World from the Nazi destroyers of Christianity, only to be consigned to the Soviet, the greatest destroyers and enemies of Christian civilization since the Cruclfixion. THE SAD AWAKENING On the sixth day of the revolution in which bundreds or !!ves and millions in property was destroyed. General Vlassoff's troopers were s linking along the shattered fronts of buildings in Wenzelspaltz. These were the Russians, mostly from the Ukraine, who had first been equipped by the Germans to fight thP Communists. Now they turned on the Germans and were belping to drive tbem out of Prague. The thought came to me at the time: what will be tbe fate or these pol!tlcal pawns? They followed tbeir leader, General VlassofI against the Bolshevik terrorists, then they remainecl witb him when he turned agalnst the Germans. Would tbe Allied nations give them sanctuary and a cbance to live• They did not. General Vlassoff was dellvered to the Moscow '"liberators" just as was President Tiso and bis cabinet. After a mock tria! that followed the pattern of al! Red trlals. Vlassoff was put before a firing squad. But what ls the fate of tbe simple l{ussian farmeťs boy hundreds of them - wbo wore a uniform an carried a rifle, or drove a team of horses pulling a wagon Joad of supplles to aid In the war for tbe West? Any number or t.hem were hquldated and others are SLOV~ .I A 110w slaves In Slberia. Not being articulate their story is never heard. And who delivered them to death or slavery? The same ones wbo dellvered the Slovaks to the Communlsts at Teheran and Yalta. By the end of the sixth or seventh day there came into the n1lnds or the beleagured people of Prague as well as the hundreds or Slovak, Pollsh and Hungarian evacuees, the susplclon that the Amerlcans were not coming. When for days the Amer!can rorces did not advance a step, but on the contrary moved away trom the city, they knew that something or a Mach!avelian nature had taken place behind the scenes. That they had been sold !nto bondage. All the p!ous words and pretty promlses that had been inade about guaranteeing their liberatlon - were just so many empty words. It became obvlous that political tricksters had ordained in secret conferences that Czecho-Slovakia was to be handed lnto the Red orbit. It was agaínst every tenet of their beliefs. part!cularly the Slovaks, who were avowed and m!l!tant foes or the Communist ideology and who w!th thelr then presldent, Joseph Tlso, had said they would t!ght to the !ast man. Now they realized that they were being conslgned to Red dominat!on. After another day of intermittent bombing and shell fire those of us In Prague heard a jubilant news announcer on the London radlo assure us that "the war in Europe !s over." That same inaccurate statement came from the American operated radlo stations In Germany and France and synchronized. ironlcally enough, with the staccato barking of machlne guns that raked Wenzelsplatz and the occasional deep toned thunder of an aerlal bomb or German shell that ~xploded somewhere too near ror comfort. For the people of Czecho-Slovakia the war was not over. We knew in tbe promises of the Western Powers, had been abandoned to t.he then that the Czechs and Slovaks. also the Hungarlans. the Poles and the other people of Chrlstian nations. who had placed thelr fatth benign brutallties and tyranny of Joseph Stalin. Innuences In Washington hari labored zealously to airl the Kremli n's effort for worldwide destruct!on of Chrl.stlan civllizatlon. and the Slovaks were another pawn In the game. Proof or that innuence and c!tations or those. who were lnstrumental In lntlict!ng that ruln on Centra! :E;urope. bave already been written tnto the publi<' records. Slovakia had enjoyed a measure of freedom only to have lt snatched away anrl her peopl~ consigned to oppression, spollatlon and deportation. far more ghastly than any they had endured in past bistory. But rbeir falth in God and their delermlnation to flght on has 1emalned. • • • WHO SAID IT? - "We are children or freedom. We cannot be s afe except in an environment of freedom. We belleve in freedom as fundamentally as we belleve anythlng In thls world. We belleve In it far everyone In our country. And we don't restrict thls belie! to freedom for ourselves. We belleve that all people in the world are entltled to as much freedom, to develop in thelr own way, as we want ourselves." - (Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Aprll 22, 1950).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource I Was in Slovakia Description An account of the resource Edward L. Delaney Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 25-44 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Delaney, Edward L. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/da3f2ca94d04ff9e5d213069e50cef64.pdf 37bf27089082f711bbb586f539324490 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 23 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA ORAVA The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper. The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069, wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary. If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543" and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate, and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the castle proper. In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved." The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč. In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica, succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380), and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd. · In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž, �24 SLOVAKIA was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský, who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000 ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family. In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen, defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered) and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever, ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra, Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich l<'orgáč. George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616 and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly, a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs, rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711. The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored it . to lts present cÓnditlon. If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava valley trom tbe castle heights. � SLOVAKIA 23 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA ORAVA The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper. The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069, wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary. If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543" and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate, and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the castle proper. In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved." The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč. In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica, succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380), and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd. · In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž, �24 SLOVAKIA was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský, who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000 ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family. In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen, defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered) and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever, ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra, Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich l<'orgáč. George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616 and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly, a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs, rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711. The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored it . to lts present cÓnditlon. If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava valley trom tbe castle heights. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 23 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA ORAVA The Orava Castle, one o! the most beautiful in Slovakla, nestles some 360 feet a bove the Orava River. The stronghold ls made up or three parts, bullt at different ti mes: the lower, centra), and upper. The centra) portlon is the oldest. Thls castle wa.,; royal property as early as 1010, and lts foundation goes back to the pagan perlod of Slovakia. lt is recorded that tbe castle sent aid to Trenčín In 1069, wben tbe Czeebs attacked the city, and t hat it was a safe refuge for tbe people in 1241, when the barbaric Tatars invaded Hungary. If you would enter the lower courtyard, you must pass througb a gate and a tower. On the gate you (Ind the inscription, "I. Z. C. 1543" and two beautlful escutcheons: one of George Thurzo and the other of Francis Zichy. Inside tbe lower courtyard are the residences of officers, tbe record room, a well, and a chapel. Members of tbe Thurzo and Tokoly families, as well as those of other notables, are buried witbin the cbapel walls. As you pass on, you pause before a beautlful stairease to vlew the two sculptured lions on columns stationed at the foot of the stalrs. You ascend the stairs, pass through a heavy gate, and enter the oldest part of the Orava Castle, tbe courtyard and the castle proper. In the courtyard is a well which flows lnto the Orava river b eneatb the Castle. To the rlght of the welI is a cave, within which, a Iegend says, Peter Varday, Archblshop of Kaloča, was imprlsoned in l 484, because he spoke too freely against higher taxes. Then you enter the castle, which was once occupled by the Thurzo family, and find the portraits of al-1 the administrators of Orava, trom George Thurzo down to Zichy. Odd, worn stairs In the wall and ladders take you to a long narrow bridge, wbich extends to the entrance of the upper. castle. This courtyard is quite small compared to the others. The chapel !s the highest point of this castle. Beneatb this are small narrow rooms or cells in wblch, the Oravans telI you, "the Red Monks once llved." The castle has passed through many hands. Records show that Peter Balaša, administrator of Hont, occupied it in 1267. The dauntless Matúš Čák - "the mightly lord of the Vah and the Tatras" became the owner in 1298, and some time Iater a man named Donč. In 1320 the King exchanged two other castles for Orava. Lambert became the .admlnlstrator in 1322, and Hypolytus, Count of Kremnica, succeeded bim in 1335. During the relgn of Louis (1342-1382), Stephen Katy (135(>), Dletricb Bebek (1379), Vladlslaus and Jobn Kakas (1380), and Count Nlcbolas (1382) were admlnistrators of Orava and occupled the Castle. Louis was a Crequent visitor at the castle; it was bere that he beld counsel wlth bis uncie Casimir, King of Poland. When Caslmir dled in 1370, Louls succeeded bim as· regent ot Poland and passed througb Orava many limes on bis way to Polnnd. · In 1398 King Zigmond gave the castle to Ctibor. who ruled over Bečkov and several otber castles in tbe upper Váb territory. Wben Ctibor dled in 1424, Zlgmond gave tbe castle to Nlcbolas and Andrew Dalucký, over the protests of Ct!bor's daugbter. Catherine. Jlskra, the Hussite, took the castle In 1440. Tbe Russian Duke, Peter Odrovaž, 24 SLOVAKIA was imprisoned in tbe castle by Jiskra in 1442. Peter Komorovský, who held Likava besides flve otber strongholds, became adn'linistrator of Orava in 1449. Komorovský Jost all except Orava to Matblas Corvin, ~ause he allied hlmself witb Prince Casimir of Poland, wbo sougbt to unseat Mathias as Regent of Hungary. Mathias could not take the stronghold by force; Komorovský sold it to bim for 8000 ducats In 1474. Komorovský left for Poland, but bis army, "tbe Black Regiment," joined · up wltb King Mathlas. Jobn Corvi:n, who succeeded bis father as regent, marrled into tbe Zápoľský family. After bis death in 1505, the castle became the property of the Zápoľský family. In 1526, the two Kostkas, Peter and Nicholas, Czecb noblemen, defended it in tbe name of Zápoľský so well, that Katzianer, commander of King Ferdinanďs army and the man who practlcally wlped out Trenčín in 1528, could not capture ít. S6metime later the Kostkas made up with Ferdinand, who recognized their possessions (Lietava and Strečno, received from Zrupoľský for valoai>Je services rendered) and gave Orava to the grandson of tbe Kostkas' sister, John of Dubová, in 15·34. The latter dled in 1545 without heirs and willed the castle to Wenceslaus Sedlnlcký on the condition that the Kostkas could have it on the payment of 9000 ducats, the sum expended in furnisblng the castle. Nicholas Kostka wanted tbe castle very mucb, but did not bave the stipulated 9000 ducats. lt became bis, bowever, ihdirectly some years later. Francis 'ľhurzo, adminlstrator of Nitra, Celi in love witb Bal'bara Kostka, Nicbolas' daughter, and married ber in 1554. Thurzo paid Sedlnický tbe requlred sum and became the next owner of the castle. He built the lower part of the castle and the well in tbe courtyard, furnlshed the rooms luxuriously, and planted fruit trees in tbe vlcinlty. Hls wlfe dled about ten years Jater wltbout bearing children, and Tburzo married Catherine Zrinský, who bore him four sons and two daugbters. Thurzo wllled the castle to bis oldest '·s on George when he died in 1576. Tbe Thurzo widow then married ·Emerich l<'orgáč. George Tburzo became palatinate. In 1611 he prnnounced judgment against "the Bloody Countess Bathory" of Čachtrce. He died in 1616 and left the castle to bis son Henry. The Jatter dled flve years later and the Orava stronghold passed lnto the hands of Catherine Tôkôly, a Tburzo by birth. The seventeenth century was packéd wlth ~~ouble for tbe occupants of tbe castle, whlch passed into the hands of klngs, rebel.s, and brigands. Emrlch Tôkôly fortified the castle ánd Caspar Pika was at the head of tbe garrlson stationed there. Tbe castle was taken In 1674 by generals Špork and Heister through tbe treacbery of the Polis)?. dlvislon of tbe garrison. Pika was pinned tó a pole and the otber defendants were sfaughtered. Tôkčily's four-year-old son and bis tutor got a.way with their llves. The rebels under Rákoczy won tbe castle 1back in 1703, only to lose lt to tbe EmJ?eror's anny In 1711. The Orava Ca.stle was dam~ed by fire May 18, 1800, but was partlally rebuilt soon after. In tbe first quarter of the twentleth century Orava came into the possession of tbe Zichy famlly, who restored it . to lts present cÓnditlon. If limes ever get norma! again and you wlll be allowed ·to travel t o Slovakla., v-isit Orava Castle and vlew the beautiful, enchanted Orava valley trom tbe castle heights.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Orava (The Orava Castle) Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 23-24 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/29af679117eb1a8f94f9279572e14640.pdf f2fa8623d117cb324497ad5972796b06 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe �18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. �SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion �20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· �SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl �22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians. � SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe �18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. �SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion �20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· �SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl �22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 17 THE FEDERATION OF THE DANUBE Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche {Colonel Mlksche, fairly well known as a polltico-strate g!c writer, was appolnted Czech Mllltary Attache In Paris after the war. He was recaJled to Czecho-Slova kla by tbe Communists, but soon a!terward.8 escaped and acted as advlser on Centra! European affairs to the Chiet of tbe French General Staf!. H e ls now .seconded trom the French Army to tbe Portuguese Hlgher Statf College. TblS dlssertatlon was publlshed In the "WORLD REVIEW," London, Nov. 1961.) • • • • Europe ls today Jlvlng under the constant menace of a new war, the outbreak ot whlch would appear to be only a question ot tíme. The catastropbe. can ba-ppen tomorrow, or In a year or two, or perhaps later. Tbere can be no doubt tbat In the past many great mistakes bave been made. Passlons have galned the upper hand over cool retlectlons. Only too often propaganda was tbe basls ot offlclal pollcy, wlth attractive slogans coverlng the actlons ot statesmen. In our Ume there ls no sufflclent differentatlon between Utopia and reality, party and State policy, journallsm and diplomacy. In May, 1951, the composltlon and pollcy of the National Commlttes, brougbt into exlstence by tbe USA, was the subject of a debate In tbe Brltlsh Parllament. ~1ajor Legge Bourke, M.P., sald: " I think there i• a very great danger, and we ought to face · i\, that thi• type of warfare - the cold war - will fall lnto the handa of those who were dlscredited in days gone by and who are di1credited now in the countries concerned. This must not be Just a refugee organization. There could be nothing more fata l to the Chri1tian and Western cause than for it to be thought in the countrles behind the Iron Curtain that all this propaganda ia being done to restore the old and discredited regimes. We must produce 1omethlng better than that." Wbereupon Mr. Kennetb Younger, Minister of State, gave the tollowing answer: " I think the Hon. Member la right when he sald we had to be on our· g'uard ·against allowing this thing to develop into an uncoordinated series of efforts by groups of discr edited refugees." - Hansard, Vol. 487, No. 106.) lt does not seem as yet as tbough the lt'ree European Movement had any deflnite target, hence the prevalllng confuslon. Talk about freedom and democracy does not constltute a real polltlcal program. These words !end themselves to lnterpretaUon s which vary wlth tbe wlshes or needs ot the speaker. But what are the political aims of the West? A rett.irn to the Versailles status quo or a United Europe ? In tbe last analysls, public oplnlon 1s only an artlficfar · produ<!t of propaganda. Tbe- enslaved peoples behlnd the Iron · CUrta!n Tfsten anxiously to wbat the West has to say to them, and lhelr publté' oplnlon ls naturally built upon what tbey hear most a.bout. Tberefore, wben W estern ·propaganda talks or the Vetsallles Order, tbls appeaťs to- be what lhe West wa:nts, wlth the Jnglcal effect thá.t Eutope woulď agaln revert to the Quarrelsome atmosphere which rharärt:er1zed ťhe 18 SLOVAKIA period between the two wars, and which was the main cause of the second one. In the first enthusiasm over being liberated from Bolshe• vism, anything would be accepted, but thlngs look diMerent when the first flush is over; and it is then that the difflculties of the past would appear once more. • • • In its traditional form (that is to say before 1918) Europe eon· slsted of three clearly-defined, geo-political parts: East, Centr11l, and West Europe. It was the Centre's important task to maintain tbe bal• ance between East and West. Tbis Centre h~s always acted as a bul· wark against inva.<,ions threatening from the East - Stav, Mongol or Turkish people. Even German antagonism against tbe West could not a lter tbe bistoric role role of Centra! Europe, altbough t h is fact does not seem to have been borne sufficiehtly in mind by t hose in whose power lt was to make political de cisions after the First and Second World Wars. The unity of the Danubian nations was dissolved in 1918. In 1945 Germany was compelled by her "unconditional s uri-ender" to withdraw from the European Concert, with the ľesult that the balance of power on the Continent was fiually destroyed. Thus Centra! Europe has ceased to exist as a factor of power-policy. Europe now consists of two geo-political parts only - East and West; and as the East has absorbed the gľeater portion of Centra! Europe, thus weakening the West, Europe's destiny now depends greatly on American help. Was the realization of tbis position which led to the Atlantic Pact an effort to restore with Amerlcas' assistance the equilibrium which s he could not achieve by herself? The consolidatlon of Centra! Europe, by which I mean the cre· ation of a strong centre in the heart of the Continent, remains one of the basic conditlons of European sta•b ility. It is a mistake to tmderestimate the real natlonal character of RU\Ssian pollcy, i.e., Panslav• ism. Thls !act could hardly be altered even by the complete destruction of Communism. Russia's daily increase in population is approximately 8,000, so that in 49 years, i.e., in the year 2,000, she will have some 500 million inhabitants, whereas, in comparison, the population of Western Europe is stationary. It is difficult to see how, uncler tbls enormous pressure from the East. Europe (England included) can continue to exist without the hard core of a consolldated centre. It would also be unwise to count too much on "pan-Europe." Tbe proceedings in Straisbourg have shown only too clearly how far we are from realizing the idea; to build upon it would be nothing less than to base Europe's political organization on somethlng which does not exist, and is not likely to clo so for a very long tíme. The Federaliza• tion of Europe cannot be achieved at one stroke, but only gradually, step by ste.p . It is necessary, first of all, to group together jnto Reglonal Federations those entltles which are economlcally and culturally COllllPlementary to each other, and already have s ome tradition ot common background. Such a grouping of several natlons, possesslng lclentlcal economic lnterests, geographical and cultural characterlstics, 1s a workable propositlon in the D anube Basin, whlch could thus become the core of crystalization in a progressive development of Centra] Europe. SLOVAKIA 19 In the past, no great statesman ever que.stioned the need for unity of the Danu,be Basin as a primary condition of European stability. "The Austrian monarchy 1s a combination of ill-assorted States. Such a power is necessarily weak, but she is an adequate bulwark against the barbarians, and a necessary one. In the future the Habs· burg Empire will stand with its back towards Europe and its front to the East, thus protecting Western civilizat!on from the aggression of Russia." - (Talleyrand on October 17, 1805, to Napoleon, before the battle of Austerlltz). 'What sbould be put in tbat space in Europe wbicb is occupied by the Austrian State from Tyrol to tbe Bukovina? New formations in that area would be of a permanently revolutionary cbaracter." - (Bismark in 1868). "If Austria did not exist, s be would have t o be invented." (Palacky Frantisek, Czecb bistorian, in 1862, generally considered in llobemia as lhe "Father of the Czech natlon," but unfortunately less known in the West than T. G. Masa.ryk). " In America, as elsewhere, it was bard to convince people that it would be necessary to break up Austrla-Hungary. Austria was generally looked up as a counterpoise to Germany, as a necessary organization of small peoples and odds and ends of peoples, and as a safeguard against balkanization. I feared tbat we migbt acbieve notbing if tbe war ended quickly. lf it were protracted, we might bave more Ume for propaganda." - (Prof. T. G. Masa.ryk: "Tbe Making of a State," Alien and Unwin, London, 1929). Tbe centrifugal force of extreme nationalism destroyed in 1918 wbat was about to develop, not by brutal revolution by by peaceful evolutlon, into a great Centra! European Commonwealth. It destroyed tben wbat we would now so much like to build up aga.In, under mucb less favo'!'ruble circumstances. Tbe practical mlsery caused to •a ll peoples by this nationalism was mucb greater than t:he tbeoretlcal bappiness lt was supposed to give tbem. An enormous decadence bas overcome during tbe last thirty years, tbis once so civilized part of Europe. Tbe declsion to spllt up tbe unity of the Danublan nat!ons was neitber bumane nor progresslve. Tbe United Sta.les seems prepared to support the federalization of Centra! Europe, but at tbe same Ume we bave tbe impression that such important factors as tradition, common cultural standards, etc., are not gettlng tbe attent!on tbey deserve. Jf tbe various National Committees were formed in tbe hope that they would be able to proäuce something sensible, we sball bave to wa!t a long time. To recogn!ze them as governments would be tantamount to the recognition of tbe disorder brougbt into exlstence by tbe Versailles Treaty. A new Cen1.ral Europe cannot be created by a few fanatical nationalhsts, hut only by men wbo represent not only tbe lnt.erests of thelr own small tribes, hut wbo also regarcl the problem as a wbole from a supernational angle, and are no longer under the disturhing influence of their political pa.'\t. While I am clealing with the subject of Centra! Europe, I should like to add tbat it woulcl be a mlstake to set up a federatlon of that area on too big a scale. Large entitles, stretcbing from the Baltic t<' t he Black and Adria.tie Seas, coulcl harclly have the inner cobesion 20 SLOVAKIA which would be so necessary in a future Europe. lt would • be difficult to bring all the different nations inhabitlng this region under one common denom!nator into a federation with no real historic or economic background. There are reasons to believe that this idea !s proposed by. the Poles. Poland will have many difficult!es in the future with Germany on account of the Oder frontier. with the Balts over Vllna and with the U-krainians over East Galicia. These ambitions of some Polish exiles are not justif,ied historlcally, ethnographically or morally. As far ai, we in the Danube Basin are concerned, they only interest us to the extent that we do not wish to be drawn into the quarrels which would be una11oidable if the Danubian countries were to gp into a federatlon _,vjth · the · Pole!I.. As a matter of fact, tbe Danube Basin has very llttle in common wHh Poland either economically or culturally. That country lies north of the Carpathlans, and even during the Halbsburg monarcby the Polísh provinces led an almos.t isolated existence. · · There are other important reasons. A Centra! European Federation embracing Poland could hardly count on Austria also being a member. It is time that the West understood that Austrla, as fashioned in 1918, cannot remain independent for economic reasons. H, therefore, Austria were to rema!n on ber own, an Anschluss with Germany would sooner or later be inevitable. And lf the Germans get to Vlenna again, the wbole polltical order of the Danube Basin will be thrown to the winds and Germany's pressure on the whole South• east of Europe, especially the Balkan peninsula and Rumanla, wlll be inevitable. Such a development could eventually be a seriously disturblng factor in the cooperation between Germany and tbe West, especlally in Franco-German relations, a danger which can only be averted if Austrfa is made an !ntegral part of a Dannbe federation. THÉ PROBLEM OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA It is possible that Czecbs, Anstrians, Hungarians and Slovaks might come· to an underStanding amongst themselves on a reasonable basls, especially as for centuries they were · leá.ding· a common existence, but on·ty on conditlon that the Weat no -longer éling1 to the idea of the Czechoalovakian State. Czee.boslovakia does not fit !nto the- frame,~wk . of the Danublan Basin, no matter how much one may try. Even to create it, terrlto1,ies from al! the neighborlng nations had to be incorporated, with the result that In 193tl that ,country comprised: 7.1 millions Czechs, 3.0 mlllions Slovaks. 3.5 millions Germans, 0.8 millions Hnngarians, 0.4 mlllions Ukrainians, 0.2 millions Po,l(l&; total 15 millions. ·,And as ''from 1925 or thereaibouts, the Slovaks lived In latent ~ntagonism ·tówards the Czechs, it is hardly an exaggeratiton to say that 50 pe1•;~nt o'f Czechoslovakia's inhabitants were in opposltion to t.be State. 'Th'en, · again, there is the qulte unnatural geographical sbape of tha:t ·cotmtry. wbich stretches a-bout 700 miles rlght across the Danub!-a-n Basin and !s at places only 70 miles wide. In the meantime, in 1946, the 3.5 mllllons Sudeten Germans. who lived in Bohemia slnce the thirteenth century and at the Versailles conference had valnly pleaded tor selt-determination, were rejected in a most lnhuman fashion. It ls difficult to see how ~orne n!ne mil• lion refugees. who are at present in Western Germany. will be aseimil· SLPVAKIA 21 ated within the next few decades, whilst their former countries, tµe Sudetenlan d and East Prussia demain practically deserted. C.zechoslovakia was the artiflclal product of a peace conference a child of propaganda - whilst Austria and Hungary were her victims. Through the partition of the Danube Monarchy in 1918, Czechoslovakla lnherited 65 per cent of the industries which formerly belonged to an Empire of 54 m!llions and which had been mosUy founded with Vlennese capltal. It was principally to this favorable economic position that thls new State owed its reputation. On the other hand, does not this fact prove tbat the Ozech provinces of the former Danublan E mpire were by no means so much exploited by Vienna as was maintained at the Versa!lles Conference? To talk about the reatoratlon of Czechoslovakia nowadaya ia plairi nonsense. The Slovaks who at all times were opposed to Prague, will never forget that their rightly or wrongly revered leader, Msgr. Tiso, was condemned by a Czechoslovakian Court and that Benes, in spite of the intervention of the Vatica,,, confirmed his death sentence. By so doing, Benes really signed the death warrant of the Czechosľovak Republic. This action created an unbridgeable gulf between Slov.Íks· and Czechs. The few Slovak emigranta wandering about the Weit, advocating the idea of a Czechoslovak State, no not represent the free will of the Slovak people, who are today at least to the extent of 80 per cent fanatically anti-Czech. And without the Slovaks there can be· no Czechoslovakia. •.. , The · fact that propaganda made Masaryk play the role of a l)r0· phet does not alter ailyt:hing. We should not forget· that Czechos lova• kla durlng ber whole existence was hut an internatnonal calamity, and that any policy based on false hlstorical foundations can only bring_ new misfortunes. Why, therefore, cllng to ideas wbich in the past have been proved erroneous. which were one or the maln causes of World War II, and the practical exlstence of wbich only lasted. for lwenty years, a mere moment in the life of nations? It remalns to be seen whether the \Vest inten<ls to support the arnbitlons of a few emigrants, who for years have lost contact with their own natlons and do not ·reptesent a·n ytbing but tbem.selves. However that may be, -""~e sbould no t forget that in Centra! Europe there are only eight million Czechs, a distinct minority compared with seven million Austrians. elght million Hungarians and three million Slov::iks. · lt is rather surprising that free European ·propaganda is· still eulo. gizing Masaryk. This· must strike a ll Austrians, Hungarians, and SIÔ~vaks as béing very strange. Of course, for many Czech politicians íť is easier to create 'political capital out of the Masaryk legend than to take up an entirely new line. Would it, however, not be adviaab le discreetly to do away with thls myth and not dtipe.n d, for propa11anda purposes, on names which before history bear the ht-avy responsibility of disrupting the unity of the Danube peoples'! • • • The s olution of the Danube problem ánd, In a broader sense. tbat of Centra! Eurore. lie!I ln a correct blending of the various peoples within a Fecleration. Only thu!I C'an the Slav peoples of Centra! Europe be prevented from again falUng viC'tim~ to Pans lavist ideology, ancl the Austrians and H ungarlans to that of Pan-Germa.n-i sm. Such a policy alone can restore the interna! equlllbrlum in the Danube Basin an cl 22 SLOVAKIA convert it once more into a constructive factor in European polltics. From a practical point of view the1-e appears to be only one possibillty of establishing a Centra) European Federation, and that would be to group together the countries Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Slovakla into a sort of Danubian Switzerland. For this purpose, Czechoslovakia would first bave to be split up into ber historical, i.e.. natural parts. Bohemia and Moravia on one side, Slovakia on the other. We can only repeat that neither Austria nor Hungary wlll res'ign itself indefinitely to the existence of C1.echoslovakia, to wbich even the Slovaks are opposed. The position would be dififerent in the case of Bohemia - Moravia being separated from Slovakia. Sucb a Federation would consist of four autonomous coun tries: Austria, Bobemia-Moravla, Hungary and ,sJovakia. Tbe presence of the Czechs and Slovaks is a guarantee tbat tbe Federatlon could not turn proGerman; that of the Austrians and Hungarians that she cannot become pro-iR-ussian. Of course, even the constitution of such a polltical organlzatlon would prove to bave its difficul-ties. The Allied powers would have to invest Austria with a more important status than what she has held so far. In spite of the occupat!on, Austria is still the only remaining free Danubian country, and the development or Vienna could have a great influence on the future shaping of the whole Danube Basin. For instance, there are even today half as many Czechs living in Vienna as in Prague, and they are the trne bearers of the tradition which, until not very long ago, has linked Bohemia wlth Austria. Austria is today one of the most important advanced posts or tbe West in Centra! Europe. She wlll only be able to carry on the fight agaínst Bolshevism if the world is willíng to offer her a more just deal tban that to which she has been condemned by the Versam es Treaty. Instead of putting too much faith in a few desperate emigrants, would it not be better for the Western Powers to make Vienna the basis of their future Danube policy? The Czech and Slovak problems ought to be dealt with separately. The oft-repeated argument, that Czechoslovkia's partition into her natural components would cause an even greater dislocation in the Danube Basin fails to convince, if one realizes that such a partition is the essential prerequisite of the creation of a large political entity. The restoration of the unity of the Danube Basin does not hlnder the eventual Federation of the whoie of Europe; on the contrary, it can make it only easier. From whichever angle one regards the problem, the establishment of a Danube Federation appears to be the first constructive step to be taken in the future political reorganization of Centra! Europe. Perhaps it may appear stran~e that all tbis should have been wrltten by a Czech. However, a political action can only be judgoo by its results, and these generally only appear durlng the lifetime of the next gen1:!ľation. I! regarded in thls llght, lt !s clear that Masaryk's "liberatlon" Jed to the " balkanizat!on" of Centra.) Europe, and that wha.t the Versailles Treaty has created wa<i lncomparably worse than what had existed before. One can say with a clear conscience: only bad Czechs can be Czechoslovakians.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Federation of the Danube Description An account of the resource Lieut. Colonel F. O. Miksche Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 17-22 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Miksche, Ferdinand Otto, 1905-1992 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/601134ae37c577a6153dcabc2a4076a4.pdf 4f5b1bad0879a3d825ced9b77393b7c2 PDF Text Text SLOVA.KIA. 13 IN RETlROSPECT TISO ON THE GALWWS (From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947) The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely centralized and dependent on Moscow. Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~ of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and 1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome. On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.) The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland. the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden. Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed �14 SLOVAKIA agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com• mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary, they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such .... Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi• dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic." T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis. Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo. Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian· ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor." The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce. As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary." �SLOVAKIA 16 This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts. And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi· dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused. Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line. After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks. Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the Slovaks at that time." Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho• Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have done," Tis o declared. .,. For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la. Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people, who were sent to Lalbor Camps. On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for �16 SLOVA.KIA mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea, and he was executed on April 18th. Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant. The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend. The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere has become very tense and there is much talk of great political changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party. On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti• Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still active followers." Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all, the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice. This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter your house and destroy you." • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin· cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re· celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London. December H, 1944). � SLOVA.KIA. 13 IN RETlROSPECT TISO ON THE GALWWS (From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947) The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely centralized and dependent on Moscow. Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~ of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and 1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome. On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.) The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland. the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden. Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed �14 SLOVAKIA agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com• mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary, they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such .... Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi• dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic." T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis. Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo. Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian· ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor." The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce. As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary." �SLOVAKIA 16 This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts. And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi· dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused. Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line. After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks. Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the Slovaks at that time." Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho• Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have done," Tis o declared. .,. For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la. Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people, who were sent to Lalbor Camps. On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for �16 SLOVA.KIA mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea, and he was executed on April 18th. Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant. The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend. The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere has become very tense and there is much talk of great political changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party. On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti• Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still active followers." Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all, the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice. This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter your house and destroy you." • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin· cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re· celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London. December H, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVA.KIA. 13 IN RETlROSPECT TISO ON THE GALWWS (From "EAST EUROPE," London, Apríl 30, 1947) The Western Powers fought the war for a number of principles, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, and not in order to enable one nation to dominate another. But in the post-war world, two tendencies are at work. In the West, neither Great Britain, the U. S. A. nor any other country look for territorial aggrandizement. Britain !s withdrawing from Egypt, Jraq, Trans-Jordanla, India and Burma; the NUEA has recognized the independence of the Philippines, Denmark that of Iceland, China. that of Korea, while France has accepted Syrian and Lebanese self-government. Thls process of decentralizatlon c haracteristic of the Western Democracies, is in complete contrast to the process of centralization which is going on in Soviet Russla and her Zone of lnfluence. In the flrst place, Russia berself has increased her territory by incorporating the Baltic States, Finnlsh Karelia, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabla, and part of the Bukovina. On behal! of tbe Georgian, Armenian and Azerba!jan Republics, she 1s claiming Turklsh and Persian territory. Although wide cultural rights are granted to the Soviet Republics, their administration is completely centralized and dependent on Moscow. Within the Sov.iet Zone, Russia is backing all the territorial claim~ of her satellites: of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The most recent effect of this was the failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on the Austrian Treaty, because Russia has ldentified herself with Yugoslav territorial demands on Austria. Czecho-Slovakla and Yugoslavia have reestablished thelr rule over Slovakia and Croatia respectlvely, both of which had been Independent between 1938 and 1945. These two trends form the background against which the Czech and Slovak controversy within t he reestablished Republic must be considered. lt illustrates the conflicts whic h the policy of centralization bas to overcome. On April 18th a secret radio transmitter, calling itself "The Voice of the Slovak Republic" broadcast a petition from the Slovak Action Committee. "The Slovak Republic was not the result of external intervention. Its creation called for no foreign support, nor was the approval or consent of Germany .':!ought or deemed necessary. No one can say, that, with the creation of the Slovak Republlc, the Germans overran and occupied the Czech lands, for tbe two events bore no relation to eacb otber. . . . (A simllar point of view is taken in tbe Soviet 'History of Diplomacy,' Vol. III, chapter 24, wbicb deals with the Anschluss and the partitlon of Czecho-Slovakia, compiled by Academician V. P. Potemkin, edition 1945. It holds Britain and France respons!ble for the disintegration of Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. - Ed.) The Slovak Republic was recognlzed by 27 Forelgn Powers in a very s hort Ume. Among them, states that were bound by treaty agalnst Germany - Poland, Brltaln, France, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland. the U. S. S. R., and so on - and also by states which, as t he war progressed, remalned neutra! Switzerland, the Vatlcan, Sweden. Spain and others. The Slovak Republic was not recognizecl by the U. S. A., but the reason for this may be found in propaganda directed 14 SLOVAKIA agalnst the Slovak Republic . . . . It !s unthinkable, therefore, that the acts of the representatives o[ t he Slovak Repub lic should b e judged by a court estaiblished by Czecho-Slovak!a, slnce Czecho-Slovak la is n ot the ir countr y. . . . Slovak r epresen tatlves could no t have com• mitted any acts of treason against the Czecho-Slovak Governm ent since they d!d n ot recognize Czecho·Slovak la as th e State to wh ich they belonged, or to which they owed allegiance. On the contrary, they looked upon Ozecho-Slovakla ae a S tate lnto whlch th e Slovak people had been propelled by foroo and dlplomatic lntrigue . .. . The proceedings of the <National Court in Bratislava against Preside nt T iso and other representatives of the S lovak Republic were not designed for the examlnation of war c rimes defined in Art ic le 6 of the Charter of lnternational Military Tribunal. In the Bratislava tria! not only were the persona of President Tiso and other Slovak representatives involved but also the politlca l concept, the idea of a Slova k independent state, and the self-determination of the S lova k nation as such .... Had Ru84ia become the protector of the Slovak state, under the presi• dency of Tiso, there wou ld be no c harge of treason today against the c hief of the Slovak Repub lic .... We c laim the reestab lis hment of a democratic and Christia n Slova k Republic." T hls broadca.!!t reveals the real confllct b etween Slovak and Czech ideas. Accordlng to the Slovaks, Czecho-Slovak legal contln\tlty has been lnterrupted, Independent Slovakia was a reality, and CzechoSlovak relations must be reestabllshed on a completely new basis. Accordlng to t he Czechs , Czecho-Slovakla's Iegal continuity has been s afeguarded, Iegally Independent Slovakla bas never exlsted, and lt v.as a purely ephemeral creation. The Czechs pass over in silence the fact that the third component of the 1918 'Republic, Car pathlan Ruthenia, was taken by Soviet Russia. On February 13, 1947, Presldent Benes dotted the i's and crossed the ťs of the Czech attitude. Speaking of relations between th e Czechs and Slovaks, he said: "Archblshop Dr. Kmetko said in the T lso !rial that the Slovaks would llke t o have thelr own state but accept tbe Czecbo-Slovak Republlc .b ecause there is no way of a chlevlng it. I reject such an argument categorlcally ; I sball never accept it. We could not survlve anotber crlsls In CzechoSlovak reations. After such a crisis there would no longer be a Czecbo. Slovak Repub llc, and Slovakla wou ld not be an independent state In any case; lt wou\d most probably fall lnto Soviet Russia.... The Czechs border on a Germany of seventy milllon people, therefore in t he future the Czechs must be neighbors of Soviet Russla. They could not in consequence accept an independent Slovak state as their ne ighbor. .. . There can be no alternatives today, nor any questlon of pian· ning a Central Euro pean Federatlon. T hese plans bave been dead ever slnce Soviet Russla becam e our nelghbor." The executlon of President Tiso was tbe dramatic consummation of President Benes' policy. Tiso was condemned and e xecuted not a s a war c riminal, but a s the symbol of Slova k ·indepe nde nce. As late as the autumn of 1946, dur ing his visit to Topolcany, Pr eaident Benes dec lared before the Councll of Slovak Commissars that Tiso must be hanged. When one of the Slova k Commissars remarked t hat Slovak public opinion would not stand fo r his e xecution, Benes r eplied, " Perhaps it wll l not stand for it, but it is absolutely necessary." SLOVAKIA 16 This explains the appointment of Dr. Daxner as Presldent ot the Bratislava court, which tried Tiso. Daxner had sworn vengeance on Tiso for the "wrongs" inflicte<i by the Slovak natíonallsts. And yet, in 1935, Tiao waa reaponaible for the reelectlon of Benea aa Preaident of Czecho-Slovakia. The Slovak People's Party wanted to vote for Dr. Nemecz, the candidate for the Agrarians, but at the last moment Tiso convinced his party that Benes was a better choice trom a fore.ign political point of view. Mr. Sidor was the only member of the S)Rvak People's Party. w,bo abstained trom votlng. Posslbly Benes would have commuted the Tlso sentence, especially in view of Slovak public opinion, had he not had to consider the Russian attitude. It was expressed - aimong others - by Gundorov, t he Presi· dent of the All..Slav Committee in Moscow, who in the Slovak communis t daily " Pravda" demanded ruthless punlshment of the accused. Benea c hose to follow the Ruaaian line. After the occupation of Slovakla by the Soviet Army, Tiso sought refugé in the American Zone of Germany. In November 1945, the American M:ilitary Authoritles handed him over to the Czechs. As the Slovaks regarded this a b erach of the rlghts o! asylum, the Slovak League of America in th e U. S. A. made investigations as to who had authorized it. Neither the State Department, nor the General Staff were responsible for th!s extradition. Apparently the declslon had been taken by the local American commander, in response to the demand of the Czecho-Slovak Government. The Prague Government had place<i at the disposal of the President of the Czecho-Slovak War Crlmes Commission, General Ecer, the sum of 50 mllHon Kcs for the ·1nterception of political emigrés, mainly Slovaks. Flown to Bratislava, Tlso was paraded through the town wlth chains around his wri-sts, from whlch hung a large padlock. He was allowed to attend his father's funeral, but had to march ignominlously in handcuffs. Because of the constant demonstrations In hls favor he was sent letters, telegrams, flowers, food and so on - ·Tiso was transferred to th e prison in Brno and returned to Bratls'1ava only for his tria!. He waa not allowed to chooae hls defenae couael, who waa appoi nted by the Czec h authoritiea. Many of the witnesses gave evidence in his favor. The Archlblshop of Slovak.ia, Kmetko, who is highly res pected by the Czechs as well as the Slovaks, tesutled " Tlao acted and worked in the intereata of Slovakia, and waa never a traltor. Hia election aa Preaident of Slovakia waa the wlll of 90 per cent of the Slovaks at that time." Tis o himself pleaded not guilty. He malntalned that he did not c-ommit treason, and declared the responsJblllty for the fate of Czecho• Slovakla dld not rest witb Slov.akia, but wlth tbe 20 years of Czech domestlc and Coreign pollcy. "lf ·a od allowed me to carry out my policy agaln under simi[ar c.o ndltlona I would do exactly aa I have done," Tis o declared. .,. For th e trlal special security measures were taken In Slovak.la. Czech troops were brought In because the authoritles dld not trust the Slqvak troops. There were large-sc-ale demonstrations In favor ot T lso at Plestany and Puchov, and the Secret Police arrested many people, who were sent to Lalbor Camps. On Aprll 15th Tiso was condemned to death by banging. When asked whether he would a,p.peal for mercy, Tlso replled: "Yes - for 16 SLOVA.KIA mora! reasons." (According to Catholic doctrine a man must defend his llfe by all avallable means.) President Benes rejected Tiso's plea, and he was executed on April 18th. Apríl 18th may prove to be a fateful day in Czecho-Slovak relations. 1n the eyes of the devout Slovak people the hanging of a pri est is an unforgivable act. In the eyes of intelligent Slovaks abroad, it was a cri me against national fee li ngs. Benes' rejection of Tiso's plea for mercy is regarded not as the act of a democrat, but of a tyrant. The Slovaks say that thereby Benes has destroyed his own democratic legend. The unrest whicb was expected to follow Tiso's execution iu Slovakia was checked by very strong measures, but the atmospbere has become very tense and there is much talk of great political changes. Within tbe Democratic Party tbere is strife; tbe Slovak Catholics are expected to go over to the Freedom Party. On April 17th, Soviet opinion, which is tantamount to official iustructions, was thus expressed by the Moscow Radlo: "'On various occasions, and particularly recently the pro-Tiso and Hlinka Guard elements bave behaved witb growing impertinence and daring against the vi tal interests of tbeir own nation.... An ambiguous attitude has been adopted by some Democratic Party circles. Their press directly encourages tbe organizers of anti-Government action (This referred to tbe democratic daily, "Čas." - Ed.) A serious menace to democratic reconstruction in Slovakia arises from the influence or reactionary and fascist ele ments witbin the Democratic Party. Tbe Hlinka Guard, tbe followers of Sidor and Durčanský, undermine the State, cause anti• Czech, anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic provocations and attempts to smash the Czecbo-Slovak RepU1blic. A relentless purge of all fascists is called for, affecting not only the leaders, but their Joyal and still active followers." Opinions may vary about the tria! or Tiso, who was, after all, the protegé of the Germans. But the conception of justice and morality of the average person bas been put to a severe strain. Recent trials in East Europe appear to seek polltical vengeance not justice. This was exemplif'led in the trials of Archbishop Steplnac, or Mibailovitch and most scandalous of all, that of the 16 members of the Polish Underground Govel'hment. World public opinion must never cease to make a stand against injustice and falsehood. In the words of the Gospel, unlesa you go out and meet evil to combat it, evil will enter your house and destroy you." • • • WHO SAID IT? "The Czeehoslovak-Soviet Treaty rorms the BASIS ot our count ry's external securlty and fundamen,t al con trlbutlon to the un!flcatlon ot national forcei.. The alllance with the SOVIET and triendshlp wttb tbe West was w elcomed by ALL classes of tlhe Czechoslovak people In com<plete acoordance w!th thelr CONVICTIONS and wlth sin· cere joy. . . . Thanks to tbe treaty, Czechoslovakla's lnterests are re· celvlng e tfeetlve support" - (H ubert Rlpka, Minister of State, Broadcast on the annlversary or the Czecboslovak-Sovie-t Treaty, London. December H, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Tiso on the Gallows Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 13-16 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a26e78cce5aaaba26b6aa159393a855a.pdf 51bfe3ef9f258946af07a9a1b0deebc0 PDF Text Text 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under �SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only �12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947. � 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under �SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only �12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 10 SLOVAKIA THE TRADITION OF SLOVAK STATEHOOD Marian Žiar In the contemporary great conflict of the free world agairuit thé ideology and forceful aggression of Commun!sm, we look upon the tradition of Slovak statehood trom two view·points. It 1s from these two viewpoints that our f!ght against Communism and for the renewal of Slovak statehood is waged. The Slovak nation at horne and the great majority of Slovak ex!les in the free world reject not only the Communist regime in Czecho-SJovakia, installed by and serving Moscow, but also the anti• Slovak ideology of ethnical and pollt!cal "Czechoslovaklsm," the standard•bearers of which are the very Czecho-Slovak politicians in exile, wbo installe<i the violent "people's democratlcal" regime in Slovakia after 194'5 and In 1948 cowardly surrendered power to the Communists. Just as the Slovak nat!on at horne is valiantly resist!ng the forceful pressure of Moscow and Prague Communism, so the great majority of Slovak ex.iles is supl)Ort!ng, in every way possi'ble, tbe effort of the free world against Communist aggression and totality and, in accord with tbe tradition of the Slovak nation, is flghtlng for the restorat!on of its statehood within the framework of a future federated Europe. Th!s fight of the Slovak ex!les is based not only on historical, but politlcal and practlcal consideratlons as well. Already at the beglnning of the n!nth century, the Slovaks had the!r own State, which the Byzant!ne Chronicler called Great Moravia, because it extended beyond both b anks of the Morava River. The nucleus of this State was the territory of western Slovak!a, and lts bullders were the Slovak rulers Mojmír, Rastislav, Svätopluk and Mojmír II. Already Jn the eightb century, the Slovaks were among the first in Centra! Europe to accept Christlan!ty and thereby also western Christian culture and civ!l!zat!on. Thls Slovak State Jasted untll 907, when it succumbed to the joint onslaugbt of the Magyars, Germans and ~ecbs. In old Hungary, Slovakia formed a separate pol!t!cal unit witb its own administrat!ve, military and financial autborlties. It was separated from the rest of Hungary by a customs boundary. In the fourteentb century, Slovak!a was an independent territory under the rule of Matúš Čák of Trenčín, wbo had bis own army, colned bis own money, and concluded agreements '\vlth allles independently. And in the fifteenth century, Slovakia was an Independent administratlve unit under Jobn Jiskra of Brandýs. After the terrlble Turks invaded Centra] Europe, Slovakia was completely separated !rom Magyar lands and was a klnd of independent State unit under the rule of tbe Haibsburgs. It remained so unt!l the end of the seventeenth century. At tbe beginning of tbe eighteenth century, when the Slovaks b e,. came increaslngly consclous natlonally, thelr desires agaln tended to thelr own lndependence. George Fándly cried out to the Slovaks at that t!me: "Slovaks, recall the times when our nation lived under SLOVAKIA 11 kings of its own people." And the great Slovak poet, John Hollý, wrote beautiful epochs about Svätopluk ·'who founded the great kingdom or tbe Slovaks and became an lndepenrlent sovereigu." In the nineteenth century, the Slovaks were organizing their fight for the polltical rights of thelr nation. Louls Štúr, leader or that movement, Qrganized a milltary rebellion In 1848 to sever Slovak.ia from the Magyars and proclaimed the independence of Slovakia in Myjava on September 19, 1848. Even though thls mllitary revolution failed, the Slovaks kept on flghtlng politlcally against Magyarizat!on and the political pressure of Pešť. The Slovaks wanted to be an independent country under the H a bsburg rule.~ Vlenna, howevet; rejected the efforts of the Slovaks for a federat!on, even though 1:Cr-aus, Finance Minister of Austria, backed tbem. The result was that the solution or the important natlonality problems In Centra! Europe were side-tracked for over a half century, whlch was to the detriment not only of Vienna, but also the whole of Europe and the Central European nations. On June 7, 1861, Slovaks from all parts of t he country assembled at Turčiansky Svätý Martin and demanded that Slovakia be constituted as the Slovak area o f Upper Hungary. This was followed by the Spiš petition of 1868, the massacre Jn Černová in 1907, and the heroic struggle of Svetozar Hur:ban Vajanský, great Slovak patriot, publlsher and writer, wbo wrote in the NÁRODN:l!: NOVINY (The l'fatlonal News) in 1910: "To have one's own State is the supreme deslre of every nation." But the demands of the Slovaks went unheeded; the Magyars were stubborn and determined to keep the Slova,ks under their rule. When the first World War broke out in 1914, the Slovaks at ltome and rubroad p repared the ground .for the liberation of the Slovak nation. Es-pecially tbe Amerlcan Slovaks of wbom there was close to a n1illion. The latter clamored for Slovak independence in the SLOVENSK'{° DJDNNÍK (The Slovak Daily), published in Pltts,burgh, . on January 21, 1910. Tbelr action, carried on dnring World War I under the motto "For An Independent S lovakia," was expressed in th e Cleveland Agreement of October 22, 1915, wblch stated that the Slovaks and the Czecbs will live In a federated union of States with complete autonomy of Slovakia, that Slovakla would bave lts own parliaroent and its own State adminlstration. In a slmllar manner, th e Slovaks were guaranteed autonomy also by the Pittsburgb Pact, of l\lay 30, 1918, wbich was signed by T. G. Masaryk. It was on th e basis ot these suppositions that the Slovaks entered the Czecho-Slovak Republic in 1918. However, Czech politicians under the leadershlp of Edward Beneš created the fictitious ideotogy of an ethnical and polltlcal union of the so-called "Czechoslovak natlon," which meant in practlce the polltlcal hegemony of the Czechs over the Slovaks. Just as the Slovaks had to flght for their natural rlghts in Hungary, so they had to fight again for their politlcal rights in the Czecho-Slovak Republlc. The Slovak nation was denled the right to call ltself the Slovak nation in a State which was created by the joint efforts of the Czechs and Slovaks. American Slovaks alone had g!ven Masaryk almost a milllon dollars during the first World War for the Jfberat!on movement. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Slovak nation had only 12 SLOVAKIA one choice: to fight with all legal means for autonomy as a basis for the complete political independence of the Slovaks. By sens!ble and logical arguments it was not possible to convince the Czechs that the Slovaks, too, had a right to full political sovereignty on Slovak territory. It was not untll 1938, when the Re• public was threatened from the outs!de, that Beneš finally concurred with the idea that the Slovaks be granted autonomy. The development, however, was going forward speedily at that time. And under the given s!tuation, the Slovak parliamentar!ans on March 14, 1939, took the historicalJy s!gnlficant step, when they accepted the responsibility for the fate of t heir own natlon and proclaimed the independence o! Slovakia. From the democratic standpoint, formally it would be possible to censure almost anything about March 14, 1939, but historicalJy it meant and stlll means the day of renewal of Slovak lndependence, whlch is the desire and the goal of the Slovak nation. Even though at the present time national viewpoints are giving way to the broader perspective of a political federation ot the whole of Europe, or at least of Central Europe, nevertheless the real bas!s for every federation still remain the nations, whether large or small, wlth which and on whicb a new form of political society of Europe can be built. That ls why the tradition of Slovak statehood is for us a fundamental issue for every form of European political organizatlon. And with Chrlstlanity, deeply rooted in the soul of our people since the eighth century, thls is the only real basis for liberating Slovakla from the hegemony of Communlsm. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "Monsignor Tiso's execution was a travesty o[ justice. The fact that he could have remained president of the Slovak nation if he had only bent bis knee to the communist tyrant makes bim a martyr to the cause of freedom and rellgion. Although the Slovaks have suffered much from their political appressors for centuries, thls is the greatest crime against them in their h!storic struggle for national freedom. His tragic deatb cannot help but inspire Slovaks for centurles to come to defend their God-given politlcal and religious rights." - Abbot Theodore Kojiš, O.S.B., Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Condemnation of Tiso to death was taken as an indication tbat the Beneš government has surrendered completely to Moscow. Also indicative of thls ls the fact that the Beneš regime, after piously professing friendllness to tbe Cathollc Church. has begun an effort to seize Catholic schools and establish a state monopoly." - CathoJic Universe BulJetin, Cleveland, Ohlo. "Edward Beneš, murderer of the freedom of tbe Slovak nation, killed a good man, a zealous priest of Christ, a loyal Slovak patriot. the flrst president of the Slovak Republic' elected by the Slovak nation. The crlme of murderer Bene!i ls worsll, uglier and more wicked than the crime of Cain." - Peter Prídavok, Presldent Slovak National Council, London, England, April 1947.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Tradition of Slovak Statehood Description An account of the resource Marian Žiar Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 10-12 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Žiar, Marian Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/bf790366e4f46ef61e114e865e4a60e8.pdf 6d8b53718545dade60db6cc05e04f709 PDF Text Text MARCH, 1952. SLOVAKIA 1 THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Cieker From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they <;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable. More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless, successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State. In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair of the first President of the Slovak Republlc. The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads" or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people. How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso - was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level, evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized and cultured nation had ever seen. �2 SLOVAKIA The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was organized and led by the Kremlln. At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons, who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed· ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the Christian world-outlook. At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im· mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws, which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and legallzed by the Soviet system. The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted, tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit. On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy- �SLOVAKIA a sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious, national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit. Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason, blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge, on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground, worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men, being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy, The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora! and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests, led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is, and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso, and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak nation. From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak 11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~ the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon. �4 SLOVAKIA To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life. Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations. Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear deeds of President Tiso himself. On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e. "Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end, places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation. The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea. "Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\ rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi· cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed, Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he �SLOVAKIA 6 fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land." It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words, but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured and civilized world with bis martyr's death. We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the Slovak nation remains on earth. Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life.. Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after �6 SLOVAKIA acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation, stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful people even from the shadow of the gallows. The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws, or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate, prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all time. The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic, serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its international relationsbip it could gain recognition. Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler, did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London, or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city 9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist. " This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr. Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague. · Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same polic!es that I did at that Ume." Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world, we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values. wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery �SLOVAKIA 7 which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal, but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com• ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro• file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms, but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an alliance witb Communlsm. That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness. Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer. Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon, wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti, M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East - the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe. The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws; and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly European State. Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation. J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation. Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity; cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism; the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo· rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs. On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines, they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages. The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison, on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would �SLOVAK.IA 9 weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals, but also of nations. Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow, where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso will appear on the stage o! European history. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak, elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned." - Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England, April 1947. • • • "American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno· minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be• neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27, 1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of 75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people." - Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union, Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano, Yatican City, Haly. " The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio. � MARCH, 1952. SLOVAKIA 1 THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Cieker From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they <;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable. More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless, successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State. In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair of the first President of the Slovak Republlc. The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads" or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people. How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso - was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level, evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized and cultured nation had ever seen. �2 SLOVAKIA The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was organized and led by the Kremlln. At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons, who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed· ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the Christian world-outlook. At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im· mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws, which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and legallzed by the Soviet system. The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted, tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit. On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy- �SLOVAKIA a sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious, national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit. Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason, blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge, on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground, worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men, being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy, The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora! and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests, led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is, and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso, and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak nation. From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak 11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~ the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon. �4 SLOVAKIA To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life. Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations. Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear deeds of President Tiso himself. On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e. "Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end, places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation. The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea. "Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\ rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi· cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed, Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he �SLOVAKIA 6 fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land." It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words, but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured and civilized world with bis martyr's death. We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the Slovak nation remains on earth. Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life.. Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after �6 SLOVAKIA acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation, stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful people even from the shadow of the gallows. The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws, or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate, prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all time. The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic, serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its international relationsbip it could gain recognition. Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler, did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London, or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city 9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist. " This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr. Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague. · Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same polic!es that I did at that Ume." Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world, we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values. wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery �SLOVAKIA 7 which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal, but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com• ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro• file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms, but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an alliance witb Communlsm. That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness. Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer. Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon, wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti, M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East - the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe. The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws; and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly European State. Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation. J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation. Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity; cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism; the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo· rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs. On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines, they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages. The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison, on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would �SLOVAK.IA 9 weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals, but also of nations. Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow, where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso will appear on the stage o! European history. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak, elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned." - Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England, April 1947. • • • "American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno· minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be• neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27, 1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of 75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people." - Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union, Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano, Yatican City, Haly. " The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MARCH, 1952. SLOVAKIA 1 THE FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Dr. Joseph Cieker From the very beginning of its history the Slovak nation endeavored to attain a full natlonal and political life. From the standpoint of history, the substance of the development of the Slovaks has not changed. Not all natlons developed in the same manner. Many nations lived in such an environment and under such conditions that their norma! life was not hindered by serious obstacles and they <;ould, therefore, develop to state and national perfectlon more rapidJy t han the nations which, on the road of their development, met with many obstacles - some of which were insurmountable. More than one nation spent its blood in wars and disappeared from the history of Europe. We Slovaks, too, frequently found ourselves exhausted by wars, and at times it appeared to us we might not be strong enough to overcome the obstacles thrust in our path by foreigners and also renegades from our own ranks. Despite the extreme material and biological losses, the Slovak nation, nevertheless, successfully won a place of equality among the nations of Europe and the world and proved its maturity in its own independent Slovak State. In the development of the Slovak nation, there existed a constant continuity even though many falled to see it and some even denied it. Loyal Slovak sons, who were entrusted wlth the responsible task of leadership In Slovak national and political life, believed In this contlnuity of the Slovak spirit wbich glistened so brightly ln real expression on the throne of the first Slovak rulers and then on the chair of the first President of the Slovak Republlc. The elderly Archbishop of Nitra, Dr. Char.les Kmeťko, gave testimony of tbis continuity of the hlstorical evolution of tbe Slovak natíon when, looking at Presldent Dr. .Joseph Tiso in the Bratislava National Court, he said: "This man was, after Svätopluk, our second bead." Austrian emperors and Hungarian klngs were not "our heads" or rulers because of the free will of the Slovak nation. But nelther was T. G. Masaryk, nor Dr. Edward Beneš; nor is Clement Gottwald the "head" of the Slovak nation. From the standpoint of this historical continuity, "our head" can be, and shall be able to be, only the man who shall be placed on the empty chalr of the president of tbe Slovak Republic by the will of the people and in the intent of the national and Ohristian traditions of the Slovak people. How extremely difficult was the road travelled by the Slovak nation - from the times of Svätopluk all the way to Dr. Joseph Tlso - was clearly demonstrated when counter forces tried to destroy the work of the Slovak spirit, es,pecially when they removed in crimlnal fashion the representatlves and Jiving expresslons of the Slovak will from the leadership of Slovak national and politlcal life. The more concrete the form of realizing Slovak aims, the more cruelly all alien and anti-Slovak forces intervened. That is why the work of the Slovak State, wben it proved itself to be on a European and world level, evoked so much concentrated crlmlnality and revenge from the enemies of Slovak independence, the likes of wblch not a single clvilized and cultured nation had ever seen. 2 SLOVAKIA The anti-Slovak forces were symbolized by one of the most des-picalble phenomena of the Czech nation and of contemporary European history, Dr. Edward Beneš. Knowlng that they could not be a ble to destroy the blessed achievements of S lovak vlctory - the Slovak Republíc - they dld not hesitate to ask the help of the criminal forces of the anti-European and anti-Cbristian conspiracy whicb was organized and led by the Kremlln. At the moment of the bistorlcal duel, there remained on the side of the Slovak Republic only the falthful Slovak race and its sons, who were determined and prepared to die as martyrs for the rights of the Slovak nation. Against the Slovak 1Republic was the world public, which had been charmed by the falsehoods and frauds of Dr. Ed· ward Beneš. Thirsting for Slovak blood, designated wlth Cain's mark on their forehads, armed wlth all the means of Soviet justice and prot0i)ted by the military, political and police might of the Soviet Union, the wards of Dr. Edward Beneš-of Czech and Slovak originset out wlth a vengeance against the Joya.l sons of the Slovak nation who were armed only with prayerbooks and the Jegal code of the Christian world-outlook. At the same Ume few people In Europe and in the world comprehended the extent of the treason, the victim of which was the Christian Slovak natlon and the Jegal expression of its will - the Slovak State. Very few people in Europe and in the world realized the im· mensity of the treason of Dr. Edward Beneš, his Czech polítical companions and the individuals of Slovak origin who had united with them in crlme. This anti-Slovak consplracy, which was the beginning of the anti-European and anti-Christlan consplracy of internationa.l Communism, was determlned to destroy the Slovak Republlc, the expression of right and justice. But the means valld up to that tíme did not suffice for the conspirators, so they acted according to the new laws, which were created by the philosophy of violence and Communist crime. To destroy the Slovak State, this conspiratorial, anti-Slovak assoclatlon needed the entire apparatus of terror whlch was used and legallzed by the Soviet system. The Slovak nation succumbed to thls vlolence and temporarily was deprlved of its own State. "After Svätopluk our second head" the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Joseph Tiso - was indicted, tried, convlcted and executed according to the manner of the Communlst system. Fully aware of thls historical crime and with the consent of hls own Government and full co-responsiblllty of his own executive organs on the territory of the Slovak State, which according to thelr own admission "ruled themselves," Dr. Edward Beneš intervened In the bloodiest manner in thls hlstorlcal development of tbe Slovak natlon, tbereby deflnltely intending to sever the lndestructlble contlnulty of the Slovak spirit. On tbis hlstorical background, there comes before tbe eyes of the contemporary Slovak generation and tbe eyes of contemporary Europe and the world the human and politlcal protile of tbe President of the Slovak Republlc, Joseph Tiso. From tbe Slovak view·point, as well as that of universal history, the greatness of his martyr's death has attained such a degree, that it has placed the figme of Joseph Tlso among the bravest, the noblest and morally perfect expresslons of human effort !or good, for justice, and for right and freedom. His phy- SLOVAKIA a sical appearance is today crowned with a legendary halo, wbicb to date no member of tbe Slovak natlon bas attained. Every Slovak son and daugbter was acquainted wltb Tiso, because Tiso as priest, as politician, as man, and even as president, was in daily contact wlth Slovak life. And thougb tbe martyr's deatb ba.s enbanced the political and human profile of Joseph Tiso over any otber, as well as the degree of pel'fectlon of the Slov3k spirit atta1ned from a moral, religious, national, polltlcal and world vlewpoint, bis immortal and live presence bas become tbe most su:bstantlal part of the tbinking of the Slovak man today and shall be a constant stimulator of bis· spirit. Tbe more tragic and dark the background from wbicb appears tbe clean and bright pbenomenon of tbe personality of Josepb Tlso, tbe more impassable tbe aibyss between tbe Slovak nation and tbe conspirators against its freedom. Tbe martyr's deatb of Joseph T iso and its glorification cannot be and shall not b e separated from this background, in which - in a union sealed with a treaty or treason, blood and crime - moves a bout and shall eternally appear tbe repulsive face of Dr. Edward Beneš, marked wlth the spittle of revenge, on wbich no artist and no propaganda procedure s hall be able to elicit a smile of a clean conscience. On this bistorlcal b ackground, worthy of Dante's interno, in an equal mora! ugliness sball eternally find tbemselves the individuals, wbo consldered it an honor to besmirch their consciences ,ľitb tbe biood of Slovak sons and whose only vietory is tbe temporary destruction of Slovak independence. These men, being branded wltb tbe mark of Communlsm, bave followed thelr master, Edward Beneš, on the stage of Slovak tragedy, The present Slovak tragedy has attained sucb dlmenslons that not only the intellectual groups of a Slovak generatlon, but even tbe wbole Slovak natlon collectively have been affected by lt. Never b efore in the history of tbe Slovak people did it happen tbat every Slovak man, woman and child were the llvlng partlcipants of the mora! and material destruction caused by tbe conspirators against Slovak statebood. Even if we can comprebend the revenge of Edward Beneš and bis Czecb companlons on the Slovak Nation as an interventlon of negatíve forces in the Divine plans, we cannot understancl, and so much the less excuse, the actlve partlc!patlon in it of tbe lndlvlduals of Slovak origin, wbo renderecl servlce to aliens and consplred agalnst the life of the nation t hey are clescended from. The terrible contrast between the reality of the Slovak State and tbe "acquisitlons of tbe glorious national insurrectlon." which was insplrecl by foreign interests, led by Slovak renegades and climaxed by total communlstlc terror is, and forever shall be, the final sketcher of the political and human profile of ťhe personlflei- of Slovak State lndependence, J oseph Tiso, and the mora! and political degeneracy of those who are In a run measure responsible for the present servlle position of the Slovak nation. From the viewpoint of historical perspective. not only the Slovak 11atlon, but even the whole world sees today the immensity of the sacrifice of a son, loyal to God and nation, was able to make and, on tbe other hand, tbe immenslty of the treason and the consequences emanating from the gullt of those who, silencing wlthin themselv~ the outcry of conscience, rejected from their declsions and acts the law of God and th e Jaw of the natlon. 4 SLOVAKIA To make the human and political profile of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic more expressive, no Slovak needs any syntbetic beautifying mediums, because bis pbysical and spiritua,l features were tbe work of tbe Hands of God and tbe bealtby, religious environment of tbe Slovak nation. On thls face glowed tbe fire of tbe servant of God and nation to tbe very last moment of bis eartbly life. Josepb Tiso was not a complicated, but a clear, clean and transparent pbenomenon; just as uncomplicated, clear, clean and transparent as has been tbe natural cbaracter of tbe Slovak person for generations. Slovak bistory will not bave to searcb for reasons for tbe !ega! connection of the Slovak acts, which form a segment of tbe life of tbe Slovak State, because these acts were explained by the crystal-clear deeds of President Tiso himself. On August 16, 1938, when J oseph Tiso was partlng with the deceased Andrew Hlinka on the Ružomberok Square in the name or the whole Slovak nation, his words sound<ld like the eternal voice of the Slovak spirit, which when silenced on the li,ps of one, are heard by the living nation on the lips of another. This uninterrupted thread of Slovak evo\utlon was handed over to Joseph Tiso by Andrew Hlinka. ' Never was Andrew Hlinka so great in life, as his death has shown bim to be," said Tlso over the casket of the spiritual soverelgn of the Slovak peopl e. "Andrew Hlinka was great during bis lifetime, because he dedicated his liťe to a great idea-and he appeared great a t death, because hls death, attestlng faitbful service to his great idea to the very end, places bim in the gallery of the spiritual heroes of the Slovak nation. The idea of an independent Slovak natlon was the source of bis boundless love for the Slovak natíon, which led and took on higb tbe life of Andrew Hlinka. As a result of bis being elevated to the priestbood of the New Testament, his love for hls people received a special blessing and intensity: by becoming a servant of Christ, he became tbe servant of a grandiose idea - whlch in relation to patriotism meant that he became the servant of an idea, offerlng himself and all bis possessions on the altar of tbat same idea. "Hlinka, priest and patriot, lived in the deep conviction that he was not serving a trivial idea, a superflcial thing, but a cause tbat had deep roots in a 1000-year-old pa.st and in the Christian order of the life of bis nation in the present. In this bigher consecration, bis patriotism did not mean only persona! fancy and momentary satisfaction, but it meant dedicating and sacriflclng bis wbole being - constantly and unreservedly, un'Ceaslngly and tirelessly - because even in bis patriotism he felt that he was a prlest of God who was making a sacriflce - a full-time and lifetime sacrifice in the sense of bis full-time and lifetime priestly character. That is why bis work for bis Slovak people was a figbt - not a struggle for power and glory, but a sacred fight always in the defense of tbe most sacred values, so dear to all members of our nation: our national rigbts, po\itica\ rights, cultural and economic rights. As it bebooves a person dedi· cated to tbe service of an idea, bis fight was an ideological fight. The great Idea of a Divine Order was connected with the idea of a distinct Slovak nation to feed the two-win~ed flame which filled bis mind and bis heart and governed bis whole life. Ideally inflamed, Hlinka waged this sacred fight under difficult circumstances; he SLOVAKIA 6 fought against overwhelming odds. Yet never did he retreat trom anyone or anything, because he did not doubt tbe naturalness of the right of bis own people to its own life; and he believed in the future of bis nation, because it held fast to the space allotted it by God in the family of otber nations. He bore within himself the conviction of a chosen leader of his people with whom he lived in the most intimate union, along with whom he fought in the land of the Pharaohs, and whom he was to lead into the promised land." It was thus that Tiso described the political and human profile of Andrew Hlinka. And in this profile of the spiritual sovereign of the Slovak nation, Andrew Hlinka, in substance were also found all the traits of the human and political features of Joseph Tiso. The physical person was not the same, but what was substantial, splritual and eternal remained - as proof of the continuity of Slovak life. All the cbaracteristics which adorned the priestly and polltlcal personality or Andrew Hlinka, also adorned bis successor in the management of the destinies of the Slovak people, Dr..Joseph Tiso. Service to God and nation. however, exacted from Joseph Tiso the maximum that a person possibly could give. What Joseph Tiso said at the final parting with Andrew Hlinka was not only so many beautiful words, but a great and heroic act, which attalned its perfect expresslon in the existenee of the Slovak Republic during his presldency - one that was confirmed before the Slovak natlon and before the whole cultured and civilized world with bis martyr's death. We can thank Divine Providencť' and the living continuity of the Slovak spirit that during the most decisive phase of Slovak and world bistory, the Slovak nation decided of it~ own free will to place in the chair of Svätopluk a man of the people who ťarried In hls heart and soul the spark of consecration which was given the Slovak natlon as a dowry at the dawn of its history. That is why the political and human work of Joseph Tiso attainecl such a mora! ancl historical value, the value of which will be recognized even if only one member of the Slovak nation remains on earth. Joseph Tiso did not get on the throne of Slovak rulers by the coincidence of subordinate circumstances, because even the realization of state independence was not the result of an accident. Just as state independence was the ripe fruit on the tree of life of Slovak gnerations, just so its visible head was the mature offspring of Slovak ideological, mora) and spiritual development. Even lf Joseph Tiso personally as a man would not have wanted to be the president of the Slovak Republic, he simply had to be, because at the tlme of the proclamation of Slovak independence he was the acknowledged ruler of the collective will of the Slovak people. Just as 'ľiso dld not seek the oHlce of president as man and priest, just so he hearkened to the voice of the Slovak genle and accepted the presidency from the qualified representatlves of the nation as a supreme obllgatlon - a duty which he performed faithfully and well to the very last moment of his life.. Jf Joseph Tiso devoted hlmself to tbe national service or the Slovak cause, then he diel so in full responsibílity of hls historlc missión. That is why he did not hesitate even for a moment In the face of seduction and vlolence. The presldent of the Slovak Republlc could not recant or even betray anything. That is why Josepb Tlso, after 6 SLOVAKIA acceptlng the office of Pľesident with so much self-immolation, stirred the whole Slovak nation iuto a building effoľt; that is why he defended before a non-Slovak court the work of tbe Slovak RepubJic with such dignity; and that is why, being fully aware that he pertormed his duties as well as he could, Tlso could bless bis [aithful people even from the shadow of the gallows. The human accomplisbments of tbe president of tbe Slovak Republic were destined not only by bis priestly character, but also by tbe whole character of a son of the Slovak nation, who never strayed from Slovak and Cbristian trad!tions. No matter how hard the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court tried, it could not prove that Joseph Tiso wa.s gu!lty of acts tbat ran counter to natural and Slovak laws, or were contrary to mora! law. Tbat is why tbe Slova:k nat!on regarded the conviction and execution of .Josepb Tiso as a dellberate, prnmeditated and executed crime. And lt s ball regard it so for all time. The political work of tbe President of the Slovak Republic, serving the welfare o f tbe entire Slovak nation, created such conditions for tbe Slovak natlon so that it could wltbin the framework of !ts state boundaries prove its capabllity to live and so that in its international relationsbip it could gain recognition. Joseph Tiso, placed on the throne of an independent Slovak ruler, did not play the politics of Moscow, Berlin, Dudapest, Paris, London, or Washington, but worked the policy of Bratisla va, the cap!tal city 9f tbe independent State of Slovakia. He worked that pol!cy under ihe given pol!tlcal, geographical and internat!onal circumstances; and he had to work it in sucb a way so that the interests of the Slovak natlon and its State were safeguarded as well as possilble in tbis play of opposing forces. Josepb Tiso could not consplre against the work of Slovak hlstory and. therefore, no otber conception except the pnrely Slovak and state conception could be acceptable for him as well as tbe entlre Slovak nation. He did not regard the existence of the Slovak State as a debatable question. Just as the Slovak nation existed, so the Slovak State also had to exist. " This standpoint - which was not only bis, but tbe whole Slovak nation's as well - was incompatible with the view beld by Dr. Edward Beneš and dictated by him to his lackeys - the renegades of Slovak descent on the territory of t he Slovak State - first from London, then from Moscow and finally from Prague. · Joseph Tiso was so deeply convinced about the propriety of bis llecisions as President tha.t he did not hesitate to state before the nonSlovak and non-Cbristian court which was trying bim: "If in the fLÍture it were g!ven to me to concern myself wlth politics, under such circumstances as obtained in 1919-1945, I would follow the same polic!es that I did at that Ume." Looklng over the picture of the human and political profile of tbe f!rst President of tbe Slovak Republic, wbo already today appears in tbe halo of a martyr in the eyes of Europe and the world, we cannot help but be convinced that Joseph Tlso preceded t he development of European and un!versal realities of today, so tbat he could indicate the return of those eternal, mora! and polltlcal values. wbich in today'$ change or the world order have, as lt were, temporarily g!ven place and reign to the forces of the human peripbery SLOVAKIA 7 which is guided by the Iaw of the jungle. His profile appears on the background of this shocking tragedy, wbich 1s not only natlonal, but European as welJ. The Chrlstlan and natlonal values, whlch Joseph Tlso personified In a form thus far unattalned by any Slovak, were and are being torn out of the body of the Slovak natlon, and In their place was and is being forced the criminal phllosophy and morality or Godless Communism. On the European and world stage the equllibrium o! mora! and polltical order was vlolated, and the declared and proven criminallty of Communism was accepted as the equivalent com• ponent of the hnman struggle for a better tomorow. Using sneh unChristian and unhistorical yardstlcks, the human and politlcal pro• file of the President of the Slovak Republic was regarded as sometbing that does not fall into tbe accepted norms of chaos, wbich was tbe result of tbe aggressiveness and perfidiousness of the CommunLstlc system and of the cowardice and appeasement of a world, whlch, of course, did say that it is llving in Christian and democrat!c forms, but was in fact, willlng to lend itself to a suicidal experiment in an alliance witb Communlsm. That !s why the voice of Joseph Tiso was silenced - the voice which defended truth and Christian morality, tbe freedom ot tbe Slovak people and its State; tbe volce that cried out agalnst Communlsm and for European and Christian cultnre. During tbe reign ot pol!tlcaJ and moral chaos, which was instaJJed totally in Slovakia and partially In tbe rest of Europe, the voice of the just confessor of universal moral principles was a volce crying In tbe wilderness. Al that Ume the crimlnal morality of tbe non-Slovak and non-Cbrlstian court In Bratis lava was accepted as tbe norma! form of justice. It took a long tlme for the West to become sat!ated wlth thls unnatural concublnage with the Soviet system and finally declde to defend wbat Communlsm did not as yet have t!me to conquer. Edward Beneš, his people and the renegades of Slovak origin joined witb them, taking advantage of the moral and politlcal chaos of the world and using the norms of communlstlc lies and deceptlon, wanted to present the pol!t!cal and human profile of Joseph Tiso in s uch a way as to evoke averslon. They succeeded in thls, but only temporarily. As long as the world accepted Stalln as the representatlve ot the most perfect democracy, whlle Dimltrov was a model of nobility, as long as Tito was an angel of justlce, wh!le Rákos! was recognlzed as a norm ot tolerance, as long as Anna Pauker, Palmlro Togl!atti, M:aurlce Tborez and Wllliam Pleck were the hope of European brotherhood, and whlle Edward Beneš, Clement Gottwald and thelr companlone qualified as bu!lders of the brldge between the West and the East - the Presldent ot the Slovak Republ!c, Dr. Joseph Tlso, was a phenomenon who slmply dld not belong in Europe. And Joseph Tlso and the Slovak nation did not want a martyr for the falth ot Christ, for a Christian and just Europe and for the Slovak Republic to belong to the gallery of these representatlves ot dera!led Europe. The unreal conception about the posslbility or normal cohabltation of two irreconcilable world outlooks - the Communlst and the Chrlstian - was bullt on deceptlon and violence, on the basis of a philosophy or falsehood and crime, on cowardlce and apostasy. On the basls ot this unnatural concept!on, it was allowed, with the concurrence of the cultured and civilized world, to lead the head of the 8 SLOVAKIA Slovak State to the gallows despite the fact that he was a priest of the Catholic Church who never violated Her doctrines or Her ia,ws; and despite the fact that Tiso was a man of spotless life and a patriot of the highest level; and despite the fact that Tiso was the freely and democratically elected head of a recognized and orderly European State. Over Joseph Tiso, under whose government no one was executed, the verdict of death was dictated by Edward Beneš, a foreigner by blood and spirit in the eyes of the Slovaks, who perpetrated so much damage on Slovak life and property that as long as a Slovak s hall be a Slovak, the mere mentlon of Beneš's name will always inspire mora! repugnance and eternal condemnation. J oseph Tiso - who conducted himself in accordance to the existing cons<titutional and controlllng institutions, as well as the highest authority of God, that Divine Law and Catholic doctrine which he professed and upheld from childhood a11 the way up to the gallows was tried and convicted by Edward Beneš who - even though he had at hand a "freely" elected parliament ready to do his vengeful bidding - Jistened to and was guided by no one except Stalin and himself. Beneš listened only to himself and hls own voice, which was slngularly full of hatred for everything Slovak, and obeyed an unChristian and undemocratic instinct, which in the last years of his life, was centered entirely against the freedom and state independence of the Slovak nation. Individuals devoid of all morals wanted to teach the gospel to a noble, Catholic priest; w ealthy and corrupt men lec tured him a bout Christian soclology; Godless and faithless people with catechisms in their bloody hands tried bim; the destroyers and plu nderers of the national wealth of the Slovak people tried to show him how he should have defended Slovakia; the perpetrators o.f communist terror dared to speak about principles of Democracy and Christianity; cowards, who never had the courage to raise their voices in defense of Slovak interests, were presented to bim as roodels of heroism; the allies of Communism told bim about the "acquisition of the glo· rious insurrections;" traitors of tbe Slovak race tried to teacb hlm patriotism; the grave diggers of Slovak independence tried to convince hlm of the advantages of subordination of the Slovak nation within the framework of cobabitation with the Czechs. On such negative princ lples, drawn from Communist doctrines, they created the profile of Joseph Tlso. In the conflict with this pollUcal and moral underworld, wbich occupled the !and of the Slovaks and also prepared to enthrone its own government and its own principles in the rest of Europe, Joseph Tiso stood tbere before the Communist tribunal as a milestone on the threshold of two ages. The gallows erected in the courtyard of the Bratislava prison, on wbich the great S lovak, Christian, European beart of the first President of the Slovak Republic ceased beating - that is the symbol of the conflict for wblch Communism and its allies were preparing. It is the symbol of the determination shown by a man of European and world outlook, wbo foresaw not only the extent of his own sacrifice, but also its mora! lmportance at a Ume, when Europe and the world - returnlng to the trnditional Chrlstlan norms - would SLOVAK.IA 9 weigb justly the mora! and political values not only of lndivlduals, but also of nations. Looking at the human and political profile of the President ot the Slovak Republic from this historical vantage point, it can be said that the Slovak nation, whích succumbed in the brutal conflict tor its own statehood in the Europe of yesterday and today - in which Beneš, and the Communist and pro-Communist alliance helping bim, had all the say about Slovakia - shall wln its just !Ight for the renewal of Slovak statehood in the Europe of tomorrow, where people of determin ation, goodness, noblesse, Christlan morali ty - Jike J oseph Tiso will appear on the stage o! European history. • • • WHAT THEY SAID ABOUT TISO "The execution of Msgr. Joseph Tiso was a judicial murder and it is also a political murder. One can c riticize the polltics of the late Msgr. Joseph Tiso, disagree with it and fight against it wltb all of one's strength, but, according to my deep conviction, a man should not be murdered for his political activity which was in accord with the conviction of his nation and for which he had a motive in the development of political events durlng the flrst and second CzechoSlovak Republlcs and in the course followed by lts presidents and governments. It is a down-right travesty of justice that a Slovak, elected President of the Slovak Republic by a majority of the Slovak nation, be executed by the government of a self-appolnted presldent of the present 'Czechoslovak Republic,' who, accordlng to the laws of the First Republic, himself should first be tried and condemned." - Kare! Lochner, former Czecho-Slovak Consul, London, England, April 1947. • • • "American Slovak Catholic women were horrified at the igno· minious death of Monsignor Joseph Tiso. Greatly resent the ignoring of our plea and petition sent by cablegram to President Edward Be• neš and others from our Annual Board Meeting held F®ruary 27, 1947, at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in behalf of our entire membership of 75,000 women and children. The wrath of the entire membership centers itself upon the leaders of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. We hail )lonsignor Tiso as a martyr, dying for the cause of bis people." - Susan Matuscak, Secretary First Catholic Slovak Ladles Union, Cleveland, Ohio. • • • • • • "Tbe Czech governmeRt of presldent Edward Beneš sacrificed an opportunity of easing the tension between the Czechs and the Slovaks when it executed the Rev. Joseph Tiso." - Osservatore Romano, Yatican City, Haly. " The execution of Dr. Josepb Tiso, who loved bis people and served tbem conscientiously throughout bis life, wil\ undoubted\y inspire thousands of his brethren to contlnue the fight for the !nherent and God-given rights of tbe Slovak nation." - John Sabol, Secretary l•'irst Cathollc Slovak Union, Cleveland, Ohio.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The First President of the Slovak Republic Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Cieker Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3), March 1952 pp. 1-9 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cieker, Jozef, 1907-1969 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/d2f1074990e473eae739664a31c6a0d8.pdf f041675c17e416258fa64db1b4bc60ee PDF Text Text �SLOVAK.I A is publishecl periodically by the S lonlk Lcaguc of America, a cultui-al and ciYic fedeľati on of Americans of S lovak descent. 'ľhc chief pnrpose of S LOVAKl A is to pľomote a bettcľ nnderstanding and appreciation of the S lovak n ation and its long shngglc for freeclom and ii 1depenclence. As Ameľic·ans, mcmbers of the Slovak Leagnc o:f Ameľica fiľmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inheľent and Gocl-given ľight to freeclorn and independence. 'J 'he,v aľe cleclicated to the cause of the Ameľi<:an way of life, Slovak freeclom ,mel world peace a:1cl are cletermined to oppose the plag-nc of Communism and all othrľ tota litaľi an political systems. Subsc·ľiptio:1 to SloYaki a $1.00 per year in thr F. S . A. - $2.00 else\\·her e. Sencl subscri ptions to : S LO V AKIA Box 150 Mi clcllctown, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � �SLOVAK.I A is publishecl periodically by the S lonlk Lcaguc of America, a cultui-al and ciYic fedeľati on of Americans of S lovak descent. 'ľhc chief pnrpose of S LOVAKl A is to pľomote a bettcľ nnderstanding and appreciation of the S lovak n ation and its long shngglc for freeclom and ii 1depenclence. As Ameľic·ans, mcmbers of the Slovak Leagnc o:f Ameľica fiľmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inheľent and Gocl-given ľight to freeclorn and independence. 'J 'he,v aľe cleclicated to the cause of the Ameľi<:an way of life, Slovak freeclom ,mel world peace a:1cl are cletermined to oppose the plag-nc of Communism and all othrľ tota litaľi an political systems. Subsc·ľiptio:1 to SloYaki a $1.00 per year in thr F. S . A. - $2.00 else\\·her e. Sencl subscri ptions to : S LO V AKIA Box 150 Mi clcllctown, Pa. --------------------------------Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1952, Vol. 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1952 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 3), March 1952.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 4), August 1952.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 5), December 1952.</li> </ul> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (3) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 1952 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/70a93da5d0fe81afca3bd24f1c559d77.pdf 9ce6376d7b082d4e046e69dff47642f2 PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other mode;: n language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them . Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOV AI( LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROl\'i SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0 . D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County � YOU CAN LEARN SLOVAK as easily as you can any other mode;: n language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them . Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOV AI( LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 92 lessons, 400 pages; exercises in Slovak and English; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of its kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROl\'i SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0 . D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from: P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAIDA: The Stiavnicka Castle in Liptov County  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Štiavnička Castle Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/8affe32b1d99e5b7198ea2d629fcb183.pdf c05f2805e3ec532338bc99ce54df9bc0 PDF Text Text 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- �SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- �64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- �SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- �64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 62 SLOVAKIA LE'.ITRICH'S REGIME IN .THE LIGHT OF TRUTH Dr. Andrew Dubina In the fall of 1948, the International Peasant Union presented a memorandum concerning the political situation in central and south-eastern Europe to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is a very interesting document; it has the ,b acking of such personalities as Dr. Macek, Dr. Dimitrov, Mikolejczyk, Ferenc Nagy, Dr. Joseph Cerny and other representatives of the central European nations. The memorandum is replete with figures and statistics that condemn the regimes of so-called "people's" democracies and their representatives. The memorandum also says something about the conditions in 1S lovakia and the Czech lands since the re-establishment of Czecho-Slovakia. There are indications that his part of the memorandum was prepared by the Czech Agrarians: Cerny, Veverka and Klimes. Ironically enough, the memorandum Is a'l:so signed by a smaH so111 of a great father, Fedor Hod.fa, a Czech Slovak ("Czechoslovak"!) Since Czech politicians had a hand in the memorandum, it follows naturally that not everything is mentioned in the memorandum that happened since 1945 in :Slovakia against democracy and human rights. But even what the memorandum does mention about the conditions in :Slovakia since 1945 is a terrible condemnation of the regime in power at that time and its leaders: Lettrich, Hodfa, Ferjencik and their helpers, who today pose as democrats and defenders of democracy in western Europe and America. Behold the kind of democracy that prevailed in Slovakia at a time when Lettrich's regime boasted of representing over 62 per cent of the electorate (J quote from the memorandum): "All human rights were trampled upon since 1945. Nobody was certain of his fundamental right to life and freedom. People were-murdered arbitrarily and prisons were filled with the victims of class justice. "Already in the spring of 1945 the Soviet army of 'libera- SLOVAKIA 63 tio}l' occµpied the eastern _part of _S lovakia. On the basis of the denunciations of local Communists more than 2Q,OOO innocent citizens were arrested and deported to the coal pits in the Donbasse region of the USSR." That is how the memorandum begins and then continues to ~ay that Czecho-Slovakia became "a model police state. Those who refused to become ~bedient tools of the regime were deprived of all functions, if a worse fate did n~t befall them. Every personal opinion, every resistance was brutally suppressed." "The universally recognized differentiation between legislative, executive and judicial powers was done away with. The administrati,ve machine rendered verdicts and confiscated properties. "The parliament - that was never the result of free elections, but was composed on the basis of delegated power of the privileged parties, allowed by the grace of the Communist party - approved all decrees and changes. "The decisions of the courts were influenced by the press and the demands, manifestations and rallies of the masses. "Violence and lawlessness acquired a form of apparent legality. Morale was destroyed; base denunciation was .raised to a civic virtue." Certainly we need not quote further from the memorandum to illustrate the kind of "democracy" introduced into Slovakia and Bohemia by the collaborators with Bolshevisni when they came into power in 1945 :b y the grace of Moscow and the Communist Parties of Czecho-Slovakia. A queer democracy indeed: arbitrary murders, deportations, confiscations, concentration ·camps, gallows and jails for thousands of the best :Slovak people just because they did not agree with the regime and did not want their Slovakia subordinated to ruthless Czecho-bolshevik sovereignty! But the representatives of Lettrich's regime still have the gall to talk about damocracy, pose as defenders of the democratic way of life! What is more, even in emigration they dare denounce the victims of their political revenge and brutality as enemies of democracy! How much spiritual base- 64 SLOVAKIA ness and heartlessness must be necessary to do a thing like that?! We .Slovaks say that a pitcher goes for water only until it is broken. All these "democrats'' - as they did in the past - even now hide themselves ·b ehind the false reputation of Edward Benes. For them he was a model; they wanted to imitate him at home and they want to emulate him even in emigration - though some of them with their intelligence would not stand a chance of becoming squires in the lowliest Slovak village. We know that Dr. Benes talked a lot about democracy and at the same time ordered the deportation of 3,500,000 Germans, the enslavement of 3,000,000 Slovaks, and the hanging of his political opponents. And Benes got away with this kind ,o f "democracy" for a while. Finally, however, his own brand of democracy caught up with him and he himself became a victim of his lies and frauds. He perished miserably, hated by millions of people - the victims of his anti-democratic and anti-Christian policies. And such an end awaits all the Czech and Slovak followers of Dr. Benes. ~or a time they still shall be able to hide behind the mask of defenders of democracy and pose as victims of Bolshevism. However, the time shall come when they shall be unmasked before the whole world. There is a lot of innocent blood on their hands - more than they can hope to wash off in a lifetime. They have overcompromised themselves with Bolshevism and have no right to speak in the name of the nations they have cast into misery and misfortune. Slowly but surely the light of truth is piercing its way through the fog of "Czecho-Slovak" democracy - the handmaid of the "people's" democracy of Moscow. RECOMMENDED BOOKS: THE SLOVAKS - their history and traditions - by Peter P. Yurchak; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00. by Joseph Skultety; 229 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY pages, well documented; hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover - $1.00.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Lettrich's Regime in the Light of Truth Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 62-64 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb56504b2fb7b5b01b1e5cccaadb7e64.pdf 08cd7f1762d80154fe56332576d6d7d8 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity �60 S LOVAKIA from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice. From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle. Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following century, Budatin became the property of the king. It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it came into royal possession. During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna, a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433) also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar (Magyar translation "Szunyok"). In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything. While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary, the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda- �SLOVAKIA 61 tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the walled-in bride originated in his time. At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December 11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it. When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the castle disguised as a peasant. On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May 13, 1944). � SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity �60 S LOVAKIA from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice. From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle. Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following century, Budatin became the property of the king. It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it came into royal possession. During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna, a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433) also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar (Magyar translation "Szunyok"). In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything. While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary, the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda- �SLOVAKIA 61 tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the walled-in bride originated in his time. At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December 11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it. When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the castle disguised as a peasant. On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May 13, 1944). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity 60 S LOVAKIA from the tower is very beautiful. In the corridor of the tower one can also see the memorable cell with the escutcheon of the Sunog-Komar family, where the daughter of Gaspar Sunog, Catherine, was walled in, according to popular legend for refusing to marry the man of her father's choice. From the highest point of Budatin one can see the topmost parts of the ruins of Lieta va Castle. Budatin is mentioned in history as early as 1250; at that time the tower existed, but not the other adjacent buildings. That year the Budatin Chapter issued the document which determined and defined the properties of the Dukes of Zvolen. The village of "Wudatin" is also mentioned in the thirteenth century. At the beginning of the following century, Budatin became the property of the king. It is interesting to note that although Matthew Cak, "the lord of the Vah and the Tatras," ruled over thirty castles, he never was the lord of Budatin. Maximilian, a loyal adherent of Robert, was awarded Budatin shortly after it came into royal possession. During the r eign of King Zigmund of the House of Luxembourg, the Czech Brethren from Tabor settled beneath Budatin. In 1431 they captured '~ ilina which was well fortified at that time, according to a document left by Zigmund. Old documents mention a certain Ladislaus of Hatna, a valiant warrior, who was called to Budatin from Bohemia by King Zigmund. Undoubtedly he became the captain of the castle because he served Zigmund well; he escorted the king to Milan for a coronation and two years later (1433) also to Rome. The widow of Ladislaus, Raphaela, married Gaspar Sunog, a Slovak whose name really was Komar (Magyar translation "Szunyok"). In the sixteenth century, there was a struggle for the throne of Hungary between King Ferdinand and John Zap of sky, just when the Turks threatened to take everything. While the rivals fought it out for the crown of Hungary, the wealthy landowners exploited the situation to enhance their own positions. Many castles were taken by the plunderers. The vicinity of ~ilina was terrorized by the notorious John and Raphael of Podmanin, who finally even took Buda- SLOVAKIA 61 tin away from the Sunog-Komar family. The castles Hricov and Lednica, together with Budatin, became the feared residences of the robber knights. Zilina was their political centrum. The Podmanin brothers were apprehended and convicted by the regional court for their crimes, but when they humbled themselves and begged forgiveness, the king amnestied them and returned their properties. But they had to give up Budatin to the Sunog-Komar clan. Later Budatin came into the hands of Gaspar Sunog; the story of the walled-in bride originated in his time. At the beginning of December 1848, Joseph Miloslav Hurban, Slovak patriot from Beckov, and emperor's officers Bloudek, Zach and Janecek organized an expedition of volunteers in Tesin, Silesia. This volunteer army joined with a division of the Austrian army, which then took everything along the Kysuca and stood before Budatin on December 11th. At that time, Budatin was guarded by a Magyar garrison, but the volunteers had little trouble in dispersing it. When, however, they attempted to cross the bridge into Zilina, they were surprised ·b y the Magyars who cannonaded them and forced the expedition back to Budatin. With the Magyar army was also the son of the mistress of the Budatin Castle, Lady Caky, who in the meantime had fled from the castle disguised as a peasant. On January 2, 1849, another battle was staged at Budatin. The volunteers, led by Hurban, Zach and Bloudek, were aided by the forces of General Gatz of Austria. After surprising the Magyars and taking the bridge over the Vah, the volunteers rested in Zilina for six days and then moved farther into the Trencin country. The archives of Budatin Castle were destroyed by fire during this battle . • • • WHO SAID IT ? "Some pussy-footing ostriches criticize the treaty between Soviet Russia rund Czechoslovakia Our close collaboration with the Soviet Union needs no explanation. We do not want anything from the Russia,ns except protection frOiffi the Germ8!Ils, a:nd the Russians want nothing whatsoever from us." - (Jan Masaryk, BUSINESS WEEK, May 13, 1944).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Budatín Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 59-61 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5871d8288f1bb90993b597c326068fc3.pdf 05e693849668c0259d8504f0a255f049 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the �56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 �57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the �58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but �SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity � SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the �56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 �57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the �58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but �SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 55 SWVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS Dr. Andrej Dubina In the documents, read during the Nurem~I'g trials 3lgainst the main ouliprits of Hitl.e r's regime, Slovakia was mentioned several times. The events concerning t!he ;proclamation of SlovaJk indeipendence and the political existence of the Slorvak Reipulblic were s'Ulbjected to the examination olf the representatives of the victorious powers. HO!W did Slorvrukia and her leading po[itical factors fare before the Nuremibe1,g tribunal? mto what kind of a light was the proclamation od: Slcwa.k indeipendence pla:ced, which the regime of the late Dr. Benes regarded as treason, as the cause of the breaJk-'Ulp of Czecho-Slovaikia and punished with the gaHows? In the interesting book that was pUiblished in London in 1946 .b y Peter de Meindelssohn, under the title "The Nuremberg Documents - Some Aspects of German War Policy 1939-1945," we can find a meritorious answer to these questions. That answer completely contraverts the ~ech accusations aJCCording to which leading Sloiva:k factors are Quislings and that the ,p olitics of the Illinlka Slovak People's Party caused the disi:ntegration of Ozechoc-Siorvaikia. On the •b asis of the Documents read before the Nurembe:r,g tribunal, it is crystal clear that Gemnany a:lready in 1936---1937 had wcmked out its "Directive for Unified Pre:paration for War of the Aimed Forces" by the Minister of War Blomiber,g, and that in Seiptemlber 1938 the iillVasion o;f Ozecho-Slovrukia begam to be enacted according to the plan "Case Green." In .t his plan Slovakia and her leading political fig1ures were not even cOilS!idered by the leading German circles, and the Germans did not figure on any heJip from Slovakia, nor did they need it. The ,planned invasion and occupation of Ozecho~ovaikia came to naught with the Munich Pact of the four Great Powers, by which a part of CzechoSiovakia was handed o.v er to the Germans with the consent of the Prague Gorvemment headed by Dr. Benes, and the 56 SLOVAKIA rest of Ozecho-Slovakia came under the direct economical and politi ca1 . deipeindence od: Ge·rmam.y. When Dr. Benes himself w,rote about this pact and its consequences m 1943, he said that it was for Czeicho-lSl:ovaJkia "a frutad blow." We do not meet with Sloivakia and her fa;ctors, especially with Dr . . Tiso, Sidor and Dr. :Durcansky, in the Nuremlberg Do·currnents until March 1939. What was left of Ozecho-iSlOiVaJkia at that time? 'Indeed, qze:cho~Sl()IV'akia was beset UJPOn not only by Germany but -also" the resit of her neighbors and had sucoum'bed to her "fatad_blow," that is, had died, factuany hrud ceased to exist as a state. Peter de Mendelssohn q,uotes the record orf Hitler's office alboot the visit of the president of the autonomous Government of Slovakia to Berlin; Tiso was caliled by Hitler after the Czech a:rmy putsch in Slovaikia (March 10). Aoco.rding to the Nuremberg Documents, quoted by Mendelssohn: "The Czechs" - Hitle1r told Dr. Tiso - "•w ere vioJaiting the Munich a1greement and were . behaving in a proivocath7P manner into:lerruble to Gernnan,y. At Munich, Germany had solved the .C zech question a:ccording to her Weiltanschauung but if "this solution leads to no results., we have decided albsoJutely to ,p ursue it to its conclusion, without consideratipn for his ideological principle." Hitler, however, was not a!Ltogether satisfied even with Silo!Valda. Mendelssohn says: "The attitude orf Slorvakia was also a disappointment to him. In the past year - the record states, - the Ftihrer had to face the difficult deicision whether or not to permit Hungary to occupy Sloivakia. He .had been under a wrong imipre,s sion as he had od' course beilieved that Slovakia wished to be annexed to Hungary. This errorr- was caused by the fact that Slorvaikia was fanther away f11om Germany and by the importance, of the more serious problems which then overshrudorwed this question. It was oinly in the crisis that the Fuhrer was dissuaded from this opinion. It was then that he fir.st heaird and noted that Slovakia wished to co:ndwct her own a;:flfai:rs. "Norw he had pemnitted Minister Tiso to come here in 1 57 SLOVAKIA order to mruke his position clear in a very short time. Germany had no interests to the east of the Carpathian mountains. It was indifferent to hi:m what ha'Ppened there. The question was whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not. He did not wish for anything f.rom Sloiv,a lda. But he wanted to secure final confirmation as to What Slovrukia really wanted. He d,i d not wish that reproaches should come from Hungary that he was preseT1Vinig something which did not wish to be preserved at all. He took a lilbera:l view of unrest and demonstrations in general, but in this connection, unrest was only an outward indication oif internal instability. He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason pernnitted Tiso to come in order to hear his dedsion. It was not a quesrtion of days but of hours. He had stated at the time that if Slovakia wished to rmruke herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He wouild state by his own iword as lOil!g as Slovakia made it clear that she desired independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve her con,nection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of S l01vaJkia to the mercy of events for which he was no longer res,p onsible." Hitler then asked Ribbentrop - writes Mendelssohn whether he had anything to add to what he had said. Rib.bentrop repeated that the decision n:ust be made in a few hours and not in seiveral days. "He (Ri'bbentrorp) showed the Fuhrer a message he had just receirved which reported Hungarian troop m01vements on the Slovak frontieirs. The Flihrer read this report, mentioned it to Tiso and exipressed the horpe that Slavwkia wou!id sewn make her decision." 1 That is the end of t:he record concerning Tiso's visit to Beirlin. To properly appreciate the position that Slovakia and her leading political figures faced at the time, it is necessary to quote an additional document. It is the telegram of the Magywr Regent, Nicho[as Hort'hy, sent to Hitler March 3, 1939, which reads as fQ11lows: "Your EXJcellency - my sincere thanks. I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this Head Water Region - I dislike using big words - is of vital importance to the 58 SLOVAKIA life of Hungary. In spite oif the fact that our recnmts have OD!ly been serwing for five wooks, we are going into this affair with eager enthusiasrm. The dispositions ha,ve aJTeady been made. On Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will talke pla;ce which win .b e followed by the big !blow on Saturday. I shall never fo11get this proof af friendship, and Your Excellency may rely on my unshak~ able g,r atitude at all times. Your devoted friend - Horthy. " Under the circumstances Slovakia had to choose whether she wanted to be occupied by Germany and Hungary, or whet'herr she wanted to proclaim her independence. Tertium non datur. Independence , after ailil, is the supreme goal oif every nation, and every nation oif the wcrld made, use of the first opportunity that presented itse:lrf to gain independence. Slovakia did not want to be occupied by Hungary or by Germany. What couJd Dr. Tiso and his, colleagues do under the circumstance s? Well, they did not act on their orvvn. They returned to Bratislava and informed the members of the autonomous government of Sl01Vakia rubout what had transpired. Hacha orderred the Slovalk Assembly to convene, and the duly elected representativ es of the SloiVa;k people decided the fate of Sl01Vaikia: they unanimouSily proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. Did the Slovaks do wrong accorrding to the Nuremberg Documents? Oe.rtamly not! In the light of these documents the leaders o,f Slovalk politi:caJ life were justified in doing just what they did. The DocUJmelllts di$prove completely the contentions of Czech propaganda and the so...called "People's Courts" of Dr. Ben€S's State. The Documents further state the stand of Karol Sidor against the methods used .b y the Ger,mans in those hect ic days. Nevertheless, the judiciary of Dr. Ben€S condemned and sentenced to death the main c,reators of the Sl-oivak RepuJblic. Dr. Joseph Tiso died on the gallows, Dr. :Duroansky was sentenced. to die on the gallows in aJbsentia, and Kar01l Sidor was senten~ed to 20 years at harrd lrubor in a!bsentia. Thousands iwon thousands oif othe,r s were jailed and exiled and their properties confiscatec. Slova:k political factors did not betray their nation, but SLOVAKIA 59 protected it aigainst invasion, occupation and annexation, gas chambers and concentration camps. But for that Benes and his poli1Jcal regime denounced them as traitors. The Sl,ovaks were held responsible foT a situation which they thema situation into which they wetre sellVes had not created thrust alOIIlg with the Czech nation by the aniti-diemocratic, anit-Chri<Sltian, anti-Slovalk and imperialistic policies of the late but not lamented Dr. Edward Benes, the man who sold out the Slovaik and Ozech nations twice within a decade to tota'1itarian powers. • • • CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BUDATIN The ruins of the Budatin Castle stand opposite 2ilina, just about where the Kysuca pours into the Vah. In its time it stood guard over the J ablunkov Pass and the old commercial highways. Slovak history tells us that the Slovaks, led by Joseph Hurban, fought two battles here during the rebellion of the 1848-1849: the first one September 11, 1848, and the second January 2, 1849. During the latter fight the archives of Budatin, which today undoubtedly could have shed some light on the foggy history of ancient Slovakia, were destroyed by fire. In 1922-23, the lower part of the castle was restored which was adorned with a typical Budatin tower. In the castle there are two spacious rooms, one on the ground floor and the other on the upper floor, which are adorned with numerous pictures, most of them portraits of former owners of the castle. In one of the side rooms is a portrait of Ludmila Lazansky, to whom the Slovaks even today refer to as "our good Ludmila." The people still recall that the mistresses of Budatin Castle treated the Slovaks rather decently and that one of them even had a bridge built across the Vah river at a time when there was no work and people were starving. The rooms of the castle tower are especially interesting, containing as they do many precious antiquities. The view of the river and the vicinity  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia in the Light of the Nuremberg Trials Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrej Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 55-59 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4bf24b14b55c8c7c700a20bc2f0f46d7.pdf 9916fb9c6316cbdb4d95d65106f1cd09 PDF Text Text 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- �SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were �SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 �SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of �f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. �SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. �54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) . � 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- �SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were �SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 �SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of �f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. �SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. �54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 48 SLOVAKIA WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SWVAKIA Dr. Arved Grebert The Slovaks entered into a common state with the Czechs, into Ozecho-Slovrukia, on the condition that SlovaJkia would have its own self-government, its sta:tes' rights, that it would be governed by the people of Slorva,kia, have its own state courts, its own SlOIVaJk schools - in a ward, that the people of Slova,kia would be ruble to exercise their funda~ mental democraUc rights and, thus, be the masters of their own destiny. Czech Promises and Fulfillment I suppose it is quite logical to assume that Czecho-0-lovakia would not harve come into being withoot Slovakia. During World War I, the Czechs and Slov8lks concluded several agreements of which the best known are the Cleveland and Pittsburgh agreements. An examination orf the Cleveland Agreement t ells us that "Slovaikia would have complete national autonomy, its own legislature, its own state administration, and complete ctrltura!l and political autonomy." The Pittsburr,gh Agreement, dTafted and signed by T. G. Masaryk himself, guaranteed that "Slo.vaJkia sha.11 have its own administration, its own legislature and its own courts" and tha,t the SlorvaJk language "shall be the ofificial language in the scho.ols, aH state orffices and in pwb.Uc life in generad." In Chicago, T. G. Masaryk told the Slorvruks on May 6. 1918: "I aJm for the propositon that Slo!V'akia, joined with the Czech lands, should have complete sellf--administration; I am for the pr01p0siton that the S10,va,k language rule in the scihools, in the churches and in government offices everywhere." fa Pititsiburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, Masaryk told the Slovalks whom he desperately needed to re-a4ize his Ozecih0Slova.kia: "Thus it wihl be that half of the state shall be Czech and half SlorvaJk; t'he Slorvaik lan•g uage shadl rule in Slo- SLOVAKIA 49 va;lcia in the schools and in pwbi-ic office. We understand each other. 'Dherefo.re, there are no words, nor shaJl there be any about any kind of majorizing of the Slova,ks by the Czechs. Yoo shall be the masters of your household and we shaH be masters of ours." Tha,t sa,me evening, while meeting with the representatives of Slovaik life, Masaryk said: ''You slhall hruve the entire adnninistTation in your hands, because Slovakia shall not be governed from Prague, but shall govern itself." But even if such agreements and promises were not made, the Slo;vruks, just as every nation, stihl had a natocal and unalienaJble right to freedom, self-determination and independence . .Surely, no adherent of the democratic way of life will deny that the Slcwa,ks definitel,y should have administered the .territory whkh they irrhrubited since aJbout the sixth century. Slovakia Flooded By Czechs But what haippened in 191'8, when the Czecho-Slova,k RepuibHc was estaJblisthed? Just as soon as Sl01VaJkia was annexed to the Ozech lands, thousands of Czechs poured into Slovakia to help arl!minister the state. It is true, of course, that Slovakia did need some exiperls to take over the state administration from the Magyar buTeauc,ra,cy. But she certainly did not need the multitude .o f woI1kers thait Prague had sent. Slovakia did not need the thousands of S1Ina:H Czech officials, teachers, clerks, policemen, soldiers, detectives, ralilroadimen, businessmen, farmers, laJborers, postmasters, mailmen, janitors, etc., who flooded Slova!kia and deipr1ved the Slovruks of wor.k in the1r OIWiil homeland. In 1910, theTe were 7,556 Czechs in Slorvaikia. Whein the first census in Czecho-1Slovakia was talken February 15, 1921, twenty-eight months after the Reipulblic was estaJblished, Czech statistics showed that there were 71,733 Cze:chs in Slovakia. Did their nwmibers decreruse af.ter ,t hat? From 19·21 hundreds of youn:g Slovaks gTaduated from the new schools ervecy year, ,but were not erven considered for state positions ; many took UJP technicrul training to fit them for particular joibs, b,uit that did not help to any noticea1ble extent. ln 1930, twel,ve years aifter the found4ng oif the Republic, Czechs were SLOVAKIA 50 still coming into SloviaJkia "to help the Slorvalkis mn their State" ; Grech statistics put the nmnlber of Ozechs in Slova:k:ia at 1'30,926 - a;n increase oif 87.89 per cent ()!Ver 1921! Eight yea.TS later, in 1938, their ruumlber inoreased. to aJbout 200,000. 1n the meantime, rubout that mruny Slova!ks had to seek a lirvelihood in neighiborinig countries and in more distant lands. The Ozechs were doing the same tlhing the Magya,r s had dome prior to 1918. After Munich, when Creoh officials had to leruve the Sudeten1land, the NA.RJ()[)NE NOVINY (Nrutionai News) of Bratislruva remariked (Oct01ber 13, 1938): "from the lands ocicupied by Germany they will now be send.mg ahl, OT a:t least the majority of State employees to Slovakia. We see hundreds oif these people cominig in daHy." Cze<!'.h offidails and people took over not omy the lead.ring and ,key positions in Sl01VaJkia, 'but also positions that were completely sulbocdinate OT unimpo:rtant, li'ke janitors, offi'cial ser:vants, doonmen, ek., whrc:h the Sl01Vaks unquestionaJbly coUJld hawe fillled very easily - e:ven those who had little or no schodling. From 1921 to 1930, the numlber of State employees in the rugri'culltmral division increas~ by 57.93 per cent; in industry and the trades by 50.16 per cent ; in business and 'ba:nikilllg by 67. 93 per cent. While 203 independent Ozech farmers settled. in Slova!kia ,Uip to 1921, their nrnn.lber inm-eased to 1,031 by 1930 - this :being due "mainly to the co~oni:21ation of OzelC'h legionaires on some of the estates whilch were parcelil ed up" in ffiovakia. During the srume period, the number of Czechs in public adiministration iI11CTea,s ed by 14.10 per c·e nt; in the schools, in the category of o£ficials, by 70.41 per cent; in the free v01cations and the heailth serwke by 89.96 per cent; in the post-olfifice department by 10 ..74 per cent. And dwring that same time (19211930), the nlllmber of ind~ndent Oze.ch enteripri:ses in industTy and the trades increased. by 112.56 per cent; in business and banildn1g by 184.65 per cent. A. Bohaic, Ozec'h sfatistician, whose statistics we have used a'bove, rema11ked in 1935 that "even Ozech 18Jbor increased in industry" and that "in the practical professions in Slovakia, the Czechs will be validating themselves sig1 SLOVAKIA 51 niffoantly in the future and instead od: the Czech official, as ll!p ,t o now, Sl'O!Vakia in the furture will see more Czech tradesmen, businessmen, trained war.kers and enteI'lprisers" (CIDS[ NA SLOVE~U, "Staitisticky 0/beior, XVI, c. 4-5, Prague, 1935). Slovakia - A Czech Colony SlovaJkia roolily became a Czech colony. Thousands od: Czechs, whom the Slo!VaJks did not need, came into Slovakia. Eiven Dr. VaJVTo Srobar, notorious Czechofile and Minister oif the Prague gcwerrum.ent, publidy remariked in 1.919: "In recent runes, the official forces arriving here from Bohemia, are mediocre and are committing various transgressions. Many Czechs are coming into SloiV'8Jkia as if it were an occupied territory and think that they may exploit it." Kornei Stodbta, another notorious ''Oze:chosloivaJk" (a Ozeoh SllorvaJk, i.e. a SlolV'ak in the pay of the Czechs), who held the pos,i tion of referent of the PostaQ Serrvice and Rail.roads in Slovakia, complained as ea:I111y as Deornlbier 17, 1918: "From the ministries of Prague they are send.ring us peo;ple we did not order and this is ca:wsinig us great difficulties" (S'I'olbar: 0SDOBODENE SLOVENSK0, p. 437). Michael Slaivik, another great "Czechoslo.rvak," also found something to complain about. As the adlrninistr8Jto,r (l~ll!pan) of the Zemplin region, he SOOJt a conifid!ential memorandum to T. G. Mas,ruryk on June 1, 1922, in which he complained: "Czechs haive been aJppointed as senvants in Slovakia, despite the fact that local good SllovaJks sought tho,se positions. IDven though we do not have a g.reat intelligentsia, nevertheless you wiU have to admit that there are plenity oif UIS who could be serrvants, b~ause we know how to serve after 1beinig serrvants for a thousand years!" But the people quoted eividently forgot that Slo:vakia really was a colony for the 0zec'hs. "If we succeed in saving the SlorvaJc1s, " we find in NASE SlJOVENSK0 (Our S'lovakia, in 1907, No. 1, rp. 4), in Czech, "our bro!ther Czechs will ther~by be 1presented with a wide field of operation, beca;use those, for whom there is no place· in Bohemia, ,wH1 come to Slova,kia and undoubte<Ny find here a wealithy source of f>2 SLOVAKIA livelihood." And Otto's Commercial Dictionary (Ottuv olbohodni s.Iovnilk ), puil:Ylished in 0zech in 1919, states quite plainly (Vol 2, p. 1217) in 1919 that "SIJ.ovakia shall be our colonial land; it is incorrect to ho'ld to the view that, perhaips, a colonial territwy must not border on the motherfand. An exaimple is Russia with Siberia." Conscious of his own power, Dr. Edlwaird Benes threatened in his notorious "Speeoh to the Slovaiks" in 1933: ''I whll always stand out Oif principle against the political fantasy - I cannot ca[[ it by any other name - which, speruking aJbout a Slovak administration, SlovaJk bureaus and Slovaik eoonomicaJl management and enterprising, mints the one-sided Sllogan ":Slovakia for the Sl01Valks"." And Klima wrote in the ,p ublication "S'LOVENSKO" (ISlovaikia): "We have gained Slo1Vakia not only for 0zech cu1ture, but also for 0zech biusiness." Furthermore, in his book "Vychova a voiJ~sko" (Training and the Army) , Dr. F. Oberpfalcer wi,ote that the Ozechs must not lose their interest in Sl.ovaJkia, because if the Ozechs did not have SlolV,a kia "there would rerturn therefrom to us a multi-tude of our employees, for whom there would be no worl< in our country, misery and dissatisfaction with all their consequences would be increased." The Outflow of Slovak Blood While Sl01Va!kia was being fJooded wirt:h 0zechs, the natiiVe Slovaks, lacking workinig facilities, had to emigrate to France, Belgium, Germany, Canada, Brazi:l, Arge:nitina and the United States. Whi'l.e thousands of Czechs got soft jobs in Slovaikia, nati<ve Sl01VaJks had to struggle beyond the ocean in a foreign, unfriendly environment for bread. Beneath the Tatras the 0zechs lived in comfort and fared well, whereas natirve sons of Slovakia had to go ,t o the forests and jUil!gJes of BraizH and Argentina and the mines of France and BclgiUlffi. In the "Hberaited fatherJand," after large Magya;r estates weTe parcel1ed, Czech legionnaires were able to get land, but the sons of SlovaJk farmers, becaiuse of a laCik of swfificient land, had to, clear jungles and forests in Argentina, or sJave on the plantations of Brazil. SLOVAKIA 53 So that we might have an idea of the magnitude of Slova:k em~gration, let us turn to statistics: in the period from 1924-1928, out of ever,y 10,000 pQpU!lation, 7.7 per cent emigrarted to :Eiuropea,n countries from Czech lands an!d 14.3 peT cent from Slova!kia; from 1929 to 1'933 only 3.6 per cent emigratoo from Czech lands, while 14.8 per cent emigrated from Slova>kia to IDuropean countries. And what do statistiics teJ[ us aJbout emigration overseas? ~giuring on the same basis,, we find that 1.9 per cent entig;rated from Coooh lands, while 38.1 per cent went out of Sl01Va!kiia; and from 1929-1933, 0.6 per cent fr,oim the Czech lands, but 12.6 per cent from Slovakia (see: Annuaire statistique de la Repulblique tchecosfovaque, 1938, p. 33). We must bear in mind, too,, that it was mainly the Sudeften Gerimans who emigrated from the Ozech lands and not Czechs. In 1930, out olf every 100,000 peo,p le in SL01Va1kia, 503.15 had etmiligra:tion visas, whereas only 54.72 had them in Bohemia and 68.70 in Moravia.JSiiesia (vd. ChuTa, Slovensko bez dorastu? p. 187). In 1922, out of the, total n;umber of emigrants in the United States £rom Ozecho~Slovaikria, 42 Sl01Vaks. A year later the figure rose to 5:l1924 pyrMll!i.ded to 62.6 per cent. In the Slova;ks made up 78.1 per cent of the total Cze~ho.JSlova!kia. per cent were per cent, and in latter year, the emi·g ration from This, then, is what the Czechs called the "liberation" of Slovrukia from the Magyars! This f,loodiing of S1ova!kia with Czechs, ho,w ever, diid not serve to benefit only the indi-vidrual Czeoh emigrants themselves. There was more than that to it. The 200,000 Czechs in S'lova:kia represented the actual support of Czech hegemony over SlQ/Vakia. The 200,000 Czech officials, policemen, soldiers, cl0r1ks, bankers, tea;chers, etc., signified a complete occupation oif Sloiva>kia, which at tha.Jt time had a population of ruboru,t 2.8 miHion. The Czechs were everyiwhere in Slovakia; there was not a single burnau, institution, community, city and villruge, enterprise, oir cultur-a;l institution, without a. Czech, the representat1ve, sruppo-r t and coruf.idtante of the Czech hegemony o,v er S'lova>kia. 54 SLOVAKIA It was pib,vious thrut Slovaikia could not liberate herself from this situation without a politicail up.hea;val firom the outside. We must remettnlber, too, that in 192'1, there were 18,364 Ozec'h so[diers and of!ffoers in S1lovakia, but in 1930 thei.r numlber rose to 20,652 - as admitted by Czech staitistics. 'l'he Slovialks, for ''security" reason s were for the most part forced to serwe their term in the aTIIny in Ozech lands. In Slova.k ia there were 2,891 Czech and on[y 1,543 Slova;k gendarmes; olf this num1ber, 104 Czechs and only 21 Slovaks were officers. Of coiurae, even here the Czechs were in key posiition.s and a great part orf the Slovaks was very carefuUy "seledted," so that a "O.ooc:h Slovak" (1Sfov,a,k renegade in the pay orf the Czechs) practically aaways was preferred to a patriotic, nrutionaa[iy consciOIUS Slovak. The world was told b,y official Orech proipaganda and representatilves of the Prague regimes th.rut the Slovruks joined with the Czechs, as equal partners, to form the Ozecho-Slwak R~ublitc. We were told that the Slovalks and the Czechs ruled equal1y in the S'trute and thait the Slovaks determined their own state affairs in Slovakia. The Magyrurs had do,ne the srume thing before the C:zJechs. 'Dhe trurbh, however, was something else. The Sl01Vaiks pleaid:ed', begged and entreated the Benes Czechs for twenty yea,i,s to come to their senses and recognize in a pra'Ctical way the inherent rights of the Slovak nation, the right of the Slovaiks to govern their own sta;te within the frrumeworik of Ctzooho..,Slov~a, bu.rt to no aivail. The inevita!ble happened in 1939. Czecho-SlOIVaJkia had to cohlapse like a horuse of cards, beca'USe it treated the majority of its inhabitants as secondrat·e citizens. "Czechosilo;valk" democira;cy failed utterly, becaru.se in rea[,i ty it made a mO'Cikery of the greait £undamental _principles that make up for a democracy . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "None of us has the right to obligate definitely for the future our people and state in fundamental matters, internal or international, to anything . . . . That holds for all of us and, above all, even for me personally. I think that it is necessary that this be altogether clear. That is why from the beginnnlng I have refused to make any funda(Dr. Edward Benes, to mental, internal or international, ties ...... " - th e Czechoslovak State Council, Nov. 21i, 1941) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Why the Slovaks Were Not Content in Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Dr. Arved Grébert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 48-54 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grébert, Arvéd, 1915-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/5740bcb2c8466cf7731faeb73a771caf.pdf 0861438e95b1cf0142c007040c57cb37 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or �42 SLOVAKIA Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom. Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by the British and American governments under the title "Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV, Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2). Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome. German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however, did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri 1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most important are: a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent: "Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German influence" (3). b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7, 1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the �SLOVAKIA 43 solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement" ( 4). c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague)" (5). This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy. It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that the development that took place in Slovakia later might better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague. In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia, in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north. And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague, but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky, Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). ' 1 �44 SLOVAKIA According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed," said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their own hands." After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ; furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000 more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr. 1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons. Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the Hungarians." It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that "they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital �SLOVAKIA 45 for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days." That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing -events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its -entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows: "MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF Munich, October 19, 1938 At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that he had invited them quite unofficially and privately in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague. Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have to steer developments slowly and methodically. At Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move. If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which had been made regarding complete autonomy, with the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the administrative side of finance had already been taken over, so that joint control remained only in the State finances. In the army, too, agreement had been reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments, but this had not yet been put into practice. �46 SLOVAKIA In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister, Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was, of course, impossible for her to form a modern army for the defense of her frontiers. There were three possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw material resources, was also economically the equal of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff demands, he did not think that there would be much sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing in their lot with the Magyars. In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that he was naturally interested in the development of their country, and he asked them to apply directly to him if they ever · had any particular or economic Hewel." (7) problems. After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak factors did not have any contacts with representatives of the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to Goering, according to the official record, but also according to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts with Germany directly. �SI.;OVAKIA 47 The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic monument and that all Slovak history books would have to be burned if the castle were lost." Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia should remain united with Prague. According to the record, "the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany, therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which threatened it in 1938. · How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation was described as follows: "According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. "Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. "Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9). References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40; 4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32. � SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or �42 SLOVAKIA Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom. Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by the British and American governments under the title "Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV, Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2). Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome. German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however, did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri 1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most important are: a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent: "Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German influence" (3). b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7, 1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the �SLOVAKIA 43 solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement" ( 4). c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague)" (5). This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy. It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that the development that took place in Slovakia later might better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague. In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia, in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north. And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague, but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky, Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). ' 1 �44 SLOVAKIA According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed," said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their own hands." After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ; furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000 more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr. 1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons. Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the Hungarians." It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that "they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital �SLOVAKIA 45 for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days." That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing -events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its -entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows: "MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF Munich, October 19, 1938 At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that he had invited them quite unofficially and privately in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague. Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have to steer developments slowly and methodically. At Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move. If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which had been made regarding complete autonomy, with the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the administrative side of finance had already been taken over, so that joint control remained only in the State finances. In the army, too, agreement had been reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments, but this had not yet been put into practice. �46 SLOVAKIA In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister, Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was, of course, impossible for her to form a modern army for the defense of her frontiers. There were three possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw material resources, was also economically the equal of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff demands, he did not think that there would be much sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing in their lot with the Magyars. In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that he was naturally interested in the development of their country, and he asked them to apply directly to him if they ever · had any particular or economic Hewel." (7) problems. After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak factors did not have any contacts with representatives of the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to Goering, according to the official record, but also according to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts with Germany directly. �SI.;OVAKIA 47 The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic monument and that all Slovak history books would have to be burned if the castle were lost." Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia should remain united with Prague. According to the record, "the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany, therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which threatened it in 1938. · How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation was described as follows: "According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. "Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. "Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9). References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40; 4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or 42 SLOVAKIA Poland, and, on the other hand, of the valiant struggle ef Slovak politicians, especially of Dr. Joseph Tiso, Karol Sidor, Dr. Ferdinand Durcansky and Dr. Vojtech Tuka, who fought for every inch of Slovak territory and !Slovak freedom. Four solutions of the Slovak question are dealt with in diplomatic documents of 1938; these were publish_ed by the British and American governments under the title "Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945" (Vol. IV, Series D). The solutions considered were: 1. Independence of Slovakia; 2. autonomy of Slovakia within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak _RElpublic; 3. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Hungary; and, 4. autonomous Slovakia orientated to Poland (2). Magyar diplomacy did everything possible to gain Slovakia for itself. And s1nce, after Munich, Germany practically had a "free hand" in Central Europe, !Magyar demands were addressed to Berlin, either directly or through Rome. German diplomacy and the German General Staff, however, did not favor either the Magyar or the Polish solution. Iri 1938, Germany persistently and consistently held the position that Slovakia should remain within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; Germany even in the least did not want an independent· .Slovakia. This is proved clearly and authoritatively by many documents, of which the most important are: a) The Memorandum bf ;the General Staff of the Wehrmacht of October 6, 1938, wherein we find this statenrent: "Consequently, it is in our military interest that Slovakia should not be separated from the Czecho-Slovak union, but should remain with Czecho-Slovakia under strong German influence" (3). b) The Memorandum for the Flihrer of October 7, 1938, prepared by the German Foreign Ministry, which tells about the changes that took place in Czecho-Slovakia after the Zilina Agreement, according to which the Czecho-'Slovak Republic took on a federative form. The !Memorandum stresses that this solution "even presents certain advantages compared with an independent Slovakia." It then continues that "from the point of view of (German) foreign policy, the SLOVAKIA 43 solution of Slovakia united with Czechia is the easiest of achievement" ( 4). c) The note of Erich Kordt, an official of the Foreign Ministry, of October 8, 1938, which says that "with regard to :Slovakia, the Ftihrer thinks it opportune to support the Sillein resolutions (autonomy and orientation toward Prague)" (5). This struggle over the fate of Slovakia took place, of course, without the knowledge and participation of :Slovak political factors, 'behind the scenes of European diplomacy. It happened just as Andrew Hlinka would have expressed it: "De nobis sine nobis." We mention these facts so that the development that took place in Slovakia later might better be understood - that the Slovaks worked to attain independence already at the time that Germany, from Hitler through the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, wished to see Slovakia united with Prague. In this period we meet with the names of the Slovak representatives during the fight for the integrity of Slovakia, in the defense of Slovak territories in the south and north. And it may be interesting to note that the first official meeting of the Slovaks with German representatives was arranged by Minister Chvalkovsky of the Prague regime. In the negotiations about the fate of Bratislava, Nitra and Kosice, which the Magyars made a claim to with the aid of Italy, the Czech factors were so yielding that the Slovak autonomous government considered it its bounden puty not to rely on Prague, but to seek out every possible means to prevent those Slovak cities from falling into the hands of the Magyars. At , that time the Slovaks harbored no illusions about the fact that Germany really had a free hand in Europe and was determined to use it forcefully. Willy-nilly they had to accept the fact that only Berlin could possibly prevent the grab of Slovak territory and, in fact, a total invasion of Slovakia by the Magyars. Thus it was that on October 19, 1938, the first meeting of :Slovak political leaders took place with the Germans: Msgr. Dr. Joseph Tiso, president of the autonomous government of Slovakia, and Dr. F~rdinand :Durcansky, Minister of Justice, met with the · Foreign Minister of the Third Reich, Dr. Ribbentrop (6). ' 1 44 SLOVAKIA According to the record of ·this meeting, Dr. Tiso told Ribbentrop that the Slovaks were a peace-loving nation and wanted to live independently. "The !Slovaks had followed," said Dr. Tiso, "the principle of nationality since 1918, when Hlinka went to Versailles, although this had been unsuccessful. !Slovakia was ethnologically, as well as in her language and literature, an independent territory. On June 5 the draft law had been introduced providing for autonomy for Slovakia under Prague, in which she had only foreign affairs, the army and finance in common with Czechia. On October 6 all Slovaks 1had united at Sillein and had taken power into their own hands." After this introduction, Dr. Tiso went on to the question of Komarno and Kosice and the efforts of the Magyars to use the statistics of 1910 to determine what cities of southern Slovakia should fall to the Magyars. Dr. Tiso stated that the Slovaks can prove that the statistics of 1910 were incorrect, nay, even falsified, to enhance the Magyar claims ; furthermore, if the Magyar demands were accepted, 300,000 more Slovaks would ·b e forced under Hungary- this in addition to the 300,000 already living there. Dr. Tiso and Dr. 1'.>urcansky, therefore, asked the German Reich to support their claims in the interest of the Slovak nation, but especially for economic and co mmunicationa:l reasons. Ribbentrop answered Dr. Tiso diplomatically. He said that "Germany had great understanding for the Slovak problems and felt the warmest sympathy for the Slovak people. Our attitude toward the Slovak problems was very simple: we would welcome the greatest possible measure of independence, which in the end was the prerequisite for peace in this part of Europe." But Ribbentrop immediately added: "If Slovakia placed great value on national necessities, she must also respect the national aspirations of the Hungarians." It was only after Dr. Tiso presented further arguments that Ribbentrop promised to instruct the German ambassador in Budapest, Erdmansdorf, to tell the Magyars that "they should renounce their claims to Pressburg, Nitra, Kaschau, Munkatsch and Ungvar, as these towns were vital SLOVAKIA 45 for Slovakia. He further expressed the hope that the negotiations would ibe resumed in one or two days." That same day, October 19, 1938, Ribbentrop again re-ceived the Slovak representatives. He himself called them for an unofficial 'Visit, during which conversation took place not only about the southern territory of Slovakia, but involved the whole Slovak problem as well. The record of this meeting is so important for the understanding of ensuing -events in Slovakia, that we feel it should he quoted in its -entirety. Published as Document No. 73, the record is dated in Munich, October 19, 1938, and its text is as follows: "MEMORANDUM BY AN OFFlICIAL OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S .PERSONAL STAFF Munich, October 19, 1938 At about 7 P. M. the Reich Foreign Minister again received at his hotel Tiso, the Slovak Prime Minister, and ,M inister Durcansky. He told these gentlemen that he had invited them quite unofficially and privately in order to ask them what they thought of their relations with Prague. Whereas Tiso elaborated at length his aim of an autonomous Slovakia collaborating with an autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine under Prague, :Durcansky seemed to be striving rather for the complete independence of Slovakia, perhaps in union with Carpatho-Ukraine. Tiso thought that he would have to steer developments slowly and methodically. At Sillein he had not wished to make any sudden move. If Prague did not adhere to the agreements which had been made regarding complete autonomy, with the exception of a common foreign policy and common army and common State finances, complete separation would soon follow. As a matter of fact, the administrative side of finance had already been taken over, so that joint control remained only in the State finances. In the army, too, agreement had been reached in theory to form purely Slovak regiments, but this had not yet been put into practice. 46 SLOVAKIA In reply to a question by the Foreign Minister, Tiso said that Slovakia could maintain her independence and economy as long as she was helped militarily ·b y guarantees from the Great Powers. It was, of course, impossible for her to form a modern army for the defense of her frontiers. There were three possible orientations in the event of Slovakia's becoming independent. The first was orientation toward Czechia, which in the end was probably nearest to the Slovaks' hearts, as ·Prague had been politically weakened and as Slovakia, because of her large raw material resources, was also economically the equal of the Czech 'State. The second possibility was orientation toward Hungary, for which the Hungarians were making great efforts; and the third was orienta.t ion toward Poland. He could not foresee which of these tendencies was strongest in the Slovak people at present. If the Hungarians persisted in their stiff demands, he did not think that there would be much sympathy left among the Slovak people for throwing in their lot with the Magyars. In conclusion, the Minister told his visitors that he was naturally interested in the development of their country, and he asked them to apply directly to him if they ever · had any particular or economic Hewel." (7) problems. After this visit, excepting the visit of Dr. Ferdinand :Durcansky in the middle of November 1938, official Slovak factors did not have any contacts with representatives of the German Reich, neither according to documents, nor reality, until March 13, 1939. The visit of Dr. :Durcansky to Goering, according to the official record, but also according to the knowledge of the writer of these lines who accompanied Dr. :Durcansky to Berlin, was forced by two circumstances: 1. the Germans demanded the annexation of Devin to the German Reich, and, 2. the Czechs were endeavoring to prove that Slovak autonomy could not be upheld economically and so forced the Slovaks to. seek economic contacts with Germany directly. SI.;OVAKIA 47 The talk with Goering was mainly about Devin; in this matter we were effectively aided by Ing. Karmasin, the representative of the Reich in Slovakia, who emphasized the point that "the castle of Theben on the rock at the confluence of the ,Morava and Danube was Slovakia's sole historic monument and that all Slovak history books would have to be burned if the castle were lost." Goering, however, also felt that politically Slovakia should remain united with Prague. According to the record, "the Field Marshall explained that at the moment the Slovak and the Ukrainian questions could ,b e dealt with only within the framework of the Czecho.,Slovak State" (8). Germany, therefore, did not allow the annexation of Slovakia to Hungary, nor an autonomous Slovakia orientated toward Poland and thus ena:bled !S lovakia tb escape the catastrophe which threatened it in 1938. · How did Prague appraise the situation in Slovakia? In the fall of 1938, according to the diplomatic report of the German Charge d'Affaires in Prague, Hencke, the situation was described as follows: "According to reports here" - says Mr. Hencke's telegram - · "independence movement in Slovakia is gaining ground steadily. Far-reaching autonomy is now demanded by political circles in Slovakia formerly loyal to Prague. A tendency is evident toward declaration of complete independence. "Hungarian Minister here stated that Budapest would regard voluntary union of :Slovakia, including CarpathoUkraine, with Hungary as the most practical solution of the Slovak question. "Polish Legation in Prague is more inclined to the idea of an independent Slovak State which would leave open the possibility of protectorate under Poland or Hungary" (9). References: 1. Ernest Denis, LES .SLOVAQUJDS, Ltbrairie Delagrave, Paris, 1917; 2. Memorandum for the Fiihrer, p. 46; 3. 1See p. 40; 4. .See ,p. 47; 5. .See p. 49; 6. Memorandum ,b y an of:ficial of the Foreign Minister's Personal Stailf, pp. 8·6-92; 7. See pp, 92-93; 8. Note 'by the Director of the Political Department, p. 142; 9. Telegram of Charge d'Affaires Hencke, p. 32.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and International Interests in 1938 Description An account of the resource Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 41-47 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/48db9010a51e0e44c7a014041b30abb2.pdf 66222c37f0096df9ae1815c9fccf02c0 PDF Text Text 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does �32 SLOVAKIA when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great camps. [ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions. That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples. Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll world. The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups, and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live neighbor to that new state for 17 years. I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In 1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My husband had /been over there but a short time when the �SLOVAKIA 33 Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA. He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance. We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with Em-ope. One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin, whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong. I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery. I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked. From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever. Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity? Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1 �34 SLOVAKIA mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik population has not 'been too seriously affected. But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers, rather than for informative purposes, on the history and problems orf the Slova;ks. Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them. We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today against the tools orf Moscow? I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 35 never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr. Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun. friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no chan'Ce to recommend it. Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame. How many Americans know the story of the prirvate schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn, and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee: and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms? Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee? Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia. m. �36 SLOVAKIA BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their bid for freedom. But there is another higihly important factor that, while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries. And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate included eiconomic resources. Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the West does not talke fu,am theiir good will. The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either side. Little countries lying between them rwould always tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm. them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation. lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs, straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them. �SLOVAKIA 37 There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted by each as the foundation upon which the new state would 1 rest. I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects. But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh Agreement it got all too little notice. 'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals, a state compairaJble in admirustratirve f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end. It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were 07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union. How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American �SLOVAKIA 38 praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit. They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which the state had been estaJblished. They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure; that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions, and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~. All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be. But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT know. 1 Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule, saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was �SLOVAKIA 39 as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion of themselives? Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death ifilter;vened. But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern. We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia? The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends upon them. SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no question. But then what? · · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion. One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders. · Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat �40 SLOVAKIA that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic, and the Black seas. There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on, a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs, that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction. There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation. Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until after liberation to get r eady. I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them. They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few. From what country do we get news of more effective guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than one . I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central �SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or � 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does �32 SLOVAKIA when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great camps. [ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions. That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples. Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll world. The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups, and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live neighbor to that new state for 17 years. I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In 1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My husband had /been over there but a short time when the �SLOVAKIA 33 Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA. He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance. We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with Em-ope. One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin, whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong. I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery. I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked. From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever. Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity? Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1 �34 SLOVAKIA mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik population has not 'been too seriously affected. But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers, rather than for informative purposes, on the history and problems orf the Slova;ks. Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them. We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today against the tools orf Moscow? I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks �SLOVAKIA 35 never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr. Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun. friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no chan'Ce to recommend it. Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame. How many Americans know the story of the prirvate schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn, and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee: and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms? Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee? Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia. m. �36 SLOVAKIA BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their bid for freedom. But there is another higihly important factor that, while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries. And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate included eiconomic resources. Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the West does not talke fu,am theiir good will. The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either side. Little countries lying between them rwould always tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm. them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation. lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs, straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them. �SLOVAKIA 37 There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted by each as the foundation upon which the new state would 1 rest. I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects. But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh Agreement it got all too little notice. 'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals, a state compairaJble in admirustratirve f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end. It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were 07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union. How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American �SLOVAKIA 38 praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit. They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which the state had been estaJblished. They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure; that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions, and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~. All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be. But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT know. 1 Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule, saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was �SLOVAKIA 39 as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion of themselives? Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death ifilter;vened. But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern. We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia? The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends upon them. SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no question. But then what? · · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion. One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders. · Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat �40 SLOVAKIA that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic, and the Black seas. There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on, a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs, that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction. There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation. Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until after liberation to get r eady. I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them. They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few. From what country do we get news of more effective guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than one . I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central �SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does 32 SLOVAKIA when the world is 1ooin,g fo11dbly divided into two great camps. [ think ,ba.dk to the time when my own enlightenm ent on Eastern Europe lbegan. Of course even -as a schoolgirl I had a ,g eneral idea orf the location of Central and Eastern European ;p eoples, which naJturailly i.nc1'uded the .Slaivirc m11tions. That kr.nowledge was lburt slightly improved during my university -and ipost~wn:iversity years. Mter a:11 my <:hief impressions <:onitinued to lbe the inOOIIl/Prehensilble and unpronowncalb1e JwngUJa;ges and the extraordin ary ibeautilful peasant costumes. The faJct w~ that there was simply no ,r eason why I shouild lbe ipairtiicularly interested in those ,peoples. Then <!ame the First Wo rld War, and American readers quidkly became ea;ger students ,o f geog,r ~hy. We were soon on rvery lfarrniliar te11II1s with the iprinted names olf a lot of cities and towns aJUd loca;lities that left us icOIIlllP,letely dumb when we tried to rp:rionounice them, until we mastered the phonetic helip girven us in 'bhe daily paipers as the war progressed. But the sum of it aM wa:s that we ,b ecame vitally interested in what was hruppening in this hitherto uniknoWlll world. The vigorously conducted movement that resulted in the creation ,o f the new state of 0.zeoho,Slova!kia made us aware of the vitwty ,olf those two ,peoples. Thomas Masaryk 'beoome a name and a symbol •a round which ~tered an immense American enthusiasm . But all this was something in whd:ch I !persona:Hy had no part, and so I r~ll little else of that movement e:,oceipt the enthusiasm of icerlain groups, and the ·g reat pulblicity girven the or eation oif what ,w as ha.Ned as a new democracy. Little did I dream that l was to live neighbor to that new state for 17 years. I am more fortunate than most Ameri(!alls when it comes to getting a chance to iknoiw Europe of our time. In 1922 my husband, an eJOpert in 1persorunel training, was loaned by the Alrnerican YiMCA to helip the neiwliy organized YMCA's in Ozecho-Slova.k-ia and Poland get themsclves established . (I :s houid ~lain here that Ann Su Cardwell is my pen name. iMy rea!l name is Mrs. Paw Suiper.) My husband had /been over there but a short time when the SLOVAKIA 33 Pales asked him to lbecome na,tioll!al director of their YMCA. He oocepted on wndition that I would -agree. I did, for a temn of two · yeara. I ha'Ve ,aJreadiy said we stayed seventeen, lea.ving at midnight of the day the Red Aranry crossed the Polish4Soiviet firontier, Septemlber 17, 1939. We were in Rumania, Hwnga,i,y, l3Jil.d France anotiher nine months before returning to Arrnerioa after the fa:U of fiance. We had lost a:11 we had 'in our Warsaw rupartment, and that was oonsideraJble. Yet we did not count the loos. We had never boon narrow in our outlook, for we had been privileged to iknow .A!meric"a ;fir.om coast to coast and had lived ten years in Honolulu. 'Burt IDurape ,was somethin,g else. It was the ;place Of Arrneri~n origins; and conscious of our ignorance we began di•ligentliy to acquaint 01.l!rselves with Em-ope. One of the !first coiuntri.es I wa:s to vis.it was OzechoSlovaJkia, as everyfbodry then said, but ,which I now refer to simply as IS'loivaikia. There was a conference in T,rencin, whieh mry hu.sband had to attend. My son and I went ,a iong. I irecaM the very attraotirve place where we stayed, the pleasant pe<>iple, the ,g ood food, the lorvely country, the lbeautid:ul things in the ,g ift shops, eSipeciaB.y the briUiant embroidery. I think eJVery woman at the colliference bought at least one blouse "to send 'home." A better introduction to a country than that ivisit afforded could 'hardly ibe asked. From Tren:cin we took the :train to Vienna, and that jowney aicross the southwest corner of iSlowrukia is memoraJble not only for its scenery but the, castle ruins. The names of the castles haive, of course, escaped me, though I was duly instnrcted as or be:fo:re we passed them, but the beaiuty of that scenery shall remain with me forever. Now after the introduction what d!id I learn aJbout Slovakia? ·F or one thing, that it is laiiger than severall well a,nd honoralbly lkm,own European states. Swi,merl,and, Belgi'llllll, Denmark, for insta.:nce. .Arul -w ho would ,propose that these ,n ations ,s houM 4ose their independence and identity? Slova,kia is not th'inl'Y :populated, either. · One cannot say precisely what the tpopulation figures are now, uncertain as we are of the extent o:f 'Moscow's deportation and exter1 34 SLOVAKIA mination aictiivities, ,plus the importation of elements from the Soviet Union. !But we can still ,be sU1re that the Slovaik population has not 'been too seriously affected. But why was it that we on this side of the Atlantic knew so Jittle aJbout 1Slava1kia during the years preceeding World War I? That is easHy anS1Wered. It 'had been so completely incOI1J)OTated ·i nto Hungary that it did not maJke the i.!Illlpression l.J!POn us as it would have, had it beein a separate sbate. How much space did American histories giive Slovakia? A •parngraiph? But Switzerland - every American schoo~boy and schoolgiTl :knew something of that country's history, ,c,ouild call U!p clear images of pictured mountains and chalets, knew that for watches and clooks no ipeople •c ould compete with t!he. ·Swiss. Perhaips pu:bhcation'S ltke the _National Geograiphic Magruzine carried illrustrated articles on Slovakia, as it did ,and does on little known parts of the world as well. as on the known. But if so, they were for the entertainment of the curious and of arm-chair trruvellers, rather than for informative purposes, on the history and problems orf the Slova;ks. Unless Americans •c ame in ·contact with Slovaks who had emigrated lfnom their unfortunate homelaind to free Ameriica, they never heard olf how the Slova!ks had fought through the ,c enturies to 1pre·se11ve their freedoon or throw off the oppresso•r 's yolke when it had been laiid ,u pon them. We know noching otf the fier,ce Slovruk resistance to swarming Tatar hordes that came up over the "Blaelk Trail" to loot a,nd burn in Burope and ,retire with ca,p tives to be sold in the slawe mankets of tthe East. We knew little or nothing of Slovaik battles •w'ith invading Turks; nothing of the never...ceasing effort to hold their own against German domination amd ·aSiSimilation; and ivery little of the hopeless struggle to prevent .b eing swallowed up by Hungary. And how much more, may I aSik, do Ameri·cans !know of the underigrounrl struggJe itlhat is going on in SlovaJkia today against the tools orf Moscow? I know how difficult it is to. get tmstworthy news out of the lands behind the Iron Curtain, and then how difficult it is to get the press here to take it. But I hope the Slovaks SLOVAKIA 35 never allow di,s coora:gement to get hold ol[ them. And as for Slo:va!k history, they now hruve an excellent vol,urrne in Mr. Yurehaik's "'.Dhe SlowaJks," to iput before their Americrun. friends and those who should be, their friends. I lose no chan'Ce to recommend it. Norw the magnificent thing about Slo1Vak history is that it is the story of a 1peo1p le that despite oppression, which in all. too many instances reduced the 1Sloivaks to what was little better than an runimal existence,, never lost the consciousness of tJheir nationality and the rights that nationality gave them. The Slovruk spirit !burned with a /bright unwruvering flame. How many Americans know the story of the prirvate schools that were estalblished when the SlovaJk language was not pernn1tted in the state schools? How boo1ks were written and printed, how collection;s of things ipreserving the Slo:vruk tradition, culture, and history were made; how the vairious dfa.iJ.ects were unified to become one recognized languruge? How denationaHzat ion was fought at every turn, and that the num!ber of Slovaks who ,su:ocumbed to magyarfaation for eoonomi1c or sociail reasons was very small compared with the numlber that stubbo,r nly paid the price for remaining 1Slovalks, keeping the SlovaJk farm of thei,r namee: and folllowing Slova:k c;ustoms? Resistantce to denationaliza tion woultl not a1wa,ys remain pass,iive. There were times when protest after protest was made, ruppead after ruppeal. But even when noble Hungarians valiantly espoused the Slovak Slide and sometimes won what seemed a victory, nothing ever came of it. The Slovaks were either scorned or ignored. Then sometimes conditions lbecaime intoleraJble and Slovruk leaders called for fo11ce. But what could ri-sin,gs of the oppressed do against ove:rwheJJining fo,r ee? Oppression of a people for century after century naturally leaids individuals among that people to despairing resignation. They for.get that if the blood of the martyrs is the seed Olf the churich, it is no less true that the blood of the ,p atriots is the seed of the free nation. That is as true America as it is of any other land. Lt is true of tSlovaJkia. m. 36 SLOVAKIA BecaUJSe of the martyrs and the. patriots, there never ceased to ,be a SlovaJlda ipopulated iby Slovaks. And so it came rubout as a wholly logical sequence that when World War I showed the fatal wealkness of the Austro-SiULtllg.arian ffimpire, the minorities within it, among them the SlovaJks, made their bid for freedom. But there is another higihly important factor that, while it has !been in existence for some time, now comes into the limelight. That is the Slovalk element in Ameriica. 1 mentioned earlier the .fact that Slov:alks had either to accept denationalization or leaive their homeland if they hoped fo,r advancement in. any field. There could be but one result in such a situation, namely, the potential leadership of a Slovakian movement for lilberation -was largely drained out of the country and aibso:lfued into the 'Citizenship of other countries. And leadershifp is a temi. that in this instance: alt any rate included eiconomic resources. Where and how that leadership airose I need not recite to the Slovalks who were O!f that ndble comp81Ily. Friends in Western Europe swelled the ranks. We should not forget that during all those years of oppressi,o n there had been a few voirces raised in an eiifort oo let the ,w orld know, in the hope thalt pressure oould be. brought to bear upon a professedly Om-istian. E)rrupiire to right the wrongs. That these revealers o(f the truth oo.e after another failed to stir the West does not talke fu,am theiir good will. The Slo:va/k,s were wise enough to underatand that it wais useless for a smrull Centrrul European oou,nt,r,y to attempt to maintain its independence. There was and it seemed there would always ibe a powerif1U[ amlbitious st.ate on either side. Little countries lying between them rwould always tempt them. Nothing except force sufficient . to irestmm. them would deter them from cooking Ulp one excuse oir ainother for moiving in and taikill!g ,p ossession. 'Dhe only way to get that ne:cessrury force was tJhroug,h union of smaller nations in some sort of federation. lt was but natural, therefore that when the Czechs, straining every effort through Czech leaders in America to gain Owch independence, proposed the Sl()IVaJks join them. SLOVAKIA 37 There was agreement. A new creation, Ozecho~lovakia, a demooraoy with a;utonomy for eruch partner in the union was to be hera[ded to the world. 'l'he SlorvaJks were ,particular to require sipedfic ,provisions for Slo,vakiia's pos,ition in that union, as is penfootly clear through Ozech acceptance of the iPittsbtu,gh Aig,rooment. ,I n that the db.ligations assumed by eacll party are doowmented, as aire the prinicip'les accepted by each as the foundation upon which the new state would 1 rest. I well ,remem1ber the hig'h enthusiasm wiitll which Americans welcomed the birth of the new state. Oze.cho-Slovrulcia and demooracy see:m.ed toi be words interchangealble in meaning. Thomas Masa,'rylk was spoiken orf as one of the greatest statesmen orf the age, a "Grand Old Mam.," ea.reh of these three words oogi:rming with a caipital letter. Masary!k was a great main in those days and, I was told, that he was a SlO!Vak ,b y birth; but education lhaid -made him Czech in outlook, and that was to be most unfortunate in its eJffects. But at the time, Masaryk's star outshone a11 others in the Ozech0-1SlO!V'aJk slcy, and ilf •w e heard of the Pittsburgh Agreement it got all too little notice. 'r.he rest iis ;painful to recall. Instead orf a Ozecho..Slorvakia where Ozoohs an:d Slovaks, were "equals with equals, a state compairaJble in admirustratirve f.ree with free" oi,gain.izations to the Swiss cantons - the Ozech leaders utterlry disregarded the solemn compact with their Slovak brothers, inrvented reasons for disarvowing it, and emlbarked at the outset on a centralization !I)Ol'icy that put all authority in .Prague. And desipite vociferous and continual protests it ,was a ipolicy followed through to the end. It was a iba4d assumption of Czech suiperi-0rity. Yet we must 1be just and remember that not all Czechs approrved that poliey. There haid been Ozechs supporting, and very valiantly, the Slovruk side of the debate whille the Pittsburgh Algireement iwas under discussion. So alS-O there ,were 07.eehs who did not rupprove the Masaryfic&nes repudiation of that aigreement. But they could not inlfilruence the men launched on the ,r oad toward a Ozooh--controMed union. How easy it is for men to fall viictim to ,t he lust for power! Their judgment warped lby excessive American SLOVAKIA 38 praise, Benes and his adherents believed that only the Ozechs had the vision and the competence to administer and guide the state fOT whose creation they toolk the credit. They flouted the ivery prindples of democracy on which the state had been estaJblished. They lbecaJme dbsessed with the idea of develo.ping a Ozecho-Sl01Vrukia in which there would ibe no hyphen ~d no crupital S, in which the Ozech would lbe dominant, and whose peqple ,woUJl.d lbe known as "CzeichosJava!ks." They were too blind to see that surc!h a project was foredoomed to faiJure; that a people who if or a thOIU'sand years had endured sub9ection and yet preserived their disitinrctirve cuiltuire, traditions, and toogue was not materirul ,f or amalgamation. But truth and justice were refused a heairing. By devious a:rigume:i:its those in the seats of ipower ,p rofessed to justify their couir~. All these years, even after his crupituil.ation ,t o the Germans, Benes was the ideal democrat in the eyes of many Americans. He waJS :referred to as "the aJblest diiplomat in Europe - the top EurOlpean statesman." The legend of his democra oy has clun,g to .h'im despite the record. But IDdwa11d Benes was not the 1p aragon he was held to 1be. He was not a great .statesman but a clever politician, with the cleverness too often in question. We in PoJ.and knew only too well that Czecho~Sloivakia was not the embodiment of democracy Americans naively swpposed it to be, amd iknew that Benes was not the democrat they ibelieved him to .be. But nothing we oouild say lhad .a ny effect. We were a,ccmsed of indulging in malice and jealousy betcause, as they in -their swperior intelligence asserted, we Hived in Poland, a co'Uiltry ruled by a dictator! Which showed how much they did NOT know. 1 Few .Americrun.s had ,been in either country; if they had, it was for a brief stay only. They made stopover !Visits in Praigiue and Warsruw fo,r a daiy or so while enroute to that most delig,hbfiul ( !) olf all taurist lands, the SoiViet Union f.rom w'hich honest ones came out somewhat less, lyrical than when they went in. In iPra·g ue they met Oze:chs, as a rule, saw the really siplendid Czech industries and arts, but saw and heard little of SlovaJks and Slcxvalkia. If they did it was SLOVAKIA 39 as. '.'Cz~chosloivakia." The Ozechs, in American Olpinion, were E1qTope's ,p rize exh'ilbit. ls .it any wonder they got satisd'action out of the role O!I' that it infiluenced their own opinion of themselives? Wehl, "God doesn't rpay erv~ day, but He pays," a famous French woman is credited with hav:mg ,w ritten. And Benes and those with him who . framed and ex~ruted thek mistaiken policres have made the final accounting. Surrely no one can envy rthem their fasit years, when in oiverweening confiidenice in their own aibility they wallked inrt o the Soiviet traip, were deiprived of al!l ,p ower, and lingered on runtil death ifilter;vened. But the past is ,p ast. We cannot change its pattern. We review it oruy to 1earn its les,s on, that the same mistaik es may n01t lbe made again. For t!hinlking people it is farll oif guide posts to that fuitme which while we talk betomes the present. What of that future for Sloivrukia? The .~lovaJks are aH w~l a;ware of how mtroh it deipends upon them. SloivaJkia must olf course ibe free. Of that there is no question. But then what? · · You will ,prolbaJbly rugree that the position tiruken at the time the Slov,aiks thre,w in their lot with the Cze.chs was soU!Ild. Oze:chs and Slovaks are, ib1ood kin. They are neighbors, .destined to be neighlbors with nonmaJl commercial and other relations, unless another iron curtain des:coo.ds. There is good reason to hope that after these years otf serivitude to :Moscow the Czechs wil!l .better understand international and ibrotherly relationsh1ps and the spirit of cooperntion. One thing will he~p - t'hey haive not the ;remarkrub~e reputation in America that they onice had. They are less akin to the angcls and deiddedlly more mortal. A real Sio:vak state and a real Ozech state - eaJOh indiividual and independent - should ~ppear after the StaUn'ists are induced to. •r eturn to their own bor,ders. · Yet formation of these separate inmvidurul states is oruy a beginning. Thmwghout the ruges there has been a Gffl'ma,n .push to the east and a Russian to the west. In that is the care oif the prdblem the world stiN faces. It is the threat 40 SLOVAKIA that haiS ai1Jways hung lake the sword of Demooles a!bove the heads oif the peoples ibetween t!he Bail.tic, the Adriatic, and the Black seas. There is a solution to that prOlblem, but one which our Administration in Waslhington for some reason refuses to re!Cogni:ze. That is a regionrul federation in Centrrul and Eastern IDuirqpe. Iif the roughly 11'5,000,000 (POOI>le in that area were in a f~eration that gaJVe them a customs unii.on, a common currency, .s tandardized a'rnlled forces under some kind of a joint comma,nld, a common foreign policy, and whatever e:l:se in icammon or in cooperation they agreed upon while retaining cooniplete control of their initernrul aliai:rs, that federation would fu:rnn so ipowenfiul an dbsta.cile to aggression that no power would dare eJq)and in its direction. There is not spruce here to disouss the enomnous and varied adJvantages that wouil.d come to each of the countries entering into suoh a federation. Moscow has forcilb1y produced a regional union, but what a travesty it is! It is ,t o be hoped that when tJhe day of U'beration comes, the exiles from t)lese Jands WOI1king togetller ,w ith .Americans whose all!cestors came from those lands will ha;ve plains fur swch a regiomcl federation thoroughly discussed and prepared. Lt wou!ld be fol!ly to wait until after liberation to get r eady. I lknow how faithlfully and persistently the Slovaks hwve been fighting all these• re!Cent years that .Americans might iknow the trult'h rubout !Slovalkia. 1It is caJUSe for rejoici.n!g that t:Jhe representa:tiives oif the peoples behind the ITop Curtain are uniting in a common effort to fight communism. The Sllovaiks hruve good grounds for holding up their heads in this fight, for .they hruve Sloivalkia with them. They are not a front behind which stands a paltry few. From what country do we get news of more effective guerilla resastantce, o:r of a greater resistance on the part of the people to soviet~ati.Qn? The Sl01Vak:.s are making t hemselves a force to be redkoned with in mor e ways than one . I close on a note of ,confidence in the future. The struggle for the liberation and ,r ~tablishment of a free Central SLOVAKIA 41 and East :mu.rope wi'hl .r equire all the wisdom, courage, and persist.eillCe we can commaind. Lt will mean further suffering and blood saic:riifice on the part of the peoples of that area, possilbly on OUT own part. But in the end right wm t.:r,iumiph over might. The signs ,t hat the tide is at last b,eginnin.g to turn in Riight's fawor a.re ruppearing on the horizon, and we will :liive to see the task to whlch we haive set ourselves accomplished. ,SlolV'alkia, too, shall lbe free! • • • SLOVA.KIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 Joseph Kirschbaum From the very beginning of Czecho-Slovakia, for twenty entire years, Czech policy and diplomacy succeeded in presenting the Slovak question as an internal problem, about which the outside world could say nothing without disturbing the sovereignty of the Czecho..Slovak State. Even professor Ernest Denis of the Sorbonne in Paris, who was quite partial to the Czech nation, wrote as early as 1917 that "the Slovak question is of European importance" (1), but for Czech politicians it was only an insignificant administrative problem. They refused to admit the existence of any Slovak problem. Thus it happened that Slovakia and Slovak politicians were not mentioned in international official documents until the fall of 1938. The storm, which broke loose over CzechoSlovakia, tore the cloak of Czech propaganda to shreds, and Slovakia, together with other problems of the Czecho-Slovak State, came to the forefront of European interests. This happened primarily through the neighbors of Czecho-Slovakia, each of whom wished to solve the Slovak question according to their own interests. Since these were not always in accord with the interests of the Slovaks, the representatives of the Slovak nation undertook everything possible to save Slovakia from the catastrophe into which the Czecho..Slovak Republic was led lby the policy of Prague. And so, almost simultaneously, we find documents which tell us, on the one hand, of the efforts to annex Slovakia to Hungary or  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia's Right to Be Heard Description An account of the resource Ann Su Cardwell Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 31-41 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cardwell, Ann Su Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/ae5428178125aeb910bcd7dd99c6ef17.pdf fa604aa054ec872cd30311720bd3078d PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 27 THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION? Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con.. sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr. Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does express the tendency of a great part of it. In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy statement: "During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic world. That idea is the idea Oif federation." And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber 1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together. Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished �28 SLOVAKIA in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years 1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism. "These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony." Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-. Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of the f ederatilve idea." Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -· am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce. Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation. The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from the views m other central European nations and deviates especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation. In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the ~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years. None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to 1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands." 'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 29 date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of the federation. That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national, cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt. Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~, federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial development." A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation," then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~ vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges. A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs - is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds itself in today? �30 SLOVAKIA But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce, when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans and have emphatically stated and proved time and again that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14, 'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to? In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding, I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947). Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central .European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that 1 �31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does � SLOVAKIA 27 THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION? Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con.. sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr. Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does express the tendency of a great part of it. In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy statement: "During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic world. That idea is the idea Oif federation." And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber 1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together. Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished �28 SLOVAKIA in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years 1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism. "These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony." Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-. Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of the f ederatilve idea." Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -· am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce. Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation. The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from the views m other central European nations and deviates especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation. In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the ~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years. None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to 1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands." 'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent 1 1 �SLOVAKIA 29 date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of the federation. That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national, cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt. Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~, federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial development." A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation," then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~ vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges. A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs - is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds itself in today? �30 SLOVAKIA But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce, when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans and have emphatically stated and proved time and again that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14, 'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to? In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding, I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947). Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central .European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that 1 �31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 27 THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION? Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Ozec):l. emigrants publish a neiwsipa,per in Paris. It is called "The Free Tomorrow" (Svobodny zitfek) and is con.. sidered the mouthpiece of Dr. HUibert Riipka, a weiI.Umown newspaper man, who after 194'5 became one Oif Dr. Benes's ministers. In the sll!mmer olf 1949, this neWSlpaiper published am article of Dr. Riipka's that deserives some attention. It g1ves us am. ide,a of what Dr. Riipl{a's ipro,g ram is. And Dr. Ripka is considered a leading Czech emigrant; he is one of those who initiated the so-called "third revolution" on the Continent - in Paris. We recaU that the other two revolutions for Ozecho.-SlOIVakia originated there also,. This gives his article weight, am.d even though 1t may not be tlle credo of the whole of the Czech emig,raition, in sub.stance it does express the tendency of a great part of it. In that article Dr. Riipka made the following noteworthy statement: "During the last war our pro.g ram was: a free CzechoSlovakia in a free Europe. IDven though this motto loses none of its significance today, it is hardly swffic,ient for us by itself. It is necessary to complement it with an idea which would gain for our cause the sympathies of the democratic world. That idea is the idea Oif federation." And Ripka continues: "Masaryk was well aiware that the disintegration of AustriaJlfongary into nationa!l 'states is not, should not be and cannot be the final airrangement of tihe complex conditions in central Euroipe. 'Dhat is why, in his very :f:i-rst messruge to the liberated naJtion in Decemlber 1918, he encouraged it to seek ways to haive the smaller nations of central IDurope become friends and work together. Masaryk recalled the pOilitical program exipressed by Palacky, m w licek, and Saifarik in 1848: a free federation of free and legally equal nations of the Danube basin. AustriaHungary perished because it did not know how to transform itself into such a free federation. But the naitional sovereignties of the individual central European states, estalblished 28 SLOVAKIA in 1918, also collapsed. In 1938-1941 they strocumbed to German imiperialism and, after Hitler's defeat, in the years 1945.J.948 to Soviet iin!Perialism. "These nations cain preserve theiT freedom only iif tJhey UJllite in a free federation which wouJld. be strong enough, in cooperation with a federation of western ElN"ope, to oppose any Gevman da'Illger or Riussian hegemony." Those rure solber words even irf they probalbly are not ba:sed on conJVilction - as judged hy the remark of. Dr-. Ripka's albout the necessity "of gaining the sympaJthies of the demoorat:i.,c world for the Ozeoh cause with the aid of the f ederatilve idea." Crech enrig.vation, in whose naJllle Dr. llipk,a speaks, has thu:s come close to the conceptions that Slovaks hawe promoted and booked from the beginning of World War II -· am intensively especially sinlce its concliusion, if we can really say that it has ended. True, with a fundamental differen,ce. Dr. Ripka taliks a:bout Czecho~Slova!kia, whereas SlovaJks - the vast majority of whom are nationaJ:ly contJal,k albout Slovatkfa scious alnd think as Euro,peams as a legrefily equal central European unit or part of the proposed Erurqpean federation. The return of Coochs to the central European conception wi1Jh the hope m preser.ving C.zecho-SlO!V'aki•a , b.Olwever is not on:1y in oomliict wi,th our views, but differs also from the views m other central European nations and deviates especially from the histork conceiption of a central European federation. In no plan to reooganize central Europe on a federnlistic basis did we meet with a Czech~Slova!k unit until the ~~ond World War, thowgh there were tens ()If sueih plans from Ostrozinsky to Popovi.ci in the last hoo<lred years. None of the promote~s for a federated central Europe demanded this, nor could d~and it, because such a demand was at variance with 1Jhe ethni:c pvindple and the historic principle concerning territories as well. Slovakia prior to 1918 never did belong to the hlistoric Czech lands." 'l'he assertion that the Great Mora,v,ian Empire.was some sort of "Ozecho--Slovaik" state is a histori'C fuble of recent 1 1 SLOVAKIA 29 date. The trnfill is that the Ozech territory was included in the GreaJt Morruvi.ian Empire only for a short period as a land co:aquered by Svatopluik, the ruler of the Slovalk people, and that Czech princes called the Germans to help them throw off Svatopluk's ruie. Alb.out the ethnieal differenices of the Ozechts and SlovaJks there was no doubt from 1848 and t1mJt is w!hy, for example, Popoviici in his rather ela!borrute wol1k "Die Vereinigiten Staiaten von GrossOestreich" proposes also the Slovak state a;s a mem/ber of the federation. That Riplm's conception spealks aJbOUJt a "Ozechoslovakia" and not even about a "Ozecho-Sfo:v<8Jkia" (Bohemia and SllO'VaJlcia) is in conlfllict, however, even Wii!th the fiumdannental princitPJ.es of federalism. 'Dhe i'dea of federation originated from the needs of securing freedOIIIl for the smaller national, cul:turaA units. that stT-ive to preserrve their dhamcter, their traddtions and indelpeindoot developmenrt. Federation - as Dr. Ripka correctly writes - "does not mean the suppression of independence, but, coruversel~, federation OIIl fille oither hand: ocganizes national soivereignties into a hitgher system founded on the legal equality of i:ts mem.lbers and ruflfo:rds a guarantee of their free intemial development." A Czecho-Slav'8Jkia is indisputaibi,y a negation of the principles of feiderailtism to the SlQi\71aJk DJation. If Dr. Ripka thought a/bouJt SOIIlle !kind of "Czecho-1Slo1V'ak confederation," then fuat would amount to an unreasoniaJble druipliicity: a federation wirbhin a regioina~ federation, wherein the SlD~ vaJk.s would hawe to sulITender some of their S01Vereignty in the interest of ~ho:4SlO'Vaikia and some to the c~trail. EurQpean felde;ration, but without 'benefit oif doufble prirvileges. A thoughtful person undOOibtedly undembaDlds readily that Dr. Ripkia - and with him a definite part of the Ozeohs - is striving to continue the ~istence of Coocho-Slovakia in EUTO(pe or in a federated centra;l Euirope. Whrut nation in the world was not seduced iby :imiperialism ,MlJd, \PI'3-Y, which one would not be, if it found itself in such a goographica!l location amd ipoliti<cal situation as the Owch nation finds itself in today? 30 SLOVAKIA But why should any one who proclaims himself a disciple of freedom and democracy force the Czecho-Slovak State on a nation that does not want to be a part of it? And this at a time when Ire}a,n!d has proclaimed its indelpendooce, when democratic coll!I1tries aJP!prOIVed the establishment of a Jewish Strute, when Indonesia and several countries in Afric,a and India hruve been reicogindzed as independent. And we still rememlber tJhrat the last bloody war wa s fought by pratctica:llry the whole world against the, pohroy of "lebensraum" that d~anded the swppression of the independence of other nations in the interests of some, •~He&erwo~k" ! The Slovaks have had their fill of Magyars, Czechs and Germans and have emphatically stated and proved time and again that they do not want to be a colony of the Czechs. They proclaimed the independence of their country on March 14, 'J 939, and still insist that they want an independent Slovak State. Why, then, not let them have what they are inherently and by God-given right entitled to? In this connection, however, we must _stress t,he fact that the indination of the Oze-c,h s to the idea of a federated centra:l IDurQPe is a departure from the poiliti~al conceptions and practices of Dr. Edward Benes. If there was any one in IDurope during the ipast 30 years who was an enemy of the idea of a federated Europe with his policies, that person was Benes, anything that he might have said to the contrar~ notwithstanding, I1n his boak "Dissertations about Shwdom" (Uvahy o SlOiV'anstvi) , Benes writes a!bout the formation of a central European federation. Hie says: "I do no:t wish to make such politics a:nd I do not wish th'is fate either for the Ozechs or some kind of new SlovaJk state in a central European federation . . . . lnto such a federation the Ozechs never would be ruble to enter. . . . " In another connection he noted the surrender Oif <Swb..Ca:r,pathian Ruthenia to Moscow, not without pe11sonal satiwruction, as "the end of all dreams of some kind of centra:l European federation" (,vd. his ta1k to Lettri~h and associates,, February 18, 1947). Are the Czechs sincere when they talk a!bout a central .European federation? Those for whom Dr. Ripka speallrs rupparenbly are not. They are for any European system that 1 31 SLOVAKIA would guarantee the existence oif a 0zeicho-Sloivakia in which they would rule. They 3Jre true foUowers oif Benes: If they are for a central Euroq>ean federation, it is only because of political exiped!iency, or, as Ripka himself so a'PtlY put it: "to gain the sympathies of the demo.craitic world for the CZECH caJuse." The Slovaks, on the other hand, are against any and all forms of Czecho-Slovakia - the federation they were forced into against their will. They are stricmgl,y for a '.Central :IDuropean federation in which Sloiva'kia would be an independent ethnic part, independent oif Bohemia and the 0zechs, and an equal among equals. 1 • • • SLOVAKIA'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD Ann Su Cardwell The Slovak nation has a fong and enrv'iaJble record in the :struggle for freedom and the rights O!f man. That struggle continiues, ,w ith the SlovaJks in this country carrying the'ir share of the rbul'den. How clifrfiicwlt they find it I know only too well it:rom actual experience. '!'here were years when getting the trutJh 1before the Amerilca,n reading 'PUIJ:>lic was next to impossi!ble, and those writers who did succeed oocasional,l y were the ,reciipients ,of letters ()If sha11p criticism and even inrveC:ti!ve. On th3Jt point, too, ·I speak out of experience. It is not necessa'I1)' for me to tell the Slova.tks that Americans in generall hawe ,known ail.I too little of SlovaJkia and its pface in Centra!l European lirfe and 'C!iviliization; and if irn Eastern European life, and dvilization, then in that of Western. Eu1:1oipe and America as well. ,F or despite geograiphical distances am.di differences in lamrgruarge and customs, the entire Western world - and hy that I mean all Europe and Amerrea - is bOIUDd together throughout histo!IY to agree that we do not st-Olp to realize. What haipnot hruppen to one ipeorple has its effect upon pens or the rest, though thait effect may be long in beoom:ing manifest. Surely that point does not need argument these days, does  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The Czechs for a Central European Federation? Description An account of the resource Dr. Joseph Kirschbaum Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 27-31 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Kirschbaum, Jozef M., 1913-2001 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 SNK https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/761361c5f6afeaf3ae1ee90f14ad507b.pdf 7512a9c9e50f4c3d9f0f6d1232487783 PDF Text Text 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 �23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 �24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. �SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, �26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 �23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 �24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. �SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, �26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 22 SLOVAK.IA SWVA'KIA AND THE WEST Dr. Andrew Dubina The western world k1I1Jorw,s Ia.,tt1e rubout Slo;Viakia. What has been puljjlislied has been ,preipa;red; by :f:hreig;n~rs or the propaganda rupparatu:s, of Pra gue, whic'h for olbwou!s reas,ons could not .present the tr.uth a/bout Slo;va1ki:a an:d the Slovaks. 'I1he strug,gle Olf the SiklfVak,s fo,r their national rights in Hungary wa;s ,p resented to the world by the Ma;gy,ars as a Panslavistic corrspiirrucy with Tsarist Russia. Since the Slovruks continued to. fight for national rights eiven in icentralistic O,zeclho~rnovrukiia, the Ozeclhs in the pay of Benes a;nd Prague exiplained that this fight wa.rs simply the :;i.ictirvity oif a few un:riuly, i!Iltolerant auttonomists and sepruratists, \VhO were saturnted with. Hungiairiianism and, the:rm._9r~, had to b,e sile1n:ced in the interest of "Czechoslovak" democracy. Finally, becruuse of the relationship of the Slovak Reipulblic wl1:h Germany durfog the Second World War, the same Benes Ozeclhs today smear all Slovak ,patriots, even those .who held insigni.!ficant State jolbs, as fascists. Now, the avera;ge Ameriican citizen, who has practicaMy no knowledge of the real 1problems. oif the central European nations, what does he think ~bout the Slorvruks. a;fte:r being exposed to suclh a flood of misinformation about them? What, can he .possilbly thinik aJbout a nation that is once '.lrubcled "pa.nsbavh;itilc," tlhen "a!Ilti-™'.a;g;yair" and · "anti.Czech," and fi'll!ahly a:s "Ge:rimanoplhi[e" and "against the al1.ies"? Surely, he wiH thinlk tha;t the :Slo;vaks as a friivolous and :iirrespons~ble nation in central :IDuro:pe. He is not awaire of th~ fact that these ~ithets aire used pur,posely to sy,m,plify the whole prolblem and, therefore, they must be taken in a manner warranted by the situation, that is as pro:paganda slogans .o f a certain phase o.f the struggle whiclh was gradua;lly wruged between the Czechs and the Magyars, or the Ge,:rimans and the Russia,n s, for domination 01Ver the Sfo;vaks during the past fifty years It wa:s oruy natural that in the second half of the nineteen th century, when Euroipe was uruconcerned about the SlovaJk prolblem, the Slo1Vaks looked towwd Russia, to the 1 23 SLOVAKIA famous Russian writers, expooting at least inSlpiration, if not material help. But so did the Cze:chs and othex Slo.V'anic nations at that time. This, of course, fr:ritaJteld the Magyacrs. Not that they were really ' afraid of "Pans,lavti.~," but because.they feared the Slovak national idea, Sl01vak nationahsm, whiicih hindered them from suicces,sfU!lly cOIIIl.pleting the chanige-0iver of a nationailistic Hungary into a Magyar national state. Panskwism, t!herefore, was the bogey with whiclh the Magyars endeavored to justify themselves in the eyes of Eurorpe for their unjust treatment of Slovruk. patriots. When the Magyars "lost" the Silorvaks in 1918 with the creation of Oze:cho-Slorvakia, and the Czechs be,g an to rule over Slovakia, it did not truke the Pr,a gue gorve:rnment lotfg to lab.el the Slovruk s "Magyarones," because the Slovaks made claim to tlhe right of se[f-determiOOJtion and insisted that T. G. Masaryk's gorvernment validate the PittsblllI"gh Pact of May 30, 1918, which guaranteed the la.ind of the Slo¥a!ks · autonomy. In SloJVlalkia at that time, outside of a few i.n:diyidua:is, thexe were no pofitical forces tending toward Budapest. But that did not matter to the Czech poHtidans in .pe>vver, Tihey had to have some excuse for insitalling Benes's· "po:lirce" deimoomcy in SlovaJkia by :pas.s.ir11g a la;w f~r ~he ",prote:ction" of the Republic. As studenits we lea-med that tlhe city of -Sparta was not enclosed by wahls, but that it was, nevertheil ess, well protected by the harmony of its citizens. Well, what Sparta did could not be a;ccomrpiished by Benes's ~ooho~Slorvwkia, because it la·clked harmony among its citizens. The Gzech MaLffit wa;s not concerned aJbo.ut the weilfare of the Reipuiblic, but o,nly aJbout the realization of the aims of political Pancze'ehism. Czech politics, just lilke the "iBlac:k Hand" of greater Se11bia before Wo!I'ld WaT I, was. guided by the slogan: "Unity OT death!" Of course, tJhis policy only divided the .newly created state• into Czechs and non.Czechs; - into the governing and the gorverned. So that the state cquld be kept together fhmJy, Benes needed eX!C'~tionaI laws and vadous swbtle, outside "walls" to. support his i;tate. And these were his allianices, pacts, and agireements; they' weire 1 1 24 SLOVAKIA SlJ!PPOsed to "guarantee" the Hite of the state from stem to stem., f:rom the East to. the West. While study;i,ng physics•, we learned of the existence of a laiw which states that to every- ruction there is an equal a:nd oppoo.ite rea;otion. lit seems that Benes forgot about this laiw, orr prolbably newer studied physd.lCS. The more pressure Prague exeit.ed on the Sloiva.k,s to make them forrget they were .Sl01V1aks, the more the Siova:~s became a.ware Olf the fa.ct that they were Slovaks, an individual ethnic entity, and the more tlhey resisted the attempt orf Czech Prague to make them one with the Oze.ch nation. Naitionai so.Iidariitly bloomed among the SlOIVaks. This did not eSIC3JPe the a;ttention of the outside world. When Slovruks voiced themsewes aJbout the matter in the foreirg n press (England, tJhe Unirted States allld Can.a da), Benes oonnilngly ~lained that such expressi'Ons were made, 'iby the "local opposition" of the People's Pa;rty. "Why opposition belongs to tlhe suJbstance of demooracy," Benes explained cynkaUy. FOil" him Slava!kia always wais only "an internal problem of the RepuJblic," that is a prO!bJem whilch the Czechs were detemnined to resolve at ·some time in the name of power preponderrance. The meaniD!g of true democracy was pei,verted by Beto fit his braJnd, that is "Ozechoslovaik" demooracy, which meant the complete sulbjugation a.ind, finali)I', the utter extinction of the Slov:ruk nation. Natura1ly it was opposed by aM trrue .Slovruks. If democracy is a "daily pletbi.Sictte" within the framework of a state, then the right of self-determination of .nations meruns a permanent and Ult1Silenooalble plebiscite of the nations on the, rood to world democracy. One can see the meaning of political development in the world not in the pr®ltection od: definite historical state :fornls or certain nulmg oligarehies, but only in tJhe endreaivor for a greater rreedom af nations and individuals. nes Today the Slov,aJks in the free world are working for the international :recognition of their right to self-determination. The nUJcleus, which can be ;pludkeld from thi,s genera:l prin'c iple by logical reas001iing, is tJhe cl-airm to one's olWJl. national government, to one's own state. That is the aim whilc h is the motive of activity of the Slovaks in exile in the free world. SLOVAKIA 25 While Louis Stur and Stephen Marko DaXiner limited their demands for national rights to the most fundraimentall ones - the rj,gbJt to lirve, the right to one's oiwn territory, to their own national tongue, tlheir own naitionail culture, their own government o.ver theiir o·wn destiny, etc. - the present Slovruk generation, which is no longer burdened spi<ritually with any sort of '"Hungariianisan" or "Miagyaronism" or even by that complex oif political inferiority knorwn as "Czechosloivaiki;s m," deri<ves its ooncl'l.l!sions froon a:ll premises which weire foI1IX1ulated by previous generations and demands foothe Slova!k IIJaJbion, in the name of order and democracy in central ffiuroipe, the right to its own gowemment, to 1ts own state. But it does not do so in the name oif oveI'lly erudite and more or less polemical theories - sucih as is, for example, the legal conrtiniuity of the Slovak RepuJblic - but in the name of the princi1)les oif equality orf al•l natio!IlS, that is, in the name of the principle whicll not onil y UIIliversity professora, but every person in the wo:rild can :rea.di1y understamd, and the ,p rinciple whlch is so clearly exipressed in the American DeclaratiOIIl of Independence,. to wit : "We hold tlhese truths to be selrf-evident, that all men are created equa;l, that they are endowed ·b y their Creatoc with certain unalienruble Rj,g,hts, that among these are Life, Lilberty and the ipl.ll'suit of Happiness. That t.o secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People t.o alt.er or to abolish it, and institute new Government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." Jn this paraigrrup'h is exipresserl the uruversal principle of world dem.01Cracy. These words are the goopel of the oppressed naJtions. They condemn whatever fonn oif interna.tionail feud:a1ism and stress the rigiht of oppressed nations t o fight foT theiir life and freedmn. The Slovaks, too, see in t his paragraph of the Ameri10an Declaration oif Independence t heir strongest argument for a place on the map oif Europe, 26 SLOVAKIA for the recognition of their right to national existence. The Slova!k nation demrunds nothing more: Of course, it may ibe said thaJt no western democracies deny that right to the Slowik people. They recogru:ze it and ,r espect it, we are told, 'but validating it is another question. The Slo:vruks, it seems, are not strOillg enough physically to force their just demands, so the western world pa:ys no heed to them. On the other hand, however, the greatest statesmen oif the West haJVe told us r eipeatedly that there r eally was no argument that could not be settled without the use of ·p hysical or amned force. The United Nations Organization aaso sulbscri!bes to this. So, might does not necessarily mean right, we are led to ·believe. But, then, what stands in the way of Slovruk freedom and i:ndependen:ce, the aipplication m the right of self-deter:mination in the caise of the Slov,aJk nation? Why then does the West recognize the . proponents of the old "Czechoslova:k" school, the followers of Benes, who still claim tfue rrght to determine the destiny of the Slovruk nation? It is high time that the democratic West relegated the "Czechoslo:va!k" pseudodemoc rats to the poHtical rubish hoop. The damage they have done in thirty years will not be repaired in the next hundred years, if the West persists in taking adJv,k e from them . • • • WHO SAID IT? "President Benes was always of the opinion, and in his latest statements ailwa;ys stressed, 1:lhrut OUT pam of alliance with So:viet Russia and our friendshiip with other S~av nations must not encrooch on OUT friendly and cordiail relations with other democratic states. This is the natuiral deske, shared iby an enormous majority of ()IUr people, and nothing .p revents UIS from keeping the comidence of the democratic states and strerugthening and deepening our friendship with our great western Allies. Moscow, · too, wan/ts tio ful[o;w this line of polircy. rt willl, h01Wever, be necessary for certain prej'l.l(Eces of the West with regard to the Soviet Union, which are stiU existing, to be swept away." - Premier Fierlinger o:f Czercho-,Slovakia, OW1I Bulletin, June 1, 1945.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovakia and the West Description An account of the resource Dr. Andrew Dubina Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 22-26 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dubina, Andrew Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/a01fa46f3883973925608e41e6246ea6.pdf 9f80c494a979434be4c2efa3cf00fa40 PDF Text Text 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. �SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This �18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and �SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds �20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not �SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. �SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This �18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and �SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds �20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not �SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 16 SLOVAKIA CHRISTMAS IN THE WW TATRA REGION By Robert A. Heckert A fow yeairs ago it was .my good fortune to. spend the Christmas hol'idays in the Low Tatra region orf Slovakia. A'bourt two days :b efore ChTistmas I haJppened. to be in Prague, feeling rather disconsolate a;bout the prospect of spending this Christmas alone in a foreign city, when suddenly and quite unexpected.iy I r~eived an iruvitation to come to Slovakia. WitJh eager anticipation I accepted. That very night I lef.t Prague ,b y train, for my destination was 400 miles to the east, and it was most important that I slhOIU!ld ,b e in the town of Banska Bystrica on Christmas Eve. 'Dhe train was crowded with all s.o.rts orf people, all joyously looiking forwaird, de~ite clouds on t!he .p olitical horizon to sipendinig the holidays at home or in the mountains. Scores of young soldiers there were, and like boys in any country in the world, they we-re proud oif their uniforms and indescrilbably hasppy in the knowledge that they wen:e going hOime to sweetheart., to Mother and Father, and the family hearth. It was stil.l daJI'.k when we reaidhed BratislaJva on the Dant11be. Most of the town was still asloop, 1b ut quite a large delegation of holiday seekers got on our train tJhere. Many orf them were Hungarians, some were Austria.ins, but most were Slovaks, and I was the only .Ame:rican. Almost everybody was carryilllg a pair of skis, for rpe,oiple in this part orf the WOI'ld feel like a holiday is not complete without skis. As we left BratiStlava behind we were oive•r taiken by the ever...recurri:ng miracle orf d8Jwn. Slowly 1!hrough the early morning hou~s our train wound its way up the mountain vaHey, now white with fresh fallen snow. At each village station a proud peasant father and mother were there to welcome a son who was coming from the big city fa,r away. Pride, humility and deep affection mingled to produce a scene, ciharacteri:Sltically SlovaJk, which has left a permanent maTk on this olbserver. SLOVAKIA 17 It was albout noon when our train reached the. town of Banska Bystrilca. Uipon emerging from the train I felt at on'Ce that I was in a spot in whidh charm and grandeur were mi·n gled in.a wondrous way. In the distance on alil sides were snow--covered mountadns, damzling in the sun. At a lower altitude was a ,b elt oif forests, and in tihe center of this magnificent panorama was the old town of Banska Bystrica, a peil'lfect gem in a perfect setting. Then it was that I U!Ilderstood why it was called "The Pea.I'll of 'Sl01va!kia." The spiTes in its old medieval church, the ancient ruined castle aloog the rirver, the color a1I1d quaintness of the old houses, all com!bined to giive me the feeling that I was in a dream world. /My hosts were at the station to meet me. They put me to 'b ed at once, for I had had no sl~ on the train the nig,ht before . .A!bout six o'clock in the eveniillg I was awa!kened by the pealing of clhiurch bells. I arose at once, and quickly made myself ready for the evening's fesitirvities, for in Slova'ki.a. tihe grea;t moment oif the year comes on Ohristmas Eve. As if 'b y magic a doorr wa.c;. opened,. and I was ushered into a. new and gforio:us kimgdb!In. The room was lighted with candles, 8Jlld the people in the, room seemed to be transfigured by some mir.aJcUlous power into wonderf.u!l beiillgs. It was Christmas filve. There in a corner of the room was a Christmas tree, and rut the taible in the center of the room stood the grrundmother, the father and mother, and the children. They seemed to ibe hruppy to haJVe a guest from faroff Ameri'Ca on this unique occasion. We sat do1W1I1 to a simple meal of which the princ:iipal dish was fresh caz,p. The fish , as we iknow, was the firrstknown Christian symb.ol, going back to tihe time of the Apostles in the first centuriy A.D. After this simiple sUipper the famH.y ,g rowp gathered around the Christmas tree 3.IIld exchanged gifts. This was followed by the singing of carols and 0th.err ChTistian hymns, and also· folik-<Songs, with the father aJccompa,nying on a gwtarr. There was singing until albout .ten o'dodk, wlhen a1l retired for the night. Next morning, when I loo\ked out the window, I saw that a fresh mantle of snow had fal.len that night. This 18 SLOVAKIA made all tlhe skiers hruppy, for it meant that there would be good skimg through the holidays. Skiing is especia:Hy fine when fresh light snow has fa:Hen on an old layeT of snow thart has pa,oked. The under layer of paJcked snow serves as a solid cushion, while the top layer of fresh snow is li:ke the wax that is added to a hardwood dancing floOT. •' ·. Following church in the ea•rly morning we htked··buf to . a hili whiclh was good for skiing aJbout three mHes from the center of the town. Soores. of people we,r e a'lready there when we came. SmaH chHdren as, young as six yearrs were on skis, some .of them showing remrurlkarble ~ill and courage. In many cases tlhere were whole frumiiies on skis, father . and motheT, and the chilidren. L '.. -· • -l,. You can ima:gine what healthy appetites we had 'Yhen we got ba;clk after this exer.cise in the healthy mount?,in air. Often a;fter Slllpper and a rest, we would talc~ , a little strroH throUJgh the main street of the town. Pewsamts in_their gor.geous costUJffies rud:ded a riot of color to this most colorful of seasons. It was a ravishing sight to see a red-<cheeked peasant .g irl with a hrund-iworiked, vari-icolored kerchief round her darik hair, and wearing a go·r geous hand-worked dress that must have taJken a year to make. The lo,w er part of her dress was pr~domina:ntly red, in contrast to her black leather boots, whi~h crume up almost to her knees. She was rivalled by several dozen girls in costume, rolliclding in the sno..w, with a trooip olf men, also in peasa:nt costume, at their heels. We could hear beaiuti!ful Christmas mus~c floating in the air, coming fu-om somewheTe in the nearest mountain above the town. 'I1he whoJe scene, with sound effects, seemed to be too bea:urtiiful to be true. One day we .decided to visit a village a;bout six miles away. We ,p ut on good heaivy warm boots, and lots of sweaters, and carried some lunch with us, for we kne,w that we would .be gone most of the day. It was a delightful hike through forest land in la<rge part, and over the country roa,ds. Several times we passed gypsies, w!ho are ,quite numerous in this part olf the wodd. Not infrequently they would be carrying a stringed musical instTUJffient, by which many of them earned their living in the towns. On and SLOVAKIA 19 on we walked. Often, as we were approaching the toip of a hill, or a cross..road, there loomed beforre us a carved, wooden c:rulcifix, liifo-si•ze, silhouetted against t!he clea·r blue sky, a centuiries-oM feature off the SlO!Vak landscaipe, aind sym'bol of a reliigioin deep}y :iimbedded in the Sloivak heart, the heaJrts of the over.whelming majority. 'Dhis fact came home to me arud left its indelilble ma;:r,k rus we hilked through the snow. Finally we reruched the village. As we came lllp the main street of the viHruge all the boys and girls, arrd all the dogs came rushing orut to greet us with wild-eyed curiosity. The dogs barlked as they had never barlked before, and they and the children suirrounded .us as we .progressed to:ward the centerr of tJhe vinage. The news of our coming sipread like wildfire, and when the v:iillage may,or heard it he quickly prepared to greet us. He was a fine Slovak type, gentle, as most of them are, with small eyes, deHcate chin, and a Roman nose. The SloivaJks have been caJled the "doveJJ.ike" people. When the village mayor heard that I was froim Amer. ica, . .he said that one of his villagers had lived in America a long time, but had come bacik to his native viJlage to fore the rest of his days. We werut to, see him. He was quite an old man now and had already been baok in his homeland for some years. He had for.gotten much aJbout America, but he recalled that his life had been one of hard work, of su:f.fering, and of saving. He had wonked in the steel mill at Johnstown, PennsyJ.vania. When he told us tJhat, I saluted him as a fellow-worker, for in my own youth I had to.i'led i'n the grim and gri:my steel miills o.f Pennsylrvania some 35 years ago, side by side with many a sorn of Slovakia, and in the glare of the furnaices dUJring loo.g nights, I had listened to some of them pourin1g tales of Slovakia into my ears. The old man looked out the window of his cottage with contentment. He was content to die here in his natiive villruge on his native soiJ. We went into se;veral homes in the village. In one of the peasant huts a little girl of a!bout ten years was sitri,pping and deaning goosefeathers to be used for featherbeds 20 SLOVAKIA -and pill.lows. The :tlloor o.f the hwt was earthen, and in one corner was a huge stove made of bricik. Porcelainware hung on the walls, anrli on a talble was a huge Bible. The father was there, 1but the motlher had gone to mariket in town that morning to sehl her eggs, and butter and cheese. The father had felt honored that we had come to his home. He gave us fresh mHk to drink with the Lunch that we had br011i:,c0iht along, and he told us stories rubout 1id'e in the village. He asked me whether I lklllew certain individuals wiho had gone to America f11om this villruge. They had never been heard from again aifter they went ruwaiy. He mentioned names and places in different parts of the United States, but, a:las, he fai-led to realize the enornnous distances jn Arrnerica, and my extremely limited acqu1ai,n tanceshi1p with tihe Slo.valk immigrrution in America . Like all SloviaJk peasants, the :poople in this village wore .picturesque costumes. Americans of Slovak birth am.d upbringing do not need to 1be told that costumes from one village to another in .Slova1cia may vary only in some sliglht debaN, but the variation in d~il is unique to each particular villruge, and mariks the inhaJbit,a nt of a particular village. The practiced dbsez,ver, upon seeing a peasant in a market town among crowds of pea,srunts on market day, oan name the villaige from which the peasant comes lby noting the disti.n:otirve detail in :hiiis or her costume. Toward lrute afternoon o<f this day in tlhe vi!hlage we started baclk to BaJilSka Bystrica. On the road we ·met the peasant mother returning from maliket, trrud!gi:ng along through the snow with a heruvy pruClk on her 1b aak. She had walked six miles to the mairiket tfurough the snow very early that morning wi1Jh her healVY pruck, and now she was wallking back with another heavy load of t'hirnigs she had bought for the family . But she was all smiles when she crume abreast of us, and she stopped to ta:llk. S!he was full of all that happened that day in tlhe toiwn, rund she had to teH us aJbout it. After a whHe she put her b~g bag on her baidk again, showered us with compliments rund good wishes, waved a smiling farewell, and went off down the road toward the village. She had left a wonderi,f.ul wa.T!IIJ.,tJh in our hearts, this little Slovruk woman, whose name I could not SLOVAKIA 21 say, but who-se simple, rug,ged, yet sweet .personality will remain with me fur a, long while. The .s un was setting as we came to the toip of the last hill overlooiking the town oif Banska By:strioa. 'Dhe North Star was already out, and in the east a full ...rounded moon cast a sHrveey beam Oiver the crest of tlh.e mountain and in a few miootes shown in her fu11 splendor. Soon a light aJPpea;red in the tOWill, and then anOither, and still anotiheT; and then we could hear the farofd' sound of clh.urch bells with tbek ethereal purity of tone, wih ich can be heard only in Eu~pe. And then silence reigned again. For a whiile we.stood there in that sacred silence, beholding the glory of God in the heawens and illlVokiillg His bleSS1I11g upon the people of Ba.nska Bystriica and 1..11pon the children Olf men everywhere. A few minutes later we reentered tlh.e town and thus ended our druy's pilgrimage. Next diary I journeyed iba:ck to Prague. Miy ho.liday wa'S ov~. But a:s long as I li:ve I shaH remember that season spent in the Low 'Datras with peculiar vividness and satisfaction. I hope sincere:ly thait many of you, my readers, m!i,y some day have the pri;vilege oif sojourning in. that picturesque and memomlble lamrl - Slovakia, wh:i.ch I lo,ve. • • • WHO SAID IT? "We can ottl:y repeat ,t hat neither Austria nor Hungary, and prolbaJbly not even Gerunany, nor even the Slovaks, woun.d a:cceipt in the iong I'lliil. tlle existence of Czoohoslovakia. Therefore -t he graftmg olf OzoohoslovaJkia on to a Danubian federation is hair&y possilble. In such a framewo.nk she would simiplry continue to lbe what she was in her prevfous existence: an international oalamity. The position would !be d.iifferent in .the case of Bohemfa and Moravia being separated from Slovakia. The od'ten repeated argument that Czeohoslova:kia's brea;king l.llp into her naJtural components wO'U!ld cause an even gireaiter disfoca:tion in the DanrUl'be Basin, fails to convince, if one rea!li.zes that such a part.iition. is the essentia1l iprerequisite oif the oreation o'f a greater State entity." - F. 0. Miik.sche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, pp. 215-21'6 ; FaJber and Faiber, Ltd., London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Christmas in the Low Tatra Region Description An account of the resource Robert A. Heckert Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 16-21 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Heckert, Robert A. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 name https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/6394be7187e3ab8f7c136ae6bea94f28.pdf 9ba5b71db2ea2fc1783abb5eab2fc013 PDF Text Text DECEMBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SWVAK LIFE Dr. Francis Hrusovsky Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in the new warild, especially in the United States oif America, were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the first world war. The natural temperament of the average Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty. The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi. cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural lot on earth. Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism, because the average Slovak was hampered at every step by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he �2 SLOVA-IHA failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own government in power and one's own native language as the official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate freedom and democra;cy. Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom, for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a higher power. This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the New World were so diametrically different from his life in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras. He was amazed by the vast difference between life at home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance for improvement; here in America he could look forward to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams. No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter �SLOVAKIA 3 how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$ in the old country and improved his own condition. America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated, though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:. niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an unending stream of goods for human consumption and welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~ mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty. Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative success in America. The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~ toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted · himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~ riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too, �4 SLOVAKIA ·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of a democratic way of life in the United States. Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born. If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance further on the road to Americanization, a process that �SLOVAKIA 5 brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry. The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own kind for companionship and understanding. All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they went, being drawn to each other by their common longing for the homes they had but recently left behind across the sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became the centers of their activities. This association kept them closely united and helped them to protect and enhance their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of every nation on earth. Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in America they were free to profess their patriotism and write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins. A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did · not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source �SLOVAKIA of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths their own for many centuries. They cherished the national traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them in this new land of freedom. In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America · teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could ·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted -country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the ·land of their forefathers. The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe. He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope. The church, located in the center of Slovak village life, with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence. The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would, indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di- �SLOVAKIA 7 vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer at all times. Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church, then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation, the Slovak in America maintained his national character and expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions, preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured memories of Slovakia. Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are. concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd· cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial. At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the .spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home, burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home· enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life. �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring, made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native land, where the people were submissive and demoralized, nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion. Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented them from developing their native culture and realizing their right to self-government and independence. Internally, the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped natural resources, but needed an external force to set it free. And this dynamic force came from America. Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country. Even without this material, however, w~ are able to mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter of fact, remained in America and made their permanent home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land �SLOVAKIA 9 and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh. The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic texture and blend, effected several significant changes on home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of ~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life. Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have .his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order, Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though �10 SLOVAKIA lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily ~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's ;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its ,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household. Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in modern times, many large estates came into the hands of fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country. There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population, :I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop fai-lure. Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were �SLOVAKIA 11 1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their country forever. The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp decline. Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and stability, was its independent gentry which had been close .to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware. 1 America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~ tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years, many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared, old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national economy was once more in the hands of iits own native population. ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre- �12 SLOVAKIA :voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership. Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-, nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises. These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields, but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match for them. Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity to acquire a high school and college training. The need was both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed, to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades. Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them. Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself from foreign domination. An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines �SLOVAKIA 13 and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society). The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics, for he had become accustomed to the view that this was a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view, and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to them from across the sea. From their pages they learned for the first time how grave the situation was in reality in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they were informed of things that happened right at home by receiving newspapers, published in their own language and spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their membership in American Slovak societies for several years after coming back to Slovakia. Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive country, not only because they brought their savings, but also because these men had learned much by their new experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy. �14 SLOVAKIA In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual, for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover, as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true democracy. Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of these rights to his people back home inspired him to work for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness and freedom. Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the common man, for, after learning the democratic technique of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man. While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications �SLOVAKIA 15 betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch with their brothers across the sea. Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce, the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~ rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an countries of the world. The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic way of life - Communism . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks. Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation) can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London). � DECEMBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SWVAK LIFE Dr. Francis Hrusovsky Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in the new warild, especially in the United States oif America, were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the first world war. The natural temperament of the average Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty. The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi. cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural lot on earth. Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism, because the average Slovak was hampered at every step by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he �2 SLOVA-IHA failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own government in power and one's own native language as the official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate freedom and democra;cy. Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom, for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a higher power. This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the New World were so diametrically different from his life in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras. He was amazed by the vast difference between life at home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance for improvement; here in America he could look forward to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams. No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter �SLOVAKIA 3 how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$ in the old country and improved his own condition. America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated, though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:. niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an unending stream of goods for human consumption and welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~ mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty. Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative success in America. The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~ toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted · himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~ riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too, �4 SLOVAKIA ·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of a democratic way of life in the United States. Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born. If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance further on the road to Americanization, a process that �SLOVAKIA 5 brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry. The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own kind for companionship and understanding. All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they went, being drawn to each other by their common longing for the homes they had but recently left behind across the sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became the centers of their activities. This association kept them closely united and helped them to protect and enhance their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of every nation on earth. Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in America they were free to profess their patriotism and write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins. A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did · not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source �SLOVAKIA of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths their own for many centuries. They cherished the national traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them in this new land of freedom. In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America · teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could ·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted -country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the ·land of their forefathers. The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe. He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope. The church, located in the center of Slovak village life, with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence. The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would, indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di- �SLOVAKIA 7 vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer at all times. Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church, then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation, the Slovak in America maintained his national character and expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions, preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured memories of Slovakia. Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are. concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd· cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial. At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the .spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home, burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home· enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life. �8 SLOVAKIA Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring, made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native land, where the people were submissive and demoralized, nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion. Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented them from developing their native culture and realizing their right to self-government and independence. Internally, the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped natural resources, but needed an external force to set it free. And this dynamic force came from America. Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country. Even without this material, however, w~ are able to mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter of fact, remained in America and made their permanent home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land �SLOVAKIA 9 and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh. The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic texture and blend, effected several significant changes on home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of ~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life. Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have .his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order, Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though �10 SLOVAKIA lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily ~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's ;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its ,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household. Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in modern times, many large estates came into the hands of fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country. There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population, :I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop fai-lure. Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were �SLOVAKIA 11 1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their country forever. The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp decline. Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and stability, was its independent gentry which had been close .to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware. 1 America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~ tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years, many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared, old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national economy was once more in the hands of iits own native population. ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre- �12 SLOVAKIA :voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership. Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-, nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises. These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields, but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match for them. Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity to acquire a high school and college training. The need was both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed, to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades. Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them. Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself from foreign domination. An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines �SLOVAKIA 13 and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society). The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics, for he had become accustomed to the view that this was a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view, and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to them from across the sea. From their pages they learned for the first time how grave the situation was in reality in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they were informed of things that happened right at home by receiving newspapers, published in their own language and spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their membership in American Slovak societies for several years after coming back to Slovakia. Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive country, not only because they brought their savings, but also because these men had learned much by their new experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy. �14 SLOVAKIA In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual, for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover, as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true democracy. Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of these rights to his people back home inspired him to work for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness and freedom. Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the common man, for, after learning the democratic technique of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man. While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications �SLOVAKIA 15 betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch with their brothers across the sea. Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce, the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~ rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an countries of the world. The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic way of life - Communism . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks. Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation) can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London). � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DECEMBER, 1953 SLOVAKIA 1 INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SWVAK LIFE Dr. Francis Hrusovsky Actual living conditions of the Slovak immigrants in the new warild, especially in the United States oif America, were very much different from those in hi1s homeland which was under the domination of Hungary until the end of the first world war. The natural temperament of the average Slovak was determined, to some degree, by the circumstances of his life in a land that had been under foreign nrle for centuries. Economically, the native of Slovakia found life hard and difficult; socially, his lot was unprogressive; politically, freedom and equality had no practical meaning for him. His energies were drained by the relentless struggle for survival. Not infrequently, he suffered from want; his entire life was spent in misery and poverty. The downtrodden Slovak peasant, though inwardly protesting against social inequality and injustice, had not suffi. cient strength and vitality to break the chains of his servitude. He resigned hims~lf to his misfortune, concluding that unkind fate decreed that misery was to be his n a tural lot on earth. Under such adverse circumstances, it was extremely difficult to arouse and maintain a feeling of Slovak national patriotism ; and it was doubly difficult to organize a Slovak society that would espouse the idea of Slovak nationalism, because the average Slovak was hampered at every step by his enemies who tenaciously held to the age-old concept of Magyar feudalism, a way of life that was contrary to the idea of Slovak nationalism. Every Slovak knew that he was not a Magyar but a Slovak; yet, this consciousness of nationalism was never allowed to develop freely. Patriotism and loyalty in the Hugarian State was only one: all had to acknowledge their adherence to the Crown of St. Stephen and Magyar hegemony. It is not surprising, therefore, that the peasant in Slovaikia had no clearcut understanding of the meaning of nationalism ; that he failed to aspire to national emancipation is manifestly an indication that he 2 SLOVA-IHA failed to grasp the glorious meaning of having one's own government in power and one's own native language as the official tongue of the land. And, hence, at first, the aver age Slovak was not inclined to partici,pate in political gatherings that were designe'd· to bring his own country ultimate freedom and democra;cy. Weighed . down ,b y the burdens of life as an oppressed human being, the Slovak's paJtience and endurance were truly remarkable. In the long succession of centuries of political servitude and 'tymnny, he had become resigned to his unchanging misery, injustice, humiliation and serfdom, for to him it seemed that this was decreed by fate, or a higher power. This was, then, the average Slova,k immigrant who came to America. Imagine how great was his amazement upon discovering that living an:d social conditions in the New World were so diametrically different from his life in the land of his birth, his Slova:kia beneath the Tatras. He was amazed by the vast difference between life at home in Slovakia and here in America and the unlimited opportunities offered the immigrant, provided he was willing to work. And since hard work was practica,lly s~cond nature to the Slovak immigra,nrt, he found his new home to his liking. At home, his sphere of activity ha,d been limited, while here, in his new home land, unlimited opportunities presented themselves on all sides, so that a man of inte1ligence, ingenuity and industry just could not fail to become a success in America. At hame, the Slovak could only hope to eke out a bare existence with hardly a chance for improvement; here in America he could look forward to a steady improvement of his social conditions. Here, in the new world, his .progress was not impeded by circumstances, on the contrary, the conditions for his advancement exceeded his fondest dreams. No doubt the primary motive for Slovak emigration was to seek a solution for financial difficulties; the Slovak went abroad chiefly to secure economic advantages which were lacking at home. He envisioned the day when he would rise above his lowly station in life with the help of his incr:eased earning power. Hence, there was no job, no matter SLOVAKIA 3 how strenuorus or dangerous, that he shirked S'O long as ft promised him immediate returns. There is little doubt that tlhe Slovak immigrant in America worked harder than he had ever worked at home, •b ut t:Jhis was a sacrifice well worthwhile, in his estimation, if it helped his loved one$ in the old country and improved his own condition. America attracted the simple peaJsant from the hills and villages throughout Slovakfa. He was uneducated, though generally not illiterate, but equirpped with the natural gifts of remarkahle stamina, courage, ingenuity, industry and native intelligence. Possessing unusual powers of observation, sound judgment and ability to assimilate new ways of life, as well as being blessed witJh a good moral training, the Slov,a k found America a fertile field for his endeavors. He learned much in the new land of freedom and opportunity; and though he received much from it, he ailso gave much in return. He put his heart and will in his work, employed his mind in developing new tech:. niques, spared no effort, time and energy to produce an unending stream of goods for human consumption and welfare. Thus, the Slovak, who had been held in political bondage and who had lapsed into a state of social and economic retrogression, suddenly found a dynamic release for his pent-up energies in a land that was forever dedicated to freedom and equality, a land which offered him constant inspiration for his enterprising spirit and proved to be a never-ending source of visions of a great destiny. The de_~ mocratic atmosphere of America was to him a tonic, an elixir of magical powers that turned him into a veritable giant who feared no undertaking, avoided no difficulty. Consequently, many of his kind, working doggedly and persistently with indomitable energy, achieved comparative success in America. The typical American immigr ant from Slovakia was confronted with the difficulties of language, strange cus~ toms and new surroundings, and the immedi•a te necessity of employment. After securing a job, he quickly adjusted · himself to his new emrironment, acquired vaJ1uaJble expe~ riences over a period of years, steadHy increased his earnings and saved his money. He soon perceived that he, too, 4 SLOVAKIA ·was a human being with natural aspirations, desires and ideals which he knew could be realized if he worked for their attainment. It wa;s in America that he found himself as an ind!iividual, no:t only with civic responstbilites, but with personal rights as weH. As a full-fledged naturalized citizen of hi:s adopted country, he became acutely aware of his added dignity as a free man. This both satisfied him and aLso aroused in him the determination to emulate his fellow-citizens in the fullest a;ppreciation of his precious inheritance. Of course, there were some unfortunate exceptions to the general respon:se of the typical Slovak to his Ameriican surroundings; but on the whole, the great majority reacted favorably to the stimulating influences of a democratic way of life in the United States. Life's vicissitudes make human existence a constant struggle with obstacles strewn on the path that ,l eads to the ultimaJte goal. The SlovaJk lras never been without hardships and, therefore, he has never been afraid of the future. At home, all his efforts to overcome the handicaps of his lowly station in life were to no avail. He was doomed to remain in the same social caiste into which he was born. If he was born in poverty, he was destined to a lifelong struggle for a mere livelhood. There was no opportunity for him to rise above his station, being inextricably bound by ties of an outmoded feudal ,s ystem which kept him hopelessly mired in a bog of caste-privileged society. But his patient endurance and peritina;city, his indefatigable industry, which had helped him to survive under the most adverse conditions, served him well in the new land; and his ingrained habits of determination, dependability and native ingenuity were qualities which gave him the impetus to succeed when he was suddenly thrust into the fresh atmosphere of American free enterpr1se and democracy. The a;ma:zing discovery that he was on a plane of political and social equality with men of more than a score of nationa-lities, enjoy}ng freedom under one flag, the Stars and Stripes, made him feel that he had accomplished something worthwhile; and the consciousness of his abilities and achievements inspired him to work even harder to advance further on the road to Americanization, a process that SLOVAKIA 5 brought out the native powers of the Slovak to adopt himself to new surroundings and to assimilate without losing his identity as a new American of Slovak ancestry. The immigrant Slovak's contacts with men of various races made him conscious of his own distinctness as a national figure, for he was unable to converse with them and he did not understand their ways. This factor affected him in two ways: 1) he was inclined to keep aloof from "strangers" and, 2) he was instinctively drawn to follow Slovaks who spoke his language and who knew his ways. Thus, it was but natural for him to draw closer to men of his own kind for companionship and understanding. All Slovak immigrants came together wherever they went, being drawn to each other by their common longing for the homes they had but recently left behind across the sea. Following the example of other nationalities, they organized societies and founded churches thaJt soon became the centers of their activities. This association kept them closely united and helped them to protect and enhance their common interests. Moreover, the feeling of national consciousness grew stronger among them as they sought refuge and comfort in these islands of Slovak memories and realities in the midst of a sea of representatives of every nation on earth. Slovaks in their homeland could not publicly express their national aspirations without reprisals, but here in America they were free to profess their patriotism and write about their ideals of nationhood. Every American of Slovak parentage could acknowledge his Slovak heritage publicly, and no one took it amiss, nobody was suspicious of his motives, no one insulted him for it. Moreover, his fellow-citizens of other national origins, in business and politics, accepted the new Americans as equals without regard to national origins. A Slovak immigrant who became a naturalized American citizen soon realized that he not only had civic responsibilities but personal rights, too, and the fact that 'he did · not have to renounce his Slovak heritage as such, while pledging loyalty to his new homeland, became the source SLOVAKIA of his national pride of being a descendant of Slovak an~estors who had not been able to call their ancient hearths their own for many centuries. They cherished the national traditions of their forefathers and soon gave voice to them in this new land of freedom. In a comparatively short time, the Slovak in America · teaHzed that he, too, could voice his opinions freely, that he could have convictions wiithout fear of repression. Slovak organizations gave him ample opportunities to express himself; and hls newspapers were for him mediums of information, instruction and inspiration. These <:!orrstituted the keystone of Slovak unity for all fellow Americans of Slovak ancestry. From the stand,point of individual advancement, any Slovak, no matter how humble his origin, could ·air his views in his own newspapers. This was a veritable school for many simple, uneducated Slovaks who became well-informed and law-abiding citizens of their •a dopted -country, but who, nevertheless, spoke proudly of their native Slovakia, the land in which they had been born, the ·land of their forefathers. The Slovak immigrant found it impossible to forget the land of his birth; he fondly recalled the scenes of Ms childhood, and often spolke of the relatives and friends beyond the sea. This was perfectly natural, for despite 1:!he hard lot and misery •o f his oTiginal home, yet he longed to be with his parents and friends, if only for a little whHe. He could see the village church wit'h its cross uplifted to the sky, as an eternal sign of salvation, a symbol of the deep faith in God that was in his soul, a symbol at once of his own pain and suffering, of his strength and hope. The church, located in the center of Slovak village life, with spires rising high above the simple peasant huts in whose shadow they reclined, stood out in sharp relief in his memory, for religion was the keystone of his existence. The church was his fortress in time of danger, his solace in time of grief, his hope in time of despair. Without his qhurch, his village priest, without prayer, his life would, indeed, be empty and forelorn. The Slovak has been able to bear life's burdens because he staunchly believes in Di- SLOVAKIA 7 vine Providence and because he seeks resources in prayer at all times. Abroad, in foreign lands, the church with its Slovak prayers and hymns, has been the bulwaTk of the Slovak immigrant. It has been his ,anchor on a foreign shore, a compass in an uncharted sea. Because the church is all hnportant in his life, the Slovak has invariably built a church, then school. With a ,s trong religious and social foundation, the Slovak in America maintained his national character and expanded his cultural endeavors as the years went by. It was his faith that kept him loyal to his sacred traditions, preserved his language, and made him cherish his nationality. On Sundays, he joined his fellow countrymen in Slovak prayers and hymns; this, perhaps, more than any ot'her single factor, perpetuated the most sacred and treasured memories of Slovakia. Imposing Slovak churches, modern parish and school buildings, and office building,s· of the Slovak societies are. concrete expressions of the deep religious convictions a:nd· cultural aspirations of the Slovak immigrant. They are monuments of self-sacrifice and devotion to time-honored institutions, permeated with the same fervent spirit of his forefathers who cherished their Christian traditions be·neath the Tatras since time immemorial. At home, unfortunately, genuine Slovaik societies and organizations did not exist, and the few that functioned were -p rimarily designed to serve elements and interests that were alien to the Slovak cause. Even ibhe churcih, in some instances, became an agency for these forces. But · in America, Slovak churches, organizations and schools became the centers of Slovak national culture. Moreover, the .spark of nationalism which was barely kept alight ait home, burst into a bright flame in the new Land of freedom. The Slovak immigrant caught t:Jhe spirit of American democracy whose blessings he had personally experienced in his daily life. He accepted these with a deep sense of gratitude. He was proud of his new status of citizenship, an'd now · tlia.t he was content, he yearned to have his folks back home· enjoy these self-same rights and advantages of the democratic way of life. 8 SLOVAKIA Slovak poets and writers, keenly aware of this stifling atmosphere in which their people were slowly expiring, made every effort to arouse the masses out of their lethargy. Although their voices were unheeded in their native land, where the people were submissive and demoralized, nevertheless, a small but determined minority of patriaticminded Slovaks organized political clubs to fight for their nation's inherent rights and to formulate a program for an active political movement. The Slovaks had leadership, but failed to support their leaders efficiently, and on various occasions some of their leaders joined the opposition to work against the best interests and welfare of their nat,ion. Before the first World War Slovakia's national life was caught in a nut-cracker net-wor'k of political and social intrigue and seemed doomed. National extinction was. indeed, a grave danger which had to be averted. The Slovaks were helpless in the fa:ce of the opposition whi•c h prevented them from developing their native culture and realizing their right to self-government and independence. Internally, the Slovak nation was vitally sound-physically, biologically and morally it was sound - and it possessed untapped natural resources, but needed an external force to set it free. And this dynamic force came from America. Actual statistics are not available to indicate to what extent the American Slovaks influenced various developments in their ancient homeland, but, perhaps, in the future this vital information will be gathered and compiled in order to determine approximately, if nat precisely, to what measure they affected the social and political progress of their native country. Even without this material, however, w~ are able to mention the beginnings of the movements that were inspired and inaugurated by the Slorvaks in America. Naturally, a considerable number of Slovak emigrants returned home after spending several years abroad. These had. fulfilled. their goal to attain sufficient funds for their particular needs; but a large number, the majority as a matter of fact, remained in America and made their permanent home in the land of their adoption. These had overcome the almost irresistable desire to return to their native land SLOVAKIA 9 and, though they never returned, during their entire life-time they nevertheless maintained close contaet with their relatives and friends in Slovakia. Even those, who brdke their ties with Europe irrevoc~bly, sti'll remained in touch w.iith their fellow-countrymen and, consequently, ma.de some contribution to the S'lovak cause indirectly. Actual instances of individua1s who broke completely wi1:Jh their past and lost contact wii!h their fellow Slovaks in Amerka were so rare that they can be d1scounted in our attempts to evaluate the destiny of the Slovaks in America and to arrive at a realistic analysis of the influence of American Slovaks on Slovia'k life in the country of their birtJh. The American phase of Slovak life, with its democratic texture and blend, effected several significant changes on home life in their native land. S,i nce the impeUing force of ~heir emigration in many cases was economic, there is no doubt whatsoever that corresponding returns from their labors abroad became the direct and immediate source of a relatiivelly large national income in Slovakia. The amount of new capital that was brought in by returning , Slovak emigrants is, perhaps, impossible to determine even approximately, but the fact remains that it was a windfall which gave Slovakia a new lease on its economic life. Foremost among the effec,ts of this influx of new capital to Slova'kia, was the ability of the average Slovak to own his own land by redeeming it if he hia,d lost it, and to purchase the necessary equiipment and livestock to insure his future economically. This gave him a chance to live as a free man to a large degree, for he was no longer subject completely to the whims and caprice's of his overlords in a smaill country, where the steadily increasing population made it imperative for the native Slovak to have .his plot of land, if he hoped to survive. The emergence of a growing number of debt-free, well-equipped arrd wellstocked small landowners marked the estalblishment, imperceptrbly but none-the-less surely, of a sound well-balanced economic unit in Slovakia's clhanging social order, Sma!ll landowners formed the nucleus of Slovakia's national life, for now they not only inha;bited the land of their forefathers, but they aetually owned it. Economic power, though 10 SLOVAKIA lllodest, indeed, had nevertheless enabled them to effect their social emancipation. Their improved status i'S readily ~derstood and appreciaited if we realize to what extent it freed them from the dead-weight of an oppressive feudal system stHl in vogue throughout Hungary and its domination - a feudal inheritance that had put most of Slovakia's ;forests and ara!ble soil, its rivers and la:kes, a'S weH as its ,l)O\litica1 control, into the ha,nds of an exclusively foreigz:i aristocracy. Under this system the Slovaks were nothing more than servants in their own homes and the fruits of their labors were plucked by usur,peTS who had seized control of tlheiir household. Originally, Slovakia's nobility was largely Slovak by birth, but in the course of time it degenerated by wholesale pesertion to a foreign cause. In this · way, large tracts of Jand passed into the hand'S of those who no longer were Slovak by temperament or nature and, hence, their policies were not designed to benefit the Slovaks. Moreover, in modern times, many large estates came into the hands of fore1gners whose policies were injurious to Slovak interests and whose political al'ignment with ,parties hostile to the Slovaks constituted· a positive menace to the national ex,i stence of the Slovaks in their own country. There is no doubt that the loss of ownership by the majority of the Slovak gentry, which was the backbone of the nation, put the national destiny of Slovakia into a most precarious posit!i:on. Moreover, the necessity of brea:king up their smal>l estates, because of the increasing population, :I'65ttlted in reducing the land to such small units as to make them unprofitable. 'J.ihis inevitably forced the s·m all land-holders to go into debt whenever there was the least mi:sca}Jeulation in their p1ans, or when there was a crop fai-lure. Improvements, or an expansion of one's holdings, were out of the question, for there was seldom a:ny surplus which the Slovalk could use · as an investment in a new enterprise. As a matter of fact, iit often ha:rppened thiat a landpwner was unable to meet his interest, not to speak of reducing the principal on his loan. Eventually, therefore, mahy estates fell into the hands of receivers, arid ·1ater were SLOVAKIA 11 1bought up by non-Slovaks. As a result, the Slovaks suffered. in a twofold manner: 1) native land-owners dmlinished greatly in numbers, and 2) many diispossessed Slovaks emigrated to o1!her lands where, having settled chiefly in industrial areas, they no longer cared to return to the land and, consequently, they and their children were lost to their country forever. The continual drain of human resources from the n_a ti.onal reservoi'I' of Slovakia weakened the country economica'1ly, morrully and poliitically, because non-Slovaks replaced. the original Slovaks in their native homeland. Under such conditions, Slovak life, as su~h, suffered a sharp decline. Without a doubt, the most essential unit of the Slovalk nation, w'hich gave it permanent character, solidarity and stability, was its independent gentry which had been close .to the sdil for centuries. It was imperative that this group be ,p reserved in its pristine strength and vigor if Slova'kia was to survive as a distinct race in its original niationrul domain. The land-holdings, instead of being sub_ject to di,visions, must be held intact - otherwise, a complete economic breakdown would result and national dissolution would inevitably follow. This was their fear, a well-founded one, of which the Slovaks were acutely aware. 1 America -came to the rescue in this national crisis. The many opportunities for work and good pay in the new world offered a solution to the problems of economic reihabili~ tion at home. Accordingly, t:Jhousands of debt-r:idden and almost destitute Slovaks departed. for American shores with high hopes for the future. And that they were not disillusioned is attested to by the fact that, in a few years, many returned home again with savings which reestablishe d their fortunes in thcir homeland. New homes a.ppeared, old ones were repaired, new equipment and livestock were purchased, old debts were liquidated and Slova'kia's national economy was once more in the hands of iits own native population. ParadoxicaUy enough, the emigration on a large scale from Slovakia which threatened to destroy the nation irre- 12 SLOVAKIA :voca;bly beyond revival, actually restored it to its rightful ownership and renewed vigor. The returning emigrants manifested remarkable energy and enthusiasm in this national restoration. Moreover, many former workers and tenants upon their return were a)ble to buy sufficient parcels pf land to insure a preponderantly Slovak ownership. Others, profiting from their varied experiences abroad, established some sort of business by buying a sawmill, a flour mill, a tavern, etc., and thereby reenforced Slovakia's eco-, nomy by their initiative in founding diversified enterprises. These manifold activities by a thoroughly-awakened Slovak populace were greeted with keen competition by alien interlopers who had established a monopoly in many fields, but the returning Slovaks, having had the advantages of rich experience in the new world, proved to be a match for them. Of tantamount importance was the need for wider education, so that their children might have the opportunity to acquire a high school and college training. The need was both soci'a.'l and political, for they needed Slovak leaders in public Hfe and industry. It was a serious menace, indeed, to have a large percentage of their sons desert to an alien camp and serve a foreign cause stmply because of their training in the anti-Slovak schools sponsored by chauvinistic Magyar regimes which produced countless renegades. Fortunately, not all the Slovak graduates of these schools turned against their Slovak nation. The blessings of American capital became aga,in apparent in the struggle of the Slovak nationalists to maintain the Slovak spirit of loyalty in their ~hildren by providing speciali>zed training for them. Thus, Slovak fathers in America secured the funds necessary for the task of educating their sons in Slovakia for the common welfare of their own countrymen. In homes that had an Ameri'c an background, the spirit of democracy and patriotism kept alive the national life of Slovakia. This is to be .attribulted to Amerka as her gift of freedom to a small nation which was struggling to emancipate itself from foreign domination. An essentia~ element in directing the destiny of a nation is undoubtedly the press, for newspapers, magazines SLOVAKIA 13 and books provide an index for the spiritual condition of a people. In this respect, the situation in Slovakia was really ~ploralble, because. only a fow Slovak neiwspaipers were published, and these did not enjoy wide circulation. The masses, as yet, had:·not acquired the habit of reading, because they did not feel the need of it. Moreover, they were impoverished and, hence, bought few boolks. For a long time, the only reading they had at hand was limited to their praye:tibodks, religious .bulletins and an occasional publication of the Spalok sv. Vojtecha (St. Adalbert's Society). The average Slovak showed l.ittle or no interest in politics, for he had become accustomed to the view that this was a game, or hobby, exclusively reserved for the nobility. The Americanized Slovaik, however, adopted a different view, and even native-born Slovaks, who had never been outside the confines of their country, gradually cihanged their attitude by reading Slovak newspapers which were sent to them from across the sea. From their pages they learned for the first time how grave the situation was in reality in their own b'ac'k yards. It was truly paradoxical that they were informed of things that happened right at home by receiving newspapers, published in their own language and spirit, more than three thousand miles away. They learned to defend their rights by a unified public opinion which was being crysta1Uzed largely through the influence of publications from foreign lands. And returning emigi.·ants strengthened this movement by keeping up their subscriptions to American newspapers. Many of them kept in close touch with their brother Slovaks abroad by retaining their membership in American Slovak societies for several years after coming back to Slovakia. Perhaps the most precious gift that America presented to Slovakia were the Slovaks who returned to their na.tive country, not only because they brought their savings, but also because these men had learned much by their new experiences whirch had matured them in many ways and which were to help Slovakia on the way towards winning her national freedom. Men who had left their country, dejected and despirrited, now returned refreshed and revivified by the atmosphere of American democracy. 14 SLOVAKIA In America, the Slovak who became a naturalized citizen lost his inferiority complex and acquired a healthy selfconfidence. He felt important once more as an individual, for he was proud of his new staJtus as a full-fledged citi'zeri of a great, democratic country. He respected the rights of others, While his own rights were a'liso respected. Moreover, as a member of free Slovak organizations, he learned to work not only in his own, but also in other's !interests. In fulfilling his responsibilities, as well as in insisting on his own rights, he was doing his work well in the spirit of true democracy. Although he became a vital part of American democratic life, the new citizen of S'lovak ancestry did not forget his native counrtrymen who lived in the land of his fathers in the Slovaik hills and woodlands and fields that stretched from the Low Carpathians in the West to the High Carpathians in the East. The Slovak language became a golden bond by whkh he was united to his fellow-countrymen beyond the seas ; and the concept ·of a wider extention of these rights to his people back home inspired him to work for the realrization of that idea!. Thus America became the fertile soil for the growth of Siovak national consciousness and freedom. Every Slovak town and village felt the impact of American democracy. The returning emigrant did not remain aloof from affairs of public welfare, but plunged 'into the thick of thfogs. Polirt:fos was no longer the here noire of the common man, for, after learning the democratic technique of American life, the Slovak entered into the arena of political struggles for his rights. He had both the courage and confidence to carry on the fight for his country's freedom as well as for his rights as a free man. While tracing 1:he direct influence of American democratic elements on Slovakia, we ought to reca:11 tha,t there was a strong cross-current that was felt in Slovak circles in America. This mutual assistance was ruppreciaited by leading Slovaks on both sides of the Atlantic, and they tried to establish closer ties of rela1Jionshilp with ea:ch other in order to achieve their goal of freedom. Communications SLOVAKIA 15 betw~n leading Slovak thinkers in Slovakia and America were mruintained through · personal messages, · writings in the mag~ines a,nd,_ newsipapers, annuals and almanacs in which the freedom-lov,ing Slovaks at home kept in touch with their brothers across the sea. Americans of Slovak descent, former immigrants from Slovakia, learned the iJ.esson of democracy and freedom well in Ameri'Ca. Freedom, they learned, is the natural birthright of all mankind. If and when the Slovak nation wins its fight for fireedom and complete pwitical independenrce, the Slovak people will have America to tJhank for it. Am~ rica was, and still is, a constant source of insipiration and hope for the Slovaks in their hom~land, despite what has happened in 1945. 'I1he Slovaks shall remain eternally grateful to Ameri'ca and Americans of Slo,va'k ancestry for the priceless contributions to their struggle for freedom and independence, for the many sacrifices made so that true democracy once may rule not only in Slovakia, butt in an countries of the world. The roots of democracy and freedom in .Slovalk,i a had their beginnings in America, and Slovaks everywhere, at home and aJbroad in foreign lands, firmly believe that America will not abandon Slovakia in her darkest hour. The Slovaks look longingly to America for liberat ion from the scourge of manlkind, the greatest enemy of the democratic way of life - Communism . 1 • • • WHO SAID IT? "We lay pa;roiooJar stress on ithe fadt that the few Slovaik rei:f.ugees wandering about in the we:sit, adwooating the idea of a Ozooh.os!lova!k State, do not r~resent the Slovalk people, who are today fanat~ca'lly anti-Czeoh. Ozeohoslovakia can only be restored against the wi:H of the S-loivaks. Concerning the Czeicihs, they s'hould wnderstand that onJy the federation suggested aJbQlVe (!the Da.nulbian federation) can protect theisr nation from new adventures." - (F. 0. Miksche - a Czech - in UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER, p. 216 ; Faber and Faber Ltd .. London).  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Influence of American Democracy on Slovak Life Description An account of the resource Dr. Francis Hrušovský Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9), December 1953 pp. 1-15 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hrušovský, František, 1903-1956 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/cb03e26aa3acb215579376ed63028435.pdf f040d644392e73fd9863035830cbd646 PDF Text Text DECEMBER 1953 VQL. Ill NO. 4 IN THIS ISSUE: INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SLOVAK LIF E CHRISTMAS IN THE LOW TATRA REGION . SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION ? SLOVAKIA' S RIGHT TO BE HEARD s SLOVAKIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: BUDATIN LETTRICH ' S REGIME IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH WHO SAID IT ? - PP. 15, 21 , 26, 54, 61 • • • Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Pub I ished by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �SLOV A.KIA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of S.LOV AK.IA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � DECEMBER 1953 VQL. Ill NO. 4 IN THIS ISSUE: INFLUENCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ON SLOVAK LIF E CHRISTMAS IN THE LOW TATRA REGION . SLOVAKIA AND THE WEST THE CZECHS FOR A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION ? SLOVAKIA' S RIGHT TO BE HEARD s SLOVAKIA AND INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 1938 WHY THE SLOVAKS WERE NOT CONTENT IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA SLOVAKIA IN THE LIGHT OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA: BUDATIN LETTRICH ' S REGIME IN THE LIGHT OF TRUTH WHO SAID IT ? - PP. 15, 21 , 26, 54, 61 • • • Edited and compi led by PHILIP A. HROBAK Pub I ished by THE SLOVAK LEAGUE OF AMERICA �SLOV A.KIA is µublished periodically by the Slovak League of America, a cultural and civic federation of Amerteans of Slovak descent. The chief purpose of S.LOV AK.IA is to promote a better understanding and appreciation of the Slovak nation and its long struggle for freedom and independence. As Americans, members of the Slovak League of America firmly believe that the Slovak nation, just as all nations, has an inherent and God-given right to freedom and independence. They are dedicated to the cause of the American way of life, Slovak freedom and world peace and are determined to oppose the plague of Communism and all other totalitarian political systems. Subscription to Slovakia $1.00 per year in the U. S. A. - $2.00 elsewhere. Send subscriptions to: SLOVAKIA Box 150 Middletown, Pa. Printed in the U. S. A. JEDNOTA PRESS Middletown, Pa. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Front Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 4 (9) Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource December 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cb18e5e0a77ab067de6c9a0fae8cb11.pdf 1e20dc5f9190e730a960390f4bf3731d PDF Text Text YOU CAN LEARN SLOV Al( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 9'.2 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English ; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of it s kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov castle, the story of which is told in this issue � YOU CAN LEARN SLOV Al( as easily as you can any other modern language. Slovak should be a MUST for students of Slovanic languages, because it is the simplest of all of them and a KEY to all of them. Prove it to yourself with the most scholarly text on Slovak, the SLOVAK LESSONS A practical study of the Slovak Grammar, 9'.2 lessons, 400 pages ; exercises in Slovak and English ; English-Slovak and Slovak-English vocabulary. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $3.50 HROBAK'S ENGLISH DICTIONARY - the best and most complete dictionary of it s kind; 702 pages with a brief sumary of the Slovak Grammar. Hard cover, bound in cloth, $4.00 THE SLOVAKS, by Peter P. Yurchak, should be read by all students interested in the history and traditions of the Slovak nation; 312 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $3.00; paper cover - $2.00 SKETCHES FROM SLOVAK HISTORY by Joseph Skultety, translation by 0. D. Koreff; a documented refutation of several errors propagated by writers and historians; 229 pages, hard cover, bound in cloth - $2.00; paper cover $1.00. Order from : P.A.HROBAK Box 150 Middletown, Pa. �SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov castle, the story of which is told in this issue � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA: A picturesque vi,~w of the ruins of the Beckov castle, the story of which is told in this issue  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Back Matter, Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8) Description An account of the resource includes photo of Beckov Castle Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/7cd17d0344bde42a0a0e78c075006252.pdf 1bc6bb2984939dcd15a5a6d7a8eae570 PDF Text Text 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) . � 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) . � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 64 SLOVAKIA DR. JOSEPH LETTRICH was head man in Slovakia from 1945 to 1948. The Slovak National Council, which he was chairman of, was absolute in all matters pertaining to Slovakia. He was a member of the Communist-dominated "National Front" Government of Prague until February 1948. Today ha is Vice-Chairman of the Executive Committee of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" (Washington, D. C.). which is headed by former Czech "National Fronters" who collaborated with the Communists in the Prague Government before the so-called Communist "putsch" of February 1948. Lettrich, the man who helped to destroy his own country, the independent Republic of Slovakia, suddenly became a "democratic, anti-Communist exile from Czecho,Slovakla" - as did many of the other members of the Council - after that "putsch.'' What kind of a "democrat" and "anti-Communist" Lettrlch actually was is reflected by the following quotations from his articles and speeches: "We cannot stress the fact often enough t'hat witho'll/t the help of the Soviet Army we would not have been ruble to meet here today. We shall never forget the saorifices and efforts made by ,t he Soviiet Union for the oause of political freedom. This showld be exipla:ined. to the yol.l'Ilgest people oif our generation. The Slovak oration and the Czechoslovruk Republic are. morally bound to the Soviet Union by very stron:g ties." - (CAS, Bratislaiva, June 5, 1945 . • • • • • • "Political parties which have outlived themseLves, which are politically unaiccepta.ble or guilty, may not be reviived in our country, nor renewed in any form ... The Democratic Party, together with the Communist Party in Slovakia, have created a well-,coordinated working body, hithento unknown, which bore witness and proved in a:11 fielas of endeavor that they weire united in a common punpose and by common interests that they had been faced by a cOIIIUllon enemy and by the same perils Today they are U1I1ited anew in a common endeavor to rebuild our nation. It is the firm convktion of all political leaders in the Democratic Party that this bond of collaboration shall be further strength(Before the Provisional National Assembly, ened.." Prague, October 30, 1945) . "Generalissimo stalin is the leader of tJhe great So.Vliet Uruion, our good ally and friend, whose Red .All'Iny fought so heroically against Nazism and brought freedom f)Ven to us." - (NARODNA OBRODA, Janiuary 26, 1947) .  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Joseph Lettrich in Retrospect Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 p. 64 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/fffb2baa8fcbabe8af38a838ff5d3dfb.pdf 9ddca8ebd9a2c57f524a16334c4c7b13 PDF Text Text SLOVAKIA 61 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BECKOV Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora. vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis. Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v "Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded by fortifications. Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was �62 SLOVAKIA the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later, the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396. OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor III inherited his father's properties and led his people in the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~ missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons, known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus prepared the way for the Retformatioo. When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle. Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod). Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle. The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after �S LOVAKIA 63 a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him: "Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall grant it." Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me, if you please, a castle upon that rook!" The crowd roared with laughter, because every one thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock, rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall have it!" The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison. Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend, Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles. The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March 19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere. 1 � SLOVAKIA 61 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BECKOV Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora. vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis. Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v "Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded by fortifications. Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was �62 SLOVAKIA the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later, the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396. OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor III inherited his father's properties and led his people in the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~ missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons, known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus prepared the way for the Retformatioo. When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle. Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod). Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle. The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after �S LOVAKIA 63 a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him: "Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall grant it." Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me, if you please, a castle upon that rook!" The crowd roared with laughter, because every one thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock, rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall have it!" The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison. Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend, Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles. The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March 19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere. 1 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document SLOVAKIA 61 CASTLES OF SLOVAKIA BECKOV Beclkov - proibalbly caUed "Bludinec" originally - belongs to the group of the oldest citadels or castles of the Vah region which were situated for the mos.t part on the left banlk of the Vah river. Beneath BeckOIV there was an old military and commercial road, whi'ch deiviated from the main Czech highway near Jablonica and extended through Brezova to the Vah region. According to tradition, °the Beclwv Castle already existed during the time of the Great Mora. vran Empire, so that the legend aJbout its originating druoring the time of Ct"iJbor (a'bout 1412) prdbaibly has no historical basis. Bookov is mentioned in docUilllents already in 1208 under the name of "BlU'lldix." In descri!bing Ska.Jilm, the documents tell us of a road "ooming from Beokov." The bishop of Nitra (rubout 1228), we learn, donated a fourth of the wine he had received as a tithe from Beckov to the monastery on Skalka. That means that in those days the vicinity of Bec•k ov was intersted in growing grapes. In the 13th centll.'ry, Anonymous ("Belae regis notarius") oalled Becko;v "Ca.strum Blundus" (Bolondoc), and Bela I. himself called it "Bolondtuich." The Belelkov · fortress was at first a royal military station and, later, bieneath the castle there originated the settlement of Beckov, which was once surrounded by fortifications. Matthew Cak oif Trencin, "the Lord of the V ah and the Tatras," ruled over Bedkov at one time. After him to Beckov came the royal solicitor, which means that during the rule o.f King Robert and King Louis I , Bedkov was in the hands of the king. When Zigmond of Luxemburg sought men in Boland in 1386 to fight his dvaJ, Charles of Durazza, he was escorted on this trip by four soldiers from Slovakia, one of whom, OtiJbor ("Tilbu'l'tius" in Latin) , received extensiive lands from Zigmond for faithful services rendered. This CUbor was generally known as the Lord of the Vah river ("dominus fluvii Vagi"), even though he also was 62 SLOVAKIA the admrinistrator of Bratislava (.Press/burg) amd, later, the Duke of TransyWania. At that time Zigmond and his wife donated wen Beckov to Ctilbor and this gift is confiitrned by a special document, dated in Trencin in 1396. OUbor relbuilt and renovated the castle for his own use and then dona!l:ed Podhrad to his old oasteMan J a.mes from Nasil.O!V. Otiibor founded the ipr~osture in Norve Mesto (nad Vahom) amd ,pa;rtiiciipated in the CouI11Cil of Kostmca (14141418). DUike Ctilbor, Lord of Treinici111, Hlohorvec and many other casitles·, died in 1424 after he was stung by a bee. His oldest son, • Ctihor II, . became BishOtp of Jager and Oti!bor III inherited his father's properties and led his people in the fights agaiinst the Hus.sites. Ten years after his father's death, Ctibor NI also passed away and the family's v,ast hoWmgis, excepting Beckov, were wen orver by the r01yal soli'c;itOT. Boolmv came in.to the hands, of the Banflfy family from Dol111a Lindia:va; the last desicendant of this clan, John Banffy died fighting the Tunks in 1595. While the Banfey family nrled orver Bookorv, the preacller Borne~ missa visited them and wrote his collection of sermons, known as "Postla," which was .published in 1584 and thus prepared the way for the Retformatioo. When the Turks attaciked Piestlany in 1599, they took with them 13,000 eruptives from that part of the country and plll'lldered and piilaged the entire vicinity Ulp to Trencin. History notes, howerver, that the people who sought refuge in the Beokorv Oa,,stle were spared, even though the TurlIB had oome under the very fortifications of the castle. Imrich Thakoly used Beickov as a prison for his eruptives aftetr his MoraJVian eJQpedition (Uherslky Brod). Bult how did Beokov fall into ruins? Some say that the castle was riazed durin1g the rei<gn of Leopold I, while others say something else. Nervertheless, it is quite certain that the great confla;gra:tion which devoured the commU!Ility of Bookov in 1729, also completely ruined the castle. The legend aJbout the oriigin orf the castle, which the Slwaks oif BookOIV love to teH, relates that Ctilbor built the c.astle to fwfill. his ;promise to his clown Beiclko. Ct:ifbor, the legend says, was a passionate hunter. One evening, after S LOVAKIA 63 a successful day o,f hunting, Ctibo,r and his group made cam11p near the high limestone rook upon whiclh the ruins of .Beckov rest tod!ay. Ctilbor was in a jovJal mood. After eating heartily, the group burst oot in song; some mernfbe:rs of the party recounted tales of heroism, witches and goblins; others told jokes. But no one could te11 a tale or a joke like Bedim, Ctilbor's court jester. Betoko had Otiibor and his entourage in stirtJches. A.ifter the clown had rel,a ted his last "just one more" taill tale, Ctibor s,aid to him: "Booko, my fool, well done. Demand o!f me what you will and I, iif your wish is at a'll humacly attrunaJble, shall grant it." Becka, seated at.oip a hrl.l!ge b1aclk bear the party had ba;gged that da;y, grinned, fixed his eyes on the rook above and said: "Look, if you are sll!ch a frumous mam, build me, if you please, a castle upon that rook!" The crowd roared with laughter, because every one thoUJght that impossible. But Ctilbor lodked up art tilie rock, rulbbed his, whiskers, smiled and r~lied: "You shall have it!" The legend continues that Ctilbor did fulfill his promise. A few days l•aiter he had his people start woI1k on the new castle. We are toJd that Ctibor ordered his men to stO!p all traivelers along the road beneath the site of the castle and put them to work for ei ght days. In a year the castle was bui,l t and Ctibor arnd his people celebriated the a-ccom:plishment. The new castle wa s beaurt1ful beyond comparison. Ctilbor named it Beckov in honor of his olown Beclco. But Ctilbor did not give it to Beclko. Aiocordin,g to the legend, Ctibor lilked the castle so much that he moved into it himsellf and gave Be'clko one of his other castles. The great Slovak patriot, writer and publisher, Joseph MilosJ.av Hurban, was born in the viHaige of Becikov, March 19, 1817. He was one of the leaders of the SlOIVaJk rebellion against the Haibsiburg,s in 1848-49; with Louis Stur and Michael Hoooa, he led the revolt for equal rights for the Slovak nation. Hur.ban and Hodza joined with Stu.ir to establish the literary Slovak that is used today by Slovaks everywhere. 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Castles of Slovakia: Beckov Description An account of the resource Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 61-63 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 castles https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/208254f95568e58a0bb64b8eba392d53.pdf 745c5ac46407f7c329eb3082fa1b68d6 PDF Text Text 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of �SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe �34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the �SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming �SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular �SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs �38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them �SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 �40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- �SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the �42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the �SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in �44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- �SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 �4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , �SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk �48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. �SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. �50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was �SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- �1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The �SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and �54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ �SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 �56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its �58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; �SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity �60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world. � 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of �SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe �34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the �SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming �SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular �SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs �38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them �SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 �40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- �SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the �42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the �SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in �44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- �SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 �4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , �SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk �48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. �SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. �50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was �SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- �1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The �SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and �54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ �SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 �56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet �SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its �58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; �SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity �60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 32 SLOVAKIA DR. HUBERT RIPKA'S VERSION OF THE COMMUNliST "PUTSCH" IN CZECHO-SLOVAKIA Karol Sidor Fourteen months after the Communists took over Czecho-,Slovalda, Hubert R~pka, former minister orf various resorts cxf the late Dr. Edward Benes, decided to write a series o,f articles under the head.mg of "A Prefabricated Revolution" (Une Revolution Prefabriquee) . The articles, telling what happened in Prague in February 1948, were published in several European dailies. Why Riipka waited so long to tell the world his version of what happened in Ozecho--lSlovaikia early in 1948, he does not d~V'll:lge, but it is quite obvioUIS that he wanted time to do a little healing. Rilpka's trade was journ.alism. He was the editor o:f the "Lldove Noviny" (People's News), the daily cxf · the Czech intelligentsia published in Brno, and during his six years in exile he was Minister of Propaganda - and what propaganda! - of Dr. Benes's London government-in-exile. R iipka, then, was ruble and crupafbJe of writing. The Roman daily "II POipolo" paid quite a tribute to Ripka when it began pUJblishmg his series of articles. It presented Ripka as "the only Czechoslovak democratic minister, who successfully escaped from his country after last February's putsch"! Of course, that was a bit far.fetched, because we know that ministers Zenkl, Kocvara, Stransky, Pieto.r , Prochazka, Majer and Franelk also escruped from Praigue after the Felbruary "putscih ." These collea,gues of Ripka were just a s "Czechoslovak" and "democratic" as he was himself. They all had one thing irn common with Ripka: they helped Benes sell out both the Slovaks and the Czechs to the USSR. It is quite s1gnifiicant that after sUJCh a "terrible putsch" so many Ozeoh ministers, officials and leading politicians could escape without incident or accident. Robert Ingrim -,. author cxf "After Hitler Stalin?" - wrote a:bout this phenomenal exodus in the Swiss "ViATIDRLAND" of SLOVAKIA 33 September 25, 1948. One is led to suspect with Ingrim that so many Czech ministers, generals, politicians and thousands of Czech go.vernment officials and workers could hardly escaipe wtthout incident or accident without a "deal" with Comrade Gottwald. Any one who has read Riplta's articles must admit that Ripka was careful not to attook Gottwald or Zapotocky. What is more, Riplk a did not conrfess that he played bad politics, or that he was sorry for what he had done, or that he would never again collaiborate with Communism. On the contrary, Ripka wrote: "Today more than ever before, I cannot stop believing that a free and independent Czecho-Slovakia can exist only in Europe that is brought to balance, where the West and Russia find a proper agreement to collaborate. Even the events of February 1948 could not shake me from this conviction, which remains the basis of my whole conception of national politics." - ("Fi,garo., " Paris, April 4, 1949). Stanisl•aN Mikolaj,czylk, Nagy Ferencz, and other refugees frOIID 'beyO!Ild the Lron Cm·tain wrote in a different tone. They corufessed that they were mistaiken in thinking they could negotiate a decent agreement with Soviet Russia. But Riipka stated pulblicly, even arrter the so...;called February "putsch," that he shall persist in his error, and his articles only corufirm the fact that in the "new" CzechoSloivaikia which Ripka would build - he would again cultivate contacts with the Communist USSR just as enthusiastically and loyally as does Antonin Zapotocky today in the name of Czecho-Slovakia. R~pka is lo•a th to admit that politically he is bankrupt. He keeps on talking aJbout a "new agreement" between the West and Russia meaning Czecho..Sl01Vakia when he sarys "West." In fact, w:hat he told us in his articles was equivalent to saying that ne and his "Czechoslovak democratic" colleagues would even now be collaborating with the Communists and Stalin's stooge in Czech-Slovakia, if they would have been allowed to keep their ministries. But in Washington, Ripka, Zenkl and the other soc_alled ·"OzechoslovaJk democrats" - now organized in tihe 34 SLOVAKIA "Council oif Free OzechoSilwakia" - talk aJbout their fight against Communism. Wihat kind of fight agaill'st Comm'll.Ilism? As far as is kno:wn there was no fight against Communism in Czeteho-1Sloivaikia as a whole, but only in Slovakia. Deception, appea:sement, crupitulation, and shameful mght mto other ilands can hardliy be called a "fight against Communism"! The mass "escape" oif Ozech Sociialists was undoulbtedly arranged and assured in advance, and the socalled "OzoohoslovaJk dernoorats" did not esc~ emptyhanded either. What can be tni.rthlfully said about the: fight of the Ozech emigration against Communism? Only this: We are still patiently waiting for it to start! It aippea,rs to us that Czech emigrants - both the right and left wings - are agreed on only one thing: to carry on their fight against Slovak emigrants and refugees whom they have termed "separatists." They vilify them before the Red Cross, the U. S. oocwpation forces and their allies, and the U. S. State Department. The Slovaiks, aocording to them, simply are no good; they are Hitlerites, Fascists, Nazis and, worst of all, "separatists." Aocording to Rilpka, Zenkl, Lebtrich and other "has.beens" of Dr. IDdward Benes's bankrl.llpt political ikd.ngdom, the Slovaks hiwe no right to freedom and independence, no right to an indeipendent po~mcal state. To the "Czechoslovak democrats" the fight against Slovak freedom and independence means more than the fight against Communism. T. G. Masaryk and Benes fooled the world in 1918. Benes did it again in 1945. And their disciples are dete:rmined to continue the propagation of the fraud that was "Czechoslovaik democracy.'' Ripka, Zenikl and their followers are not fighting Communism. The ra'llks oif Ozech emigrants are fiull or' agents of the Ozeich secret police and spies of the Communist Party. More Czech emigrants "escaped" back home than all'y other class of emigrants. That is not suITTprising to any one who really knows the Benes Czechs. There was veriy little difference between Benes's "Czechoslovak democracy" and Communism. The former was in fact a handmaid of the SLOVAKIA 35 latter. Benes and his "Czechoslovaks" could not suffer political opposition ~ more than the Reds or the Nazis. Loolk at their rewrds: they tell us tihat these queer "democrats" ipla,y ed a'long with Communism and actively collaborated with Communists for many yea,rs. Ripka enthusiastically welcomed the c0Ua.1boration and eternal frien<lshlp between Soviet Russia and Czecho...slovalkia in 1935 (Vd. his article in "Zahranicni politilka," Pra)gue, 1935,pgs. 14-l7). At that tilme Riipka wrote that the Ozechs wanted to 'b e "not only mediators between the old West and the new East, but also factors, actively cocreating a synthesis of lasting values of the old European civilization and the new civilization being born in the Soviet Union." Ten years later - in 19415 - the Benes Ozechs really got the chance to play the role of "factorris." They were given the opporturuty "to aictilvely cocreaite a synthesis" between Russia and Czec'ho~Slovakia. Just how suocessful they were in this, we shall see later when we anal~ Ripka's articles. But let us say at the outset: in Central Europe it was only the BENES CZECHS who actually want.ed to collaborate with the Communists! In Ma~, 194'5, when the Soviet a:ranies rolled into Prague, it was only the Ozechs cxf all the peoples of Central Eurorpe who welcomed them with oipen joy and enthusiasm a'S the "armies o,f lilbeTation." In the first Ozech post-wa,r government, Clement Gottwald, chairnnran of the Czech Communist party was named Vice-iPrennier am.d, after the parliamentary elections in 1946, as Premier of the government in Prague by "!president" Benes. At that time no;where did the Communists in a parliamentary election receive so many votes as they did in Bohemia a!Ild MoraJVia; in Slovaikia they were beaten dedsive1y by the SlovaJk electorate. 1 Such was the political line of Benes and his followers. In Prwgue the Cotmmunists, a;nd not Benes and Ripka, 1becrume the "factors." And the Communists lost no time in creating Rilpka's "synthesis" of 1935 between the "old West" and the "new East." Benes and Ripka had prepared for this synthesis already since 1935 and were beaming SLOVAKIA 36 with joy because the whole world was astounded by · their political recltlessness. Collaib,oration with the Communists in internal politics had begll!Il in 193'5 when Benes needed the votes orf the COimmunist Party · to be elected president. The C.omimunisits promised to vote fOl" Benes on the condition that Gottwald, Kopecky and Stetka, whose political mandates the Court of Election of Czecho-Slovakia would not verify and approve, would be approved as members of the Prague parliament. Benes promised to do that little thing and so enaJbled three Communists to become members of par1i'a,ment in 1935. 'Dhe Communists voted for Benes and later proved their sympathy for him by voting for the presildential budget every ye·a r. The Communists were for everything that •~President" Benes himself asked for in the budget, but either refrained from voting or voted against all other items of the State budget. 1 When Benes resigned as ,president of CzechO-iSlovakia in June, 1948 - the second time within a decade - the Communists voted him full presidential rpay for life and mrugnanimously gruve him the Limy Castle and the properties belonging to it. In a word, Benes and Ripka did collruborate with the Communists for many years. That collaboration did not cease because orf ideological reasons, but only because the Communists in February, 1948, told their collaborators what amounted to: "We thank you with communistic sincerity for your collab.o ration O!f many years with us. You can go now; we do not need you any mo:re. You can even go alb road if you wish; at hQlme you are useless to us, and id' you go abroad we shall not fear you." "The Czechoslovak people" - said Hubert Riplka in his article in the "IL POPOLO" ( 4--30-49) - "with singular joy welcomed the first allied treaty with Russia in 1935." In the first place, no "Czechoslovak" people exists, ethnJ1cally 51peruking. But there are Czechs a!lld Slovaks. There are two nations - the Czech and the Slovak - who do ~ t to all phenomena aocording to their training and traditions. And so it was with the treaty of Benes with Stalin in 193'5: the Czechs reacted one way, while the Slovruks reacted altogether differently. The ~ h s reacted "with singular SLOVAKIA 37 joy;" they welcomed that treaty, because they thought just as Ripka himself had thought in 1935 - that together they would be able to form a synthesis of the "old" European ciiv:i lization and the "new" civilization which was being born in the Soviet Union. Soviet ci'Vilization was not brought to Europe by Ripka; but by the soldiers of the Soviet armies. The nations of the "old" ciivilization felt the sting of this "new" civilization on their bodies. And they shall continue to feel it as long as they do not :wcept it 100 per cent by discarding the "old" civilization which was founded on Christianity and is almost 2000 yea:rs oJd. Personally, Ri;pka was terrified by Soviet . "'Ciivi.lilzation" in praclice. He did not remain in C?.echo-Slovakia to take part in the creation of the "synthesis," but fled far beyond her borders. Yes, as far a:s he could go Jrorn this "new" civilization which in 1935, he praised highly and recommended so zealously not only to the Czech peoiple, but to the whole world as well. Why did Ripka do that? Did he not ,know what was happemng in the S()IViet Union? From 191,8 to 1935 there were aJbout 100,000 Rlussians, Ukranian and White Russian emrl.grants in OzechoJS[,()IValkia. They had fled from the Soviet Union and told the Czechs what they saw aind e~rienced in Soviet Rlussia. 'Ilhe Benes Oze.chs, however, did not ~Ii.eve those eye-<Witneses. 'Ilhe Czechs were blinded by their old lave for the "Sl01Vanic Ea:st" and thought that Communism of the 1935 vintage was no longer the Communism of 1917. They forgot tllat Communism, as a doctrine and a system of government, is one and the saime for all peoples aJild all times. It does not relate only to the Russian Ozars, but to all n0;tions of the earth and to aH states. The substance of CommuniSIIll is not sulbject to the ohangeis of time. Ripka evidently met with real Communist civilization only in 194'8, in Prague, when it too:k aiway his ministry. He fled before it, we are sruq:~posed to believe, to saive his life. And yet 1n 1949 he wrote that he still believed in colla.borating with the UISSR. so Ripka, too, was a product of Czech na:tiona:l development, whlch was a1ways directed to the left. The Czedhs 38 ::,LOVAKIA made Jan Hus (1'370~141'5) the symlbol of their rebellion aigainst Rome. '.Dhey grolllped ooder his banner and always emphasized more and more the negati~stic ·elements of Hus' character, suppressing all his positive qualities. As a result large grOUfPS of the Ozech nation, matriculated as Catholics at baptism, got themselves. in the periphery of world Christianity, their roots of solidarity w~th the Ohristian civilization of the west dried Ulp in tilme and the Ozech masses aH the more readily joined the "111ew" civiHzation which Ripka said was being born in the Soviet Union. Thrs ideological development of the Czechs to the left explains why in 193'5 the Czechs welcomed a treaty with Moscow and why in 1946 in the parliamentary elections in Ozetcho-1Slovakia the international and atheistic Oommunist Party came out on top in Bohemia and Morrruvia. But the Ozechs were accustomed to belonging to laiI'!ge economiic and politkal units. Their outstanding historian, Francis Palacky, wrote to the FrMllkfurt Assemlbly in 1848: "The preservation of Austria, its integrity and cOl11SOlidation, is and must be a great and important th!ing not only to the Czech nation, but also to the whole, olf IDurope, nay, to all humanity and cultU'l"e." That same Palaciky is the author of the staitement: "H Austria did not exist, we would have to create it." Dr. Edward Benes shared similar ideas. In his bodk, "Le Problem Autrichien et la QuestiO!ll Tcheque" (pg. 307) ·b e wrote in 1908: "Frequently we bear talk about the collapse of Austria. I absolutely do not believe it. The historical and economic ties that mutually unite the 1181tions of Austria are too strong to allow Austria to collapse.'' This was written at a time when the Czechs were becomilllg a nation of oifificia.ils and directors, administering not only in Bohemia, Morruvia and Silesia, but even in Galicia, a signdficant part of Vienna and later even in Bosnta and Hercegcwina. True, this was all under the supernsion of Vienna and ac:corddng to her laws. During the first World War T. G. Masar,yik and Edward Benes came upon the idea of making the Czech nation independent by destroying Austria-Hungary. To help them SLOVAKIA 39 with that plan tihey SIUCCeeded in getting 1,'500,000 Slovaks to whom T. G. Masaryk had solemruy promised in Pittsburgh, Pa., on May 30, 1918, that Slovalk ia, within the framewonk af Czecho-SlovaJkia, would hiwe, arrnong other things, her own assembly, her own courts and her own ,s chools. On the 0:ther hand, Dr. Edward Benes, wJth his signature attaiched to the Peace Treaty of St. Germain Se!ptem\ber 19, 1919) , haid guaranteed the Ruthenfans territorial autonomy, a legislative a:ssemlbly, their own governor, etc. Both Masaryk and Benes la~r repudiated their solemn promises. As lonig as Masaryk and Benes · ruled Czecho,.,SloV'akia, neither the Slwaiks nor the Rut>henians were guaranteed autonomy. Nolbody 'bothered to ask the other peoples orf Czecho-SloV1aLkia - the 3,500,000 Germans, albout a miUion Magyars, SOIIIle 200,000 Po.les, etc., whether they wanted to live together with the · Czechs in the common staite of CzeohoSlorvaJkia. The frirst Constitution of 1920 was approved by the Prague parliament when that body did not have a single representative of the Germans, the Poles, Magyars and Ruthenians, and when the Slovaks were represented not by deputies elected by the Slovak people, but by deputies named by Prague, i.e., by T. G. Masaryk and Edward Benes. And that Constitution - a tyipi~al Benes creation remained tmchanged and was binding U!pon every citizen of Czeicho..iSllovaikia until N oivemlbe~, 193-8. It is understandiaJbJe that the majority Olf nations of the ReipUJblk did not fare well in Ozecho-.Slo,vaikia. The existence of Czecho-1Slovaikia was not supPorted by the will of the majority of her mhrubitants. 'l'he Czechs themseLves knew that, and the old desire for broader economical and political spheres, whereby the life o,f the Czechs could bet.t er be safeguarded and ·p rotected, began to awaken in them. They knew that internally Czecho-Slovakia was weak and that externally she wws threatened lb y the Germans. Czech leaders, therefore, ,b egan looking to;ward the So~fot Union which emlbraces one-SQxth o1: the unilverse. They began to tell their ,people and the world that the So'Viet Union was •a Slovian:ic land, that a "new" cirvi:lization and a new ally and ( 1 40 SLOVAKIA defender Oif the Ozech nation, especially against German aggression was being born there. This thought was strengthened by the Ozech...SOviet Treaty of 1935. The Czechrs saw before themselves the vast expansiveness Oif the Soviet cowntry which was incomparably larger and rilcher than Austria-iliungacy. Culturally and politicai11y the Russii'am,s were far ~hind the Czechs. The Czeohs dreamed that in time they might even rule the Russian roost! They thought that by collruborating with the Soviets they would sooner or later find themselves on top even if it were oruy in the sense of the old Czech and even sicikly inclination toward Panslavism - at one time the Czarist and Ortlhod-0x variety and now the Red and atheistic kind. Slovaik national development went along a completely different course. The SlOIVruks not only did not welcome the treaty with Moscow in 1935, but openly condemned it through their elected deputies, in the Prague parliament. The Slova3c naition built its spiritual world consistently on its own national tradition. That tradition was Christian. It was created with equal zeal by both the Slovak Catholics and the Slovalk Protestants. Thait S1walk tradition is the common property olf aU Slovalks, no matter what their political or religious beliefs. The Slovak Protestant L'udovit Stur (1815-1856), Slovak patriot and national philogq>her, left the Slovalk nation in his books valua/b'le sources on how to correctly orientate itself in new social and national tendencies. Stur's book "The Slavs and the World of the Future," published after his deaith, has this to sary albout the Communism of his day: ''In every instan1ee Communism means the collapse and the destruiction oif the state. Communism arrived at this aim through atheism and apostacy from Christianity. In every fornn of Communism, no matter w:hat its origin, the outlook on life is da,r,k, laicking every tender j'oy. It brings the most c:mel sJaivery. Commun,i:sm, let it striive. and pretend in any manner whatsoever that it will make all peoples share in all rights, nevertheless, knows nothing a!bout humanity; it degrades humanity and, because it holds to sys- SLOVAKIA 41 tams that are imipractiea!l and unrealizaJble, it belongs among the most stupid innovations that harve th'llS far been created by the human mind." The Slovak Catholic priest Jan Palarik (1822-1870) wrote a dissel'ta,tion in 1:864 "Albout SlOlVanic Mutuality." In it he resolutely stands fo.r a Slorvalk Sta,te and desires to see it in a federation of staites in EurOipe. But ne:ver under the direction of Russia. Pa1arik strongly repudiated Russia,n Panslavism and ,predicted thart "the whole of Europe wouM rebel against the Slovanic peoples" if they should ever come under the rule of the Russians. The Slovak Protestant, Milan R. Stefanik (1880-1919), a General in the French Army and the first Minister of War in Czooho-lSlovaikiia, was in Rus,s,i a in 191'8..1919 and saw Communism at close range. In February, 191'9, he tele. graphed his government at Prague: "To flirt with Bolshevik tendencies would be comparable to foresaking the path of honor and sane reason. The fight against Bolshevism in all its manifestations must prevail in our politics." On such foundations, then, was, buiilt the Slovak stand against Communism. It was built on the foundations of Christianity and nationalism, and never on the foundation whi~h Mussolini amd Hitler gave to their anti-Communism. The Communists and their friends had pro~1aimed that Mus-solini and Hitler dervised anti-Communism in Europe and that the SIJ.ovaJks had taken it over from them. That does not correspond with the truth. Slovak phifosophers long before Mussolini and Hitler warned their nations not to acceipt Communistic teaJChing. In the po1itiical life w Slov-a kia the party of Msgr. Andrew Hli'Dlka consciously fortified and strengthened this SlovaJk anti-Communism in the broad masses of the Slovak nation. Anti-Communism had thus become a component part of Slovak national beliefs. That is why the pa11ty of Andrew Hllinka pmtested a,g ainst the apprwal of Benes's treaty with Stalin in 1935 when it came up for approval on the floor of the Prague Parliament. At that time Hlinika's Farly haid 30.1 per cent of all the voters in Slovakia, while the Communist Party in Sfovakia had 13 per cent, and the 42 SLOVAKIA party orf Benes and Riipka only 3.2 per cent of the total Slovia:k electorate. The Slovak stanqpoint was ideologically and rightd'uUy represented by Hlinika's Party which was the first and largest political party in Slovakia since 1925. On November 6, 1935, as a Slovak deputy I sipotk e in the IllMil.e of Hlinlka's Party on the floor of the Pra:g,ue parliament. In the presence of the Foreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, I said: "Alas, foreign policy under the direction m Dr. Edward Benes has deviated from the tendency that General Stefanik followed in 1919. He requested the Prag;ue government to fight against Bolsheivism in all its manifestations and warned not even to flirt w.ith Bolshe'Viik tendencies. IDven flirting with Bolshevik tend.endes he called foresaiking the road of hooor and sanity. 1n the meantime the Prague government already conoluded various rugreements with the bloody offspring o;f Bolshevism~ the Soviet Union. "The Hlinlka Slovak People's Party rejects the theory of Bolshevism, co:ndemns its bloody ipra:ctices as well as its inhuman methods, and with a very heavy heart tolerates the fact that OzeichoJSlo'Wllkia has deviated from the course that was 'Plotted b,y her co-d'ounder and first Minister of War, Ge111eral Stman:i!k. The no:mnali.!zation of diplomatic contaiots can be understood even between such st:riucturally different states as is our democrartic Ozecho-slovaJk RepubHc and the SOIVieit Union. Fimdly other states similar to ours have such diiplomatic contacts. But imrrnediatetly following the esta!blishment otf contacts, there were so many expressions of sympathy within the Ozooho.,Slo;va:k Reipublic for the Soviet Union and its system that this must fJll us who are nationally orientated in a Christian way - with fears about the future Czecho-Slovaikia. To· tie ouir destiny with the destinies of the Soviet Union, to build on agreements signed by Bolshevii.ks, I consider as the greatest bl,un. der made by our present foreign policy. "We slovak,s warn the Czechs away from the political mista!kes being committed by our Fcreign Minister, Dr. Edward Benes, because . too zealously he binds us with the Soviet Union that is so distant to us. In the interests of the SLOVAKIA 43 State we demamd a change in the lime followed by our foreign polilcy, we demand thait the defense of the State be built on a more realistic 'basi'S - one that conforms mo•r e with the mentality of the poipulation. Stating ·a ll these insufficiencies, I intvoduce them as one of tihe reasons that force us SloivaJks not to express our confidence in the present leailersh'ip of our foreign policy." Is it necessary to bring in more evidence to show that the SloviaJks were conisristently orientJated anti-Cottnlmun.istically? It proives co!D'clusively that Riipka was wrong when he said that "the Ozecho--!Slov.a!k people un:anilmously welc,ooned with joy the first allied agreement with Russia in 1935." The Ozec'hs, especialily the Sovieto,phiie Ozech intellectuals headed by R~pka, were made h~y by the treaty. The Slova!ks, however, eX1perieniced aJbsolutely no joy on that ocoasioo; nay, they aiticized and rejected the treaty and voted against it in 1936 in the Pra:gue Parliament. And this aJso attests to the fact that we are here concerned with two very different nations whose development and political convictio1J1S were altogether distin'Ct and diffe:rent. 1Riipka was rilght when he said that afiter the conclusion of a;greemnts with Moscow, in 19315 and 1943, Benes and his goveI1Il!ment exipressed "their complete confidence in the Soviet government." In return they expected the Sov.iet to return the friendshiip, confidenice and, rubove a'll, tihe assuraI1JCe that the USSR shall not intervene in our internal affairs." "That conrfidence has been betrayed" - Hulbert Ripka is screeching today. In February 1948 Moscow proceeded against democracy in Ozecho~Slovakia, ·be'Cause "it wanted to see in Pra;gue a totalitarian Communistic goivernment swbsement to. its will." So Ripka acknowledges th,at Moscow was dissaJtisfied with coHruborating in the fomnation of Riipk,a 's "synthesis." Ripka finally dis,wvered that Red Moscow wants its allies to be totaHy sulbserivierut to its dictates. But Ripka came upon this self-evident matter only in 1948, when he was thrown out of the g01VeTil!IIlent, or was at least prevented from co-governing in Prague with the Reds, and after he fled Ozecho-SlofVlakia. Before that time, however, Ripka was the man, who - act)ing like somebody in 44 SLOVAKIA the pay of Moscow - assured the Czechs and the uninformed world that reports about Moscow intervening in the internal affairs of individual states were absolutey false! Philip Panetili in his boO!k "Ed.war:d Benes, Leader of Democracy," on pgs. 123-124, notes the commentary of Dr. HUibert Ripka on the treaty of December, 1943, which Dr. Benes concluded with Moscow. "This Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty," said Riipk:a at that time, "had as its aim to strengthen the security of Europe." Ripka rejected the contention that this pact would mean the bolshevization of Euro,pe or Ozecho,Slovaikia. "The treaty," Ripka stated categorically, "gives a clear answer to all those who continue to suspect the Soviet Union of the intention of bolshevizing the countries of Central Europe that are its neighbors, nay, of intending even to annex them to the Soviet Union. The treaty gives a clear answer to all who are continuing to present Czecho-Slovakia as a tool in the hands of the Soviets. In the agr.e ement of 1943, the Soviet Union once again binds itself to respect her independence and that it shall not intervene in her internal affairs. Czecho-Slovakia binds iself in a similar fashion. By these formal ties the fact was confirmed again that the Soviet government had no intention of forcing its political regime on other nations and so much the less to annex the nations of Central Europe or any others to the Soviet framework." Whence did Dr. Ripka know these things? Was he ignorant of the fates of the Caucasian repulblics, or the painful fate oif the three Ba:ltic states, Latvia, Lithuania and Est01I1ia? Since the S01viet government acted imperlalisti:c . ally to.ward those states, why did Ri,pka think that the same thing would not aiso happen in the case of Czecho~Sl()IV3ikia? But Riipka wenlt mucli farther . He said thait the treaty which Ozeicho-SlavaJkiia conicluided with the Soviet Union not only did not weaken her S01Verdgnty and independence, but, converseJy, that 'basically it strengthened and secured them. As a real progressive, aJ.way;s wanting to instruct and teach other nations, R1pka offered thi,s instruction: "Not in distrust and in a hostile stand toward the Soviet Union, but in confidence and sincere willingness for a clean, friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union is the re- SLOVAKIA 45 liable guarant.ee for assuring the freedom and independence of every country, namely, the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. Every nation in this region with which the Soviet Union borders directly can be certain if it cultivates a friendship with this great power - that it certainly shall get from it help to defend its freedom and independence." Note the certainty with whioh Ripka spo!ke in 1943 about the future conduct of Moscow toward the states that trust it. What swperfJdality that was, what irresponsrbility, nay, what rookllesness oif the first degree! The years have proved that the Slovaks were right when they warned in the Piiag,ue Parliament that the union of Ozecho-,Slovakia with Moscow was "the greatest blunder ever committed by Ozecho~Slovaik foceign ,p olitics." The blunder of 1'93'5 was duplii cated in 1943, and its consequences showed up in July, 1947, in a dram'atic way. On Jul,y 7, 1947, the Prrugue Council oif Ministers, whose presidoot was K1lement Gottwald, unanimously aJOCepted the hwitation to the confereI11ce in Paris, where Czecho-Sl'Ovakia was to join the Marshall Plan. Not a single minister voted against it. On Jruly 9th, Gottwald, Jan Masaryk, and Drt1na flew to Moscow. There the representatirves of s01vereign and independent Repulb1ic of Czecllo-Sloviak:ia were ordered by Stalin to annul their unanimous decision. and tell Paris that the Ozecho-Slov;aJk RepuibHc would not join in the · Marshall Plan. Behold the crude Soviet mterventi:on in the internal affairs of a state to which the :S oviets had guaranteed SOIV·· ereignty and independence, in two treaties. And the Czech delegation, of which Gottwald was the only Communist, unanimously accepted Stalin's dictate in Moscow! Gottwald, just as Masaryk, telephoned several tirmes from Moocow to Prague to have the Coun.cil @f Miniisters convene and unanimous!~ "ruccept" Stalin's order. It must be stressed that at this time the Council of Ministers was presided over by Dr. Peter Zenkl, the first Vice-Premier of the government and presently the chairman of the "Council of Free Czechoslovakia" of Washington, D. C. Capitulation! 1 4-6 SLOVAKIA The small nation of the. Finns and Tito did not capitulate before the dictates of Moscow. The Czechs C8l{)itulated and t:hey themselves, headed by Benes, Ma.saryk, Zen!kl and Rilpka, voluntariJy went over into the Soviet camp. That is their handiiwork and, hence, they t:hemselrves are responsibie fo1.' it. And it is their ulllpardOO!aJble sin that into their caJmp they also dvrugged the S}QIV'a;ks who never a.greed with the Sovietophile po:lilcy of Benes, Mla.saryik, Zen!ki and Ripka. The Slo:vaks from the very beginning warned the Czechs that they were on the wrong road when they fraternized with Communi'sti:c Moscow. A. J. Janda·cek wrote the truth in his boOlk•l et ''Behind the Iron Curtain'' (Chicago·, 1948) , when he said: "Everything that happened in Prague in February, 1948, was only the result and climax of all former provisions of the Czech government in London." To this I might add, that it was the result of the decisions oif not onJy the London government, but also that government in Prrugue, which, after 1945, rupproved all decrees and accepted all legal motions which the Communists placed before it and the Parliament. Not once did the anti-Communist majority in Parliament reject Communistic bills. Thus, in a,n altogether legal manner, the ground was prepared for Communism in Czecho-Slovakia. Under those laws, serving only Communism, we find the signatures of Zenkl, Ripka and the rest of the Communist collaborators. All these gentlemen thought that they could flirt with Communism to build in Central Europe some kind of greater Czech power, greater than it really was. We s•a w how without ptllblic protest the whole Czech government caipituJl:ated to the dictates of Stalin. It reversed itself completely on the Marshahl Plan. The goverD!ID.ent newspa.pers - which a few days 'befOTe had ,prruised the Marshall Plan and the acwantages of entering into it - now began a heaiviy bomlbardment against America and the Marshall Plan. Now, let us see what was happening in Slcwakiia aJt that same time. Ripka says tJhat President Benes in the summer oif 1947 went to Slwakia for a rest. He went to Toporcia.niky which lies some 2 kilometers from the capital city of Slova:kia , SLOVAKIA 47 Bratislava. At the Topof,cian:ky castle, for six years (19391944), the president of Slorvaikia, Dr. Joseph Tiso, used to spend his summers. It was the summer holffie df the same Dr. Tiso who was hanged in Bratisilava on Aprii 18, 1947, after Benes refused to grant clemency. Most decent peoiple thought it was tactiless on the part oif Benes to go to Slovakia in 1947. Benes, it seems, with his presence in sorrowing SlOIV'akia wanted to boast of his triumph over Tiso, just as a year before he had done in Bohemia with the former president of Ozecho-Slovaikia, Dr. ffimfil Ha;cha. The Slovak s always lwke to welcome guests. In Slovakia there is a motto: a guest in the home - God in the home. Well, in the case of Benes, this motto did not holld. The Slovaks bitte:rly s:uifd'ered the presence of Benes in their land, in their own home. They de1uged Benes with letters, anonymous and signed, ~n which they called him tlhe heartless mwrderer .o f Dr. T~so, and the greatest enemy oif the Slovaks, predicting for him a most shameful end within a year. In his memoirs RJiipka admits that Benes did not feel physicaJ1y w~ll in Slovrukia. Within a few daJYiS he was threatened with an atta~k of paralysis (aipoplexy). The Slorvaiks loolked upon these re[>Orts with satisifa:cition, seeing ilil them the fJniger of God. As soon as, Benes le:ft .Sloviakia a mass political perseoution olf S'IO!Vaik paitriots began in that hapless countey. The Communists were seeking to gain their ends, while the Ozechs, on the oither hand, their OiWil aims. But their common goal was: to master Slovakia and break her resistance. 1 Both the Communists and the Benes Oze~hs wanrted to frighten the Slava!k'S who had on the who,l e remained tr:ue to the idea of the Slovaik State. The Slorv ~s were forced to live together with the Czechs in a common state against their will from 1945, the State they had parted with on March 14, 1939. It is known that the Communists were more tactfruJ. with the S1oivaJk national question. They admitted th.tat a nation that on.ce had its own State would never re~ nounce it wilfwlly. Ripka recalls correctly that when Ben~ returned from Moscow in 1944, he told his intilmates in London of the possibility of establishing an independent SlovaJk 48 SLOVAKIA State. That was at a time when Moscow, in the agreement of 1943, solemnly recognized Ozecho-Slovaikia, resipected the integrity of her territory, nay, even recognized Benes as the "president" of the "new" Czecho.,SlovaJkia. ·.1n Mosicow, Benes was given to understand that a S1oviak Repulblic was not only possilble, but also quite a~ceiptaible to Stalin. 1 Of course, the Communists at that time (1944) ~pected the Slovaik president, Dr. Jo£qph Tiso, to go to Moscow, or to send his plenipotentiary, to negotiate the possi.bility of saving the SlovaJk Repuiblic under a Communistic disguise. Dr. Tiso, however, refused to go to Mosicow, whilE Benes aJlld the ruJers of Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria did go. With Dr. Tiso a ,principle was at stake. With the others only tact. But one cannot malke tad out of principle. It never pays. And nothing permanent or valU'aJble can be attained by surrendering prindples. It was not oruy Dr. Tiso, but all the SlovaJks loyal to him, who refused to go along with the Slova;k CO!mlffiunists or the Commumsts of Moscow. In the elections of 1946, the SlQ!VaJks voted over 70 per cent against Communism and, this, clearly made it known that they did not want to coUa:borate with Communism under any ciroumstainces. The SloiVa;ks pr01Ved in practice their loyalty to the principles exipressed by Stur, Palarik, Stefanik, Hlinika, Tiso and otfue:r rpolitical representatiives of the Slovak nation. This wa:s a pra'CticaJl demonstration of the high political consciousness of the Slovaks, the basis of which was a clean and practical Christianity. Ripka knows well that the Czechs were not i!J:nlbued with any such consciousness. In Bohemia not only Czech workers, but even Czech peasants voted for Communism. What is mo:re, even Kral'ovske VinOihrady, where the wealthiest groups of Ozech boungeoisie resided, voted for Communism. The rich Czechs wanted to save their wealth, their 'b anks and factories, just as Czech wonkers wanted to save their work and the Czech faI'Illers their lands. In Slovakia, however, the fight against Comrnunism was waged on an. ideological basis of clean national traditioo. SLOVAKIA 49 and of adherence to the Catholic Church. It thus happened that the Communists and Ozeich centralists had to come to grips with a spiritual power such as CatholiciSlm. R~pka wrote that "the Communists, favoring Slovak nationalism, were, not successful in paralyzing the influence of Slovak Catho&cism, which is not only nationalistic, but also passionately anti-Communist." We might add that even the Ozech centralists could not paralyze the influeD1Ce of Catholic-ism on publilc affairs in Slorvaldia. At that time, Riipka mentions in his memoirs, he, Zenkl, the Stra.nskys, father and son, and Drtina came together at Karls1bad. They worked out a plan to haive the Slovak Democrati~ Party - representing aver 60 per cent of the anti-Communist voters olf Slorva.kia - "ta;ke the initiative to rid itsellf olf 'undesirable' elements in its rrunk,~." The Communists were for the plan 100 per cent; not only with words, burt with deeds as wel!l. The Minister of Interior in Bratislava was a certain General Nicholas Ferjenci!k, a man without prindple and a willing exeouito.r of CommUJnistic orders. On Octo!ber 6, 1947, this Ferjenrcik broadcast that his o:5fice had tmcOIVered a plot against the Reipulblic and had already arrested 380 young memlbers of the ,S lovak anti..icentralistic and anti-Communistic intelligentsia. He accused them, as Rijpka states, "of colla:b orating with emigrants who were in foreign lands under the leadershtp of Sidor and :Our- cansky." Immediately the State representatives at Bratislaiva demanded the Prague parLiament to. deprive of immunity two Slovak Catholic gentlemen, deputies and general secretaries of the Slorvak Democratic Party, Dr. Mi<los Bugar and Dr. Jan Kempny, who were, it was chavged, connected with the "plot against the Reipulblic" Rtpka himself confirms that this was all a Communist inrvention. The offidals were not concerned with punishing ou1prits, because there were none. But they did want to terrorize the anti-COimimunistic elements in Sloiviakia, which meant pra-ctically the whole pOipulation of SlovaJkia. And, in this case, a shameful thing happened. Within the SlovaJk Democratic Party and within the Czech Government parties the Red colla!borators began their shady work. 50 SLOVAKIA They demanded Bugar and Kempny be deprived of immunity. These two deputies, mind you, belonged to the largest anti-Comnn,tmist party in. Sl01Vakia tha,t was represented in the Prague Government by Jan Ursiny, Vice-Premier of the Government, Dr. liV'an Pietor, Minister of Railroads, Dr. N. Franetk, Minilster of Unification, and Jan Lic'lmer, State UndersecTetary in the Ministry of National Defense. And in 194 7 the Prague Parliament had an absolute majority of non-Communist deputies. Something that should not have ha.'Ppened dild haq>pen. The Prague Government decided to sur.re:nder both Slo,vak deputies,. and immediately thereafter Parliament deprived both the general secretaries of a Government party in Slovalkia of their deputorial immunity. Dr. Bwgar and Dr. Kempny had to sit in jail, while Dr: Joseph Lettri'ch, president af the Democratic Party, !kept on sitting in the chairman's seat of the Slovak Naition,a;l Council in Bratislava and the other ministers remained sitting in their ministerial chairs in Prague. In the history af parliamentarism this is probably the only case of its kind. It was possible only bec8.lllse none of the people in the Government of Prague and Bratislava had enough co.ura:ge and p&sonal integrity to fight the Commtmists. A1l tihe SlO'V'ak and Czech people in Goive:rmnent were willing to make any and aill compromi<ses, treaties ano concessions, as long as they could pay for them with the freedOIIn and Sltlffering oif others. The case of Bu,gar and Kemipny presented the occasion to begin a .g reat offensive against the extortions af the Communists in the OzechoSlovaik Republic. The Slova!ks, as one man, todk the lead, in this ba,ttle, bec8.lllse here the principle af freedom was· at stake and the freedom of two af their sons was threatened. But they were hopelessly overpowered by the Reds and the Benes Czechs. True it is tha:t Benes, Riipka and others of their kind were of the opinion that onJy the western powers were supiposed to oppose the Communists and to stem the tide of Communism. Benes, Riiipka, and others of their political entourage, thought that their yielding, duplicity, nay, even their hostility toward their two co-workers, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny, was appealing to the Soviets. And such was SLOVAKIA 51 the case. A great opportunity to sihow up the Reds was lost in the case of Bugar aind Kempny. It meant that the first fight on internal policy was lost, and that only shortly after Pra:gue also lost its first battle on foreign policy by olbeying Stalin and refusing to join in the Ma.I1S:hall P}an. Let us not forget that all this was done with the assent of Dr. Benes. Even here he · had his own "plan," and according t,o it he direct.ed especially the Czech National Socialists. We must rememb.er that Dr. Benes was a deputy and vice-president of the Czech National Soc,ialist Part.y from 1920 to 193'5, and that he financed it generously out of the State treasury. Benes needed that party as a means to gain his ends. He wanted first of all the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then, af:ter T. G. Masaryk, the office of -p resident. Then, when he noticed that the pallty hindered him in attaimng his ends, he easily renounced it. And so it was that in 1926 the party of the Ozetch National Socialists went into opposition to the Government rund its deputy, Dr. Edward Benes, was supposed to follow it. But he preferred to .r esign his mandate of deputy so that he cowd remain in the goivernment as an "impartial" (non...politi'cal) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the C.oo<!h National Socialists always regarded Benes as their man - their leader. Little wonder, then, that the Czech National Socialist ministers went to President Benes for adMce during the crisis that broke out in the Government between the Communists and the non-Communists in 194-8. Without Benes's assent nothmg was underta.ken, and Benes assured his followers that he Wa!S bacikinig them, that he would not desert them as he did in 1926. That was sUipposed to mean that he wowd not use them as tools to hold his position, but that he wowd stay with them to the end in the fight against the Communists in government, rugainst Gottwald's faction. In the moo:nitime. the Comunists sought to strengthen their positions, the key positions in the government which Benes had given them. In 1947 the Communists held these positions in the Pra;gue Government: Klement Gottwald, Premier; Viliam Siroky, Vi:ce~~ e r ; Vaclav Nosek, Min- 1i2 SLOVAKIA ister of Interior; Ja.romil Dolansky, Minister of Finance; Vaclav Kopecky, Minister of Infomnation; Ant.on Zmrhal, Minister of Internal 00immerce; Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare; Julius Duris, Minister of Agriculture; Vlado Clementis, StiaJte Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All these Corrununist ministers did what was in the interest of their Party. And this jolb they did loyally and thoroughly. The Minister of the Interior, Nosek, purged the leadership of the Deipartment oif National Security in Bohemia of all non-Co1rmmmist eilements. He had eight regional commanders of the polrce tra..."'lsferred and fiUed their places with eight reliallJle Communists. The non-Communist ministers had a pretext to attack. This was one of the most foolish quarrels thiat ever took pla:ce. But President Benes rupproved it and was happy that the Communists occasioned it. The time to stir Uip the masses in Slovaikia and the whole Reipulblic, as weH a,s for rousing the sincere anger of the people, was when the Corrumunists demanded the arrest of the two SlovaJk deputies, Dr. Bugar and Dr. Kempny. But this opportunity was not used by Benes and his followers. Why should i.t be? Noithing b:uit the freedom and the lives of two Slo:viak Catholic deputies was ait stake ! Benes, Riipka, Zelllkl and company figured that they could better move the masses by starting a fight O!Ver such a great affair as No~ transferring eight po1icemen in Prague and supplanting them witih eight others. The police affair could not enthuse the Slav'c!Jkis and mll!c:h less the Czechs, who never were fighters. Besides the Czechs are educated by their witty journalist P. Haivlicek to hate and ridicule the police. But Benes, Zookl, Ri:pika and others, who did not go a:mong the peo,ple, but made politics in offices and editorial rooms, wanted to rescue eight poHcemen on account of whom a "graJve goveirrnmenual crisis" was initiated. On Felbruary 13, 1948, Zelllkl and other non-Communist ministers demanded that Nosek rescind his order. The Communists answered that the matter belOil!ged to the Ministry of Interior, and Nosek would rescind nothing. Every minister performs his office and does th,i ngs as he noiws best. The SLOVAKIA 53 government can caiH a minister to answer for his office, but in this case Premier Gottwald would not do that. Gottwald agreed completely with Nosek and would not disavow anything the Minister of t:Jhe futerior had approved. The nonCommunist ministers considered for a few days whether they should or shou;ld not resign. They told Nosek that they would not a,ttend any meetings of the GOfVernment or the National Front as long as Noselk would not rescind his order. On February 18th, Ripka and Zenk.I again hurried to Rresident Benes, who. approved of their taJctics and encouraged them to peraevere. He advised them to resign and so force the Commurusts to yield. Again and again :he asS1Ned them that he would stand by them "no, matter what happens!'' Fiil!ally, on Felbruacy 20, 1948, three parties - the Ozech Nationa,l Socialists, Sramek's Czech People's Party, and the S1ovruk Democrats - reca:Ued their ministers from the Government. Before resigning, Zenkl, as chairman of the National Socialist Party, telephoned President Benes and as Ripka himself tells it - Benes said over the telephone : "Finally! And now 'b e careful! No false moves!" Benes aiso peTsonally assured the resigning ministers that they acted co:rirectly when they resigned. He stated emphatically that he would not aC'Capt their resignations and so force the Comttnunists to yield. J,f there was any one who did not belieive in the strength and persona.:l honesty of Be,. nes, that person was the leader of the Czech Populists, Msgr. Sramelk. A. J. Janda:ceik in his booklet "Behind the !Ton Curtain" writes (ipg. 29): "Verry fow people, however, knew President Benes as well as Msgr. Sramek did. He knew how Benes conducted himself during the Munich crisis and 1kne,w some of his irresolute and 01Verly philosqphk views. That is why he expressed the fear at the time: whether too m1.11ch responsibility WalS not •b eing placed on the President, whether it was wise to put all the burden on the shoulders of one man. In his judgment Sramek went so far as to express a grave fear whether the President - with regard to his health would not aJotually disappoint in this decisive moment and 54 SLOVAKIA whether his nerves woulrl last to oppose the hard and well considered plans olf the Communists. Dr. Peter Zenkl, however, was so satisfied with the president's conduct that he dispelled Srarrnek's fears aJt least partially." In a word, it was known that Benes could not withstand the ordeal, as he could not even in 193'8 in Mund.ch. It was known that Benes's assurances had to be taken with great reserve - on the baisis of past experiences. Burt: why, then, did the tiwe1ve ministers ha,nd in their resignations, when Benes was not supposed to accept them and when with their resignation he was suwosed to peinform some sort of magic before the eyes of the Communists? Such utter silliness was SlllPposed to frighten the Communists and maike them concede, when they ha,d the masses on the move and headed in one direction in the Prwgue "of Benes" - the Prague that was ail Solkol and true to democracy?! The Communists used St.ate funds to call a rally of workers and farmers from the whole Republic to Pragqe. They commanded the streets of Prague. They already had the police safely in their hands since 1945, and General Ludo vik Sloboda, whom Benes named Minister ·of National Defense, promised to have the entire army ready if Gottwald should need it. Into the situation, directly from Moscow, flew Valerian A!exandroviic Zorin, Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Mfuirs and fo:mner Soviet aanibassador in Kosi.ce and, then, in Prrugue. Against these enthusiastic Communist masses that filled the streets of Prague and against· Zorin, who represented the whole diploma:tic and military might of the Soviet Union, Dr. Edward Benes stood alone. Behind him were the twe1ve ministers shaking with fear - the ministers who real1y did not want to resign, but wanted to stay on as .rninistem and in the Government, that is to say, to eogoveI1I1 with the Carrurruunists. That really was a scene for a puppet theatre! SraimeJk, as a good soothsayer, kept on cautioning that Be:nes would not hold up, that Benes was capiturlating even as he had capitulated in the fall of 193·8 to Ado1ph Hitler. And so it happened. Goittwa:ld and Nosek visited Benes two or three times to tallk things over. These were in~ SLOVAKIA 55 teresting coowersiations. "The president," writes A. J. Janda.eek, "ordered liistening deivices be placed in the room in which Benes conferred with the Communists. President Benes at that moment did not \know that a:ll his conversations and telephone calls were followed and heard 'by a system whi:ch already was rigged up by the Communist police without Benes's knoiwledige." Borth negotiarting parties tried to ,b eat each other in being cralfty. But the Communists were always a step ahead of Benes. Mteir Go.ttwa1d and Nosek left Benes, he was vdsited by two Nat:ionai Socialist ministers, Riipka and Stran. sky: This was Benes's l1ast conive1:1sation with these two ministers. Ripka noted the folloiwing as coming out of that conversation: Benes 'began the colllVersation with an energetic cry: "I shall not give in! I said openly and clearly to Gottwald: 'You are preparing to overthrow the St.ate, for a putsch, but I shall not let myseH be terrorized : by you'!" And then Benes told them the ·contents of his Wk with Premier Gottwald. I (Ripka) tQlld hd,m without mincing words: "That which you are preparing is another Munkh." The President's face grew serious. He said to us: "You .Jroow the Communists. You know that they do not hesitate to use any means to real±ze their pla:ns. We must be ·prepared for anything." There were reports, which I persona:hly _did not believe, that is that Russia was going to at~ck us. I told the President that I thought Russia would ,be S'atisfied to extend political help to our Corrm:i.un~sts, 'but that _w ith regard to the internatio.n•a l comp1ications that ' might result - Russia would not decide on a single military intemrention. The president listened with great attention. Then · he said to me literally: "I agree with you. I also think that way; Moscow will not take a risk -that would mean · military intenvention. Nevertheless, I .cannot -exclude the possi.ibility that the Soviet av.my would cross our · ,'bo:rders and then what would we do?" 1 56 SLOVAKIA "What would we do?" - repeated the president, looking at me and then at Stransky, "Yes, what would you do?" I answered that in such a case we would be occupied and defeated. But the nation and the whole world would see that we suC'Cumlbed to violence. It would be known that the COiIDmunist regime was forced upon us, that Ozecho.,Slwakia was a victim of an attack, agruinst which she could not defend herself. This defeat woud carry us to a new victory. A moment of silence intet,vened. Then the president 1begain to say: "Maybe," - he said - '~but that is not cerbain. Nolbody will helip us. Moscow knows tha:t." Then with growing feeling, raising his voice, Benes said: "I know them well, those peo,ple frO!lll MOS'COw. I had a chanice to know them more iintimaitely than you have known them. You overrate their intel1igence and their foresight. Even I committed the same mistalke. They do not U!Ilderstand the other states ait a!H. They thinlk they are realists. But, in fact, they are only fain.a.tics. Their whole policy is nothi,IJJg else but one of provoki.n!g war. But with them everything will end up as it did wlith Hitler." Stransky who never heard the president speak so, cried out: "And you tell us that? You who have done more than any!body else on earth to bring albout colla1boraition with Soviet Russia?" ,B enes smiled sadly and said: "I repeat what I have already told you: I shall not yield! You may rest assured on that!" With tha,t sentence our last carwersation with president Benes ended. None orf us ait that moment could know that we shall never again see him. So wrote Ripka albout his last conversation with Benes. The coniversation tells us that Benes knew the Soviet factors in Moscow and 'knew them for a long time. And, yet, he continually and without end recommended to Roosevelt and Churehill to collaborate wlith them. He demanded that the West believe Stalin. Benes dressed up the lies of Soviet SLOVAKIA 57 propaganda in a gartb of truth and thus, presented them to the uninfoI1II1ed West. That is how Benes sinned against the whole Christian world. He did not go unrewarded. He had to stand alone and face to face wi,t h the Soviet danger knowing that "nl()(body will helip us -- Moscow knows that." Despit,e all hlis assurances that he would not submit, that he knew the Communists well, Benes, nevertheless, did give in to the Communists. He capitulated to Clement Gottwald. He accepted the resignations of the 12 non-Communist minist,ers a-nd named the Government that Gottwald dictated! And what haJPPOOed with the 12 ministers who resigned? Espeicialiy what happened with the four ministers who belonged to, the Czech Na,tional Socia,1ist Party of Dr. :&!ward Benes? On May 6, 1948, deputies Dr. Duchacek, Dr. Krajina, Dr. StraJI1Skiy, VHim and Firt collaJborated in preparing a report on the .Alls,a{!e HoUJSe in FranikfuTt. This is what it says literally: "On the ad:temoon of Februacy 28, 1948, the National Socialist ministers assembled in the residence of Dr. Stransky. Durinig this meeting they telephoned Dr. Jina, political adviser af President Benes, and aslked him whether the President wotrld reiceiive them, as is the custom when ministers resign. Dr. Jina answered tha.t the President will not receive them and he repeated this statement when Dr. Rilpka asked a,g,a.in. Dr. Rilpka then said to Jina: "Tell Mr. President for us that he would not corner wJth the fouir ministers who during the who,l e period stood uncompromisingly behind his program. with him in full agreement. We want Dr. Benes to know just how the people who coUaiborated so closely witlh him feel rubout his not giving them an audience to e:,cplain his stand." Benes had fivst eooouraged the miru.stera to resign, then he assured them of his loyalty and persevea-ence, and, in the end, without theiir knowledge of it, had decided to accept their resignations. Then Benes did not even want to tadlk with them in parting. To keep the presidency Benes no longer needed the Czech N'aittonal Socialist Party nor its 58 S LOVAKIA four ministers. Now he needed only the Communists, because at the m01Inent they were stronge,r and in power. On February 27th Benes received the whole Gottwald gavernrment. Gottiwald said his speech, presented his ministers to Benes, and Benes replied to Gottwald's speech. By doing so, Benes accoided the recognition od' legality to the Coonmll!Ilist ministers for aH their future orders. · ..t\ifter Mlunich Benes proclaimed that he had a "plan." That w,as th~ plan by which he fled from Czecho..SlovaJkia. After cwpitulating t o Gottwald - the caipitulation that Benes himself ca'lied a "second Munich" - Benes burst into tears and said to editor Janda.eek, ,aecordin:g to 'J andacek : "Tell all the people who love democraicy to woiik in its interest and to try to validate its principles everywhere, and that eyen there, where they were for a time outraged." But did not Benes disgrace them? Did he haive to wp• prove the Communistic system? Were only othel's swppooed to work and fight for democracy, while Benes and his people were entitled to roop its advanta:ges and oo.j'Oy its privileges? After this secood capitulation Benes did not have an aerop1ane. He could not fly rubroad. He had only an automdbile. In it he left for his priv,ate residence in Sezimova U sti. He left, but only alter lie had legalired. every~ thing that the Oommumsts did and what they were still to do with the poople oif Ozecho-SfovaJlda. Benes, "the great de~ mocrat and builder," had done all that for the Communists! At the .end of his memoirs Ripk!a displayed .t he pinnacle of his cynicism. He whit~washed the Benes Czechs. They could not prevent the second Munich, even with weapons, he says, because the Soviet army would probably walk in and swbject the Czechs to untold brutalities. "After the oooupation of our country by the Soviet a11my in 1945," Ripka writes cynically, "we knew well what the Soviet army was cwpalble of!" (Il P01polo, Rome, May 15, 1949) . . Whether Ripka was in London or in Prague, until February 1948, he ·a-Iways spoke and wrote about the "liberation" ,of •Czecho,.JSlovakia a,nd the victorious Soviet . ·army; SLOVAKIA 59 The Czechs actuaHy welcomed that amiy enthusiastically. While Benes and the Czecihs 'kept tal!kiing about "liiberation" from 1945 to 194'8, we Slovaks, on the other hand, claimed that SlovaJkia was octmipied, that the Sio:viruk State was suppressed by force and th at the Soiviet soldiers in 1M4-1946 committed the most terrible bestialities against unarmed Slovak men and women. 1 Even Czech emigrants told me to my face that Slovakia was "liberated" in 1945. But today, even Ripka confesses, rather belatedJy, that his Bohemia, too, was occupied by Red Moscow already in 1946 ! That really is unmitigated cynici,s m, coming as it does from a person who played "independent minister" from 1945 to 1948 in his occupied country and then, looving the country, would agiain - with some other kind of army of "liberation" - save not only his own country, but also our beaten and crucified . SloviaJkia. We began our remarks to Ripka's memoirs by citing the ar.gumenit of R:dbert Ingrim about the possibility of the existenice of a secret a·g rooment between. Benes, Ripka, Zenkl and Gottwa:ld. Now we read in the newspaper of the Czech National Socialist deiputy Fr.anois Klatil ("CA.IS," London, The Wa!Wi(j}c Printing Co. , issue No. 1, 1949) a note from the pen of Dr. Edward Benes a:bout the conferenJce with Gottwald on May 1'4, 194'8. In it Benes carries on a long dialogue with Gottwald aiboot wanting to resign from the presidency. Let us quote at least a few sentences from it: "The president does not want to tell the Communists to do things dififerently, since he does not want to hinder them. That is why he repeats to the Premier o!f the Government not to loOlk for any foreign influences in his action. It is only and only his personal decision. . . . The president again emphasizes that (in Sezimovo Usti) he did not receive any1body, neither did he aiSlk anyibod,y for any exiplanations or to let him kno:w his stand. Eive:rything is exclusively his own.. .. Therefore he .is g1ving the Communist PM'ty freedom of action to arr.ange things to suit its needs. The President further states that he is taLkiDJg with the Prime Minister of the government witlh complete sincerity 60 SL OV AK IA and con1Viction and he is asking him to judge what he is saying from that standpoint. He does not quarrel, nor in the end, does he want to part with t!he Prime Minister of the Governrment in a quarrel. . . . He does not want the Communists to hasve any quaITels with the President, nor the President to quarrel with the Communists, 1because it would be possi!ble to a.lbuse this. The State is so dear to the President, that he will do nothing that might harm it. . . . Prime Minister Gottwald at first replied in general terms to the President's explanation. and his initention orf abdiooting. He says that the Communists wotl'ld prefer not to have to discuss the question olf the departure of the President. He knows what moti1Ves the President has, he respects them aoo thinks that id' it is already necessary to part, that they would want to part as friends. The President answers, that he wishes the same. He said that to Smutny and hopes that they shall pa.rt as friends. He reminded even Dr. Clementi'! that he, Benes, will not undertake any action against his own State, that he will not go against the Communists and he shall not undertake any act that would be direct.e<l against the Soviet Union." That, then, is how Benes spoke to Gottwald in Sezimoivo Usti. He assured him he would do nothing against the Communists or the Soviet Union. He expressed a sincere desire to part with Got:Jtwal:d and the Communists in Governmeint as a friend. He wanted to retire and hand over everything to Gottwald and his Ozech Reds peaoofully. And he did eventually. Gottwald then saw to it th,a t Dr. Edward Benes got full pay "for life," too. Does the international anti-Com.mt.mist pU!blic think that the sa,me principles do not hold for Bene.s's close colila:borators - for Ripka, ZenJk,l , and for the many other Czechs, who fled Ozechoslovaikia after February 19~8? We must be on our g:uard. The legends olf "li'beration" and "Jiberntors" from 1948 to 1945 are well knolWil. to us and must ever be a warning not only for us Slova:ks, but a'lso for the whole civilized Christian world.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dr. Hubert Ripka's Version of the Communist "Putsch" in Czecho-Slovakia Description An account of the resource Karol Sidor Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 32-60 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Sidor, Karol, 1901-1953 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/4355d5fa608dcbd2e5899b446d1a939b.pdf 80ffe57af0f2baf80c1a8cf5b8032a04 PDF Text Text 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" �SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 �2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by �SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." �30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- �SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor. � 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" �SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 �2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by �SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." �30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- �SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 26 SLOVAKIA SLOVAK AND EUROPEAN SEPARATISM (AN INTERVIEW WITH THE LATE ROYAL TAYLOR) Joseph A. Mikus "The National Committee for a Free Eu.Tope" has a district office in Paris. After 1949, political exiles from Central Europe, from newsp3ipeI1lllen to students desiring scholarships, visited this office seeiking .American aid. The Czechs, in particu[ar, passed frequently throogh its doors. In order to infornn Americans that there was a large and well-organized group of Slo.vruks in Paris which desired to have direct contact with political personalities in the free West, I sought an a.ppointment by telephone, one day in the su!mmer of 1950, with Mr. Loyal TayJor, Chief of the American Divisi'on of NOFE in Paris. · Wihen I appeared in the waiting room of the office on F'ooh .AJvenue at five o'clock the following afternoon, I was welcomed iby a ipleasant, elderly gentleman. Shaking my hand and smiling while measuring me from head to foot, he greeted me with the words: "So you are that Sloivruk separatist!" ''That depends on how you take it, Mr. Taylor," I re1plied. "It is evident that unrtil now you have been informed by the Czechs. It is well that I harve come." ; . "Well, welicome and haive a chair!" "'Dhanlk you; gladly! As soon as I hang 'my coat I will exiplain our stand on thi,s matter." "I aim very curious," he said. In the meantime, we had entered his ctffice and sat down. Mr. Taylor crossed his legs and settled himself behind a. large desk, and I made myself comfortaible in the easy c•h air opposite him. "The matter is very simpie," I began. "The difference ,b etween the Ozechs and the Slovaks is the same as between any two indi.vhluals. Certainly, Mr. Taylor, you would not think to claim, for exarniple, that there is any relationship between you and me that could be designated as separatism. We are two different pel"SOns, not?" SLOVAKIA 27 "That I admit," Mr. Taylor said, "but I am not certain that your comparison is correct. You form with the Czechs one Czechoslovak (sic) nation, I mean, one State." "That is what the Ozechs claim. But that is not true," I answered. "We are two, nations, two historic and ethnic individualities which existed long before Czecho-Slovakia and Wlhich, since 191'8, formed one State on a basis of a mutua!l and voluntary decision. The original aim of CzechoSloivakia was to guarantee ,p olitical freedom to both nations within the joint State, to the Czechs as well as to the Slovaks. That is what Benes ,s aid at the peace conference. That is the waiy it is stated in the Treaty otf St. Gernl.ain. But, sinlce the ~ h s by unilateral a:ction changed the original pUI'lpOSe of the Ozecho-Slovak State, and misused this jointly-creruted b,ody, so that through the fiction of a 'Czechoslovatk' nation they cOUlld enthrone their own hegemony, the SlovaJk,s ceased to. consider this State as their own." "These, then, are the reasons which led the Slovaks to separatism?" Mr. Taylor inquired. "Well, taiken logically, as I have already stated, there ,c an be no question albout a Ozech and Slovak separatism. It would be ,possi!ble to tallk rubout separatism only where a breaich of a natural entity unit would be conoorned. Separatism cannot be 31PPlied in describing the relation.ship of. one nation to another. They can be close or distant neighbors; they can be friends or enemies; but not separatists. Our relationshilp to the Ozechs is an international relationship, and the Owcho..,Slovak State was actuaUy the result Olf that international interest for the guarantee of the freedom of its peoples. As soon as this interest faided on the one side, so fell Czecho~Slovalkia - just as a bridge falls, when the swpiporting pillars on one side of the river are washed o.ut by a flood." "Just what do you mean?" interrwpted Mr. Taylor. "Well, as you certainly will admit, we si,g ned a treaty with the Czechs in 1918, the contents of which they changed on their own initiatiive and to their own adivanta.ge. To put it more conJCretely, we ordered ten wagons of wheat and they delivered ten wagons of chaff. Naturainy, we refused to accept the delivery." 1 2·8 S LOVAKIA "What exactly do you wish to say when you claim that the Czechs unilaterally changed the treaty with the Slova:ks regarding a common state?" pressed Mr. Taylor, _ . '.'Specifically this: in 1920, the Prague Government dictated .a Constitution for Slo1Vrukia which depr:ived the Slovaks of all . national rights," I explained. "How did it do that?" Mr. Taylor askeid -w ith much surprise. ''Why Masaryik's Czecho~Slovakia was a democratic state! And, as far as I know, the Constitution was not dictated by the Goverillillent but was adopted by the CzechoSlovak parliaiment." "In regard to the first point, there are democracies and democracies," I replied. "There is an American democra cy, a British democracy, a French democracy. There was, then, a 'Ozechoslava!k' democracy and now there is a 'people's' democracy. W1h.at I mean to say is. that these all d1ffer, that is, they are political systems of varied content. In regard to tJhe Constitution, you are right in saying that it was adopted by the so~called National Re1Volutionary Assem1bly. What, perhaips., you do not know, i-s that the members of this so-called parliament had been named by the Government. In short, the revolutionary Government appoint.e<l the revolutionary parliament which confirmed and adopted the revolutionary Constitution which this same revolutionary government presented to it." •~Dr. Mikus, are you serious in making this claim?" asked Mr. Taylor witJh astonishment. "It seems to me, Mr. Taylor, that it would 'be out of place were I not to speak seriously," I replied. "But I will tell you another in:cred:ilble thing. Mr. Benes, as Minister of that revolutionary government, named himself and eleven other Czechs as SLOV\AK 'deputies' to this. revolutionary parlirument." "Really? I must admit that this is exciting and unfamiliar history to me. " ''That does not surziprise me, Mr. Taylor. The period dming which the Czech0-1Slovruk Republic was created, as well as tlh~_. indifvidual acts of the 'Czechoslova:k' democracy, is a terrain pm,posely bedimrrned, from the very beginmng, by SLOVAKIA 29 Ozech propaganda. A strict, 'blackout,' imposed by Czech pro1paiganda and Czech political history, hangs oyer this period." ·' •No matter what the situation was in the past, Dr. M;i.kus, I belie;ve that you underestimate the determination with which the Czechs will fight for the maintenance of the Czecho..,Slovalk State." "I, on the other hand, am of the opinion that the West is n'()lt fully aware of the tenacity of the Slovaks in their struggle for national independence. Moreo:ver, while the struggle Olf the Czechs is ordinary greed for political power, the struggle Olf the Slovalks is much more. It is a struggle for freedom, for the very existence of the nation. While a state is only a form, a nation is a living, moral being. Even Masaryik, whom the Czechs like to quote so much, recognized the priority of a nation over a state when he said: 'Wihen indirvidual nations are striving for their independence and are attempting to break up states in which they have until now been incor,porated, that is not a fight against humanity and internationalism, but a fight against those who used the states for an artificial levelling of the status among peoples and politiical uniformity. Humanity, however, does not seek uniformity but union, and it is the independence of nations which will maike possible an organic association, an organiic federation of Europe'." "That is an astQIUilding statement," ejaculated Mr. Taylor. "Certainly! But it i,s important to know when Masaryk said these words. That quotation does not come from Masaryk, the post-,war statesman, but from Masaryk, the exiled politician, who, in 1917, in hi:s book The New Europe, was explaining to the Allies why Austria-Hungary should be bro/ken up. Even though the Slovaks regard Masaryk as an unfriendly personal, µevertheless, except for a few national separatists, we all a:gree with hlm on this point." "Then you do admit that there are separatists among · the S}()IV:aJks ?" said Mr. Taylor, smiling triumphantly. 'There are! How colJlld there not be? The question is, who are they? It is not Sidor, or Durcansky, as the Czechs claim." 30 SLOVAKIA "Then who can they ~ ?" "They are, beginning with Pa:panek, the Slovaks in the so-called 'Council of Free Czechoslovakia'." "Dr. Milkus, your deductions certainly suT!prise me." "Believe me, Mr. TaJYloir, that was not my intention. But it is as clear as tlhe sun. The Slovaks are a nation and a political individuality in Central Europe. From a nation.al standpoint, those S1ov,aJks are separatists who deserted. their nation.a1 heritaige, jomed the Czechs of their 01Wn free will., formed the 'Council of Free CZ'echoslovaikia' with them and, so, as a minority, franik,l y disregard the will of the nation from which they descended. This is a classi'cal example of separatiSIID." ."WeH, UJPOn my word, this is, the first time I ever heard of it! It certainly is something when a separatist like you, designates men lilke Papanek separatists." "I swppose it wiH remain so with these gentlemen until they die," 1 sa,id. "They haive lived and died so long with the Ozechs that politically they have ·o ocome completely captured ,b y them. The Slovak nation will probably have to strike tlhem off its list. Just look well. Even now they are setting out on the .p olitical waters of Central Europe playing host on .iboard to the Ozooh secessionists. And with them they wou.W. li!ke to win in the fight for a thing which, from the point of view od' IDuropean devel01pIDent, must certainly collalPse." "You mean, perhaips, with Chudoba, Prehala, etc."? "No! Certainly not!" I contradicted, laughing 'heartily. "I mean with Zenkl, Ripka, etc." "I must say, Dr. Milkus, that I find it diffioolt to overcome my astonishment over your unusual interpretation of a:ffairs." "It is poosilble. But, just think aver it, Mr. Taylor. Europe is maviDJg and <beginnin,g to unite. There wi!M be a joint IDuropean coail and steel. There is much talik of a Euiropean Council at Stra.sslmrg, of a European parliament, even of a IDuropean army. But Zenikl and his group do not wish to see such a development. He continues to see another Ver- SLOVAKIA 31 sallies Ozecho..;SlovaJlda, which guaranteed to the Ozechs priority in power. Do you not think that these gentlemen 'let the world pass them by' as the Czech poet Vrehlitoky would hasve said of them? Don't you think that the politics of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslova1kia' is a typical case of European secession? When I compare the politilcs of the Czechs and their Sl()IVaJk colia!borato;rs to the effort ~nded for a united Europe, it appeara to me entirely the same as if the State of Ohio and the State of Pe:rmsylivania, for instance, attempted to secede from the American Union and to estaJblish an independent federated State, Penn-Ohi:o, right in the heart of the United States." "I note, Dr. Mikus, that your comparisons become bolder as you continue." "That, too, is possible," I said, smiling. "Nevertheless, one thing is certain. Whiie .America certainliy woUJld not tolerate aniy secession in her midst, yet politically and finaJ11.cially she s~rts the open separatism of the 'Council of Free Ozechoslovaki,a' in Central Europe. For today anyone, living between Germany and the Soviet Union who is for the status quo of 1918, is a European secessionist and separatist. Yet, on the other hand, the SlovaJks who are for a free Slovakia in a federated Europe are aipparentliy ignored by America. • • • As I was leaiving, Mr. Taylor accompanied me to the door and, shaiking his head, made a final comment: ''l lived in Buda;pest many years and I heard much of SlovaJki:a. I confess, however, that our conversation has troubled many of my current views. I must give it more thought.'' "Irf that is true, my visit to you will be well justified. Until we meet again, Mr. Taylor." Bowing to, him, I thought to mysel.tf: "It woll'ld be fatal for America, if in such a diy:n:a:mic period as exists today, her destiny and the destiny of the whole world should be directed ,b y political conformists." But this reflection was not heard by Mr. Taiylor.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Slovak and European Separatism: An Interview with the Late Royal Taylor Description An account of the resource Joseph A. Mikus Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 26-31 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Mikuš, Joseph A., 1909-2005 Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 LCNAF+dates https://slovakia.wordsofpassage.net/files/original/b5cbfdd20f357ed8329aae999cb2576f.pdf a243bef75596fc23bed53bced6ba65b0 PDF Text Text 18 SLOVAKIA THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE By Eleonor Podkrivacky There still are some people who believe erroneously that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study of their language. Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main had literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both their languages; during the eighteenth century after the reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the eastern dialect as the literary language. Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to explore its baJClk,ground briefly. After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language used in documents in central Europe for several centuries. R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states �SLOVAKIA 19 that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some documents. ·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents in addition to La-tin and Germ an. German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home. Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia. Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r, quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia, when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland �20 SLOVAlGA from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the death of King Ladislav in 14'57. The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and literary material perished in the ipilla:ging. Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks. Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655, among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their native tongue was as important as other languages. The needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters. Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century. At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books. With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number �SLOVAKIA 21 and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a, in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century. It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language. Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4, 1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen- �22 SLOVAKIA eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration. Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete. While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis of literary Slovak. In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge. To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century, and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western dialect. The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu- �SLOVAKIA dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors. While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in 1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di· tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for "j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel. In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky, where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15, 1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the sixth volume. During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was to further the advancement of education and culture of the SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun- �SLOVAKIA dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature. Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on to state that the society was represented also in other lands. In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not lirving in their homeland . .A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society. Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies. · ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy of admiration for the great love for their language and the efforts they put forth for its sake. �SLOVAKIA BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS : \J Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia, Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906. \J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges. London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition). Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921. Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943. Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905. Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944. Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z roku 1890) 1923. PERIODICALS : Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51. Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana, August 3, 1937. Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike, May 9, 1933. Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak, date unknown. � 18 SLOVAKIA THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE By Eleonor Podkrivacky There still are some people who believe erroneously that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study of their language. Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main had literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both their languages; during the eighteenth century after the reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the eastern dialect as the literary language. Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to explore its baJClk,ground briefly. After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language used in documents in central Europe for several centuries. R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states �SLOVAKIA 19 that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some documents. ·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents in addition to La-tin and Germ an. German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home. Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia. Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r, quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia, when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland �20 SLOVAlGA from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the death of King Ladislav in 14'57. The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and literary material perished in the ipilla:ging. Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks. Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655, among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their native tongue was as important as other languages. The needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters. Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century. At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books. With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number �SLOVAKIA 21 and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a, in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century. It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language. Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4, 1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen- �22 SLOVAKIA eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration. Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete. While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis of literary Slovak. In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge. To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century, and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western dialect. The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu- �SLOVAKIA dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors. While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in 1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di· tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for "j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel. In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky, where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15, 1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the sixth volume. During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was to further the advancement of education and culture of the SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun- �SLOVAKIA dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature. Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on to state that the society was represented also in other lands. In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not lirving in their homeland . .A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society. Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies. · ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy of admiration for the great love for their language and the efforts they put forth for its sake. �SLOVAKIA BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS : \J Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia, Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906. \J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges. London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition). Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921. Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943. Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905. Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944. Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z roku 1890) 1923. PERIODICALS : Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51. Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana, August 3, 1937. Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike, May 9, 1933. Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak, date unknown. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource 1953, Vol. 3 Description An account of the resource <ul><li>Issue 1 (No. 6), April 1953.</li> <li>Issue 2 (No. 7), July 1953.</li> <li>Issue 3 (No. 8), September 1953.</li> <li>Issue 4 (No. 9), December 1953.</li> </ul> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available The Slovak League of America Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1953 Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 18 SLOVAKIA THE EVOLUTION OF SLOVAK LITERATURE ANTON BERNOLAK'S INFLUENCE By Eleonor Podkrivacky There still are some people who believe erroneously that the Slo1vaJk languruge was not written prior to the ninetee.n th century. The fact that Hiving languages undergo change should be kept in mind by those who ipoint to differences in the literary language of the Slovalk ,people of today and in the languaige used a century or more a:go. Also the history of a people should not be overlooked in the study of their language. Among the Slav nations, most of which had varied external inf,l uences causing linguistic mutationis, we find that the literary langua,ge of eruch, closely resettnibling that in co.nterruporary use, had its fomnal beginnings in the late se.venteenth, in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. For example, in the seventeenth century the Lusatians though a very small nation numerically they have two main had literary langua:ges: Lower and Upper Lusatian grammars and selection of dialects for literary use in both their languages; during the eighteenth century after the reforuns of Peter the Great, Lomonosov was responsilble for the standardi.ization of Russian; and f.rom the sbcteenth century throUJgh the nineteenth the ":p opular" Bulgarian ,w as used in writings until 1869, when Drinov estaJblished the eastern dialect as the literary language. Before examining the ,p eriod when the Slovak language underwent literary formalization, it is necessary to explore its baJClk,ground briefly. After the death of St. Methodius, who with St. Cyril prapagated and strengthened Christianity among the Slovaks, German prelates who came to Slovalkia in the tenth century substituted the Latin languruge for the Slo.vanic in the liturgy. IDventually Latin was used in pulblitc life, iboth literary and diplomatic. Latin was· the official language used in documents in central Europe for several centuries. R. G. A. de Bray in Guide to the Slavonic Languages states SLOVAKIA 19 that in the period from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries the Slovruk language was used with the Latin in some documents. ·P erhaps the oldest written Slov3ik work is that of V a.claw of Bzenec, Glossovane spevy cirkevne, a collection of religious songs which he wrote in 1385 in the dialect of Halie. Another of the most ancient written records is also a religious song, "Jezu Kriste scedry Kneze," which J. Ka.c:ka in Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej dates ba,cik to the fourteenth or p.ossd.lbJy the thirteenth century. And Fr. Hr1lSOVsky in Slovenske Dejiny tells of the use of the Slovak language made in the records of the guilds during the sixteenth century. This sanne histo.r ian relates that many Slorvak ex:pTessions and phrases are to be found in doouments written in Slovakia in the ~ech language whi'ch in the fifteenth century (Hussite Movement) was used in official documents in addition to La-tin and Germ an. German was in use because of the large Genman population in certain Slo1Vaik cities. Ge11mans were g1rven special prirvileges by the king who ill!Vited them to settle in sections of the CO'lliiltry which afforded sources of wealth either because of natural resources (mines and mm.ts, etc.) or because cxf their locations as trade centers. It must be kept in mind that for several centuries, by that time, the SlovaJks had been ruled by foreign kings. S. Krcmery in St.opafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury Sipea(ks cxf the three cultures in SloJVa;kia ,w hich intermingled: the Latin in political, academic and religious life; the German in business and commercia'1 life; and the 1Slovaik in the home. Early in the fi!fteenth century two events were resiponsible for the official use of Cze:ch in some sections of Slovakia. In the first place there were the extensi,ve raids and occwpation by the Czech Hussites in western Slo,vaikia. Secondly, Jan Jisikra, the renowned Ozech CathoLk warrio:r, quartered his army, which was made up of many Czech Hussites and some Germans, in central and eastern SlovaJkia, when he was entreated by Elizrubeth, the queen~mother of Ladislav Posthumous, then a child, DU'ke of Austria, King oif Bohe(mia, and Htmgary, to ,prevent Vladislav of Poland 20 SLOVAlGA from usuripi.ng her son's throne. Jisikra maintained his hold on that section of Sllovakia for many years, even after the death of King Ladislav in 14'57. The Turkish Wars in the sixteenth century left their mark also. There are legends, folk songs and poems in the Slovak language dating frOIIll that unhappy period which give accounts of the i.nlvasions of the Turks and the a;bduction of many .SlovaJks. In addition to the hU1man li,ves lost orthe ,g reat nUlmlber of the population carried away into caiptivity, the devastation which the Turks brought upon the country is an irrepara,ble loss because much historical and literary material perished in the ipilla:ging. Although there were so many unfavoraJble outside elements, as far as the ,l anguage is concerned, the Slovak language did not fade aiwa,y. On the contrary, by the seventeenth century a national consciousness of their heritage and culture .b egan to manifest itse1f among the Slov8Jks. Catholic priests were the initial spark of the flame which was spread eventually throughout the country. An import.ant center for this a;cti.Jvity was in western Sloivrukia where the Uniiversity of Trnruva - whose press printed in 1655, among its, first .boOlks, a Latin-Slovaik hymnal - played a leading roJ.e in turning out men who reali~ed that their native tongue was as important as other languages. The needs of the ordinary man had to be c onstdered both in spiritual and temporal matters. Students who knew •:Gatin particiipated in plays in that language. However, the perfovmances ,w ere often presented for audiences of non...academilc people from neighboring towns, and there are evidences that plays were penfomned fo Slovak early in the seventeenth century. At the lb eginnmg oif the eighteenth century with the Counter-Refonmat ion came a definite concentration on writing in the vernacular instead of in Czech in, which language the Slova,k Protestants continued writing their books. With the religious writings 1partioularly of the Jesuits, although there are manuscripts and 1ptfulished wor1krs in Slovak by other religious orders, the prot!ess orf grrummatical consciousness of the Slovak langua:ge began. The number SLOVAKIA 21 and quality of writings by the Jesuits prompted J. Ka&a, in his book mentioned earlier, to state that the Slovak language ()If that period could be called Jesuit Slovak. By the second half of the eighteenth century the Slovak nationalistic revival was accentuated by greater political oppression. Among the controversial issues of the reform.s of Marie Therese and Joseph I was the measuTe by whi~h Latin was to be replaced by another officia:l language in the empire. Laws were passed which established Genman as the official language in non~Genman lands of the empire. Tihe Hungarians, who at first wished to keep Latin, reacted to this law by Later insisting that Hungarian, and no other language, be taught in all the schools oif Hungarian and non-Htmgarian suibjects in their domain. The Slovaks also rea.cted. In literature, b.oth Latin and Sloivruk, writers refered back to the glorious past of the Slovaks, before the Hungarians settled in that part olf Eurorpe, when Christianity was introduced and when they had a powerfw king and oojoyed ,p olitical inderpendence in the ninth century. It was left for Anton Bernonak, through his philological and linguistic studies, to become the outstanding initiator of a literary SloivaJk language. Bernolruk's ancestI1Y was distinguished. His family coat of a.nrns dated ba'Cik to 1681 when Leopold I added to their family name the title Slanicky, derived from the town Slanica, in Orruva County, where Anton was born OctOlber 4, 1762. His elementary education was completed in his natiive northeastern part of Sloiva;kia, at Namestovo, from where he went south to central Slovrukia to situdy in the classical high school (gyimn1aJZi,um) in RU!Zombero'k. His talents were recognired by the ar,c.bibishop of OstrihOIIIl (Estergom in Hlungary), ,w hose protege he became at the a.ge of 16, and he was sent to study ,i n the seminary in Bratislava in western SlovaJkia in 1778. After two years there he transferred to the seminary· in Trnava from where, after two more years of .study which .he realized with high honors, he went to Vienna to study theology. Among the reforuns of Joseph II were those which affected the Church. Aocording to his reforms the theological course was also offered in the gen- 22 SLOVAKIA eral seminary which the ®mpernr established in the castle at BratislaJVa. The course was of a five:-year duration. Hence, when Bernoilak returned to Bratislawa in the autumn of 1784, he had three more years of theology to complete. While studymg for the .p riesthood he became very interested in Slruvic la.ngua,ges, especially in the ,s tudy of his own tongue. By his twen:ty...fifth year he had written in Latin and pulblished two wonks which are conSidered the basis of literary Slovak. In the introduction to his Dissertatio philologico-critica de literis Slavonun which was carnipleted May 21, 1787, Bernolak states that he was advised by circumspect men to write these works in order to establish rules for .w riting the Slo.vruk Jamguaige. In this dissertation he e)C!)ressed the basic ,p rinciples o:f Slovak literary langua,ge. To mruke prarctical -t he prin:ciples o:f literary Slovak which he en'llll!ciated in the Dissert.atio, he stated orthogI_"aphic rules by which literary men would be guided in Linguae Slavonicae per regnmn Hungariae usit.at.ae compendiosa sumul et facilis orthographia. This second important wonk which he ipulblished also in 1787 was annexed to his famous Dissert.atio. J. Vlcek in Dejiny literatury slovenskej states that BernolaJk was well acquainted with the wol"k done in the field o:f linguis-tics by predecessors such as iMatej Bel and Pavel Dolelfal, both from the, first half of the 18th century, and with the tendencies oif the popular Slovruk 1'anguage to be found in the pUlblications from Trnaiva. Bernolalk's work was not revolutionary, rb ut rather evolutionary, in that contrary to his agreement with Bel that the best literar,y Slovak is that equidistant from the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians, namely central Slovruk - he practiically followed the Catholic writers before him who wrote in the western dialect. The significance of these works at that period in history cannot be underestimated. The newly--estaiblislhed seminary in BratiSilava castle lasted only six years, until the death of Joseph I, but it housed annually a,pproxirmately five hundred seminarians from all parts of Slwakia. The interest aroused in the seminarians by these linguistitc ·s tu- SLOVAKIA dies was soon oibserved even in neighboring ,countries. And their efforts were encouraiged surprisingly enough by men of their nationality ,w ho, did not agree with their endeavors. While he was a oUTate in Ceklis he had published in 1790, in Bratislaiva, a gra,rrumar written in Latin of the Slova:k language entitled Grammatica slavica. (Sources vary in their spelling of the complete title of this work: J. Ka.cka Hsts it is Grammatica slavica ad systema scholarum rationalium in dicionibus caesareo-regiis introductum acoomo-data; Rev. J. Porulbsky varies from this only in "diictionibus" ; and J. Vlcek writes . . . scholarum nationalium in di· tionibus" . . . "). Bernola:k based his ,g rammar on phonetics. He selected the western dialect - there are three main dialects in Slcwalkia: western, central, and eastern - as the most surited for literary writing. He eliminated diphthongs and soft "r's" (f). He SUJbstituted "6" for "u", and "i" for "j" and "y". 'Dhe softening of the consonants "d, 1, n, t" was aocomplished according to his rules by ,s oftening the consonant "d', l'. n, f" and writing "d'e," etc., instead oif following the consonant with a soft vowel. In 1791 he was ruppointed secretary to the Archlbishop in Trnaiva. Undouibtedly he had begun earlier and continued in this city and elsewhere .until his death in Nove Zrumky, where he was ,pastor imd swpervisor of schools, January 15, 1813, compiling a dictionary Slowar slowenski in five languages: Slovaik, Ozedh, Latin, German, Magyar. This sixvolume masterwonk consisting of some 5,300 pages was not pulblished, however, until 1825-27, in Budin, with the financial baoking of the Canon of Ostrihom, Jruraj Pallkovic (not to he confused with his contemporary, the Lutheran Jifi PalJkovic), who colmlpleted Bernolak's dictionary with the sixth volume. During his appointment in Trnava, Bernola;k founded in 1792, the literary and cultural society "Slowenske ucene Towarisstwo" (:Slovalk Learned Sodety) whose aim it was to further the advancement of education and culture of the SlO!Vak · pepple by means of Sl01Vak literature. The majority of the memberE of this group, numbering close to five hun- SLOVAKIA dred, were Catholic priests who promised to write Slovak bOOlks and support the prOI_Pagation -of Slovak literature. Branches of this society were esta:blished throughout Slovakia. Sources do not all list the, same towns where literary centexs, were fornned. S. Kromery names only three towns where branches were formed: Nitra, Rovne, and Banska Bystrica. To .tJhes,e centers are a:dded Sotl'na Bairn near Presov by J. Vlcek, J. Kaicka and J. Poru'bslky,. and the two last named authorities mention Trencin as well. The historian Fr. HrusovSky enumerate·s Nitra, Rovne, Banska Bystrica, ,Solirvar, Roziiav,a and Kosice in SlovaJlda. He goes on to state that the society was represented also in other lands. In Austria them wa:s a branch in Vienna, and in Hungary there was a gro,UJp in Ja;ger. Thus the writers of the Bernolak s:chool decided to meet the- literary needs of those not lirving in their homeland . .A!Illong tlhe society's most outstanding l,i tera:ry men, in addition to its founder, were Juraj Pal1kovic, who translated the Bi!ble into the SlOiVaJk language; the Archlbishop of Ostriho:m, Alexande,r Cardinal RUJdnay, who, besides writing many semnons a:nd translating Cicero assisted the society financially ; Juraj Fandli, also a priest, who even in his botanica..l and agricultural wonks urged the Slovak people to a greater aippreciation of theiir mother tongue; another priest, the first famous SlovaJk ,p oet, Jan Holly ; the first Slovak literary historian, Rev. Michael Resetka; and Martin Haimuija:k who, in 1834, co--founded another organization in Budapest, the "Spolek miloviiikov reci a literatury slovenskej" (Organi'.zation of the Lovers of the Slovak Language and Literature) to ex:pand the work commenced by Bernola;k'"S society. Varied were the types of ,books published ,b y the Bernolalk school of writecrs. Their pulblications consisted orf theses on practical agriculture; religious, poetilc and pedagogic works; and histori'cal, literary and linguistic studies. · ·Truly, Anton Bernolak and his group are men worthy of admiration for the great love for their language and the efforts they put forth for its sake. SLOVAKIA BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS : \J Botto·, Julius, Slovaci, Vyvin ich narodneho povedomia, Turciansky sv. Martin; Vydanie knihkuipooko-Nwkladatel'skeho Spolku, 1906. \J DeBray, R. G. A. Guide to the Slavonic Lan~ges. London: J. -M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1951. (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc.) Hruso:vsky, Fr. Slovenske Dejiny. Turcianslky sv. Mar\J tin, Matica SlovellSlka., 1940 (Fifth Edition). Kaolrn, Jozef. Dejiny literatury slovenskej. Ruzomlberok: Leva, 1921. Krcmery, Stefan. Stopafdesiat rokov slovenskej literatury. Sva.zok Prvy. Turcia.nsky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska., 1943. Pietro, Amlbro. Napor-Odpor, Ako postupovala mad'a.risacia v Uhorsku. Turcia.nsiky sv. Martin: Nakladom vilastnym, 1905. Ponibsky, Rev. Jan. K Stemu Vyrociu Literarnej Slovenciny 1844-1944. Scranton, Pa.: Obrana Press, Inc., 1944. Vlcek, Jaroslav. Dejiny literatiiry slovenskej. Turciansky sv. Martin: Matica Slovenska, ( obnovienie vydanie z roku 1890) 1923. PERIODICALS : Banik, Ant. Aug. "Rok zo zivota Juraja Fa.ndliho" Slovenske Pohfady, Vol. LXVI, 9 (1950), pp. 507-51. Jarouseik, Rudolf. "Anton Bernola.k Ako Ucenec a Narodny BuditeY." Slov. Uc. Reprinted in Slovenska Obrana, August 3, 1937. Kovac ml., Edo. "Anton Bernola.k," Slovak v Amerike, May 9, 1933. Skuiltety, Jozef. "Pa:miat.ka Antona BernolaJka" Slovak, date unknown.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Anton Bernolak's Influence on Slovak Literature Description An account of the resource Eleonor Podkrivacký Slovakia, Vol. 3, No. 3 (8), September 1953 pp. 18-25 Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Podkrivacký, Eleonor Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 1953 name